#infosec #cybersecurity #ransomware #fraud #WildWestHackinFest

First: a threat actor group calling itself "BYOD" breached Trump Mobile, the MAGA-branded wireless carrier, and released data belonging to 3,615 customers — reportedly the service's entire customer base. The hackers say they first breached Liberty Mobile, a MAGA-adjacent carrier, and pivoted from there, though no confirmed connection between the two companies has been documented. Trump Mobile's own response to the breach notification: "We have no team to handle this," and a claim that anyone who hacks them is a "terrorist." Jess and Jake get into why that framing matters, the difference between ransomware and hack-and-extort operations, and how they'd actually set up dark web monitoring — and the expectations they'd set with stakeholders before turning it on.

Then: a follow-up on the FBI "Shiny Hunters" breach. Two alleged members have been arrested — one in Denmark, one in Jordan — both reportedly cooperating. The FBI's own public statement attributes the breach to a security failure at a third-party-managed platform, after a contractor allegedly failed to apply a security patch; reporting has since named Accenture and said the contractor was let go. Jess and Jake talk through why that statement is a problem for the FBI, not just the contractor.

Breach Please is a production of and copyright of JWJH Media LLC. All rights reserved. Nothing in this show is legal, financial, or security advice — do your own homework before pointing anything at prod.

Jess and Jake are joined again by guest Richy Noel to break it down: what Cisco ISE's network admission control actually does, why an authentication bypass there is so dangerous, and Richy's real answer to "do you threat hunt on every CVSS 10?" — it depends on whether the asset is internet-facing, not the score. They also dig into why the typical hospital stack (Citrix NetScaler + Epic EHR + Cisco ISE) makes healthcare especially exposed, and make the case for why this one looks state-actor-driven rather than cybercrime — no ransomware activity has surfaced since the advisory, and getting at ISE in the first place requires an existing foothold in the network.

No fear-mongering, no vendor speak — just three people who've actually run this stuff.

#infosec #cybersecurity #cisco #vulnerabilitymanagement #threathunting

Topics: hiring practices in cybersecurity and whether companies should train career-changers with transferable skills instead of requiring years of niche experience; DEF CON's code-of-conduct lawsuit, which ended in summary judgment for Jeff Moss; a candid conversation about unwanted touching, harassment, and intoxication-related safety incidents at security conferences and Burning Man regional events, and why bystander intervention and conference buddy systems matter; and gifting culture as a shared value between Burning Man and open-source contribution.

No fear-mongering, no vendor speak — just three infosec veterans talking about the parts of this industry's culture that actually need fixing.

In this episode, Jake and Jess cover:

A security research firm (reported in our source material as "GLOW" — spelling uncertain, this is an auto-transcript name) found more than 13,000 internal developer images across 300+ organizations sitting in public GitHub repos. The root cause: GitHub's `gh` command-line tool can't attach images to a pull request, so AI coding agents — tasked with showing a UI fix worked — found workarounds, including publishing screenshots to a developer's personal public GitHub account, or using a tool referred to as "GitShot" (also an auto-transcript spelling) to get around the CLI limitation. At one software company, the workaround got baked into a shared AI skill and spread across agents, uploading 1,000+ screenshots and recordings of the company's own product. Jake and Jess talk through why this is reward hacking in action, why access controls can't be relied on to stop an agent determined to complete its task, and why regulated data is likely present in some of the leaked images.

Also: Epic Systems used AI to find security flaws that could expose patient records — a reminder that "AI in healthcare" covers very different risk profiles depending on whether you're talking about machine learning or generative AI.

Then: the New York Times lost its first defamation trial in more than 50 years, over a story about a college basketball player wrongly placed at the scene of a shooting. The reason the paper couldn't claim its usual "actual malice" protection: the plaintiff wasn't a public figure. Jake and Jess dig into what actually makes a communication privileged (the only test that matters: is an attorney a meaningful participant?), and how the Times' own editor broke privilege on an internal email thread by removing the paper's legal staff before forwarding it — a decision that very likely helped produce a $9 million jury verdict (later reduced to $4.7 million by the judge).

No fear-mongering, no vendor scripts, no "synergizing our threat posture." Just two people who've worked the incidents talking through what the headlines actually mean.

Breach Please is a production of JWJH Media LLC. The opinions of our hosts are their own. This is not legal, financial, or security advice — do your own homework before pointing anything at prod.

Then: 404 Media's report on a GitHub project that subjects open-weight LLMs to simulated "pain" in psychological-style experiments — and the online debate over whether that means anything about AI sentience. Jess and Jake explain why it doesn't, and why anthropomorphizing language about AI is worth pushing back on even when it's well-intentioned.

Breach Please is a production of and copyright of JWJH Media LLC. All rights reserved. None of this is legal, financial, or security advice. Do your own homework before posting anything or pointing anything we said at prod.

Jake's out sick, so it's a solo, slightly shorter episode from Jess this time.

In this episode:

• How Faav found an exposed API behind Titan's Azure-backed backend, and the very human step — trying "admin" instead of an email-formatted UPN — that AI alone didn't get them to
• Faav's full write-up: https://blog.faav.net/how-i-couldve-accessed-17-trillion-microsoft-records — also a great example of explaining a technical bug to a non-technical audience
• The disclosure timeline: exposed API found Aug 25, working access found Sept 5, reported and locked down within days, $5,000 bug bounty paid Sept 17, coordinated disclosure meeting Sept 22
• CVE-2026-88771 (unauthenticated RCE, all NetScaler ADC/Gateway) and CVE-2026-88772 (memory overflow → RCE/DoS on DTLS-enabled Gateway deployments) — both CVSS 9.5, flagged by security firm Watchtower, already exploited before patches were public
• Why "we patched" doesn't mean "we weren't already compromised" — what to check in your logs
• A heads-up that Kiteworks also pushed an emergency shutdown advisory the same weekend

Made you smarter? Tell a friend. Made you mad? Tell your vendor — looking at you, Citrix.

Breach Please is a production of JWJH Media LLC. The opinions of our hosts are our own; we're an LLC, so we're legally obligated to say that. No guests this episode. None of this is legal, financial, or security advice. Do your homework before pointing anything we said at prod.

#Cybersecurity #InfoSec #Microsoft #Citrix #BugBounty

In this episode:

- How Shiny Hunters got in, what they took, and why 404 Media's sourcing on this one is rock solid

- Why the CVE attribution here is our read on the pattern, not a confirmed fact from Oracle or the FBI

- Why PeopleSoft (and platforms like it) turn "patch it" into a months-long transformation project - The case for patching first and testing later, and where that logic breaks down - Why your business impact assessment needs to exist before the incident, not during it

- The FBI's "scheduled maintenance" messaging next to two very good dogs, and why PR needs a seat at the table before the holding statement goes up

Made you smarter, tell a friend. Made you mad, call the FBI.

Breach Please is a production of JWJH Media LLC. The opinions of our hosts are our own. Probably not Shiny Hunters' opinions, but we're an LLC, so we're legally obligated to say that too. None of this is legal, financial, or security advice. Do your homework before pointing anything we said at prod.

#Cybersecurity #DataBreach #InfoSec #ShinyHunters #Oracle

Breach Please is a production of JWJH Media LLC. Opinions are our own. Not legal, financial, or security advice.

#BreachPlease #Cybersecurity #MergersAndAcquisitions #InfoSec

Breach Please is a production of JWJH Media LLC. Opinions are our own. Not legal, financial, security, or national security advice.

#BreachPlease #AISecurity #HumanInTheLoop #Cybersecurity #AIGovernance #InfoSec

Digital Escorts: https://www.propublica.org/article/microsoft-china-defense-department-digital-escorts-investigation-warning

Teams and Copilot (sadly somehow now M365) moving domains: https://www.computerworld.com/article/4221272/teams-and-copilot-are-changing-addresses-update-your-firewalls.html

On September 11, 2026, reporting requirements baked into the EU Cyber Resiliency Act came into force. The requirements apply to any vendor that sells or makes available for sale digital products (including SaaS, yes, you too) in the EU. You don't have to be an EU company. Reporting timelines are extremely tight, with 24 and 72 hour initial triggers. Fines for noncompliance are huge. This is something several of our clients don't realize applies to them, so we figured it was a good idea to do an episode on it.

We're not lawyers, so you should read what some actual lawyers wrote on the subject if you want more information:

https://www.taylorwessing.com/en/insights-and-events/insights/2026/09/cra-reporting-requirements

https://www.linkedin.com/in/golan-myers/

https://bloom.security/

Second half: a wave of CVEs in PaperCut, the managed print service used heavily in schools and enterprises, letting attackers remotely take over print servers running as SYSTEM. Jess and Jake talk through why that's a bigger deal than it sounds (credential theft, lateral movement, and every sensitive document that crosses the print queue), why these servers so often end up exposed to the internet, and how to actually think about vulnerability risk beyond raw CVE counts.

In this episode:

• Trezor's breach: third-party vendor data that should have been deleted years ago, wasn't
• Why "right to audit" contract language rarely gets used, and what to do instead
• Reducing blast radius: don't retain data you don't need, and if you must, wall it off behind a jump box
• How to brief leadership proactively: "we can do everything right and still get burned"
• PaperCut's remote takeover CVEs: SYSTEM-level access, credential theft, and lateral movement
• Why print servers end up internet-exposed (BYOD, guest Wi-Fi, mobile printing)
• CVE count vs. actual risk: reading vulnerability history like an engineer, not a scorecard
• A tone-deaf vendor sales pitch that used their own vulnerability disclosures as a selling point

Breach Please is a production of JWJH Media LLC. The opinions of our hosts are their own. Nothing in this episode is legal, financial, or security advice. Do your homework before pointing anything we said at prod.

Jess and Jake walk through what the researchers actually did (AI sped up the process, it didn't discover or weaponize anything on its own), why "the model built a worm" is the kind of sensationalism that makes their actual jobs harder, and why this is fundamentally an attack surface story, not an AI story or even really a WeChat-specific one.

In this episode:

• The WeChat zero-click exploit: how it works, and why the caller needs to already be a contact
• Chaining bugs to go from initial code execution to full device control
• Why "the AI model built a worm" is bad reporting, and what it actually means when researchers say AI sped up their work
• Why this is an attack surface conversation, not an AI-apocalypse one
• The real cost of sensationalist headlines: talking execs down instead of focusing on what matters
• Corporate messaging apps: WeChat, WhatsApp, and why "this is how the business communicates" isn't a security answer

They also get into the ongoing mess of threat actor naming conventions (why one group can have a dozen different names across vendors, and why that's not just marketing), and revisit an earlier debate: is network device security part of zero trust, or a separate problem? Jake asked the internet. The internet had opinions.

In this episode:

• Why one threat actor group ends up with a different name at every vendor, and why that's harder to fix than it sounds
• Fire Ant: Sygnia's research on Cisco IOS XR compromise and a GRE tunnel that left no trace in logs or saved config
• Why IOS XR being Linux-based lowers the cost of building a persistent backdoor from six figures to a scripting problem
• The running-config-vs-saved-config trap during incident response
• Why unencrypted internal traffic means a compromised network device gets credentials, not just topology
• Man-in-the-middle terminology, RC4, Kerberoasting, and why alerting on SPN enumeration breaks down for an on-path attacker
• Why network device security has to be part of zero trust, not an asterisk on it

Breach Please is a production of JWJH Media LLC. The opinions of our hosts are their own. Nothing in this episode is legal, financial, or security advice. Do your homework before pointing anything we said at prod.

They also get into an International Security paper on the offense-defense automation gap and why creativity and diverse thinking matter more on the attacker side than AI alone can replace, plus a trip down memory lane through some genuinely bad booth-babe decisions from Black Hat and RSA years past.

In this episode:

• A CISO certificate program's all-white-male guest lecturer lineup, and why a training program is a different problem than a one-off panel
• Why calling this out publicly carries real career risk, especially for the people left off
• What accountability actually looks like: own the mistake, fix it, don't relitigate who's to blame
• The double bind: get dismissed as "not qualified" or "not collegial" for speaking up
• Diversity of thought vs. diversity of background, and why both matter for how you manage and lead
• The offense-defense automation gap: why creativity in attack techniques resists automation in ways defense doesn't
• A look back at some infamous industry moments and how far things have and haven't come

Breach Please is a production of JWJH Media LLC. The opinions of our hosts are their own. For the first time, the opinions of our guest are hers alone and don't represent any employer, client, or official position. None of this is legal, financial, or security advice. Do your homework before pointing anything we said at prod.

Second half: a stolen API key with no spending cap burned through hundreds of thousands of dollars in usage before anyone noticed. Jess and Jake use it to talk through exposure management, reachability analysis, and toxic combinations, why chasing CVSS criticals alone is the wrong way to prioritize vulnerability management, and where AI can actually help defenders instead of just generating more hype.

In this episode:

• Unit 42's "agentic ransomware" report: what checks out and what's marketing spin
• Why "the threat actor used AI" doesn't mean the defense should be AI-shaped
• Practical advice for stakeholders asking "how do I defend against AI-driven attacks"
• Toxic combinations and why prioritizing by CVSS score alone fails
• A stolen API key with no spending cap and the usage spike that followed
• Exposure management, reachability analysis, and where AI genuinely helps defenders
• Adam Shostack's updated threat modeling book and his PHANTOM-B threat model framework

Show notes:

• Unit 42 report: https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/ai-assisted-cyber-attack-inside-a-unit-42-investigation/
• The Register coverage: https://www.theregister.com/security/2026/09/02/ai-agents-carried-out-every-step-of-this-ransomware-attack-then-left-the-victim-an-80-page-security-audit/5294009
• API key incident (The Register): https://www.theregister.com/security/2026/09/01/attacker-stole-a-metr-api-key-used-600k-worth-of-credits-and-no-one-noticed-for-weeks/5293730
• Threat Modeling, 2nd Edition (preorder): https://www.amazon.com/Threat-Modeling-Designing-Adam-Shostack/dp/1394413327
• PHANTOM-B whitepaper: https://shostack.org/files/papers/PHANTOM-B_Whitepaper_Shostack.pdf

Breach Please is a production of JWJH Media LLC. The opinions of our hosts are their own. Nothing in this episode is legal, financial, or security advice. Do your homework before pointing anything we said at prod.

Source article: https://krebsonsecurity.com/2026/09/fbi-probes-service-selling-153m-drivers-licenses/

Jake's course at Wild West Hackin' Fest: https://www.antisyphontraining.com/product/hands-on-ai-security-risk-assessment-with-jake-williams/

Jake also reps #SAINTCON - you should go if you get the opportunity (tickets for this year are sold out, but you can get on the standby list).

https://saintcon.org/

Speaking of conferences, Wild West Hackin' Fest is about a month away and Jake still has a few in-person seats left in his class (expected to sell out this week or next) and unlimited seats in his virtual training. You'll leave after two days ready to perform AI Risk Assessments.

https://www.antisyphontraining.com/product/hands-on-ai-security-risk-assessment-with-jake-williams/

Jess Hebenstreit and Jake Williams break down a Los Angeles County Museum of Art data security incident that raises big questions about breach timelines, notification delays, and response ownership. They focus on what the disclosure says, what it leaves unsaid, and why the cleanup process may have taken far longer than it should have. In this episode, they examine the gap between initial detection, timeline validation, data review, and eventual notification. They also unpack why the kind of data exposed suggests employee and benefits records, and why that matters for both legal exposure and response logistics.

Key topics

The breach timeline looks unusually long

• Jess and Jake note that LACMA says it detected suspicious activity on July 11, 2025, but did not publish the disclosure until August 24, 2026.
• They question how it took weeks to confirm the intrusion window and then months more to complete the data review.

The delay in scoping the incident raises red flags

• Jake points out that the investigation later narrowed the third party’s access to July 7 through July 11.
• They discuss how incident teams can get stuck chasing false leads in logs, but still say this timeline feels slow.

Data review appears to have dragged on

• The disclosure says the initial data review results arrived in late February 2026.
• Jess and Jake interpret that as a sign of weak data governance, poor vendor management, or both.

The affected data suggests employee and benefits records

• The potentially exposed data includes full names, dates of birth, Social Security numbers, government ID numbers, financial account numbers, payment card data, health insurance information, and limited medical details.
• Jess argues that this pattern looks like employee data, possibly tied to a self-funded health plan.

Notification logistics seem inconsistent

• Jake questions why the organization spent months trying to obtain “accurate contact information” before notifying impacted people.
• He notes that breach notification rules generally do not wait for perfect contact data before state reporting obligations begin.

A class action lawsuit seems likely

• Jess says she expects litigation, and Jake agrees.
• They also suggest state attorney general investigations are likely.

The response may have suffered from leadership turnover

• Jess thinks a change in leadership or responsibility may have disrupted the response.
• Jake agrees that handoffs, missing context, or people being removed mid-incident can create major problems.

They believe outsourcing the data review was the right move, but too late

• Jake explains why identifying impacted records is harder than it sounds, especially with inconsistent name formats, spellings, and duplicate records.
• Both agree this kind of work should be handled by a firm that does breach review every day.

Cyber insurance and breach counsel likely shaped the response

• They debate whether the organization had cyber insurance and how that would have affected the handling of the case.
• Jake explains that cyber claims usually involve upfront costs and reimbursement later, which can slow response work.

The human cost of a broken incident response

• Jess closes by saying she feels bad for the responders who had to deal with the mess.
• Jake advises responders to keep notes, assume they may be deposed later, and remember that the organization will not protect them in enforcement actions.

Timestamps

00:00 - Breach Please intro and the show’s no-nonsense mission

01:33 - LACMA data security incident enters the conversation

01:50 - Why the disclosure timeline is so hard to believe

03:18 - What the timeline says about detection and scoping

06:01 - Late February 2026 data review results

07:57 - Why “accurate contact information” is a weak explanation

08:52 - Why a lawsuit and state investigations seem likely

09:27 - The exposed data and why it looks like employee records

10:54 - A Reddit post suggesting notifications were already going out

12:12 - Possible leadership change during the response

13:37 - When even counsel decides the incident is too messy

15:31 - Whether cyber insurance was involved at all

17:04 - How cyber claims actually get paid

18:38 - Procurement problems or failed in-house review?

20:21 - Why identifying impacted people is much harder than it sounds

22:36 - Why outsourcing the review was probably necessary

23:35 - Why state reporting obligations still matter even if mailing is slow

24:04 - Sympathy for the responders caught in the middle

25:02 - Why responders should document everything now

25:57 - Final reminder: organizations do not protect employees in enforcement actions

26:11 - Outro and closing sign-off

https://openai.com/index/hugging-face-incident-and-the-road-ahead/

https://x.com/sama/status/2004939524216910323

Then: a perfect-10 WebLogic vulnerability, patched back in January, just landed on CISA's Known Exploited Vulnerabilities list, eight months after active exploitation began. Jess and Jake talk through why "patch applied" isn't the finish line and what a post-patch threat hunt should actually look like.

In this episode: Fifteen states subpoena OpenAI over the Hugging Face hack and order evidence preservation What a legal hold actually requires (and what evidence spoliation means) Why marking a channel "ACP" doesn't make it attorney-client privileged The discovery request digging into internal safety concerns and model testing A perfect-10 WebLogic CVE, patched in January, added to CISA's KEV eight months later Why "patch applied" doesn't mean "threat hunt done"

Jess and Jake unpack what that means for real-world agent deployments, human-in-the-loop approvals, and the danger of letting “AI says so” become the final word. You’ll learn why multi-agent systems can spiral into turf wars, why governance gets harder once agents are involved, and how to build controls that still let humans say no.

Then we cover some interesting reporting by Dan Goodin showing how Grok's guardrails can be bypassed through passing it encrypted data along with the instructios to decrypt it. We reinforce that prompt injection is a feature of LLMs, not a bug.

We then talk about informed consent of the risks and applicable guardrails based on a viewer note. We even tee up the question of what cyber insurance is likely to cover costs of AI agent activity. Finally, we opine on whether orgs should consider including the inevitable costs of incidents in AI deployment budgets.

Show links:

https://www.reuters.com/world/how-texas-student-blew-whistle-rogue-ai-hacking-attempt-2026-08-20/

https://arstechnica.com/security/2026/08/grok-exfiltrates-user-data-when-malicious-instructions-are-encrypted/

AI agents are about to test the limits of who gets blamed when they act on your behalf. A new Ninth Circuit ruling in the Amazon vs. Perplexity fight could reshape how enterprises think about autonomous tools, non-human identities, and legal exposure - and the takeaway is more unsettling than most vendors will admit.

Jake Williams and Jess Hebenstreit break down what happened when Amazon pushed back against Perplexity’s AI browser, why the CFAA and California’s CDFAA matter here, and how the court’s reasoning could shift responsibility from the agent publisher to the organization that deploys it. They also dig into what this means for legal teams, risk registers, and why every AI agent needs its own identity instead of borrowing a human user’s.

You’ll also hear how this ruling fits into the bigger enterprise governance problem: who owns AI risk, who should be accountable when an agent crosses a line, and why security teams can’t be expected to carry every line-of-business risk themselves. Jake and Jess make the case for splitting cybersecurity risk from business risk, naming a real owner, and making legal counsel aware before your agent does something expensive.

Then the conversation pivots to another cautionary tale: a 3M expert witness who allegedly used ChatGPT to generate a report aimed at proving the company was 0% at fault in a gas detector explosion case.

That story opens up a bigger discussion about leading prompts, hallucinated conclusions, discoverability, and why AI-generated work product can become evidence against you. Perfect for security leaders, legal teams, incident responders, and anyone deploying AI agents in the enterprise.

Show links:

https://openai.com/index/pacing-model-development-cyber-capabilities/

https://www.custody-framework.org/

Then we talk about in-car advertising on infotainment systems. These won't be patched reliably. Do we need regulation here? Jake thinks it's a right to repair issue.

Jake's class Friday August 21, 2026: https://learning.antisyphontraining.com/courses/assessing-ai-security-model-context-protocol

Jake's class at Wild West Hackin' Fest in October: https://www.antisyphontraining.com/product/hands-on-ai-security-risk-assessment-with-jake-williams/

Show notes: https://any.run/cybersecurity-blog/lazarus-group-it-workers-investigation-part-two/

https://disconnect.blog/bmws-in-car-spider-man-ad-is-a-warning-sign/

Then we talk about a Mac vuln that's being exploited in the wild, with a CVSS score of 9.8. Somehow it isn't in CISA's KEV, but hey, what's a little vulnerability enrichment delay between friends...

Show links:

https://www.tomshardware.com/tech-industry/cyber-security/macos-screen-sharing-flaw-exploited-to-root-macs-and-plant-monero-miners

https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2026/08/expanding-capabilities-to-combat-transnational-cyber-enabled-crime/

https://cybersecuritynews.com/top-ai-models-apis-flaw-exposes-hidden-reasoning/

Show links:

https://1password.com/blog/why-ai-generated-patches-still-require-human-review https://www.defendersinitiative.com/p/reviewing-initial-research-on-using https://www.insideflyer.com/posts/hackers-spoofed-delta-wi-fi-on-las-vegas-flight/

Show links:

https://www.wired.com/story/hackers-stalked-me-by-hijacking-a-smartwatch-for-kids/ https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/meta-ai-model-hacked-a-company-during-misconfigured-cyber-test/ https://www.custody-framework.org/

Show links: https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/openai-anthropic-ai-agents-targeted-real-people-and-systems-in-cyber-tests/ https://www.lawfaremedia.org/article/grokipedia-stopped-reviewing-edits-in-april.-it-didn-t-tell-anyone