Question Presented: Whether the First Amendment permits Colorado to ban licensed talk therapists from expressing viewpoints that attempt to change a minor's sexual orientation or gender identity.

Overview: Colorado's conversion therapy ban prohibited licensed counselors from saying anything designed to change a minor's sexual orientation or gender identity while expressly permitting affirming speech — a textbook viewpoint-based restriction on professional speech.

Posture: District court and Tenth Circuit denied preliminary injunction applying rational basis review; Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve circuit split.

Holding: 8-1 decision reversed the Tenth Circuit and remanded for further proceedings. Justice Gorsuch authored the majority opinion joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Alito, Sotomayor, Kagan, Kavanaugh, and Barrett.

Majority Reasoning: (1) Colorado's law regulated the content of Chiles's speech and discriminated based on viewpoint — permitting affirming speech while forbidding speech designed to change a client's sexual orientation or gender identity; (2) licensed professionals retain full First Amendment protection and professional speech does not occupy a lesser-protected constitutional category; (3) Colorado's analogies to licensing, informed-consent, and malpractice traditions failed to establish a historical basis for suppressing professional viewpoints.

Separate Opinions:

Justice Kagan (concurring, joined by Sotomayor): Agreed Colorado's law constituted viewpoint discrimination; reserved for another day whether content-based but viewpoint-neutral laws regulating therapist speech would warrant strict scrutiny, signaling a potential path for states to regulate therapeutic speech without running afoul of the First Amendment.

Justice Jackson (dissenting): Argued Colorado's law incidentally restricted speech as a byproduct of regulating a harmful medical treatment; contended states retain traditional police power to set standards of care for licensed providers even when those standards restrict treatment-related speech, and warned the majority's ruling threatened broad categories of healthcare regulation.

Implications:

• Every state conversion therapy ban covering talk therapy now faces strict scrutiny — the Constitution's most demanding standard.
• Talk therapists, psychiatrists, and other speech-based healthcare providers across approximately 26 states gain powerful new First Amendment arguments against professional discipline.
• States seeking to regulate therapeutic speech may pursue viewpoint-neutral restrictions, though that question remains open.
• The ruling leaves undisturbed conversion therapy bans targeting physical or aversive techniques.
• Future litigation will test where the line falls for viewpoint-neutral medical speech regulation.

Oral Advocates:

• Petitioner (Chiles): James A. Campbell
• United States (Amicus Curiae): Hashim M. Mooppan, United States Department of Justice
• Respondent (Colorado): Shannon W. Stevenson, Colorado Solicitor General

The Fine Print:

• Colo. Rev. Stat. § 12-245-202(3.5)(a): "any practice or treatment . . . that attempts . . . to change an individual's sexual orientation or gender identity," including "efforts to change behaviors or gender expressions or to eliminate or reduce sexual or romantic attraction or feelings toward individuals of the same sex."
• First Amendment, U.S. Constitution: "Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech."

Primary Cases:

• National Institute of Family and Life Advocates v. Becerra (2018): Professional speech does not occupy a separate, lesser-protected constitutional category; states cannot compel or restrict professional speech without satisfying ordinary First Amendment standards.
• Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of University of Virginia (1995): Viewpoint discrimination represents an egregious form of content-based regulation from which governments must nearly always abstain; the First Amendment forbids government from favoring one perspective over another on a given subject.

Timestamps:

[00:00:00] Case Preview

[00:00:50] Argument Begins

[00:00:57] Petitioner Opening Statement

[00:02:46] Petitioner Free for All Questions

[00:17:59] Petitioner Sequential Questions

[00:27:48] United States Opening Statement

[00:35:27] United States Sequential Questions

[00:45:41] Respondent Opening Statement

[01:09:00] Respondent Sequential Questions

[01:22:28] Petitioner Rebuttal

Question Presented: Whether the First Amendment permits Colorado to ban licensed talk therapists from expressing viewpoints that attempt to change a minor's sexual orientation or gender identity.

Overview: Colorado's conversion therapy ban prohibited licensed counselors from saying anything designed to change a minor's sexual orientation or gender identity while expressly permitting affirming speech — a textbook viewpoint-based restriction on professional speech.

Posture: District court and Tenth Circuit denied preliminary injunction applying rational basis review; Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve circuit split.

Holding: 8-1 decision reversed the Tenth Circuit and remanded for further proceedings. Justice Gorsuch authored the majority opinion joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Alito, Sotomayor, Kagan, Kavanaugh, and Barrett.

Majority Reasoning: (1) Colorado's law regulated the content of Chiles's speech and discriminated based on viewpoint — permitting affirming speech while forbidding speech designed to change a client's sexual orientation or gender identity; (2) licensed professionals retain full First Amendment protection and professional speech does not occupy a lesser-protected constitutional category; (3) Colorado's analogies to licensing, informed-consent, and malpractice traditions failed to establish a historical basis for suppressing professional viewpoints.

Separate Opinions:

Justice Kagan (concurring, joined by Sotomayor): Agreed Colorado's law constituted viewpoint discrimination; reserved for another day whether content-based but viewpoint-neutral laws regulating therapist speech would warrant strict scrutiny, signaling a potential path for states to regulate therapeutic speech without running afoul of the First Amendment.

Justice Jackson (dissenting): Argued Colorado's law incidentally restricted speech as a byproduct of regulating a harmful medical treatment; contended states retain traditional police power to set standards of care for licensed providers even when those standards restrict treatment-related speech, and warned the majority's ruling threatened broad categories of healthcare regulation.

Implications:

• Every state conversion therapy ban covering talk therapy now faces strict scrutiny — the Constitution's most demanding standard.
• Talk therapists, psychiatrists, and other speech-based healthcare providers across approximately 26 states gain powerful new First Amendment arguments against professional discipline.
• States seeking to regulate therapeutic speech may pursue viewpoint-neutral restrictions, though that question remains open.
• The ruling leaves undisturbed conversion therapy bans targeting physical or aversive techniques.
• Future litigation will test where the line falls for viewpoint-neutral medical speech regulation.

Oral Advocates:

• Petitioner (Chiles): James A. Campbell
• United States (Amicus Curiae): Hashim M. Mooppan, United States Department of Justice
• Respondent (Colorado): Shannon W. Stevenson, Colorado Solicitor General

The Fine Print:

• Colo. Rev. Stat. § 12-245-202(3.5)(a): "any practice or treatment . . . that attempts . . . to change an individual's sexual orientation or gender identity," including "efforts to change behaviors or gender expressions or to eliminate or reduce sexual or romantic attraction or feelings toward individuals of the same sex."
• First Amendment, U.S. Constitution: "Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech."

Primary Cases:

• National Institute of Family and Life Advocates v. Becerra (2018): Professional speech does not occupy a separate, lesser-protected constitutional category; states cannot compel or restrict professional speech without satisfying ordinary First Amendment standards.
• Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of University of Virginia (1995): Viewpoint discrimination represents an egregious form of content-based regulation from which governments must nearly always abstain; the First Amendment forbids government from favoring one perspective over another on a given subject.

Question Presented: Does the Executive Order denying birthright citizenship to children of undocumented or temporary-visa mothers comply with the Fourteenth Amendment's Citizenship Clause?

Overview: President Trump's Executive Order attempts to redefine birthright citizenship, challenging 150 years of constitutional understanding that birth on American soil—with narrow exceptions—creates citizenship.

Posture: District court enjoined Order; First Circuit unanimously affirmed; Supreme Court granted certiorari before judgment.

Oral Advocates:

• Petitioner (United States): D. John Sauer, United States Solicitor General;
• Respondent (Barbara): Cecilia Wong, American Civil Liberties Union

Main Arguments:

Government:

• (1) "Subject to the jurisdiction" requires complete political allegiance, not mere obedience to law;
• (2) Founding-era commentators excluded children of "transient aliens" from birthright citizenship;
• (3) Wong Kim Ark addressed only domiciled aliens—temporary visitors and undocumented immigrants fall outside that holding.

Families:

• (1) English common law granted citizenship based on birth, not parentage—the Framers enshrined that rule;
• (2) Wong Kim Ark specifically rejected any domicile requirement, holding temporary visitors fall under U.S. jurisdiction;
• (3) 8 U.S.C. § 1401(a) independently guarantees citizenship based on prevailing 1940 understanding.

Implications:

• Government victory transforms citizenship from a birthright into a privilege contingent on parental immigration status—potentially questioning the citizenship of millions born to immigrant parents over generations.
• Family victory preserves 150-year constitutional bedrock: birth on American soil, with narrow exceptions, makes you American.

The Fine Print:

• Fourteenth Amendment, Section 1: "All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside."
• 8 U.S.C. § 1401(a): "The following shall be nationals and citizens of the United States at birth: (a) a person born in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof."

Primary Cases:

• United States v. Wong Kim Ark (1898): U.S.-born child of Chinese immigrant parents obtained citizenship at birth; the Citizenship Clause enshrines the common-law rule of birthright citizenship.
• Elk v. Wilkins (1884): Tribal Indians born on American soil lacked citizenship because they owed allegiance to their tribes—a sovereign-to-sovereign exception inapplicable to ordinary immigrants.

Timestamps:

00:01:11: United States Opening Statement

00:03:14: United States Free for All Questions

00:27:47: United States Round Robin Questions

01:09:57: Barbara Opening Statement

01:12:46: Barbara Free for All Questions

01:41:51: Barbara Round Robin Questions

02:06:10: United States Rebuttal

Overview: Death row inmate Terry Pitchford argues prosecutor Doug Evans deliberately excluded Black jurors in his 2006 capital murder trial and that no court ever fairly examined that claim because Mississippi's courts called it forfeited.

Question Presented: Whether Mississippi's courts unreasonably declared forfeited a racial jury-selection challenge the trial court itself blocked.

Posture: Fifth Circuit affirmed denial of federal habeas relief; Supreme Court granted certiorari.

Oral Advocates:

• Petitioner (Pitchford): Joseph Perkovich of Phillips Black
• Respondent (Cain): Scott Stewart, Mississippi's Solicitor General
• United States (as Amicus Curiae): Emily M. Ferguson, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice

Main Arguments:

Pitchford:

• (1) Three on-the-record Batson objections cannot constitute intentional waiver of a known constitutional right;
• (2) Mississippi wrongly blocked comparative juror analysis on appeal, contradicting Miller-El v. Dretke (2005) and Snyder v. Louisiana (2008);
• (3) Batson violations constitute structural error requiring automatic reversal.

Mississippi:

• (1) Mississippi courts applied a lawful, long-standing rule requiring defendants to raise pretext arguments before the trial court or forfeit them; (2) Pitchford's own post-conviction filings admitted he failed to preserve the Batson record, and his trial attorney swore under oath she never raised those arguments; (3) The cert grant covers only the AEDPA waiver question — not the underlying Batson merits or the form of habeas relief.

Implications:

• A Pitchford victory sends the case back to Mississippi courts for the first Batson Step Three examination in nineteen years — testing whether Evans's race-neutral explanations for striking four Black jurors amounted to pretext.
• A Mississippi victory leaves Pitchford on death row and establishes that AEDPA deference shields state forfeiture rulings even when trial courts themselves foreclosed the underlying challenge — chilling Batson enforcement at Step Three nationwide.

The Fine Print:

• 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (AEDPA): "An application for a writ of habeas corpus...shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law...or resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts."
• U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1: "No State shall...deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."

Primary Cases:

• Batson v. Kentucky (1986): The Equal Protection Clause prohibits prosecutors from exercising peremptory strikes to exclude jurors on the basis of race; courts must assess purposeful discrimination through a three-step inquiry.
• Flowers v. Mississippi (2019): Courts must consider a prosecutor's history of racially discriminatory strikes in assessing a Batson challenge; the same prosecutor Doug Evans removed 41 of 42 Black jurors across six trials of Curtis Flowers before the Court reversed.

Timestamps:

[00:00:00] Argument Preview

[00:01:07] Oral Advocates

[00:01:21] Argument Begins

[00:01:29] Pitchford Opening Statement

[00:03:49] Pitchford Free for All Questions

[00:28:09] Pitchford Round Robin Questions

[00:54:35] Cain Opening Statement

[00:56:46] Cain Free for All Questions

[01:15:43] Cain Round Robin Questions

[01:34:48] United States Opening Statement

[01:35:51] United States Free for All Questions

[01:45:22] United States Round Robin Questions

[01:48:42] Pitchford Rebuttal

Overview: A former hotel security guard lost his arbitration entirely, then argued the federal court he originally chose lacked power to confirm the award — forcing the Court to resolve when federal courts retain post-arbitration jurisdiction.

Question Presented: When a federal court pauses a lawsuit for arbitration, does it keep the power to confirm or throw out the arbitration result — even without independent jurisdictional grounds.

Posture: S.D.N.Y. confirmed award; Second Circuit affirmed; Supreme Court granted cert on the jurisdictional question.

Main Arguments:

• Jules (Petitioner): (1) FAA Section 8 expressly grants "retain jurisdiction" language for maritime cases only — Congress deliberately omitted it from Sections 9 and 10; (2) Badgerow v. Walters (2022) forecloses jurisdiction because the confirm-or-vacate application lacks any independent federal basis on its face; (3) the jurisdictional-anchor theory incentivizes pointless federal lawsuits, directly undermining the FAA's purpose of keeping arbitrable disputes out of court
• Balazs Respondents: (1) 28 U.S.C. § 1367's supplemental jurisdiction statute — enacted separately from the FAA — grants courts power over all related claims in the same pending case, no new jurisdictional basis needed; (2) Badgerow addressed only freestanding new post-arbitration lawsuits, not pending federal cases already vested with original jurisdiction; (3) Jules's theory forces two simultaneous court tracks — federal appeal of the pre-arbitration order plus state-court post-arbitration proceedings — creating procedural chaos Congress never endorsed

Implications: A Jules victory forces winning arbitration parties to re-file in state court, pay new fees, re-serve defendants, and educate a new court from scratch — benefiting recalcitrant defendants. A respondents' victory preserves the rule in seven circuits: one court, one proceeding, one appeal resolves the entire dispute, giving businesses and employees certainty about where arbitration enforcement lands.

The Fine Print:

• FAA Section 8, 9 U.S.C. § 8: "the court shall then have jurisdiction to direct the parties to proceed with the arbitration and shall retain jurisdiction to enter its decree upon the award"
• 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a): "in any civil action of which the district courts have original jurisdiction, the district courts shall have supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that are so related to claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy under Article III"

Primary Cases:

• Badgerow v. Walters (2022): Federal courts cannot use a "look-through" method to establish jurisdiction over FAA Section 9 and 10 applications — the application itself must reveal an independent jurisdictional basis
• Cortez Byrd Chips, Inc. v. Bill Harbert Construction Co. (2000): The court with power to stay an action under FAA Section 3 holds the further power to confirm any ensuing arbitration award

Timestamps:

[00:01:25] Argument Begins

[00:01:32] Jules Opening Statement

[00:03:03] Jules Free for All Questions

[00:26:40] Jules Round Robin Questions

[00:32:42] Balazs Opening Statement

[00:34:05] Balazs Free for All Questions

[00:51:56] Balazs Round Robin Questions

[00:52:08] Jules Rebuttal

Question Presented: Whether venue lies in a district where no offense conduct occurred, so long as the statute's intent element contemplates effects that could occur there.

Overview: Ahmad Abouammo created a fake invoice in his Seattle home during an FBI interview, then emailed it to San Francisco agents. The Court now decides whether prosecutors can try document falsification where the targeted investigation sits, not where the defendant acted.

Posture: Ninth Circuit upheld Northern District of California venue; Supreme Court granted certiorari December 2025.

Oral Advocates:

• Petitioner (Abouammo): Tobias Loss-Eaton of Sidley Austin
• Respondent (United States): Anthony A. Yang, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice.

Main Arguments:

Abouammo:

• (1) Venue tracks the offense's essential conduct elements — falsification occurred entirely in Seattle;
• (2) Intent elements cannot anchor venue because mental state does not constitute conduct;
• (3) The Founders embedded the vicinage right twice in the Constitution specifically to reject effects-based prosecution

United States:

• (1) The Constitution permits venue where a crime's effects are intentionally directed and felt, not just where the defendant stood;
• (2) Section 1519 defines an inchoate offense — like conspiracy — and the targeted investigation's location forms part of the crime's commission;
• (3) Even under Abouammo's own theory, emailing the fake PDF to San Francisco created a duplicate falsified record there, independently satisfying venue

Implications: Abouammo victory anchors venue to a person's physical location, giving protection against distant prosecution. On the other hand, it hamstrings prosecutors from bringing digital obstruction crimes that reflects today's technology realities. Government victory allows prosecution in the district of any targeted investigation, giving federal prosecutors broad forum-selection power for any obstruction-related offense nationwide.

The Fine Print:

• 18 U.S.C. § 1519: "Whoever knowingly alters, destroys, mutilates, conceals, covers up, falsifies, or makes a false entry in any record, document, or tangible object with the intent to impede, obstruct, or influence the investigation or proper administration of any matter within the jurisdiction of any department or agency of the United States . . . shall be fined under this title, imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both."
• U.S. Const. Amend. VI: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law."

Primary Cases:

• United States v. Cabrales (1998): Venue tracks the location of the specific prohibited conduct — not collateral circumstances; money laundering in Florida could not face trial in Missouri simply because the underlying drug proceeds originated there.
• Ford v. United States (1927): Acts done outside a jurisdiction but intended to produce and producing detrimental effects within it warrant prosecuting the defendant as if present at the effect — the foundational intent-and-effects venue principle.

Timestamps:

[00:00:00] Argument Preview

[00:01:12] Argument Begins

[00:01:21] Abouammo Opening Statement

[00:03:30] Abouammo Free for All Questions

[00:26:27] Abouammo Round Robin Questions

[00:33:40] United States Opening Statement

[00:35:54] United States Free for All Questions

[01:04:34] United States Round Robin Questions

[01:13:58] Abouammo Rebuttal

Link to Docket: Here.

Question Presented: Whether the Sentencing Reform Act authorizes courts to automatically extend a defendant's supervised release term when the defendant absconds.

Overview: Federal courts split on whether a defendant's disappearance during supervised release automatically pushes back the expiration date — a question affecting thousands of federal defendants nationwide.

Posture: Ninth Circuit affirmed district court's use of post-expiration drug offense as supervised release violation.

Holding: The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 does not authorize courts to automatically extend a defendant's term of supervised release simply because the defendant runs away. The law sets firm end dates for supervision. Congress must amend the law before courts can extend deadlines if a defendant runs away.

Voting Breakdown: 8-1. Justice Gorsuch wrote the majority opinion, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Sotomayor, Kagan, Kavanaugh, Barrett, and Jackson. Justice Alito filed a dissenting opinion.

Result: Reversed and remanded.

Link to Opinion: Here.

Majority Reasoning: (1) The Sentencing Reform Act sets firm start and end dates for supervised release and supplies no automatic extension rule if a defendant runs away (i.e. absconds); (2) Congress already equipped courts with specific tools to address absconders — revocation, re-imprisonment, and post-expiration revocation via warrant — making the omission of automatic extension intentional; (3) The Act's only true tolling rule pauses supervised release during incarceration of 30 or more consecutive days, and courts cannot invent a second one.

Separate Opinions:

Justice Alito (dissenting): The majority never needed to reach the tolling question. The district court could lawfully consider Rico's January 2022 drug offense as a Section 3553(a) sentencing factor — rendering any Guidelines-range error harmless. No error occurred.

Implications:

• Federal prosecutors and probation officers must now secure a warrant or summons before a supervised release term expires to preserve revocation authority over post-expiration violations.
• Defendants sentenced under the now-rejected Ninth and Fourth Circuit automatic-extension rule may challenge those sentences.
• Congress faces pressure to revisit the warrant-or-summons requirement in late-term abscondment cases.
• Courts nationwide now apply a single uniform rule: abscondment alone does not extend a supervised release term.

Oral Advocates:

• For Petitioner: Adam G. Unikowsky, Washington, D.C.
• For Respondent: Joshua K. Handell, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.

The Fine Print:

• 18 U.S.C. § 3624(e): "The term of supervised release commences on the day the person is released from imprisonment... A term of supervised release does not run during any period in which the person is imprisoned in connection with a conviction for a Federal, State, or local crime unless the imprisonment is for a period of less than 30 consecutive days."
• 18 U.S.C. § 3583(i): "The power of the court to revoke a term of supervised release for violation of a condition of supervised release, and to order the defendant to serve a term of imprisonment... extends beyond the expiration of the term of supervised release for any period reasonably necessary for the adjudication of matters arising before its expiration if, before its expiration, a warrant or summons has been issued on the basis of an allegation of such violation."

Primary Cases:

• Mont v. United States (2019): Section 3624(e)'s express terms suspend a defendant's supervised release clock during pre-trial state imprisonment — highlighting the absence of any comparable automatic extension rule for abscondment.
• United States v. Johnson (2000): Courts may not add a rule to the Sentencing Reform Act that Congress considered but chose not to enact.

Timestamps:

[00:00:00] Argument Overview

[00:00:37] Argument Begins

[00:00:45] Petitioner Opening Statement

[00:02:30] Petitioner Free for All Questions

[00:24:20] Petitioner Sequential Questions

[00:24:35] Respondent Opening Statement

[00:26:25] Respondent Free for All Questions

[00:52:15] Respondent Sequential Questions

[00:52:20] Petitioner Rebuttal

Link to Docket: Here.

Question Presented: Whether the Sentencing Reform Act authorizes courts to automatically extend a defendant's supervised release term when the defendant absconds.

Overview: Federal courts split on whether a defendant's disappearance during supervised release automatically pushes back the expiration date — a question affecting thousands of federal defendants nationwide.

Posture: Ninth Circuit affirmed district court's use of post-expiration drug offense as supervised release violation.

Holding: The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 does not authorize courts to automatically extend a defendant's term of supervised release simply because the defendant runs away. The law sets firm end dates for supervision. Congress must amend the law before courts can extend deadlines if a defendant runs away.

Voting Breakdown: 8-1. Justice Gorsuch wrote the majority opinion, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Sotomayor, Kagan, Kavanaugh, Barrett, and Jackson. Justice Alito filed a dissenting opinion.

Result: Reversed and remanded.

Link to Opinion: Here.

Majority Reasoning: (1) The Sentencing Reform Act sets firm start and end dates for supervised release and supplies no automatic extension rule if a defendant runs away (i.e. absconds); (2) Congress already equipped courts with specific tools to address absconders — revocation, re-imprisonment, and post-expiration revocation via warrant — making the omission of automatic extension intentional; (3) The Act's only true tolling rule pauses supervised release during incarceration of 30 or more consecutive days, and courts cannot invent a second one.

Separate Opinions:

Justice Alito (dissenting): The majority never needed to reach the tolling question. The district court could lawfully consider Rico's January 2022 drug offense as a Section 3553(a) sentencing factor — rendering any Guidelines-range error harmless. No error occurred.

Implications:

• Federal prosecutors and probation officers must now secure a warrant or summons before a supervised release term expires to preserve revocation authority over post-expiration violations.
• Defendants sentenced under the now-rejected Ninth and Fourth Circuit automatic-extension rule may challenge those sentences.
• Congress faces pressure to revisit the warrant-or-summons requirement in late-term abscondment cases.
• Courts nationwide now apply a single uniform rule: abscondment alone does not extend a supervised release term.

Oral Advocates:

• For Petitioner: Adam G. Unikowsky, Washington, D.C.
• For Respondent: Joshua K. Handell, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.

The Fine Print:

• 18 U.S.C. § 3624(e): "The term of supervised release commences on the day the person is released from imprisonment... A term of supervised release does not run during any period in which the person is imprisoned in connection with a conviction for a Federal, State, or local crime unless the imprisonment is for a period of less than 30 consecutive days."
• 18 U.S.C. § 3583(i): "The power of the court to revoke a term of supervised release for violation of a condition of supervised release, and to order the defendant to serve a term of imprisonment... extends beyond the expiration of the term of supervised release for any period reasonably necessary for the adjudication of matters arising before its expiration if, before its expiration, a warrant or summons has been issued on the basis of an allegation of such violation."

Primary Cases:

• Mont v. United States (2019): Section 3624(e)'s express terms suspend a defendant's supervised release clock during pre-trial state imprisonment — highlighting the absence of any comparable automatic extension rule for abscondment.
• United States v. Johnson (2000): Courts may not add a rule to the Sentencing Reform Act that Congress considered but chose not to enact.

Timestamps:

[00:00:00] Case Overview and Holding

[00:00:52] Subscribe and Contact

[00:01:14] Rico's Background and Supervised Release

[00:02:07] Absconding and New Crimes

[00:03:33] Lower Courts and Circuit Split

[00:04:33] Supreme Court Question

[00:05:07] Majority Textual Reasoning

[00:07:03] Government Arguments Rejected

[00:08:22] Decision and Remand

[00:08:38] Alito's Dissent Explained

[00:11:15] Practical Impact Nationwide

[00:13:01] Wrap Up and Outro

Docket Link: Here

Question Presented: Whether an internet service provider bears contributory copyright liability for continuing to serve subscribers it knows infringe copyrights.

Overview: Major copyright owners sought to hold Cox Communications liable for its subscribers' music piracy after Cox received over 163,000 infringement notices and terminated only 32 subscribers, producing a $1 billion jury verdict.

Posture: Fourth Circuit affirmed contributory liability; Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed.

Holding: Internet service provider Cox Communications neither induced its users’ infringement of copyrighted works nor provided a service tailored to infringement, and accordingly Cox is not contributorily liable for the infringement of Sony’s copyrights.

Majority Reasoning: (1) Contributory copyright liability requires proof of intent — meaning the provider either actively induced infringement or designed its service specifically for infringing use; (2) mere knowledge that subscribers commit infringement, without inducement or tailored design, cannot establish the required intent; (3) Cox neither promoted infringement nor tailored its internet service exclusively for copyright theft, and internet access plainly serves vast legitimate purposes.

Separate Opinions:

Justice Sotomayor (concurring in judgment, joined by Justice Jackson): Agreed Cox cannot bear liability on these facts but criticized the majority for unnecessarily foreclosing common-law aiding-and-abetting liability; argued Cox lacked the specific individual knowledge of infringers that aiding-and-abetting doctrine demands, and warned the majority's rule renders the DMCA safe-harbor provision obsolete.

Result: Reversed and remanded.

Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Thomas wrote the majority opinion joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Alito, Kagan, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, and Barrett. Justice Sotomayor filed an opinion concurring in the judgment only, joined by Justice Jackson.

Link to Opinion: Here.

Oral Advocates:

• For Petitioner (Cox Communications): Joshua Rosenkranz, New York, N.Y.
• For United States as Amicus Curiae: Malcolm L. Stewart, Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.
• For Respondent (Sony): Paul D. Clement, Alexandria, Va.

Implications: Internet service providers nationwide no longer face contributory copyright liability merely for serving subscribers they know infringe copyrights. Rights holders lose a major litigation weapon against ISPs and must pursue individual infringers directly or seek legislative reform. ISPs now face no realistic legal pressure to enforce infringement policies. Justice Sotomayor's concurrence preserves a theoretical path for future plaintiffs with specific individual-level infringement evidence under an aiding-and-abetting theory.

The Fine Print:

• 17 U.S.C. § 501(a): "Anyone who violates any of the exclusive rights of the copyright owner . . . is an infringer of the copyright."
• 17 U.S.C. § 512(i)(1)(A): Internet service providers qualify for secondary liability protection only if they implement "a policy that provides for the termination in appropriate circumstances of subscribers and account holders" who "are repeated infringers."

Primary Cases:

• Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc. (1984): Sale of the Betamax VCR to the public did not constitute contributory copyright infringement because the device served substantial legitimate noninfringing uses.
• Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd. (2005): File-sharing software companies bore contributory copyright liability because they actively marketed their software as a tool for copyright theft and built their business model around infringing use.

Timestamps:

[00:00] Oral Argument Introduction

[01:28] Oral Argument Begins

[01:36] Petitioner Opening Statement

[03:37] Petitioner Free for All Questions

[19:25] Petitioner Round Robin Questions

[41:21] United States as Amicus Curiae Opening Statement

[42:25] Amicus Curiae Free for All Questions

[51:39] Amicus Curaie Round Robin Questions

[01:01:23] Respondent Opening Statement

[01:03:44] Respondent Free for All Questions

[01:31:48] Respondent Round Robin Questions

[01:39:19] Petitioner Rebuttal

Question Presented: Whether an internet service provider bears contributory copyright liability for continuing to serve subscribers it knows infringe copyrights.

Overview: Major copyright owners sought to hold Cox Communications liable for its subscribers' music piracy after Cox received over 163,000 infringement notices and terminated only 32 subscribers, producing a $1 billion jury verdict.

Posture: Fourth Circuit affirmed contributory liability; Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed.

Holding: Internet service provider Cox Communications neither induced its users’ infringement of copyrighted works nor provided a service tailored to infringement, and accordingly Cox is not contributorily liable for the infringement of Sony’s copyrights.

Majority Reasoning: (1) Contributory copyright liability requires proof of intent — meaning the provider either actively induced infringement or designed its service specifically for infringing use; (2) mere knowledge that subscribers commit infringement, without inducement or tailored design, cannot establish the required intent; (3) Cox neither promoted infringement nor tailored its internet service exclusively for copyright theft, and internet access plainly serves vast legitimate purposes.

Separate Opinions:

• Justice Sotomayor (concurring in judgment, joined by Justice Jackson): Agreed Cox cannot bear liability on these facts but criticized the majority for unnecessarily foreclosing common-law aiding-and-abetting liability; argued Cox lacked the specific individual knowledge of infringers that aiding-and-abetting doctrine demands, and warned the majority's rule renders the DMCA safe-harbor provision obsolete.

Result: Reversed and remanded.

Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Thomas wrote the majority opinion joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Alito, Kagan, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, and Barrett. Justice Sotomayor filed an opinion concurring in the judgment only, joined by Justice Jackson.

Link to Opinion: Here.

Oral Advocates:

• For Petitioner (Cox Communications): Joshua Rosenkranz, New York, N.Y.
• For United States as Amicus Curiae: Malcolm L. Stewart, Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.
• For Respondent (Sony): Paul D. Clement, Alexandria, Va.

Implications: Internet service providers nationwide no longer face contributory copyright liability merely for serving subscribers they know infringe copyrights. Rights holders lose a major litigation weapon against ISPs and must pursue individual infringers directly or seek legislative reform. ISPs now face no realistic legal pressure to enforce infringement policies. Justice Sotomayor's concurrence preserves a theoretical path for future plaintiffs with specific individual-level infringement evidence under an aiding-and-abetting theory.

The Fine Print:

• 17 U.S.C. § 501(a): "Anyone who violates any of the exclusive rights of the copyright owner . . . is an infringer of the copyright."
• 17 U.S.C. § 512(i)(1)(A): Internet service providers qualify for secondary liability protection only if they implement "a policy that provides for the termination in appropriate circumstances of subscribers and account holders" who "are repeated infringers."

Primary Cases:

• Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc. (1984): Sale of the Betamax VCR to the public did not constitute contributory copyright infringement because the device served substantial legitimate noninfringing uses.
• Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd. (2005): File-sharing software companies bore contributory copyright liability because they actively marketed their software as a tool for copyright theft and built their business model around infringing use.

Question Presented: Whether last-mile delivery drivers who never cross state lines qualify as transportation workers "engaged in interstate commerce" under FAA Section 1.

Overview: Flowers Foods required its Colorado bread delivery driver, Angelo Brock, to arbitrate wage disputes. Brock never crossed a state line. The Court must decide whether the 1925 FAA's transportation worker exemption covers last-mile drivers.

Posture: D. Colo. denied arbitration; Tenth Circuit affirmed; four-circuit split prompted cert grant.

Oral Advocates:

1. For Petitioner (Flowers Food): Traci L. Lovett of Jones Day
2. For Respondent (Brock): Jennifer Bennett of Gupta Wessler

Main Arguments:

Flowers Foods (Petitioner):

1. (1) Section 1 covers only workers who directly and actively move goods across state or international borders;
2. (2) historical 1925 labor schemes excluded purely local intrastate workers;
3. (3) the Tenth Circuit's multi-factor test turns simple arbitration threshold questions into costly mini-trials

Angelo Brock (Respondent):

1. (1) century of Supreme Court precedent defined last-mile workers finishing an interstate goods journey as "engaged in interstate commerce";
2. (2) seamen and railroad employees in 1925 included last-mile workers who never crossed a border;
3. (3) Flowers argued its last-mile drivers qualify as interstate workers under the Motor Carrier Act — and won — directly contradicting its position here

Implications: A Flowers win strips court access from last-mile drivers at FedEx, UPS, Amazon Logistics, and the U.S. Postal Service — forcing employment disputes into private arbitration and shielding company labor practices from judicial review. A Brock win preserves court access for workers serving more than 170 million delivery addresses and anchors a century of interstate commerce precedent in the modern gig economy.

The Fine Print:

1. 9 U.S.C. § 1: "nothing herein contained shall apply to contracts of employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce"
2. 9 U.S.C. § 2: "A written provision in any...contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy...shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable"

Primary Cases:

1. Southwest Airlines Co. v. Saxon (2022): Transportation workers must play a direct and necessary role in the free flow of goods across borders to qualify for the FAA Section 1 exemption
2. Bissonnette v. LePage Bakeries Park St., LLC (2024): Transportation workers need not work for a transportation industry company to qualify for Section 1, but must actively engage in transporting goods across borders

Timestamps:

[00:00:00] Argument Preview

[00:01:02] Argument Begins

[00:01:08] Flowers Food Opening Statement

[00:03:21] Flowers Food Free for All Questions

[00:27:30] Flowers Food Round Robin Questions

[00:32:08] Brock Opening Statement

[00:34:35] Brock Free for All Questions

[01:05:32] Brock Round Robin Questions

[01:14:23] Flowers Food Rebuttal

Question Presented: Whether noncitizens stopped on Mexican soil "arrive in the United States" triggering mandatory inspection and asylum-processing requirements.

Overview: Border control challenge determines whether immigration officers can block asylum seekers at ports of entry before statutory protections attach, or whether federal law requires processing anyone who presents themselves at the border.

Posture: Ninth Circuit affirmed district court; fifteen judges dissented from denial of rehearing en banc.

Oral Advocates:

1. Petitioners (Noem, et al.): Vivek Suri, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice
2. Respondents (Al Otro Lado): Kelsi B. Corkran of the the of Institute for Constitutional Advocacy and Protection

Main Arguments:

1. Government (Petitioner): (1) Plain meaning of "arrives in" requires physical territorial entry—Greeks outside Troy's walls did not "arrive in" Troy; (2) Section 1225's inspection, detention, and removal procedures require U.S. presence—officers cannot inspect people standing in Mexico; (3) Presumption against extraterritoriality and Sale precedent confirm statutes apply only within U.S. territory.
2. Asylum Seekers (Respondent): (1) "Arrives in the United States" encompasses presentation at ports of entry to avoid rendering phrase redundant with "physically present"; (2) Congress enacted provisions to implement non-refoulement treaty obligations prohibiting return of refugees to persecution; (3) Government regulations for decades defined "arriving alien" as someone "attempting to come" into the United States at ports of entry.

Implications: Government victory preserves Executive Branch authority to manage border surges through metering, allowing officers to control entry timing at ports during capacity constraints. Asylum seeker victory requires immediate inspection and processing for anyone reaching ports of entry regardless of resources, potentially forcing facility entry to comply with statutory mandates.

The Fine Print:

1. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(1): "Any alien who is physically present in the United States or who arrives in the United States...may apply for asylum"
2. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(1) and (a)(3): "An alien present in the United States who has not been admitted or who arrives in the United States...shall be deemed...an applicant for admission" who "shall be inspected by immigration officers"

Primary Cases:

1. Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, Inc. (1993): Presumption against extraterritoriality bars applying immigration statutes to refugees interdicted at sea before reaching U.S. territory; statutes apply only within United States.
2. DHS v. Thuraissigiam (2020): Arriving aliens physically on U.S. soil remain treated as stopped at the boundary line without having effected entry; arrival and admission constitute distinct legal statuses.

Timestamps:

[00:00:00] Argument Preview

[00:01:23] Argument Begins

[00:01:29] United States Opening Statement

[00:02:40] United States Free for All Questions

[00:27:04] United States Round Robin Questions

[00:40:34] Al Otro Lado Opening Statement

[00:42:52] Al Otro Lado Free for All Questions

[01:10:56] Al Otro Lado Round Robin Questions

[01:18:32] United States Rebuttal

Overview: Fifth Circuit's mechanical judicial estoppel rule bars claims entirely when bankruptcy filers fail to timely disclose lawsuits, creating circuit split over whether courts must consider all circumstances or presume bad faith from potential motive alone.

Question Presented: Whether courts can bar a person's lawsuit if that person filed for bankruptcy and forgot to tell the bankruptcy court about the lawsuit?

Posture: Under rigid estoppel rule, district court and Fifth Circuit dismissed Keathley's lawsuit.

Oral Advocates:

1. Petitioner (Keathley): Gregory G. Garre of Latham and Watkins
2. United States (as Amicus Curiae Supporting Vacatur): Frederick Liu, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice
3. Respondent (Buddy Ayers Construction): William M. Jay of Goodwin Proctor

Main Arguments:

Petitioner Keathley:

1. (1) Courts must examine all circumstances, not presume bad intent automatically
2. (2) Estoppel punishes deliberate manipulation, not honest mistakes or simple confusion
3. (3) Rule rewards wrongdoers, harms innocent debtors, contradicts bankruptcy's fresh-start promise

Respondent Ayers Construction:

1. (1) Estoppel requires objective inconsistency, not proof of subjective bad intent
2. (2) Mistake exception covers only objective errors, not every non-malicious explanation
3. (3) Seventeen-factor test creates unworkable trials, eliminates deterrence, guts disclosure requirements

United States (supporting Keathley):

1. (1) Equity requires holistic assessment including bankruptcy-specific factors, not mechanical presumptions
2. (2) Bankruptcy courts' firsthand findings deserve weight when assessing debtor intent
3. (3) Fifth Circuit's restricted inquiry ignores relevant evidence, contradicts equitable principles

Implications:

Keathley victory: courts examine full circumstances before blocking lawsuits. Ayers victory: automatic blocking regardless of honest mistakes or creditor harm.

The Fine Print:

1. 11 U.S.C. § 521(a)(1)(B)(i): "The debtor shall file a schedule of assets and liabilities"
2. Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 1009(a): "A voluntary petition, list, schedule, or statement may be amended by the debtor as a matter of course at any time before the case is closed"

Primary Cases:

1. New Hampshire v. Maine (2001): Estoppel targets deliberate manipulation, not inadvertence or honest mistakes
2. Holland v. Florida (2010): Equity demands flexible judgments, not rigid mechanical rules

Timestamps:

[00:00:00] Argument Preview

[00:01:18] Argument Begins

[00:01:26] Keathley Opening Statement

[00:03:33] Keathley Free for All Questions

[00:18:46] Keathley Round Robin Questions

[00:33:09] United States Opening Statement

[00:34:28] United States Free for All Questions

[00:42:11] United States Round Robin Questions

[00:47:24] Buddy Ayers Opening Statement

[00:49:27] Buddy Ayers Free for All Questions

[01:09:04] Buddy Ayers Round Robin Questions

[01:09:13] Keathley Rebuttal

Question Presented: Whether federal election-day statutes preempt state laws allowing ballots cast by election day to arrive after that day.

Overview: Mississippi allows mail ballots postmarked by election day to count if received within five business days after. Republicans challenge this under federal statutes setting election day, raising fundamental questions about mail voting nationwide.

Posture: District court upheld Mississippi law; Fifth Circuit reversed unanimously; Supreme Court granted certiorari November 2025.

Oral Advocates:

1. Petitioner (Mississippi): Scott Stewart, Mississippi’s Solicitor General
2. Respondent (RNC): Paul D. Clement of Clement and Murphy
3. United States (as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondent): D. John Sauer, United States Solicitor General

Main Arguments:

1. Petitioner (Mississippi): (1) "Election" means voters' conclusive choice when casting ballots, not officials' receipt afterward; (2) Counting lawfully occurs post-election day, so receipt can too; (3) Nearly thirty states permit post-election receipt; invalidating these laws disenfranchises military voters protected under UOCAVA.
2. Respondents (RNC): (1) "Election" means state's public process of selecting officers, concluding when officials close ballot box and receive final ballots; (2) Every Civil War-era soldier-voting law required election-day receipt despite early voting; (3) UOCAVA creates narrow exception proving baseline rule requires election-day receipt.

Implications: Petitioner victory preserves mail-ballot practices in nearly thirty states and protects military voters relying on extended receipt deadlines under federal law. Respondent victory requires states to receive all ballots by election day, potentially disenfranchising voters facing mail delays and invalidating extended military-ballot protections, forcing nationwide restructuring of absentee voting systems before next federal election.

The Fine Print:

1. 2 U.S.C. § 7: "The Tuesday next after the 1st Monday in November, in every even numbered year, is established as the day for the election, in each of the States and Territories of the United States, of Representatives and Delegates to the Congress"
2. Mississippi Code § 23-15-637(1)(a): Mail ballots "postmarked on or before the date of the election and received by the registrar no more than five (5) business days after the election" count toward final tallies

Primary Cases:

1. Foster v. Love (1997): Federal election-day statutes mandate holding all elections for Congress and Presidency on single day throughout Union; Louisiana's open-primary system allowing October final selection violated federal requirement.
2. Republican National Committee v. Democratic National Committee (2020): Court recognized ballot "casting" as fundamental to elections; reversed district court decision permitting voters to mail ballots after election day during pandemic.

Timestamps:

[00:00:00] Argument Preview

[00:01:02] Argument Begins

[00:01:13] Watson Opening Statement

[00:03:10] Watson Free for All Questions

[00:27:07] Watson Round Robin Questions

[00:56:51] RNC Opening Statement

[00:59:02] RNC Free for All Questions

[01:17:29] RNC Round Robin Questions

[01:51:58] United States Opening Statement

[01:52:57] United States Free for All Questions

[02:02:11] United States Round Robin Questions

[02:05:17] Watson Rebuttal

In Olivier versus City of Brandon, Mississippi, the Supreme Court ruled unanimously that a person previously convicted under a law can still sue in federal court to stop that law's future enforcement. Justice Kagan wrote for the full Court. No concurrences. No dissents.

Link to Docket: Here.

Question Presented:

1. Can someone who already received a criminal conviction under a law still sue in federal court to stop that law's future enforcement — or does a 1994 Supreme Court precedent called Heck versus Humphrey permanently close that door?
2. Does Heck versus Humphrey block a federal civil rights lawsuit even when the person suing never had the ability to challenge their conviction through the normal imprisonment-challenge process — called habeas corpus — in the first place?

Holding: 9-0. A person who previously received a criminal conviction under a law can still sue in federal court to stop that law's future enforcement.

Rationale:

1. Olivier sought future relief — not to undo his conviction.
2. Heck targets backward-looking attacks on convictions, not forward-looking injunctions.
3. Wooley versus Maynard already resolved this question in 1977.

Result: Reversed.

Voting Breakdown: Justice Kagan delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. No concurrences. No dissents.

Link to Opinion: Here.

Oral Advocates:

1. For Petitioner (Olivier): Allyson N. Ho, Dallas, TX.
2. For United States (as Amicus Curiae) in Support of Vacatur: Ashley Robertson, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice.
3. For Respondents (City of Brandon): G. Todd Butler, Flowood, MS argued for Respondents.

Question Presented: Does the Executive Order denying birthright citizenship to children of undocumented or temporary-visa mothers comply with the Fourteenth Amendment's Citizenship Clause?

Overview: President Trump's Executive Order attempts to redefine birthright citizenship, challenging 150 years of constitutional understanding that birth on American soil—with narrow exceptions—creates citizenship.

Posture: District court enjoined Order; First Circuit unanimously affirmed; Supreme Court granted certiorari before judgment.

Main Arguments:

Government:

1. (1) "Subject to the jurisdiction" requires complete political allegiance, not mere obedience to law;
2. (2) Founding-era commentators excluded children of "transient aliens" from birthright citizenship;
3. (3) Wong Kim Ark addressed only domiciled aliens—temporary visitors and undocumented immigrants fall outside that holding.

Families:

1. (1) English common law granted citizenship based on birth, not parentage—the Framers enshrined that rule;
2. (2) Wong Kim Ark specifically rejected any domicile requirement, holding temporary visitors fall under U.S. jurisdiction;
3. (3) 8 U.S.C. § 1401(a) independently guarantees citizenship based on prevailing 1940 understanding.

Implications:

1. Government victory transforms citizenship from a birthright into a privilege contingent on parental immigration status—potentially questioning the citizenship of millions born to immigrant parents over generations.
2. Family victory preserves 150-year constitutional bedrock: birth on American soil, with narrow exceptions, makes you American.

The Fine Print:

1. Fourteenth Amendment, Section 1: "All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside."
2. 8 U.S.C. § 1401(a): "The following shall be nationals and citizens of the United States at birth: (a) a person born in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof."

Primary Cases:

1. United States v. Wong Kim Ark (1898): U.S.-born child of Chinese immigrant parents obtained citizenship at birth; the Citizenship Clause enshrines the common-law rule of birthright citizenship.
2. Elk v. Wilkins (1884): Tribal Indians born on American soil lacked citizenship because they owed allegiance to their tribes—a sovereign-to-sovereign exception inapplicable to ordinary immigrants.

Overview: Death row inmate Terry Pitchford argues prosecutor Doug Evans deliberately excluded Black jurors in his 2006 capital murder trial and that no court ever fairly examined that claim because Mississippi's courts called it forfeited.

Question Presented: Whether Mississippi's courts unreasonably declared forfeited a racial jury-selection challenge the trial court itself blocked.

Posture: Fifth Circuit affirmed denial of federal habeas relief; Supreme Court granted certiorari.

Main Arguments:

Pitchford:

1. (1) Three on-the-record Batson objections cannot constitute intentional waiver of a known constitutional right;
2. (2) Mississippi wrongly blocked comparative juror analysis on appeal, contradicting Miller-El v. Dretke (2005) and Snyder v. Louisiana (2008);
3. (3) Batson violations constitute structural error requiring automatic reversal.

Mississippi:

1. (1) Mississippi courts applied a lawful, long-standing rule requiring defendants to raise pretext arguments before the trial court or forfeit them; (2) Pitchford's own post-conviction filings admitted he failed to preserve the Batson record, and his trial attorney swore under oath she never raised those arguments; (3) The cert grant covers only the AEDPA waiver question — not the underlying Batson merits or the form of habeas relief.

Implications:

1. A Pitchford victory sends the case back to Mississippi courts for the first Batson Step Three examination in nineteen years — testing whether Evans's race-neutral explanations for striking four Black jurors amounted to pretext.
2. A Mississippi victory leaves Pitchford on death row and establishes that AEDPA deference shields state forfeiture rulings even when trial courts themselves foreclosed the underlying challenge — chilling Batson enforcement at Step Three nationwide.

The Fine Print:

1. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (AEDPA): "An application for a writ of habeas corpus...shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law...or resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts."
2. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1: "No State shall...deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."

Primary Cases:

1. Batson v. Kentucky (1986): The Equal Protection Clause prohibits prosecutors from exercising peremptory strikes to exclude jurors on the basis of race; courts must assess purposeful discrimination through a three-step inquiry.
2. Flowers v. Mississippi (2019): Courts must consider a prosecutor's history of racially discriminatory strikes in assessing a Batson challenge; the same prosecutor Doug Evans removed 41 of 42 Black jurors across six trials of Curtis Flowers before the Court reversed.

Overview: A former hotel security guard lost his arbitration entirely, then argued the federal court he originally chose lacked power to confirm the award — forcing the Court to resolve when federal courts retain post-arbitration jurisdiction.

Question Presented: When a federal court pauses a lawsuit for arbitration, does it keep the power to confirm or throw out the arbitration result — even without independent jurisdictional grounds.

Posture: S.D.N.Y. confirmed award; Second Circuit affirmed; Supreme Court granted cert on the jurisdictional question.

Main Arguments:

1. Jules (Petitioner): (1) FAA Section 8 expressly grants "retain jurisdiction" language for maritime cases only — Congress deliberately omitted it from Sections 9 and 10; (2) Badgerow v. Walters (2022) forecloses jurisdiction because the confirm-or-vacate application lacks any independent federal basis on its face; (3) the jurisdictional-anchor theory incentivizes pointless federal lawsuits, directly undermining the FAA's purpose of keeping arbitrable disputes out of court
2. Balazs Respondents: (1) 28 U.S.C. § 1367's supplemental jurisdiction statute — enacted separately from the FAA — grants courts power over all related claims in the same pending case, no new jurisdictional basis needed; (2) Badgerow addressed only freestanding new post-arbitration lawsuits, not pending federal cases already vested with original jurisdiction; (3) Jules's theory forces two simultaneous court tracks — federal appeal of the pre-arbitration order plus state-court post-arbitration proceedings — creating procedural chaos Congress never endorsed

Implications: A Jules victory forces winning arbitration parties to re-file in state court, pay new fees, re-serve defendants, and educate a new court from scratch — benefiting recalcitrant defendants. A respondents' victory preserves the rule in seven circuits: one court, one proceeding, one appeal resolves the entire dispute, giving businesses and employees certainty about where arbitration enforcement lands.

The Fine Print:

1. FAA Section 8, 9 U.S.C. § 8: "the court shall then have jurisdiction to direct the parties to proceed with the arbitration and shall retain jurisdiction to enter its decree upon the award"
2. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a): "in any civil action of which the district courts have original jurisdiction, the district courts shall have supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that are so related to claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy under Article III"

Primary Cases:

1. Badgerow v. Walters (2022): Federal courts cannot use a "look-through" method to establish jurisdiction over FAA Section 9 and 10 applications — the application itself must reveal an independent jurisdictional basis
2. Cortez Byrd Chips, Inc. v. Bill Harbert Construction Co. (2000): The court with power to stay an action under FAA Section 3 holds the further power to confirm any ensuing arbitration award

Question Presented: Whether venue lies in a district where no offense conduct occurred, so long as the statute's intent element contemplates effects that could occur there.

Overview: Ahmad Abouammo created a fake invoice in his Seattle home during an FBI interview, then emailed it to San Francisco agents. The Court now decides whether prosecutors can try document falsification where the targeted investigation sits, not where the defendant acted.

Posture: Ninth Circuit upheld Northern District of California venue; Supreme Court granted certiorari December 2025.

Main Arguments:

Abouammo:

1. (1) Venue tracks the offense's essential conduct elements — falsification occurred entirely in Seattle;
2. (2) Intent elements cannot anchor venue because mental state does not constitute conduct;
3. (3) The Founders embedded the vicinage right twice in the Constitution specifically to reject effects-based prosecution

United States:

1. (1) The Constitution permits venue where a crime's effects are intentionally directed and felt, not just where the defendant stood;
2. (2) Section 1519 defines an inchoate offense — like conspiracy — and the targeted investigation's location forms part of the crime's commission;
3. (3) Even under Abouammo's own theory, emailing the fake PDF to San Francisco created a duplicate falsified record there, independently satisfying venue

Implications: Abouammo victory anchors venue to a person's physical location, giving protection against distant prosecution. On the other hand, it hamstrings prosecutors from bringing digital obstruction crimes that reflects today's technology realities. Government victory allows prosecution in the district of any targeted investigation, giving federal prosecutors broad forum-selection power for any obstruction-related offense nationwide.

The Fine Print:

1. 18 U.S.C. § 1519: "Whoever knowingly alters, destroys, mutilates, conceals, covers up, falsifies, or makes a false entry in any record, document, or tangible object with the intent to impede, obstruct, or influence the investigation or proper administration of any matter within the jurisdiction of any department or agency of the United States . . . shall be fined under this title, imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both."
2. U.S. Const. Amend. VI: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law."

Primary Cases:

1. United States v. Cabrales (1998): Venue tracks the location of the specific prohibited conduct — not collateral circumstances; money laundering in Florida could not face trial in Missouri simply because the underlying drug proceeds originated there.
2. Ford v. United States (1927): Acts done outside a jurisdiction but intended to produce and producing detrimental effects within it warrant prosecuting the defendant as if present at the effect — the foundational intent-and-effects venue principle.

Question Presented: Whether last-mile delivery drivers who never cross state lines qualify as transportation workers "engaged in interstate commerce" under FAA Section 1.

Overview: Flowers Foods required its Colorado bread delivery driver, Angelo Brock, to arbitrate wage disputes. Brock never crossed a state line. The Court must decide whether the 1925 FAA's transportation worker exemption covers last-mile drivers.

Posture: D. Colo. denied arbitration; Tenth Circuit affirmed; four-circuit split prompted cert grant.

Main Arguments:

Flowers Foods (Petitioner):

1. (1) Section 1 covers only workers who directly and actively move goods across state or international borders;
2. (2) historical 1925 labor schemes excluded purely local intrastate workers;
3. (3) the Tenth Circuit's multi-factor test turns simple arbitration threshold questions into costly mini-trials

Angelo Brock (Respondent):

1. (1) century of Supreme Court precedent defined last-mile workers finishing an interstate goods journey as "engaged in interstate commerce";
2. (2) seamen and railroad employees in 1925 included last-mile workers who never crossed a border;
3. (3) Flowers argued its last-mile drivers qualify as interstate workers under the Motor Carrier Act — and won — directly contradicting its position here

Implications: A Flowers win strips court access from last-mile drivers at FedEx, UPS, Amazon Logistics, and the U.S. Postal Service — forcing employment disputes into private arbitration and shielding company labor practices from judicial review. A Brock win preserves court access for workers serving more than 170 million delivery addresses and anchors a century of interstate commerce precedent in the modern gig economy.

The Fine Print:

1. 9 U.S.C. § 1: "nothing herein contained shall apply to contracts of employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce"
2. 9 U.S.C. § 2: "A written provision in any...contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy...shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable"

Primary Cases:

1. Southwest Airlines Co. v. Saxon (2022): Transportation workers must play a direct and necessary role in the free flow of goods across borders to qualify for the FAA Section 1 exemption
2. Bissonnette v. LePage Bakeries Park St., LLC (2024): Transportation workers need not work for a transportation industry company to qualify for Section 1, but must actively engage in transporting goods across borders

Overview: Fifth Circuit's mechanical judicial estoppel rule bars claims entirely when bankruptcy filers fail to timely disclose lawsuits, creating circuit split over whether courts must consider all circumstances or presume bad faith from potential motive alone.

Question Presented: Whether courts can bar a person's lawsuit if that person filed for bankruptcy and forgot to tell the bankruptcy court about the lawsuit?

Posture: Under rigid estoppel rule, district court and Fifth Circuit dismissed Keathley's lawsuit.

Main Arguments:

Petitioner Keathley:

1. (1) Courts must examine all circumstances, not presume bad intent automatically
2. (2) Estoppel punishes deliberate manipulation, not honest mistakes or simple confusion
3. (3) Rule rewards wrongdoers, harms innocent debtors, contradicts bankruptcy's fresh-start promise

Respondent Ayers Construction:

1. (1) Estoppel requires objective inconsistency, not proof of subjective bad intent
2. (2) Mistake exception covers only objective errors, not every non-malicious explanation
3. (3) Seventeen-factor test creates unworkable trials, eliminates deterrence, guts disclosure requirements

United States (supporting Keathley):

1. (1) Equity requires holistic assessment including bankruptcy-specific factors, not mechanical presumptions
2. (2) Bankruptcy courts' firsthand findings deserve weight when assessing debtor intent
3. (3) Fifth Circuit's restricted inquiry ignores relevant evidence, contradicts equitable principles

Implications:

Keathley victory: courts examine full circumstances before blocking lawsuits. Ayers victory: automatic blocking regardless of honest mistakes or creditor harm.

The Fine Print:

1. 11 U.S.C. § 521(a)(1)(B)(i): "The debtor shall file a schedule of assets and liabilities"
2. Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 1009(a): "A voluntary petition, list, schedule, or statement may be amended by the debtor as a matter of course at any time before the case is closed"

Primary Cases:

1. New Hampshire v. Maine (2001): Estoppel targets deliberate manipulation, not inadvertence or honest mistakes
2. Holland v. Florida (2010): Equity demands flexible judgments, not rigid mechanical rules

Question Presented: Whether noncitizens stopped on Mexican soil "arrive in the United States" triggering mandatory inspection and asylum-processing requirements.

Overview: Border control challenge determines whether immigration officers can block asylum seekers at ports of entry before statutory protections attach, or whether federal law requires processing anyone who presents themselves at the border.

Posture: Ninth Circuit affirmed district court; fifteen judges dissented from denial of rehearing en banc.

Main Arguments:

1. Government (Petitioner): (1) Plain meaning of "arrives in" requires physical territorial entry—Greeks outside Troy's walls did not "arrive in" Troy; (2) Section 1225's inspection, detention, and removal procedures require U.S. presence—officers cannot inspect people standing in Mexico; (3) Presumption against extraterritoriality and Sale precedent confirm statutes apply only within U.S. territory.
2. Asylum Seekers (Respondent): (1) "Arrives in the United States" encompasses presentation at ports of entry to avoid rendering phrase redundant with "physically present"; (2) Congress enacted provisions to implement non-refoulement treaty obligations prohibiting return of refugees to persecution; (3) Government regulations for decades defined "arriving alien" as someone "attempting to come" into the United States at ports of entry.

Implications: Government victory preserves Executive Branch authority to manage border surges through metering, allowing officers to control entry timing at ports during capacity constraints. Asylum seeker victory requires immediate inspection and processing for anyone reaching ports of entry regardless of resources, potentially forcing facility entry to comply with statutory mandates.

The Fine Print:

1. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(1): "Any alien who is physically present in the United States or who arrives in the United States...may apply for asylum"
2. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(1) and (a)(3): "An alien present in the United States who has not been admitted or who arrives in the United States...shall be deemed...an applicant for admission" who "shall be inspected by immigration officers"

Primary Cases:

1. Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, Inc. (1993): Presumption against extraterritoriality bars applying immigration statutes to refugees interdicted at sea before reaching U.S. territory; statutes apply only within United States.
2. DHS v. Thuraissigiam (2020): Arriving aliens physically on U.S. soil remain treated as stopped at the boundary line without having effected entry; arrival and admission constitute distinct legal statuses.

Question Presented: Whether federal election-day statutes preempt state laws allowing ballots cast by election day to arrive after that day.

Overview: Mississippi allows mail ballots postmarked by election day to count if received within five business days after. Republicans challenge this under federal statutes setting election day, raising fundamental questions about mail voting nationwide.

Posture: District court upheld Mississippi law; Fifth Circuit reversed unanimously; Supreme Court granted certiorari November 2025.

Main Arguments:

1. Petitioner (Mississippi): (1) "Election" means voters' conclusive choice when casting ballots, not officials' receipt afterward; (2) Counting lawfully occurs post-election day, so receipt can too; (3) Nearly thirty states permit post-election receipt; invalidating these laws disenfranchises military voters protected under UOCAVA.
2. Respondents (RNC): (1) "Election" means state's public process of selecting officers, concluding when officials close ballot box and receive final ballots; (2) Every Civil War-era soldier-voting law required election-day receipt despite early voting; (3) UOCAVA creates narrow exception proving baseline rule requires election-day receipt.

Implications: Petitioner victory preserves mail-ballot practices in nearly thirty states and protects military voters relying on extended receipt deadlines under federal law. Respondent victory requires states to receive all ballots by election day, potentially disenfranchising voters facing mail delays and invalidating extended military-ballot protections, forcing nationwide restructuring of absentee voting systems before next federal election.

The Fine Print:

1. 2 U.S.C. § 7: "The Tuesday next after the 1st Monday in November, in every even numbered year, is established as the day for the election, in each of the States and Territories of the United States, of Representatives and Delegates to the Congress"
2. Mississippi Code § 23-15-637(1)(a): Mail ballots "postmarked on or before the date of the election and received by the registrar no more than five (5) business days after the election" count toward final tallies

Primary Cases:

1. Foster v. Love (1997): Federal election-day statutes mandate holding all elections for Congress and Presidency on single day throughout Union; Louisiana's open-primary system allowing October final selection violated federal requirement.
2. Republican National Committee v. Democratic National Committee (2020): Court recognized ballot "casting" as fundamental to elections; reversed district court decision permitting voters to mail ballots after election day during pandemic.

Marc S. Blubaugh joins The High Court Report to break down this high-stakes case. Marc serves as Partner at Benesch Friedlander Coplan & Aronoff LLP and Counsel of Record for the Transportation Intermediaries Association — the trade group representing over 1,700 freight brokerage companies. He wrote the amicus brief Justice Kavanaugh cited by name and page number during oral argument.

Marc explains the legal framework, then pulls back to reveal the full picture. The $343 billion freight brokerage industry operates on the premise that federal law — not state juries — determines which motor carriers may operate on America's roads. But plaintiffs' lawyers now name brokers in virtually every major truck accident case, threatening to reshape who enters the market and how efficiently America's supply chain runs.

The stakes cut both directions. Injured parties deserve recourse when dangerous carriers cause catastrophic accidents. Marc walks through why petitioner's counsel argues an 80,000-pound truck sits at the center of every negligent hiring claim — and why the safety exception exists precisely to preserve that theory.

A broker victory brings certainty and supply chain efficiency. A petitioner victory turns brokers into federal safety inspectors without the tools to do the job. The Court's reasoning will define preemption fights in the transportation industry for years.

Listen to the full March 4, 2026 oral argument: Here.

Listen to The High Court Report case preview: Here.

Connect with Marc Blubaugh on LinkedIn: Here.

Connect with Marc Blubaugh at Benesch Law: Here.

Fine Print

• §14501(c)(1): Preempts state laws "related to a price, route, or service" of interstate brokers

• §14501(c)(2)(A): Preserves state authority to regulate safety "with respect to motor vehicles"

• §14501(b)(1): Preempts state laws "relating to intrastate rates, routes, or services" of brokers

Timestamps:

[00:00:00] Episode Preview

[00:00:40] Guest Introduction

[00:01:57] 60 Second Takeaway from Oral Arguments

[00:09:04] Logistics Ecosystem

[00:10:35] What Brokers Do

[00:10:53] Broker Licensing Basics

[00:11:04] Motor Carriers Explained

[00:11:27] Drivers and Authority

[00:11:54] Consignee at Delivery

[00:14:29] Legal Battle Over Liability

[00:18:43] How the Arguments Unfolded at Oral Arguments

[00:30:08] What Happens if Montgomery Wins? If the Brokers Win?

[00:33:26] Wrap Up

Question Presented: Whether federal appeals courts must defer to immigration agency findings — or take a fresh, independent look — when deciding if an asylum seeker suffered persecution severe enough to qualify for protection.

Overview: A Salvadoran family fled a hitman who shot two relatives, tracked them through four moves, and kept demanding money under threat of death — yet immigration judges still denied their asylum claim. The family lost at every level before reaching the Supreme Court, which took the case to settle a nationwide disagreement over how much power federal judges hold to second-guess immigration agencies on asylum decisions.

Holding: The Supreme Court ruled unanimously that federal judges must defer to the agency — meaning they can only reverse when the evidence so overwhelmingly favors the asylum seeker that no reasonable person could rule against them.

Result: Affirmed.

Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Jackson delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.

Majority's Rationale: The Court's 1992 decision in INS v. Elias-Zacarias already required deferential review of the entire persecution determination, including its legal application. Congress codified that standard nearly verbatim when it enacted §1252(b)(4)(B) in 1996's IIRIRA amendments. IIRIRA's overall structure consistently narrowed federal court review of immigration decisions, making any expansion anomalous.

Oral Advocates:

1. For Petitioner (Urias-Orellana): For petitioners: Nicholas Rosellini, San Francisco, CA
2. For Respondent (United States): For respondent: Joshua Dos Santos, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.

Link to Opinion: Here.

The Fine Print:

1. 8 U.S.C. §1252(b)(4)(B): "the administrative findings of fact are conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary" — meaning agency decisions stand unless no reasonable person could agree with them.
2. 8 U.S.C. §1101(a)(42)(A): A "refugee" qualifies as someone "unable or unwilling to return" to their home country "because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion" — meaning the applicant must show targeted mistreatment tied to who they are or what they believe.

Primary Cases:

1. INS v. Elias-Zacarias (1992): To obtain judicial reversal of an agency persecution determination, an asylum applicant must show the evidence "so compelling that no reasonable factfinder could fail to find the requisite fear of persecution" — establishing substantial-evidence review for the entirety of the persecution inquiry.
2. Nasrallah v. Barr (2020): §1252(b)(4)(B) prescribes a deferential "substantial-evidence standard" for review of agency factual findings in removal proceedings.

Question Presented: Whether the New Jersey Transit Corporation functions as an arm of the State of New Jersey for interstate sovereign immunity purposes

Overview: NJ Transit claims sovereign immunity after bus injured passenger in Philadelphia, raising fundamental federalism questions about state power to extend constitutional immunity to state-created corporations while disclaiming their debts and liabilities.

Posture: Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed lower courts, holding NJ Transit qualifies as state arm based on statutory mission and structure.

Holding: NJ Transit Corporation is not an arm of New Jersey and thus is not entitled to share in New Jersey’s interstate sovereign immunity.

Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Sotomayor delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court

Majority Reasoning: New Jersey structured NJ Transit as a legally separate corporation responsible for its own debts and judgments. The statutory firewall explicitly blocked state liability, and NJ Transit itself conceded New Jersey owed nothing on its obligations. Two hundred years of precedent confirm that state-created corporations carrying their own debts do not qualify as state arms.

Result: Affirmed (24–1113); Reversed (24–1021)

Link to Opinion: Here.

Oral Advocates:

1. For Petitioner (New Jersey Transit Corp.): Michael Zuckerman, Deputy Solicitor General, Trenton, New Jersey.
2. For Respondents (Galette and Colt): Michael Kimberly, Washington, D.C.

The Fine Print:

• N.J. Stat. § 27:25-17: "All expenses incurred by the corporation in carrying out the provisions of this act shall be payable from funds available to the corporation...No debt or liability of the corporation shall be deemed or construed to create or constitute a debt, liability, or a loan or pledge of the credit of the State"

• Eleventh Amendment: "The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State"

Primary Cases:

• Hess v. Port Authority Trans-Hudson Corp. (1994): Treasury factor constitutes "most salient factor" that "homes in on the impetus for the Eleventh Amendment: the prevention of federal-court judgments that must be paid out of a State's treasury"; when evidence on structure and control factors appears mixed, treasury factor becomes dispositive

• Bank of United States v. Planters' Bank of Georgia (1824): When government becomes partner in trading company, it "devests itself, so far as concerns the transactions of that company, of its sovereign character, and takes that of a private citizen"; corporate form precluded sovereign immunity regardless of state ownership or control

Question Presented: Whether federal appeals courts must defer to immigration agency findings — or take a fresh, independent look — when deciding if an asylum seeker suffered persecution severe enough to qualify for protection.

Overview: A Salvadoran family fled a hitman who shot two relatives, tracked them through four moves, and kept demanding money under threat of death — yet immigration judges still denied their asylum claim. The family lost at every level before reaching the Supreme Court, which took the case to settle a nationwide disagreement over how much power federal judges hold to second-guess immigration agencies on asylum decisions.

Holding: The Supreme Court ruled unanimously that federal judges must defer to the agency — meaning they can only reverse when the evidence so overwhelmingly favors the asylum seeker that no reasonable person could rule against them.

Result: Affirmed.

Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Jackson delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.

Majority's Rationale: The Court's 1992 decision in INS v. Elias-Zacarias already required deferential review of the entire persecution determination, including its legal application. Congress codified that standard nearly verbatim when it enacted §1252(b)(4)(B) in 1996's IIRIRA amendments. IIRIRA's overall structure consistently narrowed federal court review of immigration decisions, making any expansion anomalous.

Oral Advocates:

1. For Petitioner (Urias-Orellana): For petitioners: Nicholas Rosellini, San Francisco, CA
2. For Respondent (United States): For respondent: Joshua Dos Santos, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.

Link to Opinion: Here.

The Fine Print:

1. 8 U.S.C. §1252(b)(4)(B): "the administrative findings of fact are conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary" — meaning agency decisions stand unless no reasonable person could agree with them.
2. 8 U.S.C. §1101(a)(42)(A): A "refugee" qualifies as someone "unable or unwilling to return" to their home country "because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion" — meaning the applicant must show targeted mistreatment tied to who they are or what they believe.

Primary Cases:

1. INS v. Elias-Zacarias (1992): To obtain judicial reversal of an agency persecution determination, an asylum applicant must show the evidence "so compelling that no reasonable factfinder could fail to find the requisite fear of persecution" — establishing substantial-evidence review for the entirety of the persecution inquiry.
2. Nasrallah v. Barr (2020): §1252(b)(4)(B) prescribes a deferential "substantial-evidence standard" for review of agency factual findings in removal proceedings.

Question Presented: Whether the New Jersey Transit Corporation functions as an arm of the State of New Jersey for interstate sovereign immunity purposes

Overview: NJ Transit claims sovereign immunity after bus injured passenger in Philadelphia, raising fundamental federalism questions about state power to extend constitutional immunity to state-created corporations while disclaiming their debts and liabilities.

Posture: Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed lower courts, holding NJ Transit qualifies as state arm based on statutory mission and structure.

Holding: NJ Transit Corporation is not an arm of New Jersey and thus is not entitled to share in New Jersey’s interstate sovereign immunity.

Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Sotomayor delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court

Majority Reasoning: New Jersey structured NJ Transit as a legally separate corporation responsible for its own debts and judgments. The statutory firewall explicitly blocked state liability, and NJ Transit itself conceded New Jersey owed nothing on its obligations. Two hundred years of precedent confirm that state-created corporations carrying their own debts do not qualify as state arms.

Result: Affirmed (24–1113); Reversed (24–1021)

Link to Opinion: Here.

Oral Advocates:

1. For Petitioner (New Jersey Transit Corp.): Michael Zuckerman, Deputy Solicitor General, Trenton, New Jersey.
2. For Respondents (Galette and Colt): Michael Kimberly, Washington, D.C.

The Fine Print:

• N.J. Stat. § 27:25-17: "All expenses incurred by the corporation in carrying out the provisions of this act shall be payable from funds available to the corporation...No debt or liability of the corporation shall be deemed or construed to create or constitute a debt, liability, or a loan or pledge of the credit of the State"

• Eleventh Amendment: "The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State"

Primary Cases:

• Hess v. Port Authority Trans-Hudson Corp. (1994): Treasury factor constitutes "most salient factor" that "homes in on the impetus for the Eleventh Amendment: the prevention of federal-court judgments that must be paid out of a State's treasury"; when evidence on structure and control factors appears mixed, treasury factor becomes dispositive

• Bank of United States v. Planters' Bank of Georgia (1824): When government becomes partner in trading company, it "devests itself, so far as concerns the transactions of that company, of its sovereign character, and takes that of a private citizen"; corporate form precluded sovereign immunity regardless of state ownership or control

In this episode:

Why 107 days and six separate opinions directly predict each other — and what that pattern means for the 48 cases still ahead.

How one dataset predicted the Trump Tariff ruling's timing, complexity, and doctrinal fractures before the Court said a word.

Why the Court now pushes more than half its rulings into June — and what Trump's emergency application surge does to that trend.

Whether the Court's faster pace this term marks real change — or a one-year blip.

About Dr. Adam Feldman:

Founder of Empirical SCOTUS. Statistics Editor at SCOTUSblog. Head of legal analytics firm Empirilaw. J.D., UC Berkeley. Ph.D. in Political Science, USC. Post-doctoral fellow, Columbia Law School. Author of 15 peer-reviewed articles. Former trial lawyer.

Reach Adam Feldman via:

1. LinkedIn: Here;
2. Empirical SCOTUS: Here;
3. Legalytics: Here;
4. Empirilaw: Here.

Adam Feldman's Work:

1. The Supreme Court’s Vanishing Fall Docket: How Decision Timing Has Transformed Since 2000 (Jan. 26, 2026), available at: https://legalytics.substack.com/p/the-supreme-courts-vanishing-fall?utm_source=publication-search
2. The $133 Billion Question: Inside the Supreme Court’s Historic Tariff Case (Feb. 6, 2026), available at: https://legalytics.substack.com/p/the-133-billion-question-inside-the?utm_source=publication-search

Question Presented: Whether the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act preempts state common-law tort claims against brokers for negligently selecting motor carriers or drivers whose vehicles subsequently cause accidents.

Overview: Trucking broker liability case determines whether federal deregulation law blocks state tort claims for negligent hiring practices that result in highway accidents with severe injuries.

Posture: Seventh Circuit affirmed preemption; Ninth Circuit rejected preemption; circuit split.

Main Arguments:

• Montgomery (Petitioner): (1) Federal safety exception explicitly preserves state tort claims against broker negligent selection; (2) Fair interpretation requires consistent broad reading of both preemption provision and safety exception; (3) Longstanding common law negligent hiring claims predate federal trucking regulation

• C.H. Robinson/Caribe (Respondents): (1) Federal law preempts broadly any state regulation of broker services and selection decisions; (2) Safety exception applies narrowly only to direct motor vehicle operation regulation; (3) Comprehensive federal regulatory scheme provides adequate safety oversight

Implications: Montgomery victory preserves state tort accountability for broker hiring decisions, incentivizing highway safety through market liability. Respondent victory eliminates broker accountability for negligent selection, potentially reducing safety screening while limiting victim compensation options for trucking accidents.

The Fine Print:

1. 49 U.S.C. § 14501(c)(1): states may not enforce laws "related to a price, route, or service" of brokers "with respect to the transportation of property"
2. 49 U.S.C. § 14501(c)(2)(A): the preemption provision "shall not restrict the safety regulatory authority of a State with respect to motor vehicles"
3. 49 U.S.C. § 14501(b)(1): states may not enforce laws "relating to intrastate rates, intrastate routes, or intrastate services" of brokers

Primary Cases:

• Dan's City Used Cars v. Pelkey (2013): Phrase "with respect to the transportation of property" in FAAAA preemption provision "massively limits" federal preemption scope, requiring direct connection to transportation services

• Miller v. C.H. Robinson Worldwide (9th Cir. 2020): State negligent hiring claims against motor carrier brokers fall within FAAAA safety exception because they represent state authority to regulate safety through common-law tort claims

Oral Advocates:

1. For Petitioner (Montgomery): Paul D. Clement of Clement & Murphy, PLLC argues for Petitioner Montgomery.
2. For Respondents (C.H. Robinson and Caribe Transport): Ted Boutrous of Gibson Dunn.
3. For United States (as Amicus Curiae Supporting Caribe): Sopan Joshi, Assistant to the Solicitor General, U.S. Department of Justice.

Timestamps:

[00:00:00] Case Preview

[00:00:53] Oral Advocates

[00:01:09] Oral Argument Begins

[00:01:17] Montgomery Opening Statement

[00:03:15] Montgomery Free for All Questions

[00:26:20] Montgomery Round Robin Questions

[00:44:00] Caribe and Robinson Opening Statement

[00:46:15] Caribe and Robinson Free for All Questions

[01:04:17] Caribe and Robinson Round Robin Questions

[01:09:37] United States Opening Statement

[01:11:07] United States Free for All Questions

[01:20:35] United States Round Robin Questions

[01:36:19] Montgomery Rebuttal

Overview: Criminal defendant challenges mandatory medication condition after judge told him he could appeal despite signed appeal waiver, creating fundamental questions about plea agreement enforcement and judicial authority

Question Presented: Whether appeal waivers in plea agreements can only include exceptions for ineffective assistance claims and sentences exceeding statutory maximums, and whether judicial statements about appeal rights override written waivers

Oral Advocates:

1. For Petitioner: Lisa S. Blatt of Williams & Connolly LLP argued for Petitioner Hunter.
2. For Respondent: Zoe A. Jacoby, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, argued for Respondent United States.

Posture: Fifth Circuit dismissed appeal citing two-exception rule; Supreme Court granted certiorari

Main Arguments:

• Hunter (Petitioner): (1) Contract law requires broader exceptions protecting reasonable expectations beyond two rigid categories; (2) Other circuits successfully recognize additional exceptions without creating chaos; (3) Judicial statements about appeal rights combined with government silence modify plea agreements

• United States (Respondent): (1) Appeal waivers constitute binding contracts requiring enforcement according to written terms; (2) Appeal rights remain statutory rather than constitutional making waivers more enforceable; (3) Post-plea judicial misstatements cannot undermine knowing and voluntary waivers

Implications: Hunter victory creates safety valve for extreme sentences but weakens prosecutorial bargaining power and plea agreement finality. Government victory cements nationwide enforcement of broad appeal waivers while potentially allowing constitutional violations without appellate oversight.

The Fine Print:

• Fifth Amendment: "No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law"

• 18 U.S.C. § 3563(b)(9): Courts may require defendants "undergo available medical, psychiatric, or psychological treatment as specified by the court"

Primary Cases:

• Garza v. Idaho (2019): "No appeal waiver serves as an absolute bar to all appellate claims" because plea agreements function essentially as contracts subject to traditional defenses

• United States v. Mezzanatto (1995): Even "most fundamental protections afforded by the Constitution" may be waived through knowing and voluntary agreements including plea bargains

Timestamps:

[00:00:00] Oral Argument Preview

[00:01:00] Oral Advocates

[00:01:11] Oral Argument Begins

[00:01:18] Hunter Opening Statement

[00:03:10] Hunter Free for All Questions

[00:27:27] Hunter Round Robin Questions

[00:45:07] United States Opening Statement

[00:46:54] Hunter Free for All Questions

[01:15:22] United States Round Robin Questions

[01:33:51] Hunter Rebuttal

Overview

1. David Villarreal took the witness stand as the sole defense witness in his Texas murder trial, testifying he stabbed the victim in self-defense.
2. During his testimony, a scheduling conflict forced a 24-hour recess mid-direct examination.
3. Before breaking, the trial judge ordered defense counsel not to "manage" Villarreal's ongoing testimony overnight while expressly permitting all other consultation, including strategy, sentencing, and plea discussions.
4. The jury convicted Villarreal, and he received a 60-year sentence.
5. The Supreme Court unanimously upheld the judge's order as a permissible balance between the Sixth Amendment right to counsel and the truth-seeking function of trial.

Question Presented: Whether a trial judge may order defense counsel not to discuss a testifying defendant's ongoing testimony during a mid testimony overnight recess without violating the Sixth Amendment right to counsel.

Holding: A qualified conferral order prohibiting only testimony management during a midtestimony overnight recess permissibly balances the Sixth Amendment right to counsel against the truth-seeking function of trial.

Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Jackson wrote the majority opinion joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Alito, Sotomayor, Kagan, Kavanaugh, and Barrett. Justice Alito filed a concurring opinion. Justice Thomas filed an opinion concurring in the judgment joined by Justice Gorsuch.

Result: Affirmed.

Majority's Rationale:

The constitutional line separating Geders and Perry runs on subject matter, not time — testimony coaching loses Sixth Amendment protection once a defendant takes the stand. Courts may restrict discussion of testimony for its own sake while leaving all other attorney-client consultation — strategy, plea negotiations, witness decisions — fully protected. The judge's order targeted only testimony management and left every other protected topic available to Villarreal and his counsel overnight.

Alito Concurrence:

A recess should not alter the baseline rule that juries hear a defendant's testimony in his own words without counsel's real-time coaching. Indirect attempts to shape testimony carry the same constitutional infirmity as direct ones, regardless of strategic framing. Counsel may advise a client to consider a plea because the trial looks rough, but may not tell the client to clean up specific mistakes from the stand.

Thomas Concurrence in Judgment:

The trial judge's order plainly survived under Geders and Perry without any need for new rules or expanded doctrine. The majority announced a new "incidental testimony" carve-out that Perry never recognized and that these facts never required. Perry endorsed orders categorically forbidding testimony discussion — the majority created a protection Perry specifically declined to establish.

Oral Advocates:

1. For Petitioner: Stuart Banner, Los Angeles, Cal.
2. For Respondent: Andrew N. Warthen, Assistant Criminal District Attorney, San Antonio, Tex.; and Kevin J. Barber, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C. (for United States, as amicus curiae.)

Link to Opinion: Here.

Link to Docket: Here

Preview Episode: Here

Timestamps:

[00:00:00] Case Overview

[00:01:59] Trial Scene Setup

[00:03:15] Geders vs Perry

[00:04:34] Content Based Line

[00:07:36] Applying to Villarreal

[00:08:13] Concurrences Split

[00:08:32] Alito Sharpens Rule

[00:10:34] Thomas Pushes Back

[00:12:24] Nationwide Impact

[00:13:43] Final Takeaways

[00:14:37] Wrap Up and Subscribe

Overview: Constitutional challenge to federal law criminalizing firearm possession by marijuana users tests Supreme Court's new historical framework for gun regulations after millions potentially face prosecution.

Question Presented: Whether 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(3) violates the Second Amendment as applied to respondent

Posture: Fifth Circuit granted summary affirmance dismissing prosecution; government appeals seeking reversal.

Main Arguments:

• Government (Petitioner): (1) Founding-era laws restricting "habitual drunkards" provide historical precedent supporting marijuana user disarmament; (2) Circuit courts split on constitutional analysis requiring Supreme Court intervention; (3) Section 925(c) relief process addresses constitutional concerns through administrative remedies

• Hemani (Respondent): (1) Government's historical analogues fail Bruen-Rahimi "why" and "how" requirements for constitutional restrictions; (2) No genuine circuit split exists warranting Supreme Court review; (3) Administrative relief cannot cure fundamental constitutional violations

Implications:

Government victory enables continued prosecution of millions combining legal state marijuana use with lawful firearm ownership, expanding congressional power over combined legal activities. Hemani victory requires narrow tailoring of federal gun restrictions, potentially invalidating broad categorical prohibitions lacking specific historical justification and forcing legislative reconsideration of drug user firearm restrictions.

The Fine Print:

• 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(3): "It shall be unlawful for any person...who is an unlawful user of or addicted to any controlled substance...to...possess...any firearm"

• Second Amendment: "A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed"

Primary Cases:

• New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass'n v. Bruen (2022): Government must demonstrate historical tradition supporting firearm regulations through relevantly similar "why" and "how" justifications from founding era

• United States v. Rahimi (2024): Historical analogues need not provide "historical twin" but must address comparable problems through similar regulatory approaches under constitutional analysis

Oral Advocates:

1. For Petitioner (United States): Sarah M. Harris, Principal Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice argues for Petitioner United States.
2. For Respondent (Hemani): Erin Murphy of Clement & Murphy, PLLC argues for Respondent Hemani.

Timestamps:

[00:00:00] Case Preview

[00:01:02] Oral Argument Begins

[00:01:08] United States Opening Statement

[00:03:09] United States Free for All Questions

[00:26:14] United States Round Robin Questions

[01:00:32] Hemani Opening Statement

[01:02:37] Hemani Free for All Questions

[01:31:01] Hemani Round Robin Questions

[01:50:46] United States Rebuttal

Overview

Today, the Supreme Court hears oral arguments in Geo Group versus Menocal, which examines whether derivative sovereign immunity creates a fast-pass to appeal. Detainees sue a private contractor running an ICE facility, claiming forced labor—the company says "the government told me to do it" and wants to skip straight to appeal after the trial court found that the contractor held no derivative sovereign immunity. Must government contractors face years of expensive, potentially politically-motivated litigation first, or can they appeal immediately?

Oral Advocates:

1. For Petitioner (GEO Group): Dominic E. Draye, Washington, D.C.
2. For Respondent (Menocal): Jennifer D. Bennett, San Francisco, California.
3. For United States as Amicus Curiae (Supporting Respondent): Sopan Joshi, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.

Holding: Parties cannot immediately appeal pretrial orders denying derivative sovereign immunity.

Result: Affirmed.

Voting Breakdown: Justice Kagan delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Sotomayor, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, Barrett, and Jackson joined, and in which Justice Thomas joined as to Parts I and III. Justice Thomas filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment. Justice Alito filed an opinion concurring in the judgment.

Link to Opinion: Here.

Overview

Today, the Supreme Court hears oral arguments in Hain Celestial Group versus Palmquist, a forum fight about when courts keep cases they never should have had. A Texas family sued two companies over their child's heavy metal poisoning from baby food—but after a federal court wrongly kicked out one defendant and ran a two-week trial, an appeals court said the case never belonged in federal court, forcing everyone back to square one.

Questions Presented:

1. Whether a district court's final judgment as to completely diverse parties must be vacated when an appellate court later determines that it erred by dismissing a non-diverse party at the time of removal.
2. Whether a plaintiff may defeat diversity jurisdiction after removal by amending the complaint to add factual allegations that state a colorable claim against a nondiverse party when the complaint at the time of removal did not state such a claim.

Holding: Because the federal trial court wrongly dismissed Whole Foods Market, the federal courts lacked jurisdiction to hear the case.

Result: Affirmed.

Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Sotomayor delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Justice Thomas filed a concurring opinion.

Link to Opinion: Here.

Oral Advocates:

1. For Petitioner (Hain and Whole Foods): Sarah E. Harrington, Washington, D.C.
2. For Respondent (Palmquist): Russell S. Post, Houston, Texas

Adeel Bashir joins The High Court Report to break down this high-stakes case. Adeel works as Federal Public and Community Defenders Sentencing Resource Counsel and defended numerous clients charged under this exact statute.

Adeel explains the case from each angle then widens the lens. Controlled substances under federal law include Adderall, Xanax, cough medicine, and supplements common in gyms across America. Millions of Americans could fall within the statute's reach without ever knowing it.

But the stakes cut both directions. The government argues that courts should defer to congressional judgment about which groups pose risks; a principle that, if accepted, preserves legislative flexibility to address evolving public safety concerns. Adeel walks through Congress' power to classify conduct as dangerous while noting that other prohibited-person categories may face similar challenges.

Something must give. The Court's reasoning here will define Second Amendment battles for years. You don't want to miss this episode.

Oral arguments take place Monday, March 2nd. To learn more about the case, check out The High Court Report case preview: Here.

Connect with Adeel Bashir on LinkedIn: Here.

Overview

Today we break down the February 24, 2026 Supreme Court opinion in United States Postal Service versus Konan. In a 5-4 decision, the Court ruled that the postal exception to the Federal Tort Claims Act shields the government even when postal workers deliberately refuse to deliver your mail—not just when they mess up accidentally.

Justice Thomas wrote for the majority. Justice Sotomayor fired back with a sharp dissent, accusing the majority of handing the Postal Service blanket immunity that Congress never intended to give.

Link to Docket: Here

Case Preview: Here

Question Presented: Whether a plaintiff can sue the postal service for intentional mail nondelivery where the statute at issue (the Federal Tort Claims Act) permits lawsuits for "loss", "miscarriage", and "negligent transmission".

Holding: The United States retains sovereign immunity for claims arising out of the intentional nondelivery of mail because both “miscarriage” and “loss” of mail under the FTCA’s postal exception can occur as a result of the Postal Service’s intentional failure to deliver the mail.

Result: Vacated.

Voting Breakdown: 5-4. Justice Thomas delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Alito, Kavanaugh, and Barrett joined. Justice Sotomayor filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Kagan, Gorsuch, and Jackson joined.

Link to Opinion: Here.

Oral Advocates:

1. For Petitioner: Frederick Liu, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.
2. For Respondent: Easha Anand, Menlo Park, Ca.

In this episode:

Why 107 days and six separate opinions directly predict each other — and what that pattern means for the 48 cases still ahead.

How one dataset predicted the Trump Tariff ruling's timing, complexity, and doctrinal fractures before the Court said a word.

Why the Court now pushes more than half its rulings into June — and what Trump's emergency application surge does to that trend.

Whether the Court's faster pace this term marks real change — or a one-year blip.

About Dr. Adam Feldman:

Founder of Empirical SCOTUS. Statistics Editor at SCOTUSblog. Head of legal analytics firm Empirilaw. J.D., UC Berkeley. Ph.D. in Political Science, USC. Post-doctoral fellow, Columbia Law School. Author of 15 peer-reviewed articles. Former trial lawyer.

Reach Adam Feldman via:

1. LinkedIn: Here;
2. Empirical SCOTUS: Here;
3. Legalytics: Here;
4. Empirilaw: Here.

Adam Feldman's Work:

1. The Supreme Court’s Vanishing Fall Docket: How Decision Timing Has Transformed Since 2000 (Jan. 26, 2026), available at: https://legalytics.substack.com/p/the-supreme-courts-vanishing-fall?utm_source=publication-search
2. The $133 Billion Question: Inside the Supreme Court’s Historic Tariff Case (Feb. 6, 2026), available at: https://legalytics.substack.com/p/the-133-billion-question-inside-the?utm_source=publication-search

The Pung family lost their $194,400 home over a $2,242 tax bill — a tax bill they never owed. Isabella County auctioned the home for $76,000 and returned only $73,766. The family lost over $118,000 in home equity.

Question: Can local governments pay a person their home’s auction price or their home’s fair market value when the government auctions the home at a foreclosure sale?

Background: The Pung family lost $194,400 home over $2,242 tax bill they never owed. Isabella County auctioned the home, fetching $76,000. Pung family received only $73,766 back.

Pung Argues: Counties must give fair market value as compensation when government takes property, not whatever an auction produces. Losing $118,000 over $2,242 creates grossly disproportionate punishment violating Eighth Amendment Excessive Fines Clause.

Isabella County Argues: Just compensation means what someone pays at a free and fair auction. No penalty exists, the Pungs lost only difference between auction price and debt.

Stakes: If Pung wins: Property owners get market value from forced home sales regardless of what a person pays at an auction. If Isabella County wins: property owners risk losing home equity over small, disputed, but unpaid property taxes.

Oral Advocates:

1. For Petitioner (Pung): Philip L. Ellison of Outside Legal Counsel PLC.
2. United States as Amicus Curiae: Frederick Liu, Assistant to the Solicitor General, U.S. Department of Justice.
3. For Respondent (Isabella County, Michigan): Matthew Nelson of Warner Norcross and Judd.

Link to Opinion: TBD.

Website Link to Opinion Summary: TBD.

Website Link to Oral Argument: TBD.

Timestamps:

[00:00:00] Oral Argument Preview

[00:01:11] Oral Argument Begins

[00:01:20] Pung Opening Statement

[00:02:58] Pung Free for All Questions

[00:26:21] Pung Round Robin Questions

[00:51:09] United States Opening Statement

[00:52:18] United States Free for All Questions

[00:59:56] United States Round Robin Questions

[01:19:40] Isabella County Opening Statement

[01:21:46] Isabella County Free for All Questions

[01:39:59] Isabella County Round Robin Questions

[01:43:00] Pung Rebuttal

Overview: Pipeline company removes Michigan environmental lawsuit to federal court two years late, claiming extraordinary circumstances involving international treaty and state forum manipulation justify extending statutory deadline.

Question Presented: Can federal may extend the 30-day removal deadline under 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(1) for extraordinary circumstances.

Posture: District court allowed late removal; Sixth Circuit reversed and ordered remand to state court.

Main Arguments:

• Enbridge (Petitioner): (1) Equitable tolling presumption applies to all non-jurisdictional filing deadlines; (2) Congressional exceptions elsewhere don't preclude judicial flexibility here; (3) International treaty invocation and state forum manipulation create extraordinary circumstances

• Nessel (Respondent): (1) Removal deadlines govern forum selection, not claim staleness; (2) Six express statutory exceptions rebut tolling presumption; (3) Strategic litigation choices don't constitute extraordinary circumstances

Implications: Enbridge victory expands defendant flexibility for late federal court access when genuine emergencies arise but risks encouraging strategic removal delays. Nessel victory enforces strict congressional deadlines and prevents removal manipulation but could bar federal jurisdiction even when international treaties or diplomatic relations face genuine threats. Middle-ground ruling might distinguish ordinary delays from cases involving actual foreign policy implications, creating specialized removal doctrine for international law contexts.

The Fine Print:

• 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(1): "The notice of removal of a civil action or proceeding shall be filed within 30 days after the receipt by the defendant, through service or otherwise, of a copy of the initial pleading"

• 1977 U.S.-Canada Transit Pipelines Treaty, Article II(1): "Each Party shall ensure that no public authority in its jurisdiction implements any measure that would have the effect of impeding, redirecting, redirecting or interfering with in any way the transmission of hydrocarbons in transit"

Primary Cases:

• Young v. United States (2002): Equitable tolling applies to statutory deadlines that "prescribe a period within which certain rights may be enforced" unless Congress clearly indicates otherwise

• Arellano v. McDonough (2023): Detailed statutory exceptions within same provision rebut equitable tolling presumption; courts cannot add implied exceptions where Congress specified express ones

Oral Advocates:

1. For Petitioners (Petitioners Enbridge Energy): John Bursch of Bursch Law PLLC.
2. For Respondent (Nessel): Ann Sherman, Michigan's Solicitor General.

Link to Opinion: TBD.

Website Link to Opinion Summary: TBD.

Website Link to Oral Argument: TBD.

Timestamps:

[00:00:00] Oral Argument Preview

[00:00:40] Argument Begins

[00:00:51] Enbridge Opening Statement

[00:02:46] Enbridge Free for All Questions

[00:21:13] Enbridge Round Robin Questions

[00:31:21] Nessel Opening Statement

[00:33:22] Nessel Free for All Questions

[00:55:18] Nessel Round Robin Questions

[00:58:18] Enbridge Rebuttal

Question Presented: Whether Title III liability requires proving defendants trafficked in property plaintiff currently owns a claim to, or property plaintiff would own absent confiscation.

Overview: Cuban property confiscation case challenges Eleventh Circuit's "counterfactual analysis" requiring proof of hypothetical property ownership, potentially gutting Congress's primary tool for pressuring hostile regimes.

Posture: Eleventh Circuit reversed district court grant of summary judgment for petitioner.

Main Arguments:

• Havana Docks (Petitioner): (1) Statute creates liability when plaintiff "owns the claim," not hypothetical property ownership; (2) Cuba confiscated physical dock facilities, not abstract concession rights; (3) Narrow interpretation defeats congressional deterrence objectives

• Cruise Lines (Respondent): (1) Property law requires respecting temporal limitations on original rights; (2) Concession excluded passenger services, preventing trafficking in cargo-only rights; (3) Congress balanced deterrence against property law principles

Implications: Havana Docks victory preserves congressional sanctions tool and reinforces meaningful private remedies against hostile regimes. Cruise lines victory creates roadmap for exploiting confiscated property through temporal limitations arguments, undermining deterrent effect and foreign policy objectives toward Cuba.

The Fine Print:

• 22 U.S.C. §6082(a)(1)(A): "Any person who traffics in property which the Cuban Government confiscated shall face liability to any United States national who owns the claim to such property"

• 22 U.S.C. §6023(12)(A): "Property" includes "any present, future, or contingent right, security, or other interest therein, including any leasehold interest"

Primary Cases:

• Humphrey's Executor v. United States (1935): Congress can restrict presidential removal power for independent agencies through "for cause" requirements, establishing legislative authority over agency independence

• United States v. Atlantic Research Corp. (2007): Courts reject interpretations that "reduce potential plaintiffs to almost zero, rendering statutory provisions a dead letter"

Oral Advocates:

1. For Petitioner (Havana Docks Corp.): Richard Klingler of Ellis George LLP.
2. United States as Amicus Curiae: Aimee Brown, Assistant to the Solicitor General, U.S. Department of Justice.
3. For Respondents (Royal Caribbean Cruises): Paul D. Clement of Clement & Murphy, PLLC.

Link to Opinion: TBD.

Website Link to Opinion Summary: TBD.

Website Link to Oral Argument: TBD.

Timestamps:

[00:00:00] Oral Argument Preview

[00:01:02] Oral Argument Begins

[00:01:12] Havana Docks Opening Statement

[00:03:15] Havana Docks Free for All Questions

[00:19:05] Havana Docks Round Robin Questions

[00:36:46] United States Opening Statement

[00:38:14] United States Free for All Questions

[00:47:30] United States Round Robin Questions

[00:57:21] Royal Caribbean Opening Statement

[00:59:35] Royal Caribbean Free for All Questions

[01:28:15] Royal Caribbean Round Robin Questions

[01:30:23] Havana Docks Rebuttal

Overview: Constitutional challenge to D.C. Circuit decision dismissing lawsuit against Cuban state-owned companies operating stolen American oil facilities raises fundamental questions about congressional authority to override sovereign immunity for targeted foreign policy objectives.

Question Presented: Whether Exxon Mobil can sue Cuban companies for seizing Exxon Mobil’s oil refineries and related property.

Posture: D.C. District Court denied Cuban companies' motion to dismiss; D.C. Circuit reversed for lack of jurisdiction

Main Arguments:

• Exxon (Petitioner): (1) Title III's "any person" language including foreign instrumentalities effects clear immunity abrogation; (2) Congressional purpose requires Cuban government accountability without FSIA compliance; (3) Supreme Court precedent eliminates magic-words requirement for immunity waiver

• Cimex (Respondent): (1) Kirtz distinction applies because FSIA creates restrictive immunity regime allowing suit progression; (2) Statutory harmonization principles permit Title III and FSIA coexistence without implied repeal; (3) Petitioner's interpretation creates subject-matter jurisdiction gaps

Implications: Exxon victory enables $9 billion in Cuban expropriation claims while establishing congressional authority for targeted immunity abrogation. A Cimex victory preserves traditional sovereign immunity protections, requiring Americans to satisfy onerous FSIA exceptions for Cuban trafficking claims.

The Fine Print:

• Helms-Burton Act § 6082(a)(1): "Any person that traffics in property which was confiscated...shall be liable to any United States national who owns the claim to such property"

• 22 U.S.C. § 6023(11): "'Person' means any person or entity, including any agency or instrumentality of a foreign state"

Primary Cases:

• Department of Agriculture Rural Development Rural Housing Service v. Kirtz (2024): Fair Credit Reporting Act abrogated federal sovereign immunity through "any person" language creating government liability; clear congressional intent overcomes immunity presumptions

• Financial Oversight & Management Board for Puerto Rico v. Centro de Periodismo Investigativo, Inc. (2023): Statutory immunity abrogation requires "unmistakably clear" congressional language; recognizing immunity would negate authorized cause of action entirely

Oral Advocates:

1. For Petitioner (Exxon Mobil): Morgan Ratner of Sullivan & Cromwell LLP argues for Petitioner Exxon Mobil.
2. United States as Amicus Curiae: Curtis E. Gannon, Deputy Solicitor General, U.S. Department of Justice.
3. For Respondents (Corporación Cimex): Jules Lobel, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania.

Link to Opinion: TBD.

Website Link to Opinion Summary: TBD.

Website Link to Oral Argument: TBD.

Timestamps:

[00:00:00] Argument Preview

[00:00:55] Oral Argument Begins

[00:01:10] Exxon Mobil Opening Statement

[00:03:23] Exxon Mobil Free for All Questions

[00:18:48] Exxon Mobil Round Robin Questions

[00:32:32] United States Opening Statement

[00:33:51] United States Free for All Questions

[00:42:54] United States Round Robin Questions

[00:59:32] Corporacion Cimex Opening Statement

[01:01:51] Corporacion Cimex Free for All Questions

[01:28:01] Corporacion Cimex Round Robin Questions

[01:30:24] Exxon Mobil Rebuttal

This episode captures the most electrifying moments from the Supreme Court's November 2025 oral arguments in the consolidated Trump Tariff Cases—constitutional blockbusters that pit presidential emergency powers against Congress's exclusive authority to tax. These cases represent the most significant separation of powers challenge since the New Deal, with over $4 trillion in tariffs hanging in the balance.

TIMESTAMPS

[00:00:00] Episode Intro

[00:01:16] Introduction to the Major Question Doctrine

[00:01:16] Trump Tariff Cases Highlights

[00:01:28] Common-Sense Interpretation and Historical Context

[00:02:54] Debating Presidential Powers and Tariffs

[00:03:54] Historical Precedents and Legal Interpretations

[00:05:59] The Nixon Example and Its Significance

[00:09:30] Legislative History and Statutory Interpretation

[00:19:26] Nondelegation Principle and Constitutional Concerns

[00:24:17] Congressional Delegation and Political Oversight

[00:26:52] Historical Context of Presidential Tariff Authority

[00:28:10] Legal Interpretations of 'Regulate Importation'

[00:29:23] Debating the Scope of Presidential Powers

[00:32:07] Judicial Review and Congressional Intent

[00:33:15] Revenue-Raising vs. Embargoes

[00:35:08] Nondelegation Doctrine and Emergency Powers

[00:39:18] Clarifying the Nixon and Algonquin Precedents

[00:41:42] Final Arguments and Hypotheticals

[00:53:02] Episode Conclusion

Consolidated with: Learning Resources, Inc. v. Trump | Case No. 24-1287 | Docket Link: Here

Overview

Today, the Supreme Court hears oral arguments in the Trump Tariff cases—Trump versus V.O.S. Selections and Learning Resources versus Trump—a constitutional clash over tariffs and separation of powers. President Trump put sweeping tariffs on trillions of dollars in imports using a 1977 emergency law that says he can "regulate" trade—but the law never mentions tariffs, duties, or taxes, and the Constitution gives only Congress the power to tax.

Oral Advocates:

1. For Petitioner (Federal Parties): D. John Sauer, Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.
2. For Respondent (Private Parties): Neal K. Katyal, Washington, D.C.
3. For Respondent (State Parties): Benjamin N. Gutman, Solicitor General, Salem, Oregon

Question Presented: Whether the President can impose tariffs under IEEPA.

Holding: IEEPA does not authorize the President to impose tariffs.

Voting Breakdown: 6-3.

Chief Justice Roberts announced the judgment of the Court and delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts I, II–A–1, and II–B, in which Justices Sotomayor, Kagan, Gorsuch, Barrett, and Jackson joined, and an opinion with respect to Parts II–A–2 and III, in which Justices Gorsuch and Barrett joined.

Justice Gorsuch filed a concurring opinion. Justice Barrett filed a concurring opinion.

Justice Kagan filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, in which Justices Sotomayor and Jackson joined.

Justice Jackson filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment.

Justice Thomas filed a dissenting opinion.

Justice Kavanaugh filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Thomas and Alito joined.

Reasoning:

Majority (Chief Justice Roberts, joined by Justices Sotomayor, Kagan, Gorsuch, Barrett, and Jackson)

The Constitution gives Congress alone the power to tax, and tariffs represent a tax on imports. IEEPA's authority to "regulate importation" lets the President control, restrict, or block foreign transactions—but it never gave him power to reach into Americans' pockets by imposing taxes Congress never authorized.

Gorsuch Concurrence

The major questions doctrine protects Congress's lawmaking power by requiring clear authorization before the President can claim extraordinary authority, and that principle traces back centuries through English and American law. When Congress wants to hand over its most fundamental power—the power to tax—it must speak clearly, and IEEPA's generic emergency language falls far short.

Barrett Concurrence

Courts interpret statutes using context and common sense, and any reasonable reader would expect Congress to make trillion-dollar tax policy decisions itself rather than hiding them in vague emergency language. The major questions doctrine simply reflects ordinary interpretation informed by constitutional structure—not some special thumb on the scale against executive power.

Kagan Concurrence (joined by Justices Sotomayor and Jackson)

No special doctrine needed here—"regulate" simply doesn't mean "tax" in any dictionary, any statute, or any universe where words retain their ordinary meaning. When Congress actually delegates tariff power, it uses words like "duty" and "surcharge" and imposes strict limits; IEEPA does none of that.

Jackson Concurrence

The official congressional reports accompanying IEEPA describe the law as granting "freezing control" authority over foreign property—not power to tax imports. Courts should examine what Congress actually said it intended, not speculate about what makes sense to judges decades later.

Kavanaugh Dissent (joined by Justices Thomas and Alito)

Text, history, and precedent all confirm that "regulate importation" includes tariffs—President Nixon used identical language for worldwide tariffs in 1971, courts upheld it, and Congress copied that exact phrase into IEEPA six years later. The Court's decision extends the major questions doctrine into foreign affairs for the first time, potentially handcuffing future Presidents when America faces genuine emergencies requiring rapid trade responses.

Thomas Dissent

The Constitution only prevents Congress from delegating "core legislative power" over life, liberty, and property—but regulating foreign trade involves privileges the government grants, not fundamental rights it must protect. Congress can freely delegate tariff authority to the President, and it did so through IEEPA's broad emergency powers.

Link to Opinion: Here.

Oral Advocates:

1. For Petitioner (Federal Parties): D. John Sauer, Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.
2. For Respondent (Private Parties): Neal K. Katyal, Washington, D.C.
3. For Respondent (State Parties): Benjamin N. Gutman, Solicitor General, Salem, Oregon

Timestamps:

[00:00:00] Episode Intro

[00:05:13] Opinion by the Page Count

[00:06:26] Tariff Timeline

[00:07:55] Tariff Lawsuits

[00:08:41] Roberts Majority Opinion

[00:19:03] Gorsuch Concurring Opinion

[00:20:42] Justice Barrett Concurring Opinion

[00:21:57] Justice Kagan Concurring Opinion

[00:23:25] Justice Jackson Concurring Opinion

[00:24:36] Kavanaugh Dissenting Opinion

[00:31:49] Justice Thomas Dissenting Opinion

[00:33:17] Implications

[00:36:28] Bottom Line

Link to Docket: Here

Case Preview: Here

Question Presented: Whether a law that censors certain conversations between counselors and their clients based on the viewpoints expressed regulates conduct or violates the Free Speech Clause. In plain English, this case asks: Can states ban therapists from discussing conversion therapy?

Oral Advocates:

• For Petitioner: James A. Campbell, Lansdowne, Va.
• For United States as Amicus Curiae: Hashim M. Mooppan, Principal Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.
• For Respondent: Shannon W. Stevenson, Colorado Solicitor General

Timestamps:

[00:00:00] Case Preview

[00:00:50] Argument Begins

[00:00:57] Petitioner Opening Statement

[00:02:46] Petitioner Free for All Questions

[00:17:59] Petitioner Sequential Questions

[00:27:48] United States Opening Statement

[00:35:27] United States Sequential Questions

[00:45:41] Respondent Opening Statement

[01:09:00] Respondent Sequential Questions

[01:22:28] Petitioner Rebuttal

Consolidated with: Learning Resources, Inc. v. Trump | Case No. 24-1287 | Docket Link: Here

Overview

Today, the Supreme Court hears oral arguments in the Trump Tariff cases—Trump versus V.O.S. Selections and Learning Resources versus Trump—a constitutional clash over tariffs and separation of powers. President Trump put sweeping tariffs on trillions of dollars in imports using a 1977 emergency law that says he can "regulate" trade—but the law never mentions tariffs, duties, or taxes, and the Constitution gives only Congress the power to tax.

Oral Advocates:

1. For Petitioner (Federal Parties): D. John Sauer, Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.
2. For Respondent (Private Parties): Neal K. Katyal, Washington, D.C.
3. For Respondent (State Parties): Benjamin N. Gutman, Solicitor General, Salem, Oregon

Link to Opinion: TBD.

Website Link to Opinion Summary: TBD.

Website Link to Oral Argument: TBD.

Timestamps:

[00:00:00] Argument Overview

[00:00:44] Argument Begins

[00:00:56] Federal Parties Opening Statement

[00:02:53] Federal Parties Free for All Questions

[00:36:05] Federal Parties Sequential Questions

[01:15:56] Private Parties Opening Statement

[01:18:27] Private Parties Free for All Questions

[01:36:30] Private Parties Sequential Questions

[02:12:28] State Parties Opening Statement

[02:13:28] State Parties Free for All Questions

[02:33:00] State Parties Sequential Questions

[02:35:40] Federal Parties Rebuttal

Question Presented: Whether the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act preempts state common-law tort claims against brokers for negligently selecting motor carriers or drivers whose vehicles subsequently cause accidents.

Overview: Trucking broker liability case determines whether federal deregulation law blocks state tort claims for negligent hiring practices that result in highway accidents with severe injuries.

Posture: Seventh Circuit affirmed preemption; Ninth Circuit rejected preemption; circuit split.

Main Arguments:

• Montgomery (Petitioner): (1) Federal safety exception explicitly preserves state tort claims against broker negligent selection; (2) Fair interpretation requires consistent broad reading of both preemption provision and safety exception; (3) Longstanding common law negligent hiring claims predate federal trucking regulation

• C.H. Robinson/Caribe (Respondents): (1) Federal law preempts broadly any state regulation of broker services and selection decisions; (2) Safety exception applies narrowly only to direct motor vehicle operation regulation; (3) Comprehensive federal regulatory scheme provides adequate safety oversight

Implications: Montgomery victory preserves state tort accountability for broker hiring decisions, incentivizing highway safety through market liability. Respondent victory eliminates broker accountability for negligent selection, potentially reducing safety screening while limiting victim compensation options for trucking accidents.

The Fine Print:

• 49 U.S.C. § 14501(c)(1): "a State may not enact or enforce a law, regulation, or other provision having the force and effect of law related to a price, route, or service of any motor carrier...or any motor private carrier, broker, or freight forwarder with respect to the transportation of property"

• 49 U.S.C. § 14501(c)(2)(A): the preemption provision "shall not restrict the safety regulatory authority of a State with respect to motor vehicles"

Primary Cases:

• Dan's City Used Cars v. Pelkey (2013): Phrase "with respect to the transportation of property" in FAAAA preemption provision "massively limits" federal preemption scope, requiring direct connection to transportation services

• Miller v. C.H. Robinson Worldwide (9th Cir. 2020): State negligent hiring claims against motor carrier brokers fall within FAAAA safety exception because they represent state authority to regulate safety through common-law tort claims

Overview: Criminal defendant challenges mandatory medication condition after judge told him he could appeal despite signed appeal waiver, creating fundamental questions about plea agreement enforcement and judicial authority

Question Presented: Whether appeal waivers in plea agreements can only include exceptions for ineffective assistance claims and sentences exceeding statutory maximums, and whether judicial statements about appeal rights override written waivers

Posture: Fifth Circuit dismissed appeal citing two-exception rule; Supreme Court granted certiorari

Main Arguments:

• Hunter (Petitioner): (1) Contract law requires broader exceptions protecting reasonable expectations beyond two rigid categories; (2) Other circuits successfully recognize additional exceptions without creating chaos; (3) Judicial statements about appeal rights combined with government silence modify plea agreements

• United States (Respondent): (1) Appeal waivers constitute binding contracts requiring enforcement according to written terms; (2) Appeal rights remain statutory rather than constitutional making waivers more enforceable; (3) Post-plea judicial misstatements cannot undermine knowing and voluntary waivers

Implications: Hunter victory creates safety valve for extreme sentences but weakens prosecutorial bargaining power and plea agreement finality. Government victory cements nationwide enforcement of broad appeal waivers while potentially allowing constitutional violations without appellate oversight.

The Fine Print:

• Fifth Amendment: "No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law"

• 18 U.S.C. § 3563(b)(9): Courts may require defendants "undergo available medical, psychiatric, or psychological treatment as specified by the court"

Primary Cases:

• Garza v. Idaho (2019): "No appeal waiver serves as an absolute bar to all appellate claims" because plea agreements function essentially as contracts subject to traditional defenses

• United States v. Mezzanatto (1995): Even "most fundamental protections afforded by the Constitution" may be waived through knowing and voluntary agreements including plea bargains

Overview: Constitutional challenge to federal law criminalizing firearm possession by marijuana users tests Supreme Court's new historical framework for gun regulations after millions potentially face prosecution.

Question Presented: Whether 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(3) violates the Second Amendment as applied to respondent

Posture: Fifth Circuit granted summary affirmance dismissing prosecution; government appeals seeking reversal.

Main Arguments:

• Government (Petitioner): (1) Founding-era laws restricting "habitual drunkards" provide historical precedent supporting marijuana user disarmament; (2) Circuit courts split on constitutional analysis requiring Supreme Court intervention; (3) Section 925(c) relief process addresses constitutional concerns through administrative remedies

• Hemani (Respondent): (1) Government's historical analogues fail Bruen-Rahimi "why" and "how" requirements for constitutional restrictions; (2) No genuine circuit split exists warranting Supreme Court review; (3) Administrative relief cannot cure fundamental constitutional violations

Implications:

Government victory enables continued prosecution of millions combining legal state marijuana use with lawful firearm ownership, expanding congressional power over combined legal activities. Hemani victory requires narrow tailoring of federal gun restrictions, potentially invalidating broad categorical prohibitions lacking specific historical justification and forcing legislative reconsideration of drug user firearm restrictions.

The Fine Print:

• 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(3): "It shall be unlawful for any person...who is an unlawful user of or addicted to any controlled substance...to...possess...any firearm"

• Second Amendment: "A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed"

Primary Cases:

• New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass'n v. Bruen (2022): Government must demonstrate historical tradition supporting firearm regulations through relevantly similar "why" and "how" justifications from founding era

• United States v. Rahimi (2024): Historical analogues need not provide "historical twin" but must address comparable problems through similar regulatory approaches under constitutional analysis

Overview: Pipeline company removes Michigan environmental lawsuit to federal court two years late, claiming extraordinary circumstances involving international treaty and state forum manipulation justify extending statutory deadline.

Question Presented: Can federal may extend the 30-day removal deadline under 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(1) for extraordinary circumstances.

Posture: District court allowed late removal; Sixth Circuit reversed and ordered remand to state court.

Main Arguments:

• Enbridge (Petitioner): (1) Equitable tolling presumption applies to all non-jurisdictional filing deadlines; (2) Congressional exceptions elsewhere don't preclude judicial flexibility here; (3) International treaty invocation and state forum manipulation create extraordinary circumstances

• Nessel (Respondent): (1) Removal deadlines govern forum selection, not claim staleness; (2) Six express statutory exceptions rebut tolling presumption; (3) Strategic litigation choices don't constitute extraordinary circumstances

Implications: Enbridge victory expands defendant flexibility for late federal court access when genuine emergencies arise but risks encouraging strategic removal delays. Nessel victory enforces strict congressional deadlines and prevents removal manipulation but could bar federal jurisdiction even when international treaties or diplomatic relations face genuine threats. Middle-ground ruling might distinguish ordinary delays from cases involving actual foreign policy implications, creating specialized removal doctrine for international law contexts.

The Fine Print:

• 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(1): "The notice of removal of a civil action or proceeding shall be filed within 30 days after the receipt by the defendant, through service or otherwise, of a copy of the initial pleading"

• 1977 U.S.-Canada Transit Pipelines Treaty, Article II(1): "Each Party shall ensure that no public authority in its jurisdiction implements any measure that would have the effect of impeding, redirecting, redirecting or interfering with in any way the transmission of hydrocarbons in transit"

Primary Cases:

• Young v. United States (2002): Equitable tolling applies to statutory deadlines that "prescribe a period within which certain rights may be enforced" unless Congress clearly indicates otherwise

• Arellano v. McDonough (2023): Detailed statutory exceptions within same provision rebut equitable tolling presumption; courts cannot add implied exceptions where Congress specified express ones

Question Presented: Whether Title III liability requires proving defendants trafficked in property plaintiff currently owns a claim to, or property plaintiff would own absent confiscation.

Overview: Cuban property confiscation case challenges Eleventh Circuit's "counterfactual analysis" requiring proof of hypothetical property ownership, potentially gutting Congress's primary tool for pressuring hostile regimes.

Posture: Eleventh Circuit reversed district court grant of summary judgment for petitioner.

Main Arguments:

• Havana Docks (Petitioner): (1) Statute creates liability when plaintiff "owns the claim," not hypothetical property ownership; (2) Cuba confiscated physical dock facilities, not abstract concession rights; (3) Narrow interpretation defeats congressional deterrence objectives

• Cruise Lines (Respondent): (1) Property law requires respecting temporal limitations on original rights; (2) Concession excluded passenger services, preventing trafficking in cargo-only rights; (3) Congress balanced deterrence against property law principles

Implications: Havana Docks victory preserves congressional sanctions tool and reinforces meaningful private remedies against hostile regimes. Cruise lines victory creates roadmap for exploiting confiscated property through temporal limitations arguments, undermining deterrent effect and foreign policy objectives toward Cuba.

The Fine Print:

• 22 U.S.C. §6082(a)(1)(A): "Any person who traffics in property which the Cuban Government confiscated shall face liability to any United States national who owns the claim to such property"

• 22 U.S.C. §6023(12)(A): "Property" includes "any present, future, or contingent right, security, or other interest therein, including any leasehold interest"

Primary Cases:

• Humphrey's Executor v. United States (1935): Congress can restrict presidential removal power for independent agencies through "for cause" requirements, establishing legislative authority over agency independence

• United States v. Atlantic Research Corp. (2007): Courts reject interpretations that "reduce potential plaintiffs to almost zero, rendering statutory provisions a dead letter"

Overview: Constitutional challenge to D.C. Circuit decision dismissing lawsuit against Cuban state-owned companies operating stolen American oil facilities raises fundamental questions about congressional authority to override sovereign immunity for targeted foreign policy objectives.

Question Presented: Whether Exxon Mobil can sue Cuban companies for seizing Exxon Mobil’s oil refineries and related property.

Posture: D.C. District Court denied Cuban companies' motion to dismiss; D.C. Circuit reversed for lack of jurisdiction

Main Arguments:

• Exxon (Petitioner): (1) Title III's "any person" language including foreign instrumentalities effects clear immunity abrogation; (2) Congressional purpose requires Cuban government accountability without FSIA compliance; (3) Supreme Court precedent eliminates magic-words requirement for immunity waiver

• Cimex (Respondent): (1) Kirtz distinction applies because FSIA creates restrictive immunity regime allowing suit progression; (2) Statutory harmonization principles permit Title III and FSIA coexistence without implied repeal; (3) Petitioner's interpretation creates subject-matter jurisdiction gaps

Implications: Exxon victory enables $9 billion in Cuban expropriation claims while establishing congressional authority for targeted immunity abrogation. A Cimex victory preserves traditional sovereign immunity protections, requiring Americans to satisfy onerous FSIA exceptions for Cuban trafficking claims.

The Fine Print:

• Helms-Burton Act § 6082(a)(1): "Any person that traffics in property which was confiscated...shall be liable to any United States national who owns the claim to such property"

• 22 U.S.C. § 6023(11): "'Person' means any person or entity, including any agency or instrumentality of a foreign state"

Primary Cases:

• Department of Agriculture Rural Development Rural Housing Service v. Kirtz (2024): Fair Credit Reporting Act abrogated federal sovereign immunity through "any person" language creating government liability; clear congressional intent overcomes immunity presumptions

• Financial Oversight & Management Board for Puerto Rico v. Centro de Periodismo Investigativo, Inc. (2023): Statutory immunity abrogation requires "unmistakably clear" congressional language; recognizing immunity would negate authorized cause of action entirely

1. For Petitioner (Wolford): Alan A. Beck, San Diego, California.
2. For United States (as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner): Sarah M. Harris, Principal Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice argues.
3. For Respondent (Lopez): Neal K. Katyal, Washington, D.C.

Question Presented: Whether the Ninth Circuit erred in holding that Hawaii may presumptively prohibit concealed carry permit holders from carrying handguns on private property open to the public without property owner express permission.

Overview: Post-Bruen constitutional challenge to Hawaii's affirmative-consent requirement for carrying firearms on private property open to public creates circuit split over intersection of Second Amendment rights and traditional property law principles.

Posture: District court enjoined law; Ninth Circuit reversed, creating conflict with Second and Third Circuits.

Main Arguments:

• Petitioner: (1) Carrying firearms on private property open to public falls within Second Amendment's plain text protection; (2) Hawaii's presumptive prohibition effectively abolishes public carry rights through property law circumvention; (3) Colonial and Reconstruction-era scattered laws fail to establish sufficient historical tradition under Bruen framework

• Respondent: (1) Second Amendment never protected armed entry onto private property without owner consent under English common law inheritance; (2) Hawaii's law vindicates fundamental property owners' right to exclude rather than restricting Second Amendment rights; (3) Multiple colonial and Reconstruction-era historical analogues constitute "dead ringers" supporting Hawaii's approach requiring express consent

Implications: Petitioner victory establishes robust Second Amendment protection in privately-owned publicly-accessible spaces, potentially invalidating similar post-Bruen restrictions across multiple states and expanding public carry rights significantly. Respondent victory permits states to circumvent direct gun control restrictions through property law mechanisms, enabling broader firearms regulations while preserving traditional property rights and potentially creating complex patchwork of varying consent requirements across jurisdictions affecting everyday carry practices.

The Fine Print:

• H.R.S. § 134-9.5(b): "No person shall carry or possess a firearm on any private property unless that person has been given express authorization by the property owner or the owner's authorized agent through unambiguous written or verbal authorization or clear and conspicuous signage"

• Second Amendment: "A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed"

Primary Cases:

• NYSRPA v. Bruen (2022): Second Amendment protects individual right to carry handguns publicly for self-defense; government restrictions must demonstrate consistency with historical tradition of firearm regulation rather than interest-balancing approach

• Cedar Point Nursery v. Hassid (2021): Property owners possess fundamental right to exclude others from their premises, constituting "one of the most treasured rights of property ownership" requiring government compensation for regulatory takings

Link to Opinion: TBD.

Website Link to Opinion Summary: TBD.

Timestamps:

[00:00:00] Argument Preview

[00:01:24] Oral Argument Begins

[00:01:34] Wolford Opening Statement

[00:03:03] Wolford Free for All Questions

[00:19:29] Wolford Round Robin Questions

[00:33:22] United States Opening Statement

[00:34:36] United States Free for All Questions

[00:44:23] United States Round Robin Questions

[01:07:53] Lopez Opening Statement

[01:10:09] Lopez Free for All Questions

[01:39:01] Lopez Round Robin Questions

[01:51:14] Wolford Rebuttal

Overview: Ellingburg committed a crime in 1996 before Congress enacted a new law requiring convicted defendants to pay restitution to victims. Courts later sentenced Ellingburg under this new law and ordered him to pay $7,567.25 - money he never paid. Ellingburg challenged this restitution order as unconstitutional retroactive punishment, arguing the government cannot apply new penalties to old crimes. The case forces the Supreme Court to determine whether victim restitution constitutes criminal punishment protected by the Constitution's ban on ex post facto laws.

Link to Docket: Here

Case Preview: Here

Question Presented: Whether criminal restitution under the Mandatory Victim Restitution Act (MVRA) is penal for purposes of the Ex Post Facto Clause.

Oral Advocates:

1. For Petitioner: Amy M. Saharia, Washington, D.C. argued for petitioner.
2. For Respondent in Support of Vacatur: Ashley Robertson, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice argued for respondent in support of vacatur.
3. For Court-Appointed Amicus Curiae in Support of Judgment Below: John F. Bash, Austin, Texas.

Holding: The Supreme Court held that restitution under the MVRA constitutes criminal punishment subject to Ex Post Facto Clause analysis.

Result: Reversed and remanded.

Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Kavanaugh wrote the opinion for a unanimous Court. Justice Thomas filed a concurring opinion joined by Justice Gorsuch.

Majority's Rationale: Congress explicitly labeled MVRA restitution as a "penalty" for criminal offenses imposed during sentencing alongside imprisonment and fines. The statute appears in the criminal code and requires courts to follow criminal procedure rules when ordering restitution. Defendants who refuse to pay face potential imprisonment for punishment and deterrence purposes, confirming the criminal nature.

Concurring Rationale: Justice Thomas argued the Court should abandon its current twelve-factor test for determining criminal punishment. The original 1798 understanding of ex post facto laws protected against any retroactive government penalties for public wrongs. Modern courts should focus on whether laws impose coercive sanctions for offenses against government authority, regardless of civil labels.

Link to Opinion: Here.

Timestamps:

[00:00:00] Argument Preview

[00:00:58] Argument Begins

[00:01:06] Petitioner Opening Statement

[00:03:14] Petitioner Free for All Questions

[00:14:04] Petitioner Sequential Questions

[00:18:36] Respondent in Support of Vacatur Opening Statement

[00:19:45] Respondent in Support of Vacatur Free for All Questions

[00:33:22] Respondent in Support of Vacatur Sequential Questions

[00:34:41] For Court-Appointed Amicus Curiae in Support of Judgment Below Opening Statement

[00:37:03] For Court-Appointed Amicus Curiae in Support of Judgment Below Free for All Questions

[01:01:03] For Court-Appointed Amicus Curiae in Support of Judgment Below Sequential Questions

[01:02:09] Petitioner Rebuttal

Link to Docket: Here

Case Preview: Here

Question Presented: Whether law enforcement may enter a home without a search warrant based on less than probable cause that an emergency is occurring, or whether the emergency-aid exception requires probable cause.

Oral Advocates:

1. For Petitioner: Fred A. Rowley, Jr., Los Angeles
2. For Respondent: Christian B. Corrigan, Solicitor General, Montana
3. United States as Amicus Curiae: Zoe A. Jacoby, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice

Holding: Brigham City’s objective reasonableness standard for warrantless home entries to render emergency aid applies without further gloss and was satisfied in this case.

Result: Affirmed.

Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Kagan delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Justices Sotomayor and Gorsuch filed concurring opinions.

Link to Opinion: Here.

Timestamps:

[00:00:00] Episode Preview

[00:00:50] Argument Begins

[00:01:02] Petitioner Opening Statement

[00:03:12] Petitioner Free for All Questions

[00:27:25] Petitioner Sequential Questions

[00:39:50] Respondent Opening Statement

[00:41:41] Respondent Free for All Questions

[00:55:44] Respondent Sequential Questions

[01:00:52] United States as Amicus Curaie Opening Statement

[01:02:01] United States as Amicus Curaie Free for All Questions

[01:09:15] United States as Amicus Curaie Sequential Questions

[01:10:40] Petitioner Rebuttal

Link to Docket: Here

Episode Preview: Here

Background:

Question Presented: Whether a state law providing that a complaint must be dismissed unless it is accompanied by an expert affidavit may be applied in federal court.

Oral Advocates:

1. For Petitioner: Andrew T. Tutt, Washington, D.C.
2. For Respondent: Frederick R. Yarger, Denver, CO.

Holding: Delaware’s affidavit law does not apply in federal court.

Result: Reversed and remanded.

Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Barrett wrote the majority opinion. Justice Jackson wrote an opinion concurring in the result.

Link to Opinion: Here.

Timestamps:

[00:00:00] Argument Intro

[00:00:33] Argument Begins

[00:00:39] Petitioner Opening Statement

[00:02:57] Petitioner Free for All Questions

[00:25:46] Petitioner Sequential Questions

[00:31:36] Respondent Opening Statement

[00:33:52] Respondent Free For All Questions

[00:59:19] Respondent Sequential Questions

[01:00:05] Petitioner Rebuttal

Overview

Today, the Supreme Court hears oral arguments in Coney Island Auto Parts versus Burton, a time trap tangle examining when void verdicts gain validity. Coney Island's bank account gets frozen for nearly $100,000 based on a 2015 Tennessee judgment they claim they never knew about. When Coney finally fights back seven years later, the Sixth Circuit dismisses the case, saying that you waited too long to challenge the judgment Coney didn’t even know about. "If something never existed in the first place, does waiting too long to challenge it make it real?

Question Presented: Whether Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(c)(1) imposes any time limit to set aside a void default judgment for lack of personal jurisdiction.

Oral Advocates:

1. For Petitioner (Coney): Daniel Ginzburg, Freehold, N.J.
2. For Respondent (Burton): Lisa S. Blatt, Washington, D.C.

Holding: Rule 60(c)(1)’s reasonable-time limit applies to a motion alleging that a judgment is void under Rule 60(b)(4).

Result: Affirmed.

Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Alito wrote the majority opinion. Justice Sotomayor wrote an opinion concurring in the judgment.

Majority's Rationale: Rule 60(c)(1) clearly requires all Rule 60(b) motions within reasonable time, including void judgment challenges. Even void judgments face timing limits because no constitutional principle grants unlimited challenge time. Allowing indefinite challenges would create extreme consequences like ignoring appeal and certiorari deadlines.

Concurring Rationale: Rule 60's text and structure clearly require reasonable time limits for all motions. The majority unnecessarily addressed constitutional questions that no party raised or argued. Courts should stick to deciding actual disputes, not inventing constitutional theories.

Link to Opinion: Here.

Timestamps:

[00:00:00] Argument Preview

[00:00:58] Argument Begins

[00:01:07] Petitioner Opening Statement

[00:03:17] Petitioner Free for All Questions

[00:19:12] Petitioner Sequential Questions

[00:19:15] Respondent Opening Statement

[00:20:33] Respondent Free for All Questions

[00:34:10] Petitioner Rebuttal

Link to Docket: Here

Case Preview: https://scotus-oral-arguments.captivate.fm/episode/upcoming-oral-argument-bost-v-illinois-ballot-box-bout-when-can-candidates-challenge-election-rules/

Background: Federal law sets the first Tuesday after the first Monday in November as the federal Election Day. 2 U.S.C. §§ 1 and 7; and 3 U.S.C. § 1. Several states, including Illinois, have enacted state laws that allow ballots to be received and counted after Election Day. Petitioners contend these state laws are preempted under the Elections and Electors Clauses. Petitioners sued to enjoin Illinois' law allowing ballots to be received up to fourteen days after Election Day.

Question Presented: Whether Petitioners, as federal candidates, have pleaded sufficient factual allegations to show Article III standing to challenge state time, place, and manner regulations concerning their federal elections.

Oral Advocates:

1. For Petitioner: Paul D. Clement, Alexandria, Va.;
2. United States, as Amicus Curiae: Michael Talent, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.
3. For Respondent: Jane E. Notz, Solicitor General, Chicago, Ill.

Link to Opinion: Here.

Holding: As a candidate for office, Congressman Bost holds standing to challenge the laws that govern the counting of votes in his election.

Result: Reversed and remanded.

Voting Breakdown: 7-2. Chief Justice Roberts delivered the opinion of the Court in which Justices Alito, Thomas, Gorsuch, and Kavanaugh joined. Justice Barrett filed an opinion concurring in the judgment in which Justice Kagan joined. Justice Jackson filed a dissenting opinion in which Justice Sotomayor joined.

This episode offers six critical insights from last week's opinions.

Six Pack Roadmap:

1. Deceptive Unanimity Statistics Court achieves 71% unanimity rate (versus 42% last year) by clearing uncontested low hanging fruit cases; rate will drop as complex constitutional questions arrive later this term.

2. Fractures Behind Unanimous Results: Two cases feature justices concurring only in judgment—agreeing with outcomes but rejecting majority reasoning; Jackson splits on procedural methodology in Berk v. Choy; Sotomayor objects to unnecessary constitutional analysis in Coney Island v. Burton.

3. Strategic Opinion Authorship Pattern: Each majority opinion authored by different justice; only Gorsuch and Thomas remain without majority opinions this term, suggesting strategic distribution of constitutional precedent-setting opportunities.

4. Thomas's Doctrinal Attack Signal: Thomas writes Ellingburg concurrence (joined by Gorsuch) targeting current Ex Post Facto jurisprudence, continuing his pattern of using separate opinions to undermine established legal frameworks.

5. Ex Post Facto Originalism: Thomas advocates abandoning modern twelve-factor balancing tests for 1798 Calder v. Bull approach; would subject civil penalties, administrative enforcement, and regulatory sanctions to constitutional scrutiny regardless of legislative labeling.

6. Emergency Docket Constitutional Chaos: Trump v. Cook oral arguments reveal dangers of rushed litigation creating inadequate factual records; Justice Alito highlights how time pressure forces courts into constitutional holdings rather than narrower statutory grounds.

Referenced Cases:

• Berk v. Choy - Unanimous decision on Delaware affidavit requirements conflicting with federal civil procedure rules; Jackson concurrence only in judgment preferring Rule 3 over Rule 8 analysis

• Coney Island v. Burton - Unanimous decision with Sotomayor concurrence only in judgment objecting to unnecessary due process constitutional analysis

• Ellingburg v. United States - Thomas concurrence (joined by Gorsuch) advocating originalist Ex Post Facto interpretation based on Calder v. Bull (1798)

• Trump v. Cook - Emergency docket case involving Federal Reserve governor removal; oral arguments criticized rushed litigation timeline creating inadequate factual development

The High Court Report covers three major oral arguments from this past week, analyzing constitutional clashes over Second Amendment rights, pension plan calculations, and presidential removal powers. Each case presents fundamental questions about constitutional interpretation, federal authority, and the balance between individual rights and government power.

Takeaways:

Wolford v. Lopez

• Second Amendment treated as second-class right compared to First Amendment protections

• Historical evidence battle focuses on colonial anti-poaching laws and Black Codes versus modern concealed carry contexts

• Justices skeptical that 1771 hunting regulations justify modern permission slip requirements for constitutional rights

M&K Employee Solutions v. IAM

• Pension liability calculation dispute centers on timing of actuarial assumptions versus measurement dates

• Built-in statutory safeguards include professional ethics requirements and mandatory arbitration processes

• Court likely to rule that "as of" creates reference point rather than deadline for calculations

Trump v. Cook

• Presidential removal authority clashes with Federal Reserve independence principles

• "For cause" standard requires judicial review to prevent arbitrary executive actions

• Procedural defects provide potential narrow ruling path without resolving broader constitutional questions

Attribution

1. Episode analysis draws from Daniel Thompson's Substack piece "Litigating Originalism in Bruen: A Brief-Level Coding Study of History, Evidence, and Argument Form" available at https://legalytics.substack.com/p/litigating-originalism-in-bruen-a

Links:

1. Opinion: Here.
2. Oral Argument: Here
3. Case Preview: Here

Overview: Ellingburg committed a crime in 1996 before Congress enacted a new law requiring convicted defendants to pay restitution to victims. Courts later sentenced Ellingburg under this new law and ordered him to pay $7,567.25 - money he never paid. Ellingburg challenged this restitution order as unconstitutional retroactive punishment, arguing the government cannot apply new penalties to old crimes. The case forces the Supreme Court to determine whether victim restitution constitutes criminal punishment protected by the Constitution's ban on ex post facto laws.

Question Presented: Whether restitution under the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act of 1996 constitutes criminal punishment for purposes of the Ex Post Facto Clause.

Holding: The Supreme Court held that restitution under the MVRA constitutes criminal punishment subject to Ex Post Facto Clause analysis.

Result: Reversed and remanded.

Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Kavanaugh wrote the opinion for a unanimous Court. Justice Thomas filed a concurring opinion joined by Justice Gorsuch.

Majority's Rationale: Congress explicitly labeled MVRA restitution as a "penalty" for criminal offenses imposed during sentencing alongside imprisonment and fines. The statute appears in the criminal code and requires courts to follow criminal procedure rules when ordering restitution. Defendants who refuse to pay face potential imprisonment for punishment and deterrence purposes, confirming the criminal nature.

Concurring Rationale: Justice Thomas argued the Court should abandon its current twelve-factor test for determining criminal punishment. The original 1798 understanding of ex post facto laws protected against any retroactive government penalties for public wrongs. Modern courts should focus on whether laws impose coercive sanctions for offenses against government authority, regardless of civil labels.

Oral Advocates:

1. For Petitioner: Amy M. Saharia, Washington, D.C. argued for petitioner.
2. For Respondent in Support of Vacatur: Ashley Robertson, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice argued for respondent in support of vacatur.
3. For Court-Appointed Amicus Curiae in Support of Judgment Below: John F. Bash, Austin, Texas.

Docket Link: Here

Overview

This case involves a time trap tangle examining when void verdicts gain validity. Coney Island's bank account gets frozen for nearly $100,000 based on a 2015 Tennessee judgment they claim they never knew about. When Coney finally fights back seven years later, the Sixth Circuit dismisses the case, saying that you waited too long to challenge the judgment Coney didn’t even know about. If a judgment was invalid from the start, does waiting too long make it become valid?

Question Presented: Whether Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(c)(1) imposes any time limit to set aside a void default judgment for lack of personal jurisdiction.

Holding: Rule 60(c)(1)’s reasonable-time limit applies to a motion alleging that a judgment is void under Rule 60(b)(4).

Result: Affirmed.

Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Alito wrote the majority opinion. Justice Sotomayor wrote an opinion concurring in the judgment.

Majority's Rationale: Rule 60(c)(1) clearly requires all Rule 60(b) motions within reasonable time, including void judgment challenges. Even void judgments face timing limits because no constitutional principle grants unlimited challenge time. Allowing indefinite challenges would create extreme consequences like ignoring appeal and certiorari deadlines.

Concurring Rationale: Rule 60's text and structure clearly require reasonable time limits for all motions. The majority unnecessarily addressed constitutional questions that no party raised or argued. Courts should stick to deciding actual disputes, not inventing constitutional theories.

Link to Opinion: Here.

Oral Advocates:

1. For Petitioner (Coney): Daniel Ginzburg, Freehold, N.J.
2. For Respondent (Burton): Lisa S. Blatt, Washington, D.C.

Docket Link: Here

Episode Preview: Here

Overview: Federal Rules of Civil Procedure conflict with state screening requirements raises fundamental questions about procedural uniformity in diversity jurisdiction and limits on state authority over federal court operations.

Question Presented: Whether a state law providing that a complaint must be dismissed unless it is accompanied by an expert affidavit may be applied in federal court.

Holding: Delaware’s affidavit law does not apply in federal court.

Result: Reversed and remanded.

Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Barrett wrote the majority opinion. Justice Jackson wrote an opinion concurring in the result.

Link to Opinion: Here.

Oral Advocates:

1. For Petitioner: Andrew T. Tutt, Washington, D.C.
2. For Respondent: Frederick R. Yarger, Denver, CO.

Posture: Third Circuit affirmed dismissal; Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed unanimously.

Main Arguments:

1. Berk (Petitioner): (1) Rule 8 requires only "short and plain statement," precluding additional merit requirements; (2) Rule 12 forbids considering materials outside pleadings for dismissal; (3) Federal Rules displace conflicting state procedural laws in diversity cases
2. Defendants (Choy and Beebe): (1) Rule 11 creates statutory exception allowing state affidavit requirements; (2) Delaware law addresses different issue than Federal Rules; (3) State screening mechanisms constitute substantive law under Erie doctrine

Implications: Berk victory establishes federal procedural rule supremacy over conflicting state requirements, protecting diversity jurisdiction access while potentially eliminating state tort reform screening mechanisms in federal court. Defendants victory would enable states to impose additional federal court barriers beyond Federal Rules requirements, potentially creating procedural chaos through conflicting state requirements and undermining uniform federal court procedures nationwide.

The Fine Print:

1. Federal Rule 8(a)(2): "A pleading that states a claim for relief must contain a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief"
2. Delaware Code § 6853(a)(1): "No action for medical negligence shall be filed unless the complaint is accompanied by an affidavit of merit signed by a medical professional"

Primary Cases:

1. Hanna v. Plumer (1965): Valid Federal Rules displace contrary state law even when state law qualifies as substantive under Erie; Federal Rules govern procedure in federal court
2. Shady Grove v. Allstate (2010): Federal Rule displaces state law when it "answers the question in dispute" unless the Federal Rule exceeds statutory authorization

Oral Advocates:

1. For Petitioner (Trump): D. John Sauer, Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.
2. For Respondent (Cook): Paul D. Clement, Alexandria, Virginia.

Question Presented: Whether Federal Reserve Board governors possess Fifth Amendment property rights in their offices and whether "for cause" removal authority permits presidential removal based on pre-office conduct.

Overview: President Trump's 30-minute ultimatum removal of Fed Governor Cook over mortgage misrepresentations creates unprecedented constitutional crisis testing presidential power against central bank independence and due process rights.

Posture: D.C. Circuit denied emergency stay by 2-1 vote; Governor Cook continues serving pending appeal.

Main Arguments:

• Trump (Petitioner): (1) Federal offices constitute no Fifth Amendment property interest under longstanding precedent; (2) "For cause" permits broad removal discretion for misconduct affecting fitness including pre-office conduct; (3) Presidential removal determinations remain unreviewable by courts absent explicit congressional authorization

• Cook (Respondent): (1) Tenure-protected officers possess constitutionally protected property interest requiring pre-removal hearing under Loudermill; (2) "For cause" historically limited to in-office conduct under 1913/1935 statutory backdrop; (3) Judicial review prevents presidential circumvention of congressional restrictions protecting agency independence

Implications: Trump victory eliminates due process protections for principal officers while expanding presidential control over independent agencies through discretionary "for cause" interpretations. Cook victory establishes constitutional hearing requirements for tenure-protected removal while constraining presidential authority to politicize Federal Reserve monetary policy decisions affecting national economic stability.

The Fine Print:

• 12 U.S.C. § 242: "Any member of the Board may be removed for cause by the President"

• Fifth Amendment: "No person shall be...deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law"

Primary Cases:

• Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill (1985): Tenure-protected public employees possess property interest in continued employment requiring pre-termination notice and hearing opportunity

• Taylor v. Beckham (1900): Political offices constitute no property rights protected by Due Process Clause; removal from office triggers no constitutional process requirements

Link to Opinion: TBD.

Website Link to Opinion Summary: TBD.

Timestamps:

[00:00:00] Oral Argument Preview

[00:01:51] Oral Argument Begins

[00:02:00] Trump Opening Statement

[00:04:02] Trump Free for All Questions

[00:27:07] Trump Round Robin Questions

[01:00:10] Cook Opening Statement

[01:02:05] Cook Free for All Questions

[01:30:37] Cook Round Robin Questions

[01:56:24] Trump Rebuttal

Oral Advocates:

1. For Petitioner (M&K Employee Solutions): Michael E. Kenneally, Jr., Washington, D.C.
2. For Respondent (IAM National Pension Fund): John E. Roberts, Providence, Rhode Island.
3. For United States as (Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent): Kevin J. Barber, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice.

Question Presented: Can pension plans charge higher prices using future prices, or must they stick with the original prices?

Overview: Four companies' pension withdrawal liability tripled from timing of actuarial assumption changes, creating circuit split over whether "as of" December 31st calculations require December 31st assumptions or permit retrospective professional judgment.

Posture: Arbitrators favored companies; D.C. District Court and Circuit reversed, permitting post-measurement assumption adoption with restrictions.

Main Arguments:

1. Petitioners: (1) "As of" language creates statutory deadline requiring pre-measurement assumption adoption; (2) Legislative framework expected annual assumption reviews before measurement dates; (3) Anti-manipulation principles from Section 1394 should apply to actuarial assumptions
2. Respondents: (1) "As of" establishes reference date, not completion deadline for retrospective valuations; (2) "Best estimate" requirement mandates current professional judgment over stale assumptions; (3) Standard actuarial practice permits and encourages post-measurement selection

Implications: Petitioner victory creates uniform nationwide timing deadlines for actuarial assumptions but potentially forces use of outdated professional judgments. Respondent victory maintains professional flexibility and accuracy in pension calculations but creates potential manipulation risks and planning uncertainty. Decision affects multiemployer pension withdrawals nationwide, involving billions in liability calculations. Ruling influences broader questions about statutory interpretation incorporating professional standards and temporal requirements in technical regulatory contexts.

The Fine Print:

1. 29 U.S.C. § 1391: "The amount of an employer's withdrawal liability...shall be computed...as of the end of the plan year preceding the plan year in which the withdrawal occurs"
2. 29 U.S.C. § 1393(a)(1): "actuarial assumptions and methods which...offer the actuary's best estimate of anticipated experience under the plan"

Primary Cases:

1. National Retirement Fund v. Metz Culinary Management (2020): Second Circuit held actuarial assumptions for withdrawal liability must exist by measurement date; automatic rollover applies absent timely changes
2. Concrete Pipe & Products v. Construction Laborers Pension Trust (1993): Withdrawal liability creates "fixed and certain debt"; actuarial determinations receive presumption of correctness due to professional constraints and statutory requirements

Link to Opinion: TBD.

Website Link to Opinion Summary: TBD.

Timestamps:

[00:00:00] Oral Argument Preview

[00:01:30] Oral Argument Begins

[00:01:41] M & K Opening Statement

[00:03:33] M & K Free for All Questions

[00:26:54] M & K Round Robin Questions

[00:31:47] IAM Opening Statement

[00:34:23] IAM Free for All Questions

[00:47:28] IAM Round Robin Questions

[00:47:31] United States Opening Statement

[00:48:39] United States Free for All Questions

[00:53:44] United States Round Robin Questions

[00:53:50] M & K Rebuttal

1. For Petitioner (Wolford): Alan A. Beck, San Diego, California.
2. For United States (as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner): Sarah M. Harris, Principal Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice argues.
3. For Respondent (Lopez): Neal K. Katyal, Washington, D.C.

Question Presented: Whether the Ninth Circuit erred in holding that Hawaii may presumptively prohibit concealed carry permit holders from carrying handguns on private property open to the public without property owner express permission.

Overview: Post-Bruen constitutional challenge to Hawaii's affirmative-consent requirement for carrying firearms on private property open to public creates circuit split over intersection of Second Amendment rights and traditional property law principles.

Posture: District court enjoined law; Ninth Circuit reversed, creating conflict with Second and Third Circuits.

Main Arguments:

• Petitioner: (1) Carrying firearms on private property open to public falls within Second Amendment's plain text protection; (2) Hawaii's presumptive prohibition effectively abolishes public carry rights through property law circumvention; (3) Colonial and Reconstruction-era scattered laws fail to establish sufficient historical tradition under Bruen framework

• Respondent: (1) Second Amendment never protected armed entry onto private property without owner consent under English common law inheritance; (2) Hawaii's law vindicates fundamental property owners' right to exclude rather than restricting Second Amendment rights; (3) Multiple colonial and Reconstruction-era historical analogues constitute "dead ringers" supporting Hawaii's approach requiring express consent

Implications: Petitioner victory establishes robust Second Amendment protection in privately-owned publicly-accessible spaces, potentially invalidating similar post-Bruen restrictions across multiple states and expanding public carry rights significantly. Respondent victory permits states to circumvent direct gun control restrictions through property law mechanisms, enabling broader firearms regulations while preserving traditional property rights and potentially creating complex patchwork of varying consent requirements across jurisdictions affecting everyday carry practices.

The Fine Print:

• H.R.S. § 134-9.5(b): "No person shall carry or possess a firearm on any private property unless that person has been given express authorization by the property owner or the owner's authorized agent through unambiguous written or verbal authorization or clear and conspicuous signage"

• Second Amendment: "A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed"

Primary Cases:

• NYSRPA v. Bruen (2022): Second Amendment protects individual right to carry handguns publicly for self-defense; government restrictions must demonstrate consistency with historical tradition of firearm regulation rather than interest-balancing approach

• Cedar Point Nursery v. Hassid (2021): Property owners possess fundamental right to exclude others from their premises, constituting "one of the most treasured rights of property ownership" requiring government compensation for regulatory takings

Link to Opinion: TBD.

Website Link to Opinion Summary: TBD.

Timestamps:

[00:00:00] Argument Preview

[00:01:24] Oral Argument Begins

[00:01:34] Wolford Opening Statement

[00:03:03] Wolford Free for All Questions

[00:19:29] Wolford Round Robin Questions

[00:33:22] United States Opening Statement

[00:34:36] United States Free for All Questions

[00:44:23] United States Round Robin Questions

[01:07:53] Lopez Opening Statement

[01:10:09] Lopez Free for All Questions

[01:39:01] Lopez Round Robin Questions

[01:51:14] Wolford Rebuttal

Don't miss this action packed episode. In it, we cover three things:

1. News that the Supreme Court agreed to hear 4 new cases;
2. News that the Supreme Court will issue opinions
3. Stats, trends, and observations of last week's 4 opinions; and
4. Final thoughts on this week's oral arguments

NEW CERTIORARI GRANTS

Cases Added: Four new grants bring total to approximately 57 unique cases for the term

1. Geofence Warrants Case: Constitutional challenge to warrants allowing police access to cell phone user data by specific date, time, and location
2. Patent Infringement Case: Intellectual property dispute involving patent protection standards
3. Monsanto/Roundup Case: Product liability challenge over failure to warn about cancer dangers
4. Investment Fund Case: Securities litigation involving pleading standards for fund underperformance claims

Term Outlook: Current case count (57 unique cases) approaches last term's 62-63 cases, suggesting limited additional grants expected

JANUARY 20TH OPINIONS FORTHCOMING

Release Schedule: Supreme Court plans opinion release on Monday, January 20th Coverage Plan: Detailed opinion breakdowns scheduled for Thursday or Friday depending on volume Anticipation: Multiple pending cases await resolution from previous oral argument sessions

SCOTUS OPINION TRENDS & STATISTICAL ANALYSIS

Reversal Patterns: Current term mirrors historical 69% reversal rate

1. 3 reversals/vacates vs. 1 affirmance from first four decisions
2. Montana Supreme Court decision upheld; federal circuit courts overturned

Vote Distributions: Early decisions show typical voting patterns

1. 2 unanimous (9-0) decisions: Barrett v. United States, Case v. Montana
2. 1 decision 7-2, 1 decision 5-4
3. 3 criminal law cases, 1 standing/election case

Authorship Patterns: Different justices authored each majority opinion

1. Roberts, Sotomayor, Kagan, Jackson wrote majorities
2. Gorsuch most active: 2 concurrences, 1 dissent
3. Jackson 2nd most active: 1 majority, 1 dissent

Judicial Fracturing Analysis: Early emergence of fractured reasoning despite agreement on outcomes

1. Notable example: Bost v. Illinois where Barrett and Kagan joined conclusion but rejected reasoning
2. Barrett criticized majority's "bespoke standing rule for candidates"
3. Fracturing expected to intensify in major constitutional cases

Legislative History Debate: Emerging doctrinal battle over legislative history usage

1. Barrett v. United States highlights split: Jackson's Part IV-C attracted only 4 votes (Roberts, Sotomayor, Kagan)
2. Textualist justices (Thomas, Alito, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, Barrett) rejected legislative history reliance
3. Roberts' surprising support suggests institutional concerns over methodological purity

FINAL THOUGHTS ON UPCOMING CASES

TRUMP V. COOK - Federal Reserve Governor Removal

Strategic Innovation: Cook's supplemental brief marshaling amicus arguments demonstrates tactical genius

1. Adam Feldman's research shows increasing academic influence in Supreme Court decisions
2. Oral arguments provide inadequate forum for addressing comprehensive written amicus submissions
3. Supplemental briefs fill procedural gap allowing systematic written response to third-party interventions

Core Constitutional Themes:

1. Judicial Restraint: Courts must enforce only what Congress actually wrote, not judicial interpretations of congressional intent
2. "For Cause" Protection: Risk of rendering statutory protections meaningless if presidents can fabricate misconduct allegations

Trump Tariff Connection: Parallel arguments about congressional authorization requirements

1. Government previously argued against broad executive authority in tariff context
2. Now uses same textual arguments to deny Cook's statutory process rights
3. Constitutional consistency demands similar outcomes across separation of powers cases

Broader Implications: Potential elimination of congressional removal statute authority if combined with Trump v. Slaughter FTC ruling

WOLFORD V. LOPEZ - Second Amendment Property Rights

Constitutional Framework: Hawaii's 2023 "vampire rule" requiring owner consent for armed entry onto private property

1. Similar laws in California, Maryland, New York, New Jersey
2. Post-Bruen constitutional analysis requires historical tradition support

Property Rights Clash: Fundamental tension between property owner exclusion rights and Second Amendment protections

1. Hawaii invokes English law's "sole and despotic dominion" property principle
2. Gun owners argue state cannot criminalize conduct where property owners remain silent
3. Distinguishes between property owner choice and state mandate

Strategic Burden: Hawaii must prove constitutionality under strict scrutiny post-Bruen framework

1. Historical tradition analysis favors gun rights absent clear precedent
2. Five-vote majority appears unlikely given current Court composition

M & K EMPLOYEE SOLUTIONS V. IAM PENSION FUND - Pension Calculation Timing

Main Issue: Whether pension plans can retroactively apply new calculation methods

Restaurant Analogy: Changing menu prices after meal consumption parallels pension calculation timing Stakes: Fundamental contract interpretation affecting employer obligations and pension security

Related Resources:

1. Adam Feldman, "The Rise of Scholars' Amicus Briefs," Legalytics, available at https://legalytics.substack.com/p/the-rise-of-scholars-amicus-briefs
2. The High Court Report, "January Mega Preview Episode - Transgender Sports, Gun Rights, and Fed Firings," available at https://scotus-oral-arguments.captivate.fm/episode/january-mega-preview-episode-transgender-sports-gun-rights-and-fed-firings/
3. The High Court Report, "Six Pack of Takeaways + Prediction: Trump v. Slaughter," available at OVERVIEW

   Don't miss this action packed episode. In it, we cover three things:

   1. News that the Supreme Court agreed to hear 4 new cases;
   2. News that the Supreme Court will issue opinions
   3. Stats, trends, and observations of last week's 4 opinions; and
   4. Final thoughts on this week's oral arguments
   
   

   NEW CERTIORARI GRANTS

   Cases Added: Four new grants bring total to approximately 57 unique cases for the term

   1. Geofence Warrants Case: Constitutional challenge to warrants allowing police access to cell phone user data by specific date, time, and location
   2. Patent Infringement Case: Intellectual property dispute involving patent protection standards
   3. Monsanto/Roundup Case: Product liability challenge over failure to warn about cancer dangers
   4. Investment Fund Case: Securities litigation involving pleading standards for fund underperformance claims
   
   

   Term Outlook: Current case count (57 unique cases) approaches last term's 62-63 cases, suggesting limited additional grants expected

   JANUARY 20TH OPINIONS FORTHCOMING

   Release Schedule: Supreme Court plans opinion release on Monday, January 20th Coverage Plan: Detailed opinion breakdowns scheduled for Thursday or Friday depending on volume Anticipation: Multiple pending cases await resolution from previous oral argument sessions

   SCOTUS OPINION TRENDS & STATISTICAL ANALYSIS

   Reversal Patterns: Current term mirrors historical 69% reversal rate

   1. 3 reversals/vacates vs. 1 affirmance from first four decisions
   2. Montana Supreme Court decision upheld; federal circuit courts overturned
   
   

   Vote Distributions: Early decisions show typical voting patterns

   1. 2 unanimous (9-0) decisions: Barrett v. United States, Case v. Montana
   2. 1 decision 7-2, 1 decision 5-4
   3. 3 criminal law cases, 1 standing/election case
   
   

   Authorship Patterns: Different justices authored each majority opinion

   1. Roberts, Sotomayor, Kagan, Jackson wrote majorities
   2. Gorsuch most active: 2 concurrences, 1 dissent
   3. Jackson 2nd most active: 1 majority, 1 dissent
   
   

   Judicial Fracturing Analysis: Early emergence of fractured reasoning despite agreement on outcomes

   1. Notable example: Bost v. Illinois where Barrett and Kagan joined conclusion but rejected reasoning
   2. Barrett criticized majority's "bespoke standing rule for candidates"
   3. Fracturing expected to intensify in major constitutional cases
   
   

   Legislative History Debate: Emerging doctrinal battle over legislative history usage

   1. Barrett v. United States highlights split: Jackson's Part IV-C attracted only 4 votes (Roberts, Sotomayor, Kagan)
   2. Textualist justices (Thomas, Alito, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, Barrett) rejected legislative history reliance
   3. Roberts' surprising support suggests institutional concerns over methodological purity
   
   

   FINAL THOUGHTS ON UPCOMING CASES

   TRUMP V. COOK - Federal Reserve Governor Removal

   Strategic Innovation: Cook's supplemental brief marshaling amicus arguments demonstrates tactical genius

   1. Adam Feldman's research shows increasing academic influence in Supreme Court decisions
   2. Oral arguments provide inadequate forum for addressing comprehensive written amicus submissions
   3. Supplemental briefs fill procedural gap allowing systematic written response to third-party interventions
   
   

   Core Constitutional Themes:

   1. Judicial Restraint: Courts must enforce only what Congress actually wrote, not judicial interpretations of congressional intent
   2. "For Cause" Protection: Risk of rendering statutory protections meaningless if presidents can fabricate misconduct allegations
   
   

   Trump Tariff Connection: Parallel arguments about congressional authorization requirements

   1. Government previously argued against broad executive authority in tariff context
   2. Now uses same textual arguments to deny Cook's statutory process rights
   3. Constitutional consistency demands similar outcomes across separation of powers cases
   
   

   Broader Implications: Potential elimination of congressional removal statute authority if combined with Trump v. Slaughter FTC ruling

   WOLFORD V. LOPEZ - Second Amendment Property Rights

   Constitutional Framework: Hawaii's 2023 "vampire rule" requiring owner consent for armed entry onto private property

   1. Similar laws in California, Maryland, New York, New Jersey
   2. Post-Bruen constitutional analysis requires historical tradition support
   
   

   Property Rights Clash: Fundamental tension between property owner exclusion rights and Second Amendment protections

   1. Hawaii invokes English law's "sole and despotic dominion" property principle
   2. Gun owners argue state cannot criminalize conduct where property owners remain silent
   3. Distinguishes between property owner choice and state mandate
   
   

   Strategic Burden: Hawaii must prove constitutionality under strict scrutiny post-Bruen framework

   1. Historical tradition analysis favors gun rights absent clear precedent
   2. Five-vote majority appears unlikely given current Court composition
   
   

   M & K EMPLOYEE SOLUTIONS V. IAM PENSION FUND - Pension Calculation Timing

   Main Issue: Whether pension plans can retroactively apply new calculation methods

   Restaurant Analogy: Changing menu prices after meal consumption parallels pension calculation timing Stakes: Fundamental contract interpretation affecting employer obligations and pension security

   Related Resources:

   1. Adam Feldman, "The Rise of Scholars' Amicus Briefs," Legalytics, available at https://legalytics.substack.com/p/the-rise-of-scholars-amicus-briefs
   2. The High Court Report, "January Mega Preview Episode - Transgender Sports, Gun Rights, and Fed Firings," available at https://scotus-oral-arguments.captivate.fm/episode/january-mega-preview-episode-transgender-sports-gun-rights-and-fed-firings/
   3. The High Court Report, "Six Pack of Takeaways + Prediction: Trump v. Slaughter," available at https://scotus-oral-arguments.captivate.fm/episode/six-pack-of-takeaways-prediction-trump-v-slaughter/
   
   ]]>2bad4bcf-8cd8-40b7-93cb-91d76c20d92cMon, 19 Jan 2026 05:00:00 -040023:16falsefull202578782025Recap: Week of January 12 Oral ArgumentsThe Supreme Court heard oral arguments in four major cases during the week of January 12, 2026, covering federal contractor jurisdiction, transgender athletics rights, and state agency immunity.

   The Court issued its first four opinions of the term while demonstrating reluctance to expand constitutional protections in sensitive areas like transgender rights and police emergency powers.

   Justice concerns about nationwide chaos and disruption emerged as recurring themes across multiple cases involving federalism and state authority questions.

   Chevron Corporation v. Plaquemines Parish

   Question Presented: Whether federal contractor removal statute permits federal jurisdiction for conduct "relating to" government contracts

   Overview: Louisiana oil dumping lawsuit raises federalism questions about protecting contractors from local bias versus state court expertise.

   Main Analysis:

   1. Paul Clement invoked Daniel Webster's 1812 commentary about federal courts protecting nationally important projects from local prejudice
   2. Chevron fears massive verdict after Louisiana secured $744 million judgment in similar WWII oil case
   3. Chief Justice Roberts expressed "butterfly effect" concerns about sweeping federal jurisdiction for paper clip contractors
   4. Both sides conceded Fifth Circuit test failed to follow statutory text
   
   

   Prediction: Victory for Chevron or remand for different legal test application. Court disliked Fifth Circuit approach.

   Key Tension: Federal protection from local bias versus state expertise in Louisiana environmental law

   Little v. Hecox and West Virginia v. B.P.J.

   Question Presented: Whether Title IX permits excluding transgender students from gender-aligned athletics

   Overview: Parallel cases create constitutional clash over state biological sex requirements versus federal anti-discrimination protections.

   Main Analysis:

   1. Majority seemed disinclined to draw constitutional lines protecting transgender people
   2. Government's contradictory positions caught justices' attention - supports state biological sex requirements while challenging California's opposing law
   3. Follows Skrmetti decision recognizing broad state authority over transgender issues
   4. No appetite for constitutional intervention when states actively disagree
   
   

   Prediction: Idaho and West Virginia victory. Court reluctant to wade into transgender debates.

   Key Insight: Next frontier involves legitimacy of state laws protecting transgender status

   CSX Galette v. NJ Transit Corp.

   Question Presented: Whether state-created corporations retain sovereign immunity despite corporate structure

   Overview: Transit authority immunity dispute affects numerous state agencies using corporate structures.

   Main Analysis:

   1. Court focused intensely on formality versus functionality question
   2. Justice Kavanaugh expressed "chaos" concerns about jeopardizing state corporations nationwide
   3. Conservative justices seemed reluctant to depart from 1980s D.C. Circuit precedent written by Judge Bork and joined by Justice Scalia
   4. Governor maintains absolute veto power over every board action despite corporate structure
   
   

   Prediction: New Jersey Transit Corporation victory based on formality precedent and chaos avoidance

   Key Factor: Risk of nationwide disruption to state transit authorities and similar agencies

   ]]>The Supreme Court heard oral arguments in four major cases during the week of January 12, 2026, covering federal contractor jurisdiction, transgender athletics rights, and state agency immunity.

   The Court issued its first four opinions of the term while demonstrating reluctance to expand constitutional protections in sensitive areas like transgender rights and police emergency powers.

   Justice concerns about nationwide chaos and disruption emerged as recurring themes across multiple cases involving federalism and state authority questions.

   Chevron Corporation v. Plaquemines Parish

   Question Presented: Whether federal contractor removal statute permits federal jurisdiction for conduct "relating to" government contracts

   Overview: Louisiana oil dumping lawsuit raises federalism questions about protecting contractors from local bias versus state court expertise.

   Main Analysis:

   1. Paul Clement invoked Daniel Webster's 1812 commentary about federal courts protecting nationally important projects from local prejudice
   2. Chevron fears massive verdict after Louisiana secured $744 million judgment in similar WWII oil case
   3. Chief Justice Roberts expressed "butterfly effect" concerns about sweeping federal jurisdiction for paper clip contractors
   4. Both sides conceded Fifth Circuit test failed to follow statutory text
   
   

   Prediction: Victory for Chevron or remand for different legal test application. Court disliked Fifth Circuit approach.

   Key Tension: Federal protection from local bias versus state expertise in Louisiana environmental law

   Little v. Hecox and West Virginia v. B.P.J.

   Question Presented: Whether Title IX permits excluding transgender students from gender-aligned athletics

   Overview: Parallel cases create constitutional clash over state biological sex requirements versus federal anti-discrimination protections.

   Main Analysis:

   1. Majority seemed disinclined to draw constitutional lines protecting transgender people
   2. Government's contradictory positions caught justices' attention - supports state biological sex requirements while challenging California's opposing law
   3. Follows Skrmetti decision recognizing broad state authority over transgender issues
   4. No appetite for constitutional intervention when states actively disagree
   
   

   Prediction: Idaho and West Virginia victory. Court reluctant to wade into transgender debates.

   Key Insight: Next frontier involves legitimacy of state laws protecting transgender status

   CSX Galette v. NJ Transit Corp.

   Question Presented: Whether state-created corporations retain sovereign immunity despite corporate structure

   Overview: Transit authority immunity dispute affects numerous state agencies using corporate structures.

   Main Analysis:

   1. Court focused intensely on formality versus functionality question
   2. Justice Kavanaugh expressed "chaos" concerns about jeopardizing state corporations nationwide
   3. Conservative justices seemed reluctant to depart from 1980s D.C. Circuit precedent written by Judge Bork and joined by Justice Scalia
   4. Governor maintains absolute veto power over every board action despite corporate structure
   
   

   Prediction: New Jersey Transit Corporation victory based on formality precedent and chaos avoidance

   Key Factor: Risk of nationwide disruption to state transit authorities and similar agencies

   ]]>f5a9ec9f-683b-442c-bc59-f28e6458129bFri, 16 Jan 2026 16:00:00 -040013:51falsefull202578782025Opinion Summary: Bowe v. United States | Post-Conviction PuzzleBowe v. United States | Date Decided: 1/9/26 | Case No. 24-5438

   Background: Under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(1), “[ a] claim presented in a second or successive habeas corpus application under section 2254 that was presented in a prior application shall be dismissed. ” (emphasis added).

   Question Presented:

   1. Whether 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(1) applies to a claim presented in a second or successive motion to vacate under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. * * * Under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(E), “[ t]he grant or denial of an authorization by a court of appeals to file a second or successive application shall not be appealable and shall not be the subject of a petition . . . for a writ of certiorari. ” (emphasis added).
   2. Whether 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(E) deprives this Court of certiorari jurisdiction over the grant or denial of an authorization by a court of appeals to file a second or successive motion to vacate under 28 U.S.C. § 2255.
   
   

   Holding:

   1. The Court has jurisdiction because §2244(b)(3)(E) does not bar this Court’s review of a federal prisoner’s request to file a second or successive §2255 motion.
   2. Section 2244(b)(1) does not apply to second or successive motions filed under §2255(h) by federal prisoners challenging their convictions or sentences.
   
   

   Result: Vacated and remanded

   Voting Breakdown: 5-4. Justice Sotomayor delivered the opinion of the Court in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Kagan, Kavanaugh, and Jackson joined. Justice Jackson filed a concurring opinion. Justice Gorsuch filed a dissenting opinion in which Justices Thomas and Alito joined and in which Justice Barrett joined as to Part I.

   Link to Opinion: Here.

   Oral Advocates:

   1. For Petitioner: Andrew L. Adler, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Ft. Lauderdale, Florida.
   2. For Respondent: Anthony A. Yang, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.
   3. For Court-appointed amicus curiae in support of judgment below as to Question 1: Kasdin M. Mitchell, Dallas, Tex.
   
   ]]>Bowe v. United States | Date Decided: 1/9/26 | Case No. 24-5438

   Background: Under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(1), “[ a] claim presented in a second or successive habeas corpus application under section 2254 that was presented in a prior application shall be dismissed. ” (emphasis added).

   Question Presented:

   1. Whether 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(1) applies to a claim presented in a second or successive motion to vacate under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. * * * Under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(E), “[ t]he grant or denial of an authorization by a court of appeals to file a second or successive application shall not be appealable and shall not be the subject of a petition . . . for a writ of certiorari. ” (emphasis added).
   2. Whether 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(E) deprives this Court of certiorari jurisdiction over the grant or denial of an authorization by a court of appeals to file a second or successive motion to vacate under 28 U.S.C. § 2255.
   
   

   Holding:

   1. The Court has jurisdiction because §2244(b)(3)(E) does not bar this Court’s review of a federal prisoner’s request to file a second or successive §2255 motion.
   2. Section 2244(b)(1) does not apply to second or successive motions filed under §2255(h) by federal prisoners challenging their convictions or sentences.
   
   

   Result: Vacated and remanded

   Voting Breakdown: 5-4. Justice Sotomayor delivered the opinion of the Court in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Kagan, Kavanaugh, and Jackson joined. Justice Jackson filed a concurring opinion. Justice Gorsuch filed a dissenting opinion in which Justices Thomas and Alito joined and in which Justice Barrett joined as to Part I.

   Link to Opinion: Here.

   Oral Advocates:

   1. For Petitioner: Andrew L. Adler, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Ft. Lauderdale, Florida.
   2. For Respondent: Anthony A. Yang, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.
   3. For Court-appointed amicus curiae in support of judgment below as to Question 1: Kasdin M. Mitchell, Dallas, Tex.
   
   ]]>fdcf8f2c-1845-46db-8059-32f98a04bc1fFri, 16 Jan 2026 15:15:00 -040009:54falsefull202578782025Opinion Summary: Case v. Montana | Probable Cause ConfusionCase v. Montana | Date Decided: 1/14/26 | Case No. 24-624

   Question Presented: Whether law enforcement may enter a home without a search warrant based on less than probable cause that an emergency is occurring, or whether the emergency-aid exception requires probable cause.

   Background

   In this case, Case challenged the established emergency-aid exception by asking the Supreme Court to require probable cause rather than the current "objectively reasonable belief" standard for warrantless home entries during emergencies.

   Holding: Brigham City’s objective reasonableness standard for warrantless home entries to render emergency aid applies without further gloss and was satisfied in this case.

   Result: Affirmed.

   Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Kagan delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Justices Sotomayor and Gorsuch filed concurring opinions.

   Link to Opinion: Here.

   Oral Advocates:

   1. For Petitioner: Fred A. Rowley, Jr., Los Angeles, CA.
   2. For Respondent: Christian B. Corrigan, Solicitor General, Montana
   3. United States as Amicus Curiae: Zoe A. Jacoby, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice.
   
   ]]>Case v. Montana | Date Decided: 1/14/26 | Case No. 24-624

   Question Presented: Whether law enforcement may enter a home without a search warrant based on less than probable cause that an emergency is occurring, or whether the emergency-aid exception requires probable cause.

   Background

   In this case, Case challenged the established emergency-aid exception by asking the Supreme Court to require probable cause rather than the current "objectively reasonable belief" standard for warrantless home entries during emergencies.

   Holding: Brigham City’s objective reasonableness standard for warrantless home entries to render emergency aid applies without further gloss and was satisfied in this case.

   Result: Affirmed.

   Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Kagan delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Justices Sotomayor and Gorsuch filed concurring opinions.

   Link to Opinion: Here.

   Oral Advocates:

   1. For Petitioner: Fred A. Rowley, Jr., Los Angeles, CA.
   2. For Respondent: Christian B. Corrigan, Solicitor General, Montana
   3. United States as Amicus Curiae: Zoe A. Jacoby, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice.
   
   ]]>9a3c74fa-4b4c-4a23-8cab-e71c4c7a869bFri, 16 Jan 2026 15:15:00 -040011:55falsefull202578782025Opinion Summary: Barrett v. United States | Double Jeopardy DilemmaBarrett v. United States | Date Decided: 1/14/26 | Case No. 24-5774

   Question Presented:

   1. Whether the Double Jeopardy Clause permits two sentences for an act that violates 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) and§ 924(j), a question that divides seven circuits but about which the Solicitor General and Petitioner agree.
   2. Whether "Hobbs Act robbery qualifies as a crime of violence under §924(c) (3)(A), a question left open after" United States v. Taylor , 596 U.S. 845 (2022). United States v. Stoney , 62 F.4th 108, 113 (3d Cir. 2023).
   
   

   Holding: Congress did not clearly authorize convictions under both §§924(c)(1)(A)(i) and (j) for a single act that violates both provisions. One act that violates both provisions therefore may spawn only one conviction.

   Result: Reversed in part and remanded

   Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Jackson delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts I, II, III, IV–A, and IV–B and an opinion with respect to Part IV–C in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Sotomayor and Kagan joined. Justice Gorsuch filed an opinion concurring in part.

   Link to Opinion: Here.

   Oral Advocates:

   1. For Petitioner: Matthew B. Larsen, Assistant Federal Defender, New York, N. Y.
   2. For Respondent in Support of Petitioner: Aimee Brown, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.
   3. For Court-Appointed Amicus Curiae in Support of Judgment Below: Charles L. McCloud, Washington, D.C.
   
   ]]>Barrett v. United States | Date Decided: 1/14/26 | Case No. 24-5774

   Question Presented:

   1. Whether the Double Jeopardy Clause permits two sentences for an act that violates 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) and§ 924(j), a question that divides seven circuits but about which the Solicitor General and Petitioner agree.
   2. Whether "Hobbs Act robbery qualifies as a crime of violence under §924(c) (3)(A), a question left open after" United States v. Taylor , 596 U.S. 845 (2022). United States v. Stoney , 62 F.4th 108, 113 (3d Cir. 2023).
   
   

   Holding: Congress did not clearly authorize convictions under both §§924(c)(1)(A)(i) and (j) for a single act that violates both provisions. One act that violates both provisions therefore may spawn only one conviction.

   Result: Reversed in part and remanded

   Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Jackson delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts I, II, III, IV–A, and IV–B and an opinion with respect to Part IV–C in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Sotomayor and Kagan joined. Justice Gorsuch filed an opinion concurring in part.

   Link to Opinion: Here.

   Oral Advocates:

   1. For Petitioner: Matthew B. Larsen, Assistant Federal Defender, New York, N. Y.
   2. For Respondent in Support of Petitioner: Aimee Brown, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.
   3. For Court-Appointed Amicus Curiae in Support of Judgment Below: Charles L. McCloud, Washington, D.C.
   
   ]]>2b6ac929-4660-4eeb-8da1-abb5f2cc38c0Fri, 16 Jan 2026 15:00:00 -040009:44falsefull202578782025Opinion Summary: Bost v. Illinois Board of Elections | Election Law StandingBost v. Illinois State Bd. of Elections | Date Decided: 1/14/26 | Case No. 24-568

   Question Presented: Whether candidates running for federal office hold Article III standing to challenge state time, place, and manner regulations concerning their federal elections, specifically the state laws that allow ballots to be receivd and counted after election day.

   Link to Opinion: Here.

   Holding: As a candidate for office, Congressman Bost holds standing to challenge the laws that govern the counting of votes in his election.

   Result: Reversed and remanded.

   Voting Breakdown: 7-2. Chief Justice Roberts delivered the opinion of the Court in which Justices Alito, Thomas, Gorsuch, and Kavanaugh joined. Justice Barrett filed an opinion concurring in the judgment in which Justice Kagan joined. Justice Jackson filed a dissenting opinion in which Justice Sotomayor joined.

   Oral Advocates:

   1. For Petitioner: Paul D. Clement, Alexandria, Va.;
   2. United States, as Amicus Curiae: Michael Talent, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.
   3. For Respondent: Jane E. Notz, Solicitor General, Chicago, Ill.
   
   ]]>Bost v. Illinois State Bd. of Elections | Date Decided: 1/14/26 | Case No. 24-568

   Question Presented: Whether candidates running for federal office hold Article III standing to challenge state time, place, and manner regulations concerning their federal elections, specifically the state laws that allow ballots to be receivd and counted after election day.

   Link to Opinion: Here.

   Holding: As a candidate for office, Congressman Bost holds standing to challenge the laws that govern the counting of votes in his election.

   Result: Reversed and remanded.

   Voting Breakdown: 7-2. Chief Justice Roberts delivered the opinion of the Court in which Justices Alito, Thomas, Gorsuch, and Kavanaugh joined. Justice Barrett filed an opinion concurring in the judgment in which Justice Kagan joined. Justice Jackson filed a dissenting opinion in which Justice Sotomayor joined.

   Oral Advocates:

   1. For Petitioner: Paul D. Clement, Alexandria, Va.;
   2. United States, as Amicus Curiae: Michael Talent, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.
   3. For Respondent: Jane E. Notz, Solicitor General, Chicago, Ill.
   
   ]]>4eceff64-2285-4e8e-a1c9-4a6bbb705ce1Fri, 16 Jan 2026 15:00:00 -040013:14falsefull202578782025Oral Argument: CSX Galette versus New Jersey Transit | Sovereign Immunity Shell GameCSX Galette v. NJ Transit Corp. | Argument Date: 1/14/26 | Docket Link: Here Consolidated with CSX NJ Transit Corp. v. Colt | Argument Date: 1/14/26 | Docket Link: Here

   Oral Advocates:

   1. For Petitioner (New Jersey Transit Corp.): Michael Zuckerman, Deputy Solicitor General, Trenton, New Jersey.
   2. For Respondents (Galette and Colt): Michael Kimberly, Washington, D.C.
   
   

   Question Presented: Whether the New Jersey Transit Corporation functions as an arm of the State of New Jersey for interstate sovereign immunity purposes

   Overview: NJ Transit claims sovereign immunity after bus injured passenger in Philadelphia, raising fundamental federalism questions about state power to extend constitutional immunity to state-created corporations while disclaiming their debts and liabilities.

   Posture: Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed lower courts, holding NJ Transit qualifies as state arm based on statutory mission and structure.

   Main Arguments:

   • NJ Transit (Petitioner): (1) New Jersey's legislative designation of public transportation as "essential governmental function" deserves federal deference and establishes instrumentality status; (2) Governor's appointment, for-cause removal, and veto powers demonstrate sufficient state control; (3) Substantial state subsidies (15-40% of operating budget) create practical financial interdependence implicating state treasury despite formal liability disclaimer

   • Galette (Respondent): (1) Founding-era bright-line rule denied sovereign immunity to all corporations liable for own judgments regardless of state ownership, control, or purpose; (2) Treasury factor proves dispositive because New Jersey statute explicitly disclaims legal liability for NJ Transit debts, eliminating state treasury exposure; (3) Corporate structure with sue-and-be-sued powers, operational independence, and commercial transportation function demonstrates legal separateness from state

   Implications: NJ Transit victory allows states to extend sovereign immunity to state-created corporations operating across state lines while disclaiming their liabilities, potentially shielding transit authorities, universities, and development agencies nationwide from sister-state court jurisdiction. Galette victory reinforces Founding-era corporate separateness doctrine and makes treasury factor controlling, requiring actual state legal liability for immunity and limiting state power to manufacture constitutional immunity through entity characterization while maintaining corporate independence and debt disclaimers.

   The Fine Print:

   • N.J. Stat. § 27:25-17: "All expenses incurred by the corporation in carrying out the provisions of this act shall be payable from funds available to the corporation...No debt or liability of the corporation shall be deemed or construed to create or constitute a debt, liability, or a loan or pledge of the credit of the State"

   • Eleventh Amendment: "The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State"

   Primary Cases:

   • Hess v. Port Authority Trans-Hudson Corp. (1994): Treasury factor constitutes "most salient factor" that "homes in on the impetus for the Eleventh Amendment: the prevention of federal-court judgments that must be paid out of a State's treasury"; when evidence on structure and control factors appears mixed, treasury factor becomes dispositive

   • Bank of United States v. Planters' Bank of Georgia (1824): When government becomes partner in trading company, it "devests itself, so far as concerns the transactions of that company, of its sovereign character, and takes that of a private citizen"; corporate form precluded sovereign immunity regardless of state ownership or control

   Link to Opinion: TBD.

   Website Link to Opinion Summary: TBD.

   Website Link to Oral Argument: TBD.

   Timestamps:

   [00:00:00] Argument Preview

   [00:01:27] Oral Argument Begins

   [00:01:38] New Jersey Transit Corp. Opening Statement

   [00:03:46] Transit Free for All Questions

   [00:29:21] Transit Round Robin Questions

   [00:37:27] CSX Galette and Colt Opening Statement

   [00:39:44] CSX Galette and Colt Free for All Questions

   [01:07:30] CSX Galette and Colt Round Robin Questions

   [01:08:09] Transit Rebuttal

   ]]>CSX Galette v. NJ Transit Corp. | Argument Date: 1/14/26 | Docket Link: Here Consolidated with CSX NJ Transit Corp. v. Colt | Argument Date: 1/14/26 | Docket Link: Here

   Oral Advocates:

   1. For Petitioner (New Jersey Transit Corp.): Michael Zuckerman, Deputy Solicitor General, Trenton, New Jersey.
   2. For Respondents (Galette and Colt): Michael Kimberly, Washington, D.C.
   
   

   Question Presented: Whether the New Jersey Transit Corporation functions as an arm of the State of New Jersey for interstate sovereign immunity purposes

   Overview: NJ Transit claims sovereign immunity after bus injured passenger in Philadelphia, raising fundamental federalism questions about state power to extend constitutional immunity to state-created corporations while disclaiming their debts and liabilities.

   Posture: Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed lower courts, holding NJ Transit qualifies as state arm based on statutory mission and structure.

   Main Arguments:

   • NJ Transit (Petitioner): (1) New Jersey's legislative designation of public transportation as "essential governmental function" deserves federal deference and establishes instrumentality status; (2) Governor's appointment, for-cause removal, and veto powers demonstrate sufficient state control; (3) Substantial state subsidies (15-40% of operating budget) create practical financial interdependence implicating state treasury despite formal liability disclaimer

   • Galette (Respondent): (1) Founding-era bright-line rule denied sovereign immunity to all corporations liable for own judgments regardless of state ownership, control, or purpose; (2) Treasury factor proves dispositive because New Jersey statute explicitly disclaims legal liability for NJ Transit debts, eliminating state treasury exposure; (3) Corporate structure with sue-and-be-sued powers, operational independence, and commercial transportation function demonstrates legal separateness from state

   Implications: NJ Transit victory allows states to extend sovereign immunity to state-created corporations operating across state lines while disclaiming their liabilities, potentially shielding transit authorities, universities, and development agencies nationwide from sister-state court jurisdiction. Galette victory reinforces Founding-era corporate separateness doctrine and makes treasury factor controlling, requiring actual state legal liability for immunity and limiting state power to manufacture constitutional immunity through entity characterization while maintaining corporate independence and debt disclaimers.

   The Fine Print:

   • N.J. Stat. § 27:25-17: "All expenses incurred by the corporation in carrying out the provisions of this act shall be payable from funds available to the corporation...No debt or liability of the corporation shall be deemed or construed to create or constitute a debt, liability, or a loan or pledge of the credit of the State"

   • Eleventh Amendment: "The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State"

   Primary Cases:

   • Hess v. Port Authority Trans-Hudson Corp. (1994): Treasury factor constitutes "most salient factor" that "homes in on the impetus for the Eleventh Amendment: the prevention of federal-court judgments that must be paid out of a State's treasury"; when evidence on structure and control factors appears mixed, treasury factor becomes dispositive

   • Bank of United States v. Planters' Bank of Georgia (1824): When government becomes partner in trading company, it "devests itself, so far as concerns the transactions of that company, of its sovereign character, and takes that of a private citizen"; corporate form precluded sovereign immunity regardless of state ownership or control

   Link to Opinion: TBD.

   Website Link to Opinion Summary: TBD.

   Website Link to Oral Argument: TBD.

   Timestamps:

   [00:00:00] Argument Preview

   [00:01:27] Oral Argument Begins

   [00:01:38] New Jersey Transit Corp. Opening Statement

   [00:03:46] Transit Free for All Questions

   [00:29:21] Transit Round Robin Questions

   [00:37:27] CSX Galette and Colt Opening Statement

   [00:39:44] CSX Galette and Colt Free for All Questions

   [01:07:30] CSX Galette and Colt Round Robin Questions

   [01:08:09] Transit Rebuttal

   ]]>3f48f3ee-0ea6-4407-b8e0-8760a2a538b6Wed, 14 Jan 2026 16:15:00 -040001:11:18falsefull202574742025Oral Argument: West Virginia v. BPJ | Title IX Transgender TornadoWest Virginia v. B.P.J. | Oral Argument Date: 1/13/26 | Docket Link: Here

   Oral Advocates:

   1. For Petitioner (West Virginia): Michael Williams, Solicitor General, Charleston, WV.
   2. For United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner): Hashim M. Mooppan, Principal Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice.
   3. For Respondent (B.J.P.): Joshua Block, New York, New York.
   
   

   Question Presented: Whether laws protecting women's sports by limiting participation to biological females violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment

   Overview: Consolidated cases challenging Idaho's categorical ban and West Virginia's Save Women's Sports Act generate Supreme Court's first major ruling on transgender athletics after Skrmetti reshaped constitutional sex discrimination analysis.

   Posture: Multiple circuit splits; Little preliminarily enjoined (Ninth Circuit), West Virginia reversed (Fourth Circuit); proceedings stayed pending review.

   Main Arguments:

   • Petitioners (West Virginia): (1) Constitutional "sex" means objective biological reality, not subjective gender identity; (2) Rational basis review applies to definitional challenges about meaning of "female"; (3) Skrmetti forecloses proxy discrimination claims targeting biology-based classifications

   United States (as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners): (1) Equal Protection permits sex-separated athletics based on constitutional history; (2) Biology-based classifications address competitive fairness, not discriminatory animus; (3) Skrmetti forecloses proxy discrimination claims

   • Respondents (B.P.J.): (1) Categorical exclusions constitute traditional sex discrimination triggering heightened scrutiny; (2) Transgender status qualifies as quasi-suspect classification warranting judicial protection; (3) Individual assessment required under VMI rather than blanket exclusions

   Implications:

   1. Petitioners' victory establishes broad state authority over sex-separated activities using biological definitions, potentially affecting employment discrimination, housing rights, and educational access beyond sports.
   2. Respondent victory extends heightened constitutional protection to transgender individuals, requiring individualized consideration rather than categorical exclusions and potentially invalidating similar laws across twenty-six states.
   3. Ruling will clarify whether Skrmetti's restrictive constitutional framework applies beyond medical treatment contexts and resolve circuit split on Title IX interpretation.
   
   

   The Fine Print:

   • Fourteenth Amendment § 1: "No State shall...deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws"

   • W. Va. Code § 18-2-25d(c)(2): Female teams "shall not be open to students of the male sex where selection for such teams is based upon competitive skill or the activity involved is a contact sport"

   Primary Cases:

   • United States v. Skrmetti (2025): Constitutional sex classifications analyze biological differences rather than gender identity; laws addressing medical procedures and age restrictions don't trigger heightened scrutiny based on transgender status

   • United States v. Virginia (VMI) (1996): Sex-based exclusions require exceedingly persuasive justification under intermediate scrutiny; categorical rules must account for individual capabilities rather than statistical generalizations

   Link to Opinion: TBD.

   Website Link to Opinion Summary: TBD.

   Timestamps:

   [00:00:00] Oral Argument Intro

   [00:01:45] Oral Argument Begins

   [00:01:52] West Virginia Opening Statement

   [00:04:02] West Virginia Free for All Questions

   [00:19:07] West Virginia Round Robin Questions

   [00:31:49] United States as Amicus Curiae Opening Statement

   [00:32:57] United States Free for All Questions

   [00:41:58] United States Round Robin Questions

   [00:49:15] BJP Opening Statement

   [00:51:30] BPJ Free for All Questions

   [01:19:19] BPJ Round Robin Questions

   [01:20:56] West Virginia Rebuttal

   ]]>West Virginia v. B.P.J. | Oral Argument Date: 1/13/26 | Docket Link: Here

   Oral Advocates:

   1. For Petitioner (West Virginia): Michael Williams, Solicitor General, Charleston, WV.
   2. For United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner): Hashim M. Mooppan, Principal Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice.
   3. For Respondent (B.J.P.): Joshua Block, New York, New York.
   
   

   Question Presented: Whether laws protecting women's sports by limiting participation to biological females violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment

   Overview: Consolidated cases challenging Idaho's categorical ban and West Virginia's Save Women's Sports Act generate Supreme Court's first major ruling on transgender athletics after Skrmetti reshaped constitutional sex discrimination analysis.

   Posture: Multiple circuit splits; Little preliminarily enjoined (Ninth Circuit), West Virginia reversed (Fourth Circuit); proceedings stayed pending review.

   Main Arguments:

   • Petitioners (West Virginia): (1) Constitutional "sex" means objective biological reality, not subjective gender identity; (2) Rational basis review applies to definitional challenges about meaning of "female"; (3) Skrmetti forecloses proxy discrimination claims targeting biology-based classifications

   United States (as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners): (1) Equal Protection permits sex-separated athletics based on constitutional history; (2) Biology-based classifications address competitive fairness, not discriminatory animus; (3) Skrmetti forecloses proxy discrimination claims

   • Respondents (B.P.J.): (1) Categorical exclusions constitute traditional sex discrimination triggering heightened scrutiny; (2) Transgender status qualifies as quasi-suspect classification warranting judicial protection; (3) Individual assessment required under VMI rather than blanket exclusions

   Implications:

   1. Petitioners' victory establishes broad state authority over sex-separated activities using biological definitions, potentially affecting employment discrimination, housing rights, and educational access beyond sports.
   2. Respondent victory extends heightened constitutional protection to transgender individuals, requiring individualized consideration rather than categorical exclusions and potentially invalidating similar laws across twenty-six states.
   3. Ruling will clarify whether Skrmetti's restrictive constitutional framework applies beyond medical treatment contexts and resolve circuit split on Title IX interpretation.
   
   

   The Fine Print:

   • Fourteenth Amendment § 1: "No State shall...deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws"

   • W. Va. Code § 18-2-25d(c)(2): Female teams "shall not be open to students of the male sex where selection for such teams is based upon competitive skill or the activity involved is a contact sport"

   Primary Cases:

   • United States v. Skrmetti (2025): Constitutional sex classifications analyze biological differences rather than gender identity; laws addressing medical procedures and age restrictions don't trigger heightened scrutiny based on transgender status

   • United States v. Virginia (VMI) (1996): Sex-based exclusions require exceedingly persuasive justification under intermediate scrutiny; categorical rules must account for individual capabilities rather than statistical generalizations

   Link to Opinion: TBD.

   Website Link to Opinion Summary: TBD.

   Timestamps:

   [00:00:00] Oral Argument Intro

   [00:01:45] Oral Argument Begins

   [00:01:52] West Virginia Opening Statement

   [00:04:02] West Virginia Free for All Questions

   [00:19:07] West Virginia Round Robin Questions

   [00:31:49] United States as Amicus Curiae Opening Statement

   [00:32:57] United States Free for All Questions

   [00:41:58] United States Round Robin Questions

   [00:49:15] BJP Opening Statement

   [00:51:30] BPJ Free for All Questions

   [01:19:19] BPJ Round Robin Questions

   [01:20:56] West Virginia Rebuttal

   ]]>582b83f5-f2be-4766-946e-ea643fd2caa8Tue, 13 Jan 2026 17:00:00 -040001:23:40falsefull202573732025Oral Argument: Little v. Hecox | Title IX Transgender TornadoLittle v. Hecox | Oral Argument Date: 1/13/26 | Docket Link: Here

   Oral Advocates:

   1. For Petitioner (Idaho): Alan Hurst, Solicitor General, Boise, Idaho
   2. For United States (as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner): Hashim Mooppan, Principal Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice
   3. For Respondent (Hecox): Kathleen R. Hartnett, San Francisco, California.
   
   

   Question Presented: Whether laws protecting women's sports by limiting participation to biological females violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment

   Overview: Consolidated cases challenging Idaho's categorical ban and West Virginia's Save Women's Sports Act generate Supreme Court's first major ruling on transgender athletics after Skrmetti reshaped constitutional sex discrimination analysis.

   Posture: Multiple circuit splits; Little preliminarily enjoined (Ninth Circuit), West Virginia reversed (Fourth Circuit); proceedings stayed pending review.

   Main Arguments:

   • Petitioners (Idaho): (1) Constitutional "sex" means objective biological reality, not subjective gender identity; (2) Rational basis review applies to definitional challenges about meaning of "female"; (3) Skrmetti forecloses proxy discrimination claims targeting biology-based classifications

   United States (as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners): (1) Equal Protection permits sex-separated athletics based on constitutional history; (2) Biology-based classifications address competitive fairness, not discriminatory animus; (3) Skrmetti forecloses proxy discrimination claims

   • Respondents (Hecox): (1) Categorical exclusions constitute traditional sex discrimination triggering heightened scrutiny; (2) Transgender status qualifies as quasi-suspect classification warranting judicial protection; (3) Individual assessment required under VMI rather than blanket exclusions

   Implications:

   1. Petitioners' victory establishes broad state authority over sex-separated activities using biological definitions, potentially affecting employment discrimination, housing rights, and educational access beyond sports.
   2. Respondent victory extends heightened constitutional protection to transgender individuals, requiring individualized consideration rather than categorical exclusions and potentially invalidating similar laws across twenty-six states.
   3. Ruling will clarify whether Skrmetti's restrictive constitutional framework applies beyond medical treatment contexts and resolve circuit split on Title IX interpretation.
   
   

   The Fine Print:

   • Fourteenth Amendment § 1: "No State shall...deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws"

   • Idaho Code § 33-6203(3): "Athletic teams or sports designated for females, women, or girls shall not be open to students of the male sex"

   Primary Cases:

   • United States v. Skrmetti (2025): Constitutional sex classifications analyze biological differences rather than gender identity; laws addressing medical procedures and age restrictions don't trigger heightened scrutiny based on transgender status

   • United States v. Virginia (VMI) (1996): Sex-based exclusions require exceedingly persuasive justification under intermediate scrutiny; categorical rules must account for individual capabilities rather than statistical generalizations

   Link to Opinion: TBD.

   Website Link to Opinion Summary: TBD.

   Timestamps:

   [00:00:00] Oral Argument Intro

   [00:01:19] Oral Argument Begins

   [00:01:26] Little Opening Statement

   [00:03:27] Little Free for Questions

   [00:19:05] Little Round Robin Questions

   [00:42:18] United States as Amicus Curiae Opening Statement

   [00:43:27] United States Free for All Questions

   [00:52:38] United States Round Robin Questions

   [01:08:33] Hecox Opening Statement

   [01:10:40] Hecox Free for All Questions

   [01:38:37] Hecox Round Robin Questions

   [01:51:09] Little Rebuttal

   ]]>Little v. Hecox | Oral Argument Date: 1/13/26 | Docket Link: Here

   Oral Advocates:

   1. For Petitioner (Idaho): Alan Hurst, Solicitor General, Boise, Idaho
   2. For United States (as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner): Hashim Mooppan, Principal Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice
   3. For Respondent (Hecox): Kathleen R. Hartnett, San Francisco, California.
   
   

   Question Presented: Whether laws protecting women's sports by limiting participation to biological females violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment

   Overview: Consolidated cases challenging Idaho's categorical ban and West Virginia's Save Women's Sports Act generate Supreme Court's first major ruling on transgender athletics after Skrmetti reshaped constitutional sex discrimination analysis.

   Posture: Multiple circuit splits; Little preliminarily enjoined (Ninth Circuit), West Virginia reversed (Fourth Circuit); proceedings stayed pending review.

   Main Arguments:

   • Petitioners (Idaho): (1) Constitutional "sex" means objective biological reality, not subjective gender identity; (2) Rational basis review applies to definitional challenges about meaning of "female"; (3) Skrmetti forecloses proxy discrimination claims targeting biology-based classifications

   United States (as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners): (1) Equal Protection permits sex-separated athletics based on constitutional history; (2) Biology-based classifications address competitive fairness, not discriminatory animus; (3) Skrmetti forecloses proxy discrimination claims

   • Respondents (Hecox): (1) Categorical exclusions constitute traditional sex discrimination triggering heightened scrutiny; (2) Transgender status qualifies as quasi-suspect classification warranting judicial protection; (3) Individual assessment required under VMI rather than blanket exclusions

   Implications:

   1. Petitioners' victory establishes broad state authority over sex-separated activities using biological definitions, potentially affecting employment discrimination, housing rights, and educational access beyond sports.
   2. Respondent victory extends heightened constitutional protection to transgender individuals, requiring individualized consideration rather than categorical exclusions and potentially invalidating similar laws across twenty-six states.
   3. Ruling will clarify whether Skrmetti's restrictive constitutional framework applies beyond medical treatment contexts and resolve circuit split on Title IX interpretation.
   
   

   The Fine Print:

   • Fourteenth Amendment § 1: "No State shall...deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws"

   • Idaho Code § 33-6203(3): "Athletic teams or sports designated for females, women, or girls shall not be open to students of the male sex"

   Primary Cases:

   • United States v. Skrmetti (2025): Constitutional sex classifications analyze biological differences rather than gender identity; laws addressing medical procedures and age restrictions don't trigger heightened scrutiny based on transgender status

   • United States v. Virginia (VMI) (1996): Sex-based exclusions require exceedingly persuasive justification under intermediate scrutiny; categorical rules must account for individual capabilities rather than statistical generalizations

   Link to Opinion: TBD.

   Website Link to Opinion Summary: TBD.

   Timestamps:

   [00:00:00] Oral Argument Intro

   [00:01:19] Oral Argument Begins

   [00:01:26] Little Opening Statement

   [00:03:27] Little Free for Questions

   [00:19:05] Little Round Robin Questions

   [00:42:18] United States as Amicus Curiae Opening Statement

   [00:43:27] United States Free for All Questions

   [00:52:38] United States Round Robin Questions

   [01:08:33] Hecox Opening Statement

   [01:10:40] Hecox Free for All Questions

   [01:38:37] Hecox Round Robin Questions

   [01:51:09] Little Rebuttal

   ]]>68b6f4fd-fea0-4e24-8676-8d31e4e553a4Tue, 13 Jan 2026 16:00:00 -040001:53:40falsefull202573732025Oral Argument: Chevron USA Inc. v. Plaquemines Parish: When Fueling WW2 Meets Leads to LawsuitsChevron USA Inc. v. Plaquemines Parish | Oral Argument Date: 1/12/26 | Docket Link: Here

   Oral Advocates:

   1. For Petitioner (Chevron): Paul D. Clement, Alexandria, VA argues for Petitioner Chevron.
   2. For United States (as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner): Aaron R., Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice argues for United States as amicus curiae.
   3. For Respondent: J. Benjamin Aguiñaga, Solicitor General, Baton Rouge, LA argues for Respondent Plaquemines Parish.
   
   

   Question Presented: Whether oil companies can remove a state lawsuit into federal court involving oil production if the oil companies provided services under a federal contract for oil refining but not production.

   Overview: Oil companies that fueled WWII fighter planes face $744.6 million in state court verdicts for 80-year-old production methods, creating unprecedented federal contractor liability exposure with massive removal jurisdiction implications.

   Posture: Fifth Circuit denied en banc rehearing by narrow 7-6 vote after split panel affirmed remand.

   Main Arguments:

   • Chevron (Petitioner): (1) 2011 amendment eliminated causal-nexus requirement through "relating to" language expansion; (2) Fifth Circuit improperly reinstated contractual-direction test rejected by other circuits; (3) Oil production activities directly connected to federal avgas contracts through pricing terms and wartime regulations

   • Louisiana (Respondent): (1) No genuine circuit split exists among courts applying "connection or association" standard; (2) Case lacks national importance beyond fact-specific contractor disputes; (3) Federal contracts remained silent about production methods, requiring sufficient connection between challenged conduct and federal directives

   Implications: Chevron victory expands federal contractor protection from state court liability for activities connected to federal work, potentially encouraging emergency contracting. Louisiana victory maintains state environmental enforcement authority while exposing federal contractors to massive local jury verdicts for wartime activities.

   The Fine Print:

   • 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1): "A civil action...commenced in a State court against...any officer (or any person acting under that officer) of the United States...for or relating to any act under color of such office...may be removed"

   • State and Local Coastal Resources Management Act: Requires compliance with environmental standards for oil and gas operations in Louisiana coastal zone

   Link to Opinion: TBD.

   Website Link to Opinion Summary: TBD.

   Timestamps:

   [00:00:00] Argument Intro

   [00:01:54] Argument Begins

   [00:02:01] Chevron Opening Statement

   [00:04:26] Chevron Free for All Questions

   [00:19:20] Chevron Round Robin Questions

   [00:34:43] United States as Amicus Curiae Opening Statement

   [00:35:48] United States Free for All Questions

   [00:45:50] United States Round Robin Questions

   [00:52:13] Plaquemines Opening Statement

   [00:53:57] Plaquemines Free for All Questions

   [01:10:14] Plaquemines Round Robin Questions

   [01:16:07] Chevron Rebuttal

   ]]>Chevron USA Inc. v. Plaquemines Parish | Oral Argument Date: 1/12/26 | Docket Link: Here

   Oral Advocates:

   1. For Petitioner (Chevron): Paul D. Clement, Alexandria, VA argues for Petitioner Chevron.
   2. For United States (as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner): Aaron R., Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice argues for United States as amicus curiae.
   3. For Respondent: J. Benjamin Aguiñaga, Solicitor General, Baton Rouge, LA argues for Respondent Plaquemines Parish.
   
   

   Question Presented: Whether oil companies can remove a state lawsuit into federal court involving oil production if the oil companies provided services under a federal contract for oil refining but not production.

   Overview: Oil companies that fueled WWII fighter planes face $744.6 million in state court verdicts for 80-year-old production methods, creating unprecedented federal contractor liability exposure with massive removal jurisdiction implications.

   Posture: Fifth Circuit denied en banc rehearing by narrow 7-6 vote after split panel affirmed remand.

   Main Arguments:

   • Chevron (Petitioner): (1) 2011 amendment eliminated causal-nexus requirement through "relating to" language expansion; (2) Fifth Circuit improperly reinstated contractual-direction test rejected by other circuits; (3) Oil production activities directly connected to federal avgas contracts through pricing terms and wartime regulations

   • Louisiana (Respondent): (1) No genuine circuit split exists among courts applying "connection or association" standard; (2) Case lacks national importance beyond fact-specific contractor disputes; (3) Federal contracts remained silent about production methods, requiring sufficient connection between challenged conduct and federal directives

   Implications: Chevron victory expands federal contractor protection from state court liability for activities connected to federal work, potentially encouraging emergency contracting. Louisiana victory maintains state environmental enforcement authority while exposing federal contractors to massive local jury verdicts for wartime activities.

   The Fine Print:

   • 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1): "A civil action...commenced in a State court against...any officer (or any person acting under that officer) of the United States...for or relating to any act under color of such office...may be removed"

   • State and Local Coastal Resources Management Act: Requires compliance with environmental standards for oil and gas operations in Louisiana coastal zone

   Link to Opinion: TBD.

   Website Link to Opinion Summary: TBD.

   Timestamps:

   [00:00:00] Argument Intro

   [00:01:54] Argument Begins

   [00:02:01] Chevron Opening Statement

   [00:04:26] Chevron Free for All Questions

   [00:19:20] Chevron Round Robin Questions

   [00:34:43] United States as Amicus Curiae Opening Statement

   [00:35:48] United States Free for All Questions

   [00:45:50] United States Round Robin Questions

   [00:52:13] Plaquemines Opening Statement

   [00:53:57] Plaquemines Free for All Questions

   [01:10:14] Plaquemines Round Robin Questions

   [01:16:07] Chevron Rebuttal

   ]]>2a78d95d-7520-40e6-bf8d-c11804ea1755Mon, 12 Jan 2026 14:00:00 -040001:19:19falsefull202573732025SCOTUS Returns: Final Thoughts on This Week’s Supreme Court CasesHear final thoughts on this week's Supreme Court cases:

   See case preview episodes and January Mega Episode (here) for additional case details.

   Case Summaries:

   Chevron v. Plaquemines (Jan 12): WWII oil companies face massive state court verdict for 1940s production methods.

   Little v. Hecox (Jan 13): Transgender female students challenge Idaho and West Virginia sports participation bans.

   CSX Galette v. NJ Transit (Jan 14): Transit authority claims sovereign immunity despite state disclaimer of responsibility.

   Follow The High Court Report:

   1. Apple, Spotify, YouTube podcasts
   2. LinkedIn for daily updates
   3. Email: scotus.cases.pod@gmail.com
   4. Individual case previews available on podcast page
   
   ]]>Hear final thoughts on this week's Supreme Court cases:

   See case preview episodes and January Mega Episode (here) for additional case details.

   Case Summaries:

   Chevron v. Plaquemines (Jan 12): WWII oil companies face massive state court verdict for 1940s production methods.

   Little v. Hecox (Jan 13): Transgender female students challenge Idaho and West Virginia sports participation bans.

   CSX Galette v. NJ Transit (Jan 14): Transit authority claims sovereign immunity despite state disclaimer of responsibility.

   Follow The High Court Report:

   1. Apple, Spotify, YouTube podcasts
   2. LinkedIn for daily updates
   3. Email: scotus.cases.pod@gmail.com
   4. Individual case previews available on podcast page
   
   ]]>8b03ac7f-7bbb-46c9-a96c-de9e7885d93aMon, 12 Jan 2026 05:00:00 -040017:26falsefull202572722025January Mega Preview Episode - Transgender Sports, Gun Rights, and Fed FiringsBased on the project templates and your episode script, here are show notes for your January 2026 mega episode:

   January 2026 Supreme Court Mega Preview | The High Court Report

   Overview: Action-packed January brings constitutional showdowns across five major cases spanning wartime contractor protection, transgender athletics, sovereign immunity, Second Amendment property rights, and presidential removal power over Federal Reserve governors.

   Roadmap Episode: Complete preview covering Chevron's $744 million WWII liability case, transgender sports restrictions post-Skrmetti, New Jersey Transit sovereignty claims, Hawaii's gun permission requirements after Bruen, and Trump's authority to fire Fed officials for pre-appointment conduct.

   Case Summaries:

   Chevron v. Plaquemines (Jan 12): WWII oil companies face massive state court verdict for 1940s production methods.

   Little v. Hecox (Jan 13): Transgender female students challenge Idaho and West Virginia sports participation bans.

   CSX Galette v. NJ Transit (Jan 14): Transit authority claims sovereign immunity despite state disclaimer of responsibility.

   Wolford v. Lopez (Jan 20): Licensed gun carriers sue Hawaii over business entry permission requirements.

   Trump v. Cook (Jan 21): Presidential firing of Fed Governor Lisa Cook over mortgage application allegations.

   Key Themes:

   1. Federalism tensions across multiple cases
   2. Post-Bruen Second Amendment applications
   3. Sovereign immunity doctrine evolution
   4. Presidential removal authority limits
   5. Constitutional gender classifications after Skrmetti
   
   

   Statistics:

   1. Supreme Court currently reviewing 48 unique pending cases
   2. 63 cases heard last term, suggesting 10-15 more additions likely
   3. Fourth sovereign immunity case this term
   4. Benjamin Aguinaga and Paul Clement each arguing third cases this year
   
   

   Schedule Notes:

   1. January arguments followed by February hiatus until month-end
   2. Only three sitting days in entire February
   3. Eight March days and seven April sitting days planned
   4. May-June dates not yet set
   
   

   Follow The High Court Report:

   1. Apple, Spotify, YouTube podcasts
   2. LinkedIn for daily updates
   3. Email: scotus.cases.pod@gmail.com
   4. Individual case previews available on podcast page
   
   

   Link

   1. 8/19/25 Episode: Road Work Ahead: How Four 2024 Cases May Be Reshaping First Amendment Scrutiny (https://scotus-oral-arguments.captivate.fm/episode/road-work-ahead-how-four-2024-cases-may-be-reshaping-first-amendment-scrutiny/)
   
   ]]>Based on the project templates and your episode script, here are show notes for your January 2026 mega episode:

   January 2026 Supreme Court Mega Preview | The High Court Report

   Overview: Action-packed January brings constitutional showdowns across five major cases spanning wartime contractor protection, transgender athletics, sovereign immunity, Second Amendment property rights, and presidential removal power over Federal Reserve governors.

   Roadmap Episode: Complete preview covering Chevron's $744 million WWII liability case, transgender sports restrictions post-Skrmetti, New Jersey Transit sovereignty claims, Hawaii's gun permission requirements after Bruen, and Trump's authority to fire Fed officials for pre-appointment conduct.

   Case Summaries:

   Chevron v. Plaquemines (Jan 12): WWII oil companies face massive state court verdict for 1940s production methods.

   Little v. Hecox (Jan 13): Transgender female students challenge Idaho and West Virginia sports participation bans.

   CSX Galette v. NJ Transit (Jan 14): Transit authority claims sovereign immunity despite state disclaimer of responsibility.

   Wolford v. Lopez (Jan 20): Licensed gun carriers sue Hawaii over business entry permission requirements.

   Trump v. Cook (Jan 21): Presidential firing of Fed Governor Lisa Cook over mortgage application allegations.

   Key Themes:

   1. Federalism tensions across multiple cases
   2. Post-Bruen Second Amendment applications
   3. Sovereign immunity doctrine evolution
   4. Presidential removal authority limits
   5. Constitutional gender classifications after Skrmetti
   
   

   Statistics:

   1. Supreme Court currently reviewing 48 unique pending cases
   2. 63 cases heard last term, suggesting 10-15 more additions likely
   3. Fourth sovereign immunity case this term
   4. Benjamin Aguinaga and Paul Clement each arguing third cases this year
   
   

   Schedule Notes:

   1. January arguments followed by February hiatus until month-end
   2. Only three sitting days in entire February
   3. Eight March days and seven April sitting days planned
   4. May-June dates not yet set
   
   

   Follow The High Court Report:

   1. Apple, Spotify, YouTube podcasts
   2. LinkedIn for daily updates
   3. Email: scotus.cases.pod@gmail.com
   4. Individual case previews available on podcast page
   
   

   Link

   1. 8/19/25 Episode: Road Work Ahead: How Four 2024 Cases May Be Reshaping First Amendment Scrutiny (https://scotus-oral-arguments.captivate.fm/episode/road-work-ahead-how-four-2024-cases-may-be-reshaping-first-amendment-scrutiny/)
   
   ]]>2fc86428-fbb8-452b-b560-12e69e79658aFri, 09 Jan 2026 05:00:00 -040018:52falsefull202571712025Case Preview: M & K v. IAM Pension Trustees | Pension Plan Predicament: The "As Of" Ambiguity That May Cost MillionsM & K Employee Solutions, LLC v. Trustees of The IAM Pension Fund | Argument Date: 1/20/26 | Docket Link: Here

   Question Presented: Can pension plans charge higher prices using future prices, or must they stick with the original prices?

   Overview: Four companies' pension withdrawal liability tripled from timing of actuarial assumption changes, creating circuit split over whether "as of" December 31st calculations require December 31st assumptions or permit retrospective professional judgment.

   Posture: Arbitrators favored companies; D.C. District Court and Circuit reversed, permitting post-measurement assumption adoption with restrictions.

   Main Arguments:

   1. Petitioners: (1) "As of" language creates statutory deadline requiring pre-measurement assumption adoption; (2) Legislative framework expected annual assumption reviews before measurement dates; (3) Anti-manipulation principles from Section 1394 should apply to actuarial assumptions
   2. Respondents: (1) "As of" establishes reference date, not completion deadline for retrospective valuations; (2) "Best estimate" requirement mandates current professional judgment over stale assumptions; (3) Standard actuarial practice permits and encourages post-measurement selection
   
   

   Implications: Petitioner victory creates uniform nationwide timing deadlines for actuarial assumptions but potentially forces use of outdated professional judgments. Respondent victory maintains professional flexibility and accuracy in pension calculations but creates potential manipulation risks and planning uncertainty. Decision affects multiemployer pension withdrawals nationwide, involving billions in liability calculations. Ruling influences broader questions about statutory interpretation incorporating professional standards and temporal requirements in technical regulatory contexts.

   The Fine Print:

   1. 29 U.S.C. § 1391: "The amount of an employer's withdrawal liability...shall be computed...as of the end of the plan year preceding the plan year in which the withdrawal occurs"
   2. 29 U.S.C. § 1393(a)(1): "actuarial assumptions and methods which...offer the actuary's best estimate of anticipated experience under the plan"
   
   

   Primary Cases:

   1. National Retirement Fund v. Metz Culinary Management (2020): Second Circuit held actuarial assumptions for withdrawal liability must exist by measurement date; automatic rollover applies absent timely changes
   2. Concrete Pipe & Products v. Construction Laborers Pension Trust (1993): Withdrawal liability creates "fixed and certain debt"; actuarial determinations receive presumption of correctness due to professional constraints and statutory requirements
   
   ]]>M & K Employee Solutions, LLC v. Trustees of The IAM Pension Fund | Argument Date: 1/20/26 | Docket Link: Here

   Question Presented: Can pension plans charge higher prices using future prices, or must they stick with the original prices?

   Overview: Four companies' pension withdrawal liability tripled from timing of actuarial assumption changes, creating circuit split over whether "as of" December 31st calculations require December 31st assumptions or permit retrospective professional judgment.

   Posture: Arbitrators favored companies; D.C. District Court and Circuit reversed, permitting post-measurement assumption adoption with restrictions.

   Main Arguments:

   1. Petitioners: (1) "As of" language creates statutory deadline requiring pre-measurement assumption adoption; (2) Legislative framework expected annual assumption reviews before measurement dates; (3) Anti-manipulation principles from Section 1394 should apply to actuarial assumptions
   2. Respondents: (1) "As of" establishes reference date, not completion deadline for retrospective valuations; (2) "Best estimate" requirement mandates current professional judgment over stale assumptions; (3) Standard actuarial practice permits and encourages post-measurement selection
   
   

   Implications: Petitioner victory creates uniform nationwide timing deadlines for actuarial assumptions but potentially forces use of outdated professional judgments. Respondent victory maintains professional flexibility and accuracy in pension calculations but creates potential manipulation risks and planning uncertainty. Decision affects multiemployer pension withdrawals nationwide, involving billions in liability calculations. Ruling influences broader questions about statutory interpretation incorporating professional standards and temporal requirements in technical regulatory contexts.

   The Fine Print:

   1. 29 U.S.C. § 1391: "The amount of an employer's withdrawal liability...shall be computed...as of the end of the plan year preceding the plan year in which the withdrawal occurs"
   2. 29 U.S.C. § 1393(a)(1): "actuarial assumptions and methods which...offer the actuary's best estimate of anticipated experience under the plan"
   
   

   Primary Cases:

   1. National Retirement Fund v. Metz Culinary Management (2020): Second Circuit held actuarial assumptions for withdrawal liability must exist by measurement date; automatic rollover applies absent timely changes
   2. Concrete Pipe & Products v. Construction Laborers Pension Trust (1993): Withdrawal liability creates "fixed and certain debt"; actuarial determinations receive presumption of correctness due to professional constraints and statutory requirements
   
   ]]>e1a58437-7196-4599-8875-0b37c92c202cWed, 07 Jan 2026 05:00:00 -040010:56falsefull202570702025Case Preview: Wolford v. Lopez | Hawaii's Handgun Hurdle: When Gun Rights Meet "Mother May I"Wolford v. Lopez | Case No. 24-1046 | Docket Link: Here

   Question Presented: Whether the Ninth Circuit erred in holding that Hawaii may presumptively prohibit concealed carry permit holders from carrying handguns on private property open to the public without property owner express permission.

   Overview: Post-Bruen constitutional challenge to Hawaii's affirmative-consent requirement for carrying firearms on private property open to public creates circuit split over intersection of Second Amendment rights and traditional property law principles.

   Posture: District court enjoined law; Ninth Circuit reversed, creating conflict with Second and Third Circuits.

   Main Arguments:

   • Petitioner: (1) Carrying firearms on private property open to public falls within Second Amendment's plain text protection; (2) Hawaii's presumptive prohibition effectively abolishes public carry rights through property law circumvention; (3) Colonial and Reconstruction-era scattered laws fail to establish sufficient historical tradition under Bruen framework

   • Respondent: (1) Second Amendment never protected armed entry onto private property without owner consent under English common law inheritance; (2) Hawaii's law vindicates fundamental property owners' right to exclude rather than restricting Second Amendment rights; (3) Multiple colonial and Reconstruction-era historical analogues constitute "dead ringers" supporting Hawaii's approach requiring express consent

   Implications: Petitioner victory establishes robust Second Amendment protection in privately-owned publicly-accessible spaces, potentially invalidating similar post-Bruen restrictions across multiple states and expanding public carry rights significantly. Respondent victory permits states to circumvent direct gun control restrictions through property law mechanisms, enabling broader firearms regulations while preserving traditional property rights and potentially creating complex patchwork of varying consent requirements across jurisdictions affecting everyday carry practices.

   The Fine Print:

   • H.R.S. § 134-9.5(b): "No person shall carry or possess a firearm on any private property unless that person has been given express authorization by the property owner or the owner's authorized agent through unambiguous written or verbal authorization or clear and conspicuous signage"

   • Second Amendment: "A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed"

   Primary Cases:

   • NYSRPA v. Bruen (2022): Second Amendment protects individual right to carry handguns publicly for self-defense; government restrictions must demonstrate consistency with historical tradition of firearm regulation rather than interest-balancing approach

   • Cedar Point Nursery v. Hassid (2021): Property owners possess fundamental right to exclude others from their premises, constituting "one of the most treasured rights of property ownership" requiring government compensation for regulatory takings

   ]]>Wolford v. Lopez | Case No. 24-1046 | Docket Link: Here

   Question Presented: Whether the Ninth Circuit erred in holding that Hawaii may presumptively prohibit concealed carry permit holders from carrying handguns on private property open to the public without property owner express permission.

   Overview: Post-Bruen constitutional challenge to Hawaii's affirmative-consent requirement for carrying firearms on private property open to public creates circuit split over intersection of Second Amendment rights and traditional property law principles.

   Posture: District court enjoined law; Ninth Circuit reversed, creating conflict with Second and Third Circuits.

   Main Arguments:

   • Petitioner: (1) Carrying firearms on private property open to public falls within Second Amendment's plain text protection; (2) Hawaii's presumptive prohibition effectively abolishes public carry rights through property law circumvention; (3) Colonial and Reconstruction-era scattered laws fail to establish sufficient historical tradition under Bruen framework

   • Respondent: (1) Second Amendment never protected armed entry onto private property without owner consent under English common law inheritance; (2) Hawaii's law vindicates fundamental property owners' right to exclude rather than restricting Second Amendment rights; (3) Multiple colonial and Reconstruction-era historical analogues constitute "dead ringers" supporting Hawaii's approach requiring express consent

   Implications: Petitioner victory establishes robust Second Amendment protection in privately-owned publicly-accessible spaces, potentially invalidating similar post-Bruen restrictions across multiple states and expanding public carry rights significantly. Respondent victory permits states to circumvent direct gun control restrictions through property law mechanisms, enabling broader firearms regulations while preserving traditional property rights and potentially creating complex patchwork of varying consent requirements across jurisdictions affecting everyday carry practices.

   The Fine Print:

   • H.R.S. § 134-9.5(b): "No person shall carry or possess a firearm on any private property unless that person has been given express authorization by the property owner or the owner's authorized agent through unambiguous written or verbal authorization or clear and conspicuous signage"

   • Second Amendment: "A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed"

   Primary Cases:

   • NYSRPA v. Bruen (2022): Second Amendment protects individual right to carry handguns publicly for self-defense; government restrictions must demonstrate consistency with historical tradition of firearm regulation rather than interest-balancing approach

   • Cedar Point Nursery v. Hassid (2021): Property owners possess fundamental right to exclude others from their premises, constituting "one of the most treasured rights of property ownership" requiring government compensation for regulatory takings

   ]]>41260026-bf35-4968-a19c-eabfd8278d3cTue, 06 Jan 2026 05:00:00 -040016:31falsefull202569692025Case Preview: CSX Galette versus New Jersey Transit | Sovereign Immunity Shell Game: When Transit Authorities Steer Around AccountabilityCSX Galette v. NJ Transit Corp. | Argument Date: 1/14/26 | Docket Link: Here Consolidated with CSX NJ Transit Corp. v. Colt | Argument Date: 1/14/26 | Docket Link: Here

   Question Presented: Whether the New Jersey Transit Corporation functions as an arm of the State of New Jersey for interstate sovereign immunity purposes

   Overview: NJ Transit claims sovereign immunity after bus injured passenger in Philadelphia, raising fundamental federalism questions about state power to extend constitutional immunity to state-created corporations while disclaiming their debts and liabilities.

   Posture: Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed lower courts, holding NJ Transit qualifies as state arm based on statutory mission and structure.

   Main Arguments:

   • NJ Transit (Petitioner): (1) New Jersey's legislative designation of public transportation as "essential governmental function" deserves federal deference and establishes instrumentality status; (2) Governor's appointment, for-cause removal, and veto powers demonstrate sufficient state control; (3) Substantial state subsidies (15-40% of operating budget) create practical financial interdependence implicating state treasury despite formal liability disclaimer

   • Galette (Respondent): (1) Founding-era bright-line rule denied sovereign immunity to all corporations liable for own judgments regardless of state ownership, control, or purpose; (2) Treasury factor proves dispositive because New Jersey statute explicitly disclaims legal liability for NJ Transit debts, eliminating state treasury exposure; (3) Corporate structure with sue-and-be-sued powers, operational independence, and commercial transportation function demonstrates legal separateness from state

   Implications: NJ Transit victory allows states to extend sovereign immunity to state-created corporations operating across state lines while disclaiming their liabilities, potentially shielding transit authorities, universities, and development agencies nationwide from sister-state court jurisdiction. Galette victory reinforces Founding-era corporate separateness doctrine and makes treasury factor controlling, requiring actual state legal liability for immunity and limiting state power to manufacture constitutional immunity through entity characterization while maintaining corporate independence and debt disclaimers.

   The Fine Print:

   • N.J. Stat. § 27:25-17: "All expenses incurred by the corporation in carrying out the provisions of this act shall be payable from funds available to the corporation...No debt or liability of the corporation shall be deemed or construed to create or constitute a debt, liability, or a loan or pledge of the credit of the State"

   • Eleventh Amendment: "The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State"

   Primary Cases:

   • Hess v. Port Authority Trans-Hudson Corp. (1994): Treasury factor constitutes "most salient factor" that "homes in on the impetus for the Eleventh Amendment: the prevention of federal-court judgments that must be paid out of a State's treasury"; when evidence on structure and control factors appears mixed, treasury factor becomes dispositive

   • Bank of United States v. Planters' Bank of Georgia (1824): When government becomes partner in trading company, it "devests itself, so far as concerns the transactions of that company, of its sovereign character, and takes that of a private citizen"; corporate form precluded sovereign immunity regardless of state ownership or control

   ]]>CSX Galette v. NJ Transit Corp. | Argument Date: 1/14/26 | Docket Link: Here Consolidated with CSX NJ Transit Corp. v. Colt | Argument Date: 1/14/26 | Docket Link: Here

   Question Presented: Whether the New Jersey Transit Corporation functions as an arm of the State of New Jersey for interstate sovereign immunity purposes

   Overview: NJ Transit claims sovereign immunity after bus injured passenger in Philadelphia, raising fundamental federalism questions about state power to extend constitutional immunity to state-created corporations while disclaiming their debts and liabilities.

   Posture: Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed lower courts, holding NJ Transit qualifies as state arm based on statutory mission and structure.

   Main Arguments:

   • NJ Transit (Petitioner): (1) New Jersey's legislative designation of public transportation as "essential governmental function" deserves federal deference and establishes instrumentality status; (2) Governor's appointment, for-cause removal, and veto powers demonstrate sufficient state control; (3) Substantial state subsidies (15-40% of operating budget) create practical financial interdependence implicating state treasury despite formal liability disclaimer

   • Galette (Respondent): (1) Founding-era bright-line rule denied sovereign immunity to all corporations liable for own judgments regardless of state ownership, control, or purpose; (2) Treasury factor proves dispositive because New Jersey statute explicitly disclaims legal liability for NJ Transit debts, eliminating state treasury exposure; (3) Corporate structure with sue-and-be-sued powers, operational independence, and commercial transportation function demonstrates legal separateness from state

   Implications: NJ Transit victory allows states to extend sovereign immunity to state-created corporations operating across state lines while disclaiming their liabilities, potentially shielding transit authorities, universities, and development agencies nationwide from sister-state court jurisdiction. Galette victory reinforces Founding-era corporate separateness doctrine and makes treasury factor controlling, requiring actual state legal liability for immunity and limiting state power to manufacture constitutional immunity through entity characterization while maintaining corporate independence and debt disclaimers.

   The Fine Print:

   • N.J. Stat. § 27:25-17: "All expenses incurred by the corporation in carrying out the provisions of this act shall be payable from funds available to the corporation...No debt or liability of the corporation shall be deemed or construed to create or constitute a debt, liability, or a loan or pledge of the credit of the State"

   • Eleventh Amendment: "The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State"

   Primary Cases:

   • Hess v. Port Authority Trans-Hudson Corp. (1994): Treasury factor constitutes "most salient factor" that "homes in on the impetus for the Eleventh Amendment: the prevention of federal-court judgments that must be paid out of a State's treasury"; when evidence on structure and control factors appears mixed, treasury factor becomes dispositive

   • Bank of United States v. Planters' Bank of Georgia (1824): When government becomes partner in trading company, it "devests itself, so far as concerns the transactions of that company, of its sovereign character, and takes that of a private citizen"; corporate form precluded sovereign immunity regardless of state ownership or control

   ]]>2fea6faa-1dd9-4350-9d46-33401f4fa178Mon, 05 Jan 2026 05:00:00 -040023:20falsefull202570702025Case Preview: Little v. Hecox | Title IX Tornado: Transgender Teams No More?Little v. Hecox | Oral Argument Date: 1/13/26 | Docket Link: Here

   Consolidated with West Virginia v. B. P. J. | Oral Argument Date: 1/13/26 | Docket Link: Here

   Question Presented: Whether laws protecting women's sports by limiting participation to biological females violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment

   Overview: Consolidated cases challenging Idaho's categorical ban and West Virginia's Save Women's Sports Act generate Supreme Court's first major ruling on transgender athletics after Skrmetti reshaped constitutional sex discrimination analysis.

   Posture: Multiple circuit splits; Little preliminarily enjoined (Ninth Circuit), West Virginia reversed (Fourth Circuit); proceedings stayed pending review.

   Main Arguments:

   • Petitioners (Idaho/West Virginia): (1) Constitutional "sex" means objective biological reality, not subjective gender identity; (2) Rational basis review applies to definitional challenges about meaning of "female"; (3) Skrmetti forecloses proxy discrimination claims targeting biology-based classifications

   United States (as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners): (1) Equal Protection permits sex-separated athletics based on constitutional history; (2) Biology-based classifications address competitive fairness, not discriminatory animus; (3) Skrmetti forecloses proxy discrimination claims

   • Respondents (Hecox/B.P.J.): (1) Categorical exclusions constitute traditional sex discrimination triggering heightened scrutiny; (2) Transgender status qualifies as quasi-suspect classification warranting judicial protection; (3) Individual assessment required under VMI rather than blanket exclusions

   Implications:

   1. Petitioners' victory establishes broad state authority over sex-separated activities using biological definitions, potentially affecting employment discrimination, housing rights, and educational access beyond sports.
   2. Respondent victory extends heightened constitutional protection to transgender individuals, requiring individualized consideration rather than categorical exclusions and potentially invalidating similar laws across twenty-six states.
   3. Ruling will clarify whether Skrmetti's restrictive constitutional framework applies beyond medical treatment contexts and resolve circuit split on Title IX interpretation.
   
   

   The Fine Print:

   • Fourteenth Amendment § 1: "No State shall...deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws"

   • Idaho Code § 33-6203(3): "Athletic teams or sports designated for females, women, or girls shall not be open to students of the male sex"

   • W. Va. Code § 18-2-25d(c)(2): Female teams "shall not be open to students of the male sex where selection for such teams is based upon competitive skill or the activity involved is a contact sport"

   Primary Cases:

   • United States v. Skrmetti (2025): Constitutional sex classifications analyze biological differences rather than gender identity; laws addressing medical procedures and age restrictions don't trigger heightened scrutiny based on transgender status

   • United States v. Virginia (VMI) (1996): Sex-based exclusions require exceedingly persuasive justification under intermediate scrutiny; categorical rules must account for individual capabilities rather than statistical generalizations

   ]]>Little v. Hecox | Oral Argument Date: 1/13/26 | Docket Link: Here

   Consolidated with West Virginia v. B. P. J. | Oral Argument Date: 1/13/26 | Docket Link: Here

   Question Presented: Whether laws protecting women's sports by limiting participation to biological females violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment

   Overview: Consolidated cases challenging Idaho's categorical ban and West Virginia's Save Women's Sports Act generate Supreme Court's first major ruling on transgender athletics after Skrmetti reshaped constitutional sex discrimination analysis.

   Posture: Multiple circuit splits; Little preliminarily enjoined (Ninth Circuit), West Virginia reversed (Fourth Circuit); proceedings stayed pending review.

   Main Arguments:

   • Petitioners (Idaho/West Virginia): (1) Constitutional "sex" means objective biological reality, not subjective gender identity; (2) Rational basis review applies to definitional challenges about meaning of "female"; (3) Skrmetti forecloses proxy discrimination claims targeting biology-based classifications

   United States (as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners): (1) Equal Protection permits sex-separated athletics based on constitutional history; (2) Biology-based classifications address competitive fairness, not discriminatory animus; (3) Skrmetti forecloses proxy discrimination claims

   • Respondents (Hecox/B.P.J.): (1) Categorical exclusions constitute traditional sex discrimination triggering heightened scrutiny; (2) Transgender status qualifies as quasi-suspect classification warranting judicial protection; (3) Individual assessment required under VMI rather than blanket exclusions

   Implications:

   1. Petitioners' victory establishes broad state authority over sex-separated activities using biological definitions, potentially affecting employment discrimination, housing rights, and educational access beyond sports.
   2. Respondent victory extends heightened constitutional protection to transgender individuals, requiring individualized consideration rather than categorical exclusions and potentially invalidating similar laws across twenty-six states.
   3. Ruling will clarify whether Skrmetti's restrictive constitutional framework applies beyond medical treatment contexts and resolve circuit split on Title IX interpretation.
   
   

   The Fine Print:

   • Fourteenth Amendment § 1: "No State shall...deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws"

   • Idaho Code § 33-6203(3): "Athletic teams or sports designated for females, women, or girls shall not be open to students of the male sex"

   • W. Va. Code § 18-2-25d(c)(2): Female teams "shall not be open to students of the male sex where selection for such teams is based upon competitive skill or the activity involved is a contact sport"

   Primary Cases:

   • United States v. Skrmetti (2025): Constitutional sex classifications analyze biological differences rather than gender identity; laws addressing medical procedures and age restrictions don't trigger heightened scrutiny based on transgender status

   • United States v. Virginia (VMI) (1996): Sex-based exclusions require exceedingly persuasive justification under intermediate scrutiny; categorical rules must account for individual capabilities rather than statistical generalizations

   ]]>ce40d6d7-1fa5-456b-850e-132b8b0e68feFri, 02 Jan 2026 05:00:00 -040014:58falsefull202568682025Throwback: June 30th Roundup: Last Week's Opinions, End of Term Stats, Deep Dive into Trump v. Casa and New Cert GrantsThis episode:
   1. Analyzes the Supreme Court's blockbuster end to the 2024-2025 term, covering the final nine opinions and examining patterns across all 61 cases decided this term.
   2. Explores the dramatic Friday release where cases "trickled out slowly" due to lengthy dissents read from the bench, dive into comprehensive term statistics, and conduct an in-depth analysis of Justice Barrett's methodological approach in Trump v. CASA—particularly her heavy reliance on historical sources versus textual analysis.
   3. Concludes with analysis of seven landmark cases the Court agreed to hear for next term, including a billion-dollar copyright battle over internet piracy (Cox v. Sony Music), a campaign finance showdown (National Republican Senatorial Committee v. FEC), and disputes over federal removal deadlines, private rights of action, and criminal fugitive tolling that could reshape fundamental areas of American law. June 30 Order List: Here.
   
   

   Episode Highlights

   Final Week Patterns: June 27th saw uniform 6-3 splits with conservative dominance, while June 26th showed more fractures with 5-4 and 6-3 divisions

   Term Overview: 61 total cases decided with a 70% reversal rate, demonstrating the Court's role as an error-correction mechanism

   Voting Consensus: 43% of cases decided unanimously (26 cases), showing remarkable agreement despite ideological divisions

   Barrett's Methodology: Deep dive into her historical originalism approach in Trump v. CASA versus her typical textualist methods in other cases

   New Cert Grants: Overview of the 7 new cases SCOTUS agreed to hear.

   Key Justice Statistics (2024-2025 Term)

   The Justices wrote 5 Per Curiam opinions.

   Justice Roberts: Authored or joined 59 opinions, authored or joined 1 concurrences and authored or joined 2 dissents.

   Justice Thomas: Authored or joined 47 opinions, authored or joined 21 concurrences and authored or joined 14 dissents.

   Justice Alito: Authored or joined 47 opinions, authored or joined 21 concurrences and authored or joined 14 dissents.

   Justice Sotomayor: Authored or joined 45 opinions, authored or joined 11 concurrences and authored or joined 13 dissents.

   Justice Kagan: Authored or joined 51 opinions, authored or joined 2 concurrences and authored or joined 9 dissents.

   Justice Gorsuch: Authored or joined 42 opinions, authored or joined 6 concurrences and authored or joined 12 dissents.

   Justice Kavanaugh: Authored or joined 57 opinions, authored or joined 9 concurrences and authored or joined 3 dissents.

   Justice Barrett: Authored or joined 54 opinions, authored or joined 10 concurrences and authored or joined 5 dissents.

   Justice Jackson: Authored or joined 41 opinions, authored or joined 12 concurrences and authored or joined 17 dissents.

   Referenced Cases

   1. Trump v. CASA (universal injunctions)
   2. Grupo Mexicano (historical equity test)
   3. Louisiana v. Callais (relisted case)
   4. Esteras v. United States (criminal sentencing)
   5. Medical Marijuana v. Horn (statutory interpretation)
   6. FDA v. R.J. Reynolds (administrative law)
   
   

   New Cert Grants:

   1. M & K Employee Solutions, LLC, et al. v. Trustees of the IAM National Pension Fund | Case No. 23-1209 | Docket Link: Here.
   2. Cox Communications, Inc., et al. v. Sony Music Entertainment, et al. | Case No. 24-171 | Docket Link: Here.
   3. FS Credit Opportunities Corp., et al. v. Saba Capital Master Fund, Ltd., et al. | Case No. 24-345 | Docket Link: Here.
   4. Douglas Humberto Urias-Orellana, et al. v. Bondi | No. 24-777 | Docket Link: Here.
   5. Enbridge Energy, LP, et al. v. Dana Nessel, Attorney General of Michigan, on Behalf of the People of the State of Michigan | Case No. 24-783 | Docket Link: Here.
   6. Isabel Rico v. United States | Case No. 24-1056 | Docket Link: Here.
   7. National Republican Senatorial Committee, et al. v. Federal Election Commission, et al. | Case No. 24-621 | Docket Link: Here.
   
   

   Source cited:

   1. Mark Walsh, Closing the book on the term, SCOTUSblog (Jun. 27, 2025, 7:15 PM), https://www.scotusblog.com/2025/06/closing-the-book-on-the-term/
   
   

   Timestamps:

   [00:00:00] Introduction

   [00:02:13] June 27th Opinions

   [00:03:20] June 26th Opinions

   [00:04:30] Term in Review

   [00:09:48] Trump v. CASA Deep Dive: Justice Barrett's Approach

   [00:13:40] Comparing Justice Barrett's Methodology Across this Term

   [00:17:00] Grupo Mexicano Heavily Influenced Justice Barrett

   [00:19:42] Comparison of Oral Arguments to Opinion

   [00:29:33] June 30th Cert Grants

   [00:29:41] Cert Grant: M & K Employee Solutions

   [00:30:36] Cert Grant: Cox Communications v. Sony Music Entertainment

   [00:32:16] Cert Grant: FS Credit v. Saba Capital Master Fund

   [00:33:59] Cert Grant: Enbridge Energy v. Nessel

   [00:38:35] Cert Grant: Urias-Orellana v. Bondi

   [00:38:48] Cert Grant: Rico v. United States

   [00:39:56] Cert Grant: Senate Committee on Ethics v. FEC

   [00:41:22] Conclusion

   ]]>This episode:
   1. Analyzes the Supreme Court's blockbuster end to the 2024-2025 term, covering the final nine opinions and examining patterns across all 61 cases decided this term.
   2. Explores the dramatic Friday release where cases "trickled out slowly" due to lengthy dissents read from the bench, dive into comprehensive term statistics, and conduct an in-depth analysis of Justice Barrett's methodological approach in Trump v. CASA—particularly her heavy reliance on historical sources versus textual analysis.
   3. Concludes with analysis of seven landmark cases the Court agreed to hear for next term, including a billion-dollar copyright battle over internet piracy (Cox v. Sony Music), a campaign finance showdown (National Republican Senatorial Committee v. FEC), and disputes over federal removal deadlines, private rights of action, and criminal fugitive tolling that could reshape fundamental areas of American law. June 30 Order List: Here.
   
   

   Episode Highlights

   Final Week Patterns: June 27th saw uniform 6-3 splits with conservative dominance, while June 26th showed more fractures with 5-4 and 6-3 divisions

   Term Overview: 61 total cases decided with a 70% reversal rate, demonstrating the Court's role as an error-correction mechanism

   Voting Consensus: 43% of cases decided unanimously (26 cases), showing remarkable agreement despite ideological divisions

   Barrett's Methodology: Deep dive into her historical originalism approach in Trump v. CASA versus her typical textualist methods in other cases

   New Cert Grants: Overview of the 7 new cases SCOTUS agreed to hear.

   Key Justice Statistics (2024-2025 Term)

   The Justices wrote 5 Per Curiam opinions.

   Justice Roberts: Authored or joined 59 opinions, authored or joined 1 concurrences and authored or joined 2 dissents.

   Justice Thomas: Authored or joined 47 opinions, authored or joined 21 concurrences and authored or joined 14 dissents.

   Justice Alito: Authored or joined 47 opinions, authored or joined 21 concurrences and authored or joined 14 dissents.

   Justice Sotomayor: Authored or joined 45 opinions, authored or joined 11 concurrences and authored or joined 13 dissents.

   Justice Kagan: Authored or joined 51 opinions, authored or joined 2 concurrences and authored or joined 9 dissents.

   Justice Gorsuch: Authored or joined 42 opinions, authored or joined 6 concurrences and authored or joined 12 dissents.

   Justice Kavanaugh: Authored or joined 57 opinions, authored or joined 9 concurrences and authored or joined 3 dissents.

   Justice Barrett: Authored or joined 54 opinions, authored or joined 10 concurrences and authored or joined 5 dissents.

   Justice Jackson: Authored or joined 41 opinions, authored or joined 12 concurrences and authored or joined 17 dissents.

   Referenced Cases

   1. Trump v. CASA (universal injunctions)
   2. Grupo Mexicano (historical equity test)
   3. Louisiana v. Callais (relisted case)
   4. Esteras v. United States (criminal sentencing)
   5. Medical Marijuana v. Horn (statutory interpretation)
   6. FDA v. R.J. Reynolds (administrative law)
   
   

   New Cert Grants:

   1. M & K Employee Solutions, LLC, et al. v. Trustees of the IAM National Pension Fund | Case No. 23-1209 | Docket Link: Here.
   2. Cox Communications, Inc., et al. v. Sony Music Entertainment, et al. | Case No. 24-171 | Docket Link: Here.
   3. FS Credit Opportunities Corp., et al. v. Saba Capital Master Fund, Ltd., et al. | Case No. 24-345 | Docket Link: Here.
   4. Douglas Humberto Urias-Orellana, et al. v. Bondi | No. 24-777 | Docket Link: Here.
   5. Enbridge Energy, LP, et al. v. Dana Nessel, Attorney General of Michigan, on Behalf of the People of the State of Michigan | Case No. 24-783 | Docket Link: Here.
   6. Isabel Rico v. United States | Case No. 24-1056 | Docket Link: Here.
   7. National Republican Senatorial Committee, et al. v. Federal Election Commission, et al. | Case No. 24-621 | Docket Link: Here.
   
   

   Source cited:

   1. Mark Walsh, Closing the book on the term, SCOTUSblog (Jun. 27, 2025, 7:15 PM), https://www.scotusblog.com/2025/06/closing-the-book-on-the-term/
   
   

   Timestamps:

   [00:00:00] Introduction

   [00:02:13] June 27th Opinions

   [00:03:20] June 26th Opinions

   [00:04:30] Term in Review

   [00:09:48] Trump v. CASA Deep Dive: Justice Barrett's Approach

   [00:13:40] Comparing Justice Barrett's Methodology Across this Term

   [00:17:00] Grupo Mexicano Heavily Influenced Justice Barrett

   [00:19:42] Comparison of Oral Arguments to Opinion

   [00:29:33] June 30th Cert Grants

   [00:29:41] Cert Grant: M & K Employee Solutions

   [00:30:36] Cert Grant: Cox Communications v. Sony Music Entertainment

   [00:32:16] Cert Grant: FS Credit v. Saba Capital Master Fund

   [00:33:59] Cert Grant: Enbridge Energy v. Nessel

   [00:38:35] Cert Grant: Urias-Orellana v. Bondi

   [00:38:48] Cert Grant: Rico v. United States

   [00:39:56] Cert Grant: Senate Committee on Ethics v. FEC

   [00:41:22] Conclusion

   ]]>d392242a-483e-4cb4-89f9-269886d33263Thu, 01 Jan 2026 05:00:00 -040042:52falsefull202571712025Case Preview: Trump v. Cook | “For Cause” Federal Reserve Fracas: Prez Removal Power Meets Federal IndependenceTrump v. Cook | Argument Date: 1/21/26 | Docket Link: Here

   Question Presented: Whether Federal Reserve Board governors possess Fifth Amendment property rights in their offices and whether "for cause" removal authority permits presidential removal based on pre-office conduct.

   Overview: President Trump's 30-minute ultimatum removal of Fed Governor Cook over mortgage misrepresentations creates unprecedented constitutional crisis testing presidential power against central bank independence and due process rights.

   Posture: D.C. Circuit denied emergency stay by 2-1 vote; Governor Cook continues serving pending appeal.

   Main Arguments:

   • Trump (Petitioner): (1) Federal offices constitute no Fifth Amendment property interest under longstanding precedent; (2) "For cause" permits broad removal discretion for misconduct affecting fitness including pre-office conduct; (3) Presidential removal determinations remain unreviewable by courts absent explicit congressional authorization

   • Cook (Respondent): (1) Tenure-protected officers possess constitutionally protected property interest requiring pre-removal hearing under Loudermill; (2) "For cause" historically limited to in-office conduct under 1913/1935 statutory backdrop; (3) Judicial review prevents presidential circumvention of congressional restrictions protecting agency independence

   Implications: Trump victory eliminates due process protections for principal officers while expanding presidential control over independent agencies through discretionary "for cause" interpretations. Cook victory establishes constitutional hearing requirements for tenure-protected removal while constraining presidential authority to politicize Federal Reserve monetary policy decisions affecting national economic stability.

   The Fine Print:

   • 12 U.S.C. § 242: "Any member of the Board may be removed for cause by the President"

   • Fifth Amendment: "No person shall be...deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law"

   Primary Cases:

   • Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill (1985): Tenure-protected public employees possess property interest in continued employment requiring pre-termination notice and hearing opportunity

   • Taylor v. Beckham (1900): Political offices constitute no property rights protected by Due Process Clause; removal from office triggers no constitutional process requirements

   ]]>Trump v. Cook | Argument Date: 1/21/26 | Docket Link: Here

   Question Presented: Whether Federal Reserve Board governors possess Fifth Amendment property rights in their offices and whether "for cause" removal authority permits presidential removal based on pre-office conduct.

   Overview: President Trump's 30-minute ultimatum removal of Fed Governor Cook over mortgage misrepresentations creates unprecedented constitutional crisis testing presidential power against central bank independence and due process rights.

   Posture: D.C. Circuit denied emergency stay by 2-1 vote; Governor Cook continues serving pending appeal.

   Main Arguments:

   • Trump (Petitioner): (1) Federal offices constitute no Fifth Amendment property interest under longstanding precedent; (2) "For cause" permits broad removal discretion for misconduct affecting fitness including pre-office conduct; (3) Presidential removal determinations remain unreviewable by courts absent explicit congressional authorization

   • Cook (Respondent): (1) Tenure-protected officers possess constitutionally protected property interest requiring pre-removal hearing under Loudermill; (2) "For cause" historically limited to in-office conduct under 1913/1935 statutory backdrop; (3) Judicial review prevents presidential circumvention of congressional restrictions protecting agency independence

   Implications: Trump victory eliminates due process protections for principal officers while expanding presidential control over independent agencies through discretionary "for cause" interpretations. Cook victory establishes constitutional hearing requirements for tenure-protected removal while constraining presidential authority to politicize Federal Reserve monetary policy decisions affecting national economic stability.

   The Fine Print:

   • 12 U.S.C. § 242: "Any member of the Board may be removed for cause by the President"

   • Fifth Amendment: "No person shall be...deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law"

   Primary Cases:

   • Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill (1985): Tenure-protected public employees possess property interest in continued employment requiring pre-termination notice and hearing opportunity

   • Taylor v. Beckham (1900): Political offices constitute no property rights protected by Due Process Clause; removal from office triggers no constitutional process requirements

   ]]>1999a3bd-3164-45dd-8bb4-9ca39b01e821Wed, 31 Dec 2025 05:00:00 -040011:49falsefull202571712025Case Preview: Chevron v. Plaquemines Parish | WWII Warriors or Environmental Enemies?Chevron USA Inc. v. Plaquemines Parish | Oral Argument Date: 1/12/26 | Docket Link: Here

   Question Presented: Whether a causal-nexus or contractual-direction test survives the 2011 amendment to the federal-officer removal statute

   Overview: Oil companies that fueled WWII fighter planes face $744.6 million in state court verdicts for 80-year-old production methods, creating unprecedented federal contractor liability exposure with massive removal jurisdiction implications.

   Posture: Fifth Circuit denied en banc rehearing by narrow 7-6 vote after split panel affirmed remand.

   Main Arguments:

   • Chevron (Petitioner): (1) 2011 amendment eliminated causal-nexus requirement through "relating to" language expansion; (2) Fifth Circuit improperly reinstated contractual-direction test rejected by other circuits; (3) Oil production activities directly connected to federal avgas contracts through pricing terms and wartime regulations

   • Louisiana (Respondent): (1) No genuine circuit split exists among courts applying "connection or association" standard; (2) Case lacks national importance beyond fact-specific contractor disputes; (3) Federal contracts remained silent about production methods, requiring sufficient connection between challenged conduct and federal directives

   Implications: Chevron victory expands federal contractor protection from state court liability for activities connected to federal work, potentially encouraging emergency contracting. Louisiana victory maintains state environmental enforcement authority while exposing federal contractors to massive local jury verdicts for wartime activities.

   The Fine Print:

   • 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1): "A civil action...commenced in a State court against...any officer (or any person acting under that officer) of the United States...for or relating to any act under color of such office...may be removed"

   • State and Local Coastal Resources Management Act: Requires compliance with environmental standards for oil and gas operations in Louisiana coastal zone

   Primary Cases:

   • Latiolais v. Huntington Ingalls, Inc. (5th Cir. 2020): Post-2011 amendment abandoned "causal nexus" test, replacing with "connected or associated with" standard demonstrating expanded federal-officer removal scope

   • Watson v. Philip Morris Cos. (4th Cir. 2007): Federal contractor removal permitted without explicit contractual direction for challenged conduct, supporting broad interpretation of "relating to" language

   ]]>Chevron USA Inc. v. Plaquemines Parish | Oral Argument Date: 1/12/26 | Docket Link: Here

   Question Presented: Whether a causal-nexus or contractual-direction test survives the 2011 amendment to the federal-officer removal statute

   Overview: Oil companies that fueled WWII fighter planes face $744.6 million in state court verdicts for 80-year-old production methods, creating unprecedented federal contractor liability exposure with massive removal jurisdiction implications.

   Posture: Fifth Circuit denied en banc rehearing by narrow 7-6 vote after split panel affirmed remand.

   Main Arguments:

   • Chevron (Petitioner): (1) 2011 amendment eliminated causal-nexus requirement through "relating to" language expansion; (2) Fifth Circuit improperly reinstated contractual-direction test rejected by other circuits; (3) Oil production activities directly connected to federal avgas contracts through pricing terms and wartime regulations

   • Louisiana (Respondent): (1) No genuine circuit split exists among courts applying "connection or association" standard; (2) Case lacks national importance beyond fact-specific contractor disputes; (3) Federal contracts remained silent about production methods, requiring sufficient connection between challenged conduct and federal directives

   Implications: Chevron victory expands federal contractor protection from state court liability for activities connected to federal work, potentially encouraging emergency contracting. Louisiana victory maintains state environmental enforcement authority while exposing federal contractors to massive local jury verdicts for wartime activities.

   The Fine Print:

   • 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1): "A civil action...commenced in a State court against...any officer (or any person acting under that officer) of the United States...for or relating to any act under color of such office...may be removed"

   • State and Local Coastal Resources Management Act: Requires compliance with environmental standards for oil and gas operations in Louisiana coastal zone

   Primary Cases:

   • Latiolais v. Huntington Ingalls, Inc. (5th Cir. 2020): Post-2011 amendment abandoned "causal nexus" test, replacing with "connected or associated with" standard demonstrating expanded federal-officer removal scope

   • Watson v. Philip Morris Cos. (4th Cir. 2007): Federal contractor removal permitted without explicit contractual direction for challenged conduct, supporting broad interpretation of "relating to" language

   ]]>913585a6-7cb8-43bf-98d5-4f32f734d3ccTue, 30 Dec 2025 05:00:00 -040016:05falsefull202567672025Case Roundup: Bounties, National Guard & Corrupted Courts + January BlockbustersOVERVIEW

   December delivered constitutional chaos with two emergency Supreme Court cases and a preview of January's landmark docket. From federal agents facing $10,000 bounties in Chicago to immigration judges exposing government corruption, plus six blockbuster cases that could reshape American law for decades.

   Featured Cases:

   • Trump v. Illinois - Presidential emergency powers meet federalism

   • Margolin v. NAIJ - Immigration judges challenge speech restrictions

   • January Preview - Six constitutional blockbusters including transgender sports, gun rights, and executive authority

   1. Chevron v. Plaquemines - $744M WWII contractor liability
   2. Little v. Hecox - Idaho transgender sports ban vs. equality rights
   3. CSX Galette v. NJ Transit - State corporation sovereign immunity
   4. Wolford v. Lopez - Hawaii gun permits vs. Second Amendment
   5. M&K Employee Solutions v. IAM - $4.4M pension timing dispute
   6. Trump v. Cook - Presidential removal of Fed Governor
   
   

   Key Moments:

   • Supreme Court denies emergency stays in both cases within one week

   • Federal agents operate under bounties during immigration enforcement

   • Fourth Circuit orders discovery into corrupted government complaint systems

   • January docket threatens to reshape constitutional rights for a generation

   Episode Highlights:

   • $10,000 bounties placed on federal immigration officers

   • Texas National Guard deployed to Illinois over state objections

   • Immigration judges may bypass internal procedures to challenge speech restrictions

   • Six January cases spanning Second Amendment, transgender equality, sovereign immunity, executive authority, pension law, and WWII contractor liability

   • Constitutional decisions affecting daily life from mortgage rates to athletic participation

   Stakes: These cases determine the balance between presidential emergency powers and federalism, federal employee speech rights versus government control, and fundamental constitutional protections that affect millions of Americans.

   Major Questions:

   • Can presidents deploy military domestically without meeting rebellion standards?

   • Can government silence employees then force them through corrupted complaint processes?

   • Will January cases reshape constitutional law for the next thirty years?

   Bottom Line: December's emergency cases and January's preview demonstrate how Supreme Court decisions directly impact daily American life - from federal law enforcement to mortgage rates to constitutional rights.

   Call to Action: Share this episode with someone who thinks Supreme Court cases don't affect daily life - because these decisions determine everything from your mortgage rate to fundamental constitutional protections.

   Connect:

   • Apple Podcasts, Spotify, YouTube: Search "The High Court Report"

   • LinkedIn: @TheHighCourtReport

   • Questions: LinkedIn or Email (scotus.cases.pod@gmail.com)

   ]]>OVERVIEW

   December delivered constitutional chaos with two emergency Supreme Court cases and a preview of January's landmark docket. From federal agents facing $10,000 bounties in Chicago to immigration judges exposing government corruption, plus six blockbuster cases that could reshape American law for decades.

   Featured Cases:

   • Trump v. Illinois - Presidential emergency powers meet federalism

   • Margolin v. NAIJ - Immigration judges challenge speech restrictions

   • January Preview - Six constitutional blockbusters including transgender sports, gun rights, and executive authority

   1. Chevron v. Plaquemines - $744M WWII contractor liability
   2. Little v. Hecox - Idaho transgender sports ban vs. equality rights
   3. CSX Galette v. NJ Transit - State corporation sovereign immunity
   4. Wolford v. Lopez - Hawaii gun permits vs. Second Amendment
   5. M&K Employee Solutions v. IAM - $4.4M pension timing dispute
   6. Trump v. Cook - Presidential removal of Fed Governor
   
   

   Key Moments:

   • Supreme Court denies emergency stays in both cases within one week

   • Federal agents operate under bounties during immigration enforcement

   • Fourth Circuit orders discovery into corrupted government complaint systems

   • January docket threatens to reshape constitutional rights for a generation

   Episode Highlights:

   • $10,000 bounties placed on federal immigration officers

   • Texas National Guard deployed to Illinois over state objections

   • Immigration judges may bypass internal procedures to challenge speech restrictions

   • Six January cases spanning Second Amendment, transgender equality, sovereign immunity, executive authority, pension law, and WWII contractor liability

   • Constitutional decisions affecting daily life from mortgage rates to athletic participation

   Stakes: These cases determine the balance between presidential emergency powers and federalism, federal employee speech rights versus government control, and fundamental constitutional protections that affect millions of Americans.

   Major Questions:

   • Can presidents deploy military domestically without meeting rebellion standards?

   • Can government silence employees then force them through corrupted complaint processes?

   • Will January cases reshape constitutional law for the next thirty years?

   Bottom Line: December's emergency cases and January's preview demonstrate how Supreme Court decisions directly impact daily American life - from federal law enforcement to mortgage rates to constitutional rights.

   Call to Action: Share this episode with someone who thinks Supreme Court cases don't affect daily life - because these decisions determine everything from your mortgage rate to fundamental constitutional protections.

   Connect:

   • Apple Podcasts, Spotify, YouTube: Search "The High Court Report"

   • LinkedIn: @TheHighCourtReport

   • Questions: LinkedIn or Email (scotus.cases.pod@gmail.com)

   ]]>737c41cd-57eb-48d6-b5f4-95df27a575beMon, 29 Dec 2025 05:00:00 -040014:08falsefull202569692025Throwback: United States v. Skrmetti | Rational Basis or Heightened Scrutiny?: The Constitutional Test for Transgender RightsThis week, we'll air throwback episodes. Each episode will relate to the current cases.

   Today's case is United States v. Skrmetti. I chose this case to segue into the 2026 Supreme Court calendar. In January, the Supreme Court hears two transgender cases that in some ways offshoot from Skrmetti. Here are a few details on these cases. We'll be sure to preview these cases soon. Also, check out our July 7th Roundup episode for more details.

   Transgender Sports Cases

   Little v. Hecox (Idaho) | Case No. 24-38 | Docket Link: Here

   1. Background: Idaho's "Fairness in Women's Sports Act" banning transgender women from women's sports teams
   2. Key Player: Lindsay Hecox, transgender student at Boise State University
   3. Ninth Circuit Reasoning: Applied heightened scrutiny; found likely Equal Protection violations
   4. Post-Skrmetti Impact: How the medical treatment precedent affects sports participation
   
   

   West Virginia v. B.P.J. | Case No. 24-43 | Docket Link: Here

   1. Background: West Virginia's H.B. 3293 categorical sports ban
   2. Key Player: B.P.J., 14-year-old transgender student with amended birth certificate
   3. Unique Factors: Puberty blockers, competitive performance, individual circumstances
   4. Fourth Circuit's Approach: Case-by-case analysis vs. categorical rules
   5. Strategic Litigation: Why B.P.J. argued for waiting on Skrmetti decision
   
   

   Here's the background on United States v. Skrmetti.

   Tennessee enacted Senate Bill 1 (SB1) in 2023, prohibiting healthcare providers from prescribing puberty blockers or hormones to minors for treating gender dysphoria or helping them transition, while still allowing these treatments for other medical conditions like congenital defects or precocious puberty. Three transgender minors, their parents, and a doctor sued under the Equal Protection Clause, with a district court initially blocking the law after finding transgender individuals deserve heightened constitutional protection. The Sixth Circuit reversed, ruling the law only needed to meet the lowest constitutional standard (rational basis review), prompting the Supreme Court to take the case.

   The Supreme Court ruled 6-3 that Tennessee's ban on gender-affirming medical treatments for transgender minors does not violate the Equal Protection Clause because the law classifies based on age and medical use rather than sex or transgender status, requiring only rational basis review which the law satisfies.

   Analysis (3 sentences): The Court rejected arguments that the law discriminates based on sex, finding that it applies equally to all minors regardless of biological sex and merely removes certain diagnoses from treatable conditions—similar to how pregnancy-related exclusions don't automatically constitute sex discrimination under precedent like Geduldig v. Aiello. The majority applied the lowest level of constitutional scrutiny (rational basis review), deferring to Tennessee's legislative judgment about protecting minors from potentially harmful medical treatments in an area of scientific uncertainty. The dissenters argued the law clearly discriminates against transgender individuals and should face heightened constitutional scrutiny, warning that the majority's approach undermines equal protection for vulnerable minorities and ignores the real-world impact of denying medically necessary care.

   ]]>This week, we'll air throwback episodes. Each episode will relate to the current cases.

   Today's case is United States v. Skrmetti. I chose this case to segue into the 2026 Supreme Court calendar. In January, the Supreme Court hears two transgender cases that in some ways offshoot from Skrmetti. Here are a few details on these cases. We'll be sure to preview these cases soon. Also, check out our July 7th Roundup episode for more details.

   Transgender Sports Cases

   Little v. Hecox (Idaho) | Case No. 24-38 | Docket Link: Here

   1. Background: Idaho's "Fairness in Women's Sports Act" banning transgender women from women's sports teams
   2. Key Player: Lindsay Hecox, transgender student at Boise State University
   3. Ninth Circuit Reasoning: Applied heightened scrutiny; found likely Equal Protection violations
   4. Post-Skrmetti Impact: How the medical treatment precedent affects sports participation
   
   

   West Virginia v. B.P.J. | Case No. 24-43 | Docket Link: Here

   1. Background: West Virginia's H.B. 3293 categorical sports ban
   2. Key Player: B.P.J., 14-year-old transgender student with amended birth certificate
   3. Unique Factors: Puberty blockers, competitive performance, individual circumstances
   4. Fourth Circuit's Approach: Case-by-case analysis vs. categorical rules
   5. Strategic Litigation: Why B.P.J. argued for waiting on Skrmetti decision
   
   

   Here's the background on United States v. Skrmetti.

   Tennessee enacted Senate Bill 1 (SB1) in 2023, prohibiting healthcare providers from prescribing puberty blockers or hormones to minors for treating gender dysphoria or helping them transition, while still allowing these treatments for other medical conditions like congenital defects or precocious puberty. Three transgender minors, their parents, and a doctor sued under the Equal Protection Clause, with a district court initially blocking the law after finding transgender individuals deserve heightened constitutional protection. The Sixth Circuit reversed, ruling the law only needed to meet the lowest constitutional standard (rational basis review), prompting the Supreme Court to take the case.

   The Supreme Court ruled 6-3 that Tennessee's ban on gender-affirming medical treatments for transgender minors does not violate the Equal Protection Clause because the law classifies based on age and medical use rather than sex or transgender status, requiring only rational basis review which the law satisfies.

   Analysis (3 sentences): The Court rejected arguments that the law discriminates based on sex, finding that it applies equally to all minors regardless of biological sex and merely removes certain diagnoses from treatable conditions—similar to how pregnancy-related exclusions don't automatically constitute sex discrimination under precedent like Geduldig v. Aiello. The majority applied the lowest level of constitutional scrutiny (rational basis review), deferring to Tennessee's legislative judgment about protecting minors from potentially harmful medical treatments in an area of scientific uncertainty. The dissenters argued the law clearly discriminates against transgender individuals and should face heightened constitutional scrutiny, warning that the majority's approach undermines equal protection for vulnerable minorities and ignores the real-world impact of denying medically necessary care.

   ]]>e228431b-9038-4c33-b390-f420324015ecFri, 26 Dec 2025 05:00:00 -040002:21:10falsefull202566662025Throwback: FEC v. Cruz | When Campaign Loan Limits Collide with Free SpeechThis week, we'll air throwback episodes. Each episode will relate to the current cases.

   Today's episode is FEC v. Cruz. I chose this case for the interplay with a case this term, NRSC v. FEC. Listen to the arguments regarding standing, free speech, and political corruption.

   Here's the story of FEC v. Cruz.

   Senator Ted Cruz loaned $260,000 to his 2018 reelection campaign, but federal law limits candidates to recovering only $250,000 from post-election contributions, leaving Cruz unable to recover the final $10,000. Cruz and his campaign committee sued the Federal Election Commission, arguing this loan repayment restriction in the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act violates the First Amendment by deterring candidates from self-funding their campaigns. The case centered on whether limiting post-election contributions for loan repayment serves a legitimate anti-corruption purpose or unconstitutionally burdens political speech.

   The Supreme Court ruled 6-3 that the federal law limiting candidates to recovering $250,000 in personal loans from post-election contributions violates the First Amendment because the government failed to prove this restriction prevents actual corruption or its appearance.

   
   

   The Court applied strict scrutiny to this campaign finance restriction, requiring the government to demonstrate the law prevents "quid pro quo" corruption with actual evidence rather than mere speculation—which the FEC could not provide despite most states having no such limits. The majority emphasized that restricting loan repayment creates barriers to entry for new candidates and challengers who rely on personal loans to fund competitive campaigns. The dissenters argued the majority was too demanding in requiring concrete evidence of corruption, warning that weakening campaign finance laws could increase the influence of wealthy donors and undermine electoral integrity.

   ]]>This week, we'll air throwback episodes. Each episode will relate to the current cases.

   Today's episode is FEC v. Cruz. I chose this case for the interplay with a case this term, NRSC v. FEC. Listen to the arguments regarding standing, free speech, and political corruption.

   Here's the story of FEC v. Cruz.

   Senator Ted Cruz loaned $260,000 to his 2018 reelection campaign, but federal law limits candidates to recovering only $250,000 from post-election contributions, leaving Cruz unable to recover the final $10,000. Cruz and his campaign committee sued the Federal Election Commission, arguing this loan repayment restriction in the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act violates the First Amendment by deterring candidates from self-funding their campaigns. The case centered on whether limiting post-election contributions for loan repayment serves a legitimate anti-corruption purpose or unconstitutionally burdens political speech.

   The Supreme Court ruled 6-3 that the federal law limiting candidates to recovering $250,000 in personal loans from post-election contributions violates the First Amendment because the government failed to prove this restriction prevents actual corruption or its appearance.

   
   

   The Court applied strict scrutiny to this campaign finance restriction, requiring the government to demonstrate the law prevents "quid pro quo" corruption with actual evidence rather than mere speculation—which the FEC could not provide despite most states having no such limits. The majority emphasized that restricting loan repayment creates barriers to entry for new candidates and challengers who rely on personal loans to fund competitive campaigns. The dissenters argued the majority was too demanding in requiring concrete evidence of corruption, warning that weakening campaign finance laws could increase the influence of wealthy donors and undermine electoral integrity.

   ]]>42ea242e-171a-49e6-878e-e24786b485beWed, 24 Dec 2025 05:00:00 -040001:28:22falsefull202565652025Throwback: Trump v. United States | The Levers of PowerEpisode Throwback: The Levers of Power

   Case: Trump v. United States | Case No. 23-939 | Docket Link: 23-939

   Context & Connection

   This week, we revisit the 2024 landmark ruling on Presidential immunity to provide context for our current coverage of Trump v. Slaughter and Trump v. Cook. These cases collectively explore the boundaries of Article II authority: (1) when can the President fire a person without cause when Congress permitted the person's firing only for cause; and (2) when can courts second guess the President's for cause determinations.

   The Immunity Framework

   In a 6-3 ruling in favor of presidential immunity, the Supreme Court established a three-tiered hierarchy for evaluating the criminal prosecution of a former President:

   1. Core Constitutional Powers: The President possesses absolute immunity for actions falling within his "conclusive and preclusive" constitutional authority (e.g., the pardon power, veto power, or recognition of foreign nations).
   2. Official Acts: The President is entitled to presumptive immunity for all other official acts within the "outer perimeter" of his responsibilities. The government must prove that prosecution would pose no danger of intrusion on the Executive Branch's function to rebut this.
   3. Unofficial Acts: The President holds no immunity for unofficial, private conduct.
   
   

   Analysis: The "Pall of Prosecution" vs. The Rule of Law

   1. The Majority Opinion (Roberts): The Court prioritized the "energetic executive," arguing that the threat of future prosecution would "chill" a President's ability to make bold, split-second decisions. By citing Fitzgerald and Youngstown, the Court emphasized that the Executive must be able to manage the Justice Department without judicial "second-guessing" of motives.
   2. The Evidentiary Bar: Crucially, the Court ruled that in a prosecution for unofficial acts, the Government cannot introduce evidence of official acts (such as private conversations with advisors) to prove the President's intent or context. This creates a significant "evidentiary shield" that complicates the prosecution of private conduct.
   3. The Dissents (Sotomayor & Jackson): Justice Sotomayor issued a stark warning, arguing the decision creates a "law-free zone" around the President. She contended that the majority's focus on "chilling" presidential action ignores the greater danger of an "insulated" President who can use the tools of the state (like the military or DOJ) to commit crimes with impunity. Justice Jackson focused on the "interbranch accountability" gap, noting that the ruling shifts the power to determine criminal liability from the law to the Judiciary's ad hoc classification of "official" vs. "unofficial."
   
   

   
   

   1. First in History: This was the first time in the 235-year history of the United States that the Supreme Court addressed whether a former President is immune from federal criminal prosecution for actions taken while in office.
   2. A Divided Bench: The ruling fell along a 6-3 split, reflecting a deep ideological divide regarding the "Unitary Executive" theory and the structural protections of Article II.
   
   ]]>Episode Throwback: The Levers of Power

   Case: Trump v. United States | Case No. 23-939 | Docket Link: 23-939

   Context & Connection

   This week, we revisit the 2024 landmark ruling on Presidential immunity to provide context for our current coverage of Trump v. Slaughter and Trump v. Cook. These cases collectively explore the boundaries of Article II authority: (1) when can the President fire a person without cause when Congress permitted the person's firing only for cause; and (2) when can courts second guess the President's for cause determinations.

   The Immunity Framework

   In a 6-3 ruling in favor of presidential immunity, the Supreme Court established a three-tiered hierarchy for evaluating the criminal prosecution of a former President:

   1. Core Constitutional Powers: The President possesses absolute immunity for actions falling within his "conclusive and preclusive" constitutional authority (e.g., the pardon power, veto power, or recognition of foreign nations).
   2. Official Acts: The President is entitled to presumptive immunity for all other official acts within the "outer perimeter" of his responsibilities. The government must prove that prosecution would pose no danger of intrusion on the Executive Branch's function to rebut this.
   3. Unofficial Acts: The President holds no immunity for unofficial, private conduct.
   
   

   Analysis: The "Pall of Prosecution" vs. The Rule of Law

   1. The Majority Opinion (Roberts): The Court prioritized the "energetic executive," arguing that the threat of future prosecution would "chill" a President's ability to make bold, split-second decisions. By citing Fitzgerald and Youngstown, the Court emphasized that the Executive must be able to manage the Justice Department without judicial "second-guessing" of motives.
   2. The Evidentiary Bar: Crucially, the Court ruled that in a prosecution for unofficial acts, the Government cannot introduce evidence of official acts (such as private conversations with advisors) to prove the President's intent or context. This creates a significant "evidentiary shield" that complicates the prosecution of private conduct.
   3. The Dissents (Sotomayor & Jackson): Justice Sotomayor issued a stark warning, arguing the decision creates a "law-free zone" around the President. She contended that the majority's focus on "chilling" presidential action ignores the greater danger of an "insulated" President who can use the tools of the state (like the military or DOJ) to commit crimes with impunity. Justice Jackson focused on the "interbranch accountability" gap, noting that the ruling shifts the power to determine criminal liability from the law to the Judiciary's ad hoc classification of "official" vs. "unofficial."
   
   

   
   

   1. First in History: This was the first time in the 235-year history of the United States that the Supreme Court addressed whether a former President is immune from federal criminal prosecution for actions taken while in office.
   2. A Divided Bench: The ruling fell along a 6-3 split, reflecting a deep ideological divide regarding the "Unitary Executive" theory and the structural protections of Article II.
   
   ]]>19f33169-d9ed-4037-a69d-2a108ec0bb73Tue, 23 Dec 2025 05:00:00 -040002:39:18falsefull202567672025Throwback: Biden v. Nebraska | Major Questions Doctrine in ActionThis week, we'll air throwback episodes. Each episode will relate to the current cases.

   Today's case is Biden v. Nebraska. I chose this case due to the statutory interpretation parallels with the Trump Tariff Cases. When listening, pay close attention to the justices' ways to decipher text and how the major questions doctrine plays into their thinking.

   Here's the story of Biden v. Nebraska:

   The Biden Administration tried to cancel $430 billion in student loan debt under the HEROES Act, claiming emergency powers from COVID-19 justified forgiving up to $20,000 per borrower. Six states sued, arguing the Education Secretary exceeded his legal authority to make such massive loan forgiveness without explicit congressional approval. The case reached the Supreme Court after lower courts blocked the program with a nationwide injunction.

   The Supreme Court ruled 6-3 that the HEROES Act does not give the Education Secretary authority to cancel $430 billion in student loans, because the power to "waive or modify" existing law cannot be stretched to completely rewrite federal student loan programs.

   The Court applied the "major questions doctrine," requiring clear congressional authorization when agencies claim power over issues of vast economic and political significance—here affecting 43 million borrowers and costing nearly half a trillion dollars. The majority distinguished between modest administrative adjustments (which the HEROES Act allows) and fundamental program overhauls (which require explicit congressional approval). The dissenters argued the majority was improperly second-guessing expert agency judgment and that emergency powers should be read more broadly during genuine national crises like the pandemic.

   ]]>This week, we'll air throwback episodes. Each episode will relate to the current cases.

   Today's case is Biden v. Nebraska. I chose this case due to the statutory interpretation parallels with the Trump Tariff Cases. When listening, pay close attention to the justices' ways to decipher text and how the major questions doctrine plays into their thinking.

   Here's the story of Biden v. Nebraska:

   The Biden Administration tried to cancel $430 billion in student loan debt under the HEROES Act, claiming emergency powers from COVID-19 justified forgiving up to $20,000 per borrower. Six states sued, arguing the Education Secretary exceeded his legal authority to make such massive loan forgiveness without explicit congressional approval. The case reached the Supreme Court after lower courts blocked the program with a nationwide injunction.

   The Supreme Court ruled 6-3 that the HEROES Act does not give the Education Secretary authority to cancel $430 billion in student loans, because the power to "waive or modify" existing law cannot be stretched to completely rewrite federal student loan programs.

   The Court applied the "major questions doctrine," requiring clear congressional authorization when agencies claim power over issues of vast economic and political significance—here affecting 43 million borrowers and costing nearly half a trillion dollars. The majority distinguished between modest administrative adjustments (which the HEROES Act allows) and fundamental program overhauls (which require explicit congressional approval). The dissenters argued the majority was improperly second-guessing expert agency judgment and that emergency powers should be read more broadly during genuine national crises like the pandemic.

   ]]>a73cd30d-6b57-40b5-878a-d0b00e210ceaTue, 23 Dec 2025 05:00:00 -040002:02:33falsefull202564642025Throwback: Twitter, Inc. v. Taamneh | Algorithms, Aiding, Abetting, and Secondary LiabilityThis week, we'll air throwback episodes. Each episode will relate to the current cases.

   In this case, Twitter claimed that federal law shielded them from liability for terrorists who used their platform for terrorist acts. I chose this case because it relates to arguments that Cox raised in Cox v. Sony Music Entertainment. In Cox, Cox argued that this case, Twitter v. Taamneh, created heightened proof necessary to establish liability for its' users actions.

   Here's the story of Twitter v. Taamneh:

   Families of victims killed in a 2017 ISIS terrorist attack at the Reina nightclub in Istanbul sued Twitter, Facebook, and Google under federal anti-terrorism law, claiming these social media companies aided and abetted ISIS by allowing the terrorist group to use their platforms for recruitment, fundraising, and propaganda while profiting from advertisements placed on ISIS content. The plaintiffs argued that the companies' recommendation algorithms actively promoted ISIS content to users likely to engage with it, and that the companies failed to adequately remove ISIS-related accounts and content despite knowing about their presence. The Ninth Circuit allowed the lawsuit to proceed, but the social media companies appealed to the Supreme Court.

   
   

   The Supreme Court unanimously reversed, ruling that the plaintiffs failed to state a valid claim for aiding and abetting liability because the social media companies' general provision of platforms and passive failure to remove ISIS content did not constitute the "knowing and substantial assistance" required under federal law.

   
   

   The Court applied the Halberstam framework, which requires defendants to consciously participate in specific wrongful acts—meaning companies must actively help with particular terrorist attacks, not just allow terrorists to use their platforms like any other users. The Court distinguished between active misconduct (which creates liability) and passive failure to act (which generally does not), ruling that simply allowing ISIS to use social media platforms without special treatment amounts to passive inaction rather than culpable assistance. This decision protects communication providers from automatic liability for knowing that bad actors use their services, instead requiring evidence of intentional participation in specific terrorist acts.

   ]]>This week, we'll air throwback episodes. Each episode will relate to the current cases.

   In this case, Twitter claimed that federal law shielded them from liability for terrorists who used their platform for terrorist acts. I chose this case because it relates to arguments that Cox raised in Cox v. Sony Music Entertainment. In Cox, Cox argued that this case, Twitter v. Taamneh, created heightened proof necessary to establish liability for its' users actions.

   Here's the story of Twitter v. Taamneh:

   Families of victims killed in a 2017 ISIS terrorist attack at the Reina nightclub in Istanbul sued Twitter, Facebook, and Google under federal anti-terrorism law, claiming these social media companies aided and abetted ISIS by allowing the terrorist group to use their platforms for recruitment, fundraising, and propaganda while profiting from advertisements placed on ISIS content. The plaintiffs argued that the companies' recommendation algorithms actively promoted ISIS content to users likely to engage with it, and that the companies failed to adequately remove ISIS-related accounts and content despite knowing about their presence. The Ninth Circuit allowed the lawsuit to proceed, but the social media companies appealed to the Supreme Court.

   
   

   The Supreme Court unanimously reversed, ruling that the plaintiffs failed to state a valid claim for aiding and abetting liability because the social media companies' general provision of platforms and passive failure to remove ISIS content did not constitute the "knowing and substantial assistance" required under federal law.

   
   

   The Court applied the Halberstam framework, which requires defendants to consciously participate in specific wrongful acts—meaning companies must actively help with particular terrorist attacks, not just allow terrorists to use their platforms like any other users. The Court distinguished between active misconduct (which creates liability) and passive failure to act (which generally does not), ruling that simply allowing ISIS to use social media platforms without special treatment amounts to passive inaction rather than culpable assistance. This decision protects communication providers from automatic liability for knowing that bad actors use their services, instead requiring evidence of intentional participation in specific terrorist acts.

   ]]>0923b373-bf4a-4c13-8e54-295119a33185Mon, 22 Dec 2025 05:00:00 -040002:29:42falsefull202563632025Takeaways + Predictions | from Cases on Campaign Finance, Death Penalty IQ Tests, and Securities SuitsOverview

   This episode delivers post-oral argument analysis and predictions for three major Supreme Court cases heard during the December 2025 argument session. We break down the key exchanges, judicial fault lines, and likely outcomes in National Republican Senatorial Committee v. FEC (campaign finance limits), Hamm v. Smith (intellectual disability determinations in death penalty cases), and FS Credit v. Saba (implied private rights of action in securities law).

   NRSC v. FEC: Campaign Finance Revolution

   • JD Vance standing issues and Article III requirements

   • Chief Justice Roberts challenges coordinated expenditure "fictions"

   • Justice Kagan's systematic dismantling of Republican arguments

   • Super PAC dominance versus party strength dynamics

   • Justice Alito's revealing "who benefits" question

   
   

   Hamm v. Smith: Life-or-Death IQ Determinations

   • Joseph Smith's brutal 1997 murder and five IQ test scores (75, 74, 72, 78, 74)

   • Alabama's collective scoring approach versus federal holistic evaluation

   • Chief Justice Roberts' "results-oriented" methodology critique

   • Justice Jackson's clinical expertise emphasis

   • Solicitor General's compromise "circle back" approach

   
   

   FS Credit v. Saba: Securities Law Private Enforcement

   • Activist investor challenges to fund management poison pills

   • Justice Kavanaugh as potential swing vote on "anomalous" state court outcomes

   • Legislative history debate between Sotomayor and textualists

   • Justice Gorsuch's separation of powers concerns

   • Practical implications for investment fund governance

   
   

   Episode Highlights

   
   

   Campaign Finance Revelations:

   • Chief Justice Roberts: "I don't know in substance what the difference is" between coordinated expenditures and direct contributions

   • Justice Kagan's methodical exposure of existing circumvention loopholes

   • Republican counsel's admission about partisan fundraising advantages

   
   

   Death Penalty Constitutional Stakes:

   • Chief Justice Roberts challenging Alabama's statistical consistency

   • Justice Jackson emphasizing clinical complexity over mechanical score-counting

   • Three-way methodological split among Alabama, Smith, and federal government

   
   

   Securities Law Enforcement:

   • Justice Kavanaugh's practical concerns about "very bizarre" state court relegation

   • Paul Clement's "nugatory statute" argument about defensive-only interpretation

   • Justice Gorsuch's emphasis on separation of powers in implied rights creation

   
   

   Host Predictions:

   • NRSC wins 6-3 (Thomas, Alito, Kavanaugh plus Roberts, Barrett, Gorsuch)

   • Hamm adopts Solicitor General's compromise approach

   • Saba wins 5-4 with Justice Barrett as deciding vote

   
   

   ]]>Overview

   This episode delivers post-oral argument analysis and predictions for three major Supreme Court cases heard during the December 2025 argument session. We break down the key exchanges, judicial fault lines, and likely outcomes in National Republican Senatorial Committee v. FEC (campaign finance limits), Hamm v. Smith (intellectual disability determinations in death penalty cases), and FS Credit v. Saba (implied private rights of action in securities law).

   NRSC v. FEC: Campaign Finance Revolution

   • JD Vance standing issues and Article III requirements

   • Chief Justice Roberts challenges coordinated expenditure "fictions"

   • Justice Kagan's systematic dismantling of Republican arguments

   • Super PAC dominance versus party strength dynamics

   • Justice Alito's revealing "who benefits" question

   
   

   Hamm v. Smith: Life-or-Death IQ Determinations

   • Joseph Smith's brutal 1997 murder and five IQ test scores (75, 74, 72, 78, 74)

   • Alabama's collective scoring approach versus federal holistic evaluation

   • Chief Justice Roberts' "results-oriented" methodology critique

   • Justice Jackson's clinical expertise emphasis

   • Solicitor General's compromise "circle back" approach

   
   

   FS Credit v. Saba: Securities Law Private Enforcement

   • Activist investor challenges to fund management poison pills

   • Justice Kavanaugh as potential swing vote on "anomalous" state court outcomes

   • Legislative history debate between Sotomayor and textualists

   • Justice Gorsuch's separation of powers concerns

   • Practical implications for investment fund governance

   
   

   Episode Highlights

   
   

   Campaign Finance Revelations:

   • Chief Justice Roberts: "I don't know in substance what the difference is" between coordinated expenditures and direct contributions

   • Justice Kagan's methodical exposure of existing circumvention loopholes

   • Republican counsel's admission about partisan fundraising advantages

   
   

   Death Penalty Constitutional Stakes:

   • Chief Justice Roberts challenging Alabama's statistical consistency

   • Justice Jackson emphasizing clinical complexity over mechanical score-counting

   • Three-way methodological split among Alabama, Smith, and federal government

   
   

   Securities Law Enforcement:

   • Justice Kavanaugh's practical concerns about "very bizarre" state court relegation

   • Paul Clement's "nugatory statute" argument about defensive-only interpretation

   • Justice Gorsuch's emphasis on separation of powers in implied rights creation

   
   

   Host Predictions:

   • NRSC wins 6-3 (Thomas, Alito, Kavanaugh plus Roberts, Barrett, Gorsuch)

   • Hamm adopts Solicitor General's compromise approach

   • Saba wins 5-4 with Justice Barrett as deciding vote

   
   

   ]]>d33a9a04-dde1-407c-8ab8-1007694537f9Mon, 15 Dec 2025 05:00:00 -040019:42falsefull202562622025Oral Argument: FS Credit v. Saba | Fund Feud: Forcing Fiduciary Fairness Through Federal LawsuitsFS Credit v. Saba | Fund Feud: Forcing Fiduciary Fairness Through Federal Lawsuits | Argument Date: 12/10/25 | Docket Link: Here

   Question Presented: Whether Section 47(b) of the Investment Company Act of 1940 gives private plaintiffs a federal cause of action to seek rescission of contracts that allegedly violate the Act.

   Overview

   The Supreme Court will decide whether activist investors can sue investment funds directly in federal court when funds adopt governance provisions that allegedly violate federal securities law. Four closed-end funds adopted Maryland Control Share Acquisition Act provisions to strip voting rights from shareholders acquiring more than 10% ownership, prompting Saba Capital to seek rescission under Section 47(b) of the Investment Company Act. The case creates a fundamental clash over private enforcement of securities laws versus exclusive SEC regulatory authority, with implications for millions of Americans who invest in mutual funds and closed-end funds.

   Question Presented:

   Oral Advocates:

   • For Petitioner (FS Credit) and Respondents (BlackRock): Shay Dvoretzky, Washington, D.C.
   • United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners: Max E. Schulman, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice
   • For Respondent: Paul D. Clement, Alexandria, VA
   
   

   Link to Opinion: TBD.

   Website Link to Opinion Summary: TBD.

   Website Link to Oral Argument: TBD.

   Timestamps:

   [00:00:00] Oral Argument Preview

   [00:01:23] Oral Argument Begins

   [00:01:36] Petitioner Opening Statement

   [00:03:40] Petitioner Free for All Questions

   [00:19:29] Petitioner Round Robin Questions

   [00:30:53] United States as Amicus Curiae Opening Statement

   [00:32:17] United States Free for All Questions

   [00:42:11] United States Round Robin Questions

   [00:46:27] Respondent Opening Statement

   [00:48:55] Respondent Free for All Questions

   [01:16:48] Respondent Round Robin Questions

   [01:16:58] Petitioner Rebuttal

   ]]>FS Credit v. Saba | Fund Feud: Forcing Fiduciary Fairness Through Federal Lawsuits | Argument Date: 12/10/25 | Docket Link: Here

   Question Presented: Whether Section 47(b) of the Investment Company Act of 1940 gives private plaintiffs a federal cause of action to seek rescission of contracts that allegedly violate the Act.

   Overview

   The Supreme Court will decide whether activist investors can sue investment funds directly in federal court when funds adopt governance provisions that allegedly violate federal securities law. Four closed-end funds adopted Maryland Control Share Acquisition Act provisions to strip voting rights from shareholders acquiring more than 10% ownership, prompting Saba Capital to seek rescission under Section 47(b) of the Investment Company Act. The case creates a fundamental clash over private enforcement of securities laws versus exclusive SEC regulatory authority, with implications for millions of Americans who invest in mutual funds and closed-end funds.

   Question Presented:

   Oral Advocates:

   • For Petitioner (FS Credit) and Respondents (BlackRock): Shay Dvoretzky, Washington, D.C.
   • United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners: Max E. Schulman, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice
   • For Respondent: Paul D. Clement, Alexandria, VA
   
   

   Link to Opinion: TBD.

   Website Link to Opinion Summary: TBD.

   Website Link to Oral Argument: TBD.

   Timestamps:

   [00:00:00] Oral Argument Preview

   [00:01:23] Oral Argument Begins

   [00:01:36] Petitioner Opening Statement

   [00:03:40] Petitioner Free for All Questions

   [00:19:29] Petitioner Round Robin Questions

   [00:30:53] United States as Amicus Curiae Opening Statement

   [00:32:17] United States Free for All Questions

   [00:42:11] United States Round Robin Questions

   [00:46:27] Respondent Opening Statement

   [00:48:55] Respondent Free for All Questions

   [01:16:48] Respondent Round Robin Questions

   [01:16:58] Petitioner Rebuttal

   ]]>4043ed11-ac19-43bd-a7d9-4ae1470fa710Wed, 10 Dec 2025 16:00:00 -040001:20:19falsefull202561612025Oral Argument: Hamm v. Smith | IQ Score ShowdownHamm v. Smith | Case No. 24-872 | Oral Argument Date: 12/10/25 | Docket Link: Here

   Question Presented: When someone takes multiple IQ tests to prove intellectual disability in a capital case, do courts look at all the scores together, or can one low score alone save their life?

   Overview

   The Supreme Court will decide whether courts must evaluate multiple IQ scores collectively or whether a single qualifying score triggers constitutional protection in death penalty cases. This decision affects hundreds of current death row inmates and reshapes capital litigation nationwide.

   Oral Advocates:

   • For Petitioner (Hamm): Robert M. Overing, Principal Deputy Solicitor General, Montgomery, Alabama argued for Petitioner Hamm.
   • United States as Amicus Curaie in Support of Petitioner: Harry Graver, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice.
   • For Respondent (Smith): Seth P. Waxman, Washington, D.C.
   
   

   Link to Opinion: TBD.

   Website Link to Opinion Summary: TBD.

   Website Link to Oral Argument: TBD.

   Timestamps:

   [00:00:00] Oral Argument Preview

   [00:01:28] Oral Argument Begins

   [00:01:43] Petitioner Opening Statement

   [00:03:58] Petitioner Free for All Questions

   [00:20:43] Petitioner Round Robin Questions

   [00:44:36] United States as Amicus Curiae Opening Statement

   [00:45:47] United States Free for All Questions

   [00:55:27] United States Round Robin Questions

   [01:21:13] Respondent Opening Statement

   [01:24:00] Respondent Free for All Questions

   [01:51:28] Respondent Round Robin Questions

   [02:01:18] Petitioner Rebuttal

   ]]>Hamm v. Smith | Case No. 24-872 | Oral Argument Date: 12/10/25 | Docket Link: Here

   Question Presented: When someone takes multiple IQ tests to prove intellectual disability in a capital case, do courts look at all the scores together, or can one low score alone save their life?

   Overview

   The Supreme Court will decide whether courts must evaluate multiple IQ scores collectively or whether a single qualifying score triggers constitutional protection in death penalty cases. This decision affects hundreds of current death row inmates and reshapes capital litigation nationwide.

   Oral Advocates:

   • For Petitioner (Hamm): Robert M. Overing, Principal Deputy Solicitor General, Montgomery, Alabama argued for Petitioner Hamm.
   • United States as Amicus Curaie in Support of Petitioner: Harry Graver, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice.
   • For Respondent (Smith): Seth P. Waxman, Washington, D.C.
   
   

   Link to Opinion: TBD.

   Website Link to Opinion Summary: TBD.

   Website Link to Oral Argument: TBD.

   Timestamps:

   [00:00:00] Oral Argument Preview

   [00:01:28] Oral Argument Begins

   [00:01:43] Petitioner Opening Statement

   [00:03:58] Petitioner Free for All Questions

   [00:20:43] Petitioner Round Robin Questions

   [00:44:36] United States as Amicus Curiae Opening Statement

   [00:45:47] United States Free for All Questions

   [00:55:27] United States Round Robin Questions

   [01:21:13] Respondent Opening Statement

   [01:24:00] Respondent Free for All Questions

   [01:51:28] Respondent Round Robin Questions

   [02:01:18] Petitioner Rebuttal

   ]]>435f5d8c-df61-4636-bf4d-18fb3b1fe2a4Wed, 10 Dec 2025 16:00:00 -040002:03:10falsefull202560602025Six Pack of Takeaways + Prediction: Trump v. SlaughterSummary:

   Analysis of the December 8, 2025 Supreme Court oral arguments in Trump v. Slaughter, examining how the justices signaled their likely approach to presidential removal power and independent agencies.

   Key Topics Covered:

   1. Chief Justice Roberts' Strategic Questioning

   • Focused on workability and implementation details
   • Challenged quality of precedents supporting Slaughter's position
   • Unusual volume of questions suggests engagement with Trump's arguments
   
   

   2. Justice Sotomayor's Stare Decisis Defense

   • Mounted strongest defense of Humphrey's Executor (1935)
   • Emphasized 90-year precedential history
   • Questioned Court's willingness to overturn longstanding constitutional precedent
   
   

   3. Predicted 6-3 Ruling for Trump

   • Court's emergency docket orders already revealed likely outcome
   • Three-step analysis: presidential removal power + FTC executive authority + distinguish/overrule Humphrey's
   
   

   4. Competing Predictions About Impact

   • Slaughter's team: regulatory chaos, undermined business planning
   • Trump's team: "sky did not fall" in previous agency restructurings
   
   

   5. The "Faithful Execution" Thread

   • Justice Gorsuch's devastating questioning about Take Care Clause
   • Exposed contradiction in Slaughter's constitutional theory
   • "Ruinous fines" vs. misdemeanor enforcement distinction crumbles
   
   

   6. The Defense Department Problem

   • Congress could restructure Cabinet departments as protected commissions
   • Slaughter's logic threatens executive unity across government
   • No limiting principle to prevent wholesale agency insulation
   
   

   Bonus: Trump v. United States Framework

   • "Conclusive and preclusive" authority test from immunity case
   • Both sides weaponized language for removal power debate
   • Constitutional framework that shaped entire argument
   
   

   Next Episode: Analysis of post-argument developments and decision timeline

   ]]>Summary:

   Analysis of the December 8, 2025 Supreme Court oral arguments in Trump v. Slaughter, examining how the justices signaled their likely approach to presidential removal power and independent agencies.

   Key Topics Covered:

   1. Chief Justice Roberts' Strategic Questioning

   • Focused on workability and implementation details
   • Challenged quality of precedents supporting Slaughter's position
   • Unusual volume of questions suggests engagement with Trump's arguments
   
   

   2. Justice Sotomayor's Stare Decisis Defense

   • Mounted strongest defense of Humphrey's Executor (1935)
   • Emphasized 90-year precedential history
   • Questioned Court's willingness to overturn longstanding constitutional precedent
   
   

   3. Predicted 6-3 Ruling for Trump

   • Court's emergency docket orders already revealed likely outcome
   • Three-step analysis: presidential removal power + FTC executive authority + distinguish/overrule Humphrey's
   
   

   4. Competing Predictions About Impact

   • Slaughter's team: regulatory chaos, undermined business planning
   • Trump's team: "sky did not fall" in previous agency restructurings
   
   

   5. The "Faithful Execution" Thread

   • Justice Gorsuch's devastating questioning about Take Care Clause
   • Exposed contradiction in Slaughter's constitutional theory
   • "Ruinous fines" vs. misdemeanor enforcement distinction crumbles
   
   

   6. The Defense Department Problem

   • Congress could restructure Cabinet departments as protected commissions
   • Slaughter's logic threatens executive unity across government
   • No limiting principle to prevent wholesale agency insulation
   
   

   Bonus: Trump v. United States Framework

   • "Conclusive and preclusive" authority test from immunity case
   • Both sides weaponized language for removal power debate
   • Constitutional framework that shaped entire argument
   
   

   Next Episode: Analysis of post-argument developments and decision timeline

   ]]>9f04fe9a-a321-4852-8138-f6dcd1cd89efTue, 09 Dec 2025 12:00:00 -040008:19falsefull202561612025Oral Argument: NRSC v. FEC | Camaign Finance First Amendment FightNRSC v. FEC | Money, Messaging, and Muzzling: The First Amendment Fight Over Party Coordination | Argument Date: 12/9/15 | Docket Link: Here

   Question Presented: Whether the First Amendment permits limits on the amount of money that the national committee of a political party may contribute to political candidates in the form of coordinated expenditures.

   Overview

   This oral argument involves National Republican Senatorial Committee versus Federal Election Commission, a landmark campaign finance case that could fundamentally reshape how political parties operate in federal elections, featuring the extraordinary situation where the Federal Election Commission itself now agrees with the challengers that coordinated party expenditure limits violate the First Amendment.

   The case centers on limits that cap how much money party committees can spend in coordination with their candidates, creating a constitutional clash over political speech rights and anti-corruption measures. With the government switching sides post-election, the Court appointed an outside lawyer to defend the law while Democratic Party committees intervened to provide the opposition the case desperately needed.

   Oral Advocates:

   • For Petitioner (NRSC): Noel J. Francisco, Washington, D.C., argued for Petitioners NRSC.
   • For Respondents in Support of Petitioners (FEC): Sarah M. Harris, Principal Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, argued in support of NRSC.
   • Court-Appointed Amicus Curiae in Support of the Judgment Below: Roman Martinez, Washington, D.C.
   • For Intervenor (DNC): Marc E. Elias, Washington, D.C.
   
   

   Link to Opinion: TBD.

   Website Link to Opinion Summary: TBD.

   Website Link to Oral Argument: TBD.

   Timestamps:

   [00:00:00] Oral Argument Preview

   [00:02:28] Oral Argument Begins

   [00:02:38] Petitioner Opening Statement

   [00:04:39] Petitioner Free for All Questions

   [00:18:19] Petitioner Round Robin Questions

   [00:48:54] United States in Support of Petitioner Opening Statement

   [00:50:08] United States Free for All Questions

   [01:05:22] United States Round Robin Questions

   [01:19:53] Court Appointed Amicus Curiae Opening Statement

   [01:22:17] Court Appointed Amicus Curiae Free for All Questions

   [01:38:08] Court Appointed Amicus Curiae Round Robin Questions

   [01:44:55] DNC As Intervenors Opening Statement

   [01:46:17] DNC As Intervenors Free for All Questions

   [02:00:05] DNC As Intervenor Round Robin Questions

   [02:09:51] Petitioner Rebuttal

   ]]>NRSC v. FEC | Money, Messaging, and Muzzling: The First Amendment Fight Over Party Coordination | Argument Date: 12/9/15 | Docket Link: Here

   Question Presented: Whether the First Amendment permits limits on the amount of money that the national committee of a political party may contribute to political candidates in the form of coordinated expenditures.

   Overview

   This oral argument involves National Republican Senatorial Committee versus Federal Election Commission, a landmark campaign finance case that could fundamentally reshape how political parties operate in federal elections, featuring the extraordinary situation where the Federal Election Commission itself now agrees with the challengers that coordinated party expenditure limits violate the First Amendment.

   The case centers on limits that cap how much money party committees can spend in coordination with their candidates, creating a constitutional clash over political speech rights and anti-corruption measures. With the government switching sides post-election, the Court appointed an outside lawyer to defend the law while Democratic Party committees intervened to provide the opposition the case desperately needed.

   Oral Advocates:

   • For Petitioner (NRSC): Noel J. Francisco, Washington, D.C., argued for Petitioners NRSC.
   • For Respondents in Support of Petitioners (FEC): Sarah M. Harris, Principal Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, argued in support of NRSC.
   • Court-Appointed Amicus Curiae in Support of the Judgment Below: Roman Martinez, Washington, D.C.
   • For Intervenor (DNC): Marc E. Elias, Washington, D.C.
   
   

   Link to Opinion: TBD.

   Website Link to Opinion Summary: TBD.

   Website Link to Oral Argument: TBD.

   Timestamps:

   [00:00:00] Oral Argument Preview

   [00:02:28] Oral Argument Begins

   [00:02:38] Petitioner Opening Statement

   [00:04:39] Petitioner Free for All Questions

   [00:18:19] Petitioner Round Robin Questions

   [00:48:54] United States in Support of Petitioner Opening Statement

   [00:50:08] United States Free for All Questions

   [01:05:22] United States Round Robin Questions

   [01:19:53] Court Appointed Amicus Curiae Opening Statement

   [01:22:17] Court Appointed Amicus Curiae Free for All Questions

   [01:38:08] Court Appointed Amicus Curiae Round Robin Questions

   [01:44:55] DNC As Intervenors Opening Statement

   [01:46:17] DNC As Intervenors Free for All Questions

   [02:00:05] DNC As Intervenor Round Robin Questions

   [02:09:51] Petitioner Rebuttal

   ]]>bbc5d17f-0dcb-4c7a-a44a-f87641e6bd7bTue, 09 Dec 2025 05:00:00 -040002:13:14falsefull202559592025Oral Argument: Trump v. Slaughter | Presidential Power PlayTrump v. Slaughter | Presidential Power Play : Trump's Total Takedown of Independent Agencies | Case No. 25-332 | Oral Argument Date: 12/8/25 | Docket Link: Here

   Question Presented: Whether Congress can require the President to show cause before removing commissioners of independent agencies, or whether Article II grants the President absolute removal power over all executive officers.

   Overview

   President Trump removed FTC Commissioner Rebecca Slaughter without cause, challenging the constitutional foundation of independent agencies. The Court confronts whether two dozen independent agencies that control $47 trillion in economic activity can maintain protection from at-will presidential removal.

   Oral Advocates:

   • For Petitioner (Trump): D. John Sauer, Solicitor General, Department of Justice.
   • For Respondent (Slaughter): Amit Agarwal, Washington, D.C.
   
   

   Link to Opinion: TBD.

   Website Link to Opinion Summary: TBD.

   Website Link to Oral Argument: TBD.

   Timestamps:

   [00:00:00] Oral Argument Preview

   [00:02:03] Oral Argument Begins

   [00:02:11] Petitioner Opening Statement

   [00:04:06] Petitioner Free for All Questions

   [00:27:29] Petitioner Round Robin Questions

   [01:05:33] Respondent Opening Statement

   [01:08:00] Respondent Free for All Questions

   [01:37:09] Petitioner Round Robin Questions

   [02:29:03] Petitioner Rebuttal

   ]]>Trump v. Slaughter | Presidential Power Play : Trump's Total Takedown of Independent Agencies | Case No. 25-332 | Oral Argument Date: 12/8/25 | Docket Link: Here

   Question Presented: Whether Congress can require the President to show cause before removing commissioners of independent agencies, or whether Article II grants the President absolute removal power over all executive officers.

   Overview

   President Trump removed FTC Commissioner Rebecca Slaughter without cause, challenging the constitutional foundation of independent agencies. The Court confronts whether two dozen independent agencies that control $47 trillion in economic activity can maintain protection from at-will presidential removal.

   Oral Advocates:

   • For Petitioner (Trump): D. John Sauer, Solicitor General, Department of Justice.
   • For Respondent (Slaughter): Amit Agarwal, Washington, D.C.
   
   

   Link to Opinion: TBD.

   Website Link to Opinion Summary: TBD.

   Website Link to Oral Argument: TBD.

   Timestamps:

   [00:00:00] Oral Argument Preview

   [00:02:03] Oral Argument Begins

   [00:02:11] Petitioner Opening Statement

   [00:04:06] Petitioner Free for All Questions

   [00:27:29] Petitioner Round Robin Questions

   [01:05:33] Respondent Opening Statement

   [01:08:00] Respondent Free for All Questions

   [01:37:09] Petitioner Round Robin Questions

   [02:29:03] Petitioner Rebuttal

   ]]>33a54ffc-42da-4337-a291-b158eb1ba19eMon, 08 Dec 2025 16:30:00 -040002:32:33falsefull202558582025Cert Grant Roundup: Constitutional Citizenship, Prosecutorial Power, and Court JurisdictionOverview

   This episode updates on four major cases granted certiorari by the Supreme Court on December 5th, 2025, following Friday's episode. The cases span constitutional citizenship rights, federal court jurisdiction, criminal procedure, and arbitration law, representing some of the most significant legal questions facing the Court this term.

   Roadmap

   Opening: December 5th Cert Grants

   • Four cases granted certiorari in one day

   • Focus on birthright citizenship case that drew most attention

   • Brief coverage of three additional jurisdictional cases

   Trump v. Barbara: The Birthright Citizenship Case

   • Background from Trump v. CASA oral arguments

   • Chief Justice Roberts' comments about expedited review

   • Executive Order 14,160 targeting children of unauthorized immigrants and temporary visitors

   • Multiple district court injunctions blocking the order

   Three Additional Cases

   • T.M. v. University of Maryland Medical System Corporation (Rooker-Feldman doctrine)

   • Abouammo v. United States (venue and statute of limitations)

   • Jules v. Balazs Properties (post-arbitration federal jurisdiction)

   Episode Highlights

   • Constitutional urgency: Chief Justice Roberts' prior comments about moving "expeditiously" now seem prophetic given the Court's cert-before-judgment grant in the birthright citizenship case

   • Universal injunction aftermath: The CASA decision's limits on universal injunctions created complications that led directly to the Barbara case

   • Circuit splits galore: All four cases involve significant circuit splits requiring Supreme Court resolution

   • Jurisdictional themes: Three of the four cases involve fundamental questions about federal court authority and jurisdiction

   Referenced Cases

   Trump v. Barbara | Case No. 25-365 | Docket Link

   Question Presented: Whether the phrase "subject to the jurisdiction thereof" in the Citizenship Clause requires that a person's parents have lawful domicile in the United States at the time of birth.

   Arguments: Government argues "subject to the jurisdiction" requires political allegiance through lawful domicile and that Wong Kim Ark only applied to permanently domiciled aliens. Respondents defend broad birthright citizenship based on Wong Kim Ark precedent and argue executive order violates federal statute and 130 years of settled law.

   T.M. v. University of Maryland Medical System Corporation | Case No. 25-197 | Docket Link

   Question Presented: Whether the Rooker-Feldman doctrine can be triggered by a state-court decision that remains subject to further review in state court.

   Arguments: T.M. argues doctrine should only apply to final state court judgments based on Section 1257's text and Exxon Mobil precedent. Hospital argues no meaningful circuit split exists and federalism concerns support broader application of doctrine.

   
   

   Abouammo v. United States | Case No. 25-5146 | Docket Link

   Question Presented: (1) Whether venue is proper in a district where no offense conduct took place, so long as the statute's intent element "contemplates" effects that could occur there. (2) Whether a criminal information unaccompanied by a waiver of indictment is an "information charging a felony" under 18 U.S.C. § 3288.

   Arguments: Abouammo argues venue should be limited to where essential conduct elements occur and that invalid informations cannot toll limitations periods. Government defends effects-based venue when statutes contemplate such effects and argues Congress deliberately removed waiver requirements from Section 3288.

   
   

   Jules v. Balazs Properties | Case No. 25-365 | Docket Link

   Question Presented: Whether a federal court that initially exercises jurisdiction and stays a case pending arbitration maintains jurisdiction over a post-arbitration Section 9 or 10 application where jurisdiction would otherwise be lacking.

   Arguments: Jules argues Badgerow requires independent federal jurisdiction for all post-arbitration motions to prevent forum shopping. Respondents defend "jurisdictional anchor" theory allowing courts that stay cases for arbitration to retain jurisdiction over final motions.

   ]]>Overview

   This episode updates on four major cases granted certiorari by the Supreme Court on December 5th, 2025, following Friday's episode. The cases span constitutional citizenship rights, federal court jurisdiction, criminal procedure, and arbitration law, representing some of the most significant legal questions facing the Court this term.

   Roadmap

   Opening: December 5th Cert Grants

   • Four cases granted certiorari in one day

   • Focus on birthright citizenship case that drew most attention

   • Brief coverage of three additional jurisdictional cases

   Trump v. Barbara: The Birthright Citizenship Case

   • Background from Trump v. CASA oral arguments

   • Chief Justice Roberts' comments about expedited review

   • Executive Order 14,160 targeting children of unauthorized immigrants and temporary visitors

   • Multiple district court injunctions blocking the order

   Three Additional Cases

   • T.M. v. University of Maryland Medical System Corporation (Rooker-Feldman doctrine)

   • Abouammo v. United States (venue and statute of limitations)

   • Jules v. Balazs Properties (post-arbitration federal jurisdiction)

   Episode Highlights

   • Constitutional urgency: Chief Justice Roberts' prior comments about moving "expeditiously" now seem prophetic given the Court's cert-before-judgment grant in the birthright citizenship case

   • Universal injunction aftermath: The CASA decision's limits on universal injunctions created complications that led directly to the Barbara case

   • Circuit splits galore: All four cases involve significant circuit splits requiring Supreme Court resolution

   • Jurisdictional themes: Three of the four cases involve fundamental questions about federal court authority and jurisdiction

   Referenced Cases

   Trump v. Barbara | Case No. 25-365 | Docket Link

   Question Presented: Whether the phrase "subject to the jurisdiction thereof" in the Citizenship Clause requires that a person's parents have lawful domicile in the United States at the time of birth.

   Arguments: Government argues "subject to the jurisdiction" requires political allegiance through lawful domicile and that Wong Kim Ark only applied to permanently domiciled aliens. Respondents defend broad birthright citizenship based on Wong Kim Ark precedent and argue executive order violates federal statute and 130 years of settled law.

   T.M. v. University of Maryland Medical System Corporation | Case No. 25-197 | Docket Link

   Question Presented: Whether the Rooker-Feldman doctrine can be triggered by a state-court decision that remains subject to further review in state court.

   Arguments: T.M. argues doctrine should only apply to final state court judgments based on Section 1257's text and Exxon Mobil precedent. Hospital argues no meaningful circuit split exists and federalism concerns support broader application of doctrine.

   
   

   Abouammo v. United States | Case No. 25-5146 | Docket Link

   Question Presented: (1) Whether venue is proper in a district where no offense conduct took place, so long as the statute's intent element "contemplates" effects that could occur there. (2) Whether a criminal information unaccompanied by a waiver of indictment is an "information charging a felony" under 18 U.S.C. § 3288.

   Arguments: Abouammo argues venue should be limited to where essential conduct elements occur and that invalid informations cannot toll limitations periods. Government defends effects-based venue when statutes contemplate such effects and argues Congress deliberately removed waiver requirements from Section 3288.

   
   

   Jules v. Balazs Properties | Case No. 25-365 | Docket Link

   Question Presented: Whether a federal court that initially exercises jurisdiction and stays a case pending arbitration maintains jurisdiction over a post-arbitration Section 9 or 10 application where jurisdiction would otherwise be lacking.

   Arguments: Jules argues Badgerow requires independent federal jurisdiction for all post-arbitration motions to prevent forum shopping. Respondents defend "jurisdictional anchor" theory allowing courts that stay cases for arbitration to retain jurisdiction over final motions.

   ]]>af49ee04-762d-440f-8494-747ccf843389Mon, 08 Dec 2025 05:00:00 -040015:11falsefull202557572025Week in Review: Unanimous Reversals, Texas Redistricting Bombshell, This Week's Oral Argument Analysis, and Presidential Power Showdown AheadOverview

   This week delivered explosive Supreme Court developments with two unanimous decisions and Texas redistricting ruling reshaping voting rights.

   The Court reversed Clark versus Sweeney and Pitts versus Mississippi while granting Texas a controversial redistricting stay. Oral arguments revealed deep tensions involving internet liability, immigration law, First Amendment standing, and federal court jurisdiction. Next week promises blockbuster cases addressing presidential power, campaign finance regulations, death penalty standards, and investment law.

   Roadmap

   • Examine three major Supreme Court actions including two unanimous reversals that reinforce core judicial principles and one explosive redistricting decision that signals the Court's growing skepticism toward racial gerrymandering claims.
   • Analyze this week's oral arguments covering Cox Communications' copyright liability dilemma, the complex standing issues in First Choice Women's Resource Centers versus Platkin, and Justice Jackson's pointed questioning in Olivier versus City of Brandon.
   • Explore the implications of the Abbott decision for Louisiana versus Callais and broader voting rights protections.
   • Preview next week's constitutional showdowns including Trump's challenge to independent agency protections and two death penalty cases that could reshape capital punishment standards.
   
   

   TIMESTAMPS

   [00:00] Intro

   [01:17] Two Supreme Court Per Curiam Opinions

   [04:57] Supreme Court Texas Redistricting Emergency Docket Decision

   [06:57] Oral Arguments Week in Review

   [15:30]  Next Week's Blockbuster Cases

   ]]>Overview

   This week delivered explosive Supreme Court developments with two unanimous decisions and Texas redistricting ruling reshaping voting rights.

   The Court reversed Clark versus Sweeney and Pitts versus Mississippi while granting Texas a controversial redistricting stay. Oral arguments revealed deep tensions involving internet liability, immigration law, First Amendment standing, and federal court jurisdiction. Next week promises blockbuster cases addressing presidential power, campaign finance regulations, death penalty standards, and investment law.

   Roadmap

   • Examine three major Supreme Court actions including two unanimous reversals that reinforce core judicial principles and one explosive redistricting decision that signals the Court's growing skepticism toward racial gerrymandering claims.
   • Analyze this week's oral arguments covering Cox Communications' copyright liability dilemma, the complex standing issues in First Choice Women's Resource Centers versus Platkin, and Justice Jackson's pointed questioning in Olivier versus City of Brandon.
   • Explore the implications of the Abbott decision for Louisiana versus Callais and broader voting rights protections.
   • Preview next week's constitutional showdowns including Trump's challenge to independent agency protections and two death penalty cases that could reshape capital punishment standards.
   
   

   TIMESTAMPS

   [00:00] Intro

   [01:17] Two Supreme Court Per Curiam Opinions

   [04:57] Supreme Court Texas Redistricting Emergency Docket Decision

   [06:57] Oral Arguments Week in Review

   [15:30]  Next Week's Blockbuster Cases

   ]]>fc549f8f-8495-4ce5-ab5d-e103e1164c94Fri, 05 Dec 2025 23:00:00 -040019:00falsefull202556562025Oral Argument: Olivier v. City of Brandon | Sidewalk Sermons and Section 1983: The Prospective Relief Puzzle | Argument Date: 12/3/25Olivier v. City of Brandon | Sidewalk Sermons and Section 1983: The Prospective Relief Puzzle | Argument Date: 12/3/25 | Docket Link: Here

   OVERVIEW

   Gabriel Olivier, a Christian who shares his faith on public sidewalks, gets convicted under a Mississippi ordinance restricting demonstrations near a city amphitheater. He sues in federal court seeking only prospective relief to prevent future enforcement against his religious expression. The Fifth Circuit blocks his lawsuit entirely under Heck v. Humphrey, but eight judges dissent from denial of rehearing en banc, setting up a Supreme Court showdown over whether prior convictions permanently bar constitutional challenges.

   Oral Advocates:

   • For Petitioner (Olivier): Allyson N. Ho, Dallas, TX
   • United States, as Amicus Curiae Supporting Vacatur: Ashley Robertson, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.
   • For Respondent (City of Brandon): G. Todd Butler, Flowood, MS
   
   

   Link to Opinion: TBD.

   Website Link to Opinion Summary: TBD.

   Website Link to Oral Argument: TBD.

   Timestamps:

   [00:00:00] Oral Argument Preview

   [00:01:37] Oral Argument Begins

   [00:01:47] Petitioner Opening Statement

   [00:03:42] Petitioner Free for All Questions

   [00:22:08] Petitioner Round Robin Questions

   [00:38:31] United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Vacatur Opening Statement

   [00:39:46] United States Free for All Questions

   [00:49:39] United States Free for All Questions

   [00:55:53] Respondent Opening Statement

   [00:58:02] Respondent Free for All Questions

   [01:20:04] Respondent Round Robin Questions

   [01:21:23] Petitioner Rebuttal

   ]]>Olivier v. City of Brandon | Sidewalk Sermons and Section 1983: The Prospective Relief Puzzle | Argument Date: 12/3/25 | Docket Link: Here

   OVERVIEW

   Gabriel Olivier, a Christian who shares his faith on public sidewalks, gets convicted under a Mississippi ordinance restricting demonstrations near a city amphitheater. He sues in federal court seeking only prospective relief to prevent future enforcement against his religious expression. The Fifth Circuit blocks his lawsuit entirely under Heck v. Humphrey, but eight judges dissent from denial of rehearing en banc, setting up a Supreme Court showdown over whether prior convictions permanently bar constitutional challenges.

   Oral Advocates:

   • For Petitioner (Olivier): Allyson N. Ho, Dallas, TX
   • United States, as Amicus Curiae Supporting Vacatur: Ashley Robertson, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.
   • For Respondent (City of Brandon): G. Todd Butler, Flowood, MS
   
   

   Link to Opinion: TBD.

   Website Link to Opinion Summary: TBD.

   Website Link to Oral Argument: TBD.

   Timestamps:

   [00:00:00] Oral Argument Preview

   [00:01:37] Oral Argument Begins

   [00:01:47] Petitioner Opening Statement

   [00:03:42] Petitioner Free for All Questions

   [00:22:08] Petitioner Round Robin Questions

   [00:38:31] United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Vacatur Opening Statement

   [00:39:46] United States Free for All Questions

   [00:49:39] United States Free for All Questions

   [00:55:53] Respondent Opening Statement

   [00:58:02] Respondent Free for All Questions

   [01:20:04] Respondent Round Robin Questions

   [01:21:23] Petitioner Rebuttal

   ]]>3e4cd92f-e7b1-449f-890a-2111e0e93b35Wed, 03 Dec 2025 14:30:00 -040001:26:32falsefull202554542025Oral Argument: First Choice v. Platkin | The Jurisdictional Jam: When State Subpoenas Silence SpeechFirst Choice Women's Resource v. Platkin | Case No. 24-781 | Oral Argument Date: 12/2/25 | Docket Link: Here

   Question Presented:

   Whether federal courts can hear First Amendment challenges to state subpoenas immediately, or whether challengers must first litigate their constitutional claims in state court.

   Overview

   This episode examines First Choice Women's Resource Centers versus Platkin, a case that generated a stunning 42 amicus briefs and could fundamentally reshape federal court jurisdiction over state investigatory demands. The Supreme Court will determine whether organizations facing state subpoenas for donor information can immediately challenge those demands in federal court, or whether they must first exhaust state court proceedings - potentially losing their federal forum rights forever due to res judicata.

   Oral Advocates:

   • For Petitioner (First Choice Women's Resource): Erin M. Hawley, Washington, D.C.
   • For United States as Amicus Curiae: Vivek Suri, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.
   • For Respondent (New Jersey): Sundeep Iyer, Chief Counsel to the Attorney General, Trenton, N.J.
   
   

   Link to Opinion: TBD.

   Website Link to Opinion Summary: TBD.

   Website Link to Oral Argument: TBD.

   Timestamps:

   [00:00:00] Oral Argument Preview

   [00:01:32] Oral Argument Begins

   [00:01:50] Petitioner Opening Statement

   [00:03:55] Petitioner Free for All Questions

   [00:19:27] Petitioner Round Robin Questions

   [00:24:43] United States as Amicus Curiae Opening Statement

   [00:25:25] Amicus Curiae Free for All Questions

   [00:35:30] Amicus Curiae Round Robin Questions

   [00:38:09] Respondent Opening Statement

   [00:40:30] Respondent Free for All Questions

   [01:08:31] Respondent Round Robin Questions

   [01:20:41] Petitioner Rebuttal

   ]]>First Choice Women's Resource v. Platkin | Case No. 24-781 | Oral Argument Date: 12/2/25 | Docket Link: Here

   Question Presented:

   Whether federal courts can hear First Amendment challenges to state subpoenas immediately, or whether challengers must first litigate their constitutional claims in state court.

   Overview

   This episode examines First Choice Women's Resource Centers versus Platkin, a case that generated a stunning 42 amicus briefs and could fundamentally reshape federal court jurisdiction over state investigatory demands. The Supreme Court will determine whether organizations facing state subpoenas for donor information can immediately challenge those demands in federal court, or whether they must first exhaust state court proceedings - potentially losing their federal forum rights forever due to res judicata.

   Oral Advocates:

   • For Petitioner (First Choice Women's Resource): Erin M. Hawley, Washington, D.C.
   • For United States as Amicus Curiae: Vivek Suri, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.
   • For Respondent (New Jersey): Sundeep Iyer, Chief Counsel to the Attorney General, Trenton, N.J.
   
   

   Link to Opinion: TBD.

   Website Link to Opinion Summary: TBD.

   Website Link to Oral Argument: TBD.

   Timestamps:

   [00:00:00] Oral Argument Preview

   [00:01:32] Oral Argument Begins

   [00:01:50] Petitioner Opening Statement

   [00:03:55] Petitioner Free for All Questions

   [00:19:27] Petitioner Round Robin Questions

   [00:24:43] United States as Amicus Curiae Opening Statement

   [00:25:25] Amicus Curiae Free for All Questions

   [00:35:30] Amicus Curiae Round Robin Questions

   [00:38:09] Respondent Opening Statement

   [00:40:30] Respondent Free for All Questions

   [01:08:31] Respondent Round Robin Questions

   [01:20:41] Petitioner Rebuttal

   ]]>53725e83-4e79-4bc8-b405-ed308a161eccTue, 02 Dec 2025 14:00:00 -040001:24:00falsefull202553532025Oral Argument: Urias-Orellana v. Bondi | Asylum Authority Showdown: Cartel Violence and Court DeferenceUrias-Orellana v. Bondi | Asylum Authority Showdown: Cartel Violence and Court Deference | Oral Argument Date: 12/1/25 | Docket Link: Here

   Overview

   In this case, the Supreme Court must decide whether federal courts must defer to immigration officials when determining if undisputed facts constitute "persecution" under asylum law, or whether courts should make independent legal determinations. The case involves a Salvadoran family who fled years of cartel violence, including death threats and physical attacks, but were denied asylum when the Board of Immigration Appeals concluded their experiences didn't rise to the level of persecution. This decision will affect hundreds of thousands of asylum cases and could reshape the relationship between agency expertise and judicial review in immigration law.

   Oral Advocates:

   • For Petitioner (Urias-Orellana): For petitioners: Nicholas Rosellini, San Francisco, CA
   • For Respondent (United States): For respondent: Joshua Dos Santos, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.
   
   

   Link to Opinion: TBD.

   Website Link to Opinion Summary: TBD.

   Website Link to Oral Argument: TBD.

   Timestamps:

   [00:00] Oral Argument Preview

   [01:10] Oral Argument Begins

   [01:20] Petitioner Opening Statement

   [03:25] Petitioner Free for All Questions

   [26:30] Petitioner Round Robin Questions

   [35:09] Respondent Opening Statement

   [38:39] Respondent Free for All Questions

   [54:30] Respondent Round Robin Questions

   [54:41] Petitioner Rebuttal

   ]]>Urias-Orellana v. Bondi | Asylum Authority Showdown: Cartel Violence and Court Deference | Oral Argument Date: 12/1/25 | Docket Link: Here

   Overview

   In this case, the Supreme Court must decide whether federal courts must defer to immigration officials when determining if undisputed facts constitute "persecution" under asylum law, or whether courts should make independent legal determinations. The case involves a Salvadoran family who fled years of cartel violence, including death threats and physical attacks, but were denied asylum when the Board of Immigration Appeals concluded their experiences didn't rise to the level of persecution. This decision will affect hundreds of thousands of asylum cases and could reshape the relationship between agency expertise and judicial review in immigration law.

   Oral Advocates:

   • For Petitioner (Urias-Orellana): For petitioners: Nicholas Rosellini, San Francisco, CA
   • For Respondent (United States): For respondent: Joshua Dos Santos, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.
   
   

   Link to Opinion: TBD.

   Website Link to Opinion Summary: TBD.

   Website Link to Oral Argument: TBD.

   Timestamps:

   [00:00] Oral Argument Preview

   [01:10] Oral Argument Begins

   [01:20] Petitioner Opening Statement

   [03:25] Petitioner Free for All Questions

   [26:30] Petitioner Round Robin Questions

   [35:09] Respondent Opening Statement

   [38:39] Respondent Free for All Questions

   [54:30] Respondent Round Robin Questions

   [54:41] Petitioner Rebuttal

   ]]>3b3d916e-aa9d-4b84-812d-73664116baefMon, 01 Dec 2025 15:30:00 -040059:22falsefull202552522025Oral Argument: Cox Communications, Inc. v. Sony Music Entertainment | The Billion-Dollar Broadband BattleCox Communications, Inc. v. Sony Music Entertainment | The Billion-Dollar Broadband Battle: When ISPs Face Copyright Catastrophe | Oral Argument Date: 12/1/25 | Docket Link: Here

   Questions Presented: (1) Did the Fourth Circuit err in holding that a service provider can be held liable for "materially contributing" to copyright infringement merely because it knew that people were using certain accounts to infringe and did not terminate access, without proof that the service provider affirmatively fostered infringement or otherwise intended to promote it? (2) Did the Fourth Circuit err in holding that mere knowledge of another's direct infringement suffices to find willfulness under 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)?

   Overview

   This case involves a billion-dollar battle between industry titans Sony ($175 billion market cap) and Cox Communications (part of $21 billion Cox Enterprises) that could fundamentally reshape internet service provider liability for customer copyright infringement. The Supreme Court must balance protecting artists' intellectual property rights against maintaining universal internet access in the digital age.

   Oral Advocates:

   • For Petitioner (Cox Communications): Joshua Rosenkranz, New York, N.Y.
   • For United States as Amicus Curiae: Malcolm L. Stewart, Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.
   • For Respondent (Sony): Paul D. Clement, Alexandria, Va.
   
   

   Link to Opinion: TBD.

   Website Link to Opinion Summary: TBD.

   Website Link to Oral Argument: TBD.

   Timestamps:

   [00:00] Oral Argument Introduction

   [01:28] Oral Argument Begins

   [01:36] Petitioner Opening Statement

   [03:37] Petitioner Free for All Questions

   [19:25] Petitioner Round Robin Questions

   [41:21] United States as Amicus Curiae Opening Statement

   [42:25] Amicus Curiae Free for All Questions

   [51:39] Amicus Curaie Round Robin Questions

   [01:01:23] Respondent Opening Statement

   [01:03:44] Respondent Free for All Questions

   [01:31:48] Respondent Round Robin Questions

   [01:39:19] Petitioner Rebuttal

   ]]>Cox Communications, Inc. v. Sony Music Entertainment | The Billion-Dollar Broadband Battle: When ISPs Face Copyright Catastrophe | Oral Argument Date: 12/1/25 | Docket Link: Here

   Questions Presented: (1) Did the Fourth Circuit err in holding that a service provider can be held liable for "materially contributing" to copyright infringement merely because it knew that people were using certain accounts to infringe and did not terminate access, without proof that the service provider affirmatively fostered infringement or otherwise intended to promote it? (2) Did the Fourth Circuit err in holding that mere knowledge of another's direct infringement suffices to find willfulness under 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)?

   Overview

   This case involves a billion-dollar battle between industry titans Sony ($175 billion market cap) and Cox Communications (part of $21 billion Cox Enterprises) that could fundamentally reshape internet service provider liability for customer copyright infringement. The Supreme Court must balance protecting artists' intellectual property rights against maintaining universal internet access in the digital age.

   Oral Advocates:

   • For Petitioner (Cox Communications): Joshua Rosenkranz, New York, N.Y.
   • For United States as Amicus Curiae: Malcolm L. Stewart, Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.
   • For Respondent (Sony): Paul D. Clement, Alexandria, Va.
   
   

   Link to Opinion: TBD.

   Website Link to Opinion Summary: TBD.

   Website Link to Oral Argument: TBD.

   Timestamps:

   [00:00] Oral Argument Introduction

   [01:28] Oral Argument Begins

   [01:36] Petitioner Opening Statement

   [03:37] Petitioner Free for All Questions

   [19:25] Petitioner Round Robin Questions

   [41:21] United States as Amicus Curiae Opening Statement

   [42:25] Amicus Curiae Free for All Questions

   [51:39] Amicus Curaie Round Robin Questions

   [01:01:23] Respondent Opening Statement

   [01:03:44] Respondent Free for All Questions

   [01:31:48] Respondent Round Robin Questions

   [01:39:19] Petitioner Rebuttal

   ]]>fb731bd0-c0b3-4c89-ab17-eb8fb576c6d2Mon, 01 Dec 2025 15:30:00 -040001:42:09falsefull202551512025Listener Mailbag & The Supreme Court's Perfect Storm: Your Queries Plus Presidential Power, Copyright Catastrophe, and Constitutional CollisionsOverview

   This comprehensive mega episode covers all seven blockbuster Supreme Court cases scheduled for December 2025 oral arguments. From presidential power over independent agencies to billion-dollar copyright battles, these cases could reshape American governance, individual rights, and economic regulation for generations. The episode provides high-level analysis of each case's constitutional stakes and practical implications.

   Episode Roadmap

   • Opening: Constitutional Collision Course Preview
   • Seven cases in ten days that could rewrite American law
   • Unprecedented concentration of constitutional challenges
   • Stakes spanning executive power, free speech, civil rights, and economic regulation
   
   

   December Cases Analysis:

   • Cox Communications v. Sony Music Entertainment | The Billion-Dollar Broadband Battle: When ISPs Face Copyright Catastrophe | Argument Date: 12/1/25
   
   

   Billion-Dollar Broadband Battle: Cox v. Sony involves a $1 billion verdict asking whether ISPs face copyright catastrophe when users infringe, potentially transforming how internet service providers police their networks and affecting every American's internet access.

   • First Choice Women's Resource Centers v. Platkin | The Jurisdictional Jam: When State Subpoenas Silence Speech | Argument Date: 12/2/25
   
   

   First Choice v. Platkin tests when state subpoenas silence speech - whether nonprofits can bypass state courts for immediate federal protection of First Amendment rights, affecting advocacy groups nationwide.

   • Olivier v. City of Brandon | Olivier v. City of Brandon | Sidewalk Sermons and Section 1983: The Prospective Relief Puzzle | Argument Date: 12/3/25
   
   

   Olivier v. City of Brandon tackles the prospective relief puzzle - whether past convictions create permanent immunity shields for potentially unconstitutional laws challenging future enforcement.

   • Trump, President of United States v. Slaughter | Presidential Power Play: Trump's Total Takedown of Independent Agencies | Argument Date: 12/8/25
   
   

   Trump v. Slaughter examines Trump's total takedown of independent agencies - whether the President can remove commissioners without cause, potentially eliminating the structure protecting $47 trillion in economic activity.

   • NRSC v. FEC | Money, Messaging, and Muzzling: The First Amendment Fight Over Party Coordination | Argument Date: 12/9/15
   
   

   NRSC v. FEC features the First Amendment fight over party coordination, with the extraordinary situation where the Federal Election Commission sides with challengers against its own regulations.

   • Hamm v. Smith | Hamm v. Smith | IQ Score Showdown: When Multiple Tests Determine Life or Death | Argument Date: 12/10/25
   
   

   IQ Score Showdown and Fund Feud: Hamm v. Smith determines when multiple tests determine life or death in capital cases, while FS Credit v. Saba examines forcing fiduciary fairness through federal lawsuits in investment disputes.

   • FS Credit v. Saba | Fund Feud: Forcing Fiduciary Fairness Through Federal Lawsuits | Argument Date: 12/10/25
   
   

   FS Credit v. Saba examines forcing fiduciary fairness through federal lawsuits, asking whether shareholders have implied private rights to sue under the Investment Company Act when the SEC doesn't act.

   TIMESTAMPS

   [00:00:00] Mailbag

   [00:23:59] December Case Previews

   [00:24:55]  Cox Communications versus Sony Music Entertainment

   [00:26:17]  First Choice Women's Resource Centers versus Platkin

   [00:27:38]  Olivier versus City of Brandon

   [00:29:04]  Trump versus Slaughter

   [00:30:31]  National Republican Senatorial Committee versus Federal Election Commission

   [00:32:04]  Hamm versus Smith

   [00:33:12]  FS Credit versus Saba

   [00:33:52] Final Thoughts and Conclusion

   ]]>Overview

   This comprehensive mega episode covers all seven blockbuster Supreme Court cases scheduled for December 2025 oral arguments. From presidential power over independent agencies to billion-dollar copyright battles, these cases could reshape American governance, individual rights, and economic regulation for generations. The episode provides high-level analysis of each case's constitutional stakes and practical implications.

   Episode Roadmap

   • Opening: Constitutional Collision Course Preview
   • Seven cases in ten days that could rewrite American law
   • Unprecedented concentration of constitutional challenges
   • Stakes spanning executive power, free speech, civil rights, and economic regulation
   
   

   December Cases Analysis:

   • Cox Communications v. Sony Music Entertainment | The Billion-Dollar Broadband Battle: When ISPs Face Copyright Catastrophe | Argument Date: 12/1/25
   
   

   Billion-Dollar Broadband Battle: Cox v. Sony involves a $1 billion verdict asking whether ISPs face copyright catastrophe when users infringe, potentially transforming how internet service providers police their networks and affecting every American's internet access.

   • First Choice Women's Resource Centers v. Platkin | The Jurisdictional Jam: When State Subpoenas Silence Speech | Argument Date: 12/2/25
   
   

   First Choice v. Platkin tests when state subpoenas silence speech - whether nonprofits can bypass state courts for immediate federal protection of First Amendment rights, affecting advocacy groups nationwide.

   • Olivier v. City of Brandon | Olivier v. City of Brandon | Sidewalk Sermons and Section 1983: The Prospective Relief Puzzle | Argument Date: 12/3/25
   
   

   Olivier v. City of Brandon tackles the prospective relief puzzle - whether past convictions create permanent immunity shields for potentially unconstitutional laws challenging future enforcement.

   • Trump, President of United States v. Slaughter | Presidential Power Play: Trump's Total Takedown of Independent Agencies | Argument Date: 12/8/25
   
   

   Trump v. Slaughter examines Trump's total takedown of independent agencies - whether the President can remove commissioners without cause, potentially eliminating the structure protecting $47 trillion in economic activity.

   • NRSC v. FEC | Money, Messaging, and Muzzling: The First Amendment Fight Over Party Coordination | Argument Date: 12/9/15
   
   

   NRSC v. FEC features the First Amendment fight over party coordination, with the extraordinary situation where the Federal Election Commission sides with challengers against its own regulations.

   • Hamm v. Smith | Hamm v. Smith | IQ Score Showdown: When Multiple Tests Determine Life or Death | Argument Date: 12/10/25
   
   

   IQ Score Showdown and Fund Feud: Hamm v. Smith determines when multiple tests determine life or death in capital cases, while FS Credit v. Saba examines forcing fiduciary fairness through federal lawsuits in investment disputes.

   • FS Credit v. Saba | Fund Feud: Forcing Fiduciary Fairness Through Federal Lawsuits | Argument Date: 12/10/25
   
   

   FS Credit v. Saba examines forcing fiduciary fairness through federal lawsuits, asking whether shareholders have implied private rights to sue under the Investment Company Act when the SEC doesn't act.

   TIMESTAMPS

   [00:00:00] Mailbag

   [00:23:59] December Case Previews

   [00:24:55]  Cox Communications versus Sony Music Entertainment

   [00:26:17]  First Choice Women's Resource Centers versus Platkin

   [00:27:38]  Olivier versus City of Brandon

   [00:29:04]  Trump versus Slaughter

   [00:30:31]  National Republican Senatorial Committee versus Federal Election Commission

   [00:32:04]  Hamm versus Smith

   [00:33:12]  FS Credit versus Saba

   [00:33:52] Final Thoughts and Conclusion

   ]]>9f82a6ab-49b5-47dc-a645-3edf198c26c8Fri, 28 Nov 2025 05:00:00 -040035:13falsefull202550502025Behind the Curtain: How The High Court Report BeganOverview

   In this special Thanksgiving episode, The High Court Report pulls back the curtain to share the personal story behind The High Court Report. The episode traces the podcast's origins from a 2021 hearing preparation that led to discovering gaps in existing Supreme Court content, to building a comprehensive resource for practitioners and the public. Your host reflects on the journey from anonymous podcast hosting to creating detailed case previews and opinion summaries that make complex legal decisions accessible. The episode concludes with heartfelt gratitude for family, friends, and listeners who have supported the podcast's mission to democratize Supreme Court coverage.

   Follow The High Court Report:

   Follow, rate, subscribe, share, and review. Find us on Apple Podcasts, Spotify, YouTube, and LinkedIn. Just search "The High Court Report." Or, email us at: scotus.cases.pod@gmail.com.

   Timestamps

   [00:00:00] Introduction and Thanksgiving Special

   [00:00:09] The Story Behind the Podcast

   [00:00:51] Preparing for a Court Hearing

   [00:02:20] Discovering Supreme Court Advocacy

   [00:05:59] Launching the Podcast

   [00:08:05] Expanding the Podcast's Scope

   [00:12:17] Gratitude and Acknowledgements

   [00:16:28] Looking Ahead

   ]]>Overview

   In this special Thanksgiving episode, The High Court Report pulls back the curtain to share the personal story behind The High Court Report. The episode traces the podcast's origins from a 2021 hearing preparation that led to discovering gaps in existing Supreme Court content, to building a comprehensive resource for practitioners and the public. Your host reflects on the journey from anonymous podcast hosting to creating detailed case previews and opinion summaries that make complex legal decisions accessible. The episode concludes with heartfelt gratitude for family, friends, and listeners who have supported the podcast's mission to democratize Supreme Court coverage.

   Follow The High Court Report:

   Follow, rate, subscribe, share, and review. Find us on Apple Podcasts, Spotify, YouTube, and LinkedIn. Just search "The High Court Report." Or, email us at: scotus.cases.pod@gmail.com.

   Timestamps

   [00:00:00] Introduction and Thanksgiving Special

   [00:00:09] The Story Behind the Podcast

   [00:00:51] Preparing for a Court Hearing

   [00:02:20] Discovering Supreme Court Advocacy

   [00:05:59] Launching the Podcast

   [00:08:05] Expanding the Podcast's Scope

   [00:12:17] Gratitude and Acknowledgements

   [00:16:28] Looking Ahead

   ]]>7ca93128-7dae-44e1-a418-c799aa72464dWed, 26 Nov 2025 05:00:00 -040017:20falsefull202549492025Trump Tariff Cases: Constitutional Clash HighlightsOverview

   This episode captures the most electrifying moments from the Supreme Court's November 2025 oral arguments in the consolidated Trump Tariff Cases—constitutional blockbusters that pit presidential emergency powers against Congress's exclusive authority to tax. These cases represent the most significant separation of powers challenge since the New Deal, with over $4 trillion in tariffs hanging in the balance.

   Follow The High Court Report:

   • YouTube: @TheHighCourtReport
   • LinkedIn: The High Court Report
   • Email: scotus.cases.pod@gmail.com
   
   

   Subscribe and Share to help others access crucial Supreme Court analysis and exceptional advocacy examples.

   TIMESTAMPS

   [00:00:00] Episode Intro

   [00:01:16] Introduction to the Major Question Doctrine

   [00:01:16] Trump Tariff Cases Highlights

   [00:01:28] Common-Sense Interpretation and Historical Context

   [00:02:54] Debating Presidential Powers and Tariffs

   [00:03:54] Historical Precedents and Legal Interpretations

   [00:05:59] The Nixon Example and Its Significance

   [00:09:30] Legislative History and Statutory Interpretation

   [00:19:26] Nondelegation Principle and Constitutional Concerns

   [00:24:17] Congressional Delegation and Political Oversight

   [00:26:52] Historical Context of Presidential Tariff Authority

   [00:28:10] Legal Interpretations of 'Regulate Importation'

   [00:29:23] Debating the Scope of Presidential Powers

   [00:32:07] Judicial Review and Congressional Intent

   [00:33:15] Revenue-Raising vs. Embargoes

   [00:35:08] Nondelegation Doctrine and Emergency Powers

   [00:39:18] Clarifying the Nixon and Algonquin Precedents

   [00:41:42] Final Arguments and Hypotheticals

   [00:53:02] Episode Conclusion

   ]]>Overview

   This episode captures the most electrifying moments from the Supreme Court's November 2025 oral arguments in the consolidated Trump Tariff Cases—constitutional blockbusters that pit presidential emergency powers against Congress's exclusive authority to tax. These cases represent the most significant separation of powers challenge since the New Deal, with over $4 trillion in tariffs hanging in the balance.

   Follow The High Court Report:

   • YouTube: @TheHighCourtReport
   • LinkedIn: The High Court Report
   • Email: scotus.cases.pod@gmail.com
   
   

   Subscribe and Share to help others access crucial Supreme Court analysis and exceptional advocacy examples.

   TIMESTAMPS

   [00:00:00] Episode Intro

   [00:01:16] Introduction to the Major Question Doctrine

   [00:01:16] Trump Tariff Cases Highlights

   [00:01:28] Common-Sense Interpretation and Historical Context

   [00:02:54] Debating Presidential Powers and Tariffs

   [00:03:54] Historical Precedents and Legal Interpretations

   [00:05:59] The Nixon Example and Its Significance

   [00:09:30] Legislative History and Statutory Interpretation

   [00:19:26] Nondelegation Principle and Constitutional Concerns

   [00:24:17] Congressional Delegation and Political Oversight

   [00:26:52] Historical Context of Presidential Tariff Authority

   [00:28:10] Legal Interpretations of 'Regulate Importation'

   [00:29:23] Debating the Scope of Presidential Powers

   [00:32:07] Judicial Review and Congressional Intent

   [00:33:15] Revenue-Raising vs. Embargoes

   [00:35:08] Nondelegation Doctrine and Emergency Powers

   [00:39:18] Clarifying the Nixon and Algonquin Precedents

   [00:41:42] Final Arguments and Hypotheticals

   [00:53:02] Episode Conclusion

   ]]>19e2fdd8-2fcb-44c8-895c-b1dbc7d6d856Tue, 25 Nov 2025 05:15:00 -040053:15falsefull202549492025Advocacy Under Fire: November's Most Electrifying Supreme Court Moments Overview

   This episode presents curated highlights from the Supreme Court's November 2025 oral arguments.

   Follow The High Court Report:

   Follow, rate, subscribe, share, and review. Find us on Apple Podcasts, Spotify, YouTube, and LinkedIn. Just search "The High Court Report." Or, email us at: scotus.cases.pod@gmail.com.

   Timestamps

   [00:00:00] Episode Intro

   [00:00:59] November Argument Highlights

   [00:00:59] Coney Island v. Burton Highlights

   [00:15:03] Hain v. Palmquist Highlights

   [00:29:37] Landor v. LA Dep't of Corrections Highlights

   [00:51:19] Fernandez v. United States Highlights

   [01:04:29] Rutherford and Carter v. United States Highlights

   [01:17:21] Hencely v. Fluor Highlights

   [01:39:00] GEO Group v. Menocal Highlights

   [01:52:30] Episode Conclusion

   ]]> Overview

   This episode presents curated highlights from the Supreme Court's November 2025 oral arguments.

   Follow The High Court Report:

   Follow, rate, subscribe, share, and review. Find us on Apple Podcasts, Spotify, YouTube, and LinkedIn. Just search "The High Court Report." Or, email us at: scotus.cases.pod@gmail.com.

   Timestamps

   [00:00:00] Episode Intro

   [00:00:59] November Argument Highlights

   [00:00:59] Coney Island v. Burton Highlights

   [00:15:03] Hain v. Palmquist Highlights

   [00:29:37] Landor v. LA Dep't of Corrections Highlights

   [00:51:19] Fernandez v. United States Highlights

   [01:04:29] Rutherford and Carter v. United States Highlights

   [01:17:21] Hencely v. Fluor Highlights

   [01:39:00] GEO Group v. Menocal Highlights

   [01:52:30] Episode Conclusion

   ]]>c4bb0f4d-c2e5-4443-b84b-a24fbf3cbd7fTue, 25 Nov 2025 05:00:00 -040001:52:43falsefull202548482025Advocacy Under Fire: October's Most Electrifying Supreme Court MomentsOverview

   • This episode presents curated highlights from the Supreme Court's October 2025 oral arguments, featuring exceptional moments of advocacy and judicial questioning from the term's most significant cases. The October sitting delivered constitutional blockbusters across First Amendment rights, criminal procedure, administrative law, and presidential power. This compilation showcases the highest caliber of Supreme Court advocacy and captures pivotal exchanges that signal how the Court may rule on these transformational cases.

   Follow The High Court Report:

   Follow, rate, subscribe, share, and review. Find us on Apple Podcasts, Spotify, YouTube, and LinkedIn. Just search "The High Court Report." Or, email us at: scotus.cases.pod@gmail.com.

   TIMESTAMPS

   [00:00:00] Episode Intro

   [00:04:28] Berk v. Choy Highlights

   [00:21:21] Bost v. Illinois Board of Illinois Highlights

   [00:36:54] Bowe v. United States Highlights

   [00:40:28] Case v. Montana Highlights

   [00:56:57] Chiles v. Salazar Highlights

   [01:03:19] Ellingsburg Oral Argument Highlights

   [01:22:35] Louisiana v. Callais Highlights

   [01:43:29] Villareal v. Texas Highlights

   [01:53:38] Episode Conclusion

   ]]>Overview

   • This episode presents curated highlights from the Supreme Court's October 2025 oral arguments, featuring exceptional moments of advocacy and judicial questioning from the term's most significant cases. The October sitting delivered constitutional blockbusters across First Amendment rights, criminal procedure, administrative law, and presidential power. This compilation showcases the highest caliber of Supreme Court advocacy and captures pivotal exchanges that signal how the Court may rule on these transformational cases.

   Follow The High Court Report:

   Follow, rate, subscribe, share, and review. Find us on Apple Podcasts, Spotify, YouTube, and LinkedIn. Just search "The High Court Report." Or, email us at: scotus.cases.pod@gmail.com.

   TIMESTAMPS

   [00:00:00] Episode Intro

   [00:04:28] Berk v. Choy Highlights

   [00:21:21] Bost v. Illinois Board of Illinois Highlights

   [00:36:54] Bowe v. United States Highlights

   [00:40:28] Case v. Montana Highlights

   [00:56:57] Chiles v. Salazar Highlights

   [01:03:19] Ellingsburg Oral Argument Highlights

   [01:22:35] Louisiana v. Callais Highlights

   [01:43:29] Villareal v. Texas Highlights

   [01:53:38] Episode Conclusion

   ]]>4bc618ad-2945-4c15-8cf6-fca0a4c27ef2Mon, 24 Nov 2025 05:00:00 -040001:53:51falsefull202547472025Case Preview: NRSC v. FEC | Money, Messaging, and Muzzling: The First Amendment Fight Over Party Coordination | Argument Date: 12/9/15NRSC v. FEC | Money, Messaging, and Muzzling: The First Amendment Fight Over Party Coordination | Argument Date: 12/9/15 | Docket Link: Here

   Question Presented: Whether the First Amendment permits limits on the amount of money that the national committee of a political party may contribute to political candidates in the form of coordinated expenditures.

   Overview

   This episode examines National Republican Senatorial Committee versus Federal Election Commission, a landmark campaign finance case that could fundamentally reshape how political parties operate in federal elections, featuring the extraordinary situation where the Federal Election Commission itself now agrees with the challengers that coordinated party expenditure limits violate the First Amendment. The case centers on limits that cap how much money party committees can spend in coordination with their candidates, creating a constitutional clash over political speech rights and anti-corruption measures. With the government switching sides post-election, the Court appointed an outside lawyer to defend the law while Democratic Party committees intervened to provide the opposition the case desperately needed.

   Episode Roadmap

   Opening: Constitutional Chaos in Campaign Finance

   • Extraordinary procedural posture: FEC agrees with challengers after Trump administration

   • Court-appointed amicus defending law that government attacks

   • Democratic Party committees intervene to create adversity

   Background: The Law Under Attack

   • Section 30116(d) limits coordinated expenditures by national party committees

   • Distinction between coordinated spending (capped) versus independent expenditures (unlimited)

   • Republican committees challenge limits as First Amendment violations

   Constitutional Framework: Political Speech Rights

   • First Amendment's protection of political speech as "core" protected expression

   • Tension between anti-corruption interests and political participation rights

   • Role of Colorado II precedent from 2001 in current doctrine

   Procedural History: From Ohio to the Supreme Court

   • 2022 filing by NRSC, NRCC, Vance, and Chabot

   • Sixth Circuit en banc ruling 10-1 upholding limits under Colorado II

   • Multiple judges expressing doubt about precedent's continued validity

   The Cert Grant and Unusual Alignment

   • June 2025 certiorari grant with intervention allowed

   • Government position reversal creates constitutional anomaly

   • Roman Martinez appointed as court-appointed amicus curiae

   Episode Highlights

   Petitioners' Arguments (NRSC, NRCC, Vance, Chabot):

   • Core Speech Violation: Coordinated expenditure limits severely burden political speech at the heart of First Amendment protection, creating "stifling effect on the ability of the party to do what it exists to do"

   • Colorado II Must Fall: 2001 precedent became "outlier in First Amendment jurisprudence" after Citizens United, McCutcheon, and Cruz strengthened political speech protection

   • No Anti-Corruption Basis: Limits serve no legitimate corruption prevention purpose since parties cannot "bribe" their own candidates whose platform they share

   Respondent-Intervenors' Arguments (DNC, DSCC, DCCC):

   • Precedent Preservation: Colorado II remains "rock solid" because coordinated expenditures function as contributions, which receive lesser constitutional protection under established doctrine

   • Circumvention Prevention: Modern joint fundraising committees allow mega-donors to route "six- or seven-figure checks" through parties to specific candidates, creating corruption potential

   • Systemic Stability: Overruling Colorado II would destabilize entire campaign finance framework and potentially eliminate distinction between contributions and expenditures

   United States Arguments (Supporting Petitioners):

   • Doctrinal Evolution: Post-Colorado II cases "repudiated its analysis of political parties' relationship with candidates, its definition of corruption, and its lenient standard of review"

   • Arbitrary Restrictions: Current limits contain inexplicable exemptions (state committees can fund get-out-the-vote efforts, nationals cannot) that undermine any anti-corruption rationale

   • Changed Landscape: Donors now have "abundant alternative avenues" like Super PACs that didn't exist in 2001, plus improved disclosure makes corruption detection more effective

   Court-Appointed Amicus Arguments (Roman Martinez):

   • Jurisdictional Defects: Case should be dismissed as moot since "Executive Branch agrees with petitioners that Section 30116(d) is unconstitutional" and no enforcement threat exists

   • Colorado II Correctly Decided: Applied proper "closely drawn" test from Buckley because coordinated expenditures include paying candidate bills, which is "virtually indistinguishable" from direct cash contributions

   • Destabilizing Consequences: Overruling would "unsettle stable law by immediately calling into question multiple tenets of the longstanding campaign-finance framework"

   Stakes

   If Petitioners Win:

   • National and congressional party committees gain unlimited coordinated spending rights with candidates

   • Political parties could regain prominence in federal campaigns after decades of declining influence relative to Super PACs

   • Potential domino effect threatening other campaign finance restrictions including contribution limits

   If Respondents/Amicus Win:

   • Preserves existing regulatory framework distinguishing between contributions and expenditures

   • Maintains corruption prevention measures designed to prevent mega-donor circumvention

   • Upholds Congressional authority to regulate campaign finance for anti-corruption purposes

   Oral Argument Preview

   Key Questions to Watch:

   • Constitutional Line-Drawing: How do Justices react to argument that parties deserve special First Amendment rights that other groups lack?

   • Corruption Analysis: Do Justices buy argument that parties cannot corrupt their own candidates, or worry about circumvention scenarios involving mega-donors?

   • Stare Decisis Weight: How seriously do Justices take precedent concerns versus arguments that Colorado II conflicts with subsequent First Amendment developments?

   • Practical Workability: What questions arise about enforcing distinctions between different types of political actors if parties get unlimited coordination rights?

   • Jurisdictional Issues: Do Justices engage with mootness arguments given government's position switch, or proceed directly to merits?

   Broader Implications:

   • Case could reshape competitive balance between political parties and outside spending groups

   • Decision may affect fundamental distinction between contributions and expenditures that underlies modern campaign finance law

   • Ruling could influence how future administrations defend laws they inherited from predecessors

   Referenced Cases:

   • FEC v. Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Committee (Colorado II) | 533 U.S. 431 (2001) | Central precedent upholding coordinated party expenditure limits under "closely drawn" scrutiny

   • Buckley v. Valeo | 424 U.S. 1 (1976) | Foundational case establishing contribution versus expenditure distinction and "closely drawn" test for contribution limits

   • Citizens United v. FEC | 558 U.S. 310 (2010) | Strengthened First Amendment protection for political speech and corporate expenditures

   • McCutcheon v. FEC | 572 U.S. 185 (2014) | Struck down aggregate contribution limits and enhanced scrutiny of campaign finance restrictions

   • FEC v. Cruz | 596 U.S. 289 (2022) | Recent case applying heightened scrutiny to campaign finance law and emphasizing anti-corruption justification requirements

   ]]>NRSC v. FEC | Money, Messaging, and Muzzling: The First Amendment Fight Over Party Coordination | Argument Date: 12/9/15 | Docket Link: Here

   Question Presented: Whether the First Amendment permits limits on the amount of money that the national committee of a political party may contribute to political candidates in the form of coordinated expenditures.

   Overview

   This episode examines National Republican Senatorial Committee versus Federal Election Commission, a landmark campaign finance case that could fundamentally reshape how political parties operate in federal elections, featuring the extraordinary situation where the Federal Election Commission itself now agrees with the challengers that coordinated party expenditure limits violate the First Amendment. The case centers on limits that cap how much money party committees can spend in coordination with their candidates, creating a constitutional clash over political speech rights and anti-corruption measures. With the government switching sides post-election, the Court appointed an outside lawyer to defend the law while Democratic Party committees intervened to provide the opposition the case desperately needed.

   Episode Roadmap

   Opening: Constitutional Chaos in Campaign Finance

   • Extraordinary procedural posture: FEC agrees with challengers after Trump administration

   • Court-appointed amicus defending law that government attacks

   • Democratic Party committees intervene to create adversity

   Background: The Law Under Attack

   • Section 30116(d) limits coordinated expenditures by national party committees

   • Distinction between coordinated spending (capped) versus independent expenditures (unlimited)

   • Republican committees challenge limits as First Amendment violations

   Constitutional Framework: Political Speech Rights

   • First Amendment's protection of political speech as "core" protected expression

   • Tension between anti-corruption interests and political participation rights

   • Role of Colorado II precedent from 2001 in current doctrine

   Procedural History: From Ohio to the Supreme Court

   • 2022 filing by NRSC, NRCC, Vance, and Chabot

   • Sixth Circuit en banc ruling 10-1 upholding limits under Colorado II

   • Multiple judges expressing doubt about precedent's continued validity

   The Cert Grant and Unusual Alignment

   • June 2025 certiorari grant with intervention allowed

   • Government position reversal creates constitutional anomaly

   • Roman Martinez appointed as court-appointed amicus curiae

   Episode Highlights

   Petitioners' Arguments (NRSC, NRCC, Vance, Chabot):

   • Core Speech Violation: Coordinated expenditure limits severely burden political speech at the heart of First Amendment protection, creating "stifling effect on the ability of the party to do what it exists to do"

   • Colorado II Must Fall: 2001 precedent became "outlier in First Amendment jurisprudence" after Citizens United, McCutcheon, and Cruz strengthened political speech protection

   • No Anti-Corruption Basis: Limits serve no legitimate corruption prevention purpose since parties cannot "bribe" their own candidates whose platform they share

   Respondent-Intervenors' Arguments (DNC, DSCC, DCCC):

   • Precedent Preservation: Colorado II remains "rock solid" because coordinated expenditures function as contributions, which receive lesser constitutional protection under established doctrine

   • Circumvention Prevention: Modern joint fundraising committees allow mega-donors to route "six- or seven-figure checks" through parties to specific candidates, creating corruption potential

   • Systemic Stability: Overruling Colorado II would destabilize entire campaign finance framework and potentially eliminate distinction between contributions and expenditures

   United States Arguments (Supporting Petitioners):

   • Doctrinal Evolution: Post-Colorado II cases "repudiated its analysis of political parties' relationship with candidates, its definition of corruption, and its lenient standard of review"

   • Arbitrary Restrictions: Current limits contain inexplicable exemptions (state committees can fund get-out-the-vote efforts, nationals cannot) that undermine any anti-corruption rationale

   • Changed Landscape: Donors now have "abundant alternative avenues" like Super PACs that didn't exist in 2001, plus improved disclosure makes corruption detection more effective

   Court-Appointed Amicus Arguments (Roman Martinez):

   • Jurisdictional Defects: Case should be dismissed as moot since "Executive Branch agrees with petitioners that Section 30116(d) is unconstitutional" and no enforcement threat exists

   • Colorado II Correctly Decided: Applied proper "closely drawn" test from Buckley because coordinated expenditures include paying candidate bills, which is "virtually indistinguishable" from direct cash contributions

   • Destabilizing Consequences: Overruling would "unsettle stable law by immediately calling into question multiple tenets of the longstanding campaign-finance framework"

   Stakes

   If Petitioners Win:

   • National and congressional party committees gain unlimited coordinated spending rights with candidates

   • Political parties could regain prominence in federal campaigns after decades of declining influence relative to Super PACs

   • Potential domino effect threatening other campaign finance restrictions including contribution limits

   If Respondents/Amicus Win:

   • Preserves existing regulatory framework distinguishing between contributions and expenditures

   • Maintains corruption prevention measures designed to prevent mega-donor circumvention

   • Upholds Congressional authority to regulate campaign finance for anti-corruption purposes

   Oral Argument Preview

   Key Questions to Watch:

   • Constitutional Line-Drawing: How do Justices react to argument that parties deserve special First Amendment rights that other groups lack?

   • Corruption Analysis: Do Justices buy argument that parties cannot corrupt their own candidates, or worry about circumvention scenarios involving mega-donors?

   • Stare Decisis Weight: How seriously do Justices take precedent concerns versus arguments that Colorado II conflicts with subsequent First Amendment developments?

   • Practical Workability: What questions arise about enforcing distinctions between different types of political actors if parties get unlimited coordination rights?

   • Jurisdictional Issues: Do Justices engage with mootness arguments given government's position switch, or proceed directly to merits?

   Broader Implications:

   • Case could reshape competitive balance between political parties and outside spending groups

   • Decision may affect fundamental distinction between contributions and expenditures that underlies modern campaign finance law

   • Ruling could influence how future administrations defend laws they inherited from predecessors

   Referenced Cases:

   • FEC v. Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Committee (Colorado II) | 533 U.S. 431 (2001) | Central precedent upholding coordinated party expenditure limits under "closely drawn" scrutiny

   • Buckley v. Valeo | 424 U.S. 1 (1976) | Foundational case establishing contribution versus expenditure distinction and "closely drawn" test for contribution limits

   • Citizens United v. FEC | 558 U.S. 310 (2010) | Strengthened First Amendment protection for political speech and corporate expenditures

   • McCutcheon v. FEC | 572 U.S. 185 (2014) | Struck down aggregate contribution limits and enhanced scrutiny of campaign finance restrictions

   • FEC v. Cruz | 596 U.S. 289 (2022) | Recent case applying heightened scrutiny to campaign finance law and emphasizing anti-corruption justification requirements

   ]]>6e4cf66a-e69c-4f63-ab2f-a3daf533dedbFri, 21 Nov 2025 05:00:00 -040017:28falsefull202546462025Case Preview: FS Credit v. Saba | Fund Feud: Forcing Fiduciary Fairness Through Federal Lawsuits | Argument Date: 12/10/25FS Credit v. Saba | Fund Feud: Forcing Fiduciary Fairness Through Federal Lawsuits | Argument Date: 12/10/25 | Docket Link: Here

   Question Presented: Whether Section 47(b) of the Investment Company Act of 1940 gives private plaintiffs a federal cause of action to seek rescission of contracts that allegedly violate the Act.

   Overview

   The Supreme Court will decide whether activist investors can sue investment funds directly in federal court when funds adopt governance provisions that allegedly violate federal securities law. Four closed-end funds adopted Maryland Control Share Acquisition Act provisions to strip voting rights from shareholders acquiring more than 10% ownership, prompting Saba Capital to seek rescission under Section 47(b) of the Investment Company Act. The case creates a fundamental clash over private enforcement of securities laws versus exclusive SEC regulatory authority, with implications for millions of Americans who invest in mutual funds and closed-end funds.

   Episode Roadmap

   Opening: Investment Fund Warfare

   • Circuit split: Second Circuit allows private suits vs. Third/Ninth Circuits reject them

   • Core constitutional tension over implied private rights of action

   • Stakes for investor activism and fund governance nationwide

   Background: The Players and the Poison Pill

   • Four underperforming closed-end funds trading 26% below asset value

   • Saba Capital as activist hedge fund targeting mismanaged funds

   • Funds adopt MCSAA to neutralize activist shareholders above 10% threshold

   • District court orders rescission following Second Circuit precedent

   The Central Legal Question

   • Section 47(b)(2): Does "rescission at the instance of any party" create individual rights?

   • Section 18(i): Equal voting rights requirement allegedly violated

   • Modern Supreme Court hostility to implied private enforcement under Sandoval

   Legal Arguments Analysis

   • Petitioners argue constitutional separation of powers violations

   • Respondents emphasize individual-rights statutory language

   • United States supports limiting private enforcement to SEC authority

   Episode Highlights

   FS Credit's Arguments (Petitioners):

   • Constitutional Separation of Powers: Courts usurp legislative authority when creating private rights Congress never explicitly authorized; Sandoval demands clear congressional intent in statutory text and structure

   • Statutory Structure Argument: Congress knew how to create private rights when intended them (Sections 30(h) and 36(b)); comprehensive scheme delegates remaining enforcement exclusively to SEC

   • Policy Disruption Concerns: Implied private rights would undermine SEC's regulatory authority and enable short-term activists to hijack funds designed for long-term investor stability

   Saba's Arguments (Respondents):

   • Individual Rights Language: Section 47(b)(2)'s "rescission at the instance of any party" constitutes "indisputably rights-creating" individual-centric language distinguishable from generic regulatory provisions rejected in Sandoval

   • TAMA Precedent Support: Transamerica Mortgage Advisors v. Lewis (1979) directly endorses implied rescission rights; limited rescission remedies fundamentally differ from broad damage claims without raising equivalent policy concerns

   • Beneficial Activism Defense: Saba serves beneficial shareholder protection function by identifying mismanaged funds; funds' poor performance and excessive fees demonstrate urgent need for activist accountability mechanisms

   United States' Arguments (Supporting FS Credit):

   • Modern Precedent Application: Supreme Court strongly disfavors implied private rights under strict Sandoval textualist methodology; courts should refuse creating new federal lawsuits from ambiguous statutory language

   • Comprehensive Enforcement Structure: Investment Company Act's architecture demonstrates Congress created limited private rights in specific sections while granting SEC broad enforcement authority over remaining violations

   • Oxford University Bank Critique: Second Circuit overlooked that Section 47(b) operates defensively in state court proceedings without requiring federal private rights; court misread TAMA involving statutory language Congress later removed from ICA

   Stakes and Broader Implications

   If FS Credit Wins:

   • Reinforces Supreme Court trend limiting private enforcement of federal statutes

   • Preserves SEC's exclusive enforcement authority over most securities violations

   • Protects long-term investors from disruptive short-term activist interventions

   • Could restrict other securities law private enforcement theories nationwide

   If Saba Wins:

   • Creates powerful federal court tools for activist investors challenging fund governance

   • Signals Court's renewed acceptance of implied private rights with supportive statutory text

   • Potential flood of federal litigation over investment fund management decisions

   • Reshapes balance between investor activism and management entrenchment across fund industry

   Looking Ahead to Oral Arguments

   Critical Questions to Monitor:

   • Justices' reactions to competing interpretations of "rescission at the instance of any party" language

   • Conservative Justices' treatment of 1979 TAMA precedent as outdated judicial activism relic

   • Practical workability concerns about overwhelming federal courts with fund governance disputes

   • Federalism tensions between state corporate law and federal securities regulation

   • Policy balance between activist accountability mechanisms and long-term investor protection priorities

   Referenced Cases:

   • Alexander v. Sandoval | 532 U.S. 275 (2001) | Established modern strict standard requiring clear congressional intent in statutory text for implied private rights

   • Oxford University Bank v. Lansuppe Feeder | 933 F.3d 99 (2d Cir. 2019) | Second Circuit precedent finding Section 47(b) creates implied private action, generating circuit split requiring Supreme Court resolution

   • Transamerica Mortgage Advisors v. Lewis (TAMA) | 444 U.S. 11 (1979) | Supreme Court recognized implied private rescission right under different securities law provision; central precedent supporting Saba's legal theory

   ]]>FS Credit v. Saba | Fund Feud: Forcing Fiduciary Fairness Through Federal Lawsuits | Argument Date: 12/10/25 | Docket Link: Here

   Question Presented: Whether Section 47(b) of the Investment Company Act of 1940 gives private plaintiffs a federal cause of action to seek rescission of contracts that allegedly violate the Act.

   Overview

   The Supreme Court will decide whether activist investors can sue investment funds directly in federal court when funds adopt governance provisions that allegedly violate federal securities law. Four closed-end funds adopted Maryland Control Share Acquisition Act provisions to strip voting rights from shareholders acquiring more than 10% ownership, prompting Saba Capital to seek rescission under Section 47(b) of the Investment Company Act. The case creates a fundamental clash over private enforcement of securities laws versus exclusive SEC regulatory authority, with implications for millions of Americans who invest in mutual funds and closed-end funds.

   Episode Roadmap

   Opening: Investment Fund Warfare

   • Circuit split: Second Circuit allows private suits vs. Third/Ninth Circuits reject them

   • Core constitutional tension over implied private rights of action

   • Stakes for investor activism and fund governance nationwide

   Background: The Players and the Poison Pill

   • Four underperforming closed-end funds trading 26% below asset value

   • Saba Capital as activist hedge fund targeting mismanaged funds

   • Funds adopt MCSAA to neutralize activist shareholders above 10% threshold

   • District court orders rescission following Second Circuit precedent

   The Central Legal Question

   • Section 47(b)(2): Does "rescission at the instance of any party" create individual rights?

   • Section 18(i): Equal voting rights requirement allegedly violated

   • Modern Supreme Court hostility to implied private enforcement under Sandoval

   Legal Arguments Analysis

   • Petitioners argue constitutional separation of powers violations

   • Respondents emphasize individual-rights statutory language

   • United States supports limiting private enforcement to SEC authority

   Episode Highlights

   FS Credit's Arguments (Petitioners):

   • Constitutional Separation of Powers: Courts usurp legislative authority when creating private rights Congress never explicitly authorized; Sandoval demands clear congressional intent in statutory text and structure

   • Statutory Structure Argument: Congress knew how to create private rights when intended them (Sections 30(h) and 36(b)); comprehensive scheme delegates remaining enforcement exclusively to SEC

   • Policy Disruption Concerns: Implied private rights would undermine SEC's regulatory authority and enable short-term activists to hijack funds designed for long-term investor stability

   Saba's Arguments (Respondents):

   • Individual Rights Language: Section 47(b)(2)'s "rescission at the instance of any party" constitutes "indisputably rights-creating" individual-centric language distinguishable from generic regulatory provisions rejected in Sandoval

   • TAMA Precedent Support: Transamerica Mortgage Advisors v. Lewis (1979) directly endorses implied rescission rights; limited rescission remedies fundamentally differ from broad damage claims without raising equivalent policy concerns

   • Beneficial Activism Defense: Saba serves beneficial shareholder protection function by identifying mismanaged funds; funds' poor performance and excessive fees demonstrate urgent need for activist accountability mechanisms

   United States' Arguments (Supporting FS Credit):

   • Modern Precedent Application: Supreme Court strongly disfavors implied private rights under strict Sandoval textualist methodology; courts should refuse creating new federal lawsuits from ambiguous statutory language

   • Comprehensive Enforcement Structure: Investment Company Act's architecture demonstrates Congress created limited private rights in specific sections while granting SEC broad enforcement authority over remaining violations

   • Oxford University Bank Critique: Second Circuit overlooked that Section 47(b) operates defensively in state court proceedings without requiring federal private rights; court misread TAMA involving statutory language Congress later removed from ICA

   Stakes and Broader Implications

   If FS Credit Wins:

   • Reinforces Supreme Court trend limiting private enforcement of federal statutes

   • Preserves SEC's exclusive enforcement authority over most securities violations

   • Protects long-term investors from disruptive short-term activist interventions

   • Could restrict other securities law private enforcement theories nationwide

   If Saba Wins:

   • Creates powerful federal court tools for activist investors challenging fund governance

   • Signals Court's renewed acceptance of implied private rights with supportive statutory text

   • Potential flood of federal litigation over investment fund management decisions

   • Reshapes balance between investor activism and management entrenchment across fund industry

   Looking Ahead to Oral Arguments

   Critical Questions to Monitor:

   • Justices' reactions to competing interpretations of "rescission at the instance of any party" language

   • Conservative Justices' treatment of 1979 TAMA precedent as outdated judicial activism relic

   • Practical workability concerns about overwhelming federal courts with fund governance disputes

   • Federalism tensions between state corporate law and federal securities regulation

   • Policy balance between activist accountability mechanisms and long-term investor protection priorities

   Referenced Cases:

   • Alexander v. Sandoval | 532 U.S. 275 (2001) | Established modern strict standard requiring clear congressional intent in statutory text for implied private rights

   • Oxford University Bank v. Lansuppe Feeder | 933 F.3d 99 (2d Cir. 2019) | Second Circuit precedent finding Section 47(b) creates implied private action, generating circuit split requiring Supreme Court resolution

   • Transamerica Mortgage Advisors v. Lewis (TAMA) | 444 U.S. 11 (1979) | Supreme Court recognized implied private rescission right under different securities law provision; central precedent supporting Saba's legal theory

   ]]>619aea55-d1b3-4dac-a1ec-0480d7e10de7Thu, 20 Nov 2025 05:00:00 -040013:03falsefull202545452025Case Preview: Hamm v. Smith | IQ Score Showdown: When Multiple Tests Determine Life or Death | Argument Date: 12/10/25Hamm v. Smith | Case No. 24-872 | Oral Argument Date: 12/10/25 | Docket Link: Here

   Question Presented: When someone takes multiple IQ tests to prove intellectual disability in a capital case, do courts look at all the scores together, or can one low score alone save their life?

   Overview

   The Supreme Court will decide whether courts must evaluate multiple IQ scores collectively or whether a single qualifying score triggers constitutional protection in death penalty cases. This decision affects hundreds of current death row inmates and reshapes capital litigation nationwide.

   Episode Roadmap

   Opening: Life-or-Death Numbers Game

   • Decision by June 2025 with immediate nationwide implementation

   • Smith's five IQ scores (75, 74, 72, 78, 74) create constitutional conflict

   • Alabama courts denied protection; federal courts granted it based on single low score

   Background: Murder and Testing Battle

   • 1997: Smith murdered Van Dam for suspected cash, received death sentence

   • Federal habeas relief sought based on intellectual disability claim

   • Five IQ tests created evidentiary puzzle for courts

   Constitutional Question

   • Collective evaluation vs. holistic assessment approaches

   • State discretion in implementing federal constitutional mandates

   • Burden of proof when test results create uncertainty

   Episode Highlights

   Alabama's Arguments (Supporting Execution):

   State Discretion

   • Atkins left states "task of developing appropriate ways to enforce" constitutional prohibition

   • Supreme Court provided no specific implementation guidelines

   • Alabama's preponderance standard considering all scores fits constitutional framework

   Rejecting "One-Low-Score" Rule

   • Eleventh Circuit misread precedents, improperly shifted burden to state

   • Four out of five scores above 70 should control determination

   • Multiple scores provide more accurate assessment than isolated measurements

   No Constitutional Expansion

   • Atkins protected only those "known to have IQ under 70"

   • Extending protection to borderline cases exceeds national consensus

   Smith's Arguments (Opposing Execution):

   Holistic Assessment Required

   • Courts must evaluate scores "holistically" with expert interpretation, not mechanical counting

   • Hall v. Florida mandates "additional evidence" beyond raw scores

   • Alabama law requires considering "all relevant evidence"

   Proper Application

   • District court correctly held evidentiary hearing and credited Smith's experts

   • Expert testimony showed measurement error creates genuine uncertainty

   • Prevents mechanical application of arbitrary cutoffs

   Scientific Reality

   • IQ tests contain measurement error, particularly for borderline functioning

   • Constitutional protections require considering scientific testing limitations

   United States' Arguments (Supporting Alabama):

   Preserve State Discretion

   • Atkins preserves "traditional legislative role in setting criminal sanctions"

   • Maintains federalism principles and constitutional structure

   Multiple Scores More Reliable

   • "Multiple IQ scores often say more collectively than any one does alone"

   • Statistical reliability improves with comprehensive testing

   Precedent Limitation

   • Hall and Moore corrected specific state misuse of IQ tests

   • Did not mandate "one-low-score rule" as circuits interpreted

   Stakes and Implications

   Immediate Impact:

   • Hundreds of current death row inmates with borderline IQ scores

   • Nationwide standard for intellectual disability determinations

   • Immediate adaptation of expert witness and testing protocols required

   Constitutional Effects:

   • Balance between federal mandates and state discretion in criminal justice

   • How scientific evidence intersects with constitutional law

   • Burden of proof application to uncertain psychological test results

   Oral Argument Preview

   Key Dynamics:

   • Federalism questions from Roberts and Kavanaugh

   • Scientific methodology discussions from Breyer and Kagan

   • Burden of proof questions about who bears risk of uncertain results

   Timeline:

   • Oral arguments expected early 2025

   • Decision by June 2025 with immediate implementation

   • Practitioners must prepare now for either outcome

   ]]>Hamm v. Smith | Case No. 24-872 | Oral Argument Date: 12/10/25 | Docket Link: Here

   Question Presented: When someone takes multiple IQ tests to prove intellectual disability in a capital case, do courts look at all the scores together, or can one low score alone save their life?

   Overview

   The Supreme Court will decide whether courts must evaluate multiple IQ scores collectively or whether a single qualifying score triggers constitutional protection in death penalty cases. This decision affects hundreds of current death row inmates and reshapes capital litigation nationwide.

   Episode Roadmap

   Opening: Life-or-Death Numbers Game

   • Decision by June 2025 with immediate nationwide implementation

   • Smith's five IQ scores (75, 74, 72, 78, 74) create constitutional conflict

   • Alabama courts denied protection; federal courts granted it based on single low score

   Background: Murder and Testing Battle

   • 1997: Smith murdered Van Dam for suspected cash, received death sentence

   • Federal habeas relief sought based on intellectual disability claim

   • Five IQ tests created evidentiary puzzle for courts

   Constitutional Question

   • Collective evaluation vs. holistic assessment approaches

   • State discretion in implementing federal constitutional mandates

   • Burden of proof when test results create uncertainty

   Episode Highlights

   Alabama's Arguments (Supporting Execution):

   State Discretion

   • Atkins left states "task of developing appropriate ways to enforce" constitutional prohibition

   • Supreme Court provided no specific implementation guidelines

   • Alabama's preponderance standard considering all scores fits constitutional framework

   Rejecting "One-Low-Score" Rule

   • Eleventh Circuit misread precedents, improperly shifted burden to state

   • Four out of five scores above 70 should control determination

   • Multiple scores provide more accurate assessment than isolated measurements

   No Constitutional Expansion

   • Atkins protected only those "known to have IQ under 70"

   • Extending protection to borderline cases exceeds national consensus

   Smith's Arguments (Opposing Execution):

   Holistic Assessment Required

   • Courts must evaluate scores "holistically" with expert interpretation, not mechanical counting

   • Hall v. Florida mandates "additional evidence" beyond raw scores

   • Alabama law requires considering "all relevant evidence"

   Proper Application

   • District court correctly held evidentiary hearing and credited Smith's experts

   • Expert testimony showed measurement error creates genuine uncertainty

   • Prevents mechanical application of arbitrary cutoffs

   Scientific Reality

   • IQ tests contain measurement error, particularly for borderline functioning

   • Constitutional protections require considering scientific testing limitations

   United States' Arguments (Supporting Alabama):

   Preserve State Discretion

   • Atkins preserves "traditional legislative role in setting criminal sanctions"

   • Maintains federalism principles and constitutional structure

   Multiple Scores More Reliable

   • "Multiple IQ scores often say more collectively than any one does alone"

   • Statistical reliability improves with comprehensive testing

   Precedent Limitation

   • Hall and Moore corrected specific state misuse of IQ tests

   • Did not mandate "one-low-score rule" as circuits interpreted

   Stakes and Implications

   Immediate Impact:

   • Hundreds of current death row inmates with borderline IQ scores

   • Nationwide standard for intellectual disability determinations

   • Immediate adaptation of expert witness and testing protocols required

   Constitutional Effects:

   • Balance between federal mandates and state discretion in criminal justice

   • How scientific evidence intersects with constitutional law

   • Burden of proof application to uncertain psychological test results

   Oral Argument Preview

   Key Dynamics:

   • Federalism questions from Roberts and Kavanaugh

   • Scientific methodology discussions from Breyer and Kagan

   • Burden of proof questions about who bears risk of uncertain results

   Timeline:

   • Oral arguments expected early 2025

   • Decision by June 2025 with immediate implementation

   • Practitioners must prepare now for either outcome

   ]]>1b5057b9-8c8a-4095-886d-f8b3b449a347Wed, 19 Nov 2025 05:00:00 -040016:50falsefull202544442025Case Preview: Olivier v. City of Brandon | Sidewalk Sermons and Section 1983: The Prospective Relief Puzzle | Argument Date: 12/3/25Olivier v. City of Brandon | Sidewalk Sermons and Section 1983: The Prospective Relief Puzzle | Argument Date: 12/3/25

   OVERVIEW

   Gabriel Olivier, a Christian who shares his faith on public sidewalks, gets convicted under a Mississippi ordinance restricting demonstrations near a city amphitheater. He sues in federal court seeking only prospective relief to prevent future enforcement against his religious expression. The Fifth Circuit blocks his lawsuit entirely under Heck v. Humphrey, but eight judges dissent from denial of rehearing en banc, setting up a Supreme Court showdown over whether prior convictions permanently bar constitutional challenges.

   EPISODE ROADMAP

   Preview: Constitutional tension between religious expression and procedural bars

   Questions & Text: Two cert questions and relevant constitutional framework

   Facts & History: Olivier's story from sidewalk preaching to federal litigation

   Cert Grant: Supreme Court takes the case, oral arguments December 3rd

   Legal Arguments: Three-way battle between Olivier, Brandon, and United States

   Oral Argument Preview: Key questions and judicial reactions to watch

   Practical Implications: What this means for practitioners and constitutional enforcement

   Takeaways: Action items and timeline for practitioners

   EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

   PETITIONER OLIVIER'S POSITION

   • Heck Doesn't Apply: Prior conviction bars don't extend to purely prospective relief claims seeking future protection

   • Constitutional Dead Zone: Fifth Circuit's rule creates permanent immunity for questionable laws after any enforcement

   • Wrong Analogy: Prospective relief differs from malicious prosecution because it doesn't challenge past proceedings

   • Stakes: Preserves federal court access for constitutional challenges despite prior convictions

   RESPONDENT BRANDON'S POSITION

   • Direct Impact: Olivier's probation sentence means prospective relief would shorten actual punishment duration

   • Common Law History: Criminal convictions traditionally barred tort claims since 17th century England

   • Demonstrable Violation: Olivier's conduct clearly violated ordinance through amplification, signs, and group activity

   • Stakes: Maintains criminal justice finality and prevents collateral attacks on convictions

   UNITED STATES AMICUS POSITION

   • No Malicious Prosecution: Prospective relief claims don't challenge prosecution propriety requiring favorable termination

   • No Habeas Conflict: Case poses no conflict between Section 1983 and federal habeas because plaintiff seeks no release

   • Custody Irrelevant: Heck requirements flow from claim elements, not whether plaintiff accessed habeas relief

   • Stakes: Supports constitutional enforcement while maintaining appropriate procedural barriers

   BROADER STAKES

   For Practitioners: Determines whether clients with prior convictions can challenge laws prospectively in federal court

   For Constitutional Law: Shapes balance between criminal justice finality and civil rights enforcement nationwide

   For Religious Liberty: Affects ability to challenge speech restrictions through federal litigation after any enforcement

   For Government Entities: Impacts litigation strategy for defending constitutional challenges from previously prosecuted plaintiffs

   ORAL ARGUMENT PREVIEW - DECEMBER 3RD

   KEY QUESTIONS TO WATCH

   • Framing Battle: Do justices view this as speech regulation or professional conduct regulation?

   • Probation Impact: Does ongoing punishment change the Heck analysis for prospective relief?

   • Evidence Standards: What proof do justices require to justify restricting constitutional rights?

   • Practical Implementation: How would courts distinguish legitimate prospective relief from disguised conviction challenges?

   PRECEDENT BATTLEGROUNDS

   • Heck v. Humphrey: Core favorable termination requirement and its scope

   • Wilkinson v. Dotson: Direct versus indirect challenges to criminal punishment

   • Wooley v. Maynard: Prospective challenges after prior convictions

   ]]>Olivier v. City of Brandon | Sidewalk Sermons and Section 1983: The Prospective Relief Puzzle | Argument Date: 12/3/25

   OVERVIEW

   Gabriel Olivier, a Christian who shares his faith on public sidewalks, gets convicted under a Mississippi ordinance restricting demonstrations near a city amphitheater. He sues in federal court seeking only prospective relief to prevent future enforcement against his religious expression. The Fifth Circuit blocks his lawsuit entirely under Heck v. Humphrey, but eight judges dissent from denial of rehearing en banc, setting up a Supreme Court showdown over whether prior convictions permanently bar constitutional challenges.

   EPISODE ROADMAP

   Preview: Constitutional tension between religious expression and procedural bars

   Questions & Text: Two cert questions and relevant constitutional framework

   Facts & History: Olivier's story from sidewalk preaching to federal litigation

   Cert Grant: Supreme Court takes the case, oral arguments December 3rd

   Legal Arguments: Three-way battle between Olivier, Brandon, and United States

   Oral Argument Preview: Key questions and judicial reactions to watch

   Practical Implications: What this means for practitioners and constitutional enforcement

   Takeaways: Action items and timeline for practitioners

   EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

   PETITIONER OLIVIER'S POSITION

   • Heck Doesn't Apply: Prior conviction bars don't extend to purely prospective relief claims seeking future protection

   • Constitutional Dead Zone: Fifth Circuit's rule creates permanent immunity for questionable laws after any enforcement

   • Wrong Analogy: Prospective relief differs from malicious prosecution because it doesn't challenge past proceedings

   • Stakes: Preserves federal court access for constitutional challenges despite prior convictions

   RESPONDENT BRANDON'S POSITION

   • Direct Impact: Olivier's probation sentence means prospective relief would shorten actual punishment duration

   • Common Law History: Criminal convictions traditionally barred tort claims since 17th century England

   • Demonstrable Violation: Olivier's conduct clearly violated ordinance through amplification, signs, and group activity

   • Stakes: Maintains criminal justice finality and prevents collateral attacks on convictions

   UNITED STATES AMICUS POSITION

   • No Malicious Prosecution: Prospective relief claims don't challenge prosecution propriety requiring favorable termination

   • No Habeas Conflict: Case poses no conflict between Section 1983 and federal habeas because plaintiff seeks no release

   • Custody Irrelevant: Heck requirements flow from claim elements, not whether plaintiff accessed habeas relief

   • Stakes: Supports constitutional enforcement while maintaining appropriate procedural barriers

   BROADER STAKES

   For Practitioners: Determines whether clients with prior convictions can challenge laws prospectively in federal court

   For Constitutional Law: Shapes balance between criminal justice finality and civil rights enforcement nationwide

   For Religious Liberty: Affects ability to challenge speech restrictions through federal litigation after any enforcement

   For Government Entities: Impacts litigation strategy for defending constitutional challenges from previously prosecuted plaintiffs

   ORAL ARGUMENT PREVIEW - DECEMBER 3RD

   KEY QUESTIONS TO WATCH

   • Framing Battle: Do justices view this as speech regulation or professional conduct regulation?

   • Probation Impact: Does ongoing punishment change the Heck analysis for prospective relief?

   • Evidence Standards: What proof do justices require to justify restricting constitutional rights?

   • Practical Implementation: How would courts distinguish legitimate prospective relief from disguised conviction challenges?

   PRECEDENT BATTLEGROUNDS

   • Heck v. Humphrey: Core favorable termination requirement and its scope

   • Wilkinson v. Dotson: Direct versus indirect challenges to criminal punishment

   • Wooley v. Maynard: Prospective challenges after prior convictions

   ]]>671d9d70-983e-4628-b933-cc3d199688c0Tue, 18 Nov 2025 05:00:00 -040010:25falsefull202543432025Case Preview: Trump, President of United States v. Slaughter | Presidential Power Play: Trump's Total Takedown of Independent Agencies | Argument Date: 12/8/25Trump v. Slaughter | Case No. 25-332 | Oral Argument Date: 12/8/25 | Docket Link: Here

   Question Presented: Whether Congress can require the President to show cause before removing commissioners of independent agencies, or whether Article II grants the President absolute removal power over all executive officers.

   Overview

   This episode examines a case that could trigger the most dramatic restructuring of federal power since the New Deal. President Trump removes FTC Commissioner Rebecca Slaughter without cause, challenging the constitutional foundation of independent agencies. The Court confronts whether two dozen independent agencies that control $47 trillion in economic activity can maintain protection from at-will presidential removal.

   Episode Roadmap

   Opening: Constitutional Crisis Brewing

   • December 8th oral argument creates immediate urgency

   • Potential elimination of independent agency protections

   • Stakes include Federal Reserve, FTC, SEC, and two dozen other agencies

   Housekeeping Matters

   • Black Friday mailbag episode announcement

   • December calendar overview with mega cases

   • Thanksgiving week content roadmap

   Constitutional Framework: Article II Powers

   • "Executive Power shall be vested in a President" - Article II, Section 1

   • Take Care Clause mandates faithful execution of laws

   • Appointments Clause divides officers into principal and inferior classes

   • Constitution grants no explicit removal authority

   Background: The Slaughter Removal

   • 1914: Congress creates FTC with removal protection for cause only

   • 2018: Trump nominates Slaughter; Senate confirms unanimously

   • 2024: Biden renominates; Senate again confirms unanimously

   • March 2025: Trump fires Slaughter via email without cause

   Procedural History: Courts Block Trump

   • DC federal court grants summary judgment for Slaughter

   • Courts issue injunctions preventing interference with duties

   • Appeals courts affirm lower court rulings

   • Supreme Court grants certiorari to resolve government structure crisis

   Legal Arguments

   President Trump's Constitutional Case

   • Article II grants conclusive removal power over all executive officers

   • "Decision of 1789" from First Congress supports absolute presidential authority

   • Modern FTC exercises "quintessentially executive powers" unlike 1935 version

   • Humphrey's Executor has become "doctrinal dinosaur" requiring overrule

   Commissioner Slaughter's Defense

   • Two centuries of congressional practice creating independent agencies

   • Multimember structure prevents arbitrary decision-making and protects liberty

   • Constitution requires no absolute removal power under Take Care Clause

   • Historical tradition supports agency independence with cause requirements

   Key Precedents Battle

   • Humphrey's Executor (1935): Upheld FTC removal protections as quasi-legislative

   • Recent cases confine Humphrey's without overruling: Free Enterprise Fund, Seila Law, Collins

   • Historical precedents from founding era support both positions

   Constitutional Stakes and Implications

   If President Wins

   • Every independent agency becomes at-will political appointment

   • Regulatory whiplash could destabilize economic sectors

   • Federal Reserve exception creates constitutional inconsistency

   • Two dozen agencies face immediate restructuring

   If Slaughter Wins

   • Independent agencies maintain stability and expertise-based decisions

   • Markets retain predictable regulatory environment

   • Historical tradition of congressional agency design continues

   • Separation of powers preserves deliberative government functions

   Timing and Urgency Factors

   December Calendar Pressure

   • Decision expected by June during active agency decision-making

   • Trump v. Cook (Federal Reserve case) follows immediately

   • Current commissioners face potential removal attempts post-decision

   • Industries should prepare for rapid regulatory shifts

   Economic Impact Analysis

   • $47 trillion in controlled economic activity at stake

   • Interest rates, merger approvals, investment protections all affected

   • Long-term planning becomes impossible with political agency control

   • Regulatory stability enables investment and economic growth

   Oral Argument Preview

   Key Questions to Watch

   • Federal Reserve exception handling reveals constitutional framework

   • Practical consequences questions from Chief Justice Roberts

   • Reliance interests and stare decisis from Justice Kagan

   • Democratic accountability versus expertise-based governance balance

   Critical Precedent Discussions

   • Whether Humphrey's Executor survives modern constitutional analysis

   • How recent administrative law cases affect independent agency doctrine

   • Role of historical practice in constitutional interpretation

   Implementation Concerns

   • Immediate effects on pending enforcement actions

   • Current regulation validity during transition period

   • Industry reliance on agency stability for business planning

   Key Legal Concepts Explained

   • Independent agency removal protections

   • Article II Vesting Clause interpretation

   • Separation of powers in administrative state

   • Stare decisis and precedent overruling standards

   • Democratic accountability versus regulatory expertise

   • Historical practice in constitutional interpretation

   ]]>Trump v. Slaughter | Case No. 25-332 | Oral Argument Date: 12/8/25 | Docket Link: Here

   Question Presented: Whether Congress can require the President to show cause before removing commissioners of independent agencies, or whether Article II grants the President absolute removal power over all executive officers.

   Overview

   This episode examines a case that could trigger the most dramatic restructuring of federal power since the New Deal. President Trump removes FTC Commissioner Rebecca Slaughter without cause, challenging the constitutional foundation of independent agencies. The Court confronts whether two dozen independent agencies that control $47 trillion in economic activity can maintain protection from at-will presidential removal.

   Episode Roadmap

   Opening: Constitutional Crisis Brewing

   • December 8th oral argument creates immediate urgency

   • Potential elimination of independent agency protections

   • Stakes include Federal Reserve, FTC, SEC, and two dozen other agencies

   Housekeeping Matters

   • Black Friday mailbag episode announcement

   • December calendar overview with mega cases

   • Thanksgiving week content roadmap

   Constitutional Framework: Article II Powers

   • "Executive Power shall be vested in a President" - Article II, Section 1

   • Take Care Clause mandates faithful execution of laws

   • Appointments Clause divides officers into principal and inferior classes

   • Constitution grants no explicit removal authority

   Background: The Slaughter Removal

   • 1914: Congress creates FTC with removal protection for cause only

   • 2018: Trump nominates Slaughter; Senate confirms unanimously

   • 2024: Biden renominates; Senate again confirms unanimously

   • March 2025: Trump fires Slaughter via email without cause

   Procedural History: Courts Block Trump

   • DC federal court grants summary judgment for Slaughter

   • Courts issue injunctions preventing interference with duties

   • Appeals courts affirm lower court rulings

   • Supreme Court grants certiorari to resolve government structure crisis

   Legal Arguments

   President Trump's Constitutional Case

   • Article II grants conclusive removal power over all executive officers

   • "Decision of 1789" from First Congress supports absolute presidential authority

   • Modern FTC exercises "quintessentially executive powers" unlike 1935 version

   • Humphrey's Executor has become "doctrinal dinosaur" requiring overrule

   Commissioner Slaughter's Defense

   • Two centuries of congressional practice creating independent agencies

   • Multimember structure prevents arbitrary decision-making and protects liberty

   • Constitution requires no absolute removal power under Take Care Clause

   • Historical tradition supports agency independence with cause requirements

   Key Precedents Battle

   • Humphrey's Executor (1935): Upheld FTC removal protections as quasi-legislative

   • Recent cases confine Humphrey's without overruling: Free Enterprise Fund, Seila Law, Collins

   • Historical precedents from founding era support both positions

   Constitutional Stakes and Implications

   If President Wins

   • Every independent agency becomes at-will political appointment

   • Regulatory whiplash could destabilize economic sectors

   • Federal Reserve exception creates constitutional inconsistency

   • Two dozen agencies face immediate restructuring

   If Slaughter Wins

   • Independent agencies maintain stability and expertise-based decisions

   • Markets retain predictable regulatory environment

   • Historical tradition of congressional agency design continues

   • Separation of powers preserves deliberative government functions

   Timing and Urgency Factors

   December Calendar Pressure

   • Decision expected by June during active agency decision-making

   • Trump v. Cook (Federal Reserve case) follows immediately

   • Current commissioners face potential removal attempts post-decision

   • Industries should prepare for rapid regulatory shifts

   Economic Impact Analysis

   • $47 trillion in controlled economic activity at stake

   • Interest rates, merger approvals, investment protections all affected

   • Long-term planning becomes impossible with political agency control

   • Regulatory stability enables investment and economic growth

   Oral Argument Preview

   Key Questions to Watch

   • Federal Reserve exception handling reveals constitutional framework

   • Practical consequences questions from Chief Justice Roberts

   • Reliance interests and stare decisis from Justice Kagan

   • Democratic accountability versus expertise-based governance balance

   Critical Precedent Discussions

   • Whether Humphrey's Executor survives modern constitutional analysis

   • How recent administrative law cases affect independent agency doctrine

   • Role of historical practice in constitutional interpretation

   Implementation Concerns

   • Immediate effects on pending enforcement actions

   • Current regulation validity during transition period

   • Industry reliance on agency stability for business planning

   Key Legal Concepts Explained

   • Independent agency removal protections

   • Article II Vesting Clause interpretation

   • Separation of powers in administrative state

   • Stare decisis and precedent overruling standards

   • Democratic accountability versus regulatory expertise

   • Historical practice in constitutional interpretation

   ]]>76064f77-9de5-4c50-8993-f6431c764c2dMon, 17 Nov 2025 05:00:00 -040020:59falsefull202542422025Case Preview: First Choice v. Platkin | The Jurisdictional Jam: When State Subpoenas Silence Speech First Choice Women's Resource v. Platkin | Case No. 24-781 | Oral Argument Date: 12/2/25 | Docket Link: Here

   Question Presented: Whether federal courts can hear First Amendment challenges to state subpoenas immediately, or whether challengers must first litigate their constitutional claims in state court.

   Overview

   This episode examines First Choice Women's Resource Centers versus Platkin, a case that generated a stunning 42 amicus briefs and could fundamentally reshape federal court jurisdiction over state investigatory demands. The Supreme Court will determine whether organizations facing state subpoenas for donor information can immediately challenge those demands in federal court, or whether they must first exhaust state court proceedings - potentially losing their federal forum rights forever due to res judicata.

   Roadmap

   • Opening: A Federal Forum Fight

   • Case generated 42 amicus briefs showing massive constitutional stakes

   • Court granted United States' request to participate in oral arguments

   • Core tension: Section 1983's guarantee of federal forums versus traditional subpoena enforcement requirements

   Background: The Subpoena Standoff

   • New Jersey Attorney General Matthew Platkin issues sweeping subpoena to faith-based pregnancy centers

   • Demands names, phone numbers, and addresses of 5,000 donors

   • First Choice refuses, citing nationwide pattern of violence against pregnancy centers

   • Attorney General threatens contempt sanctions for noncompliance

   Constitutional Framework: The Legal Clash

   • First Amendment protections for speech and association, including donor privacy rights

   • Section 1983's guarantee of federal forum for constitutional violations by state officials

   • Article III standing and ripeness requirements for federal jurisdiction

   Procedural Odyssey: The Court Journey

   • December 2023: First Choice files federal lawsuit two days before subpoena deadline

   • January 2024: District court dismisses as "unripe," requiring state court enforcement first

   • State Attorney General files enforcement action in New Jersey Superior Court

   • District court dismisses again, demanding actual contempt threat before federal review

   • Third Circuit affirms in divided decision; Judge Bibas dissents

   First Choice's Arguments (Federal Forum Rights):

   • First Amendment Chill: Attorney General's subpoena creates immediate injury by objectively chilling donor support due to nationwide violence against pregnancy centers

   • Section 1983 Federal Forum: Knick v. Township of Scott prohibits state-litigation requirements; federal forum guarantee "rings hollow" if challengers must litigate in hostile state courts first

   • Credible Enforcement Threat: Explicit contempt warnings plus actual state court enforcement action satisfy Article III standing requirements under Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus

   Attorney General Platkin's Arguments (State Court First):

   • Contingent Future Harm: Non-self-executing subpoena creates only speculative injury dependent on future state court order requiring compliance

   • No Objective Chill: Clarified scope seeks only donors from specific websites; no reasonable basis for ordinary donor to be deterred by narrow investigation

   • Century of Precedent: Reisman v. Caplin line establishes recipients of non-self-executing subpoenas cannot bring pre-enforcement challenges; would flood federal courts with routine subpoena litigation

   United States' Arguments (Supporting Petitioner):

   • Established Article III Doctrine: Credible threat of government enforcement proceedings creates concrete injuries sufficient for federal jurisdiction under longstanding precedent

   • Self-Executing Distinction Irrelevant: Whether subpoena is self-enforcing makes no difference to Article III analysis; Section 1983 creates cause of action that distinguishes this from federal agency contexts

   • Federal Court Obligation: Ripeness concerns timing, not forum adequacy; federal courts have "virtually unflagging obligation" to exercise jurisdiction regardless of parallel state proceedings

   Constitutional Stakes and Broader Implications

   If First Choice Wins:

   • Organizations facing hostile state investigations gain clearer path to immediate federal relief

   • Strengthens Section 1983's federal forum guarantee against state litigation requirements

   • Could encourage more aggressive challenges to state investigatory subpoenas across ideological spectrum

   If Attorney General Wins:

   • State officials gain stronger position to conduct investigations without immediate federal court interference

   • Targets of state subpoenas must exhaust state remedies first, potentially losing federal forum rights through res judicata

   • Could encourage more aggressive state investigations since federal relief becomes harder to obtain

   Looking Ahead to Oral Arguments

   • How justices handle res judicata "trap" that First Choice describes

   • Questions about workability and potential litigation floods

   • Historical analysis of Section 1983's purpose versus traditional subpoena enforcement

   • Court's approach to balancing federal forum rights against state sovereignty

   • Impact on broader landscape of state investigations targeting ideologically diverse organizations

   Key Legal Concepts Explained

   • Article III standing and ripeness requirements

   • Section 1983 federal civil rights actions

   • Non-self-executing versus self-executing subpoenas

   • Res judicata and claim preclusion

   • First Amendment associational rights and donor disclosure chilling effects

   • Federal forum exhaustion requirements

   • State investigatory authority and consumer protection powers

   ]]> First Choice Women's Resource v. Platkin | Case No. 24-781 | Oral Argument Date: 12/2/25 | Docket Link: Here

   Question Presented: Whether federal courts can hear First Amendment challenges to state subpoenas immediately, or whether challengers must first litigate their constitutional claims in state court.

   Overview

   This episode examines First Choice Women's Resource Centers versus Platkin, a case that generated a stunning 42 amicus briefs and could fundamentally reshape federal court jurisdiction over state investigatory demands. The Supreme Court will determine whether organizations facing state subpoenas for donor information can immediately challenge those demands in federal court, or whether they must first exhaust state court proceedings - potentially losing their federal forum rights forever due to res judicata.

   Roadmap

   • Opening: A Federal Forum Fight

   • Case generated 42 amicus briefs showing massive constitutional stakes

   • Court granted United States' request to participate in oral arguments

   • Core tension: Section 1983's guarantee of federal forums versus traditional subpoena enforcement requirements

   Background: The Subpoena Standoff

   • New Jersey Attorney General Matthew Platkin issues sweeping subpoena to faith-based pregnancy centers

   • Demands names, phone numbers, and addresses of 5,000 donors

   • First Choice refuses, citing nationwide pattern of violence against pregnancy centers

   • Attorney General threatens contempt sanctions for noncompliance

   Constitutional Framework: The Legal Clash

   • First Amendment protections for speech and association, including donor privacy rights

   • Section 1983's guarantee of federal forum for constitutional violations by state officials

   • Article III standing and ripeness requirements for federal jurisdiction

   Procedural Odyssey: The Court Journey

   • December 2023: First Choice files federal lawsuit two days before subpoena deadline

   • January 2024: District court dismisses as "unripe," requiring state court enforcement first

   • State Attorney General files enforcement action in New Jersey Superior Court

   • District court dismisses again, demanding actual contempt threat before federal review

   • Third Circuit affirms in divided decision; Judge Bibas dissents

   First Choice's Arguments (Federal Forum Rights):

   • First Amendment Chill: Attorney General's subpoena creates immediate injury by objectively chilling donor support due to nationwide violence against pregnancy centers

   • Section 1983 Federal Forum: Knick v. Township of Scott prohibits state-litigation requirements; federal forum guarantee "rings hollow" if challengers must litigate in hostile state courts first

   • Credible Enforcement Threat: Explicit contempt warnings plus actual state court enforcement action satisfy Article III standing requirements under Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus

   Attorney General Platkin's Arguments (State Court First):

   • Contingent Future Harm: Non-self-executing subpoena creates only speculative injury dependent on future state court order requiring compliance

   • No Objective Chill: Clarified scope seeks only donors from specific websites; no reasonable basis for ordinary donor to be deterred by narrow investigation

   • Century of Precedent: Reisman v. Caplin line establishes recipients of non-self-executing subpoenas cannot bring pre-enforcement challenges; would flood federal courts with routine subpoena litigation

   United States' Arguments (Supporting Petitioner):

   • Established Article III Doctrine: Credible threat of government enforcement proceedings creates concrete injuries sufficient for federal jurisdiction under longstanding precedent

   • Self-Executing Distinction Irrelevant: Whether subpoena is self-enforcing makes no difference to Article III analysis; Section 1983 creates cause of action that distinguishes this from federal agency contexts

   • Federal Court Obligation: Ripeness concerns timing, not forum adequacy; federal courts have "virtually unflagging obligation" to exercise jurisdiction regardless of parallel state proceedings

   Constitutional Stakes and Broader Implications

   If First Choice Wins:

   • Organizations facing hostile state investigations gain clearer path to immediate federal relief

   • Strengthens Section 1983's federal forum guarantee against state litigation requirements

   • Could encourage more aggressive challenges to state investigatory subpoenas across ideological spectrum

   If Attorney General Wins:

   • State officials gain stronger position to conduct investigations without immediate federal court interference

   • Targets of state subpoenas must exhaust state remedies first, potentially losing federal forum rights through res judicata

   • Could encourage more aggressive state investigations since federal relief becomes harder to obtain

   Looking Ahead to Oral Arguments

   • How justices handle res judicata "trap" that First Choice describes

   • Questions about workability and potential litigation floods

   • Historical analysis of Section 1983's purpose versus traditional subpoena enforcement

   • Court's approach to balancing federal forum rights against state sovereignty

   • Impact on broader landscape of state investigations targeting ideologically diverse organizations

   Key Legal Concepts Explained

   • Article III standing and ripeness requirements

   • Section 1983 federal civil rights actions

   • Non-self-executing versus self-executing subpoenas

   • Res judicata and claim preclusion

   • First Amendment associational rights and donor disclosure chilling effects

   • Federal forum exhaustion requirements

   • State investigatory authority and consumer protection powers

   ]]>f927fad4-ea54-4fb0-b5b4-04ad7839469fSun, 16 Nov 2025 06:00:00 -040018:59falsefull202541412025Case Preview: Urias-Orellana v. Bondi | Asylum Authority Showdown: Cartel Violence and Court DeferenceUrias-Orellana v. Bondi | Case No. 24-777 | Oral Argument Date: 12/1/25 | Docket Link: Here

   Overview

   The Supreme Court will decide whether federal courts must defer to immigration officials when determining if undisputed facts constitute "persecution" under asylum law, or whether courts should make independent legal determinations. The case involves a Salvadoran family who fled years of cartel violence, including death threats and physical attacks, but were denied asylum when the Board of Immigration Appeals concluded their experiences didn't rise to the level of persecution. This decision will affect hundreds of thousands of asylum cases and could reshape the relationship between agency expertise and judicial review in immigration law.

   Roadmap

   • Opening: Constitutional tension over agency deference in the post-Loper Bright era
   • Question Presented & Key Text: Statutory framework and the undefined term "persecution"
   • Background Facts: The Urias-Orellana family's flight from cartel violence in El Salvador
   • Procedural History: Journey from Immigration Judge through First Circuit
   • Legal Arguments: Petitioners' call for de novo review vs. Government's defense of substantial evidence standard
   • Oral Argument Preview: Key tensions and questions to watch
   • Stakes: Impact on asylum law and agency deference broadly
   
   

   Summary of Arguments

   Petitioner's Arguments (Urias-Orellana Family)

   Argument 1: Constitutional Role of Courts

   • Interpreting "persecution" is fundamentally a judicial function under Marbury v. Madison
   • Immigration and Nationality Act doesn't authorize deference on persecution determinations
   • Congress created specific deference provisions but excluded persecution questions
   
   

   Argument 2: Loper Bright Prohibits Disguised Chevron Deference

   • Substantial evidence review resurrects prohibited Chevron deference "under an alias"
   • Courts must ask "What does persecution mean?" not "Did the BIA reasonably conclude?"
   • No express congressional authorization for deference on legal interpretations
   
   

   Argument 3: Mixed Question Analysis Favors De Novo Review

   • Persecution determinations are primarily legal, requiring courts to develop legal principles
   • Courts routinely establish categorical rules (e.g., economic hardship ≠ persecution)
   • BIA itself treats these as legal questions when reviewing Immigration Judge decisions
   
   

   Respondent's Arguments (Attorney General Bondi)

   Argument 1: Persecution Determinations Are Predominantly Factual

   • Ming Dai v. Garland recognized persecution questions as "predominantly questions of fact"
   • Statute's substantial evidence standard applies to these administrative findings
   • Supreme Court precedent supports factual deference in asylum cases
   
   

   Argument 2: Mixed Questions Require Primarily Factual Work

   • Determinations involve "marshaling and weighing evidence" and "making credibility judgments"
   • 200,000+ annual asylum decisions demonstrate need for agency expertise over legal development
   • Most cases apply settled standards to varied facts rather than creating new law
   
   

   Argument 3: Loper Bright Doesn't Apply to Fact-Bound Applications

   • Loper Bright addressed pure legal interpretations, not fact-intensive applications
   • Court has consistently applied deferential review where statutory terms are "factbound"
   • This involves applying law to facts, not interpreting what statutes mean
   
   

   Stakes

   If Petitioners Win:

   • Federal courts exercise independent judgment on persecution determinations
   • More uniform asylum law development across circuits
   • Potentially more successful asylum claims through de novo review
   • Reinforces judicial role in statutory interpretation post-Loper Bright
   
   

   If Government Wins:

   • Reinforces agency expertise in immigration law
   • More deferential review of asylum denials
   • Preserves current substantial evidence standard
   • Potentially fewer successful appeals of negative decisions
   
   

   Broader Implications:

   • Framework for hundreds of thousands of annual asylum cases
   • Balance between agency expertise and judicial review
   • Implementation of U.S. obligations under international refugee law
   • Post-Loper Bright boundaries of agency deference
   
   

   Oral Argument Preview

   Key Questions to Watch:

   • How do Justices react to practical examples (medical documentation requirements vs. case volume)?
   • Do Justices see Loper Bright as resolving this issue or allowing factual deference?
   • How do they analyze Section 1252's statutory structure and congressional silence?
   • Will Justices press government on BIA's inconsistent treatment of these questions?
   • Do Justices favor agency expertise or judicial development of asylum law?
   
   

   Critical Precedents Likely Discussed:

   • Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo (2024)
   • Ming Dai v. Garland (2021)
   • U.S. Bank v. Village at Lakeridge (2018)
   • Marbury v. Madison (1803)
   
   

   Institutional Questions:

   • Role of Article III courts versus administrative agencies in developing asylum law
   • Balance between uniformity and expertise in immigration decisions
   • Implementation challenges in managing massive asylum caseloads
   
   ]]>Urias-Orellana v. Bondi | Case No. 24-777 | Oral Argument Date: 12/1/25 | Docket Link: Here

   Overview

   The Supreme Court will decide whether federal courts must defer to immigration officials when determining if undisputed facts constitute "persecution" under asylum law, or whether courts should make independent legal determinations. The case involves a Salvadoran family who fled years of cartel violence, including death threats and physical attacks, but were denied asylum when the Board of Immigration Appeals concluded their experiences didn't rise to the level of persecution. This decision will affect hundreds of thousands of asylum cases and could reshape the relationship between agency expertise and judicial review in immigration law.

   Roadmap

   • Opening: Constitutional tension over agency deference in the post-Loper Bright era
   • Question Presented & Key Text: Statutory framework and the undefined term "persecution"
   • Background Facts: The Urias-Orellana family's flight from cartel violence in El Salvador
   • Procedural History: Journey from Immigration Judge through First Circuit
   • Legal Arguments: Petitioners' call for de novo review vs. Government's defense of substantial evidence standard
   • Oral Argument Preview: Key tensions and questions to watch
   • Stakes: Impact on asylum law and agency deference broadly
   
   

   Summary of Arguments

   Petitioner's Arguments (Urias-Orellana Family)

   Argument 1: Constitutional Role of Courts

   • Interpreting "persecution" is fundamentally a judicial function under Marbury v. Madison
   • Immigration and Nationality Act doesn't authorize deference on persecution determinations
   • Congress created specific deference provisions but excluded persecution questions
   
   

   Argument 2: Loper Bright Prohibits Disguised Chevron Deference

   • Substantial evidence review resurrects prohibited Chevron deference "under an alias"
   • Courts must ask "What does persecution mean?" not "Did the BIA reasonably conclude?"
   • No express congressional authorization for deference on legal interpretations
   
   

   Argument 3: Mixed Question Analysis Favors De Novo Review

   • Persecution determinations are primarily legal, requiring courts to develop legal principles
   • Courts routinely establish categorical rules (e.g., economic hardship ≠ persecution)
   • BIA itself treats these as legal questions when reviewing Immigration Judge decisions
   
   

   Respondent's Arguments (Attorney General Bondi)

   Argument 1: Persecution Determinations Are Predominantly Factual

   • Ming Dai v. Garland recognized persecution questions as "predominantly questions of fact"
   • Statute's substantial evidence standard applies to these administrative findings
   • Supreme Court precedent supports factual deference in asylum cases
   
   

   Argument 2: Mixed Questions Require Primarily Factual Work

   • Determinations involve "marshaling and weighing evidence" and "making credibility judgments"
   • 200,000+ annual asylum decisions demonstrate need for agency expertise over legal development
   • Most cases apply settled standards to varied facts rather than creating new law
   
   

   Argument 3: Loper Bright Doesn't Apply to Fact-Bound Applications

   • Loper Bright addressed pure legal interpretations, not fact-intensive applications
   • Court has consistently applied deferential review where statutory terms are "factbound"
   • This involves applying law to facts, not interpreting what statutes mean
   
   

   Stakes

   If Petitioners Win:

   • Federal courts exercise independent judgment on persecution determinations
   • More uniform asylum law development across circuits
   • Potentially more successful asylum claims through de novo review
   • Reinforces judicial role in statutory interpretation post-Loper Bright
   
   

   If Government Wins:

   • Reinforces agency expertise in immigration law
   • More deferential review of asylum denials
   • Preserves current substantial evidence standard
   • Potentially fewer successful appeals of negative decisions
   
   

   Broader Implications:

   • Framework for hundreds of thousands of annual asylum cases
   • Balance between agency expertise and judicial review
   • Implementation of U.S. obligations under international refugee law
   • Post-Loper Bright boundaries of agency deference
   
   

   Oral Argument Preview

   Key Questions to Watch:

   • How do Justices react to practical examples (medical documentation requirements vs. case volume)?
   • Do Justices see Loper Bright as resolving this issue or allowing factual deference?
   • How do they analyze Section 1252's statutory structure and congressional silence?
   • Will Justices press government on BIA's inconsistent treatment of these questions?
   • Do Justices favor agency expertise or judicial development of asylum law?
   
   

   Critical Precedents Likely Discussed:

   • Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo (2024)
   • Ming Dai v. Garland (2021)
   • U.S. Bank v. Village at Lakeridge (2018)
   • Marbury v. Madison (1803)
   
   

   Institutional Questions:

   • Role of Article III courts versus administrative agencies in developing asylum law
   • Balance between uniformity and expertise in immigration decisions
   • Implementation challenges in managing massive asylum caseloads
   
   ]]>862c6479-3175-47dd-bfdb-77095701d473Sat, 15 Nov 2025 06:00:00 -040016:56falsefull202540402025Case Preview: Cox versus Sony | The Billion-Dollar Broadband Battle: When ISPs Face Copyright CatastropheCox Communications, Inc. v. Sony Music Entertainment | Case No. 24-171 | Oral Argument Date: 12/1/25 | Docket Link: Here

   Questions Presented: (1) Did the Fourth Circuit err in holding that a service provider can be held liable for "materially contributing" to copyright infringement merely because it knew that people were using certain accounts to infringe and did not terminate access, without proof that the service provider affirmatively fostered infringement or otherwise intended to promote it? (2) Did the Fourth Circuit err in holding that mere knowledge of another's direct infringement suffices to find willfulness under 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)?

   Overview

   This episode examines a billion-dollar battle between industry titans Sony ($175 billion market cap) and Cox Communications (part of $21 billion Cox Enterprises) that could fundamentally reshape internet service provider liability for customer copyright infringement. The Supreme Court must balance protecting artists' intellectual property rights against maintaining universal internet access in the digital age.

   Episode Roadmap

   Opening: Corporate Titans Clash at the High Court

   • Not often that industry giants of this scale face off at SCOTUS

   • Sony represents global entertainment industry's fight for IP protection

   • Cox represents infrastructure keeping America connected online

   • Whopping 31 amicus briefs from Google, X Corp, ACLU, Motion Picture Association, and more

   Background: The Billion-Dollar Verdict

   • Fourth Circuit held Cox liable for $1 billion - over 1,400 times actual damages

   • Cox received 5.8 million infringement notices in two-year period

   • "Thirteen-strike" policy deliberately undermined by Cox employees

   • Internal emails showing contempt: "F the dmca!!!"

   The Central Legal Questions

   • When does providing internet service become "material contribution" to infringement?

   • Does knowledge of customer infringement alone establish "willfulness"?

   • Sony/Grokster framework: general-purpose technology vs. active inducement

   Constitutional Stakes and Circuit Tensions

   • Universal internet access vs. copyright protection

   • Hammer analogy: ISPs as hardware stores vs. ongoing service providers

   • Fourth Circuit outlier decision creates uncertainty for ISP industry

   Episode Highlights

   Cox's Three Main Arguments (Seeking Reversal):

   • Affirmative Conduct Requirement: Contributory liability requires "purposeful, culpable conduct" with intent to promote infringement - not passive provision of general internet service

   • Sony/Grokster Protection: Internet service is "paradigmatic multi-use technology" with substantial non-infringing uses that cannot trigger liability absent active inducement

   • Practical Consequences: Fourth Circuit's rule would make ISPs liable for "literally everything bad on the internet" - from harassment to gun sales - based on mere accusations

   Sony's Three Main Arguments (Defending Verdict):

   • Classic Material Contribution: Long-established doctrine holds defendants liable when they "continue to supply their product to one whom they know is engaging in infringement"

   • Cox's Theory Would Collapse Secondary Liability: Limiting contributory infringement only to inducement cases would immunize knowing facilitators and undermine copyright protection

   • DMCA Framework Supports Liability: Congress created safe harbor protections precisely because ISPs face liability for failing to terminate repeat infringers - proving such liability exists

   United States' Three Main Arguments (Supporting Cox):

   • Culpable Intent Requirement: Recent aiding-and-abetting cases like Twitter v. Taamneh require more than knowledge - defendants must "consciously and culpably participate" in wrongdoing

   • Patent Law Parallels: Consistent with patent contributory infringement doctrine that mere knowledge of customer's infringing plans doesn't support liability for staple articles of commerce

   • Universal Internet Access Threat: Affirmance would create "substantial disincentive" to ISP provision of universal service, harming non-infringing users who share connections

   Constitutional Stakes and Broader Implications

   If Cox Wins (Reversal):

   • Strengthens protection for internet infrastructure providers

   • Requires active encouragement/inducement for ISP liability

   • Maintains affordable universal internet access

   • Could limit copyright holders' enforcement tools against online piracy

   If Sony Wins (Affirmance):

   • Expands secondary liability for knowing facilitation of infringement

   • Creates pressure for ISPs to terminate customers based on accusations

   • Strengthens copyright protection in digital age

   • May increase internet access costs and reduce availability

   Oral Argument Preview

   Key Questions to Watch:

   • Technology analogies: Internet service as hammer sales vs. ongoing specialized services

   • Practical implementation: How would each rule actually work for ISPs?

   • Precedent battle: Does Grokster limit liability to inducement cases or preserve broader material contribution doctrine?

   • Government participation: Significant that Solicitor General supports Cox with oral argument time

   Critical Precedents in Play:

   • MGM Studios v. Grokster (2005): Established inducement theory but preserved broader contributory infringement doctrine

   • Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios (1984): Protected staple articles of commerce with substantial non-infringing uses

   • Twitter v. Taamneh (2023): Required culpable participation beyond mere provision of services for aiding-and-abetting liability

   Cultural and Legal Tensions:

   • Technological innovation vs. intellectual property protection

   • Universal access vs. copyright enforcement

   • Platform neutrality vs. content policing responsibilities

   • Individual privacy vs. industry economic interests

   Referenced Cases

   MGM Studios v. Grokster | 545 U.S. 913 (2005)

   • Question Presented: Whether distributors of file-sharing software may be held liable for contributory copyright infringement

   • Arguments: Established that active inducement of infringement creates liability even for technologies with substantial non-infringing uses, but preserved broader contributory infringement doctrine beyond just inducement

   Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios | 464 U.S. 417 (1984)

   • Question Presented: Whether manufacture and sale of Betamax video recorders constitutes contributory copyright infringement

   • Arguments: Held that sale of staple articles of commerce with substantial non-infringing uses does not create liability absent evidence of intent to promote infringement

   Twitter v. Taamneh | 598 U.S. 471 (2023)

   • Question Presented: What constitutes "substantial assistance" under the Anti-Terrorism Act for aiding and abetting liability

   • Arguments: Required defendants to "consciously and culpably participate" in wrongdoing as something they wish to bring about - mere provision of services insufficient even with knowledge of misuse

   ]]>Cox Communications, Inc. v. Sony Music Entertainment | Case No. 24-171 | Oral Argument Date: 12/1/25 | Docket Link: Here

   Questions Presented: (1) Did the Fourth Circuit err in holding that a service provider can be held liable for "materially contributing" to copyright infringement merely because it knew that people were using certain accounts to infringe and did not terminate access, without proof that the service provider affirmatively fostered infringement or otherwise intended to promote it? (2) Did the Fourth Circuit err in holding that mere knowledge of another's direct infringement suffices to find willfulness under 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)?

   Overview

   This episode examines a billion-dollar battle between industry titans Sony ($175 billion market cap) and Cox Communications (part of $21 billion Cox Enterprises) that could fundamentally reshape internet service provider liability for customer copyright infringement. The Supreme Court must balance protecting artists' intellectual property rights against maintaining universal internet access in the digital age.

   Episode Roadmap

   Opening: Corporate Titans Clash at the High Court

   • Not often that industry giants of this scale face off at SCOTUS

   • Sony represents global entertainment industry's fight for IP protection

   • Cox represents infrastructure keeping America connected online

   • Whopping 31 amicus briefs from Google, X Corp, ACLU, Motion Picture Association, and more

   Background: The Billion-Dollar Verdict

   • Fourth Circuit held Cox liable for $1 billion - over 1,400 times actual damages

   • Cox received 5.8 million infringement notices in two-year period

   • "Thirteen-strike" policy deliberately undermined by Cox employees

   • Internal emails showing contempt: "F the dmca!!!"

   The Central Legal Questions

   • When does providing internet service become "material contribution" to infringement?

   • Does knowledge of customer infringement alone establish "willfulness"?

   • Sony/Grokster framework: general-purpose technology vs. active inducement

   Constitutional Stakes and Circuit Tensions

   • Universal internet access vs. copyright protection

   • Hammer analogy: ISPs as hardware stores vs. ongoing service providers

   • Fourth Circuit outlier decision creates uncertainty for ISP industry

   Episode Highlights

   Cox's Three Main Arguments (Seeking Reversal):

   • Affirmative Conduct Requirement: Contributory liability requires "purposeful, culpable conduct" with intent to promote infringement - not passive provision of general internet service

   • Sony/Grokster Protection: Internet service is "paradigmatic multi-use technology" with substantial non-infringing uses that cannot trigger liability absent active inducement

   • Practical Consequences: Fourth Circuit's rule would make ISPs liable for "literally everything bad on the internet" - from harassment to gun sales - based on mere accusations

   Sony's Three Main Arguments (Defending Verdict):

   • Classic Material Contribution: Long-established doctrine holds defendants liable when they "continue to supply their product to one whom they know is engaging in infringement"

   • Cox's Theory Would Collapse Secondary Liability: Limiting contributory infringement only to inducement cases would immunize knowing facilitators and undermine copyright protection

   • DMCA Framework Supports Liability: Congress created safe harbor protections precisely because ISPs face liability for failing to terminate repeat infringers - proving such liability exists

   United States' Three Main Arguments (Supporting Cox):

   • Culpable Intent Requirement: Recent aiding-and-abetting cases like Twitter v. Taamneh require more than knowledge - defendants must "consciously and culpably participate" in wrongdoing

   • Patent Law Parallels: Consistent with patent contributory infringement doctrine that mere knowledge of customer's infringing plans doesn't support liability for staple articles of commerce

   • Universal Internet Access Threat: Affirmance would create "substantial disincentive" to ISP provision of universal service, harming non-infringing users who share connections

   Constitutional Stakes and Broader Implications

   If Cox Wins (Reversal):

   • Strengthens protection for internet infrastructure providers

   • Requires active encouragement/inducement for ISP liability

   • Maintains affordable universal internet access

   • Could limit copyright holders' enforcement tools against online piracy

   If Sony Wins (Affirmance):

   • Expands secondary liability for knowing facilitation of infringement

   • Creates pressure for ISPs to terminate customers based on accusations

   • Strengthens copyright protection in digital age

   • May increase internet access costs and reduce availability

   Oral Argument Preview

   Key Questions to Watch:

   • Technology analogies: Internet service as hammer sales vs. ongoing specialized services

   • Practical implementation: How would each rule actually work for ISPs?

   • Precedent battle: Does Grokster limit liability to inducement cases or preserve broader material contribution doctrine?

   • Government participation: Significant that Solicitor General supports Cox with oral argument time

   Critical Precedents in Play:

   • MGM Studios v. Grokster (2005): Established inducement theory but preserved broader contributory infringement doctrine

   • Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios (1984): Protected staple articles of commerce with substantial non-infringing uses

   • Twitter v. Taamneh (2023): Required culpable participation beyond mere provision of services for aiding-and-abetting liability

   Cultural and Legal Tensions:

   • Technological innovation vs. intellectual property protection

   • Universal access vs. copyright enforcement

   • Platform neutrality vs. content policing responsibilities

   • Individual privacy vs. industry economic interests

   Referenced Cases

   MGM Studios v. Grokster | 545 U.S. 913 (2005)

   • Question Presented: Whether distributors of file-sharing software may be held liable for contributory copyright infringement

   • Arguments: Established that active inducement of infringement creates liability even for technologies with substantial non-infringing uses, but preserved broader contributory infringement doctrine beyond just inducement

   Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios | 464 U.S. 417 (1984)

   • Question Presented: Whether manufacture and sale of Betamax video recorders constitutes contributory copyright infringement

   • Arguments: Held that sale of staple articles of commerce with substantial non-infringing uses does not create liability absent evidence of intent to promote infringement

   Twitter v. Taamneh | 598 U.S. 471 (2023)

   • Question Presented: What constitutes "substantial assistance" under the Anti-Terrorism Act for aiding and abetting liability

   • Arguments: Required defendants to "consciously and culpably participate" in wrongdoing as something they wish to bring about - mere provision of services insufficient even with knowledge of misuse

   ]]>8f254fd5-3c29-491d-bd56-73f21daec43eFri, 14 Nov 2025 15:00:00 -040015:34falsefull202539392025Oral Argument: Rutherford and Carter v. United States | Retroactivity RebellionCarter v. United States | Case No. 24-860 | Oral Argument Date: 11/12/25 | Docket Link: Here (consolidated with Rutherford v. United States | Case No. 24-820 | Docket Link: Here)

   Overview

   Today, the Supreme Court heard oral arguments in the consolidated cases Rutherford versus United States and Carter versus United States. These cases examine whether federal prisoners deserve relief based on changes Congress made to gun sentencing laws. Rutherford received 25 years for his second armed robbery—a sentence that would be only 7 years under today's laws. Congress eliminated brutal "stacking" penalties in 2018, but only for future defendants. Now Rutherford and Carter argue this massive disparity creates "extraordinary and compelling reasons" for sentence reductions. Can federal judges consider Congress's own recognition that old sentences were too harsh?

   Oral Advocates:

   • For Petitioner (Rutherford): David Frederick, Washington, D.C.
   • For Petitioner (Carter): David O'Neil, Washington, D.C.
   • For Respondent (United States): Eric J. Feigin, Deputy Solicitor General, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.
   
   

   Link to Opinion: TBD.

   Website Link to Opinion Summary: TBD.

   Website Link to Oral Argument: TBD.

   Timestamps:

   [00:00:00] Argument Preview

   [00:01:05] Argument Begins

   [00:01:13] Petitioner (Rutherford) Opening Statement

   [00:02:54] Petitioner (Rutherford) Free for All Questions

   [00:14:00] Petitioner (Rutherford) Round Robin Questions

   [00:30:04] Petitioner (Carter) Opening Statement

   [00:33:35] Petitioner (Carter) Free for All Questions

   [00:40:36] Petitioner (Carter) Round Robin Questions

   [00:47:52] Respondent Opening Statement

   [00:50:12] Respondent Free for All Questions

   [01:19:10] Respondent Round Robin Questions

   [01:19:24] Petitioner (Rutherford) Rebuttal

   ]]>Carter v. United States | Case No. 24-860 | Oral Argument Date: 11/12/25 | Docket Link: Here (consolidated with Rutherford v. United States | Case No. 24-820 | Docket Link: Here)

   Overview

   Today, the Supreme Court heard oral arguments in the consolidated cases Rutherford versus United States and Carter versus United States. These cases examine whether federal prisoners deserve relief based on changes Congress made to gun sentencing laws. Rutherford received 25 years for his second armed robbery—a sentence that would be only 7 years under today's laws. Congress eliminated brutal "stacking" penalties in 2018, but only for future defendants. Now Rutherford and Carter argue this massive disparity creates "extraordinary and compelling reasons" for sentence reductions. Can federal judges consider Congress's own recognition that old sentences were too harsh?

   Oral Advocates:

   • For Petitioner (Rutherford): David Frederick, Washington, D.C.
   • For Petitioner (Carter): David O'Neil, Washington, D.C.
   • For Respondent (United States): Eric J. Feigin, Deputy Solicitor General, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.
   
   

   Link to Opinion: TBD.

   Website Link to Opinion Summary: TBD.

   Website Link to Oral Argument: TBD.

   Timestamps:

   [00:00:00] Argument Preview

   [00:01:05] Argument Begins

   [00:01:13] Petitioner (Rutherford) Opening Statement

   [00:02:54] Petitioner (Rutherford) Free for All Questions

   [00:14:00] Petitioner (Rutherford) Round Robin Questions

   [00:30:04] Petitioner (Carter) Opening Statement

   [00:33:35] Petitioner (Carter) Free for All Questions

   [00:40:36] Petitioner (Carter) Round Robin Questions

   [00:47:52] Respondent Opening Statement

   [00:50:12] Respondent Free for All Questions

   [01:19:10] Respondent Round Robin Questions

   [01:19:24] Petitioner (Rutherford) Rebuttal

   ]]>063eaf63-3759-49f2-840a-ac63c82dee8bWed, 12 Nov 2025 15:00:00 -040001:22:32falsefull202538382025Oral Argument: Fernandez v. United States | Sentence Reduction Standoff: Compassion Versus Collateral AttackFernandez v. United States | Case No. 24-556 | Oral Argument Date: 11/12/25 | Docket Link: Here | The Sentence Reduction Standoff: Compassion Versus Collateral Attack

   Overview

   This is the Supreme Court oral arguments in the case called Fernandez v. United States. Fernandez seeks a sentence reduction under federal law. Fernandez argues legal changes since his sentencing constitute "extraordinary and compelling reasons" for reducing his sentence. The government argues these legal changes don't apply retroactively and cannot justify reduction. The central question: Can courts consider legal changes—even those that don't apply retroactively—as grounds for reducing previously imposed sentences?

   Oral Advocates:

   • For Petitioner (Fernandez): Benjamin Gruenstein, New York, N.Y.
   • For Respondent (United States): Eric J. Feigin, Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.
   
   

   Link to Opinion: TBD.

   Website Link to Opinion Summary: TBD.

   Website Link to Oral Argument: TBD.

   Timestamps:

   [00:00:00] Argument Overview

   [00:00:48] Argument Begins

   [00:00:57] Petitioner Opening Statement

   [00:03:10] Petitioner Free for All Questions

   [00:28:08] Petitioner Round Robin Questions

   [00:40:01] Respondent Opening Statement

   [00:42:17] Respondent Free for All Questions

   [01:10:17] Respondent Round Robin Questions

   [01:19:07] Petitioner Rebuttal

   ]]>Fernandez v. United States | Case No. 24-556 | Oral Argument Date: 11/12/25 | Docket Link: Here | The Sentence Reduction Standoff: Compassion Versus Collateral Attack

   Overview

   This is the Supreme Court oral arguments in the case called Fernandez v. United States. Fernandez seeks a sentence reduction under federal law. Fernandez argues legal changes since his sentencing constitute "extraordinary and compelling reasons" for reducing his sentence. The government argues these legal changes don't apply retroactively and cannot justify reduction. The central question: Can courts consider legal changes—even those that don't apply retroactively—as grounds for reducing previously imposed sentences?

   Oral Advocates:

   • For Petitioner (Fernandez): Benjamin Gruenstein, New York, N.Y.
   • For Respondent (United States): Eric J. Feigin, Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.
   
   

   Link to Opinion: TBD.

   Website Link to Opinion Summary: TBD.

   Website Link to Oral Argument: TBD.

   Timestamps:

   [00:00:00] Argument Overview

   [00:00:48] Argument Begins

   [00:00:57] Petitioner Opening Statement

   [00:03:10] Petitioner Free for All Questions

   [00:28:08] Petitioner Round Robin Questions

   [00:40:01] Respondent Opening Statement

   [00:42:17] Respondent Free for All Questions

   [01:10:17] Respondent Round Robin Questions

   [01:19:07] Petitioner Rebuttal

   ]]>94e8e074-578a-48da-bc44-d4b41ae97862Wed, 12 Nov 2025 14:30:00 -040001:22:21falsefull202537372025Recap: Landor and GEO Group - Clear Statement Rule, Fractured Reasoning and GEO's "Big Hurdle"Landor v. Louisiana Department of Corrections | Case No. 23-1197 | Argued: November 10, 2025 | Landor's Lost Locks: When Prison Guards Clip Constitutional Claims

   GEO Group v. Menocal | Case No. 24-758 | Argued: November 10, 2025 | The Procedural Privilege: The Immunity Fast-Pass to Appeal

   Overview

   This episode examines oral arguments from two significant Supreme Court cases heard on the same day. The first, Landor v. Louisiana Department of Corrections, explores whether incarcerated individuals can sue prison officials personally for religious liberty violations under federal law. The second, GEO Group v. Menocal, addresses whether government contractors can claim derivative sovereign immunity to bypass lengthy litigation. Both cases reveal a fractured Court struggling with fundamental questions about federal power, individual accountability, and constitutional boundaries.

   Marathon Day Context:

   The Court conducted back-to-back oral arguments with only a one-minute transition between cases—Chief Justice Roberts concluded Landor at 11:56 a.m. and began GEO Group at 11:57 a.m., highlighting the Court's efficient case management during a demanding argument session.

   Roadmap

   Opening: A Constitutional Double Feature

   - Back-to-back Supreme Court arguments on November 10, 2025

   - Landor: "Lost Locks and Clipped Constitutional Claims"

   - GEO Group: "Immunity Fast-Pass to Appeal"

   - Behind-the-scenes glimpse: One-minute case transition

   Part I: GEO Group v. Menocal Analysis

   - Justice Jackson leads with 19 questions in active interrogation

   - Justice Sotomayor's blunt framing: "Who should be responsible for that loss?"

   - Justice Kavanaugh's "big hurdle" challenge to contractor immunity theory

   - Justice Alito's qualified immunity comparison

   - Eight justices participate (Justice Gorsuch recused)

   - Three core themes: Yearsley doctrine scope, litigation burden practicalities, federal government opposition significance

   Part II: Landor v. Louisiana DOC Deep Dive

   - 1 hour 50 minutes of intense questioning across constitutional and statutory grounds

   - Justice Gorsuch emerges as dominant questioner with quarter of argument time

   - Court fractures along multiple analytical pathways with no emerging consensus

   - Liberal justices (Sotomayor, Jackson) emphasize statutory clarity

   - Conservative justices focus on constitutional boundaries and clear statement requirements

   - Justice Barrett probes practical consequences with hypotheticals

   Part III: Three Major Constitutional Battlegrounds

   1. **Contract Theory vs. Agency Principles:** Can individual state employees be bound by spending legislation when they aren't direct funding recipients?

   2. Clear Statement Requirements: Must Congress speak with "unmistakable clarity" before imposing individual liability on non-recipients?

   3. Broader Federal Power Implications: Justice Gorsuch's Title IX hypotheticals expose potential expansion of individual damages across all federal spending programs

   Part IV: Audio Clips Analysis

   - Key moments capturing judicial divisions and strategic questioning

   - Revealing exchanges between advocates and justices

   - Insights into potential case outcomes based on questioning patterns

   Closing: Constitutional Implications

   - Landor's potential impact on federal civil rights enforcement landscape

   - GEO Group's significance for government contractor accountability

   - Court's broader approach to federalism and individual liability questions

   ]]>Landor v. Louisiana Department of Corrections | Case No. 23-1197 | Argued: November 10, 2025 | Landor's Lost Locks: When Prison Guards Clip Constitutional Claims

   GEO Group v. Menocal | Case No. 24-758 | Argued: November 10, 2025 | The Procedural Privilege: The Immunity Fast-Pass to Appeal

   Overview

   This episode examines oral arguments from two significant Supreme Court cases heard on the same day. The first, Landor v. Louisiana Department of Corrections, explores whether incarcerated individuals can sue prison officials personally for religious liberty violations under federal law. The second, GEO Group v. Menocal, addresses whether government contractors can claim derivative sovereign immunity to bypass lengthy litigation. Both cases reveal a fractured Court struggling with fundamental questions about federal power, individual accountability, and constitutional boundaries.

   Marathon Day Context:

   The Court conducted back-to-back oral arguments with only a one-minute transition between cases—Chief Justice Roberts concluded Landor at 11:56 a.m. and began GEO Group at 11:57 a.m., highlighting the Court's efficient case management during a demanding argument session.

   Roadmap

   Opening: A Constitutional Double Feature

   - Back-to-back Supreme Court arguments on November 10, 2025

   - Landor: "Lost Locks and Clipped Constitutional Claims"

   - GEO Group: "Immunity Fast-Pass to Appeal"

   - Behind-the-scenes glimpse: One-minute case transition

   Part I: GEO Group v. Menocal Analysis

   - Justice Jackson leads with 19 questions in active interrogation

   - Justice Sotomayor's blunt framing: "Who should be responsible for that loss?"

   - Justice Kavanaugh's "big hurdle" challenge to contractor immunity theory

   - Justice Alito's qualified immunity comparison

   - Eight justices participate (Justice Gorsuch recused)

   - Three core themes: Yearsley doctrine scope, litigation burden practicalities, federal government opposition significance

   Part II: Landor v. Louisiana DOC Deep Dive

   - 1 hour 50 minutes of intense questioning across constitutional and statutory grounds

   - Justice Gorsuch emerges as dominant questioner with quarter of argument time

   - Court fractures along multiple analytical pathways with no emerging consensus

   - Liberal justices (Sotomayor, Jackson) emphasize statutory clarity

   - Conservative justices focus on constitutional boundaries and clear statement requirements

   - Justice Barrett probes practical consequences with hypotheticals

   Part III: Three Major Constitutional Battlegrounds

   1. **Contract Theory vs. Agency Principles:** Can individual state employees be bound by spending legislation when they aren't direct funding recipients?

   2. Clear Statement Requirements: Must Congress speak with "unmistakable clarity" before imposing individual liability on non-recipients?

   3. Broader Federal Power Implications: Justice Gorsuch's Title IX hypotheticals expose potential expansion of individual damages across all federal spending programs

   Part IV: Audio Clips Analysis

   - Key moments capturing judicial divisions and strategic questioning

   - Revealing exchanges between advocates and justices

   - Insights into potential case outcomes based on questioning patterns

   Closing: Constitutional Implications

   - Landor's potential impact on federal civil rights enforcement landscape

   - GEO Group's significance for government contractor accountability

   - Court's broader approach to federalism and individual liability questions

   ]]>57e12cc4-d7ee-4015-b401-0cb983f9f358Tue, 11 Nov 2025 06:00:00 -040025:31falsefull202539392025Oral Argument: GEO Group v. Menocal | Sovereign Immunity Appeal Fast PassGeo Group, Inc. v. Menocal | Case No. 24-758 | Oral Argument Date: 11/10/25 | Docket Link: Here

   Overview

   Today, the Supreme Court hears oral arguments in Geo Group versus Menocal, which examines whether derivative sovereign immunity creates a fast-pass to appeal. Detainees sue a private contractor running an ICE facility, claiming forced labor—the company says "the government told me to do it" and wants to skip straight to appeal after the trial court found that the contractor held no derivative sovereign immunity. Must government contractors face years of expensive, potentially politically-motivated litigation first, or can they appeal immediately?

   Oral Advocates:

   • For Petitioner (GEO Group): Dominic E. Draye, Washington, D.C.
   • For Respondent (Menocal): Jennifer D. Bennett, San Francisco, California.
   • For United States as Amicus Curiae (Supporting Respondent): Sopan Joshi, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.
   
   

   Link to Opinion: TBD.

   Website Link to Opinion Summary: TBD.

   Website Link to Oral Argument: TBD.

   Timestamps:

   [00:00:00] Case Preview

   [00:00:55] Argument Begins

   [00:01:03] Petitioner Opening Statement

   [00:02:44] Petitioner Free for All Questions

   [00:26:30] Petitioner Round Robin Questions

   [00:26:42] Respondent Opening Statement

   [00:29:02] Respondent Free for All Questions

   [00:45:37] Respondent Round Robin Questions

   [00:45:47] United States as Amicus Opening Statement

   [00:47:24] United States as Amicus Free for All Questions

   [00:54:02] United States as Amicus Round Robin Questions

   [00:54:09] Petitioner Rebuttal

   ]]>Geo Group, Inc. v. Menocal | Case No. 24-758 | Oral Argument Date: 11/10/25 | Docket Link: Here

   Overview

   Today, the Supreme Court hears oral arguments in Geo Group versus Menocal, which examines whether derivative sovereign immunity creates a fast-pass to appeal. Detainees sue a private contractor running an ICE facility, claiming forced labor—the company says "the government told me to do it" and wants to skip straight to appeal after the trial court found that the contractor held no derivative sovereign immunity. Must government contractors face years of expensive, potentially politically-motivated litigation first, or can they appeal immediately?

   Oral Advocates:

   • For Petitioner (GEO Group): Dominic E. Draye, Washington, D.C.
   • For Respondent (Menocal): Jennifer D. Bennett, San Francisco, California.
   • For United States as Amicus Curiae (Supporting Respondent): Sopan Joshi, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.
   
   

   Link to Opinion: TBD.

   Website Link to Opinion Summary: TBD.

   Website Link to Oral Argument: TBD.

   Timestamps:

   [00:00:00] Case Preview

   [00:00:55] Argument Begins

   [00:01:03] Petitioner Opening Statement

   [00:02:44] Petitioner Free for All Questions

   [00:26:30] Petitioner Round Robin Questions

   [00:26:42] Respondent Opening Statement

   [00:29:02] Respondent Free for All Questions

   [00:45:37] Respondent Round Robin Questions

   [00:45:47] United States as Amicus Opening Statement

   [00:47:24] United States as Amicus Free for All Questions

   [00:54:02] United States as Amicus Round Robin Questions

   [00:54:09] Petitioner Rebuttal

   ]]>e226bde6-a9f0-4dcc-9866-46a98b4e9930Mon, 10 Nov 2025 16:00:00 -040057:13falsefull202536362025Oral Argument: Landor v. Louisiana Department of Corrections | Landor's Lost Locks and Clipped Constitutional ClaimsLandor v. Louisiana Dept. of Corrections | Case No. 23-1197 | Oral Argument Date: 11/10/25 | Docket Link: Here

   Overview

   This is the Supreme Court oral argument in Landor versus Louisiana Department of Corrections, examining when prison guards clip constitutional claims. Damon Landor kept his Rastafarian vows for nearly two decades, but with just three weeks left in his sentence, Louisiana guards forced him down and shaved his head—even after he showed them a court ruling that said this exact act breaks federal law. Can Landor seek damages against the prison guard after Landor becomes free?

   Oral Advocates:

   • For Petitioner (Landor): Zachary D. Tripp, Washington, D.C. argues for Petitioner Landor
   • For United States (as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner): Libby A. Baird, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice
   • For Respondent (Louisiana Department of Corrections): J. Benjamin Aguiñaga, Solicitor General, Baton Rouge, Lousiana
   
   

   Link to Opinion: TBD.

   Website Link to Opinion Summary: TBD.

   Website Link to Oral Argument: TBD.

   Timestamps:

   [00:00:00] Case Preview

   [00:00:59] Argument Begins

   [00:01:10] Petitioner Opening Statement

   [00:03:02] Petitioner Free for All Questions

   [00:18:33] Petitioner Round Robin Questions

   [00:50:19] United States as Amicus Opening Statement

   [00:51:22] United States as Amicus Free for All Questions

   [01:00:54] United States as Amicus Round Robin Questions

   [01:20:33] Respondent Opening Statement

   [01:22:39] Respondent Free for All Questions

   [01:45:57] Respondent Round Robin Questions

   [01:48:15] Petitioner Rebuttal

   ]]>Landor v. Louisiana Dept. of Corrections | Case No. 23-1197 | Oral Argument Date: 11/10/25 | Docket Link: Here

   Overview

   This is the Supreme Court oral argument in Landor versus Louisiana Department of Corrections, examining when prison guards clip constitutional claims. Damon Landor kept his Rastafarian vows for nearly two decades, but with just three weeks left in his sentence, Louisiana guards forced him down and shaved his head—even after he showed them a court ruling that said this exact act breaks federal law. Can Landor seek damages against the prison guard after Landor becomes free?

   Oral Advocates:

   • For Petitioner (Landor): Zachary D. Tripp, Washington, D.C. argues for Petitioner Landor
   • For United States (as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner): Libby A. Baird, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice
   • For Respondent (Louisiana Department of Corrections): J. Benjamin Aguiñaga, Solicitor General, Baton Rouge, Lousiana
   
   

   Link to Opinion: TBD.

   Website Link to Opinion Summary: TBD.

   Website Link to Oral Argument: TBD.

   Timestamps:

   [00:00:00] Case Preview

   [00:00:59] Argument Begins

   [00:01:10] Petitioner Opening Statement

   [00:03:02] Petitioner Free for All Questions

   [00:18:33] Petitioner Round Robin Questions

   [00:50:19] United States as Amicus Opening Statement

   [00:51:22] United States as Amicus Free for All Questions

   [01:00:54] United States as Amicus Round Robin Questions

   [01:20:33] Respondent Opening Statement

   [01:22:39] Respondent Free for All Questions

   [01:45:57] Respondent Round Robin Questions

   [01:48:15] Petitioner Rebuttal

   ]]>223e5f6d-b71b-4da0-87bd-6a29f96dd18fMon, 10 Nov 2025 15:00:00 -040001:51:27falsefull202535352025Last Week Recap & Case Previews | Coney & Trump Tariff Cases andFernandez v. United States | Case No. 24-556 | Oral Argument Date: 11/12/25 | Docket Link: Here | The Sentence Reduction Standoff: Compassion Versus Collateral Attack

   Carter v. United States | Case No. 24-860 | Oral Argument Date: 11/12/25 | Docket Link: Here (consolidated with Rutherford v. United States | Case No. 24-820 | Docket Link: Here) | Retroactivity Rebellion: Can Courts Correct What Congress Left Behind?

   SCOTUS.cases.pod@gmail.com

   Overview

   This episode examines two closely related cases that challenge the boundaries of federal compassionate release authority. Both Fernandez v. United States and Rutherford v. United States/Carter ask when trial judges can consider circumstances beyond traditional personal factors when reducing sentences for "extraordinary and compelling" reasons. Together, these cases will define the scope of judicial discretion in the modern federal sentencing system.

   Central Questions:

   • Fernandez: Can judges consider potential innocence as "extraordinary and compelling" circumstances?

   • Rutherford/Carter: Can judges consider sentencing disparities created by the First Step Act's changes to gun laws?

   Connecting Theme: Both cases test whether compassionate release serves as a safety valve for rigid sentencing rules or remains limited to traditional personal circumstances like age and illness.

   Episode Roadmap

   I. Opening and Last Week's Takeaways

   Brief Recap: Key developments and takeaways from last week's Supreme Court cases and decisions

   II. Dual Case Introduction

   Why These Cases Matter Together:

   • Both involve the same statutory provision: 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) "extraordinary and compelling reasons"

   • Both challenge circuit court restrictions on judicial discretion

   • Both cases generated significant amicus brief activity (7 briefs for Fernandez, 13 for Rutherford/Carter)

   • Combined impact could reshape federal sentencing landscape

   III. Fernandez v. United States - The Innocence Question

   A. Case Background and Procedural History

   Key Talking Points:

   • Joe Fernandez's 2013 conviction in SDNY for conspiracy to commit murder-for-hire

   • Trial relied heavily on cooperating witness "Darge"

   • Judge Alvin K. Hellerstein imposed consecutive life sentences

   • Partial success on Section 2255 appeals (firearm conviction overturned)

   • 2021 compassionate release motion combining innocence concerns with sentencing disparity

   B. The Trial Judge's Dilemma (3-4 minutes)

   Critical Quote: Judge Hellerstein's statement that "a certain disquiet remains" about the conviction and his admission of being "unsure that [Fernandez] was Darge's back-up, or that he was a member of the conspiracy."

   Discussion Points:

   • What it means when a federal judge questions his own sentencing decision

   • The human element: potentially sentencing an innocent person to die in prison

   • Second Circuit's reversal joining "near-unanimous consensus" against innocence considerations

   C. Legal Arguments - Fernandez

   Fernandez's Position:

   • Plain language: "extraordinary and compelling" contains no categorical exclusions

   • Structural argument: Congress specified only rehabilitation exclusion

   • No circumvention: claim differs from Section 2255 challenges

   Government's Counter:

   • Innocence claims are "ordinary business of the legal system"

   • Section 3582 limited to personal circumstances

   • Would create end-run around habeas procedures

   D. The Broader Stakes

   • Formalistic rules versus individualized justice

   • Implications for potentially innocent federal prisoners

   • Major Questions Doctrine undertones

   Rutherford v. United States/Carter - The First Step Act Disparity Question

   A. Case Background and the "Stacking" Problem

   The Petitioners:

   • Daniel Rutherford: 2003 armed robberies, received consecutive mandatory minimums under old § 924(c) rules

   • Marcus Carter: Similar situation with harsh stacking penalties

   The Legal Change:

   • Pre-2018: Each subsequent § 924(c) offense triggered escalating mandatory minimums

   • First Step Act 2018: Eliminated "stacking" for most offenders

   • Result: Thousands serving much harsher sentences than they would receive today

   B. The Circuit Split

   Question Presented: Whether district courts may consider disparities created by the First Step Act's prospective changes when deciding "extraordinary and compelling reasons"

   The Split:

   • Four circuits permit: Considering First Step Act disparities

   • Six circuits prohibit: Viewing such disparities as insufficient

   C. Arguments - Rutherford/Carter

   Petitioners' Position:

   • Massive sentencing disparities (decades longer than current law would impose)

   • Plain language of statute supports consideration

   • Congress intended meaningful discretion

   Government's Response:

   • Would undermine congressional choice to make changes prospective only

   • Floodgates concern: thousands of potential motions

   • Separation of powers: courts shouldn't second-guess legislative timing decisions

   ]]>Fernandez v. United States | Case No. 24-556 | Oral Argument Date: 11/12/25 | Docket Link: Here | The Sentence Reduction Standoff: Compassion Versus Collateral Attack

   Carter v. United States | Case No. 24-860 | Oral Argument Date: 11/12/25 | Docket Link: Here (consolidated with Rutherford v. United States | Case No. 24-820 | Docket Link: Here) | Retroactivity Rebellion: Can Courts Correct What Congress Left Behind?

   SCOTUS.cases.pod@gmail.com

   Overview

   This episode examines two closely related cases that challenge the boundaries of federal compassionate release authority. Both Fernandez v. United States and Rutherford v. United States/Carter ask when trial judges can consider circumstances beyond traditional personal factors when reducing sentences for "extraordinary and compelling" reasons. Together, these cases will define the scope of judicial discretion in the modern federal sentencing system.

   Central Questions:

   • Fernandez: Can judges consider potential innocence as "extraordinary and compelling" circumstances?

   • Rutherford/Carter: Can judges consider sentencing disparities created by the First Step Act's changes to gun laws?

   Connecting Theme: Both cases test whether compassionate release serves as a safety valve for rigid sentencing rules or remains limited to traditional personal circumstances like age and illness.

   Episode Roadmap

   I. Opening and Last Week's Takeaways

   Brief Recap: Key developments and takeaways from last week's Supreme Court cases and decisions

   II. Dual Case Introduction

   Why These Cases Matter Together:

   • Both involve the same statutory provision: 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) "extraordinary and compelling reasons"

   • Both challenge circuit court restrictions on judicial discretion

   • Both cases generated significant amicus brief activity (7 briefs for Fernandez, 13 for Rutherford/Carter)

   • Combined impact could reshape federal sentencing landscape

   III. Fernandez v. United States - The Innocence Question

   A. Case Background and Procedural History

   Key Talking Points:

   • Joe Fernandez's 2013 conviction in SDNY for conspiracy to commit murder-for-hire

   • Trial relied heavily on cooperating witness "Darge"

   • Judge Alvin K. Hellerstein imposed consecutive life sentences

   • Partial success on Section 2255 appeals (firearm conviction overturned)

   • 2021 compassionate release motion combining innocence concerns with sentencing disparity

   B. The Trial Judge's Dilemma (3-4 minutes)

   Critical Quote: Judge Hellerstein's statement that "a certain disquiet remains" about the conviction and his admission of being "unsure that [Fernandez] was Darge's back-up, or that he was a member of the conspiracy."

   Discussion Points:

   • What it means when a federal judge questions his own sentencing decision

   • The human element: potentially sentencing an innocent person to die in prison

   • Second Circuit's reversal joining "near-unanimous consensus" against innocence considerations

   C. Legal Arguments - Fernandez

   Fernandez's Position:

   • Plain language: "extraordinary and compelling" contains no categorical exclusions

   • Structural argument: Congress specified only rehabilitation exclusion

   • No circumvention: claim differs from Section 2255 challenges

   Government's Counter:

   • Innocence claims are "ordinary business of the legal system"

   • Section 3582 limited to personal circumstances

   • Would create end-run around habeas procedures

   D. The Broader Stakes

   • Formalistic rules versus individualized justice

   • Implications for potentially innocent federal prisoners

   • Major Questions Doctrine undertones

   Rutherford v. United States/Carter - The First Step Act Disparity Question

   A. Case Background and the "Stacking" Problem

   The Petitioners:

   • Daniel Rutherford: 2003 armed robberies, received consecutive mandatory minimums under old § 924(c) rules

   • Marcus Carter: Similar situation with harsh stacking penalties

   The Legal Change:

   • Pre-2018: Each subsequent § 924(c) offense triggered escalating mandatory minimums

   • First Step Act 2018: Eliminated "stacking" for most offenders

   • Result: Thousands serving much harsher sentences than they would receive today

   B. The Circuit Split

   Question Presented: Whether district courts may consider disparities created by the First Step Act's prospective changes when deciding "extraordinary and compelling reasons"

   The Split:

   • Four circuits permit: Considering First Step Act disparities

   • Six circuits prohibit: Viewing such disparities as insufficient

   C. Arguments - Rutherford/Carter

   Petitioners' Position:

   • Massive sentencing disparities (decades longer than current law would impose)

   • Plain language of statute supports consideration

   • Congress intended meaningful discretion

   Government's Response:

   • Would undermine congressional choice to make changes prospective only

   • Floodgates concern: thousands of potential motions

   • Separation of powers: courts shouldn't second-guess legislative timing decisions

   ]]>1b2ca8fe-2e20-46ad-b894-dce1c5448353Mon, 10 Nov 2025 06:00:00 -040034:24falsefull202534342025Oral Argument: Trump Tariff Cases | A Constitutional Clash: Trump's Tariffs and the Separation of PowersTrump v. V.O.S. Selections, Inc., et al. | Oral Argument: November 5, 2025 | Case No. 25-250 | Docket Link: Here

   Consolidated with: Learning Resources, Inc. v. Trump | Case No. 24-1287 | Docket Link: Here

   Overview

   Today, the Supreme Court hears oral arguments in the Trump Tariff cases—Trump versus V.O.S. Selections and Learning Resources versus Trump—a constitutional clash over tariffs and separation of powers. President Trump put sweeping tariffs on trillions of dollars in imports using a 1977 emergency law that says he can "regulate" trade—but the law never mentions tariffs, duties, or taxes, and the Constitution gives only Congress the power to tax.

   Oral Advocates:

   • For Petitioner (Federal Parties): D. John Sauer, Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.
   • For Respondent (Private Parties): Neal K. Katyal, Washington, D.C.
   • For Respondent (State Parties): Benjamin N. Gutman, Solicitor General, Salem, Oregon
   
   

   Link to Opinion: TBD.

   Website Link to Opinion Summary: TBD.

   Website Link to Oral Argument: TBD.

   Timestamps:

   [00:00:00] Argument Overview

   [00:00:44] Argument Begins

   [00:00:56] Federal Parties Opening Statement

   [00:02:53] Federal Parties Free for All Questions

   [00:36:05] Federal Parties Sequential Questions

   [01:15:56] Private Parties Opening Statement

   [01:18:27] Private Parties Free for All Questions

   [01:36:30] Private Parties Sequential Questions

   [02:12:28] State Parties Opening Statement

   [02:13:28] State Parties Free for All Questions

   [02:33:00] State Parties Sequential Questions

   [02:35:40] Federal Parties Rebuttal

   ]]>Trump v. V.O.S. Selections, Inc., et al. | Oral Argument: November 5, 2025 | Case No. 25-250 | Docket Link: Here

   Consolidated with: Learning Resources, Inc. v. Trump | Case No. 24-1287 | Docket Link: Here

   Overview

   Today, the Supreme Court hears oral arguments in the Trump Tariff cases—Trump versus V.O.S. Selections and Learning Resources versus Trump—a constitutional clash over tariffs and separation of powers. President Trump put sweeping tariffs on trillions of dollars in imports using a 1977 emergency law that says he can "regulate" trade—but the law never mentions tariffs, duties, or taxes, and the Constitution gives only Congress the power to tax.

   Oral Advocates:

   • For Petitioner (Federal Parties): D. John Sauer, Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.
   • For Respondent (Private Parties): Neal K. Katyal, Washington, D.C.
   • For Respondent (State Parties): Benjamin N. Gutman, Solicitor General, Salem, Oregon
   
   

   Link to Opinion: TBD.

   Website Link to Opinion Summary: TBD.

   Website Link to Oral Argument: TBD.

   Timestamps:

   [00:00:00] Argument Overview

   [00:00:44] Argument Begins

   [00:00:56] Federal Parties Opening Statement

   [00:02:53] Federal Parties Free for All Questions

   [00:36:05] Federal Parties Sequential Questions

   [01:15:56] Private Parties Opening Statement

   [01:18:27] Private Parties Free for All Questions

   [01:36:30] Private Parties Sequential Questions

   [02:12:28] State Parties Opening Statement

   [02:13:28] State Parties Free for All Questions

   [02:33:00] State Parties Sequential Questions

   [02:35:40] Federal Parties Rebuttal

   ]]>96099190-809a-4562-9a4f-5dc171b03e7cWed, 05 Nov 2025 15:00:00 -040002:39:46falsefull202533332025Oral Argument: Coney Island Auto Parts v. Burton | Time Trap TangleConey Island Auto Parts, Inc. v. Burton | Case No. 24-808 | Oral Argument Date: 11/5/25 | Docket Link: Here

   Overview

   Today, the Supreme Court hears oral arguments in Coney Island Auto Parts versus Burton, a time trap tangle examining when void verdicts gain validity. Coney Island's bank account gets frozen for nearly $100,000 based on a 2015 Tennessee judgment they claim they never knew about. When Coney finally fights back seven years later, the Sixth Circuit dismisses the case, saying that you waited too long to challenge the judgment Coney didn’t even know about. "If something never existed in the first place, does waiting too long to challenge it make it real?

   Question Presented: Whether Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(c)(1) imposes any time limit to set aside a void default judgment for lack of personal jurisdiction.

   Oral Advocates:

   • For Petitioner (Coney): Daniel Ginzburg, Freehold, N.J.
   • For Respondent (Burton): Lisa S. Blatt, Washington, D.C.
   
   

   Link to Opinion: TBD.

   Website Link to Opinion Summary: TBD.

   Website Link to Oral Argument: TBD.

   Timestamps:

   [00:00:00] Argument Preview

   [00:00:58] Argument Begins

   [00:01:07] Petitioner Opening Statement

   [00:03:17] Petitioner Free for All Questions

   [00:19:12] Petitioner Sequential Questions

   [00:19:15] Respondent Opening Statement

   [00:20:33] Respondent Free for All Questions

   [00:34:10] Petitioner Rebuttal

   ]]>Coney Island Auto Parts, Inc. v. Burton | Case No. 24-808 | Oral Argument Date: 11/5/25 | Docket Link: Here

   Overview

   Today, the Supreme Court hears oral arguments in Coney Island Auto Parts versus Burton, a time trap tangle examining when void verdicts gain validity. Coney Island's bank account gets frozen for nearly $100,000 based on a 2015 Tennessee judgment they claim they never knew about. When Coney finally fights back seven years later, the Sixth Circuit dismisses the case, saying that you waited too long to challenge the judgment Coney didn’t even know about. "If something never existed in the first place, does waiting too long to challenge it make it real?

   Question Presented: Whether Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(c)(1) imposes any time limit to set aside a void default judgment for lack of personal jurisdiction.

   Oral Advocates:

   • For Petitioner (Coney): Daniel Ginzburg, Freehold, N.J.
   • For Respondent (Burton): Lisa S. Blatt, Washington, D.C.
   
   

   Link to Opinion: TBD.

   Website Link to Opinion Summary: TBD.

   Website Link to Oral Argument: TBD.

   Timestamps:

   [00:00:00] Argument Preview

   [00:00:58] Argument Begins

   [00:01:07] Petitioner Opening Statement

   [00:03:17] Petitioner Free for All Questions

   [00:19:12] Petitioner Sequential Questions

   [00:19:15] Respondent Opening Statement

   [00:20:33] Respondent Free for All Questions

   [00:34:10] Petitioner Rebuttal

   ]]>fa3f1e75-8c5d-4866-b7ac-2ef8bfb0a3c4Tue, 04 Nov 2025 15:00:00 -040036:40falsefull202532322025Oral Argument: Hain Celestial Group, Inc. v. Palmquist | Forum FightHain Celestial Group, Inc. v. Palmquist | Case No. 24-724 | Oral Argument Date: 11/4/25 | Docket Link: Here

   Overview

   Today, the Supreme Court hears oral arguments in Hain Celestial Group versus Palmquist, a forum fight about when courts keep cases they never should have had. A Texas family sued two companies over their child's heavy metal poisoning from baby food—but after a federal court wrongly kicked out one defendant and ran a two-week trial, an appeals court said the case never belonged in federal court, forcing everyone back to square one.

   Questions Presented:

   1. Whether a district court's final judgment as to completely diverse parties must be vacated when an appellate court later determines that it erred by dismissing a non-diverse party at the time of removal.
   2. Whether a plaintiff may defeat diversity jurisdiction after removal by amending the complaint to add factual allegations that state a colorable claim against a nondiverse party when the complaint at the time of removal did not state such a claim.
   
   

   Oral Advocates:

   • For Petitioner (Hain and Whole Foods): Sarah E. Harrington, Washington, D.C.
   • For Respondent (Palmquist): Russell S. Post, Houston, Texas
   
   

   Link to Opinion: TBD.

   Website Link to Opinion Summary: TBD.

   Website Link to Oral Argument: TBD.

   Timestamps:

   [00:00:00] Argument Overview

   [00:00:42] Argument Begins

   [00:00:50] Petitioner Opening Statement

   [00:03:08] Petitioner Free for All Questions

   [00:26:21] Petitioner Sequential Questions

   [00:26:24] Respondent Opening Statement

   [00:28:31] Respondent Free for All Questions

   [00:40:05] Petitioner Rebuttal

   ]]>Hain Celestial Group, Inc. v. Palmquist | Case No. 24-724 | Oral Argument Date: 11/4/25 | Docket Link: Here

   Overview

   Today, the Supreme Court hears oral arguments in Hain Celestial Group versus Palmquist, a forum fight about when courts keep cases they never should have had. A Texas family sued two companies over their child's heavy metal poisoning from baby food—but after a federal court wrongly kicked out one defendant and ran a two-week trial, an appeals court said the case never belonged in federal court, forcing everyone back to square one.

   Questions Presented:

   1. Whether a district court's final judgment as to completely diverse parties must be vacated when an appellate court later determines that it erred by dismissing a non-diverse party at the time of removal.
   2. Whether a plaintiff may defeat diversity jurisdiction after removal by amending the complaint to add factual allegations that state a colorable claim against a nondiverse party when the complaint at the time of removal did not state such a claim.
   
   

   Oral Advocates:

   • For Petitioner (Hain and Whole Foods): Sarah E. Harrington, Washington, D.C.
   • For Respondent (Palmquist): Russell S. Post, Houston, Texas
   
   

   Link to Opinion: TBD.

   Website Link to Opinion Summary: TBD.

   Website Link to Oral Argument: TBD.

   Timestamps:

   [00:00:00] Argument Overview

   [00:00:42] Argument Begins

   [00:00:50] Petitioner Opening Statement

   [00:03:08] Petitioner Free for All Questions

   [00:26:21] Petitioner Sequential Questions

   [00:26:24] Respondent Opening Statement

   [00:28:31] Respondent Free for All Questions

   [00:40:05] Petitioner Rebuttal

   ]]>55082bd1-a3c0-4da9-a36b-7ed4d09ff872Tue, 04 Nov 2025 15:00:00 -040042:24falsefull202531312025Oral Argument: Hencely v. Fluor | Battlefield Immunity BattleHain Celestial Group, Inc. v. Palmquist | Case No. 24-724 | Oral Argument Date: 11/4/25 | Docket Link: Here

   Overview

   A father seeks justice after his son, Army Staff Sergeant Ryan Hencely, was killed in a 2016 terrorist attack at Bagram Airfield. The Army's own investigation found contractor Fluor failed to supervise the Afghan worker who carried out the attack, calling it the "primary contributing factor." Yet Fluor claims federal law shields them from any state tort liability.

   Question Presented: Should Boyle be extended to allow federal interests emanating from the FTCA's combatant-activities exception to preempt state tort claims against a government contractor for conduct that breached its contract and violated military orders?

   Oral Advocates:

   • For Petitioner (Hencely): Frank H. Chang, Arlington, Virginia argues for Petitioner Hencely.
   • For Respondent (Fluor): Mark W. Mosier, Washington, D.C.
   • For United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent: Curtis E. Gannon, Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.
   
   

   Link to Opinion: TBD.

   Website Link to Opinion Summary: TBD.

   Website Link to Oral Argument: TBD.

   Timestamps:

   [00:00:00] Argument Overview

   [00:00:48] Argument Begins

   [00:00:55] Petitioner Opening Statement

   [00:02:32] Petitioner Free for All Questions

   [00:26:18] Petitioner Sequential Questions

   [00:33:50] Respondent Opening Statement

   [00:36:12] Respondent Free for All Questions

   [00:54:59] Respondent Sequential Questions

   [01:07:11] United States Opening Statement

   [01:08:25] United States Free for All Questions

   [01:18:13] United States Sequential Questions

   [01:28:31] Petitioner Rebuttal

   ]]>Hain Celestial Group, Inc. v. Palmquist | Case No. 24-724 | Oral Argument Date: 11/4/25 | Docket Link: Here

   Overview

   A father seeks justice after his son, Army Staff Sergeant Ryan Hencely, was killed in a 2016 terrorist attack at Bagram Airfield. The Army's own investigation found contractor Fluor failed to supervise the Afghan worker who carried out the attack, calling it the "primary contributing factor." Yet Fluor claims federal law shields them from any state tort liability.

   Question Presented: Should Boyle be extended to allow federal interests emanating from the FTCA's combatant-activities exception to preempt state tort claims against a government contractor for conduct that breached its contract and violated military orders?

   Oral Advocates:

   • For Petitioner (Hencely): Frank H. Chang, Arlington, Virginia argues for Petitioner Hencely.
   • For Respondent (Fluor): Mark W. Mosier, Washington, D.C.
   • For United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent: Curtis E. Gannon, Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.
   
   

   Link to Opinion: TBD.

   Website Link to Opinion Summary: TBD.

   Website Link to Oral Argument: TBD.

   Timestamps:

   [00:00:00] Argument Overview

   [00:00:48] Argument Begins

   [00:00:55] Petitioner Opening Statement

   [00:02:32] Petitioner Free for All Questions

   [00:26:18] Petitioner Sequential Questions

   [00:33:50] Respondent Opening Statement

   [00:36:12] Respondent Free for All Questions

   [00:54:59] Respondent Sequential Questions

   [01:07:11] United States Opening Statement

   [01:08:25] United States Free for All Questions

   [01:18:13] United States Sequential Questions

   [01:28:31] Petitioner Rebuttal

   ]]>1b538771-deed-4411-8900-d2d6e7e1e87aMon, 03 Nov 2025 15:00:00 -040001:30:47falsefull202530302025Oral Argument: Rico v. United States | Disappearing Defendant DilemmaRico v. United States | Case No. 24-1234 | Oral Argument Date: 11/3/25 | Docket Link: Here

   Overview

   Today, the Supreme Court hears oral arguments in Rico versus United States, the disappearing defendant dilemma examining when sentence clocks stop ticking. Isabel Rico went on the run during her 42-month release term. The government says her time on the run doesn't count toward her sentence.

   Question Presented: Whether the fugitive-tolling doctrine applies in the context of supervised release.

   Oral Advocates:

   • For Petitioner: Adam G. Unikowsky, Washington, D.C.
   • For Respondent: Joshua K. Handell, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.
   
   

   Timestamps:

   [00:00:00] Argument Overview

   [00:00:37] Argument Begins

   [00:00:45] Petitioner Opening Statement

   [00:02:30] Petitioner Free for All Questions

   [00:24:20] Petitioner Sequential Questions

   [00:24:35] Respondent Opening Statement

   [00:26:25] Respondent Free for All Questions

   [00:52:15] Respondent Sequential Questions

   [00:52:20] Petitioner Rebuttal

   ]]>Rico v. United States | Case No. 24-1234 | Oral Argument Date: 11/3/25 | Docket Link: Here

   Overview

   Today, the Supreme Court hears oral arguments in Rico versus United States, the disappearing defendant dilemma examining when sentence clocks stop ticking. Isabel Rico went on the run during her 42-month release term. The government says her time on the run doesn't count toward her sentence.

   Question Presented: Whether the fugitive-tolling doctrine applies in the context of supervised release.

   Oral Advocates:

   • For Petitioner: Adam G. Unikowsky, Washington, D.C.
   • For Respondent: Joshua K. Handell, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.
   
   

   Timestamps:

   [00:00:00] Argument Overview

   [00:00:37] Argument Begins

   [00:00:45] Petitioner Opening Statement

   [00:02:30] Petitioner Free for All Questions

   [00:24:20] Petitioner Sequential Questions

   [00:24:35] Respondent Opening Statement

   [00:26:25] Respondent Free for All Questions

   [00:52:15] Respondent Sequential Questions

   [00:52:20] Petitioner Rebuttal

   ]]>4613be3c-3967-45f0-9305-a219535bd806Mon, 03 Nov 2025 14:00:00 -040055:11falsefull202529292025Case Preview: Geo Group v. Menocal | The Procedural Privilege: The Immunity Fast-Pass to AppealGeo Group v. Menocal Case No. 24-758 | Oral Argument Date: 11/10/25

   Overview

   This episode examines The GEO Group, Inc. versus Menocal, a technical procedural fight with massive real-world consequences for the hundreds of billions of dollars the U.S. government spends on contracts annually. The case pits the efficiency of the justice system against the government's ability to use private contractors to carry out its functions. At stake is whether a government contractor who loses a pre-trial claim of "derivative sovereign immunity" can appeal that decision immediately, or must wait until after a full, costly trial before an appeals court can weigh in.

   Episode Roadmap

   • Opening: A Procedural Privilege: A Fast-Pass to Appeal?
   • Upcoming Oral Arguments: Week of November 3, 2025
   
   

   Monday, Nov. 3:

   1. Rico versus United States
   2. Hencely versus Fluor Corp.
   
   

   Tuesday, Nov. 4:

   1. Coney Island Auto Parts, Inc. versus Burton
   2. Hain Celestial Group versus Palmquist
   
   

   Wednesday, Nov. 5:

   1. The Trump Tariff Cases (Trump v. V.O.S. Selections, Inc., et al. and Learning Resources, Inc. v. Trump)
   
   

   • Note: The argument for Hamm versus Smith has been moved to December 10th.

   Key Concepts Explained:

   1. Sovereign Immunity: The "king can do no wrong" principle; governments generally cannot be sued without their consent.
   2. Derivative Sovereign Immunity: The core defense from Yearsley, claiming a contractor shares the government's immunity when it "performed as the Government directed."
   3. Collateral-Order Doctrine: The Cohen exception; allows immediate appeal for a true "immunity from suit," not just a "defense to liability."
   
   

   Background:

   
   

   • The GEO Group, a private contractor operating an ICE facility, was sued by detainees.
   • The claims allege forced labor (violating the TVPA) and unjust enrichment ($1/day pay).
   • GEO claimed Yearsley immunity, arguing ICE directed the policies.
   
   

   Lower Court Journey:

   • The district court denied GEO's immunity claim, finding GEO had discretion.
   • The Tenth Circuit dismissed GEO's immediate appeal for lack of jurisdiction.
   • The court found an "overlap" between the immunity claim (facts of direction) and the case merits (facts of lawfulness), so it was not a "collateral order."
   • This created a deep circuit split.
   
   

   Petitioner's (GEO) Arguments:

   • Yearsley provides a true "immunity from suit," not just a defense.
   • Precedent compels appealability: Filarsky (giving immunity to an individual contractor) + Mitchell (making that immunity appealable) = GEO wins.
   • The Tenth Circuit's "overlap" reasoning was rejected in Mitchell.
   • Policy: Denying appeals hamstrings government functions; contractors will "raise their price."
   
   

   Respondent's (Menocal) & U.S. Government's Arguments:

   • "Derivative sovereign immunity" doesn't exist; sovereign immunity is "non-delegable."
   • Yearsley only grants a "defense to liability" (no liability), not an "immunity from suit" (no suit).
   • A true immunity protects unlawful conduct (if law isn't clear), but Yearsley only protects lawful conduct (following directions).
   • The order fails Cohen's third prong: It can be effectively reviewed after a final judgment.
   
   

   GEO's Reply:

   • Respondents are attacking a "Grand Straw Man"; GEO claims conditional immunity, not the government's total immunity.
   • The Court cannot ignore Filarsky: An individual contractor received this protection, and a corporation is no different.
   
   

   Stakes & Oral Argument Preview:

   • How will the Justices treat the Filarsky and Mitchell precedents?
   • The "battle of the bright lines": Does GEO's rule flood the courts, or does Menocal's rule terrify contractors?
   
   ]]>Geo Group v. Menocal Case No. 24-758 | Oral Argument Date: 11/10/25

   Overview

   This episode examines The GEO Group, Inc. versus Menocal, a technical procedural fight with massive real-world consequences for the hundreds of billions of dollars the U.S. government spends on contracts annually. The case pits the efficiency of the justice system against the government's ability to use private contractors to carry out its functions. At stake is whether a government contractor who loses a pre-trial claim of "derivative sovereign immunity" can appeal that decision immediately, or must wait until after a full, costly trial before an appeals court can weigh in.

   Episode Roadmap

   • Opening: A Procedural Privilege: A Fast-Pass to Appeal?
   • Upcoming Oral Arguments: Week of November 3, 2025
   
   

   Monday, Nov. 3:

   1. Rico versus United States
   2. Hencely versus Fluor Corp.
   
   

   Tuesday, Nov. 4:

   1. Coney Island Auto Parts, Inc. versus Burton
   2. Hain Celestial Group versus Palmquist
   
   

   Wednesday, Nov. 5:

   1. The Trump Tariff Cases (Trump v. V.O.S. Selections, Inc., et al. and Learning Resources, Inc. v. Trump)
   
   

   • Note: The argument for Hamm versus Smith has been moved to December 10th.

   Key Concepts Explained:

   1. Sovereign Immunity: The "king can do no wrong" principle; governments generally cannot be sued without their consent.
   2. Derivative Sovereign Immunity: The core defense from Yearsley, claiming a contractor shares the government's immunity when it "performed as the Government directed."
   3. Collateral-Order Doctrine: The Cohen exception; allows immediate appeal for a true "immunity from suit," not just a "defense to liability."
   
   

   Background:

   
   

   • The GEO Group, a private contractor operating an ICE facility, was sued by detainees.
   • The claims allege forced labor (violating the TVPA) and unjust enrichment ($1/day pay).
   • GEO claimed Yearsley immunity, arguing ICE directed the policies.
   
   

   Lower Court Journey:

   • The district court denied GEO's immunity claim, finding GEO had discretion.
   • The Tenth Circuit dismissed GEO's immediate appeal for lack of jurisdiction.
   • The court found an "overlap" between the immunity claim (facts of direction) and the case merits (facts of lawfulness), so it was not a "collateral order."
   • This created a deep circuit split.
   
   

   Petitioner's (GEO) Arguments:

   • Yearsley provides a true "immunity from suit," not just a defense.
   • Precedent compels appealability: Filarsky (giving immunity to an individual contractor) + Mitchell (making that immunity appealable) = GEO wins.
   • The Tenth Circuit's "overlap" reasoning was rejected in Mitchell.
   • Policy: Denying appeals hamstrings government functions; contractors will "raise their price."
   
   

   Respondent's (Menocal) & U.S. Government's Arguments:

   • "Derivative sovereign immunity" doesn't exist; sovereign immunity is "non-delegable."
   • Yearsley only grants a "defense to liability" (no liability), not an "immunity from suit" (no suit).
   • A true immunity protects unlawful conduct (if law isn't clear), but Yearsley only protects lawful conduct (following directions).
   • The order fails Cohen's third prong: It can be effectively reviewed after a final judgment.
   
   

   GEO's Reply:

   • Respondents are attacking a "Grand Straw Man"; GEO claims conditional immunity, not the government's total immunity.
   • The Court cannot ignore Filarsky: An individual contractor received this protection, and a corporation is no different.
   
   

   Stakes & Oral Argument Preview:

   • How will the Justices treat the Filarsky and Mitchell precedents?
   • The "battle of the bright lines": Does GEO's rule flood the courts, or does Menocal's rule terrify contractors?
   
   ]]>3a7e772a-a72d-47d7-8f01-18f770ef354cSun, 02 Nov 2025 07:00:00 -040013:54falsefull202528282025Case Preview: Landor v. Louisiana Dept. of Corrections | Landor's Lost Locks: When Prison Guards Clip Constitutional ClaimsLandor v. Louisiana Department of Corrections | Case No. 23-1197 | Oral Argument Date: 11/10/25 | Docket Link: Here

   Question Presented: Whether an individual may sue a government official in his individual capacity for damages for violations of RLUIPA.

   Overview

   This episode examines Landor v. Louisiana Department of Corrections, a case that could reshape religious liberty enforcement in prisons by determining whether inmates can sue individual prison officials for personal damages under RLUIPA. The case centers on Damon Landor, a devout Rastafarian whose decades-long dreadlocks were forcibly shaved despite existing Fifth Circuit precedent protecting such religious practices.

   Episode Roadmap

   Opening: Religious Freedom Behind Bars

   • November 10th, 2025 oral argument date

   • Stakes: Personal liability for prison officials violating religious rights

   • Case follows Supreme Court's 2020 Tanzin decision allowing individual damages under sister statute RFRA

   • Potential nationwide impact on prisoners' religious rights enforcement

   Background: The Nazarite Vow Violation

   • Damon Landor: devout Rastafarian following biblical Nazarite Vow for nearly two decades

   • Dreadlocks fell "nearly to his knees" when incarcerated in August 2020

   • First four months uneventful at two accommodating facilities

   • Transfer to Raymond Laborde Correctional Center with three weeks left in sentence

   The Shocking Violation

   • Landor provided intake guard with Ware decision requiring accommodation

   • Guards threw legal materials in garbage and summoned warden

   • Warden demanded documentation from sentencing judge

   • When Landor couldn't immediately provide, officials handcuffed him to chair and shaved him bald

   • Prison then kept Landor in lockdown for remainder of sentence

   Statutory Framework: RFRA and RLUIPA as "Sister Statutes"

   • Both enacted in response to Employment Division v. Smith limiting religious freedom protection

   • RLUIPA applies to state prisons receiving federal funds through Spending and Commerce Clauses

   • Identical language to RFRA: "appropriate relief against a government"

   • Tanzin held RFRA permits individual-capacity damages - question is whether RLUIPA does same

   The Circuit Split and Lower Court Decision

   • Fifth Circuit rejected individual-capacity claims under RLUIPA

   • Distinguished Tanzin as applying only to federal officials under RFRA

   • Judge Oldham's dissent called facts "stark and egregious"

   • Judge Clement's concurrence noted "visceral" need for damages remedy

   Landor's Arguments (Seeking Individual Damages)

   • RLUIPA's text is "identical" to RFRA's - same language must mean same remedies

   • Damages were available against state officers before Smith decision

   • RLUIPA "made clear" Congress intended to "reinstate" pre-Smith protections and remedies

   • Damages often "only form of relief that can remedy" violations like forced head-shaving

   Louisiana's Arguments (Opposing Individual Liability)

   • RLUIPA only permits suits against "government" entities, not individual officials

   • Sossamon precedent shows Congress did not clearly authorize damages against states

   • Spending Clause conditions cannot extend to individual officer liability

   • Sovereign immunity principles protect state officials from personal damages

   Constitutional Stakes: Spending Clause Analysis

   • Whether Congress can impose personal liability conditions on state officials through federal funding

   • Landor argues conditions clearly relate to federal spending on prisons

   • Louisiana contends extending liability to individuals exceeds spending power

   • Parallel to other federal funding programs requiring individual compliance

   The Practical Impact Question

   • Damages as deterrent: Will personal liability improve religious accommodation?

   • Louisiana's policy change: Department amended grooming policy in response to lawsuit

   • Private enforcement supplement: Government cannot monitor all prison violations

   • Fifth Circuit precedent shows even clear legal rulings insufficient without enforcement mechanism

   Broader Religious Liberty Implications

   If Landor Wins:

   • Prisoners gain powerful enforcement tool for religious rights violations

   • Individual deterrent effect on prison officials nationwide

   • Consistency with Tanzin's RFRA interpretation

   • Enhanced protection for minority religious practices in institutional settings

   If Louisiana Wins:

   • Limits enforcement to institutional defendants only

   • Potential immunity shield for individual religious rights violations

   • Inconsistency between RFRA and RLUIPA despite identical language

   • Reduced deterrent effect on individual officer misconduct

   Looking Ahead to November 10th Oral Arguments

   • Justices' reaction to "sister statute" argument and Tanzin precedent

   • Questions about Spending Clause limits on individual officer liability

   • Practical enforcement concerns and deterrent effects

   • Constitutional consistency between federal (RFRA) and state (RLUIPA) religious liberty protection

   Key Legal Concepts Explained

   • Individual-capacity versus official-capacity lawsuits
   • RLUIPA's Spending Clause and Commerce Clause foundations
   • Religious accommodation in correctional settings
   
   

   • Statutory interpretation of identical language across related statutes

   
   

   • Personal liability as enforcement mechanism for constitutional rights

   ]]>Landor v. Louisiana Department of Corrections | Case No. 23-1197 | Oral Argument Date: 11/10/25 | Docket Link: Here

   Question Presented: Whether an individual may sue a government official in his individual capacity for damages for violations of RLUIPA.

   Overview

   This episode examines Landor v. Louisiana Department of Corrections, a case that could reshape religious liberty enforcement in prisons by determining whether inmates can sue individual prison officials for personal damages under RLUIPA. The case centers on Damon Landor, a devout Rastafarian whose decades-long dreadlocks were forcibly shaved despite existing Fifth Circuit precedent protecting such religious practices.

   Episode Roadmap

   Opening: Religious Freedom Behind Bars

   • November 10th, 2025 oral argument date

   • Stakes: Personal liability for prison officials violating religious rights

   • Case follows Supreme Court's 2020 Tanzin decision allowing individual damages under sister statute RFRA

   • Potential nationwide impact on prisoners' religious rights enforcement

   Background: The Nazarite Vow Violation

   • Damon Landor: devout Rastafarian following biblical Nazarite Vow for nearly two decades

   • Dreadlocks fell "nearly to his knees" when incarcerated in August 2020

   • First four months uneventful at two accommodating facilities

   • Transfer to Raymond Laborde Correctional Center with three weeks left in sentence

   The Shocking Violation

   • Landor provided intake guard with Ware decision requiring accommodation

   • Guards threw legal materials in garbage and summoned warden

   • Warden demanded documentation from sentencing judge

   • When Landor couldn't immediately provide, officials handcuffed him to chair and shaved him bald

   • Prison then kept Landor in lockdown for remainder of sentence

   Statutory Framework: RFRA and RLUIPA as "Sister Statutes"

   • Both enacted in response to Employment Division v. Smith limiting religious freedom protection

   • RLUIPA applies to state prisons receiving federal funds through Spending and Commerce Clauses

   • Identical language to RFRA: "appropriate relief against a government"

   • Tanzin held RFRA permits individual-capacity damages - question is whether RLUIPA does same

   The Circuit Split and Lower Court Decision

   • Fifth Circuit rejected individual-capacity claims under RLUIPA

   • Distinguished Tanzin as applying only to federal officials under RFRA

   • Judge Oldham's dissent called facts "stark and egregious"

   • Judge Clement's concurrence noted "visceral" need for damages remedy

   Landor's Arguments (Seeking Individual Damages)

   • RLUIPA's text is "identical" to RFRA's - same language must mean same remedies

   • Damages were available against state officers before Smith decision

   • RLUIPA "made clear" Congress intended to "reinstate" pre-Smith protections and remedies

   • Damages often "only form of relief that can remedy" violations like forced head-shaving

   Louisiana's Arguments (Opposing Individual Liability)

   • RLUIPA only permits suits against "government" entities, not individual officials

   • Sossamon precedent shows Congress did not clearly authorize damages against states

   • Spending Clause conditions cannot extend to individual officer liability

   • Sovereign immunity principles protect state officials from personal damages

   Constitutional Stakes: Spending Clause Analysis

   • Whether Congress can impose personal liability conditions on state officials through federal funding

   • Landor argues conditions clearly relate to federal spending on prisons

   • Louisiana contends extending liability to individuals exceeds spending power

   • Parallel to other federal funding programs requiring individual compliance

   The Practical Impact Question

   • Damages as deterrent: Will personal liability improve religious accommodation?

   • Louisiana's policy change: Department amended grooming policy in response to lawsuit

   • Private enforcement supplement: Government cannot monitor all prison violations

   • Fifth Circuit precedent shows even clear legal rulings insufficient without enforcement mechanism

   Broader Religious Liberty Implications

   If Landor Wins:

   • Prisoners gain powerful enforcement tool for religious rights violations

   • Individual deterrent effect on prison officials nationwide

   • Consistency with Tanzin's RFRA interpretation

   • Enhanced protection for minority religious practices in institutional settings

   If Louisiana Wins:

   • Limits enforcement to institutional defendants only

   • Potential immunity shield for individual religious rights violations

   • Inconsistency between RFRA and RLUIPA despite identical language

   • Reduced deterrent effect on individual officer misconduct

   Looking Ahead to November 10th Oral Arguments

   • Justices' reaction to "sister statute" argument and Tanzin precedent

   • Questions about Spending Clause limits on individual officer liability

   • Practical enforcement concerns and deterrent effects

   • Constitutional consistency between federal (RFRA) and state (RLUIPA) religious liberty protection

   Key Legal Concepts Explained

   • Individual-capacity versus official-capacity lawsuits
   • RLUIPA's Spending Clause and Commerce Clause foundations
   • Religious accommodation in correctional settings
   
   

   • Statutory interpretation of identical language across related statutes

   
   

   • Personal liability as enforcement mechanism for constitutional rights

   ]]>1f801575-a435-4138-ab18-e19736912d6bSat, 01 Nov 2025 07:00:00 -040028:48falsefull202527272025Case Preview: Coney Island Auto Parts v. Burton | The Time Trap Tangle: When Void Judgments Gain ValidityConey Island Auto Parts v. Burton | Case No. 24-808 | Oral Argument Date: 11/5/25 | Docket Link: Here

   Question Presented: Whether Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(c)(1) imposes any time limit to set aside a default judgment void for lack of personal jurisdiction.

   Overview

   This episode examines a deceptively simple civil procedure case that could fundamentally reshape how federal courts handle void judgments, creating a constitutional tension between centuries-old legal principles and modern procedural rules about timing requirements for challenging judgments that courts never had authority to enter.

   Episode Roadmap

   Opening: The Void Judgment Paradox

   • November 5th, 2025 oral argument date
   • Circuit split: Sixth Circuit stands alone against every other federal circuit
   • Core tension: Can procedural rules validate what should never have existed?
   • Affects every federal court nationwide using Rule 60
   
   

   Background: The Seven-Year Journey

   • Vista-Pro Automotive bankruptcy in Nashville, Tennessee
   • February 2015: Default judgment against Coney Island Auto Parts for $48,696.21
   • Coney Island claims never received proper service - no personal jurisdiction
   • 2020: Trustee registers judgment in New York, freezes $100,000 in bank accounts
   • March 2022: Seven years later, Coney Island files Rule 60(b)(4) motion to vacate
   
   

   The Central Legal Question

   • Rule 60(b)(4): Courts can vacate judgments that "are void"
   • Rule 60(c)(1): "Any motion under Rule 60(b) must be made within a reasonable time"
   • Does "reasonable time" apply to truly void judgments?
   • Fundamental question: Can time limits apply to legal nullities?
   
   

   Lower Court Journey

   • Tennessee bankruptcy court grants motion to vacate
   • Sixth Circuit reverses 2-1, applies "reasonable time" requirement
   • Creates circuit split with every other federal circuit
   • Supreme Court grants certiorari to resolve nationwide inconsistency
   
   

   Constitutional Framework: Due Process and Jurisdiction

   • Personal jurisdiction: Court's authority over parties
   • Void judgment: "No judgment at all" - legal nullity from inception
   • Due process concerns: Enforcing judgments without proper notice
   • Historical principle: Void judgments attackable at any time
   
   

   Petitioner's Arguments (Coney Island Auto Parts):

   Argument 1: Logical Impossibility

   • "If a judgment is void immediately upon entry, how could the passage of time vivify it?"
   • Void means legal nullity - cannot gain validity through delay
   • Procedural rules cannot breathe life into what never existed
   
   

   Argument 2: Historical Practice and Tradition

   • Centuries of precedent allowing challenges to void judgments at any time
   • 1946 Advisory Committee intended "reasonable time" for voidable, not void judgments
   • Advisory Committee statements distinguish void from voidable judgments
   
   

   Argument 3: Judicial Consensus

   • Every circuit except Sixth Circuit recognizes exception for void judgments
   • Well-established understanding that void judgments are special category
   • Circuit split demonstrates widespread acceptance of traditional rule
   
   

   Respondent's Arguments (Burton):

   Argument 1: Plain Text Controls

   • Rule 60(c)(1): "A motion under Rule 60(b) must be made within a reasonable time"
   • Rule 60(b)(4) is part of Rule 60(b) - text is unambiguous
   • Every tool of statutory interpretation supports time limits
   
   

   Argument 2: Rule Structure and Drafting History

   • Drafters knew how to create exceptions - did so for Rules 60(b)(1)-(3)
   • Advisory Committee rejected proposal imposing no time limits for void judgments
   • Committee agreed "all motions should be made within a reasonable time"
   
   

   Argument 3: Procedural vs. Substantive Distinction

   • Time limits don't validate void judgments - they impose procedural requirements
   • Distinction between judgment validity and challenge procedures
   • Prevents "flagrantly inequitable conduct" and protects finality interests
   
   

   Episode Highlights

   Key Legal Concepts Explained

   • Personal Jurisdiction: Court's legal authority over parties to a lawsuit
   • Void Judgment: Legal nullity with no validity from the moment entered
   • Default Judgment: Judgment entered when defendant fails to respond
   • Rule 60(b)(4): Federal rule allowing relief from void judgments
   • Service of Process: Legal requirement to provide proper notice of lawsuit
   • Circuit Split: When federal appeals courts reach conflicting decisions
   • Due Process: Constitutional requirement of fair legal proceedings
   
   ]]>Coney Island Auto Parts v. Burton | Case No. 24-808 | Oral Argument Date: 11/5/25 | Docket Link: Here

   Question Presented: Whether Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(c)(1) imposes any time limit to set aside a default judgment void for lack of personal jurisdiction.

   Overview

   This episode examines a deceptively simple civil procedure case that could fundamentally reshape how federal courts handle void judgments, creating a constitutional tension between centuries-old legal principles and modern procedural rules about timing requirements for challenging judgments that courts never had authority to enter.

   Episode Roadmap

   Opening: The Void Judgment Paradox

   • November 5th, 2025 oral argument date
   • Circuit split: Sixth Circuit stands alone against every other federal circuit
   • Core tension: Can procedural rules validate what should never have existed?
   • Affects every federal court nationwide using Rule 60
   
   

   Background: The Seven-Year Journey

   • Vista-Pro Automotive bankruptcy in Nashville, Tennessee
   • February 2015: Default judgment against Coney Island Auto Parts for $48,696.21
   • Coney Island claims never received proper service - no personal jurisdiction
   • 2020: Trustee registers judgment in New York, freezes $100,000 in bank accounts
   • March 2022: Seven years later, Coney Island files Rule 60(b)(4) motion to vacate
   
   

   The Central Legal Question

   • Rule 60(b)(4): Courts can vacate judgments that "are void"
   • Rule 60(c)(1): "Any motion under Rule 60(b) must be made within a reasonable time"
   • Does "reasonable time" apply to truly void judgments?
   • Fundamental question: Can time limits apply to legal nullities?
   
   

   Lower Court Journey

   • Tennessee bankruptcy court grants motion to vacate
   • Sixth Circuit reverses 2-1, applies "reasonable time" requirement
   • Creates circuit split with every other federal circuit
   • Supreme Court grants certiorari to resolve nationwide inconsistency
   
   

   Constitutional Framework: Due Process and Jurisdiction

   • Personal jurisdiction: Court's authority over parties
   • Void judgment: "No judgment at all" - legal nullity from inception
   • Due process concerns: Enforcing judgments without proper notice
   • Historical principle: Void judgments attackable at any time
   
   

   Petitioner's Arguments (Coney Island Auto Parts):

   Argument 1: Logical Impossibility

   • "If a judgment is void immediately upon entry, how could the passage of time vivify it?"
   • Void means legal nullity - cannot gain validity through delay
   • Procedural rules cannot breathe life into what never existed
   
   

   Argument 2: Historical Practice and Tradition

   • Centuries of precedent allowing challenges to void judgments at any time
   • 1946 Advisory Committee intended "reasonable time" for voidable, not void judgments
   • Advisory Committee statements distinguish void from voidable judgments
   
   

   Argument 3: Judicial Consensus

   • Every circuit except Sixth Circuit recognizes exception for void judgments
   • Well-established understanding that void judgments are special category
   • Circuit split demonstrates widespread acceptance of traditional rule
   
   

   Respondent's Arguments (Burton):

   Argument 1: Plain Text Controls

   • Rule 60(c)(1): "A motion under Rule 60(b) must be made within a reasonable time"
   • Rule 60(b)(4) is part of Rule 60(b) - text is unambiguous
   • Every tool of statutory interpretation supports time limits
   
   

   Argument 2: Rule Structure and Drafting History

   • Drafters knew how to create exceptions - did so for Rules 60(b)(1)-(3)
   • Advisory Committee rejected proposal imposing no time limits for void judgments
   • Committee agreed "all motions should be made within a reasonable time"
   
   

   Argument 3: Procedural vs. Substantive Distinction

   • Time limits don't validate void judgments - they impose procedural requirements
   • Distinction between judgment validity and challenge procedures
   • Prevents "flagrantly inequitable conduct" and protects finality interests
   
   

   Episode Highlights

   Key Legal Concepts Explained

   • Personal Jurisdiction: Court's legal authority over parties to a lawsuit
   • Void Judgment: Legal nullity with no validity from the moment entered
   • Default Judgment: Judgment entered when defendant fails to respond
   • Rule 60(b)(4): Federal rule allowing relief from void judgments
   • Service of Process: Legal requirement to provide proper notice of lawsuit
   • Circuit Split: When federal appeals courts reach conflicting decisions
   • Due Process: Constitutional requirement of fair legal proceedings
   
   ]]>a606e5bc-e5ae-40f6-8162-89e9a2207612Fri, 31 Oct 2025 07:00:00 -040014:52falsefull202526262025Case Preview: Trump Tariff Cases | A Constitutional Clash: Trump's Tariffs and the Separation of PowersTrump v. V.O.S. Selections, Inc., et al. | Oral Argument: November 5, 2025 | Case No. 25-250 | Docket Link: Here

   Consolidated with: Learning Resources, Inc. v. Trump | Case No. 24-1287 | Docket Link: Here

   September 10th Episode (A Constitutional Clash: Trump's Tariffs and the Separation of Powers): https://scotus-oral-arguments.captivate.fm/episode/a-constitutional-clash-trumps-tariffs-and-the-separation-of-powers/

   Overview

   This episode examines the Supreme Court's September 9, 2025 Order that expedited review of two consolidated cases challenging President Trump's authority to impose sweeping tariffs under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), representing a constitutional clash over the separation of powers and presidential trade authority.

   Roadmap

   Opening: Explosive Constitutional Questions

   • September 9, 2025 certiorari grant and consolidation order
   • Expedited briefing schedule for November 2025 oral arguments
   • Stakes: Presidential power to tax trillions in trade and reshape the economy
   
   

   Background: The Trump Tariff Orders

   • Reciprocal Tariffs: 10% on virtually all imports, higher rates for 57 countries
   • Trafficking Tariffs: Levies on Mexico, Canada, and China for drug enforcement
   • IEEPA as claimed statutory authority for both tariff schemes
   • National emergency declarations underlying the orders
   
   

   The Central Legal Question

   • Does "regulate" in IEEPA include power to impose tariffs?
   • Constitutional separation of taxing vs. regulating powers
   • Article I distinctions between taxation and commerce regulation
   • Historical significance: "No taxation without representation"
   
   

   Lower Court Journey

   • Multiple simultaneous lawsuits in different courts
   • District court and Court of International Trade conflicting approaches
   • Federal Circuit en banc decision striking down tariffs
   • Judge Taranto's influential dissent supporting tariff authority
   
   

   Referenced Cases

   Trump v. V.O.S. Selections | Case No. 24-1286 | Docket Link: Here

   Question Presented: Whether IEEPA authorizes the President to impose these specific sweeping tariffs

   Government Arguments:

   • "Regulate" includes power to impose tariffs as lesser-included authority
   • Historical practice supports broad executive trade power during emergencies
   • Major questions doctrine doesn't apply in foreign policy contexts
   
   

   V.O.S. Arguments:

   • Constitutional separation requires clear authorization for taxation
   • "Regulate" and "tariff" are distinct powers with different purposes
   • Major questions doctrine requires explicit congressional authorization
   
   

   Learning Resources v. Trump | Case No. 24-1287 | Docket Link: Here

   Question Presented: Whether IEEPA authorizes any presidential tariffs whatsoever

   Learning Resources Arguments:

   • "Regulate" means control behavior, "tariff" means raise revenue - fundamentally different
   • No historical practice of IEEPA tariffs in nearly 50 years
   • Constitutional avoidance: IEEPA covers exports where tariffs are prohibited
   
   

   Government Arguments:

   • Plain text of "regulate importation" naturally includes tariff authority
   • Yoshida precedent shows Congress ratified tariff interpretation
   • Presidential action deserves greater deference than agency action
   
   

   Key Legal Precedents Examined

   Historical Foundation Cases

   • Gibbons v. Ogden (1824): Marshall's distinction between taxing and regulating powers
   • United States v. Yoshida International (1975): Nixon import surcharge precedent
   • Federal Energy Administration v. Algonquin SNG (1976): "Adjust imports" includes fees
   
   

   Modern Constitutional Doctrines

   • Major Questions Doctrine: Clear authorization required for "vast economic and political significance"
   • Constitutional Avoidance: Interpreting statutes to avoid constitutional problems
   • Noscitur a Sociis: "Word known by company it keeps" interpretive principle
   
   

   Strategic Legal Arguments

   Government's Core Position

   • Textual: "Regulate" includes "control" and "adjust by rule" - tariffs qualify
   • Historical: Congressional ratification of Yoshida through IEEPA enactment
   • Foreign Policy Exception: Major questions doctrine doesn't apply to national security
   • Presidential vs. Agency: Direct presidential delegation deserves greater deference
   
   

   Challengers' Core Position

   • Separation of Powers: Taxing and regulating are constitutionally distinct
   • Textual Context: Other IEEPA verbs don't involve revenue raising
   • Constitutional Avoidance: Export tax prohibition requires narrow reading
   • Major Questions: $4 trillion impact requires explicit authorization
   
   

   Broader Constitutional Implications

   If Government Wins

   • Sweeping presidential tariff authority during declared emergencies
   • Expansion of executive power over traditionally congressional domain
   • Potential model for other emergency economic powers
   
   

   If Challengers Win

   • Reinforcement of congressional primacy over taxation
   • Strengthening of major questions doctrine application to presidential action
   • Constraint on emergency powers in economic regulation
   
   

   Key Legal Concepts Explained

   • IEEPA (International Emergency Economic Powers Act): 1977 law granting emergency economic authorities
   • Major Questions Doctrine: Requirement for clear authorization for actions of vast significance
   • Constitutional Avoidance: Interpreting statutes to avoid constitutional problems
   • Separation of Powers: Constitutional division of authority between branches
   • Foreign Policy Exception: Debate over whether normal limits apply to international contexts
   
   

   Timeline and Practical Impact

   • September 19, 2025: Opening briefs due
   • September 23, 2025: Amicus briefs due
   • October 20, 2025: Response briefs due
   • October 30, 2025: Reply briefs due
   • November 2025: Oral arguments (first week)
   • Expected Decision: January 2026 or sooner
   
   ]]>Trump v. V.O.S. Selections, Inc., et al. | Oral Argument: November 5, 2025 | Case No. 25-250 | Docket Link: Here

   Consolidated with: Learning Resources, Inc. v. Trump | Case No. 24-1287 | Docket Link: Here

   September 10th Episode (A Constitutional Clash: Trump's Tariffs and the Separation of Powers): https://scotus-oral-arguments.captivate.fm/episode/a-constitutional-clash-trumps-tariffs-and-the-separation-of-powers/

   Overview

   This episode examines the Supreme Court's September 9, 2025 Order that expedited review of two consolidated cases challenging President Trump's authority to impose sweeping tariffs under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), representing a constitutional clash over the separation of powers and presidential trade authority.

   Roadmap

   Opening: Explosive Constitutional Questions

   • September 9, 2025 certiorari grant and consolidation order
   • Expedited briefing schedule for November 2025 oral arguments
   • Stakes: Presidential power to tax trillions in trade and reshape the economy
   
   

   Background: The Trump Tariff Orders

   • Reciprocal Tariffs: 10% on virtually all imports, higher rates for 57 countries
   • Trafficking Tariffs: Levies on Mexico, Canada, and China for drug enforcement
   • IEEPA as claimed statutory authority for both tariff schemes
   • National emergency declarations underlying the orders
   
   

   The Central Legal Question

   • Does "regulate" in IEEPA include power to impose tariffs?
   • Constitutional separation of taxing vs. regulating powers
   • Article I distinctions between taxation and commerce regulation
   • Historical significance: "No taxation without representation"
   
   

   Lower Court Journey

   • Multiple simultaneous lawsuits in different courts
   • District court and Court of International Trade conflicting approaches
   • Federal Circuit en banc decision striking down tariffs
   • Judge Taranto's influential dissent supporting tariff authority
   
   

   Referenced Cases

   Trump v. V.O.S. Selections | Case No. 24-1286 | Docket Link: Here

   Question Presented: Whether IEEPA authorizes the President to impose these specific sweeping tariffs

   Government Arguments:

   • "Regulate" includes power to impose tariffs as lesser-included authority
   • Historical practice supports broad executive trade power during emergencies
   • Major questions doctrine doesn't apply in foreign policy contexts
   
   

   V.O.S. Arguments:

   • Constitutional separation requires clear authorization for taxation
   • "Regulate" and "tariff" are distinct powers with different purposes
   • Major questions doctrine requires explicit congressional authorization
   
   

   Learning Resources v. Trump | Case No. 24-1287 | Docket Link: Here

   Question Presented: Whether IEEPA authorizes any presidential tariffs whatsoever

   Learning Resources Arguments:

   • "Regulate" means control behavior, "tariff" means raise revenue - fundamentally different
   • No historical practice of IEEPA tariffs in nearly 50 years
   • Constitutional avoidance: IEEPA covers exports where tariffs are prohibited
   
   

   Government Arguments:

   • Plain text of "regulate importation" naturally includes tariff authority
   • Yoshida precedent shows Congress ratified tariff interpretation
   • Presidential action deserves greater deference than agency action
   
   

   Key Legal Precedents Examined

   Historical Foundation Cases

   • Gibbons v. Ogden (1824): Marshall's distinction between taxing and regulating powers
   • United States v. Yoshida International (1975): Nixon import surcharge precedent
   • Federal Energy Administration v. Algonquin SNG (1976): "Adjust imports" includes fees
   
   

   Modern Constitutional Doctrines

   • Major Questions Doctrine: Clear authorization required for "vast economic and political significance"
   • Constitutional Avoidance: Interpreting statutes to avoid constitutional problems
   • Noscitur a Sociis: "Word known by company it keeps" interpretive principle
   
   

   Strategic Legal Arguments

   Government's Core Position

   • Textual: "Regulate" includes "control" and "adjust by rule" - tariffs qualify
   • Historical: Congressional ratification of Yoshida through IEEPA enactment
   • Foreign Policy Exception: Major questions doctrine doesn't apply to national security
   • Presidential vs. Agency: Direct presidential delegation deserves greater deference
   
   

   Challengers' Core Position

   • Separation of Powers: Taxing and regulating are constitutionally distinct
   • Textual Context: Other IEEPA verbs don't involve revenue raising
   • Constitutional Avoidance: Export tax prohibition requires narrow reading
   • Major Questions: $4 trillion impact requires explicit authorization
   
   

   Broader Constitutional Implications

   If Government Wins

   • Sweeping presidential tariff authority during declared emergencies
   • Expansion of executive power over traditionally congressional domain
   • Potential model for other emergency economic powers
   
   

   If Challengers Win

   • Reinforcement of congressional primacy over taxation
   • Strengthening of major questions doctrine application to presidential action
   • Constraint on emergency powers in economic regulation
   
   

   Key Legal Concepts Explained

   • IEEPA (International Emergency Economic Powers Act): 1977 law granting emergency economic authorities
   • Major Questions Doctrine: Requirement for clear authorization for actions of vast significance
   • Constitutional Avoidance: Interpreting statutes to avoid constitutional problems
   • Separation of Powers: Constitutional division of authority between branches
   • Foreign Policy Exception: Debate over whether normal limits apply to international contexts
   
   

   Timeline and Practical Impact

   • September 19, 2025: Opening briefs due
   • September 23, 2025: Amicus briefs due
   • October 20, 2025: Response briefs due
   • October 30, 2025: Reply briefs due
   • November 2025: Oral arguments (first week)
   • Expected Decision: January 2026 or sooner
   
   ]]>214b5c32-edde-4394-bae5-ceb1dc4864b2Thu, 30 Oct 2025 07:00:00 -040018:57falsefull202525252025Case Preview: Hain Celestial v. Palmquist | Forum Fight: Can Courts Cure Their Own Jurisdictional Mistakes? Hain Celestial Group, Inc. v. Palmquist | Case No. 24-724 | Oral Argument Date: 11/4/25 | Docket Link: Here

   Question Presented: Whether a district court's final judgment as to completely diverse parties must be vacated when an appellate court later determines that it erred by dismissing a non-diverse party at the time of removal; and whether a plaintiff may defeat diversity jurisdiction after removal by amending the complaint to add factual allegations that state a colorable claim against a nondiverse party when the complaint at the time of removal did not state such a claim.

   Overview

   This episode examines a technical but consequential case about federal court jurisdiction that could affect thousands of removal cases nationwide. The dispute centers on whether federal courts can preserve judgments when they make jurisdictional errors, presenting a fundamental tension between judicial efficiency and strict adherence to jurisdictional limits in our federal court system.

   Episode Roadmap

   Opening: When Federal Courts Keep Cases They Shouldn't

   • November 4th, 2025 oral argument date
   • Circuit split requiring Supreme Court resolution
   • Stakes: Balance between judicial efficiency and jurisdictional integrity
   • Affects every lawsuit involving forum manipulation and removal
   
   

   Background: A Family Tragedy Becomes a Jurisdictional Mess

   • The Palmquist family's baby food poisoning lawsuit in Texas
   • E.P.'s severe heavy-metal toxicity from Hain's Earth's Best products
   • Complete diversity destroyed by Texas plaintiffs suing Texas defendant Whole Foods
   • Defendants' removal strategy and fraudulent joinder claim
   
   

   Constitutional and Statutory Framework

   • 28 U.S.C. § 1332: Complete diversity requirement for federal jurisdiction
   • 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c): Mandatory remand when jurisdiction lacking
   • "Completely diverse" means every plaintiff from different state than every defendant
   • Federal courts as courts of limited jurisdiction
   
   

   Procedural Journey: From State Court to Supreme Court

   • District court's fraudulent joinder ruling dismissing Whole Foods
   • Two years of federal litigation and two-week jury trial
   • Fifth Circuit reversal: Whole Foods properly joined, judgment vacated
   • Case remanded to state court after years of federal proceedings
   
   

   The Central Legal Questions

   • Can jurisdictional "cure" occur through erroneous dismissal?
   • Voluntary versus involuntary party dismissals
   • When does jurisdictional defect "linger" through final judgment?
   
   

   Episode Highlights

   Petitioners' Three-Pronged Strategy (Hain and Whole Foods)

   • Caterpillar Cure Doctrine: Drawing on 1996 precedent arguing jurisdictional defects can be cured by dismissing non-diverse parties before final judgment, tracing principle to 19th-century cases
   • Efficiency and Finality: Emphasizing "considerations of finality, efficiency, and economy become overwhelming" once diversity case tried in federal court with state law
   • Newman-Green Discretionary Authority: Arguing Fifth Circuit should have dismissed Whole Foods as "dispensable party" under Rule 21 to preserve final judgment
   
   

   Respondents' Counter-Attack (The Palmquist Family)

   • Voluntary vs. Involuntary Distinction: Emphasizing Caterpillar involved voluntary settlement dismissal while here "respondents opposed the dismissal of Whole Foods and never voluntarily abandoned their claims"
   • Master of Complaint Principle: Invoking plaintiff's right to "establish—or not—the basis for a federal court's subject-matter jurisdiction" and choose forum
   • No Cure Occurred: Arguing jurisdictional defect persisted because "the case has lacked complete diversity at every minute from the moment of its filing"
   
   

   Key Legal Concepts Explained

   • Diversity jurisdiction and complete diversity requirement
   • Fraudulent joinder doctrine and removal strategy
   • Voluntary versus involuntary dismissals in jurisdictional context
   • Newman-Green dispensable party doctrine under Rule 21
   
   

   Competing Precedential Interpretations

   • Caterpillar, Inc. v. Lewis (1996): Battle over whether jurisdictional cure applies to involuntary dismissals
   • Royal Canin U.S.A., Inc. v. Wullschleger (2025): Recent decision on voluntary versus involuntary dismissal effects
   • Grupo Dataflux v. Atlas Global Group (2004): Limits on Caterpillar's jurisdictional cure doctrine
   
   ]]> Hain Celestial Group, Inc. v. Palmquist | Case No. 24-724 | Oral Argument Date: 11/4/25 | Docket Link: Here

   Question Presented: Whether a district court's final judgment as to completely diverse parties must be vacated when an appellate court later determines that it erred by dismissing a non-diverse party at the time of removal; and whether a plaintiff may defeat diversity jurisdiction after removal by amending the complaint to add factual allegations that state a colorable claim against a nondiverse party when the complaint at the time of removal did not state such a claim.

   Overview

   This episode examines a technical but consequential case about federal court jurisdiction that could affect thousands of removal cases nationwide. The dispute centers on whether federal courts can preserve judgments when they make jurisdictional errors, presenting a fundamental tension between judicial efficiency and strict adherence to jurisdictional limits in our federal court system.

   Episode Roadmap

   Opening: When Federal Courts Keep Cases They Shouldn't

   • November 4th, 2025 oral argument date
   • Circuit split requiring Supreme Court resolution
   • Stakes: Balance between judicial efficiency and jurisdictional integrity
   • Affects every lawsuit involving forum manipulation and removal
   
   

   Background: A Family Tragedy Becomes a Jurisdictional Mess

   • The Palmquist family's baby food poisoning lawsuit in Texas
   • E.P.'s severe heavy-metal toxicity from Hain's Earth's Best products
   • Complete diversity destroyed by Texas plaintiffs suing Texas defendant Whole Foods
   • Defendants' removal strategy and fraudulent joinder claim
   
   

   Constitutional and Statutory Framework

   • 28 U.S.C. § 1332: Complete diversity requirement for federal jurisdiction
   • 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c): Mandatory remand when jurisdiction lacking
   • "Completely diverse" means every plaintiff from different state than every defendant
   • Federal courts as courts of limited jurisdiction
   
   

   Procedural Journey: From State Court to Supreme Court

   • District court's fraudulent joinder ruling dismissing Whole Foods
   • Two years of federal litigation and two-week jury trial
   • Fifth Circuit reversal: Whole Foods properly joined, judgment vacated
   • Case remanded to state court after years of federal proceedings
   
   

   The Central Legal Questions

   • Can jurisdictional "cure" occur through erroneous dismissal?
   • Voluntary versus involuntary party dismissals
   • When does jurisdictional defect "linger" through final judgment?
   
   

   Episode Highlights

   Petitioners' Three-Pronged Strategy (Hain and Whole Foods)

   • Caterpillar Cure Doctrine: Drawing on 1996 precedent arguing jurisdictional defects can be cured by dismissing non-diverse parties before final judgment, tracing principle to 19th-century cases
   • Efficiency and Finality: Emphasizing "considerations of finality, efficiency, and economy become overwhelming" once diversity case tried in federal court with state law
   • Newman-Green Discretionary Authority: Arguing Fifth Circuit should have dismissed Whole Foods as "dispensable party" under Rule 21 to preserve final judgment
   
   

   Respondents' Counter-Attack (The Palmquist Family)

   • Voluntary vs. Involuntary Distinction: Emphasizing Caterpillar involved voluntary settlement dismissal while here "respondents opposed the dismissal of Whole Foods and never voluntarily abandoned their claims"
   • Master of Complaint Principle: Invoking plaintiff's right to "establish—or not—the basis for a federal court's subject-matter jurisdiction" and choose forum
   • No Cure Occurred: Arguing jurisdictional defect persisted because "the case has lacked complete diversity at every minute from the moment of its filing"
   
   

   Key Legal Concepts Explained

   • Diversity jurisdiction and complete diversity requirement
   • Fraudulent joinder doctrine and removal strategy
   • Voluntary versus involuntary dismissals in jurisdictional context
   • Newman-Green dispensable party doctrine under Rule 21
   
   

   Competing Precedential Interpretations

   • Caterpillar, Inc. v. Lewis (1996): Battle over whether jurisdictional cure applies to involuntary dismissals
   • Royal Canin U.S.A., Inc. v. Wullschleger (2025): Recent decision on voluntary versus involuntary dismissal effects
   • Grupo Dataflux v. Atlas Global Group (2004): Limits on Caterpillar's jurisdictional cure doctrine
   
   ]]>c692541e-be30-4a00-83d9-fe6d9cedc226Wed, 29 Oct 2025 09:00:00 -040014:40falsefull202524242025Case Preview: Rico v. United States | The Disappearing Defendant Dilemma: When Sentence Clocks Stop TickingRico v. United States | Case No. 24-1234 | Oral Argument Date: 11/3/25 | Docket Link: Here

   Question Presented: Whether the fugitive-tolling doctrine applies in the context of supervised release.

   Overview

   This episode examines Rico v. United States, a Supreme Court case that challenges the boundaries between judicial power and congressional authority in criminal sentencing. The case asks whether federal courts can indefinitely extend supervised release terms for defendants who abscond, despite Congress never explicitly authorizing such extensions. Through Isabel Rico's story - a woman whose 42-month sentence ballooned to over 60 months due to a judge-made doctrine - the episode explores fundamental questions about separation of powers, statutory interpretation, and criminal justice fairness.

   Episode Roadmap

   Opening: From Hollywood Script to Constitutional Crisis

   • Fugitive imagery from popular culture versus legal reality
   • Isabel Rico's five-year disappearance and its consequences
   • The "time stands still" assumption challenged
   
   

   The Question and Key Statutory Text

   • Fugitive-tolling doctrine definition and application
   • 18 U.S.C. § 3624(e): Congress's one explicit tolling rule
   • Supervised release versus parole distinctions
   
   

   Rico's Story: Facts

   • 2010 drug conviction and original sentencing
   • 2017-2018 supervised release violations and abscondment
   • 2021-2022 state crimes during fugitive period
   
   

   Legal Arguments: Three-Way Battle

   • Rico's textual, historical, and common law challenges
   • Government's supervision, tradition, and policy defenses
   • Reply brief rebuttals and constitutional principles
   
   

   Oral Argument Preview

   • Key dynamics to watch on November 3rd
   • Justice personalities and criminal law philosophies
   • Practical implementation questions
   
   

   Broader Constitutional Stakes

   • Separation of powers implications
   • Impact on federal supervised release practice
   • Criminal law interpretation principles
   
   

   Episode Highlights

   "Time Stood Still" Myth Exposed

   Rico's case reveals that the popular assumption about fugitive time - that sentence clocks pause when defendants flee - has no basis in federal supervised release statutes.

   Congressional Intent Detective Work

   Detailed exploration of how Congress explicitly authorized fugitive tolling for parole in 1976 but deliberately omitted it when creating supervised release in 1984.

   Sentencing Consequences Breakdown

   Rico's violations jumped from 8-14 months to 33-36 months purely based on a judicial doctrine, demonstrating real-world impact of legal technicalities.

   Separation of Powers Tension

   The case crystallizes fundamental questions about whether courts can enhance criminal punishments that Congress hasn't explicitly authorized.

   Common Law Versus Statute Battle

   Government's claim of "ancient tradition" meets Rico's challenge: "Show me the cases" - revealing potential gaps in historical precedent.

   Rule of Lenity Application

   A canon providing that ambiguous criminal statutes should be interpreted in favor of defendants when Congress hasn't spoken clearly.

   Key Legal Concepts Explained

   • Supervised Release: Post-prison supervision distinct from parole
   • Fugitive Tolling: Judge-made doctrine extending sentence terms for absconders
   • Grade A vs. Grade C Violations: Sentencing classification system for supervised release breaches
   • Expressio Unius Canon: When Congress includes one thing, it excludes others
   • Common Law Incorporation: How historical legal principles enter modern statutes
   • Rule of Lenity: Constitutional principle favoring defendants in ambiguous criminal laws
   • Separation of Powers: Constitutional limits on judicial sentence enhancement authority
   
   ]]>Rico v. United States | Case No. 24-1234 | Oral Argument Date: 11/3/25 | Docket Link: Here

   Question Presented: Whether the fugitive-tolling doctrine applies in the context of supervised release.

   Overview

   This episode examines Rico v. United States, a Supreme Court case that challenges the boundaries between judicial power and congressional authority in criminal sentencing. The case asks whether federal courts can indefinitely extend supervised release terms for defendants who abscond, despite Congress never explicitly authorizing such extensions. Through Isabel Rico's story - a woman whose 42-month sentence ballooned to over 60 months due to a judge-made doctrine - the episode explores fundamental questions about separation of powers, statutory interpretation, and criminal justice fairness.

   Episode Roadmap

   Opening: From Hollywood Script to Constitutional Crisis

   • Fugitive imagery from popular culture versus legal reality
   • Isabel Rico's five-year disappearance and its consequences
   • The "time stands still" assumption challenged
   
   

   The Question and Key Statutory Text

   • Fugitive-tolling doctrine definition and application
   • 18 U.S.C. § 3624(e): Congress's one explicit tolling rule
   • Supervised release versus parole distinctions
   
   

   Rico's Story: Facts

   • 2010 drug conviction and original sentencing
   • 2017-2018 supervised release violations and abscondment
   • 2021-2022 state crimes during fugitive period
   
   

   Legal Arguments: Three-Way Battle

   • Rico's textual, historical, and common law challenges
   • Government's supervision, tradition, and policy defenses
   • Reply brief rebuttals and constitutional principles
   
   

   Oral Argument Preview

   • Key dynamics to watch on November 3rd
   • Justice personalities and criminal law philosophies
   • Practical implementation questions
   
   

   Broader Constitutional Stakes

   • Separation of powers implications
   • Impact on federal supervised release practice
   • Criminal law interpretation principles
   
   

   Episode Highlights

   "Time Stood Still" Myth Exposed

   Rico's case reveals that the popular assumption about fugitive time - that sentence clocks pause when defendants flee - has no basis in federal supervised release statutes.

   Congressional Intent Detective Work

   Detailed exploration of how Congress explicitly authorized fugitive tolling for parole in 1976 but deliberately omitted it when creating supervised release in 1984.

   Sentencing Consequences Breakdown

   Rico's violations jumped from 8-14 months to 33-36 months purely based on a judicial doctrine, demonstrating real-world impact of legal technicalities.

   Separation of Powers Tension

   The case crystallizes fundamental questions about whether courts can enhance criminal punishments that Congress hasn't explicitly authorized.

   Common Law Versus Statute Battle

   Government's claim of "ancient tradition" meets Rico's challenge: "Show me the cases" - revealing potential gaps in historical precedent.

   Rule of Lenity Application

   A canon providing that ambiguous criminal statutes should be interpreted in favor of defendants when Congress hasn't spoken clearly.

   Key Legal Concepts Explained

   • Supervised Release: Post-prison supervision distinct from parole
   • Fugitive Tolling: Judge-made doctrine extending sentence terms for absconders
   • Grade A vs. Grade C Violations: Sentencing classification system for supervised release breaches
   • Expressio Unius Canon: When Congress includes one thing, it excludes others
   • Common Law Incorporation: How historical legal principles enter modern statutes
   • Rule of Lenity: Constitutional principle favoring defendants in ambiguous criminal laws
   • Separation of Powers: Constitutional limits on judicial sentence enhancement authority
   
   ]]>1a04917c-a477-4170-aa56-7a5c9a67e03fTue, 28 Oct 2025 07:00:00 -040015:32falsefull202523232025Case Preview: Hencely v. Fluor | Battlefield Immunity Battle: When Contractors Breach and Soldiers BleedHencely v. Fluor | Case No. 24-924 | Docket Link: Here

   Question Presented: Should Boyle be extended to allow federal interests emanating from the FTCA's combatant-activities exception to preempt state tort claims against a government contractor for conduct that breached its contract and violated military orders?

   Overview

   This episode examines Hencely v. Fluor Corporation, a case that could dramatically reshape government contractor immunity law by determining whether the Supreme Court's narrow Boyle defense should be expanded to protect military contractors who breach their contracts and violate military orders during wartime operations.

   Episode Roadmap

   Opening: Constitutional Clash Over Contractor Accountability

   • Tragic 2016 terrorist attack at Bagram Airfield killing Army Staff Sergeant Ryan Hencely
   • Son's lawsuit against Fluor Corporation under South Carolina tort law
   • Core tension: contractor immunity versus accountability for contract violations
   
   

   The Factual Foundation

   • Afghan national Nayeb's attack facilitated by Fluor's supervision failures
   • Army investigation: Fluor's "lack of reasonable supervision" was "primary contributing factor"
   • Army Contracting Command finding: Fluor "indisputably did not comply with key contractual requirements"
   • Escort and supervision protocol violations despite clear contractual obligations
   
   

   The Legal Landscape: Boyle's Boundaries

   • 1988 Boyle decision: narrow three-part test for contractor immunity
   • Required contractor conformance to government specifications
   • Current case: contractor violated rather than followed government directions
   • Circuit split over extending Boyle beyond specification-following scenarios
   
   

   Procedural Journey Through the Courts

   • 2019 federal district court filing in South Carolina
   • Political question doctrine rejected - claims about "Fluor, not military decisions"
   • Summary judgment for Fluor based on "uniquely federal interests" preemption
   • Fourth Circuit affirmance despite acknowledging FTCA "does not apply to government contractors"
   • Judge Heytens partial dissent noting factual disputes over military "command authority"
   
   

   The Constitutional Question

   • FTCA combatant activities exception: governs suits against government, not contractors
   • Article I war powers versus state tort law authority
   • Supremacy Clause analysis: when does federal interest preempt state law?
   • Distinction between express congressional preemption and judicial policy-making
   
   

   Petitioner's Three-Pronged Attack

   • Statutory Argument: FTCA text addresses government suits, not contractor liability
   • Constitutional Argument: Boyle violates Supremacy Clause through "freewheeling judicial inquiry"
   • Factual Distinction: No immunity for contractors who breach contracts and violate orders
   
   

   Respondent's Constitutional Defense

   • War Powers: Exclusive federal authority over battlefield operations
   • FTCA Guidance: Combatant activities exception reflects congressional policy against battlefield tort liability
   • Broad Immunity: Preemption regardless of contractor compliance with government directions
   
   

   Government's Structural Argument

   • Constitutional war powers create "uniquely federal interests"
   • State tort regulation conflicts with exclusive federal battlefield control
   • Immunity applies "regardless of whether state-law tort claims challenge contractual violations or discretionary actions"
   
   

   Episode Highlights

   • The Boyle Distinction: Contrasting contractor immunity when following versus violating government orders
   • South Carolina Tort Claims: Negligent supervision, entrustment, control, and retention explained
   • Circuit Split Analysis: Different approaches to contractor immunity across federal courts
   • • Constitutional Stakes: Balance between contractor accountability and federal war powers
   • • Practical Implications: Impact on military contractor incentives and family legal recourse
   
   

   Referenced Cases

   • Boyle v. United Technologies Corp. (1988) | Established government contractor defense requiring: (1) precise government specifications, (2) contractor conformance, (3) danger warnings to government
   • Miree v. DeKalb County (1977) | Example of when contractor could comply with both state tort duties and federal contract obligations
   • Yearsley v. W.A. Ross Construction Co. (1940) | Early precedent protecting contractors who execute government directions
   
   ]]>Hencely v. Fluor | Case No. 24-924 | Docket Link: Here

   Question Presented: Should Boyle be extended to allow federal interests emanating from the FTCA's combatant-activities exception to preempt state tort claims against a government contractor for conduct that breached its contract and violated military orders?

   Overview

   This episode examines Hencely v. Fluor Corporation, a case that could dramatically reshape government contractor immunity law by determining whether the Supreme Court's narrow Boyle defense should be expanded to protect military contractors who breach their contracts and violate military orders during wartime operations.

   Episode Roadmap

   Opening: Constitutional Clash Over Contractor Accountability

   • Tragic 2016 terrorist attack at Bagram Airfield killing Army Staff Sergeant Ryan Hencely
   • Son's lawsuit against Fluor Corporation under South Carolina tort law
   • Core tension: contractor immunity versus accountability for contract violations
   
   

   The Factual Foundation

   • Afghan national Nayeb's attack facilitated by Fluor's supervision failures
   • Army investigation: Fluor's "lack of reasonable supervision" was "primary contributing factor"
   • Army Contracting Command finding: Fluor "indisputably did not comply with key contractual requirements"
   • Escort and supervision protocol violations despite clear contractual obligations
   
   

   The Legal Landscape: Boyle's Boundaries

   • 1988 Boyle decision: narrow three-part test for contractor immunity
   • Required contractor conformance to government specifications
   • Current case: contractor violated rather than followed government directions
   • Circuit split over extending Boyle beyond specification-following scenarios
   
   

   Procedural Journey Through the Courts

   • 2019 federal district court filing in South Carolina
   • Political question doctrine rejected - claims about "Fluor, not military decisions"
   • Summary judgment for Fluor based on "uniquely federal interests" preemption
   • Fourth Circuit affirmance despite acknowledging FTCA "does not apply to government contractors"
   • Judge Heytens partial dissent noting factual disputes over military "command authority"
   
   

   The Constitutional Question

   • FTCA combatant activities exception: governs suits against government, not contractors
   • Article I war powers versus state tort law authority
   • Supremacy Clause analysis: when does federal interest preempt state law?
   • Distinction between express congressional preemption and judicial policy-making
   
   

   Petitioner's Three-Pronged Attack

   • Statutory Argument: FTCA text addresses government suits, not contractor liability
   • Constitutional Argument: Boyle violates Supremacy Clause through "freewheeling judicial inquiry"
   • Factual Distinction: No immunity for contractors who breach contracts and violate orders
   
   

   Respondent's Constitutional Defense

   • War Powers: Exclusive federal authority over battlefield operations
   • FTCA Guidance: Combatant activities exception reflects congressional policy against battlefield tort liability
   • Broad Immunity: Preemption regardless of contractor compliance with government directions
   
   

   Government's Structural Argument

   • Constitutional war powers create "uniquely federal interests"
   • State tort regulation conflicts with exclusive federal battlefield control
   • Immunity applies "regardless of whether state-law tort claims challenge contractual violations or discretionary actions"
   
   

   Episode Highlights

   • The Boyle Distinction: Contrasting contractor immunity when following versus violating government orders
   • South Carolina Tort Claims: Negligent supervision, entrustment, control, and retention explained
   • Circuit Split Analysis: Different approaches to contractor immunity across federal courts
   • • Constitutional Stakes: Balance between contractor accountability and federal war powers
   • • Practical Implications: Impact on military contractor incentives and family legal recourse
   
   

   Referenced Cases

   • Boyle v. United Technologies Corp. (1988) | Established government contractor defense requiring: (1) precise government specifications, (2) contractor conformance, (3) danger warnings to government
   • Miree v. DeKalb County (1977) | Example of when contractor could comply with both state tort duties and federal contract obligations
   • Yearsley v. W.A. Ross Construction Co. (1940) | Early precedent protecting contractors who execute government directions
   
   ]]>6cc0e053-ae78-4b57-b682-69c53d67e1a9Mon, 27 Oct 2025 07:00:00 -040015:50falsefull202522222025Oral Argument: Case v. Montana | Case No. 24-624 | Oral Argument Date: 10/15/25Oral Argument: Case v. Montana | Case No. 24-624 | Oral Argument Date: 10/15/25

   Link to Docket: Here

   Case Preview: Here

   Question Presented: Whether law enforcement may enter a home without a search warrant based on less than probable cause that an emergency is occurring, or whether the emergency-aid exception requires probable cause.

   Oral Advocates:

   1. For Petitioner: Fred A. Rowley, Jr., Los Angeles
   2. For Respondent: Christian B. Corrigan, Solicitor General, Montana
   3. United States as Amicus Curiae: Zoe A. Jacoby, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice
   
   

   Holding: Brigham City’s objective reasonableness standard for warrantless home entries to render emergency aid applies without further gloss and was satisfied in this case.

   Result: Affirmed.

   Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Kagan delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Justices Sotomayor and Gorsuch filed concurring opinions.

   Link to Opinion: Here.

   Timestamps:

   [00:00:00] Episode Preview

   [00:00:50] Argument Begins

   [00:01:02] Petitioner Opening Statement

   [00:03:12] Petitioner Free for All Questions

   [00:27:25] Petitioner Sequential Questions

   [00:39:50] Respondent Opening Statement

   [00:41:41] Respondent Free for All Questions

   [00:55:44] Respondent Sequential Questions

   [01:00:52] United States as Amicus Curaie Opening Statement

   [01:02:01] United States as Amicus Curaie Free for All Questions

   [01:09:15] United States as Amicus Curaie Sequential Questions

   [01:10:40] Petitioner Rebuttal

   ]]>Oral Argument: Case v. Montana | Case No. 24-624 | Oral Argument Date: 10/15/25

   Link to Docket: Here

   Case Preview: Here

   Question Presented: Whether law enforcement may enter a home without a search warrant based on less than probable cause that an emergency is occurring, or whether the emergency-aid exception requires probable cause.

   Oral Advocates:

   1. For Petitioner: Fred A. Rowley, Jr., Los Angeles
   2. For Respondent: Christian B. Corrigan, Solicitor General, Montana
   3. United States as Amicus Curiae: Zoe A. Jacoby, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice
   
   

   Holding: Brigham City’s objective reasonableness standard for warrantless home entries to render emergency aid applies without further gloss and was satisfied in this case.

   Result: Affirmed.

   Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Kagan delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Justices Sotomayor and Gorsuch filed concurring opinions.

   Link to Opinion: Here.

   Timestamps:

   [00:00:00] Episode Preview

   [00:00:50] Argument Begins

   [00:01:02] Petitioner Opening Statement

   [00:03:12] Petitioner Free for All Questions

   [00:27:25] Petitioner Sequential Questions

   [00:39:50] Respondent Opening Statement

   [00:41:41] Respondent Free for All Questions

   [00:55:44] Respondent Sequential Questions

   [01:00:52] United States as Amicus Curaie Opening Statement

   [01:02:01] United States as Amicus Curaie Free for All Questions

   [01:09:15] United States as Amicus Curaie Sequential Questions

   [01:10:40] Petitioner Rebuttal

   ]]>10d8af02-a128-4f58-9573-edbd967aab68Wed, 15 Oct 2025 16:00:00 -040001:15:55falsefull202521212025Oral Argument: Louisiana v. Callais | Case No. 24-109 | Oral Argument Date: 10/15/25Oral Argument: Louisiana v. Callais | Case No. 24-109 | Oral Argument Date: 10/15/25

   Link to Docket: Here

   Consolidated with: Robinson v. Callais | Case No. 24-110 | Oral Argument Date: 10/15/25 | Docket Link: Here

   Case Preview: Here

   Background: Over the State's strenuous objections, the Middle District of Louisiana held, Robinson v. Ardoin , 605 F. Supp. 3d 759 (M.D. La. 2022)-and the Fifth Circuit affirmed, Robinson v. Ardoin , 86 F.4th 574 (5th Cir. 2023)-that Louisiana likely violated Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act (VRA) by failing to create a second majority-Black congressional district. The Fifth Circuit gave the Legislature a small window of time to adopt its own remedial plan, or else the State would have to go to trial, which would almost certainly end in the Middle District imposing its own preferred map.

   Rather than acquiesce in the Middle District's preferences, the Legislature reclaimed its sovereign redistricting pen and passed S.B. 8, which created a second majority-Black district as the courts demanded, protected the Legislature's sovereign prerogatives, and achieved its political goals. In this case, a majority of a three-judge court sitting in the Western District of Louisiana enjoined S.B. 8 as an unconstitutional racial gerrymander.

   Question Presented: Did the majority err in finding that race predominated in the Legislature's enactment of S.B. 8? Did the majority err in finding that S.B. 8 fails strict scrutiny? Did the majority err in subjecting S.B. 8 to the Gingles preconditions? Is this action non-justiciable?

   Oral Advocates:

   • For Petitioner Press Robinson: Janai Nelson, New York
   • For Petitioner Louisiana: J. Benjamin Aguiñaga, Solicitor General, Baton Rouge, Louisiana
   • For Appellees: Edward D. Greim, Kansas City, Missouri
   • For United States, as Amicus Curiae, in Support of Appellees: Hashim M. Mooppan, Principal Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice
   
   

   Link to Opinion: TBD.

   Website Link to Opinion Summary: TBD.

   Website Link to Oral Argument: TBD.

   Timestamps:

   [00:00:00] Argument Preview

   [00:01:00] Argument Begins

   [00:01:09] Appellant Press Robinson Opening Statement

   [00:03:32] Appellant Press Robinson Free for All Questions

   [00:26:15] Appellant Press Robinson Sequential Questions

   [00:47:32] Appellant Louisiana Opening Statement

   [00:49:02] Appellant Louisiana Free for All Questions

   [00:57:59]  Appellant Louisiana Sequential Questions

   [01:20:21] Callais Appellees Opening Statement

   [01:21:47] Callais Appellees Free for All Questions

   [01:31:11] Callais Appellees Sequential Questions

   [01:40:35] United States as Amicus Curaie Opening Statement

   [01:41:42]  United States as Amicus Curaie Free for All Questions

   [01:51:08] United States as Amicus Curaie Sequential Questions

   [02:25:32] Appellant Press Robinson Rebuttal

   ]]>Oral Argument: Louisiana v. Callais | Case No. 24-109 | Oral Argument Date: 10/15/25

   Link to Docket: Here

   Consolidated with: Robinson v. Callais | Case No. 24-110 | Oral Argument Date: 10/15/25 | Docket Link: Here

   Case Preview: Here

   Background: Over the State's strenuous objections, the Middle District of Louisiana held, Robinson v. Ardoin , 605 F. Supp. 3d 759 (M.D. La. 2022)-and the Fifth Circuit affirmed, Robinson v. Ardoin , 86 F.4th 574 (5th Cir. 2023)-that Louisiana likely violated Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act (VRA) by failing to create a second majority-Black congressional district. The Fifth Circuit gave the Legislature a small window of time to adopt its own remedial plan, or else the State would have to go to trial, which would almost certainly end in the Middle District imposing its own preferred map.

   Rather than acquiesce in the Middle District's preferences, the Legislature reclaimed its sovereign redistricting pen and passed S.B. 8, which created a second majority-Black district as the courts demanded, protected the Legislature's sovereign prerogatives, and achieved its political goals. In this case, a majority of a three-judge court sitting in the Western District of Louisiana enjoined S.B. 8 as an unconstitutional racial gerrymander.

   Question Presented: Did the majority err in finding that race predominated in the Legislature's enactment of S.B. 8? Did the majority err in finding that S.B. 8 fails strict scrutiny? Did the majority err in subjecting S.B. 8 to the Gingles preconditions? Is this action non-justiciable?

   Oral Advocates:

   • For Petitioner Press Robinson: Janai Nelson, New York
   • For Petitioner Louisiana: J. Benjamin Aguiñaga, Solicitor General, Baton Rouge, Louisiana
   • For Appellees: Edward D. Greim, Kansas City, Missouri
   • For United States, as Amicus Curiae, in Support of Appellees: Hashim M. Mooppan, Principal Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice
   
   

   Link to Opinion: TBD.

   Website Link to Opinion Summary: TBD.

   Website Link to Oral Argument: TBD.

   Timestamps:

   [00:00:00] Argument Preview

   [00:01:00] Argument Begins

   [00:01:09] Appellant Press Robinson Opening Statement

   [00:03:32] Appellant Press Robinson Free for All Questions

   [00:26:15] Appellant Press Robinson Sequential Questions

   [00:47:32] Appellant Louisiana Opening Statement

   [00:49:02] Appellant Louisiana Free for All Questions

   [00:57:59]  Appellant Louisiana Sequential Questions

   [01:20:21] Callais Appellees Opening Statement

   [01:21:47] Callais Appellees Free for All Questions

   [01:31:11] Callais Appellees Sequential Questions

   [01:40:35] United States as Amicus Curaie Opening Statement

   [01:41:42]  United States as Amicus Curaie Free for All Questions

   [01:51:08] United States as Amicus Curaie Sequential Questions

   [02:25:32] Appellant Press Robinson Rebuttal

   ]]>6015c3b6-1e91-4e2d-b3d9-8c01a52153ffWed, 15 Oct 2025 16:00:00 -040002:31:02falsefull202520202025Oral Argument: Ellingburg v. United States | Case No. 24-482 | Oral Argument Date: 10/14/25Oral Argument: Ellingburg v. United States | Case No. 24-482 | Oral Argument Date: 10/14/25

   Link to Docket: Here

   Case Preview: Here

   Question Presented: Whether criminal restitution under the Mandatory Victim Restitution Act (MVRA) is penal for purposes of the Ex Post Facto Clause.

   Oral Advocates:

   1. For Petitioner: Amy M. Saharia, Washington, D.C. argued for petitioner.
   2. For Respondent in Support of Vacatur: Ashley Robertson, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice argued for respondent in support of vacatur.
   3. For Court-Appointed Amicus Curiae in Support of Judgment Below: John F. Bash, Austin, Texas.
   
   

   Link to Opinion: TBD.

   Website Link to Opinion Summary: TBD.

   Website Link to Oral Argument: TBD.

   Timestamps:

   [00:00:00] Argument Preview

   [00:00:58] Argument Begins

   [00:01:06] Petitioner Opening Statement

   [00:03:14] Petitioner Free for All Questions

   [00:14:04] Petitioner Sequential Questions

   [00:18:36] Respondent in Support of Vacatur Opening Statement

   [00:19:45] Respondent in Support of Vacatur Free for All Questions

   [00:33:22] Respondent in Support of Vacatur Sequential Questions

   [00:34:41] For Court-Appointed Amicus Curiae in Support of Judgment Below Opening Statement

   [00:37:03] For Court-Appointed Amicus Curiae in Support of Judgment Below Free for All Questions

   [01:01:03] For Court-Appointed Amicus Curiae in Support of Judgment Below Sequential Questions

   [01:02:09] Petitioner Rebuttal

   ]]>Oral Argument: Ellingburg v. United States | Case No. 24-482 | Oral Argument Date: 10/14/25

   Link to Docket: Here

   Case Preview: Here

   Question Presented: Whether criminal restitution under the Mandatory Victim Restitution Act (MVRA) is penal for purposes of the Ex Post Facto Clause.

   Oral Advocates:

   1. For Petitioner: Amy M. Saharia, Washington, D.C. argued for petitioner.
   2. For Respondent in Support of Vacatur: Ashley Robertson, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice argued for respondent in support of vacatur.
   3. For Court-Appointed Amicus Curiae in Support of Judgment Below: John F. Bash, Austin, Texas.
   
   

   Link to Opinion: TBD.

   Website Link to Opinion Summary: TBD.

   Website Link to Oral Argument: TBD.

   Timestamps:

   [00:00:00] Argument Preview

   [00:00:58] Argument Begins

   [00:01:06] Petitioner Opening Statement

   [00:03:14] Petitioner Free for All Questions

   [00:14:04] Petitioner Sequential Questions

   [00:18:36] Respondent in Support of Vacatur Opening Statement

   [00:19:45] Respondent in Support of Vacatur Free for All Questions

   [00:33:22] Respondent in Support of Vacatur Sequential Questions

   [00:34:41] For Court-Appointed Amicus Curiae in Support of Judgment Below Opening Statement

   [00:37:03] For Court-Appointed Amicus Curiae in Support of Judgment Below Free for All Questions

   [01:01:03] For Court-Appointed Amicus Curiae in Support of Judgment Below Sequential Questions

   [01:02:09] Petitioner Rebuttal

   ]]>86be30b3-c15c-4857-80a8-18219d16a892Tue, 14 Oct 2025 14:15:00 -040001:04:54falsefull202518182025Oral Argument: Bowe v. United States | Case No. 24-5438 | Oral Argument Date: 10/14/25Oral Argument: Bowe v. United States | Case No. 24-5438 | Oral Argument Date: 10/14/25

   Link to Docket: Here

   Case Preview: Here

   Background: Under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(1), “[ a] claim presented in a second or successive habeas corpus application under section 2254 that was presented in a prior application shall be dismissed. ” (emphasis added).

   Question Presented:

   1. Whether 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(1) applies to a claim presented in a second or successive motion to vacate under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. * * * Under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(E), “[ t]he grant or denial of an authorization by a court of appeals to file a second or successive application shall not be appealable and shall not be the subject of a petition . . . for a writ of certiorari. ” (emphasis added).
   2. Whether 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(E) deprives this Court of certiorari jurisdiction over the grant or denial of an authorization by a court of appeals to file a second or successive motion to vacate under 28 U.S.C. § 2255.
   
   

   Oral Advocates:

   • For Petitioner: Andrew L. Adler, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Ft. Lauderdale, Florida.
   • For Respondent: Anthony A. Yang, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.
   • For Court-appointed amicus curiae in support of judgment below as to Question 1: Kasdin M. Mitchell, Dallas, Tex.
   
   

   Link to Opinion: TBD.

   Website Link to Opinion Summary: TBD.

   Website Link to Oral Argument: TBD.

   Timestamps:

   [00:00:00] Argument Preview

   [00:00:47] Argument Begins

   [00:00:55] Petitioner Opening Statement

   [00:02:46] Petitioner Free for All Questions

   [00:23:01] Petitioner Sequential Questions

   [00:36:49] Respondent Opening Statement

   [00:39:09] Respondent Free for All Questions

   [01:03:04] Respondent Sequential Questions

   [01:14:14] Court-Appointed Amicus Opening Statement

   [01:16:15]  Court-Appointed Amicus Free for All Questions

   [01:27:23]  Court-Appointed Amicus Sequential Questions

   [01:28:11] Petitioner Rebuttal

   ]]>Oral Argument: Bowe v. United States | Case No. 24-5438 | Oral Argument Date: 10/14/25

   Link to Docket: Here

   Case Preview: Here

   Background: Under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(1), “[ a] claim presented in a second or successive habeas corpus application under section 2254 that was presented in a prior application shall be dismissed. ” (emphasis added).

   Question Presented:

   1. Whether 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(1) applies to a claim presented in a second or successive motion to vacate under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. * * * Under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(E), “[ t]he grant or denial of an authorization by a court of appeals to file a second or successive application shall not be appealable and shall not be the subject of a petition . . . for a writ of certiorari. ” (emphasis added).
   2. Whether 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(E) deprives this Court of certiorari jurisdiction over the grant or denial of an authorization by a court of appeals to file a second or successive motion to vacate under 28 U.S.C. § 2255.
   
   

   Oral Advocates:

   • For Petitioner: Andrew L. Adler, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Ft. Lauderdale, Florida.
   • For Respondent: Anthony A. Yang, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.
   • For Court-appointed amicus curiae in support of judgment below as to Question 1: Kasdin M. Mitchell, Dallas, Tex.
   
   

   Link to Opinion: TBD.

   Website Link to Opinion Summary: TBD.

   Website Link to Oral Argument: TBD.

   Timestamps:

   [00:00:00] Argument Preview

   [00:00:47] Argument Begins

   [00:00:55] Petitioner Opening Statement

   [00:02:46] Petitioner Free for All Questions

   [00:23:01] Petitioner Sequential Questions

   [00:36:49] Respondent Opening Statement

   [00:39:09] Respondent Free for All Questions

   [01:03:04] Respondent Sequential Questions

   [01:14:14] Court-Appointed Amicus Opening Statement

   [01:16:15]  Court-Appointed Amicus Free for All Questions

   [01:27:23]  Court-Appointed Amicus Sequential Questions

   [01:28:11] Petitioner Rebuttal

   ]]>19647761-f55b-4516-ae6d-508edbe58797Tue, 14 Oct 2025 14:00:00 -040001:31:41falsefull202519192025Oral Argument: Postal Service v. Konan | Case No. 24-351 | Oral Argument Date: 10/8/25Oral Argument: Postal Service v. Konan | Case No. 24-351 | Oral Argument Date: 10/8/25

   Link to Docket: Here

   Case Preview: Here

   Background: The Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), ch. 753, 60 Stat. 842 (28 U.S.C. 1346(b), 2671 et seq .), generally waives the United States' sovereign immunity for suits seeking damages "for injury or loss of property, or personal injury or death caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission" of an employee of the federal government "under circumstances where the United States, if a private person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of the place where the act or omission occurred." 28 U.S.C. 1346(b)(1). The FTCA, however, excepts from that waiver of immunity "[a]ny claim arising out of the loss, miscarriage, or negligent transmission of letters or postal matter." 28 U.S.C. 2680(b).

   Question Presented: Whether a plaintiff's claim that she and her tenants did not receive mail because Postal Service employees intentionally did not deliver it to a designated address arises out of "the loss" or "miscarriage" of letters or postal matter. 28 U.S.C. 2680(b).

   Oral Advocates:

   • For Petitioner: Frederick Liu, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.
   • For Respondent: Easha Anand, Menlo Park, Ca.
   
   

   Link to Opinion: TBD.

   Website Link to Opinion Summary: TBD.

   Website Link to Oral Argument: TBD.

   Timestamps:

   ]]>Oral Argument: Postal Service v. Konan | Case No. 24-351 | Oral Argument Date: 10/8/25

   Link to Docket: Here

   Case Preview: Here

   Background: The Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), ch. 753, 60 Stat. 842 (28 U.S.C. 1346(b), 2671 et seq .), generally waives the United States' sovereign immunity for suits seeking damages "for injury or loss of property, or personal injury or death caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission" of an employee of the federal government "under circumstances where the United States, if a private person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of the place where the act or omission occurred." 28 U.S.C. 1346(b)(1). The FTCA, however, excepts from that waiver of immunity "[a]ny claim arising out of the loss, miscarriage, or negligent transmission of letters or postal matter." 28 U.S.C. 2680(b).

   Question Presented: Whether a plaintiff's claim that she and her tenants did not receive mail because Postal Service employees intentionally did not deliver it to a designated address arises out of "the loss" or "miscarriage" of letters or postal matter. 28 U.S.C. 2680(b).

   Oral Advocates:

   • For Petitioner: Frederick Liu, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.
   • For Respondent: Easha Anand, Menlo Park, Ca.
   
   

   Link to Opinion: TBD.

   Website Link to Opinion Summary: TBD.

   Website Link to Oral Argument: TBD.

   Timestamps:

   ]]>f8a4beae-27ff-4d22-a581-4be05b1e4ba5Wed, 08 Oct 2025 13:45:00 -040001:06:54falsefull202516162025Oral Argument: Chiles v. Salazar | Case No. 24-539 | Oral Argument Date: 10/7/25Oral Argument: Chiles v. Salazar | Case No. 24-539 | Oral Argument Date: 10/7/25

   Link to Docket: Here

   Case Preview: Here

   Question Presented: Whether a law that censors certain conversations between counselors and their clients based on the viewpoints expressed regulates conduct or violates the Free Speech Clause.

   Oral Advocates:

   • For Petitioner: James A. Campbell, Lansdowne, Va.
   • For United States as Amicus Curiae: Hashim M. Mooppan, Principal Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.
   • For Respondent: Shannon W. Stevenson, Colorado Solicitor General
   
   

   Link to Opinion: TBD.

   Website Link to Opinion Summary: TBD.

   Website Link to Oral Argument: TBD.

   Timestamps:

   [00:00:00] Case Preview

   [00:00:50] Argument Begins

   [00:00:57] Petitioner Opening Statement

   [00:02:46] Petitioner Free for All Questions

   [00:17:59] Petitioner Sequential Questions

   [00:27:48] United States Opening Statement

   [00:35:27] United States Sequential Questions

   [00:45:41] Respondent Opening Statement

   [01:09:00] Respondent Sequential Questions

   [01:22:28] Petitioner Rebuttal

   ]]>Oral Argument: Chiles v. Salazar | Case No. 24-539 | Oral Argument Date: 10/7/25

   Link to Docket: Here

   Case Preview: Here

   Question Presented: Whether a law that censors certain conversations between counselors and their clients based on the viewpoints expressed regulates conduct or violates the Free Speech Clause.

   Oral Advocates:

   • For Petitioner: James A. Campbell, Lansdowne, Va.
   • For United States as Amicus Curiae: Hashim M. Mooppan, Principal Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.
   • For Respondent: Shannon W. Stevenson, Colorado Solicitor General
   
   

   Link to Opinion: TBD.

   Website Link to Opinion Summary: TBD.

   Website Link to Oral Argument: TBD.

   Timestamps:

   [00:00:00] Case Preview

   [00:00:50] Argument Begins

   [00:00:57] Petitioner Opening Statement

   [00:02:46] Petitioner Free for All Questions

   [00:17:59] Petitioner Sequential Questions

   [00:27:48] United States Opening Statement

   [00:35:27] United States Sequential Questions

   [00:45:41] Respondent Opening Statement

   [01:09:00] Respondent Sequential Questions

   [01:22:28] Petitioner Rebuttal

   ]]>b97a2efc-5894-4c71-87ef-dc1efb1c8785Tue, 07 Oct 2025 14:00:00 -040001:25:35falsefull202514142025Oral Argument: Barrett v. United States | Case No. 24-5774 | Oral Argument Date: 10/7/25Oral Argument: Barrett v. United States | Case No. 24-5774 | Oral Argument Date: 10/7/25

   Link to Docket: Here

   Case Preview: Here

   Question Presented:

   1. Whether the Double Jeopardy Clause permits two sentences for an act that violates 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) and§ 924(j), a question that divides seven circuits but about which the Solicitor General and Petitioner agree.
   2. Whether "Hobbs Act robbery qualifies as a crime of violence under §924(c) (3)(A), a question left open after" United States v. Taylor , 596 U.S. 845 (2022). United States v. Stoney , 62 F.4th 108, 113 (3d Cir. 2023).
   
   

   Oral Advocates:

   • For Petitioner: Matthew B. Larsen, Assistant Federal Defender, New York, N. Y.
   • For Respondent in Support of Petitioner: Aimee Brown, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.
   • For Court-Appointed Amicus Curiae in Support of Judgment Below: Charles L. McCloud, Washington, D.C.
   
   

   Link to Opinion: TBD.

   Website Link to Opinion Summary: TBD.

   Website Link to Oral Argument: TBD.

   Timestamps:

   [00:00:00] Case Preview

   [00:01:00] Argument Begins

   [00:01:07] Petitioner Opening Statement

   [00:02:51] Petitioner Free for All Questions

   [00:14:24] Petitioner Sequential Questions

   [00:30:00] United States Opening Statement

   [00:31:10] United States Free for All Questions

   [00:41:24] United States Sequential Questions

   [00:45:49] Court-Appointed Amicus Opening Statement

   [00:47:41] Court-Appointed Amicus Free for All Questions

   [01:00:45] Court-Appointed Amicus Sequential Questions

   [01:00:57] Petitioner Rebuttal

   ]]>Oral Argument: Barrett v. United States | Case No. 24-5774 | Oral Argument Date: 10/7/25

   Link to Docket: Here

   Case Preview: Here

   Question Presented:

   1. Whether the Double Jeopardy Clause permits two sentences for an act that violates 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) and§ 924(j), a question that divides seven circuits but about which the Solicitor General and Petitioner agree.
   2. Whether "Hobbs Act robbery qualifies as a crime of violence under §924(c) (3)(A), a question left open after" United States v. Taylor , 596 U.S. 845 (2022). United States v. Stoney , 62 F.4th 108, 113 (3d Cir. 2023).
   
   

   Oral Advocates:

   • For Petitioner: Matthew B. Larsen, Assistant Federal Defender, New York, N. Y.
   • For Respondent in Support of Petitioner: Aimee Brown, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.
   • For Court-Appointed Amicus Curiae in Support of Judgment Below: Charles L. McCloud, Washington, D.C.
   
   

   Link to Opinion: TBD.

   Website Link to Opinion Summary: TBD.

   Website Link to Oral Argument: TBD.

   Timestamps:

   [00:00:00] Case Preview

   [00:01:00] Argument Begins

   [00:01:07] Petitioner Opening Statement

   [00:02:51] Petitioner Free for All Questions

   [00:14:24] Petitioner Sequential Questions

   [00:30:00] United States Opening Statement

   [00:31:10] United States Free for All Questions

   [00:41:24] United States Sequential Questions

   [00:45:49] Court-Appointed Amicus Opening Statement

   [00:47:41] Court-Appointed Amicus Free for All Questions

   [01:00:45] Court-Appointed Amicus Sequential Questions

   [01:00:57] Petitioner Rebuttal

   ]]>56486fff-c84f-40dd-8b1d-5d9e9f9ff1b7Tue, 07 Oct 2025 02:15:00 -040001:01:54falsefull202515152025Oral Argument: Berk v. Choy | Case No. 24-440 | Oral Argument Date: 10/6/25Oral Argument: Berk v. Choy | Case No. 24-440 | Oral Argument Date: 10/6/25

   Link to Docket: Here

   Episode Preview: Here

   Background:

   Question Presented: Whether a state law providing that a complaint must be dismissed unless it is accompanied by an expert affidavit may be applied in federal court.

   Oral Advocates:

   • For Petitioner: Andrew T. Tutt, Washington, D.C.
   • For Respondent: Frederick R. Yarger, Denver, CO.
   
   

   Link to Opinion: TBD.

   Website Link to Opinion Summary: TBD.

   Website Link to Oral Argument: TBD.

   Timestamps:

   [00:00:00] Argument Intro

   [00:00:33] Argument Begins

   [00:00:39] Petitioner Opening Statement

   [00:02:57] Petitioner Free for All Questions

   [00:25:46] Petitioner Sequential Questions

   [00:31:36] Respondent Opening Statement

   [00:33:52] Respondent Free For All Questions

   [00:59:19] Respondent Sequential Questions

   [01:00:05] Petitioner Rebuttal

   ]]>Oral Argument: Berk v. Choy | Case No. 24-440 | Oral Argument Date: 10/6/25

   Link to Docket: Here

   Episode Preview: Here

   Background:

   Question Presented: Whether a state law providing that a complaint must be dismissed unless it is accompanied by an expert affidavit may be applied in federal court.

   Oral Advocates:

   • For Petitioner: Andrew T. Tutt, Washington, D.C.
   • For Respondent: Frederick R. Yarger, Denver, CO.
   
   

   Link to Opinion: TBD.

   Website Link to Opinion Summary: TBD.

   Website Link to Oral Argument: TBD.

   Timestamps:

   [00:00:00] Argument Intro

   [00:00:33] Argument Begins

   [00:00:39] Petitioner Opening Statement

   [00:02:57] Petitioner Free for All Questions

   [00:25:46] Petitioner Sequential Questions

   [00:31:36] Respondent Opening Statement

   [00:33:52] Respondent Free For All Questions

   [00:59:19] Respondent Sequential Questions

   [01:00:05] Petitioner Rebuttal

   ]]>6c508bfe-45a5-4095-add8-5ed69530b02dMon, 06 Oct 2025 14:15:00 -040001:04:15falsefull202512122025Oral Argument: Villarreal v. Texas | Case No. 24-557 | Oral Argument Date: 10/6/25Oral Argument: Villarreal v. Texas | Case No. 24-557 | Oral Argument Date: 10/6/25

   Link to Docket: Here

   Preview Episode: Here

   Question Presented: Whether a trial court abridges the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel by prohibiting the defendant and his counsel from discussing the defendant's testimony during an overnight recess.

   Oral Advocates:

   • For Petitioner: Stuart Banner, Los Angeles, Cal.
   • For Respondent: Andrew N. Warthen, Assistant Criminal District Attorney, San Antonio, Tex.; and Kevin J. Barber, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C. (for United States, as amicus curiae.)
   
   

   Timestamps

   Table of Contents

   [00:00:00] Episode Intro

   [00:00:41] Argument Begins

   [00:00:48] Petitioner Opening Statement

   [00:25:46] Petitioner Sequential Questions

   [00:40:29] Respondent Opening Statement

   [01:02:00] Respondent Sequential Questions

   [01:02:38] United States Opening Statement

   [01:13:14] United States Sequential Questions

   [01:16:15] Petitioner Rebuttal

   ]]>Oral Argument: Villarreal v. Texas | Case No. 24-557 | Oral Argument Date: 10/6/25

   Link to Docket: Here

   Preview Episode: Here

   Question Presented: Whether a trial court abridges the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel by prohibiting the defendant and his counsel from discussing the defendant's testimony during an overnight recess.

   Oral Advocates:

   • For Petitioner: Stuart Banner, Los Angeles, Cal.
   • For Respondent: Andrew N. Warthen, Assistant Criminal District Attorney, San Antonio, Tex.; and Kevin J. Barber, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C. (for United States, as amicus curiae.)
   
   

   Timestamps

   Table of Contents

   [00:00:00] Episode Intro

   [00:00:41] Argument Begins

   [00:00:48] Petitioner Opening Statement

   [00:25:46] Petitioner Sequential Questions

   [00:40:29] Respondent Opening Statement

   [01:02:00] Respondent Sequential Questions

   [01:02:38] United States Opening Statement

   [01:13:14] United States Sequential Questions

   [01:16:15] Petitioner Rebuttal

   ]]>319c632b-0633-4b06-8b78-a4ab7604668cMon, 06 Oct 2025 13:30:00 -040001:17:55falsefull202513132025Oral Argument: Bost v. Illinois State Bd. of Elections | Case No. 24-568 | Oral Argument Date: 10/8/25Oral Argument: Bost v. Illinois State Bd. of Elections | Case No. 24-568 | Oral Argument Date: 10/8/25

   Link to Docket: Here

   Case Preview: https://scotus-oral-arguments.captivate.fm/episode/upcoming-oral-argument-bost-v-illinois-ballot-box-bout-when-can-candidates-challenge-election-rules/

   Background: Federal law sets the first Tuesday after the first Monday in November as the federal Election Day. 2 U.S.C. §§ 1 and 7; and 3 U.S.C. § 1. Several states, including Illinois, have enacted state laws that allow ballots to be received and counted after Election Day. Petitioners contend these state laws are preempted under the Elections and Electors Clauses. Petitioners sued to enjoin Illinois' law allowing ballots to be received up to fourteen days after Election Day.

   Question Presented: Whether Petitioners, as federal candidates, have pleaded sufficient factual allegations to show Article III standing to challenge state time, place, and manner regulations concerning their federal elections.

   Oral Advocates:

   1. For Petitioner: Paul D. Clement, Alexandria, Va.;
   2. United States, as Amicus Curiae: Michael Talent, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.
   3. For Respondent: Jane E. Notz, Solicitor General, Chicago, Ill.
   
   

   Link to Opinion: Here.

   Holding: As a candidate for office, Congressman Bost holds standing to challenge the laws that govern the counting of votes in his election.

   Result: Reversed and remanded.

   Voting Breakdown: 7-2. Chief Justice Roberts delivered the opinion of the Court in which Justices Alito, Thomas, Gorsuch, and Kavanaugh joined. Justice Barrett filed an opinion concurring in the judgment in which Justice Kagan joined. Justice Jackson filed a dissenting opinion in which Justice Sotomayor joined.

   ]]>Oral Argument: Bost v. Illinois State Bd. of Elections | Case No. 24-568 | Oral Argument Date: 10/8/25

   Link to Docket: Here

   Case Preview: https://scotus-oral-arguments.captivate.fm/episode/upcoming-oral-argument-bost-v-illinois-ballot-box-bout-when-can-candidates-challenge-election-rules/

   Background: Federal law sets the first Tuesday after the first Monday in November as the federal Election Day. 2 U.S.C. §§ 1 and 7; and 3 U.S.C. § 1. Several states, including Illinois, have enacted state laws that allow ballots to be received and counted after Election Day. Petitioners contend these state laws are preempted under the Elections and Electors Clauses. Petitioners sued to enjoin Illinois' law allowing ballots to be received up to fourteen days after Election Day.

   Question Presented: Whether Petitioners, as federal candidates, have pleaded sufficient factual allegations to show Article III standing to challenge state time, place, and manner regulations concerning their federal elections.

   Oral Advocates:

   1. For Petitioner: Paul D. Clement, Alexandria, Va.;
   2. United States, as Amicus Curiae: Michael Talent, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.
   3. For Respondent: Jane E. Notz, Solicitor General, Chicago, Ill.
   
   

   Link to Opinion: Here.

   Holding: As a candidate for office, Congressman Bost holds standing to challenge the laws that govern the counting of votes in his election.

   Result: Reversed and remanded.

   Voting Breakdown: 7-2. Chief Justice Roberts delivered the opinion of the Court in which Justices Alito, Thomas, Gorsuch, and Kavanaugh joined. Justice Barrett filed an opinion concurring in the judgment in which Justice Kagan joined. Justice Jackson filed a dissenting opinion in which Justice Sotomayor joined.

   ]]>c759357a-7232-47f6-803b-2ad33e09afccMon, 06 Oct 2025 12:45:00 -040001:43:43falsefull202517172025Upcoming Case Preview | Louisiana v. Callais | Redistricting Reckoning: The Race to Refine Race, Representation, and Voting RightsLouisiana v. Callais | Case No. 24-109 | Oral Argument Date: 10/15/25 | Docket Link: Here

   Question Presented: Whether the State's intentional creation of a second majority-minority congressional district violates the Fourteenth or Fifteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution.

   Other Referenced Episodes:

   • August 19th – Road Work Ahead: How Four 2024 Cases May Be Reshaping First Amendment Scrutiny | Here

   Overview

   This episode examines Louisiana v. Callais, a potentially transformative voting rights case that could reshape Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act and minority representation nationwide. After ordering reargument and supplemental briefing, the Supreme Court confronts whether race-conscious redistricting to create majority-minority districts violates the very constitutional amendments the VRA was designed to enforce, creating a fundamental paradox at the intersection of civil rights law and equal protection doctrine.

   Episode Roadmap

   Opening: A Constitutional Paradox

   • Supreme Court's unusual reargument order and supplemental question

   • From routine redistricting challenge to existential VRA question

   • Constitutional paradox: using civil rights laws to potentially strike down civil rights protections

   Constitutional Framework: The Reconstruction Amendments

   • Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendment enforcement clauses

   • Congressional power versus Equal Protection constraints

   • Strict scrutiny as constitutional roadblock for race-conscious government action

   Background: From Robinson to Callais

   • 2022 Robinson v. Ardoin litigation establishing Section 2 violation

   • Complex procedural ping-pong through federal courts

   • Louisiana's creation of SB8-6 with second majority-Black district

   • March 2025 oral argument leading to reargument order

   Section 2 Framework: The Gingles Test

   • Effects test versus intent requirement

   • Three-part analysis for Section 2 violations

   • Majority-minority districts as remedial tool

   Legal Arguments: Competing Constitutional Visions

   Appellants' Defense (Louisiana & Robinson Intervenors):

   • Congressional authority under Reconstruction Amendments

   • Section 2 compliance as compelling governmental interest

   • Narrow tailoring through built-in Gingles limitations

   Appellees' Challenge (Callais):

   • Section 2 fails congruence and proportionality review

   • Students for Fair Admissions requires specific discrimination evidence

   • "Good reasons" test provides insufficient constitutional protection

   Oral Argument Preview: Key Questions for Reargument

   • Temporal scope of congressional enforcement power

   • SFFA's impact on voting rights doctrine

   • Practical consequences for existing majority-minority districts

   • Federalism tensions in electoral oversight

   Episode Highlights

   Constitutional Tension: The same Reconstruction Amendments used to justify the VRA in 1965 now being invoked to potentially strike it down in 2025

   Procedural Drama: Court's unusual reargument order signals fundamental doctrinal questions about VRA's constitutional foundations

   Practical Stakes: Could eliminate dozens of majority-minority congressional districts and significantly reduce minority representation

   Historical Evolution: From 1982 Section 2 effects test designed to combat discrimination to 2025 argument that it perpetuates discrimination

   SFFA Integration: How 2023 affirmative action ruling's anti-classification principle applies to political representation

   Evidence Battle: Whether current Louisiana record contains sufficient proof of ongoing intentional discrimination to justify race-conscious remedies

   Referenced Cases

   Students for Fair Admissions v. Harvard | 600 U.S. 181 (2023)

   • Question Presented: Whether universities may use race as a factor in student admissions decisions
   • Arguments: Established anti-classification principle requiring specific evidence of discrimination before race-conscious government action; appellees argue this standard should apply to voting rights and eliminate Section 2's effects test
   
   

   Miller v. Johnson | 515 U.S. 900 (1995)

   • Question Presented: Whether Georgia's congressional redistricting plan violated Equal Protection by using race as predominant factor
   • Arguments: Warned that VRA's command for race-based districting "brings the Act into tension with the Fourteenth Amendment"; central to appellees' argument that this tension has only worsened over decades
   
   

   Shaw v. Hunt | 517 U.S. 899 (1996)

   • Question Presented: Whether North Carolina's race-conscious redistricting plan satisfied strict scrutiny
   • Arguments: Established "good reasons" test allowing states to consider race if they have strong basis in evidence for believing VRA compliance required; appellees attack this as insufficient constitutional protection
   
   

   City of Boerne v. Flores | 521 U.S. 507 (1997) | Docket Link: Here

   • Question Presented: Whether Religious Freedom Restoration Act exceeded Congress's enforcement powers under Fourteenth Amendment
   • Arguments: Established congruence and proportionality test requiring congressional remedies be proportional to constitutional violations; appellees argue Section 2 fails this test due to lack of current discrimination findings
   
   

   Thornburg v. Gingles | 478 U.S. 30 (1986)

   • Question Presented: What standards govern Section 2 vote dilution claims
   • Arguments: Created three-part test for Section 2 violations requiring minority political cohesion, majority bloc voting, and geographic compactness; appellants argue these requirements provide adequate constitutional constraints
   
   

   Allen v. Milligan | 599 U.S. 1 (2023) | Docket Link: Here

   • Question Presented: Whether Alabama's congressional map violated Section 2 by diluting Black voting strength
   • Arguments: Reaffirmed Section 2's continued vitality but left constitutional questions unresolved; Alabama's immediate non-compliance cited by appellants as evidence ongoing discrimination requires continued VRA protection
   
   

   Shelby County v. Holder | 570 U.S. 529 (2013)

   • Question Presented: Whether Section 4's coverage formula for Section 5 preclearance violates Equal Protection
   • Arguments: Struck down VRA preclearance based on outdated congressional findings; appellees argue similar logic should apply to Section 2's effects test lacking current discrimination evidence
   
   ]]>Louisiana v. Callais | Case No. 24-109 | Oral Argument Date: 10/15/25 | Docket Link: Here

   Question Presented: Whether the State's intentional creation of a second majority-minority congressional district violates the Fourteenth or Fifteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution.

   Other Referenced Episodes:

   • August 19th – Road Work Ahead: How Four 2024 Cases May Be Reshaping First Amendment Scrutiny | Here

   Overview

   This episode examines Louisiana v. Callais, a potentially transformative voting rights case that could reshape Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act and minority representation nationwide. After ordering reargument and supplemental briefing, the Supreme Court confronts whether race-conscious redistricting to create majority-minority districts violates the very constitutional amendments the VRA was designed to enforce, creating a fundamental paradox at the intersection of civil rights law and equal protection doctrine.

   Episode Roadmap

   Opening: A Constitutional Paradox

   • Supreme Court's unusual reargument order and supplemental question

   • From routine redistricting challenge to existential VRA question

   • Constitutional paradox: using civil rights laws to potentially strike down civil rights protections

   Constitutional Framework: The Reconstruction Amendments

   • Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendment enforcement clauses

   • Congressional power versus Equal Protection constraints

   • Strict scrutiny as constitutional roadblock for race-conscious government action

   Background: From Robinson to Callais

   • 2022 Robinson v. Ardoin litigation establishing Section 2 violation

   • Complex procedural ping-pong through federal courts

   • Louisiana's creation of SB8-6 with second majority-Black district

   • March 2025 oral argument leading to reargument order

   Section 2 Framework: The Gingles Test

   • Effects test versus intent requirement

   • Three-part analysis for Section 2 violations

   • Majority-minority districts as remedial tool

   Legal Arguments: Competing Constitutional Visions

   Appellants' Defense (Louisiana & Robinson Intervenors):

   • Congressional authority under Reconstruction Amendments

   • Section 2 compliance as compelling governmental interest

   • Narrow tailoring through built-in Gingles limitations

   Appellees' Challenge (Callais):

   • Section 2 fails congruence and proportionality review

   • Students for Fair Admissions requires specific discrimination evidence

   • "Good reasons" test provides insufficient constitutional protection

   Oral Argument Preview: Key Questions for Reargument

   • Temporal scope of congressional enforcement power

   • SFFA's impact on voting rights doctrine

   • Practical consequences for existing majority-minority districts

   • Federalism tensions in electoral oversight

   Episode Highlights

   Constitutional Tension: The same Reconstruction Amendments used to justify the VRA in 1965 now being invoked to potentially strike it down in 2025

   Procedural Drama: Court's unusual reargument order signals fundamental doctrinal questions about VRA's constitutional foundations

   Practical Stakes: Could eliminate dozens of majority-minority congressional districts and significantly reduce minority representation

   Historical Evolution: From 1982 Section 2 effects test designed to combat discrimination to 2025 argument that it perpetuates discrimination

   SFFA Integration: How 2023 affirmative action ruling's anti-classification principle applies to political representation

   Evidence Battle: Whether current Louisiana record contains sufficient proof of ongoing intentional discrimination to justify race-conscious remedies

   Referenced Cases

   Students for Fair Admissions v. Harvard | 600 U.S. 181 (2023)

   • Question Presented: Whether universities may use race as a factor in student admissions decisions
   • Arguments: Established anti-classification principle requiring specific evidence of discrimination before race-conscious government action; appellees argue this standard should apply to voting rights and eliminate Section 2's effects test
   
   

   Miller v. Johnson | 515 U.S. 900 (1995)

   • Question Presented: Whether Georgia's congressional redistricting plan violated Equal Protection by using race as predominant factor
   • Arguments: Warned that VRA's command for race-based districting "brings the Act into tension with the Fourteenth Amendment"; central to appellees' argument that this tension has only worsened over decades
   
   

   Shaw v. Hunt | 517 U.S. 899 (1996)

   • Question Presented: Whether North Carolina's race-conscious redistricting plan satisfied strict scrutiny
   • Arguments: Established "good reasons" test allowing states to consider race if they have strong basis in evidence for believing VRA compliance required; appellees attack this as insufficient constitutional protection
   
   

   City of Boerne v. Flores | 521 U.S. 507 (1997) | Docket Link: Here

   • Question Presented: Whether Religious Freedom Restoration Act exceeded Congress's enforcement powers under Fourteenth Amendment
   • Arguments: Established congruence and proportionality test requiring congressional remedies be proportional to constitutional violations; appellees argue Section 2 fails this test due to lack of current discrimination findings
   
   

   Thornburg v. Gingles | 478 U.S. 30 (1986)

   • Question Presented: What standards govern Section 2 vote dilution claims
   • Arguments: Created three-part test for Section 2 violations requiring minority political cohesion, majority bloc voting, and geographic compactness; appellants argue these requirements provide adequate constitutional constraints
   
   

   Allen v. Milligan | 599 U.S. 1 (2023) | Docket Link: Here

   • Question Presented: Whether Alabama's congressional map violated Section 2 by diluting Black voting strength
   • Arguments: Reaffirmed Section 2's continued vitality but left constitutional questions unresolved; Alabama's immediate non-compliance cited by appellants as evidence ongoing discrimination requires continued VRA protection
   
   

   Shelby County v. Holder | 570 U.S. 529 (2013)

   • Question Presented: Whether Section 4's coverage formula for Section 5 preclearance violates Equal Protection
   • Arguments: Struck down VRA preclearance based on outdated congressional findings; appellees argue similar logic should apply to Section 2's effects test lacking current discrimination evidence
   
   ]]>5d5f235c-eb75-4022-81b1-adc8626ed4c0Fri, 03 Oct 2025 09:00:00 -040019:53falsefull202511112025Upcoming Case Preview | Case v. Montana | Warrantless Welfare Checks: When Can Cops Enter to your Castle Without Cause?Case v. Montana | Case No. 24-624 | Oral Argument Date: 10/15/25 | Docket Link: Here

   Question Presented: Whether law enforcement may enter a home without a search warrant based on less than probable cause that an emergency is occurring, or whether the emergency-aid exception requires probable cause.

   Other Referenced Episodes:

   • August 5th Roundup: Presidential Power Crushes Agency Independence, Court Places Voting Rights Act in Crosshairs and Maryland v. Shatzer, a Case That Evolved Beyond Its Origins | Here
   
   

   Overview

   This episode examines Case v. Montana, a Fourth Amendment case that has drawn unprecedented attention with 35 states weighing in, challenging the established emergency-aid exception by asking the Supreme Court to require probable cause rather than the current "objectively reasonable belief" standard for warrantless home entries during emergencies. The case could fundamentally reshape how police respond to suicide calls, medical emergencies, and welfare checks nationwide.

   Episode Roadmap

   Opening: Unprecedented Stakes and Attention

   • October 15th, 2025 oral argument date
   • 35 states weighing in, with 34 opposing the petitioner's position
   • Potential nationwide impact on emergency response procedures
   • Novel aspect: Petitioner seeking to restrict, not expand, police authority
   
   

   Constitutional Framework: The Fourth Amendment Text

   • "The right of the people to be secure... against unreasonable searches and seizures"
   • Two-clause structure: Reasonableness Clause vs. Warrant Clause
   • No textual emergency-aid exception - entirely judge-made doctrine
   • Court's recent skepticism toward expansive judge-made constitutional doctrines
   
   

   Background: The Tragic Facts in Anaconda, Montana

   • September 2021: William Trevor Case's suicide threat to ex-girlfriend J.H.
   • Escalating call: drinking, gun cocking sounds, "pop" followed by dead air
   • J.H.'s 9-1-1 call reporting believed suicide attempt
   • Officers' prior knowledge of Case's history with suicide attempts and violence
   
   

   The Police Response and Corroborating Evidence

   • 18-minute preparation period with protective equipment
   • Window observations: keys on table, empty beer cans, empty gun holster, apparent suicide note
   • Entry through unlocked door during protective sweep
   • Case emerges from closet pointing handgun at Sergeant Pasha
   • Officer shoots Case in abdomen; medical aid rendered
   
   

   Procedural History: The Court Journey

   • Trial court denies suppression motion, finds "exigent circumstance"
   • Case convicted of assaulting peace officer, sentenced to 60 years
   • Montana Supreme Court affirms 4-3 with vigorous dissent
   • Supreme Court grants certiorari to resolve deep circuit split
   
   

   The Circuit Split Crisis

   "Reasonable Belief" Courts:

   • First, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits plus Montana and three other states
   • Standard: "Objective, specific and articulable facts from which an experienced officer would suspect citizen needs help"
   
   

   "Probable Cause" Courts:

   • D.C., Second, and Eleventh Circuits plus Nebraska and Colorado
   • Standard: "Probable cause to believe person is seriously injured or threatened with such injury"
   
   

   Case's Three Main Arguments (Seeking Higher Standard)

   Argument 1: Historical Originalism

   • Common law required "more than probable cause, not less" for warrantless home entries
   • Only allowed entries to stop "affrays" that officers personally witnessed
   • Framers expected higher standard than current practice
   
   

   Argument 2: Fourth Amendment's Core Purpose

   • Chief purpose: "restrain discretionary government searches of the home"
   • Lower standards invite pretextual searches and abuse
   • Homes deserve highest level of Fourth Amendment protection
   
   

   Argument 3: Universal Probable Cause Requirement

   • Probable cause was "general safeguard against all unreasonable searches"
   • Should apply to all government intrusions, not just criminal investigations
   • Framers viewed probable cause as "vital safeguard against unfounded searches"
   
   

   Montana's Three Main Arguments (Defending Current Standard)

   Argument 1: Constitutional Structure and Reasonableness Standard

   • Fourth Amendment's two-clause structure allows independent operation
   • Reasonableness, not probable cause, is ultimate constitutional touchstone
   • Historical practice: officers liable for trespass unless jury found action "reasonable"
   • Extensive common law permitted warrantless entries for various purposes including "saving life"
   
   

   Argument 2: Probable Cause Would Eliminate Emergency-Aid Exception

   • "Criminality inheres in the concept of probable cause" - rooted in criminal investigations
   • Officers cannot develop probable cause when no crime has occurred
   • Emergency situations (suicide, medical emergencies, welfare checks) typically involve no criminal activity
   • Would create deadly consequences: homes become "place where citizens who need urgent medical help died alone and in agony"
   
   

   Argument 3: Officers' Actions Were Objectively Reasonable

   • Detailed 9-1-1 call from identified person with personal knowledge
   • Multiple corroborating observations: vehicle, empty holster, apparent suicide note
   • Officers took exactly the investigative steps the Constitution should require
   • Even under heightened standard, facts here would satisfy constitutional requirements
   
   

   Key Precedents in Battle

   Brigham City v. Stuart (2006)

   • Established current "objectively reasonable basis for believing" standard
   • Officers may enter without warrant when occupant needs emergency aid
   • No mention of probable cause requirement for emergency-aid entries
   
   

   Michigan v. Fisher (2009)

   • Reaffirmed Brigham City's "objectively reasonable" standard
   • Rejected repeated requests to adopt probable cause or reasonable suspicion standards
   
   

   Caniglia v. Strom (2021)

   • Rejected broad community caretaking authority but preserved emergency aid exception
   • Justice Kavanaugh noted need for Court to clarify "contours of exigent circumstances doctrine"
   • Distinguished between community caretaking functions and actual exigencies
   
   

   Lange v. California (2021)

   • Emphasized exigent circumstances require only "objectively reasonable" belief
   • No probable cause requirement for exigencies themselves
   
   

   Constitutional Stakes and Broader Implications

   If Case Wins (Probable Cause Required):

   • Could eliminate effective emergency response in non-criminal situations
   • Would require much higher certainty before officers can help people in crisis
   • Particularly impacts rural areas where police are first responders
   • Creates potential constitutional barrier to life-saving interventions
   
   

   If Montana Wins (Reasonable Belief Preserved):

   • Maintains current emergency response capabilities
   • Preserves established Brigham City doctrine from 2006
   • Could potentially enable broader police entries with limited oversight
   • Keeps focus on reasonableness rather than rigid probable cause requirement
   
   

   Cultural and Legal Tensions

   • Privacy rights versus public safety needs
   • Judicial restraint versus practical emergency response
   • Individual autonomy versus community protection
   • Textual interpretation versus judge-made doctrine
   
   

   Looking Ahead to October 15th Oral Arguments

   • How justices handle circuit split requiring national resolution
   • Practical consequences: workability of probable cause in emergencies
   • Historical disputes about common law and Framers' intent
   • Court's approach to relatively recent Brigham City precedent (2006)
   • Impact of Court's recent skepticism toward broad judge-made exceptions
   
   

   Key Legal Concepts Explained

   • Emergency-aid exception to warrant requirement
   • Objectively reasonable belief standard vs. probable cause
   • Fourth Amendment's Reasonableness Clause vs. Warrant Clause
   • Circuit splits and Supreme Court resolution function
   • Exigent circumstances doctrine
   • Judge-made constitutional exceptions
   • Constitutional balancing tests
   
   

   
   

   ]]>Case v. Montana | Case No. 24-624 | Oral Argument Date: 10/15/25 | Docket Link: Here

   Question Presented: Whether law enforcement may enter a home without a search warrant based on less than probable cause that an emergency is occurring, or whether the emergency-aid exception requires probable cause.

   Other Referenced Episodes:

   • August 5th Roundup: Presidential Power Crushes Agency Independence, Court Places Voting Rights Act in Crosshairs and Maryland v. Shatzer, a Case That Evolved Beyond Its Origins | Here
   
   

   Overview

   This episode examines Case v. Montana, a Fourth Amendment case that has drawn unprecedented attention with 35 states weighing in, challenging the established emergency-aid exception by asking the Supreme Court to require probable cause rather than the current "objectively reasonable belief" standard for warrantless home entries during emergencies. The case could fundamentally reshape how police respond to suicide calls, medical emergencies, and welfare checks nationwide.

   Episode Roadmap

   Opening: Unprecedented Stakes and Attention

   • October 15th, 2025 oral argument date
   • 35 states weighing in, with 34 opposing the petitioner's position
   • Potential nationwide impact on emergency response procedures
   • Novel aspect: Petitioner seeking to restrict, not expand, police authority
   
   

   Constitutional Framework: The Fourth Amendment Text

   • "The right of the people to be secure... against unreasonable searches and seizures"
   • Two-clause structure: Reasonableness Clause vs. Warrant Clause
   • No textual emergency-aid exception - entirely judge-made doctrine
   • Court's recent skepticism toward expansive judge-made constitutional doctrines
   
   

   Background: The Tragic Facts in Anaconda, Montana

   • September 2021: William Trevor Case's suicide threat to ex-girlfriend J.H.
   • Escalating call: drinking, gun cocking sounds, "pop" followed by dead air
   • J.H.'s 9-1-1 call reporting believed suicide attempt
   • Officers' prior knowledge of Case's history with suicide attempts and violence
   
   

   The Police Response and Corroborating Evidence

   • 18-minute preparation period with protective equipment
   • Window observations: keys on table, empty beer cans, empty gun holster, apparent suicide note
   • Entry through unlocked door during protective sweep
   • Case emerges from closet pointing handgun at Sergeant Pasha
   • Officer shoots Case in abdomen; medical aid rendered
   
   

   Procedural History: The Court Journey

   • Trial court denies suppression motion, finds "exigent circumstance"
   • Case convicted of assaulting peace officer, sentenced to 60 years
   • Montana Supreme Court affirms 4-3 with vigorous dissent
   • Supreme Court grants certiorari to resolve deep circuit split
   
   

   The Circuit Split Crisis

   "Reasonable Belief" Courts:

   • First, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits plus Montana and three other states
   • Standard: "Objective, specific and articulable facts from which an experienced officer would suspect citizen needs help"
   
   

   "Probable Cause" Courts:

   • D.C., Second, and Eleventh Circuits plus Nebraska and Colorado
   • Standard: "Probable cause to believe person is seriously injured or threatened with such injury"
   
   

   Case's Three Main Arguments (Seeking Higher Standard)

   Argument 1: Historical Originalism

   • Common law required "more than probable cause, not less" for warrantless home entries
   • Only allowed entries to stop "affrays" that officers personally witnessed
   • Framers expected higher standard than current practice
   
   

   Argument 2: Fourth Amendment's Core Purpose

   • Chief purpose: "restrain discretionary government searches of the home"
   • Lower standards invite pretextual searches and abuse
   • Homes deserve highest level of Fourth Amendment protection
   
   

   Argument 3: Universal Probable Cause Requirement

   • Probable cause was "general safeguard against all unreasonable searches"
   • Should apply to all government intrusions, not just criminal investigations
   • Framers viewed probable cause as "vital safeguard against unfounded searches"
   
   

   Montana's Three Main Arguments (Defending Current Standard)

   Argument 1: Constitutional Structure and Reasonableness Standard

   • Fourth Amendment's two-clause structure allows independent operation
   • Reasonableness, not probable cause, is ultimate constitutional touchstone
   • Historical practice: officers liable for trespass unless jury found action "reasonable"
   • Extensive common law permitted warrantless entries for various purposes including "saving life"
   
   

   Argument 2: Probable Cause Would Eliminate Emergency-Aid Exception

   • "Criminality inheres in the concept of probable cause" - rooted in criminal investigations
   • Officers cannot develop probable cause when no crime has occurred
   • Emergency situations (suicide, medical emergencies, welfare checks) typically involve no criminal activity
   • Would create deadly consequences: homes become "place where citizens who need urgent medical help died alone and in agony"
   
   

   Argument 3: Officers' Actions Were Objectively Reasonable

   • Detailed 9-1-1 call from identified person with personal knowledge
   • Multiple corroborating observations: vehicle, empty holster, apparent suicide note
   • Officers took exactly the investigative steps the Constitution should require
   • Even under heightened standard, facts here would satisfy constitutional requirements
   
   

   Key Precedents in Battle

   Brigham City v. Stuart (2006)

   • Established current "objectively reasonable basis for believing" standard
   • Officers may enter without warrant when occupant needs emergency aid
   • No mention of probable cause requirement for emergency-aid entries
   
   

   Michigan v. Fisher (2009)

   • Reaffirmed Brigham City's "objectively reasonable" standard
   • Rejected repeated requests to adopt probable cause or reasonable suspicion standards
   
   

   Caniglia v. Strom (2021)

   • Rejected broad community caretaking authority but preserved emergency aid exception
   • Justice Kavanaugh noted need for Court to clarify "contours of exigent circumstances doctrine"
   • Distinguished between community caretaking functions and actual exigencies
   
   

   Lange v. California (2021)

   • Emphasized exigent circumstances require only "objectively reasonable" belief
   • No probable cause requirement for exigencies themselves
   
   

   Constitutional Stakes and Broader Implications

   If Case Wins (Probable Cause Required):

   • Could eliminate effective emergency response in non-criminal situations
   • Would require much higher certainty before officers can help people in crisis
   • Particularly impacts rural areas where police are first responders
   • Creates potential constitutional barrier to life-saving interventions
   
   

   If Montana Wins (Reasonable Belief Preserved):

   • Maintains current emergency response capabilities
   • Preserves established Brigham City doctrine from 2006
   • Could potentially enable broader police entries with limited oversight
   • Keeps focus on reasonableness rather than rigid probable cause requirement
   
   

   Cultural and Legal Tensions

   • Privacy rights versus public safety needs
   • Judicial restraint versus practical emergency response
   • Individual autonomy versus community protection
   • Textual interpretation versus judge-made doctrine
   
   

   Looking Ahead to October 15th Oral Arguments

   • How justices handle circuit split requiring national resolution
   • Practical consequences: workability of probable cause in emergencies
   • Historical disputes about common law and Framers' intent
   • Court's approach to relatively recent Brigham City precedent (2006)
   • Impact of Court's recent skepticism toward broad judge-made exceptions
   
   

   Key Legal Concepts Explained

   • Emergency-aid exception to warrant requirement
   • Objectively reasonable belief standard vs. probable cause
   • Fourth Amendment's Reasonableness Clause vs. Warrant Clause
   • Circuit splits and Supreme Court resolution function
   • Exigent circumstances doctrine
   • Judge-made constitutional exceptions
   • Constitutional balancing tests
   
   

   
   

   ]]>00c598d6-309b-426e-9515-0e9d4a82b3c6Thu, 02 Oct 2025 09:00:00 -040018:53falsefull202510102025Upcoming Case Preview | Bowe v. United States | The Do-Over Dilemma: Federal Prisoners and the Jurisdiction TrapBowe v. United States | Case No. 24-5438 | Oral Argument Date: 10/14/25 | Docket Link: Here

   Questions Presented:

   1. Whether 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(1) applies to a claim presented in a second or successive motion to vacate under 28 U.S.C. § 2255.
   2. Whether 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(E) deprives this Court of certiorari jurisdiction over the grant or denial of an authorization by a court of appeals to file a second or successive motion to vacate under 28 U.S.C. § 2255.
   
   

   Overview

   This episode examines Bowe v. United States, where the government concedes error but argues the Supreme Court lacks jurisdiction to correct it. The case explores whether the "do-over bar" in AEDPA applies to federal prisoners and whether an acknowledged legal error will go unremedied due to jurisdictional barriers.

   Episode Roadmap

   Opening: An Acknowledged Error Without a Remedy

   • Government's unusual position: conceding error but claiming the Court can't fix it
   • Michael Bowe's years-long struggle to challenge his conviction
   • Constitutional context: Ex Post Facto Clause and retroactive application of Davis and Taylor
   
   

   The Two Questions Presented

   Question One: Does the do-over bar (§ 2244(b)(1)) apply to federal prisoners even though it references only state prisoner applications under § 2254?

   Question Two: Does § 2244(b)(3)(E) bar Supreme Court certiorari review of authorization decisions for federal prisoners?

   Background: Michael Bowe's Journey

   • 2008: Pled guilty including Section 924(c) conviction (using firearm during crime of violence)
   • 2019: Davis strikes down residual clause; Bowe seeks authorization but Eleventh Circuit denies based on circuit precedent
   • 2022: Taylor abrogates that precedent; Bowe seeks authorization again
   • 2022: Eleventh Circuit dismisses under do-over bar in In re Baptiste
   • 2024: Third authorization request denied; all alternatives rejected
   • 2025: Supreme Court grants certiorari; government switches position
   
   

   Legal Framework

   Section 2255: Federal prisoner post-conviction relief vehicle

   Section 2244: Originally for state prisoners; contains:

   • (b)(1): Do-over bar—bars claims "presented in a second or successive habeas corpus application under section 2254"
   • (b)(3): Authorization procedures, including (b)(3)(E)'s certiorari bar
   
   

   Section 2255(h): "Second or successive motion must be certified as provided in section 2244"—key question is what this incorporates

   Circuit Split: Six circuits apply do-over bar to federal prisoners; three reject it

   Petitioner's Main Arguments

   Argument One: Plain Text Excludes Federal Prisoners

   • Do-over bar explicitly references "section 2254" (state prisoners only)
   • Federal prisoners use § 2255 motions, not § 2254 applications
   • Section 2255(h) incorporates certification procedures only, not substantive bars
   • Even Eleventh Circuit admits § 2255(h) doesn't incorporate § 2244(b)(2)—can't incorporate (b)(1) either since both use identical "section 2254" language
   
   

   Argument Two: Federalism Explains Differential Treatment

   • AEDPA repeatedly subjects state prisoners to stricter requirements
   • State prisoner habeas implicates federalism and comity concerns
   • Federal prisoners challenging federal convictions raise no federalism issues
   • Do-over bar fits pattern of protecting state sovereignty, not restricting federal prisoner access
   
   

   Argument Three: Court Has Jurisdiction

   • No clear statement stripping jurisdiction for federal prisoners
   • Eleventh Circuit "dismissed" rather than "denied"—certiorari bar covers only "grant or denial"
   • No actual authorization determination made; court applied wrong legal standard
   • Constitutional avoidance: barring all review raises Exceptions Clause concerns
   • Circuit split needs resolution; federal prisoners lack alternative Supreme Court access unlike state prisoners
   
   

   Respondent's Main Arguments

   Argument One: Certiorari Bar Applies

   • Section 2255(h) comprehensively incorporates § 2244(b)(3) as integrated whole
   • All five subparagraphs use "authorization" language
   • Castro implicitly recognized incorporation
   • Cannot separate certiorari bar from rehearing bar
   
   

   Argument Two: "Dismissal" Is "Denial"

   • Plain meaning: "deny" means "refuse to grant"
   • Binary framework: must "grant or deny" within 30 days—no third category
   • Courts frequently style identical dispositions as "denials"
   • Accepting distinction would create arbitrary geographic lottery
   • Court acted on authorization request; applying wrong standard doesn't remove it from "authorization" category
   
   

   Argument Three: No Constitutional Problem

   • Common law provided no right to habeas appeal or successive attacks
   • Felker rejected Exceptions Clause challenge for state prisoners
   • Alternative mechanisms exist: certification, All Writs Act, potential district court review
   • Bowe's claim is statutory (not constitutional), so doesn't satisfy § 2255(h)(2) anyway
   • Preexisting doctrines (Sanders, law of case) prevent abuse without statutory bar
   
   

   Key Points for Oral Arguments

   • Justice reactions to government conceding error but claiming no remedy
   • Practical consequences if do-over bar doesn't apply—floodgates or manageable?
   • Whether ensuring circuit uniformity is "essential" Supreme Court jurisdiction
   • Formalism of "dismissal" versus "denial" distinction
   • Federalism pattern throughout AEDPA's structure
   • What happens to thousands of potentially affected prisoners in six circuits?
   
   

   Broader Implications

   • Immediate impact on hundreds or thousands of federal prisoners
   • Geographic lottery based on circuit precedent
   • Statutory interpretation of AEDPA's cross-references and incorporation provisions
   • Jurisdictional doctrine: clear statement rule and constitutional limits on jurisdiction-stripping
   • Access to justice: when procedural barriers prevent meritorious claims
   • Separation of powers: congressional authority to limit Supreme Court review
   
   ]]>Bowe v. United States | Case No. 24-5438 | Oral Argument Date: 10/14/25 | Docket Link: Here

   Questions Presented:

   1. Whether 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(1) applies to a claim presented in a second or successive motion to vacate under 28 U.S.C. § 2255.
   2. Whether 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(E) deprives this Court of certiorari jurisdiction over the grant or denial of an authorization by a court of appeals to file a second or successive motion to vacate under 28 U.S.C. § 2255.
   
   

   Overview

   This episode examines Bowe v. United States, where the government concedes error but argues the Supreme Court lacks jurisdiction to correct it. The case explores whether the "do-over bar" in AEDPA applies to federal prisoners and whether an acknowledged legal error will go unremedied due to jurisdictional barriers.

   Episode Roadmap

   Opening: An Acknowledged Error Without a Remedy

   • Government's unusual position: conceding error but claiming the Court can't fix it
   • Michael Bowe's years-long struggle to challenge his conviction
   • Constitutional context: Ex Post Facto Clause and retroactive application of Davis and Taylor
   
   

   The Two Questions Presented

   Question One: Does the do-over bar (§ 2244(b)(1)) apply to federal prisoners even though it references only state prisoner applications under § 2254?

   Question Two: Does § 2244(b)(3)(E) bar Supreme Court certiorari review of authorization decisions for federal prisoners?

   Background: Michael Bowe's Journey

   • 2008: Pled guilty including Section 924(c) conviction (using firearm during crime of violence)
   • 2019: Davis strikes down residual clause; Bowe seeks authorization but Eleventh Circuit denies based on circuit precedent
   • 2022: Taylor abrogates that precedent; Bowe seeks authorization again
   • 2022: Eleventh Circuit dismisses under do-over bar in In re Baptiste
   • 2024: Third authorization request denied; all alternatives rejected
   • 2025: Supreme Court grants certiorari; government switches position
   
   

   Legal Framework

   Section 2255: Federal prisoner post-conviction relief vehicle

   Section 2244: Originally for state prisoners; contains:

   • (b)(1): Do-over bar—bars claims "presented in a second or successive habeas corpus application under section 2254"
   • (b)(3): Authorization procedures, including (b)(3)(E)'s certiorari bar
   
   

   Section 2255(h): "Second or successive motion must be certified as provided in section 2244"—key question is what this incorporates

   Circuit Split: Six circuits apply do-over bar to federal prisoners; three reject it

   Petitioner's Main Arguments

   Argument One: Plain Text Excludes Federal Prisoners

   • Do-over bar explicitly references "section 2254" (state prisoners only)
   • Federal prisoners use § 2255 motions, not § 2254 applications
   • Section 2255(h) incorporates certification procedures only, not substantive bars
   • Even Eleventh Circuit admits § 2255(h) doesn't incorporate § 2244(b)(2)—can't incorporate (b)(1) either since both use identical "section 2254" language
   
   

   Argument Two: Federalism Explains Differential Treatment

   • AEDPA repeatedly subjects state prisoners to stricter requirements
   • State prisoner habeas implicates federalism and comity concerns
   • Federal prisoners challenging federal convictions raise no federalism issues
   • Do-over bar fits pattern of protecting state sovereignty, not restricting federal prisoner access
   
   

   Argument Three: Court Has Jurisdiction

   • No clear statement stripping jurisdiction for federal prisoners
   • Eleventh Circuit "dismissed" rather than "denied"—certiorari bar covers only "grant or denial"
   • No actual authorization determination made; court applied wrong legal standard
   • Constitutional avoidance: barring all review raises Exceptions Clause concerns
   • Circuit split needs resolution; federal prisoners lack alternative Supreme Court access unlike state prisoners
   
   

   Respondent's Main Arguments

   Argument One: Certiorari Bar Applies

   • Section 2255(h) comprehensively incorporates § 2244(b)(3) as integrated whole
   • All five subparagraphs use "authorization" language
   • Castro implicitly recognized incorporation
   • Cannot separate certiorari bar from rehearing bar
   
   

   Argument Two: "Dismissal" Is "Denial"

   • Plain meaning: "deny" means "refuse to grant"
   • Binary framework: must "grant or deny" within 30 days—no third category
   • Courts frequently style identical dispositions as "denials"
   • Accepting distinction would create arbitrary geographic lottery
   • Court acted on authorization request; applying wrong standard doesn't remove it from "authorization" category
   
   

   Argument Three: No Constitutional Problem

   • Common law provided no right to habeas appeal or successive attacks
   • Felker rejected Exceptions Clause challenge for state prisoners
   • Alternative mechanisms exist: certification, All Writs Act, potential district court review
   • Bowe's claim is statutory (not constitutional), so doesn't satisfy § 2255(h)(2) anyway
   • Preexisting doctrines (Sanders, law of case) prevent abuse without statutory bar
   
   

   Key Points for Oral Arguments

   • Justice reactions to government conceding error but claiming no remedy
   • Practical consequences if do-over bar doesn't apply—floodgates or manageable?
   • Whether ensuring circuit uniformity is "essential" Supreme Court jurisdiction
   • Formalism of "dismissal" versus "denial" distinction
   • Federalism pattern throughout AEDPA's structure
   • What happens to thousands of potentially affected prisoners in six circuits?
   
   

   Broader Implications

   • Immediate impact on hundreds or thousands of federal prisoners
   • Geographic lottery based on circuit precedent
   • Statutory interpretation of AEDPA's cross-references and incorporation provisions
   • Jurisdictional doctrine: clear statement rule and constitutional limits on jurisdiction-stripping
   • Access to justice: when procedural barriers prevent meritorious claims
   • Separation of powers: congressional authority to limit Supreme Court review
   
   ]]>a4b9904a-3d7d-460b-a99d-4224efcf3c2dWed, 01 Oct 2025 09:00:00 -040024:29falsefull2025992025Upcoming Case Preview | Ellingburg v. United States | The Restitution Riddle: When Does Compensation Become Punishment?Ellingburg v. United States | Case No. 24-482 | Docket Link: Here

   Question Presented: Whether criminal restitution under the Mandatory Victim Restitution Act (MVRA) is penal for purposes of the Ex Post Facto Clause.

   Overview

   This episode examines Ellingburg v. United States, one of the most procedurally unusual Supreme Court cases in recent memory. After the Court granted certiorari, the government switched positions following a change in presidential Administration, now agreeing with the criminal defendant that the Eighth Circuit erred. The Court appointed an outside attorney as amicus curiae to defend the lower court's judgment, creating a rare scenario where both named parties argue for the same outcome. At its core, the case asks whether mandatory criminal restitution constitutes punishment subject to the Constitution's Ex Post Facto Clause—a question with profound implications for thousands of federal defendants and the government's authority to retroactively enforce criminal restitution obligations.

   Episode Roadmap

   Opening: A Procedural Rarity

   • Government switches sides after Administration change
   • Court appoints amicus curiae to defend Eighth Circuit's judgment
   • Unusual three-way legal battle over fundamental constitutional question
   • Implications for thousands convicted of federal crimes before 1996
   
   

   Background: Ellingburg's Story

   • 1995: Holsey Ellingburg, Jr. robs bank in St. Louis, Missouri
   • 1996: Sentenced to 322 months imprisonment, ordered to pay $7,567 restitution under pre-MVRA law (VWPA)
   • Under original law, restitution obligation expired November 2016 (20-year limit)
   • 2022: Released from prison, rebuilding life on minimum wage
   • 2023: Government demands $13,476 using MVRA's extended collection period and mandatory interest
   • Pro se motion challenges retroactive application as Ex Post Facto violation
   
   

   The Central Legal Question

   • Is MVRA restitution criminal punishment or civil remedy?
   • If criminal: Ex Post Facto Clause prohibits retroactive application
   • If civil: Government can apply new collection rules to old offenses
   • Statutory construction as threshold issue: What did Congress intend?
   
   

   Procedural Journey Through the Courts

   • District Court: Denied motion, held MVRA application merely "procedural"
   • Eighth Circuit: Affirmed on different ground—restitution is civil remedy, not criminal punishment
   • Circuit relied on Carruth precedent despite Pasquantino and Paroline developments
   • Two concurring judges questioned binding precedent's continued validity
   • Supreme Court grants certiorari to resolve circuit split
   
   

   Constitutional Framework: The Ex Post Facto Clause

   • Article I, Section 9, Clause 3: "No ex post facto Law shall be passed"
   • Prohibits retroactively increasing punishment for criminal acts
   • Only applies to criminal laws, not civil remedies
   • Constitutional protection against arbitrary government power
   
   

   The Statutory Text Battle

   • Section 3663A: Restitution ordered "when sentencing a defendant convicted of an offense"
   • "In addition to, or in lieu of, any other penalty authorized by law"
   • Codification in Title 18 criminal code, Chapter 227 "Sentences"
   • Criminal procedures govern: presentence reports, probation officers, appellate review
   • Enforcement through threat of imprisonment for nonpayment
   
   

   Petitioner's Three Main Arguments

   Argument 1: Text and Structure Prove Criminal Intent

   • Statutory language integrates restitution into criminal sentencing
   • Grouped with fines and imprisonment as penalties
   • Criminal procedures from start to finish
   • Codified in "Sentences" chapter alongside other criminal punishments
   • Section 3556 requires courts imposing sentences to order restitution
   
   

   Argument 2: Enforcement Through Criminal Punishment and Express Penal Purpose

   • Backed by threat of imprisonment—"paradigmatic affirmative disability"
   • Nonpayment can result in revocation of probation/supervised release
   • Resentencing possible without new indictment, prosecution, or conviction
   • Section 3614(b)(2) explicitly references "purposes of punishment and deterrence"
   • Congress included "to the extent constitutionally permissible" language showing Ex Post Facto concerns
   
   

   Argument 3: Precedent and Historical Understanding

   • Pasquantino: Purpose is "to mete out appropriate criminal punishment"
   • Paroline: Restitution "serves punitive purposes" and has "penological purposes"
   • Kelly v. Robinson: State restitution is "criminal sanction" and "penal sanction"
   • Courts of appeals uniformly treated VWPA restitution as criminal for Seventh Amendment purposes
   • Government's own historical position: Solicitor General directed non-retroactive application in 1998
   
   

   Government's Arguments (Supporting Petitioner/Vacatur)

   Argument 1: Statutory Construction Demonstrates Criminal Nature

   • Question is "principally a question of statutory construction" (Kansas v. Hendricks)
   • Text and structure integrate restitution into defendant's criminal sentence
   • Codification in "Sentencing" provisions alongside imprisonment and fines
   • Procedural mechanisms mirror other criminal penalties
   • Probation officers, presentence reports, criminal appellate review
   
   

   Argument 2: Precedent Supports Criminal Characterization

   • Pre-MVRA courts uniformly held VWPA restitution was criminal penalty
   • Kelly: Criminal restitution has "deterrent effect" and serves "effective rehabilitation penalty"
   • Pasquantino: Would be "passing strange" to apply only tort law model to criminal restitution
   • Paroline: Restitution "imposed by the Government at the culmination of a criminal proceeding"
   • Majority of circuits recognize Ex Post Facto Clause applies to MVRA restitution
   
   

   Argument 3: Alternative Ground for Affirmance Exists

   • Eighth Circuit erred by ignoring statutory text and structure
   • But alternative ground available: extending collection period may not increase punishment
   • Original debt amount ($7,567.25) unchanged by MVRA amendments
   • "Time horizon" for collection arguably not separate punishment
   • Requests vacatur and remand for court of appeals to consider alternative ground
   
   

   Court-Appointed Amicus's Arguments (Defending Eighth Circuit)

   Argument 1: No "Conclusive Evidence" of Punitive Intent

   • Mendoza-Martinez requires "unmistakable penal intent" and "overwhelming indications"
   • Clear statement requirement grounded in separation of powers
   • Congress didn't use "criminal restitution" label
   • Mandatory structure eliminates judicial discretion typical of criminal sentencing
   • Courts cannot consider defendant's culpability, economic circumstances, or penological goals
   • Payment goes to victims, not government as prosecuting sovereign
   • Victims can enforce like civil creditors with liens and collection procedures
   
   

   Argument 2: Not Punitive Under Mendoza-Martinez Factors

   • Traditional civil restitution focuses on victim's losses, not defendant's gain
   • No "affirmative disability or restraint" from restitution itself
   • Consequences of nonpayment don't make underlying obligation punitive
   • Criminal conviction required to serve nonpunitive purpose (victim compensation)
   • Doesn't implicate traditional punishment aims—courts barred from considering deterrence/retribution
   • Award capped at victim's loss, offset by civil judgments
   • Substantial nonpunitive purpose (compensation) without excess
   
   

   Argument 3: Petition Improvidently Granted

   • Question asks about "restitution under the MVRA"
   • But Ellingburg's restitution imposed under pre-MVRA VWPA
   • Only MVRA's collection period and interest provisions applied retroactively
   • Answering MVRA question would be advisory opinion
   • Ex Post Facto analysis requires examining VWPA restitution's nature, not MVRA's
   • Parties failed to disclose this threshold issue in briefing
   
   

   The Legal Frameworks Explained

   Kansas v. Hendricks / Smith v. Doe Framework

   • Whether penalty is criminal "is principally a question of statutory construction"
   • Courts must ascertain whether legislature meant to establish criminal or civil proceedings
   • If legislature intended punishment, inquiry ends and Ex Post Facto Clause applies
   • Focus on legislative intent through statute's text and structure
   
   

   Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez Two-Step Test

   • Step One: Is there "conclusive evidence" of congressional punitive intent?
   • If not conclusive, Step Two: Seven-factor analysis of whether "so punitive" as to be criminal
   
   

   Broader Implications

   If Petitioner/Government Prevail:

   • Thousands of pre-1996 defendants may have expired restitution obligations
   • MVRA restitution subject to other criminal constitutional protections
   • Potential Excessive Fines Clause applications
   • Limits on retroactive enforcement of criminal restitution
   • Confirmation of decades of circuit...]]>Ellingburg v. United States | Case No. 24-482 | Docket Link: Here

     Question Presented: Whether criminal restitution under the Mandatory Victim Restitution Act (MVRA) is penal for purposes of the Ex Post Facto Clause.

     Overview

     This episode examines Ellingburg v. United States, one of the most procedurally unusual Supreme Court cases in recent memory. After the Court granted certiorari, the government switched positions following a change in presidential Administration, now agreeing with the criminal defendant that the Eighth Circuit erred. The Court appointed an outside attorney as amicus curiae to defend the lower court's judgment, creating a rare scenario where both named parties argue for the same outcome. At its core, the case asks whether mandatory criminal restitution constitutes punishment subject to the Constitution's Ex Post Facto Clause—a question with profound implications for thousands of federal defendants and the government's authority to retroactively enforce criminal restitution obligations.

     Episode Roadmap

     Opening: A Procedural Rarity

     • Government switches sides after Administration change
     • Court appoints amicus curiae to defend Eighth Circuit's judgment
     • Unusual three-way legal battle over fundamental constitutional question
     • Implications for thousands convicted of federal crimes before 1996
     
     

     Background: Ellingburg's Story

     • 1995: Holsey Ellingburg, Jr. robs bank in St. Louis, Missouri
     • 1996: Sentenced to 322 months imprisonment, ordered to pay $7,567 restitution under pre-MVRA law (VWPA)
     • Under original law, restitution obligation expired November 2016 (20-year limit)
     • 2022: Released from prison, rebuilding life on minimum wage
     • 2023: Government demands $13,476 using MVRA's extended collection period and mandatory interest
     • Pro se motion challenges retroactive application as Ex Post Facto violation
     
     

     The Central Legal Question

     • Is MVRA restitution criminal punishment or civil remedy?
     • If criminal: Ex Post Facto Clause prohibits retroactive application
     • If civil: Government can apply new collection rules to old offenses
     • Statutory construction as threshold issue: What did Congress intend?
     
     

     Procedural Journey Through the Courts

     • District Court: Denied motion, held MVRA application merely "procedural"
     • Eighth Circuit: Affirmed on different ground—restitution is civil remedy, not criminal punishment
     • Circuit relied on Carruth precedent despite Pasquantino and Paroline developments
     • Two concurring judges questioned binding precedent's continued validity
     • Supreme Court grants certiorari to resolve circuit split
     
     

     Constitutional Framework: The Ex Post Facto Clause

     • Article I, Section 9, Clause 3: "No ex post facto Law shall be passed"
     • Prohibits retroactively increasing punishment for criminal acts
     • Only applies to criminal laws, not civil remedies
     • Constitutional protection against arbitrary government power
     
     

     The Statutory Text Battle

     • Section 3663A: Restitution ordered "when sentencing a defendant convicted of an offense"
     • "In addition to, or in lieu of, any other penalty authorized by law"
     • Codification in Title 18 criminal code, Chapter 227 "Sentences"
     • Criminal procedures govern: presentence reports, probation officers, appellate review
     • Enforcement through threat of imprisonment for nonpayment
     
     

     Petitioner's Three Main Arguments

     Argument 1: Text and Structure Prove Criminal Intent

     • Statutory language integrates restitution into criminal sentencing
     • Grouped with fines and imprisonment as penalties
     • Criminal procedures from start to finish
     • Codified in "Sentences" chapter alongside other criminal punishments
     • Section 3556 requires courts imposing sentences to order restitution
     
     

     Argument 2: Enforcement Through Criminal Punishment and Express Penal Purpose

     • Backed by threat of imprisonment—"paradigmatic affirmative disability"
     • Nonpayment can result in revocation of probation/supervised release
     • Resentencing possible without new indictment, prosecution, or conviction
     • Section 3614(b)(2) explicitly references "purposes of punishment and deterrence"
     • Congress included "to the extent constitutionally permissible" language showing Ex Post Facto concerns
     
     

     Argument 3: Precedent and Historical Understanding

     • Pasquantino: Purpose is "to mete out appropriate criminal punishment"
     • Paroline: Restitution "serves punitive purposes" and has "penological purposes"
     • Kelly v. Robinson: State restitution is "criminal sanction" and "penal sanction"
     • Courts of appeals uniformly treated VWPA restitution as criminal for Seventh Amendment purposes
     • Government's own historical position: Solicitor General directed non-retroactive application in 1998
     
     

     Government's Arguments (Supporting Petitioner/Vacatur)

     Argument 1: Statutory Construction Demonstrates Criminal Nature

     • Question is "principally a question of statutory construction" (Kansas v. Hendricks)
     • Text and structure integrate restitution into defendant's criminal sentence
     • Codification in "Sentencing" provisions alongside imprisonment and fines
     • Procedural mechanisms mirror other criminal penalties
     • Probation officers, presentence reports, criminal appellate review
     
     

     Argument 2: Precedent Supports Criminal Characterization

     • Pre-MVRA courts uniformly held VWPA restitution was criminal penalty
     • Kelly: Criminal restitution has "deterrent effect" and serves "effective rehabilitation penalty"
     • Pasquantino: Would be "passing strange" to apply only tort law model to criminal restitution
     • Paroline: Restitution "imposed by the Government at the culmination of a criminal proceeding"
     • Majority of circuits recognize Ex Post Facto Clause applies to MVRA restitution
     
     

     Argument 3: Alternative Ground for Affirmance Exists

     • Eighth Circuit erred by ignoring statutory text and structure
     • But alternative ground available: extending collection period may not increase punishment
     • Original debt amount ($7,567.25) unchanged by MVRA amendments
     • "Time horizon" for collection arguably not separate punishment
     • Requests vacatur and remand for court of appeals to consider alternative ground
     
     

     Court-Appointed Amicus's Arguments (Defending Eighth Circuit)

     Argument 1: No "Conclusive Evidence" of Punitive Intent

     • Mendoza-Martinez requires "unmistakable penal intent" and "overwhelming indications"
     • Clear statement requirement grounded in separation of powers
     • Congress didn't use "criminal restitution" label
     • Mandatory structure eliminates judicial discretion typical of criminal sentencing
     • Courts cannot consider defendant's culpability, economic circumstances, or penological goals
     • Payment goes to victims, not government as prosecuting sovereign
     • Victims can enforce like civil creditors with liens and collection procedures
     
     

     Argument 2: Not Punitive Under Mendoza-Martinez Factors

     • Traditional civil restitution focuses on victim's losses, not defendant's gain
     • No "affirmative disability or restraint" from restitution itself
     • Consequences of nonpayment don't make underlying obligation punitive
     • Criminal conviction required to serve nonpunitive purpose (victim compensation)
     • Doesn't implicate traditional punishment aims—courts barred from considering deterrence/retribution
     • Award capped at victim's loss, offset by civil judgments
     • Substantial nonpunitive purpose (compensation) without excess
     
     

     Argument 3: Petition Improvidently Granted

     • Question asks about "restitution under the MVRA"
     • But Ellingburg's restitution imposed under pre-MVRA VWPA
     • Only MVRA's collection period and interest provisions applied retroactively
     • Answering MVRA question would be advisory opinion
     • Ex Post Facto analysis requires examining VWPA restitution's nature, not MVRA's
     • Parties failed to disclose this threshold issue in briefing
     
     

     The Legal Frameworks Explained

     Kansas v. Hendricks / Smith v. Doe Framework

     • Whether penalty is criminal "is principally a question of statutory construction"
     • Courts must ascertain whether legislature meant to establish criminal or civil proceedings
     • If legislature intended punishment, inquiry ends and Ex Post Facto Clause applies
     • Focus on legislative intent through statute's text and structure
     
     

     Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez Two-Step Test

     • Step One: Is there "conclusive evidence" of congressional punitive intent?
     • If not conclusive, Step Two: Seven-factor analysis of whether "so punitive" as to be criminal
     
     

     Broader Implications

     If Petitioner/Government Prevail:

     • Thousands of pre-1996 defendants may have expired restitution obligations
     • MVRA restitution subject to other criminal constitutional protections
     • Potential Excessive Fines Clause applications
     • Limits on retroactive enforcement of criminal restitution
     • Confirmation of decades of circuit court precedent
     
     

     If Amicus Prevails:

     • Government can continue enforcing MVRA provisions retroactively
     • Restitution treated differently from other criminal penalties
     • Broader state authority to craft victim compensation schemes
     • Different constitutional protections apply to civil versus criminal restitution
     
     

     Cultural and Legal Tensions

     • Victim compensation versus defendant rights
     • Retroactivity and fairness in criminal law
     • Separation of powers: Congress's authority to define punishment
     • Government position changes with Administration changes
     • Practical impact on criminal defendants' ability to rebuild lives post-incarceration
     
     

     Key Dates and Next Steps

     • Briefs completed June 2025
     • Oral arguments to be scheduled
     • Decision expected by June 2026
     • Potential remand to Eighth Circuit on alternative grounds
     
     

     Referenced Cases

     Kansas v. Hendricks | 521 U.S. 346 (1997)

     • Question Presented: Whether Kansas's Sexually Violent Predator Act, which provides for civil commitment of persons likely to engage in predatory acts of sexual violence, violates substantive due process, the Double Jeopardy Clause, or the Ex Post Facto Clause
     • Arguments: Established that determining whether law is civil or criminal "is principally a question of statutory construction"; courts must ascertain whether legislature meant to establish civil or criminal proceedings; if legislature intended punishment, that ends the inquiry for Ex Post Facto purposes.
     
     

     Smith v. Doe | 538 U.S. 84 (2003)

     • Question Presented: Whether Alaska's Sex Offender Registration Act violates the Ex Post Facto Clause
     • Arguments: Applied two-step Hendricks/Mendoza-Martinez framework; if legislative intent was to impose punishment, inquiry ends; if intent was civil and nonpunitive, party challenging must show "clearest proof" that scheme is "so punitive either in purpose or effect" as to negate legislature's intention; courts accord "considerable deference" to legislative intent as stated.
     
     

     Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez | 372 U.S. 144 (1963)

     • Question Presented: Whether statute divesting citizenship of persons who leave or remain outside United States to evade military service constitutes punishment
     • Arguments: Established seven-factor test for determining whether sanction is criminal punishment: (1) affirmative disability or restraint; (2) historically regarded as punishment; (3) requires scienter; (4) promotes traditional aims of punishment; (5) behavior already a crime; (6) alternative nonpunitive purpose; (7) excessive relative to alternative purpose. Requires "conclusive evidence" of punitive intent.
     
     

     Pasquantino v. United States | 544 U.S. 349 (2005)

     • Question Presented: Whether federal wire fraud statute applies to scheme to defraud foreign government of tax revenue
     • Arguments: Court stated "[t]he purpose of awarding restitution" under MVRA is "to mete out appropriate criminal punishment"; noted restitution "imposed by the Government at the end of a criminal proceeding against a defendant convicted of a criminal offense"; emphasized restitution serves purposes that "differ from (though they overlap with) the purposes of tort law."
     
     

     Paroline v. United States | 572 U.S. 434 (2014)

     • Question Presented: How to determine restitution amount under 18 U.S.C. § 2259 for child pornography victims when defendant is one of thousands who possessed victim's images
     • Arguments: Court recognized that while restitution's "primary goal" is "remedial or compensatory," "it also serves punitive purposes"; described restitution's "penological purposes"; noted restitution "is imposed by the Government at the culmination of a criminal proceeding and requires conviction of an underlying crime"; emphasized it serves to hold offenders "accountable for the harm [they] caused."
     
     

     Kelly v. Robinson | 479 U.S. 36 (1986)

     • Question Presented: Whether restitution obligation imposed as condition of state criminal probation is dischargeable in bankruptcy as debt "for a fine, penalty, or forfeiture payable to and for the benefit of a governmental unit"
     • Arguments: Court held state criminal restitution is "criminal sanction" and "penal sanction" serving "the State's interests in rehabilitation and punishment"; noted restitution has "deterrent effect" and is "an effective rehabilitation penalty" that forces "the defendant to confront, in concrete terms, the harm his actions have caused"; emphasized that despite benefit to victims, restitution remains fundamentally penal.
     
     

     California Department of Corrections v. Morales | 514 U.S. 499 (1995)

     • Question Presented: Whether California statute reducing frequency of parole reconsideration hearings for certain inmates violates Ex Post Facto Clause
     • Arguments: Court stated Ex Post Facto Clause "is aimed at laws that 'retroactively alter the definition of crimes or increase the punishment for criminal acts'"; establishes foundational principle that Clause only applies to criminal laws that disadvantage defendants by increasing punishment.
     
     

     United States v. Bajakajian | 524 U.S. 321 (1998)

     • Question Presented: Whether forfeiture of $357,144 for failure to report currency transportation violates Excessive Fines Clause
     • Arguments: Court analyzed whether forfeiture constitutes "punishment" for Eighth Amendment purposes; established that forfeitures can be civil in nature but still constitute punishment for constitutional purposes if they serve in part to punish.
     
     

     Calder v. Bull | 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386 (1798)

     • Question Presented: Early interpretation of Ex Post Facto Clause's scope and limitations
     • Arguments: Landmark early Supreme Court decision establishing that Ex Post Facto Clause applies only to criminal laws, not civil legislation; defined four categories of ex post facto laws including those that aggravate crimes or increase punishment for acts already committed.
     
     

     Hughey v. United States | 495 U.S. 411 (1990)

     • Question Presented: Whether Victim and Witness Protection Act authorizes restitution for losses from uncharged conduct related to convicted offense
     • Arguments: Court interpreted VWPA to limit restitution to losses caused by specific conduct underlying offense of conviction; established narrow interpretation of restitution statutes; government argued restitution under VWPA was "criminal rather than civil sanction" based on "language, structure, and legislative history."
     
     

     Dolan v. United States | 560 U.S. 605 (2010)

     • Question Presented: Whether 90-day deadline in 18 U.S.C. § 3664(d)(5) for determining restitution amount is mandatory and jurisdictional
     • Arguments: Court held deadline is mandatory claim-processing rule, not jurisdictional; emphasized compensatory purpose of MVRA in making crime victims whole; noted restitution integrated into federal criminal sentencing system.
     
     

     Key Legal Concepts Explained

     • Ex Post Facto Clause: Constitutional prohibition on retroactively increasing punishment for crimes
     • Criminal vs. Civil Punishment: Fundamental distinction determining which constitutional protections apply
     • Statutory Construction: Method of interpreting what Congress intended when enacting law
     • Mendoza-Martinez Factors: Seven-factor test for determining if sanction is criminal punishment
     • Clear Statement Rule: Requirement that Congress clearly indicate intent when testing constitutional limits
     • Lesser-Included Offense: Crime necessarily committed when committing greater offense
     • Confession of Error: Rare instance when government admits lower court ruling was wrong
     • Amicus Curiae: "Friend of the court" appointed to argue position when parties agree
     • Mandatory vs. Discretionary Sentencing: Distinction between required penalties and judicial discretion
     • Penal vs. Remedial Purpose: Whether law aims to punish wrongdoers or compensate victims
     
     ]]>3c535dfd-97a4-4d71-9483-cd02c7a8966bMon, 29 Sep 2025 09:00:00 -040031:16falsefull2025882025Oral Argument Preview | Bost v. Illinois | Ballot Box Bout: When Can Candidates Challenge Election Rules? Bost v. Illinois State Bd. of Elections | Case No. 24-568 | Oral Argument Date: 10/8/25 | Docket Link: Here

     Overview

     This episode examines Bost v. Illinois, a Supreme Court case that could reshape how candidates challenge election laws in federal court. Congressman Michael Bost and two Republican presidential elector nominees are challenging Illinois's law allowing mail-in ballots to be counted up to 14 days after Election Day, creating a fundamental test of Article III standing doctrine in the election law context. The case sits at the intersection of constitutional standing requirements and the unique competitive dynamics of electoral politics, with implications for whether candidates should receive special treatment to challenge election rules or must meet the same concrete injury standards as all other plaintiffs.

     Episode Roadmap

     Opening: A Fundamental Question About Federal Courts

     • October 8, 2025 oral argument date

     • Standing doctrine meets election law in crucial constitutional test

     • Circuit split on candidate challenges to election rules

     • Implications for flood of pre-election litigation vs. orderly dispute resolution

     Background: Illinois's Ballot-Receipt Extension

     • 2005 Illinois law change allowing 14-day post-Election Day counting window

     • Historical roots in Civil War soldier voting accommodations

     • About half of states now allow similar extended receipt deadlines

     • Congressman Michael Bost and two Republican presidential elector nominees challenge law

     Constitutional Framework: Article III's Case-or-Controversy Requirement

     • "Judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity"

     • Standing doctrine requires concrete, particularized, traceable injury

     • Tension between candidate investment in election rules and generalized grievances

     • Elections Clause and Electors Clause federal framework

     Procedural Journey Through the Courts

     • May 2022: Pre-enforcement challenge filed

     • July 2023: District court dismisses for lack of standing

     • Seventh Circuit affirmed in split decision with Judge Scudder's influential partial dissent

     • Supreme Court grants certiorari to resolve candidate standing question

     The Three-Way Legal Battle

     • Petitioners' blanket candidate standing rule vs. concrete injury requirements

     • Electoral harm theory: competitive disadvantage vs. speculative injury

     • Pocketbook injury claims: campaign extension costs vs. manufactured standing

     Clapper Doctrine and Mitigation Expenditures

     • When spending money to avoid harm creates standing vs. speculative preparation

     • Illinois's challenge to factual basis of extended campaign operations

     • "Near certainty" of ballot counting vs. substantial risk standard

     Oral Argument Preview: Key Tensions to Watch

     • Justices' reaction to special candidate standing exception

     • Factual record problems and thin allegations

     • Floodgates concerns vs. orderly pre-election resolution

     • Purcell principle timing considerations

     Broader Constitutional Stakes

     • Article III's role in limiting federal court jurisdiction

     • Election law's unique challenges for traditional standing doctrine

     • Federalism questions about state election rule authority

     • Volume and intensity of modern election litigation trends

     Referenced Cases

     Clapper v. Amnesty International | 568 U.S. 398 (2013)

     • Question Presented: Whether respondents have Article III standing to challenge FISA Amendments Act surveillance provisions
     • Arguments: Established restrictive doctrine that plaintiffs cannot manufacture standing by spending money to mitigate speculative future harm; requires substantial risk of concrete injury that mitigation expenditures are designed to avoid; Illinois relies heavily on this precedent to challenge Bost's campaign extension costs as insufficient for standing.
     
     

     Davis v. Federal Election Commission | 554 U.S. 724 (2008)

     • Question Presented: Whether provisions of McCain-Feingold Act that impose different contribution limits on candidates facing self-funded opponents violate Equal Protection and First Amendment
     • Arguments: Supreme Court recognized candidate standing based on competitive electoral harm and fundraising disadvantages in "competitive context of electoral politics"; petitioners rely on this precedent to support their electoral prospects injury theory; demonstrates Court's acceptance that campaign competition can create cognizable Article III injury.
     
     

     Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus | 573 U.S. 149 (2014)

     • Question Presented: Whether plaintiffs have Article III standing to bring pre-enforcement constitutional challenge to Ohio election law prohibiting false campaign statements
     • Arguments: Established framework for pre-enforcement challenges in election context using "substantial risk" standard for future harm; relevant to petitioners' argument that they face substantial risk of electoral and financial harm from Illinois's ballot-receipt deadline; provides precedential support for challenging election rules before they take effect in specific election.
     
     ]]> Bost v. Illinois State Bd. of Elections | Case No. 24-568 | Oral Argument Date: 10/8/25 | Docket Link: Here

     Overview

     This episode examines Bost v. Illinois, a Supreme Court case that could reshape how candidates challenge election laws in federal court. Congressman Michael Bost and two Republican presidential elector nominees are challenging Illinois's law allowing mail-in ballots to be counted up to 14 days after Election Day, creating a fundamental test of Article III standing doctrine in the election law context. The case sits at the intersection of constitutional standing requirements and the unique competitive dynamics of electoral politics, with implications for whether candidates should receive special treatment to challenge election rules or must meet the same concrete injury standards as all other plaintiffs.

     Episode Roadmap

     Opening: A Fundamental Question About Federal Courts

     • October 8, 2025 oral argument date

     • Standing doctrine meets election law in crucial constitutional test

     • Circuit split on candidate challenges to election rules

     • Implications for flood of pre-election litigation vs. orderly dispute resolution

     Background: Illinois's Ballot-Receipt Extension

     • 2005 Illinois law change allowing 14-day post-Election Day counting window

     • Historical roots in Civil War soldier voting accommodations

     • About half of states now allow similar extended receipt deadlines

     • Congressman Michael Bost and two Republican presidential elector nominees challenge law

     Constitutional Framework: Article III's Case-or-Controversy Requirement

     • "Judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity"

     • Standing doctrine requires concrete, particularized, traceable injury

     • Tension between candidate investment in election rules and generalized grievances

     • Elections Clause and Electors Clause federal framework

     Procedural Journey Through the Courts

     • May 2022: Pre-enforcement challenge filed

     • July 2023: District court dismisses for lack of standing

     • Seventh Circuit affirmed in split decision with Judge Scudder's influential partial dissent

     • Supreme Court grants certiorari to resolve candidate standing question

     The Three-Way Legal Battle

     • Petitioners' blanket candidate standing rule vs. concrete injury requirements

     • Electoral harm theory: competitive disadvantage vs. speculative injury

     • Pocketbook injury claims: campaign extension costs vs. manufactured standing

     Clapper Doctrine and Mitigation Expenditures

     • When spending money to avoid harm creates standing vs. speculative preparation

     • Illinois's challenge to factual basis of extended campaign operations

     • "Near certainty" of ballot counting vs. substantial risk standard

     Oral Argument Preview: Key Tensions to Watch

     • Justices' reaction to special candidate standing exception

     • Factual record problems and thin allegations

     • Floodgates concerns vs. orderly pre-election resolution

     • Purcell principle timing considerations

     Broader Constitutional Stakes

     • Article III's role in limiting federal court jurisdiction

     • Election law's unique challenges for traditional standing doctrine

     • Federalism questions about state election rule authority

     • Volume and intensity of modern election litigation trends

     Referenced Cases

     Clapper v. Amnesty International | 568 U.S. 398 (2013)

     • Question Presented: Whether respondents have Article III standing to challenge FISA Amendments Act surveillance provisions
     • Arguments: Established restrictive doctrine that plaintiffs cannot manufacture standing by spending money to mitigate speculative future harm; requires substantial risk of concrete injury that mitigation expenditures are designed to avoid; Illinois relies heavily on this precedent to challenge Bost's campaign extension costs as insufficient for standing.
     
     

     Davis v. Federal Election Commission | 554 U.S. 724 (2008)

     • Question Presented: Whether provisions of McCain-Feingold Act that impose different contribution limits on candidates facing self-funded opponents violate Equal Protection and First Amendment
     • Arguments: Supreme Court recognized candidate standing based on competitive electoral harm and fundraising disadvantages in "competitive context of electoral politics"; petitioners rely on this precedent to support their electoral prospects injury theory; demonstrates Court's acceptance that campaign competition can create cognizable Article III injury.
     
     

     Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus | 573 U.S. 149 (2014)

     • Question Presented: Whether plaintiffs have Article III standing to bring pre-enforcement constitutional challenge to Ohio election law prohibiting false campaign statements
     • Arguments: Established framework for pre-enforcement challenges in election context using "substantial risk" standard for future harm; relevant to petitioners' argument that they face substantial risk of electoral and financial harm from Illinois's ballot-receipt deadline; provides precedential support for challenging election rules before they take effect in specific election.
     
     ]]>40a6d780-6933-4060-934b-bb41ed124a70Fri, 26 Sep 2025 09:00:00 -040022:13falsefull2025772025Oral Argument Preview | Postal Service v. Konan | Dictionary Duel Over "Loss," "Miscarriage," and Government LiabilityPostal Service v. Konan | Case No. 24-351 | Oral Argument Date: 10/8/25 | Docket Link: Here

     Episode Overview

     This episode examines United States Postal Service v. Lebene Konan, a Supreme Court case that asks whether the federal government has immunity when postal employees intentionally refuse to deliver mail as part of a campaign of racial harassment. The case centers on the interpretation of the Federal Tort Claims Act's "postal exception" and whether terms like "loss" and "miscarriage" cover intentional wrongdoing or only negligent acts.

     Episode Roadmap

     Opening: A Deceptively Simple Question

     • Can you sue the federal government when postal workers intentionally withhold your mail?
     • The answer hinges on the Federal Tort Claims Act's postal exception
     • Core tension between remedy for wrongs vs. government immunity
     
     

     Legal Framework: The Federal Tort Claims Act

     • 28 U.S.C. § 2680(b): Exception for claims arising from "loss, miscarriage, or negligent transmission" of mail
     • Key interpretive battle: Does "negligent" modify only "transmission" or all three terms?
     • Government argues broad immunity; plaintiff argues narrow exception
     
     

     The Facts: Alleged Racial Harassment Campaign

     • Lebene Konan: Black realtor and landlady in Euless, Texas
     • Two-year campaign by USPS employees Raymond Rojas and Jason Drake
     • Allegations: Changed postal records, changed mailbox locks, refused mail delivery
     • Over 50 administrative complaints filed; Inspector General investigation ordered delivery
     
     

     Procedural Journey

     • District court: Dismissed under postal exception
     • Fifth Circuit: Reversed, held "loss" and "miscarriage" imply unintentional acts
     • Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve circuit split
     
     

     Government's Arguments

     • "Miscarriage" = broad failure to arrive (Webster's 1940s definition)
     • "Loss" = deprivation, regardless of intent
     • Structural argument: FTCA uses "loss" to cover intentional acts elsewhere
     • Policy concern: Flood of litigation if intent matters
     
     

     Konan's Counter-Arguments

     • "Miscarriage" = mail mistakenly delivered to wrong place
     • "Loss" = destruction or misplacement, both inherently accidental
     • Statutory structure shows Congress concerned only with negligence
     • "Negligent transmission" proves Congress knew how to limit scope when intended
     
     

     Battle of the Dictionaries

     • Government relies on neutral 1940s definitions from Webster's Second
     • Konan cites specific legal definitions and Oxford English Dictionary
     • Competing interpretations of what "loss" and "miscarriage" historically meant
     
     

     Looking Ahead to Oral Arguments

     • How will Justices react to competing dictionary definitions?
     • Will practical consequences (floodgates) persuade the Court?
     • Strange incentive structure if government immune for intentional but not negligent acts
     
     

     Referenced Cases

     Dolan v. USPS | 546 U.S. 481 (2006) | Docket Link

     • Question Presented: Interpretation of FTCA postal exception terms
     • Overview: Supreme Court precedent that both parties cite for their competing interpretations of "miscarriage" in the postal exception context.
     
     

     Key Legal Concepts Explained

     • Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA): Law allowing lawsuits against the United States for employee torts
     • Sovereign Immunity: Government's general protection from lawsuits
     • Statutory Interpretation: Battle between textualist approaches using period dictionaries
     • Presumption of Consistent Usage: Principle that same word should mean same thing throughout statute
     
     

     Stakes and Implications

     If Government Wins:

     • Strong immunity shield for Postal Service regardless of employee intent
     • Potential closure of courthouse doors for wide range of intentional misconduct
     • Confirmation that postal exception creates hard barrier to liability
     
     

     If Konan Wins:

     • FTCA exceptions have limits; immunity doesn't protect intentional torts
     • "Negligent" in statute colors interpretation of related terms
     • Opens door for relief against intentional postal employee misconduct
     
     

     Broader Significance:

     • Masterclass in statutory interpretation and use of historical dictionaries
     • Tension between providing remedy for wrongs vs. protecting essential government services
     • Question of whether immunity should vary based on employee intent
     
     ]]>Postal Service v. Konan | Case No. 24-351 | Oral Argument Date: 10/8/25 | Docket Link: Here

     Episode Overview

     This episode examines United States Postal Service v. Lebene Konan, a Supreme Court case that asks whether the federal government has immunity when postal employees intentionally refuse to deliver mail as part of a campaign of racial harassment. The case centers on the interpretation of the Federal Tort Claims Act's "postal exception" and whether terms like "loss" and "miscarriage" cover intentional wrongdoing or only negligent acts.

     Episode Roadmap

     Opening: A Deceptively Simple Question

     • Can you sue the federal government when postal workers intentionally withhold your mail?
     • The answer hinges on the Federal Tort Claims Act's postal exception
     • Core tension between remedy for wrongs vs. government immunity
     
     

     Legal Framework: The Federal Tort Claims Act

     • 28 U.S.C. § 2680(b): Exception for claims arising from "loss, miscarriage, or negligent transmission" of mail
     • Key interpretive battle: Does "negligent" modify only "transmission" or all three terms?
     • Government argues broad immunity; plaintiff argues narrow exception
     
     

     The Facts: Alleged Racial Harassment Campaign

     • Lebene Konan: Black realtor and landlady in Euless, Texas
     • Two-year campaign by USPS employees Raymond Rojas and Jason Drake
     • Allegations: Changed postal records, changed mailbox locks, refused mail delivery
     • Over 50 administrative complaints filed; Inspector General investigation ordered delivery
     
     

     Procedural Journey

     • District court: Dismissed under postal exception
     • Fifth Circuit: Reversed, held "loss" and "miscarriage" imply unintentional acts
     • Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve circuit split
     
     

     Government's Arguments

     • "Miscarriage" = broad failure to arrive (Webster's 1940s definition)
     • "Loss" = deprivation, regardless of intent
     • Structural argument: FTCA uses "loss" to cover intentional acts elsewhere
     • Policy concern: Flood of litigation if intent matters
     
     

     Konan's Counter-Arguments

     • "Miscarriage" = mail mistakenly delivered to wrong place
     • "Loss" = destruction or misplacement, both inherently accidental
     • Statutory structure shows Congress concerned only with negligence
     • "Negligent transmission" proves Congress knew how to limit scope when intended
     
     

     Battle of the Dictionaries

     • Government relies on neutral 1940s definitions from Webster's Second
     • Konan cites specific legal definitions and Oxford English Dictionary
     • Competing interpretations of what "loss" and "miscarriage" historically meant
     
     

     Looking Ahead to Oral Arguments

     • How will Justices react to competing dictionary definitions?
     • Will practical consequences (floodgates) persuade the Court?
     • Strange incentive structure if government immune for intentional but not negligent acts
     
     

     Referenced Cases

     Dolan v. USPS | 546 U.S. 481 (2006) | Docket Link

     • Question Presented: Interpretation of FTCA postal exception terms
     • Overview: Supreme Court precedent that both parties cite for their competing interpretations of "miscarriage" in the postal exception context.
     
     

     Key Legal Concepts Explained

     • Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA): Law allowing lawsuits against the United States for employee torts
     • Sovereign Immunity: Government's general protection from lawsuits
     • Statutory Interpretation: Battle between textualist approaches using period dictionaries
     • Presumption of Consistent Usage: Principle that same word should mean same thing throughout statute
     
     

     Stakes and Implications

     If Government Wins:

     • Strong immunity shield for Postal Service regardless of employee intent
     • Potential closure of courthouse doors for wide range of intentional misconduct
     • Confirmation that postal exception creates hard barrier to liability
     
     

     If Konan Wins:

     • FTCA exceptions have limits; immunity doesn't protect intentional torts
     • "Negligent" in statute colors interpretation of related terms
     • Opens door for relief against intentional postal employee misconduct
     
     

     Broader Significance:

     • Masterclass in statutory interpretation and use of historical dictionaries
     • Tension between providing remedy for wrongs vs. protecting essential government services
     • Question of whether immunity should vary based on employee intent
     
     ]]>e253c88e-e21a-4181-bb32-8d7ca578365eThu, 25 Sep 2025 06:00:00 -040011:01falsefull2025662025Oral Argument Preview | Barrett v. United States | Double Jeopardy Dilemma Over Sentence StackingBarrett v. United States | Case No. 24-5774 | Oral Argument Date: 10/7/25 | Docket Link: Here

     Question Presented: Whether the Double Jeopardy Clause permits punishment under both 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) and § 924(j) for one act that violates each statute

     Other Referenced Episodes:

     • September 10th: A Constitutional Clash: Trump's Tariffs and the Separation of Powers
     
     

     Overview

     This episode explores Barrett v. United States, a fascinating Double Jeopardy case where the federal government unusually sides with a criminal defendant against its own prosecution. The Supreme Court must determine whether convicting someone under both federal gun statutes—one for using a firearm during a violent crime and another for causing a death with that firearm—violates the Fifth Amendment's protection against being punished twice for the same offense. With no one defending the lower court's judgment, the Court appointed an outside attorney to argue that sentence stacking should be permitted, creating a rare three-way legal battle over fundamental constitutional protections and congressional intent in criminal sentencing.

     Episode Roadmap

     Opening: A Constitutional Twist

     • October 6th Supreme Court term preview continuation
     • Fourth case in opening week after Berm v. Choy, Villarreal v. Texas, and Chiles v. Salazar
     • Unusual scenario: Government sides with criminal defendant
     • November 5th Trump Tariffs Case announcement
     
     

     The Core Question

     • Can government punish someone twice for single criminal act--using a firearm while trafficking drugs?
     • Federal gun statutes create potential double jeopardy violation
     • Section 924(c): Using gun during violent crime (5-year minimum, up to life)
     • Section 924(j): Killing someone with that gun (death penalty or life for murder)
     
     

     The Barrett Facts

     • 2011 New York robbery crew case
     • Dwayne Barrett as getaway driver during minivan robbery
     • Co-conspirator shot and killed Gamar Dafalla during robbery
     • Government charged Barrett under both gun statutes for single act
     
     

     Legal Journey Through the Courts

     • Initial district court: Merged sentences, avoided double punishment
     • Second Circuit flip: Required stacking both sentences after Supreme Court's Lora decision
     • Circuit split on handling these overlapping prosecutions
     • Government "confessed error" - switched sides under Trump administration
     
     

     Constitutional Framework: Double Jeopardy Protection

     • Fifth Amendment: "No person shall... be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy"
     • Blockburger test: Same-elements analysis for determining "same offense"
     • Presumption against double punishment unless Congress clearly authorizes it
     • Court-appointed amicus ensures adversarial presentation when government switches sides
     
     

     Barrett and Government Arguments

     • Section 924(c) is lesser-included offense of Section 924(j)
     • Cannot violate fatal results statute without first violating gun use statute
     • Congress knew how to authorize stacking: Section 924(c)(5) armor-piercing provision
     • Omission of stacking language in Section 924(j) proves contrary intent
     
     

     Court-Appointed Amicus Arguments

     • Consecutive-sentence mandate in Section 924(c): "any other term of imprisonment"
     • Two statutes punish different evils: danger of gun vs. harm of death
     • Absurd results hypothetical: Machinegun manslaughter (15-year max) vs. machinegun brandishing (30-year minimum)
     • Congress intended comprehensive punishment for escalating criminal conduct
     
     

     Reply Brief Rebuttals

     • Prosecutorial discretion avoids hypothetical absurd results
     • Supreme Court rejected similar "implausible results" arguments in Lora
     • Consecutive-sentence mandate governs sequencing, not Double Jeopardy authorization
     • Blockburger elements test controls regardless of different policy rationales
     
     

     Broader Constitutional Stakes

     • Fundamental protection against government overreach
     • Separation of powers: Congressional crime definition vs. judicial interpretation
     • Nationwide impact on federal gun crime prosecutions and sentencing
     • Clarity requirement for "clear statement" when constitutional rights at stake
     
     

     Referenced Cases

     Blockburger v. United States | 284 U.S. 299 (1932)

     • Question Presented: Landmark case establishing "same-elements test" for determining whether two offenses constitute "same offence" under Double Jeopardy Clause
     • Arguments: Established that offenses are distinct if each requires proof of fact the other does not; creates presumption against multiple punishment for greater and lesser-included offenses unless Congress clearly indicates contrary intent.
     
     

     Lora v. United States | 599 U.S. 453 (2023)

     • Question Presented: Whether Section 924(j) requires proof that defendant personally used firearm that caused death
     • Arguments: Supreme Court established that Sections 924(c) and 924(j) represent different congressional approaches to punishment - mandatory minimums constraining judicial discretion versus sentencing flexibility with higher maximum penalties including death.
     
     

     United States v. Davis | 588 U.S. 445 (2019)

     • Question Presented: Whether definition of "crime of violence" in Section 924(c) is unconstitutionally vague
     • Arguments: Supreme Court struck down residual clause of crime of violence definition, leading to Barrett case remand and resentencing that eliminated one of his Section 924(c) convictions.
     
     

     Whalen v. United States | 445 U.S. 684 (1980)

     • Question Presented: Whether consecutive-sentence provision alone provides clear congressional authorization for cumulative punishment of same offense
     • Arguments: Supreme Court held that even explicit consecutive-sentence mandate insufficient to overcome Double Jeopardy presumption without clear indication Congress intended to authorize multiple convictions for same underlying conduct.
     
     ]]>Barrett v. United States | Case No. 24-5774 | Oral Argument Date: 10/7/25 | Docket Link: Here

     Question Presented: Whether the Double Jeopardy Clause permits punishment under both 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) and § 924(j) for one act that violates each statute

     Other Referenced Episodes:

     • September 10th: A Constitutional Clash: Trump's Tariffs and the Separation of Powers
     
     

     Overview

     This episode explores Barrett v. United States, a fascinating Double Jeopardy case where the federal government unusually sides with a criminal defendant against its own prosecution. The Supreme Court must determine whether convicting someone under both federal gun statutes—one for using a firearm during a violent crime and another for causing a death with that firearm—violates the Fifth Amendment's protection against being punished twice for the same offense. With no one defending the lower court's judgment, the Court appointed an outside attorney to argue that sentence stacking should be permitted, creating a rare three-way legal battle over fundamental constitutional protections and congressional intent in criminal sentencing.

     Episode Roadmap

     Opening: A Constitutional Twist

     • October 6th Supreme Court term preview continuation
     • Fourth case in opening week after Berm v. Choy, Villarreal v. Texas, and Chiles v. Salazar
     • Unusual scenario: Government sides with criminal defendant
     • November 5th Trump Tariffs Case announcement
     
     

     The Core Question

     • Can government punish someone twice for single criminal act--using a firearm while trafficking drugs?
     • Federal gun statutes create potential double jeopardy violation
     • Section 924(c): Using gun during violent crime (5-year minimum, up to life)
     • Section 924(j): Killing someone with that gun (death penalty or life for murder)
     
     

     The Barrett Facts

     • 2011 New York robbery crew case
     • Dwayne Barrett as getaway driver during minivan robbery
     • Co-conspirator shot and killed Gamar Dafalla during robbery
     • Government charged Barrett under both gun statutes for single act
     
     

     Legal Journey Through the Courts

     • Initial district court: Merged sentences, avoided double punishment
     • Second Circuit flip: Required stacking both sentences after Supreme Court's Lora decision
     • Circuit split on handling these overlapping prosecutions
     • Government "confessed error" - switched sides under Trump administration
     
     

     Constitutional Framework: Double Jeopardy Protection

     • Fifth Amendment: "No person shall... be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy"
     • Blockburger test: Same-elements analysis for determining "same offense"
     • Presumption against double punishment unless Congress clearly authorizes it
     • Court-appointed amicus ensures adversarial presentation when government switches sides
     
     

     Barrett and Government Arguments

     • Section 924(c) is lesser-included offense of Section 924(j)
     • Cannot violate fatal results statute without first violating gun use statute
     • Congress knew how to authorize stacking: Section 924(c)(5) armor-piercing provision
     • Omission of stacking language in Section 924(j) proves contrary intent
     
     

     Court-Appointed Amicus Arguments

     • Consecutive-sentence mandate in Section 924(c): "any other term of imprisonment"
     • Two statutes punish different evils: danger of gun vs. harm of death
     • Absurd results hypothetical: Machinegun manslaughter (15-year max) vs. machinegun brandishing (30-year minimum)
     • Congress intended comprehensive punishment for escalating criminal conduct
     
     

     Reply Brief Rebuttals

     • Prosecutorial discretion avoids hypothetical absurd results
     • Supreme Court rejected similar "implausible results" arguments in Lora
     • Consecutive-sentence mandate governs sequencing, not Double Jeopardy authorization
     • Blockburger elements test controls regardless of different policy rationales
     
     

     Broader Constitutional Stakes

     • Fundamental protection against government overreach
     • Separation of powers: Congressional crime definition vs. judicial interpretation
     • Nationwide impact on federal gun crime prosecutions and sentencing
     • Clarity requirement for "clear statement" when constitutional rights at stake
     
     

     Referenced Cases

     Blockburger v. United States | 284 U.S. 299 (1932)

     • Question Presented: Landmark case establishing "same-elements test" for determining whether two offenses constitute "same offence" under Double Jeopardy Clause
     • Arguments: Established that offenses are distinct if each requires proof of fact the other does not; creates presumption against multiple punishment for greater and lesser-included offenses unless Congress clearly indicates contrary intent.
     
     

     Lora v. United States | 599 U.S. 453 (2023)

     • Question Presented: Whether Section 924(j) requires proof that defendant personally used firearm that caused death
     • Arguments: Supreme Court established that Sections 924(c) and 924(j) represent different congressional approaches to punishment - mandatory minimums constraining judicial discretion versus sentencing flexibility with higher maximum penalties including death.
     
     

     United States v. Davis | 588 U.S. 445 (2019)

     • Question Presented: Whether definition of "crime of violence" in Section 924(c) is unconstitutionally vague
     • Arguments: Supreme Court struck down residual clause of crime of violence definition, leading to Barrett case remand and resentencing that eliminated one of his Section 924(c) convictions.
     
     

     Whalen v. United States | 445 U.S. 684 (1980)

     • Question Presented: Whether consecutive-sentence provision alone provides clear congressional authorization for cumulative punishment of same offense
     • Arguments: Supreme Court held that even explicit consecutive-sentence mandate insufficient to overcome Double Jeopardy presumption without clear indication Congress intended to authorize multiple convictions for same underlying conduct.
     
     ]]>8b0b8152-a3cb-4fb3-9966-954f8be2fa47Mon, 22 Sep 2025 09:00:00 -040018:21falsefull2025552025Oral Argument Preview | Chiles v. Salazar | Battle Over Conversion Therapy and Therapist Free Speech RightsChiles v. Salazar | Case No. 24-539 | Oral Argument Date: 10/7/25 | Docket Link: Here

     Question Presented: Whether a law that censors certain conversations between counselors and their clients based on the viewpoints expressed regulates conduct or violates the Free Speech Clause.

     Other Referenced Episodes:

     • August 19 – Road Work Ahead: How Four 2024 Cases May Be Reshaping First Amendment Scrutiny | Here
     
     

     Overview

     This episode examines one of the most anticipated cases of the October 2025 Supreme Court term - a First Amendment challenge to Colorado's "conversion therapy" ban that has generated over 50 amicus briefs and sits at the intersection of free speech, parental rights, LGBTQ issues, and professional regulation.

     Roadmap

     Opening: A Constitutional Perfect Storm

     • October 7th, 2025 oral argument date
     • Over 50 amicus briefs filed (compared to 7 for most cases)
     • Intersection of hot-button topics: parental rights, LGBTQ issues, religious freedom, professional regulation
     
     

     Background: The Players and the Law

     • Kaley Chiles: Licensed counselor in Colorado Springs at Deeper Stories Counseling
     • Christian counselor using "client-directed" approach with speech-only methods
     • Colorado's 2019 law banning "conversion therapy" for minors
     • Penalties: fines up to $5,000, license suspension or revocation
     
     

     Constitutional Framework: The First Amendment Text

     • "Congress shall make no law... abridging the freedom of speech"
     • Extension to state governments through Fourteenth Amendment
     • The simplicity of "no law" language
     
     

     Procedural History: The Court Journey

     • 2022: Chiles filed pre-enforcement challenge
     • District court denied preliminary injunction using rational basis review
     • Tenth Circuit affirmed in divided panel decision
     • Judge Hartz's "scathing dissent" calling majority approach "remarkable" and "contrary" to precedent
     
     

     The Central Constitutional Question

     • Speech versus conduct: When does professional speech become conduct that can be regulated?
     • Level of scrutiny determines case outcome
     • Three-tiered analysis: rational basis, intermediate scrutiny, strict scrutiny
     
     

     Understanding Scrutiny Levels: The Road Analogy

     • Rational basis: Highway with minimal obstacles
     • Intermediate scrutiny: Busy road with stop signs and traffic lights
     • Strict scrutiny: Road closure - "fatal in fact" for government
     
     

     Competing Legal Frameworks

     Chiles's Arguments (Strict Scrutiny)

     • Content-based discrimination: "You can help with binge eating, but not sexual orientation behaviors"
     • Viewpoint-based discrimination: "Support gender transition but forbid comfort with biological body"
     • Speech-only counseling deserves full First Amendment protection
     
     

     Colorado's Arguments (Rational Basis)

     • Professional healthcare treatment regulation, not speech restriction
     • Traditional state authority over professional standards
     • "Professional healthcare treatment that happens to involve words"
     
     

     Key Supreme Court Precedents Battle

     National Institute of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra (NIFLA) (2018)

     • Chiles interpretation: Professional speech gets full First Amendment protection
     • Colorado interpretation: States can prohibit substandard treatment involving words
     
     

     Reed v. Town of Gilbert (2015)

     • Content-based restrictions trigger strict scrutiny
     • Foundation for Chiles's discrimination arguments
     
     

     The Evidence Battle

     • Colorado's medical organization statements vs. lack of specific studies
     • Colorado counsel's concession: No studies on "talk therapy by licensed counselor with willing minor"
     • Recent developments: Cass Review from UK, new HHS reports
     
     

     Narrow Tailoring Problems

     • Overinclusive: Bans all counseling conversations on these topics
     • Underinclusive: Only applies to licensed professionals, not life coaches or religious counselors
     • Fatal inconsistency under strict scrutiny
     
     

     Broader Implications

     If Chiles Wins

     • Expanded protection for professional speech generally
     • Limits on state regulation of counselor-client conversations
     • Potential impact on other professional speech regulations
     
     

     If Colorado Wins

     • Broader state authority to regulate professional conversations
     • Precedent for public health rationales overriding speech concerns
     • Framework for regulating other controversial therapeutic approaches
     
     

     Cultural and Legal Tensions

     • Expertise versus individual choice
     • Regulatory authority versus family autonomy
     • Professional consensus versus personal beliefs
     
     

     Looking Ahead to October 7th Oral Arguments

     • Watch for justices' reaction to speech versus conduct framing
     • Evidence questions: How much proof does Colorado need?
     • Narrow tailoring challenges about unlicensed practitioners
     • Potential references to recent Court skepticism of professional speech restrictions
     
     

     Key Legal Concepts Explained

     • Content-based vs. viewpoint-based discrimination
     • Professional speech doctrine
     • Pre-enforcement challenges
     • Strict scrutiny analysis
     • Constitutional avoidance principles
     
     ]]>Chiles v. Salazar | Case No. 24-539 | Oral Argument Date: 10/7/25 | Docket Link: Here

     Question Presented: Whether a law that censors certain conversations between counselors and their clients based on the viewpoints expressed regulates conduct or violates the Free Speech Clause.

     Other Referenced Episodes:

     • August 19 – Road Work Ahead: How Four 2024 Cases May Be Reshaping First Amendment Scrutiny | Here
     
     

     Overview

     This episode examines one of the most anticipated cases of the October 2025 Supreme Court term - a First Amendment challenge to Colorado's "conversion therapy" ban that has generated over 50 amicus briefs and sits at the intersection of free speech, parental rights, LGBTQ issues, and professional regulation.

     Roadmap

     Opening: A Constitutional Perfect Storm

     • October 7th, 2025 oral argument date
     • Over 50 amicus briefs filed (compared to 7 for most cases)
     • Intersection of hot-button topics: parental rights, LGBTQ issues, religious freedom, professional regulation
     
     

     Background: The Players and the Law

     • Kaley Chiles: Licensed counselor in Colorado Springs at Deeper Stories Counseling
     • Christian counselor using "client-directed" approach with speech-only methods
     • Colorado's 2019 law banning "conversion therapy" for minors
     • Penalties: fines up to $5,000, license suspension or revocation
     
     

     Constitutional Framework: The First Amendment Text

     • "Congress shall make no law... abridging the freedom of speech"
     • Extension to state governments through Fourteenth Amendment
     • The simplicity of "no law" language
     
     

     Procedural History: The Court Journey

     • 2022: Chiles filed pre-enforcement challenge
     • District court denied preliminary injunction using rational basis review
     • Tenth Circuit affirmed in divided panel decision
     • Judge Hartz's "scathing dissent" calling majority approach "remarkable" and "contrary" to precedent
     
     

     The Central Constitutional Question

     • Speech versus conduct: When does professional speech become conduct that can be regulated?
     • Level of scrutiny determines case outcome
     • Three-tiered analysis: rational basis, intermediate scrutiny, strict scrutiny
     
     

     Understanding Scrutiny Levels: The Road Analogy

     • Rational basis: Highway with minimal obstacles
     • Intermediate scrutiny: Busy road with stop signs and traffic lights
     • Strict scrutiny: Road closure - "fatal in fact" for government
     
     

     Competing Legal Frameworks

     Chiles's Arguments (Strict Scrutiny)

     • Content-based discrimination: "You can help with binge eating, but not sexual orientation behaviors"
     • Viewpoint-based discrimination: "Support gender transition but forbid comfort with biological body"
     • Speech-only counseling deserves full First Amendment protection
     
     

     Colorado's Arguments (Rational Basis)

     • Professional healthcare treatment regulation, not speech restriction
     • Traditional state authority over professional standards
     • "Professional healthcare treatment that happens to involve words"
     
     

     Key Supreme Court Precedents Battle

     National Institute of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra (NIFLA) (2018)

     • Chiles interpretation: Professional speech gets full First Amendment protection
     • Colorado interpretation: States can prohibit substandard treatment involving words
     
     

     Reed v. Town of Gilbert (2015)

     • Content-based restrictions trigger strict scrutiny
     • Foundation for Chiles's discrimination arguments
     
     

     The Evidence Battle

     • Colorado's medical organization statements vs. lack of specific studies
     • Colorado counsel's concession: No studies on "talk therapy by licensed counselor with willing minor"
     • Recent developments: Cass Review from UK, new HHS reports
     
     

     Narrow Tailoring Problems

     • Overinclusive: Bans all counseling conversations on these topics
     • Underinclusive: Only applies to licensed professionals, not life coaches or religious counselors
     • Fatal inconsistency under strict scrutiny
     
     

     Broader Implications

     If Chiles Wins

     • Expanded protection for professional speech generally
     • Limits on state regulation of counselor-client conversations
     • Potential impact on other professional speech regulations
     
     

     If Colorado Wins

     • Broader state authority to regulate professional conversations
     • Precedent for public health rationales overriding speech concerns
     • Framework for regulating other controversial therapeutic approaches
     
     

     Cultural and Legal Tensions

     • Expertise versus individual choice
     • Regulatory authority versus family autonomy
     • Professional consensus versus personal beliefs
     
     

     Looking Ahead to October 7th Oral Arguments

     • Watch for justices' reaction to speech versus conduct framing
     • Evidence questions: How much proof does Colorado need?
     • Narrow tailoring challenges about unlicensed practitioners
     • Potential references to recent Court skepticism of professional speech restrictions
     
     

     Key Legal Concepts Explained

     • Content-based vs. viewpoint-based discrimination
     • Professional speech doctrine
     • Pre-enforcement challenges
     • Strict scrutiny analysis
     • Constitutional avoidance principles
     
     ]]>001d7db9-557d-426d-bce1-d5150a1768efFri, 19 Sep 2025 13:00:00 -040021:13falsefull2025442025Oral Argument Preview | Villareal v. Texas | Constitutional Conundrum Over the Right to Counsel and Witness CoachingVillarreal v. Texas | Case No. 24-557 | Oral Argument Date: 10/6/25 | Docket Link: Here

     Question Presented: Whether a trial court abridges the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel by prohibiting the defendant and his counsel from discussing the defendant's testimony during an overnight recess.

     Overview

     This episode examines Villareal v. Texas, a case that addresses a fundamental question affecting every criminal trial where a defendant takes the stand: what happens when testimony gets interrupted by an overnight recess? The case explores the intersection of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel and trial courts' authority to prevent witness coaching during extended breaks in testimony.

     Episode Roadmap

     Opening: The Constitutional Dilemma

     • David Villareal's murder trial and self-defense claim
     • The overnight recess that created a constitutional question
     • The judge's "qualified conferral order" - a middle-ground approach
     • Why this affects every criminal trial with testifying defendants
     
     

     The Trial Court's Balancing Act

     • Judge's concern about overnight "coaching" of defendant's testimony
     • The court's solution: prohibit testimony discussions, allow everything else
     • Defense counsel's understanding and preserved Sixth Amendment objection
     • Conviction and 60-year sentence outcome
     
     

     Constitutional Territory: Competing Precedents

     • Sixth Amendment's broad language: "assistance of counsel for his defence"
     • Geders v. United States (1976): overnight recesses require full consultation
     • Perry v. Leeke (1989): 15-minute recesses allow complete prohibition
     • The gap: what about partial restrictions during long recesses?
     
     

     Split in Lower Courts

     • Federal circuits generally reject qualified orders during overnight recesses
     • State supreme courts (including Texas) embrace the middle-ground approach
     • Texas Court of Criminal Appeals: "type of communication" controls, not recess length
     • The constitutional question that prompted Supreme Court review
     
     

     Villareal's Three-Pronged Attack

     • Perry already resolved this: "unrestricted access" during overnight recesses
     • The rule is unworkable: testimony and strategy discussions are "inextricably intertwined"
     • Practical impossibilities: plea negotiations, perjury prevention, attorney-client privilege
     
     

     Texas's Constitutional Defense

     • Perry endorsed qualified orders even during short recesses
     • Substance matters more than timing: testimony discussions aren't constitutionally protected
     • The rule works in practice: defense counsel understood and complied
     • Fairness and truth-seeking justify the restriction
     
     

     The Current Court's Jurisprudence

     • Emphasis on workability and bright-line rules
     • Skepticism of broad constitutional rules that are difficult to administer
     • Text and original meaning analysis of "assistance of counsel"
     • Historical wrinkle: defendants couldn't testify when Sixth Amendment was ratified
     
     

     Stakes and Implications

     • Impact on trial court management of testimony scheduling nationwide
     • Effect on criminal defendants' consultation rights during testimony breaks
     • Broader tension: advocacy system vs. truth-seeking function
     • Potential for significant practical impact regardless of outcome
     
     

     Relevant Precedential Cases

     Geders v. United States | 425 U.S. 80 (1976)

     Holding: Trial courts violate the Sixth Amendment by completely prohibiting defendants from speaking with counsel during overnight recesses, which are "often times of intensive work, with tactical decisions to be made and strategies to be reviewed."

     Perry v. Leeke | 488 U.S. 272 (1989)

     Holding: During brief (15-minute) recesses, trial courts may completely prohibit defendant consultation with counsel because there's "virtual certainty that any conversation would relate to ongoing testimony." However, defendants have "unrestricted access" to counsel during overnight recesses, and "discussions will inevitably include some consideration of ongoing testimony" without compromising constitutional rights.

     Key Legal Concepts Explained

     • Qualified Conferral Order: Court instruction allowing defendant-counsel consultation on some topics (trial strategy, plea negotiations) while prohibiting discussion of others (ongoing testimony) during recess
     • Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel: Constitutional guarantee of "assistance of counsel for his defence" in all criminal prosecutions
     • Attorney-Client Privilege: Protection of confidential communications between lawyer and client from disclosure
     • Witness Coaching: Improperly instructing a witness on what to say or how to testify
     • Stare Decisis: Legal principle of adhering to precedent in court decisions
     
     ]]>Villarreal v. Texas | Case No. 24-557 | Oral Argument Date: 10/6/25 | Docket Link: Here

     Question Presented: Whether a trial court abridges the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel by prohibiting the defendant and his counsel from discussing the defendant's testimony during an overnight recess.

     Overview

     This episode examines Villareal v. Texas, a case that addresses a fundamental question affecting every criminal trial where a defendant takes the stand: what happens when testimony gets interrupted by an overnight recess? The case explores the intersection of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel and trial courts' authority to prevent witness coaching during extended breaks in testimony.

     Episode Roadmap

     Opening: The Constitutional Dilemma

     • David Villareal's murder trial and self-defense claim
     • The overnight recess that created a constitutional question
     • The judge's "qualified conferral order" - a middle-ground approach
     • Why this affects every criminal trial with testifying defendants
     
     

     The Trial Court's Balancing Act

     • Judge's concern about overnight "coaching" of defendant's testimony
     • The court's solution: prohibit testimony discussions, allow everything else
     • Defense counsel's understanding and preserved Sixth Amendment objection
     • Conviction and 60-year sentence outcome
     
     

     Constitutional Territory: Competing Precedents

     • Sixth Amendment's broad language: "assistance of counsel for his defence"
     • Geders v. United States (1976): overnight recesses require full consultation
     • Perry v. Leeke (1989): 15-minute recesses allow complete prohibition
     • The gap: what about partial restrictions during long recesses?
     
     

     Split in Lower Courts

     • Federal circuits generally reject qualified orders during overnight recesses
     • State supreme courts (including Texas) embrace the middle-ground approach
     • Texas Court of Criminal Appeals: "type of communication" controls, not recess length
     • The constitutional question that prompted Supreme Court review
     
     

     Villareal's Three-Pronged Attack

     • Perry already resolved this: "unrestricted access" during overnight recesses
     • The rule is unworkable: testimony and strategy discussions are "inextricably intertwined"
     • Practical impossibilities: plea negotiations, perjury prevention, attorney-client privilege
     
     

     Texas's Constitutional Defense

     • Perry endorsed qualified orders even during short recesses
     • Substance matters more than timing: testimony discussions aren't constitutionally protected
     • The rule works in practice: defense counsel understood and complied
     • Fairness and truth-seeking justify the restriction
     
     

     The Current Court's Jurisprudence

     • Emphasis on workability and bright-line rules
     • Skepticism of broad constitutional rules that are difficult to administer
     • Text and original meaning analysis of "assistance of counsel"
     • Historical wrinkle: defendants couldn't testify when Sixth Amendment was ratified
     
     

     Stakes and Implications

     • Impact on trial court management of testimony scheduling nationwide
     • Effect on criminal defendants' consultation rights during testimony breaks
     • Broader tension: advocacy system vs. truth-seeking function
     • Potential for significant practical impact regardless of outcome
     
     

     Relevant Precedential Cases

     Geders v. United States | 425 U.S. 80 (1976)

     Holding: Trial courts violate the Sixth Amendment by completely prohibiting defendants from speaking with counsel during overnight recesses, which are "often times of intensive work, with tactical decisions to be made and strategies to be reviewed."

     Perry v. Leeke | 488 U.S. 272 (1989)

     Holding: During brief (15-minute) recesses, trial courts may completely prohibit defendant consultation with counsel because there's "virtual certainty that any conversation would relate to ongoing testimony." However, defendants have "unrestricted access" to counsel during overnight recesses, and "discussions will inevitably include some consideration of ongoing testimony" without compromising constitutional rights.

     Key Legal Concepts Explained

     • Qualified Conferral Order: Court instruction allowing defendant-counsel consultation on some topics (trial strategy, plea negotiations) while prohibiting discussion of others (ongoing testimony) during recess
     • Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel: Constitutional guarantee of "assistance of counsel for his defence" in all criminal prosecutions
     • Attorney-Client Privilege: Protection of confidential communications between lawyer and client from disclosure
     • Witness Coaching: Improperly instructing a witness on what to say or how to testify
     • Stare Decisis: Legal principle of adhering to precedent in court decisions
     
     ]]>605b7735-7cac-4690-a4d3-769ece50e42aThu, 18 Sep 2025 09:00:00 -040015:31falsefull2025332025Oral Argument Preview | Berk v. Choy | Showdown Over Federal Uniformity and State AuthorityBerk v. Choy | Case No. 24-440 | Oral Argument Date: 10/6/25 | Docket Link: Here

     Question Presented: Whether Delaware's expert affidavit requirement for medical malpractice claims conflicts with Federal Rules of Civil Procedure when applied in federal diversity cases

     Episode Overview

     This episode examines Berk v. Choy, a case that started with a simple fall but could reshape how federal courts handle state law requirements across the country. The Supreme Court must decide whether Delaware's expert affidavit requirement for medical malpractice claims conflicts with Federal Rules of Civil Procedure when applied in federal diversity cases, presenting a fundamental clash between federal procedural uniformity and state regulatory authority.

     Roadmap

     Opening: A Fall That Could Reshape Federal Court Practice

     • Harold Berk's fall from bed leads to medical malpractice case with nationwide implications
     • Delaware's expert affidavit requirement vs. Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
     • 29 states with similar medical malpractice requirements creating potential patchwork
     
     

     The Legal Framework: Erie Meets the Federal Rules

     • Erie Doctrine (1938): Federal courts must apply state substantive law for state claims
     • Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (1938): Uniform procedures for all federal courts
     • Shady Grove Test: When Federal Rule and state law "answer the same question," Federal Rule wins
     • Tension between federal procedural uniformity and state regulatory authority
     
     

     The Shady Grove Foundation

     • Shady Grove Orthopedic Associates v. Allstate Insurance (2010) background
     • $500 individual claim vs. multimillion-dollar class action potential
     • New York's prohibition on statutory penalty class actions vs. Federal Rule 23
     • Fractured Decision: Scalia plurality vs. Stevens concurrence vs. four dissents
     
     

     The Procedural Journey: From Delaware District Court to the Supreme Court

     • Berk's five-month struggle to obtain required expert affidavit
     • Dr. Raikin's refusal despite initially supporting Berk's case
     • Multiple physicians declining to provide affidavits against other doctors
     • Third Circuit's dismissal: affidavit "not a pleading" with "different purpose"
     
     

     Petitioner's Three-Pronged Attack

     1. Direct conflict with Federal Rules 8 and 9 under Shady Grove test
     2. Uniformity concerns: Undermines federal procedural consistency established in 1938
     3. Anti-circumvention: State requirements shouldn't allow end-run around federal pleading standards
     
     

     Respondents' Three-Part Defense

     1. Separate spheres: Delaware law operates as evidentiary requirement distinct from pleading rules
     2. Erie compliance: Represents substantive state law that federal courts must respect
     3. Limited Shady Grove: Fractured decision provides narrow precedential value
     
     

     CASE SIGNIFICANCE

     The outcome will likely determine whether federal courts remain faithful to both federal procedural uniformity and state substantive authority, or whether one value must give way to the other in the modern era of complex state regulatory schemes.

     Key Legal Concepts Explained

     • Diversity Jurisdiction: Federal court authority over cases between citizens of different states involving state law claims
     • Erie Doctrine: Principle requiring federal courts to apply state substantive law in diversity cases while using federal procedure
     • Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: Uniform procedural rules governing all federal courts since 1938
     • Expert Affidavit Requirements: State laws requiring medical expert certification before proceeding with malpractice claims
     • Shady Grove Test: When Federal Rule and state law "answer the same question," Federal Rule controls
     • Procedural vs. Substantive Law: Distinction between how cases are conducted (procedural) and legal rights/remedies (substantive)
     • Forum Shopping: Practice of choosing favorable court jurisdiction for litigation advantage
     
     ]]>Berk v. Choy | Case No. 24-440 | Oral Argument Date: 10/6/25 | Docket Link: Here

     Question Presented: Whether Delaware's expert affidavit requirement for medical malpractice claims conflicts with Federal Rules of Civil Procedure when applied in federal diversity cases

     Episode Overview

     This episode examines Berk v. Choy, a case that started with a simple fall but could reshape how federal courts handle state law requirements across the country. The Supreme Court must decide whether Delaware's expert affidavit requirement for medical malpractice claims conflicts with Federal Rules of Civil Procedure when applied in federal diversity cases, presenting a fundamental clash between federal procedural uniformity and state regulatory authority.

     Roadmap

     Opening: A Fall That Could Reshape Federal Court Practice

     • Harold Berk's fall from bed leads to medical malpractice case with nationwide implications
     • Delaware's expert affidavit requirement vs. Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
     • 29 states with similar medical malpractice requirements creating potential patchwork
     
     

     The Legal Framework: Erie Meets the Federal Rules

     • Erie Doctrine (1938): Federal courts must apply state substantive law for state claims
     • Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (1938): Uniform procedures for all federal courts
     • Shady Grove Test: When Federal Rule and state law "answer the same question," Federal Rule wins
     • Tension between federal procedural uniformity and state regulatory authority
     
     

     The Shady Grove Foundation

     • Shady Grove Orthopedic Associates v. Allstate Insurance (2010) background
     • $500 individual claim vs. multimillion-dollar class action potential
     • New York's prohibition on statutory penalty class actions vs. Federal Rule 23
     • Fractured Decision: Scalia plurality vs. Stevens concurrence vs. four dissents
     
     

     The Procedural Journey: From Delaware District Court to the Supreme Court

     • Berk's five-month struggle to obtain required expert affidavit
     • Dr. Raikin's refusal despite initially supporting Berk's case
     • Multiple physicians declining to provide affidavits against other doctors
     • Third Circuit's dismissal: affidavit "not a pleading" with "different purpose"
     
     

     Petitioner's Three-Pronged Attack

     1. Direct conflict with Federal Rules 8 and 9 under Shady Grove test
     2. Uniformity concerns: Undermines federal procedural consistency established in 1938
     3. Anti-circumvention: State requirements shouldn't allow end-run around federal pleading standards
     
     

     Respondents' Three-Part Defense

     1. Separate spheres: Delaware law operates as evidentiary requirement distinct from pleading rules
     2. Erie compliance: Represents substantive state law that federal courts must respect
     3. Limited Shady Grove: Fractured decision provides narrow precedential value
     
     

     CASE SIGNIFICANCE

     The outcome will likely determine whether federal courts remain faithful to both federal procedural uniformity and state substantive authority, or whether one value must give way to the other in the modern era of complex state regulatory schemes.

     Key Legal Concepts Explained

     • Diversity Jurisdiction: Federal court authority over cases between citizens of different states involving state law claims
     • Erie Doctrine: Principle requiring federal courts to apply state substantive law in diversity cases while using federal procedure
     • Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: Uniform procedural rules governing all federal courts since 1938
     • Expert Affidavit Requirements: State laws requiring medical expert certification before proceeding with malpractice claims
     • Shady Grove Test: When Federal Rule and state law "answer the same question," Federal Rule controls
     • Procedural vs. Substantive Law: Distinction between how cases are conducted (procedural) and legal rights/remedies (substantive)
     • Forum Shopping: Practice of choosing favorable court jurisdiction for litigation advantage
     
     ]]>741170a9-5940-4ec8-ab06-9660ea609170Wed, 17 Sep 2025 09:00:00 -040017:10falsefull2025222025SCOTUS 2025 Term Launches: Your Preview Series Begins NowEpisode Overview

     The Supreme Court returns from summer recess with a blockbuster lineup of cases for October and November 2025. This episode provides a comprehensive preview of the 19 cases already scheduled for oral argument, spanning critical issues from voting rights to conversion therapy bans to criminal procedure reforms. We examine why this term opens with such consequential cases and what practitioners and citizens should watch for as the arguments unfold.

     What You'll Learn

     • Complete October & November argument schedule with key dates and case pairings
     • Why Louisiana v. Callais could be the most significant voting rights case in years - including why the Court ordered reargument with explosive new briefing
     • How Chiles v. Salazar tests the boundaries between professional regulation and First Amendment protection
     • Criminal justice cases that could reshape double jeopardy doctrine, death penalty procedures, and federal sentencing
     • What these early cases signal about the Court's priorities for the full 2025-2026 term
     
     

     Episode Roadmap

     Opening: Term Overview

     • Supreme Court's 2025-2026 schedule: 19 cases across 10 argument days
     • Why the Court frontloaded significant cases in October-November
     • What's still coming: Additional cases and argument dates to be announced
     
     

     October Arguments Deep Dive

     Week 1: October 6-8

     • Villarreal v. Texas - Sixth Amendment right to counsel during trial recesses
     • Berk v. Choy - State procedural rules in federal court
     • Chiles v. Salazar - Colorado conversion therapy ban and First Amendment clash
     • Barrett v. United States - Double jeopardy and multiple sentences
     • Bost v. Illinois Board of Elections - Standing to challenge election procedures
     • U.S. Postal Service v. Konan - Federal tort immunity for intentional mail failures
     
     

     Week 2: October 14-15

     • Criminal procedure cases: Bowe and Ellingburg on post-conviction relief and ex post facto protections
     • The blockbuster: Louisiana v. Callais reargument on voting rights and equal protection
     • Case v. Montana - Fourth Amendment emergency aid exception
     
     

     November Arguments Analysis

     Early November Focus Areas:

     • Capital punishment: Hamm v. Smith on intellectual disability assessments
     • Government contractor liability: Hencely v. Fluor Corporation
     • Prisoners' religious rights: Landor v. Louisiana Department of Corrections
     
     

     Federal Sentencing Reform Finale:

     • Fernandez, Rutherford, and Carter cases on "extraordinary and compelling" sentence reductions
     
     

     Looking Ahead: What's Next

     • Additional cases expected throughout fall
     • Pattern analysis: What these early cases reveal about Court priorities
     • Preview of upcoming episode plans for individual case deep-dives
     
     

     Key Cases Highlighted

     Must-Watch Cases

     • Louisiana v. Callais (Oct. 15) - Could fundamentally alter Voting Rights Act enforcement
     • Chiles v. Salazar (Oct. 7) - Conversion therapy ban meets First Amendment
     • Hamm v. Smith (Nov. 4) - Life-or-death intellectual disability standards
     
     

     Important for Practitioners

     • Berk v. Choy - Federal court procedure and state law intersection
     • Bost v. Illinois Board of Elections - Election law standing requirements
     • Sentencing trio (Nov. 12) - Federal prison sentence modification standards
     
     

     Technical but Significant

     • Barrett v. United States - Double jeopardy doctrine refinement
     • Case v. Montana - Fourth Amendment warrant exceptions
     • Civil procedure cases throughout November
     
     

     Resources Mentioned

     • SCOTUSblog case pages for detailed briefing schedules
     • Supreme Court argument calendars (October & November 2025)
     • Voting Rights Act Section 2 background materials
     
     ]]>Episode Overview

     The Supreme Court returns from summer recess with a blockbuster lineup of cases for October and November 2025. This episode provides a comprehensive preview of the 19 cases already scheduled for oral argument, spanning critical issues from voting rights to conversion therapy bans to criminal procedure reforms. We examine why this term opens with such consequential cases and what practitioners and citizens should watch for as the arguments unfold.

     What You'll Learn

     • Complete October & November argument schedule with key dates and case pairings
     • Why Louisiana v. Callais could be the most significant voting rights case in years - including why the Court ordered reargument with explosive new briefing
     • How Chiles v. Salazar tests the boundaries between professional regulation and First Amendment protection
     • Criminal justice cases that could reshape double jeopardy doctrine, death penalty procedures, and federal sentencing
     • What these early cases signal about the Court's priorities for the full 2025-2026 term
     
     

     Episode Roadmap

     Opening: Term Overview

     • Supreme Court's 2025-2026 schedule: 19 cases across 10 argument days
     • Why the Court frontloaded significant cases in October-November
     • What's still coming: Additional cases and argument dates to be announced
     
     

     October Arguments Deep Dive

     Week 1: October 6-8

     • Villarreal v. Texas - Sixth Amendment right to counsel during trial recesses
     • Berk v. Choy - State procedural rules in federal court
     • Chiles v. Salazar - Colorado conversion therapy ban and First Amendment clash
     • Barrett v. United States - Double jeopardy and multiple sentences
     • Bost v. Illinois Board of Elections - Standing to challenge election procedures
     • U.S. Postal Service v. Konan - Federal tort immunity for intentional mail failures
     
     

     Week 2: October 14-15

     • Criminal procedure cases: Bowe and Ellingburg on post-conviction relief and ex post facto protections
     • The blockbuster: Louisiana v. Callais reargument on voting rights and equal protection
     • Case v. Montana - Fourth Amendment emergency aid exception
     
     

     November Arguments Analysis

     Early November Focus Areas:

     • Capital punishment: Hamm v. Smith on intellectual disability assessments
     • Government contractor liability: Hencely v. Fluor Corporation
     • Prisoners' religious rights: Landor v. Louisiana Department of Corrections
     
     

     Federal Sentencing Reform Finale:

     • Fernandez, Rutherford, and Carter cases on "extraordinary and compelling" sentence reductions
     
     

     Looking Ahead: What's Next

     • Additional cases expected throughout fall
     • Pattern analysis: What these early cases reveal about Court priorities
     • Preview of upcoming episode plans for individual case deep-dives
     
     

     Key Cases Highlighted

     Must-Watch Cases

     • Louisiana v. Callais (Oct. 15) - Could fundamentally alter Voting Rights Act enforcement
     • Chiles v. Salazar (Oct. 7) - Conversion therapy ban meets First Amendment
     • Hamm v. Smith (Nov. 4) - Life-or-death intellectual disability standards
     
     

     Important for Practitioners

     • Berk v. Choy - Federal court procedure and state law intersection
     • Bost v. Illinois Board of Elections - Election law standing requirements
     • Sentencing trio (Nov. 12) - Federal prison sentence modification standards
     
     

     Technical but Significant

     • Barrett v. United States - Double jeopardy doctrine refinement
     • Case v. Montana - Fourth Amendment warrant exceptions
     • Civil procedure cases throughout November
     
     

     Resources Mentioned

     • SCOTUSblog case pages for detailed briefing schedules
     • Supreme Court argument calendars (October & November 2025)
     • Voting Rights Act Section 2 background materials
     
     ]]>b9cc8091-690f-4bf6-a3b8-60ada8071b07Mon, 15 Sep 2025 09:00:00 -040011:23falsefull2025332025A Constitutional Clash: Trump's Tariffs and the Separation of PowersOverview

     This episode examines the Supreme Court's September 9, 2025 Order that expedited review of two consolidated cases challenging President Trump's authority to impose sweeping tariffs under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), representing a constitutional clash over the separation of powers and presidential trade authority.

     Roadmap

     Opening: Explosive Constitutional Questions

     • September 9, 2025 certiorari grant and consolidation order
     • Expedited briefing schedule for November 2025 oral arguments
     • Stakes: Presidential power to tax trillions in trade and reshape the economy
     
     

     Background: The Trump Tariff Orders

     • Reciprocal Tariffs: 10% on virtually all imports, higher rates for 57 countries
     • Trafficking Tariffs: Levies on Mexico, Canada, and China for drug enforcement
     • IEEPA as claimed statutory authority for both tariff schemes
     • National emergency declarations underlying the orders
     
     

     The Central Legal Question

     • Does "regulate" in IEEPA include power to impose tariffs?
     • Constitutional separation of taxing vs. regulating powers
     • Article I distinctions between taxation and commerce regulation
     • Historical significance: "No taxation without representation"
     
     

     Lower Court Journey

     • Multiple simultaneous lawsuits in different courts
     • District court and Court of International Trade conflicting approaches
     • Federal Circuit en banc decision striking down tariffs
     • Judge Taranto's influential dissent supporting tariff authority
     
     

     Referenced Cases

     Trump v. V.O.S. Selections | Case No. 24-1286 | Docket Link: Here

     Question Presented: Whether IEEPA authorizes the President to impose these specific sweeping tariffs

     Government Arguments:

     • "Regulate" includes power to impose tariffs as lesser-included authority
     • Historical practice supports broad executive trade power during emergencies
     • Major questions doctrine doesn't apply in foreign policy contexts
     
     

     V.O.S. Arguments:

     • Constitutional separation requires clear authorization for taxation
     • "Regulate" and "tariff" are distinct powers with different purposes
     • Major questions doctrine requires explicit congressional authorization
     
     

     Learning Resources v. Trump | Case No. 24-1287 | Docket Link: Here

     Question Presented: Whether IEEPA authorizes any presidential tariffs whatsoever

     Learning Resources Arguments:

     • "Regulate" means control behavior, "tariff" means raise revenue - fundamentally different
     • No historical practice of IEEPA tariffs in nearly 50 years
     • Constitutional avoidance: IEEPA covers exports where tariffs are prohibited
     
     

     Government Arguments:

     • Plain text of "regulate importation" naturally includes tariff authority
     • Yoshida precedent shows Congress ratified tariff interpretation
     • Presidential action deserves greater deference than agency action
     
     

     Key Legal Precedents Examined

     Historical Foundation Cases

     • Gibbons v. Ogden (1824): Marshall's distinction between taxing and regulating powers
     • United States v. Yoshida International (1975): Nixon import surcharge precedent
     • Federal Energy Administration v. Algonquin SNG (1976): "Adjust imports" includes fees
     
     

     Modern Constitutional Doctrines

     • Major Questions Doctrine: Clear authorization required for "vast economic and political significance"
     • Constitutional Avoidance: Interpreting statutes to avoid constitutional problems
     • Noscitur a Sociis: "Word known by company it keeps" interpretive principle
     
     

     Strategic Legal Arguments

     Government's Core Position

     • Textual: "Regulate" includes "control" and "adjust by rule" - tariffs qualify
     • Historical: Congressional ratification of Yoshida through IEEPA enactment
     • Foreign Policy Exception: Major questions doctrine doesn't apply to national security
     • Presidential vs. Agency: Direct presidential delegation deserves greater deference
     
     

     Challengers' Core Position

     • Separation of Powers: Taxing and regulating are constitutionally distinct
     • Textual Context: Other IEEPA verbs don't involve revenue raising
     • Constitutional Avoidance: Export tax prohibition requires narrow reading
     • Major Questions: $4 trillion impact requires explicit authorization
     
     

     Broader Constitutional Implications

     If Government Wins

     • Sweeping presidential tariff authority during declared emergencies
     • Expansion of executive power over traditionally congressional domain
     • Potential model for other emergency economic powers
     
     

     If Challengers Win

     • Reinforcement of congressional primacy over taxation
     • Strengthening of major questions doctrine application to presidential action
     • Constraint on emergency powers in economic regulation
     
     

     Key Legal Concepts Explained

     • IEEPA (International Emergency Economic Powers Act): 1977 law granting emergency economic authorities
     • Major Questions Doctrine: Requirement for clear authorization for actions of vast significance
     • Constitutional Avoidance: Interpreting statutes to avoid constitutional problems
     • Separation of Powers: Constitutional division of authority between branches
     • Foreign Policy Exception: Debate over whether normal limits apply to international contexts
     
     

     Timeline and Practical Impact

     • September 19, 2025: Opening briefs due
     • September 23, 2025: Amicus briefs due
     • October 20, 2025: Response briefs due
     • October 30, 2025: Reply briefs due
     • November 2025: Oral arguments (first week)
     • Expected Decision: January 2026 or sooner
     
     ]]>Overview

     This episode examines the Supreme Court's September 9, 2025 Order that expedited review of two consolidated cases challenging President Trump's authority to impose sweeping tariffs under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), representing a constitutional clash over the separation of powers and presidential trade authority.

     Roadmap

     Opening: Explosive Constitutional Questions

     • September 9, 2025 certiorari grant and consolidation order
     • Expedited briefing schedule for November 2025 oral arguments
     • Stakes: Presidential power to tax trillions in trade and reshape the economy
     
     

     Background: The Trump Tariff Orders

     • Reciprocal Tariffs: 10% on virtually all imports, higher rates for 57 countries
     • Trafficking Tariffs: Levies on Mexico, Canada, and China for drug enforcement
     • IEEPA as claimed statutory authority for both tariff schemes
     • National emergency declarations underlying the orders
     
     

     The Central Legal Question

     • Does "regulate" in IEEPA include power to impose tariffs?
     • Constitutional separation of taxing vs. regulating powers
     • Article I distinctions between taxation and commerce regulation
     • Historical significance: "No taxation without representation"
     
     

     Lower Court Journey

     • Multiple simultaneous lawsuits in different courts
     • District court and Court of International Trade conflicting approaches
     • Federal Circuit en banc decision striking down tariffs
     • Judge Taranto's influential dissent supporting tariff authority
     
     

     Referenced Cases

     Trump v. V.O.S. Selections | Case No. 24-1286 | Docket Link: Here

     Question Presented: Whether IEEPA authorizes the President to impose these specific sweeping tariffs

     Government Arguments:

     • "Regulate" includes power to impose tariffs as lesser-included authority
     • Historical practice supports broad executive trade power during emergencies
     • Major questions doctrine doesn't apply in foreign policy contexts
     
     

     V.O.S. Arguments:

     • Constitutional separation requires clear authorization for taxation
     • "Regulate" and "tariff" are distinct powers with different purposes
     • Major questions doctrine requires explicit congressional authorization
     
     

     Learning Resources v. Trump | Case No. 24-1287 | Docket Link: Here

     Question Presented: Whether IEEPA authorizes any presidential tariffs whatsoever

     Learning Resources Arguments:

     • "Regulate" means control behavior, "tariff" means raise revenue - fundamentally different
     • No historical practice of IEEPA tariffs in nearly 50 years
     • Constitutional avoidance: IEEPA covers exports where tariffs are prohibited
     
     

     Government Arguments:

     • Plain text of "regulate importation" naturally includes tariff authority
     • Yoshida precedent shows Congress ratified tariff interpretation
     • Presidential action deserves greater deference than agency action
     
     

     Key Legal Precedents Examined

     Historical Foundation Cases

     • Gibbons v. Ogden (1824): Marshall's distinction between taxing and regulating powers
     • United States v. Yoshida International (1975): Nixon import surcharge precedent
     • Federal Energy Administration v. Algonquin SNG (1976): "Adjust imports" includes fees
     
     

     Modern Constitutional Doctrines

     • Major Questions Doctrine: Clear authorization required for "vast economic and political significance"
     • Constitutional Avoidance: Interpreting statutes to avoid constitutional problems
     • Noscitur a Sociis: "Word known by company it keeps" interpretive principle
     
     

     Strategic Legal Arguments

     Government's Core Position

     • Textual: "Regulate" includes "control" and "adjust by rule" - tariffs qualify
     • Historical: Congressional ratification of Yoshida through IEEPA enactment
     • Foreign Policy Exception: Major questions doctrine doesn't apply to national security
     • Presidential vs. Agency: Direct presidential delegation deserves greater deference
     
     

     Challengers' Core Position

     • Separation of Powers: Taxing and regulating are constitutionally distinct
     • Textual Context: Other IEEPA verbs don't involve revenue raising
     • Constitutional Avoidance: Export tax prohibition requires narrow reading
     • Major Questions: $4 trillion impact requires explicit authorization
     
     

     Broader Constitutional Implications

     If Government Wins

     • Sweeping presidential tariff authority during declared emergencies
     • Expansion of executive power over traditionally congressional domain
     • Potential model for other emergency economic powers
     
     

     If Challengers Win

     • Reinforcement of congressional primacy over taxation
     • Strengthening of major questions doctrine application to presidential action
     • Constraint on emergency powers in economic regulation
     
     

     Key Legal Concepts Explained

     • IEEPA (International Emergency Economic Powers Act): 1977 law granting emergency economic authorities
     • Major Questions Doctrine: Requirement for clear authorization for actions of vast significance
     • Constitutional Avoidance: Interpreting statutes to avoid constitutional problems
     • Separation of Powers: Constitutional division of authority between branches
     • Foreign Policy Exception: Debate over whether normal limits apply to international contexts
     
     

     Timeline and Practical Impact

     • September 19, 2025: Opening briefs due
     • September 23, 2025: Amicus briefs due
     • October 20, 2025: Response briefs due
     • October 30, 2025: Reply briefs due
     • November 2025: Oral arguments (first week)
     • Expected Decision: January 2026 or sooner
     
     ]]>dd31edb5-4d22-4fae-9ee4-f12684473803Wed, 10 Sep 2025 09:00:00 -040018:12falsefull2025112025Road Work Ahead: How Four 2024 Cases May Be Reshaping First Amendment ScrutinyThis episode examines how the Supreme Court's 2024-25 term may be quietly reshaping First Amendment doctrine through four cases that suggest new approaches to constitutional scrutiny levels.

     We analyze how the Court appears to be moving away from the mechanical application of strict, intermediate, and rational basis review established in Reed v. Town of Gilbert, instead developing more contextual approaches that consider traditional government authority, institutional expertise, and competing constitutional values.

     The episode explores Catholic Charities Bureau's traditional strict scrutiny analysis of denominational discrimination, TikTok's content-neutral treatment of national security regulations, Free Speech Coalition's novel "partial protection" theory for age verification requirements, and Mahmoud's expansion of religious liberty protection in public schools.

     Cases Covered:

     1. Catholic Charities Bureau, Inc. v. Wisconsin Labor & Industry Review Commission | Case No. 24-154 | Opinion Summary: Here;
     2. TikTok Inc. v. Garland | Case No. 24-656, 24-657 | Opinion Summary: Here;
     3. Free Speech Coalition Inc. v. Paxton | Case No. 23-1122 | Opinion Summary: Here; and
     4. Mahmoud v. Taylor | Case No. 24-297 | Opinion Summary: Here.
     
     

     Key Precedents Referenced:

     1. Reed v. Town of Gilbert;
     2. Employment Division v. Smith;
     3. Wisconsin v. Yoder;
     4. Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC; and
     5. Larson v. Valente.
     
     ]]>This episode examines how the Supreme Court's 2024-25 term may be quietly reshaping First Amendment doctrine through four cases that suggest new approaches to constitutional scrutiny levels.

     We analyze how the Court appears to be moving away from the mechanical application of strict, intermediate, and rational basis review established in Reed v. Town of Gilbert, instead developing more contextual approaches that consider traditional government authority, institutional expertise, and competing constitutional values.

     The episode explores Catholic Charities Bureau's traditional strict scrutiny analysis of denominational discrimination, TikTok's content-neutral treatment of national security regulations, Free Speech Coalition's novel "partial protection" theory for age verification requirements, and Mahmoud's expansion of religious liberty protection in public schools.

     Cases Covered:

     1. Catholic Charities Bureau, Inc. v. Wisconsin Labor & Industry Review Commission | Case No. 24-154 | Opinion Summary: Here;
     2. TikTok Inc. v. Garland | Case No. 24-656, 24-657 | Opinion Summary: Here;
     3. Free Speech Coalition Inc. v. Paxton | Case No. 23-1122 | Opinion Summary: Here; and
     4. Mahmoud v. Taylor | Case No. 24-297 | Opinion Summary: Here.
     
     

     Key Precedents Referenced:

     1. Reed v. Town of Gilbert;
     2. Employment Division v. Smith;
     3. Wisconsin v. Yoder;
     4. Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC; and
     5. Larson v. Valente.
     
     ]]>4f4e661c-6f12-409a-a559-ab40ef0542f4Tue, 19 Aug 2025 09:00:00 -040020:16falsefull20241101102024The Bostock Bounce Back? How Skrmetti's Retreat from Bostock Sets Up a SCOTUS Sports ShowdownThis episode revisits the Supreme Court's 2020 Bostock decision and examines how the Court's recent retreat from Bostock in United States v. Skrmetti sets up a constitutional showdown over transgender rights in school sports.

     We analyze the methodical legal reasoning behind Bostock's landmark ruling that Title VII protects gay and transgender employees, then explore how each faction of justices treated Bostock differently in Skrmetti's constitutional challenge to Tennessee's transgender healthcare ban.

     The episode concludes by examining how both sides strategically deployed Bostock and anticipated Skrmetti's outcome in their cert petitions for the upcoming transgender sports cases, revealing fundamental disagreements about statutory interpretation, constitutional methodology, and the scope of civil rights protections.

     Cases Covered:

     • Bostock v. Clayton County | Case No. 17-1618, 17-1623, 18-107 | Opinion: Here
     • United States v. Skrmetti | Case No. 23-477 | Opinion: Here
     • State of West Virginia v. B.P.J. | Case No. 24-735 | Docket Link: Here
     • Little v. Hecox (Idaho) | Case No. 24-38 | Docket Link: Here
     • West Virginia v. B.P.J. | Case No. 24-43 | Docket Link: Here
     
     

     Episodes Referenced:

     • August 5th Roundup: Presidential Power Crushes Agency Independence, Court Places Voting Rights Act in Crosshairs and Maryland v. Shatzer, a Case That Evolved Beyond Its Origins | Link: Here
     • July 7th Roundup: New Certs: Transgender Rights in Schools and Religious Liberties | Link: Here
     • Opinion Summary: United States v. Skrmetti | Date Decided: 6/18/25 | Case No. 23-477 | Link: Here
     • Oral Argument: United States v. Skrmetti | Case No. 23-477 | Date Argued: 12/4/24 | Link: Here
     
     

     
     

     ]]>This episode revisits the Supreme Court's 2020 Bostock decision and examines how the Court's recent retreat from Bostock in United States v. Skrmetti sets up a constitutional showdown over transgender rights in school sports.

     We analyze the methodical legal reasoning behind Bostock's landmark ruling that Title VII protects gay and transgender employees, then explore how each faction of justices treated Bostock differently in Skrmetti's constitutional challenge to Tennessee's transgender healthcare ban.

     The episode concludes by examining how both sides strategically deployed Bostock and anticipated Skrmetti's outcome in their cert petitions for the upcoming transgender sports cases, revealing fundamental disagreements about statutory interpretation, constitutional methodology, and the scope of civil rights protections.

     Cases Covered:

     • Bostock v. Clayton County | Case No. 17-1618, 17-1623, 18-107 | Opinion: Here
     • United States v. Skrmetti | Case No. 23-477 | Opinion: Here
     • State of West Virginia v. B.P.J. | Case No. 24-735 | Docket Link: Here
     • Little v. Hecox (Idaho) | Case No. 24-38 | Docket Link: Here
     • West Virginia v. B.P.J. | Case No. 24-43 | Docket Link: Here
     
     

     Episodes Referenced:

     • August 5th Roundup: Presidential Power Crushes Agency Independence, Court Places Voting Rights Act in Crosshairs and Maryland v. Shatzer, a Case That Evolved Beyond Its Origins | Link: Here
     • July 7th Roundup: New Certs: Transgender Rights in Schools and Religious Liberties | Link: Here
     • Opinion Summary: United States v. Skrmetti | Date Decided: 6/18/25 | Case No. 23-477 | Link: Here
     • Oral Argument: United States v. Skrmetti | Case No. 23-477 | Date Argued: 12/4/24 | Link: Here
     
     

     
     

     ]]>8f85f4ee-eea8-4954-8ad3-78d862f0203eMon, 11 Aug 2025 09:00:00 -040018:15falsefull20241091092024August 5th Roundup: Presidential Power Crushes Agency Independence, Court Places Voting Rights Act in Crosshairs and Maryland v. Shatzer, a Case That Evolved Beyond Its OriginsThis episode catches up on recent Supreme Court developments in the regular and emergency dockets.
     • We examine how the Court may be preparing to reshape voting rights law through Louisiana v. Callais, then dive into the contentious emergency docket battle in Trump v. Doyle over presidential firing power and agency independence.
     • The second half features an in-depth analysis of Maryland v. Shatzer (2010), exploring how a seemingly narrow Miranda ruling about re-invoking counsel rights later became a foundation for broader limitations on constitutional protections, while showcasing the fractured judicial philosophies of Justices Scalia, Stevens, and Thomas on court-made constitutional rules.
     
     

     Case Covered:

     1. Trump v. Boyle | Case No. 25A11 | Docket Link: Here
     2. Louisiana v. Callais | Case No. 24-109 | Docket Link: Here | Supplemental Briefing Order: Here (Consolidated with Robinson v. Callais | Case No. 24-110 | Docket Link: Here)
     3. Maryland v. Shatzer | Case No. No. 08-680 | Opinion: Here
     4. Vega v. Tekoh | Case No. 21–499 | Opinion: Here
     
     

     Episodes Referenced:

     Order Summary: Trump v. Wilcox | Order Date: 5/22/25 | Case No. 24A966 | Episode Link: Here

     Timestamps:

     [00:00:00] Introduction

     [00:01:58] Regular Docket Update: Louisiana v. Callais

     [00:03:09] Emergency Docket Drama: Trump v. Boyle

     [00:07:24] Deep Dive: Maryland v. Shatzer Analysis

     [00:08:20] Shatzer's Case Details and Supreme Court Ruling

     [00:19:42] Implications and Evolution of Miranda Rights

     [00:21:42] Conclusion

     ]]>This episode catches up on recent Supreme Court developments in the regular and emergency dockets.
     • We examine how the Court may be preparing to reshape voting rights law through Louisiana v. Callais, then dive into the contentious emergency docket battle in Trump v. Doyle over presidential firing power and agency independence.
     • The second half features an in-depth analysis of Maryland v. Shatzer (2010), exploring how a seemingly narrow Miranda ruling about re-invoking counsel rights later became a foundation for broader limitations on constitutional protections, while showcasing the fractured judicial philosophies of Justices Scalia, Stevens, and Thomas on court-made constitutional rules.
     
     

     Case Covered:

     1. Trump v. Boyle | Case No. 25A11 | Docket Link: Here
     2. Louisiana v. Callais | Case No. 24-109 | Docket Link: Here | Supplemental Briefing Order: Here (Consolidated with Robinson v. Callais | Case No. 24-110 | Docket Link: Here)
     3. Maryland v. Shatzer | Case No. No. 08-680 | Opinion: Here
     4. Vega v. Tekoh | Case No. 21–499 | Opinion: Here
     
     

     Episodes Referenced:

     Order Summary: Trump v. Wilcox | Order Date: 5/22/25 | Case No. 24A966 | Episode Link: Here

     Timestamps:

     [00:00:00] Introduction

     [00:01:58] Regular Docket Update: Louisiana v. Callais

     [00:03:09] Emergency Docket Drama: Trump v. Boyle

     [00:07:24] Deep Dive: Maryland v. Shatzer Analysis

     [00:08:20] Shatzer's Case Details and Supreme Court Ruling

     [00:19:42] Implications and Evolution of Miranda Rights

     [00:21:42] Conclusion

     ]]>beae2025-5eb3-4bca-a858-e2db1d324da2Tue, 05 Aug 2025 09:00:00 -040021:54falsefull20241081082024Emergency Docket Summary: SCOTUS Green Lights Mass Firings at Education Dep'tThis episode examines a July 14th Supreme Court emergency docket ruling that reveals fundamental tensions about executive power over federal agency firings at the Education Department and the limits of congressional authority.

     This episode also compares and contrasts this case (McMahon v. New York) with OPM v. AFGE, a government workforce reduction case discussed in our July 9th episode. In both cases, the government raised virtually identical arguments about standing, jurisdiction and the merits. In both cases, SCOTUS permitted the reductions to take effect while litigation played out.

     Case Covered:

     McMahon v. New York | Case No. 24A1203 | Docked Link: Here

     Bottom Line: SCOTUS allows Trump Administration to proceed with eliminating over half the Department of Education's workforce while legal challenges continue, despite lower courts finding likely constitutional violations.

     ]]>This episode examines a July 14th Supreme Court emergency docket ruling that reveals fundamental tensions about executive power over federal agency firings at the Education Department and the limits of congressional authority.

     This episode also compares and contrasts this case (McMahon v. New York) with OPM v. AFGE, a government workforce reduction case discussed in our July 9th episode. In both cases, the government raised virtually identical arguments about standing, jurisdiction and the merits. In both cases, SCOTUS permitted the reductions to take effect while litigation played out.

     Case Covered:

     McMahon v. New York | Case No. 24A1203 | Docked Link: Here

     Bottom Line: SCOTUS allows Trump Administration to proceed with eliminating over half the Department of Education's workforce while legal challenges continue, despite lower courts finding likely constitutional violations.

     ]]>a4751e12-9518-4cdd-aa80-1b0b96d894bfTue, 15 Jul 2025 09:00:00 -040016:57falsefull20241071072024Emergency Docket Summary: SCOTUS Answers the Government's Speed-DialThis episode examines two major Supreme Court emergency docket rulings that reveal fundamental tensions about presidential power, judicial authority, and constitutional rights. Both cases demonstrate the Court's willingness to grant extraordinary relief to the government while exposing deep philosophical divisions among the justices.

     Cases Covered:

     Trump v. American Federation of Government Employees | Case No. 24A1174 | Docket Link: Here

     Bottom Line: Court allows President to proceed with planning massive federal workforce reductions while legal challenges continue

     Department of Homeland Security v. D.V.D. | Case No. 24A1153 | Docket Link: Here

     Bottom Line: Court twice intervened to help government deport individuals to third countries without additional constitutional process

     ]]>This episode examines two major Supreme Court emergency docket rulings that reveal fundamental tensions about presidential power, judicial authority, and constitutional rights. Both cases demonstrate the Court's willingness to grant extraordinary relief to the government while exposing deep philosophical divisions among the justices.

     Cases Covered:

     Trump v. American Federation of Government Employees | Case No. 24A1174 | Docket Link: Here

     Bottom Line: Court allows President to proceed with planning massive federal workforce reductions while legal challenges continue

     Department of Homeland Security v. D.V.D. | Case No. 24A1153 | Docket Link: Here

     Bottom Line: Court twice intervened to help government deport individuals to third countries without additional constitutional process

     ]]>d0a68895-59e2-4854-9296-e5b9287ef911Wed, 09 Jul 2025 07:45:00 -040023:26falsefull20241061062024July 7th Roundup: New Certs: Transgender Rights in Schools and Religious LibertiesThis episode covers four major Supreme Court cases granted certiorari in summer 2024 (July 3, 2025 Miscellaneous Order: Here), examining the Court's strategic approach to constitutional law and its rapid movement on key cultural and legal issues.

     Episode Roadmap

     Opening: The Court's Strategic Acceleration

     1. Supreme Court's unusual speed in granting certiorari after major rulings
     2. Rejection of traditional "percolation" approach
     3. Why the Court chose direct review over GVR orders
     
     

     Transgender Sports Cases

     Little v. Hecox (Idaho) | Case No. 24-38 | Docket Link: Here

     1. Background: Idaho's "Fairness in Women's Sports Act" banning transgender women from women's sports teams
     2. Key Player: Lindsay Hecox, transgender student at Boise State University
     3. Ninth Circuit Reasoning: Applied heightened scrutiny; found likely Equal Protection violations
     4. Post-Skrmetti Impact: How the medical treatment precedent affects sports participation
     
     

     West Virginia v. B.P.J. | Case No. 24-43 | Docket Link: Here

     1. Background: West Virginia's H.B. 3293 categorical sports ban
     2. Key Player: B.P.J., 14-year-old transgender student with amended birth certificate
     3. Unique Factors: Puberty blockers, competitive performance, individual circumstances
     4. Fourth Circuit's Approach: Case-by-case analysis vs. categorical rules
     5. Strategic Litigation: Why B.P.J. argued for waiting on Skrmetti decision
     
     

     Religious Liberty Case

     Olivier v. City of Brandon | Case No. 24-993 | Docket Link: Here 24-1021

     1. Background: Street preaching arrest and subsequent civil rights lawsuit
     2. Core Legal Issue: Heck v. Humphrey doctrine and prospective relief
     3. Circuit Split: Fifth Circuit's restrictive approach vs. Ninth Circuit's permissive stance
     4. Key Arguments:
     5. Prospective relief exception to Heck
     6. No custody/no habeas access theory
     7. Broader Impact: Civil rights enforcement for repeat constitutional violations
     
     

     Sovereign Immunity Case

     NJT v. Colt | Case No. 24-1113 | Docket Link: Here (consolidated with Cedric Galette, Petitioner v. New Jersey Transit Corporation | Case No. 24-1021 | Docket Link: Here)

     1. Background: Manhattan pedestrian struck by NJ Transit bus
     2. Procedural Drama: Three-year delay before immunity claim
     3. Geographic Split: New York vs. Pennsylvania Supreme Court decisions
     4. "Arm of the State" Test:
     5. Treasury factor debate
     6. State control analysis
     7. Historical corporate separateness doctrine
     8. Nationwide Impact: Interstate transportation liability and state entity structure
     
     

     Key Legal Concepts Explained

     1. GVR Orders: Grant, Vacate, and Remand procedure
     2. Percolation: Allowing lower courts to develop precedent before Supreme Court intervention
     3. Heck v. Humphrey: Doctrine preventing civil suits that would invalidate criminal convictions
     4. Interstate Sovereign Immunity: Protection for states from suits in other states' courts
     5. "Arm of the State" Analysis: Multi-factor test for determining state entity immunity
     
     

     Strategic Themes

     1. Institutional Impatience: Court's rejection of gradual doctrinal development
     2. Comprehensive Constitutional Architecture: Establishing unified frameworks quickly
     3. Geographic Uniformity: Ending constitutional "lottery" based on courthouse location
     4. Cultural Battle Resolution: Court's role in settling complex social debates definitively
     
     ]]>This episode covers four major Supreme Court cases granted certiorari in summer 2024 (July 3, 2025 Miscellaneous Order: Here), examining the Court's strategic approach to constitutional law and its rapid movement on key cultural and legal issues.

     Episode Roadmap

     Opening: The Court's Strategic Acceleration

     1. Supreme Court's unusual speed in granting certiorari after major rulings
     2. Rejection of traditional "percolation" approach
     3. Why the Court chose direct review over GVR orders
     
     

     Transgender Sports Cases

     Little v. Hecox (Idaho) | Case No. 24-38 | Docket Link: Here

     1. Background: Idaho's "Fairness in Women's Sports Act" banning transgender women from women's sports teams
     2. Key Player: Lindsay Hecox, transgender student at Boise State University
     3. Ninth Circuit Reasoning: Applied heightened scrutiny; found likely Equal Protection violations
     4. Post-Skrmetti Impact: How the medical treatment precedent affects sports participation
     
     

     West Virginia v. B.P.J. | Case No. 24-43 | Docket Link: Here

     1. Background: West Virginia's H.B. 3293 categorical sports ban
     2. Key Player: B.P.J., 14-year-old transgender student with amended birth certificate
     3. Unique Factors: Puberty blockers, competitive performance, individual circumstances
     4. Fourth Circuit's Approach: Case-by-case analysis vs. categorical rules
     5. Strategic Litigation: Why B.P.J. argued for waiting on Skrmetti decision
     
     

     Religious Liberty Case

     Olivier v. City of Brandon | Case No. 24-993 | Docket Link: Here 24-1021

     1. Background: Street preaching arrest and subsequent civil rights lawsuit
     2. Core Legal Issue: Heck v. Humphrey doctrine and prospective relief
     3. Circuit Split: Fifth Circuit's restrictive approach vs. Ninth Circuit's permissive stance
     4. Key Arguments:
     5. Prospective relief exception to Heck
     6. No custody/no habeas access theory
     7. Broader Impact: Civil rights enforcement for repeat constitutional violations
     
     

     Sovereign Immunity Case

     NJT v. Colt | Case No. 24-1113 | Docket Link: Here (consolidated with Cedric Galette, Petitioner v. New Jersey Transit Corporation | Case No. 24-1021 | Docket Link: Here)

     1. Background: Manhattan pedestrian struck by NJ Transit bus
     2. Procedural Drama: Three-year delay before immunity claim
     3. Geographic Split: New York vs. Pennsylvania Supreme Court decisions
     4. "Arm of the State" Test:
     5. Treasury factor debate
     6. State control analysis
     7. Historical corporate separateness doctrine
     8. Nationwide Impact: Interstate transportation liability and state entity structure
     
     

     Key Legal Concepts Explained

     1. GVR Orders: Grant, Vacate, and Remand procedure
     2. Percolation: Allowing lower courts to develop precedent before Supreme Court intervention
     3. Heck v. Humphrey: Doctrine preventing civil suits that would invalidate criminal convictions
     4. Interstate Sovereign Immunity: Protection for states from suits in other states' courts
     5. "Arm of the State" Analysis: Multi-factor test for determining state entity immunity
     
     

     Strategic Themes

     1. Institutional Impatience: Court's rejection of gradual doctrinal development
     2. Comprehensive Constitutional Architecture: Establishing unified frameworks quickly
     3. Geographic Uniformity: Ending constitutional "lottery" based on courthouse location
     4. Cultural Battle Resolution: Court's role in settling complex social debates definitively
     
     ]]>bba8c93a-ce4c-4fad-90a6-d9d6796cb264Mon, 07 Jul 2025 09:00:00 -040024:15falsefull20241051052024June 30th Roundup: Last Week's Opinions, End of Term Stats, Deep Dive into Trump v. Casa and New Cert GrantsThis episode:
     1. Analyzes the Supreme Court's blockbuster end to the 2024-2025 term, covering the final nine opinions and examining patterns across all 61 cases decided this term.
     2. Explores the dramatic Friday release where cases "trickled out slowly" due to lengthy dissents read from the bench, dive into comprehensive term statistics, and conduct an in-depth analysis of Justice Barrett's methodological approach in Trump v. CASA—particularly her heavy reliance on historical sources versus textual analysis.
     3. Concludes with analysis of seven landmark cases the Court agreed to hear for next term, including a billion-dollar copyright battle over internet piracy (Cox v. Sony Music), a campaign finance showdown (National Republican Senatorial Committee v. FEC), and disputes over federal removal deadlines, private rights of action, and criminal fugitive tolling that could reshape fundamental areas of American law. June 30 Order List: Here.
     
     

     Episode Highlights

     Final Week Patterns: June 27th saw uniform 6-3 splits with conservative dominance, while June 26th showed more fractures with 5-4 and 6-3 divisions

     Term Overview: 61 total cases decided with a 70% reversal rate, demonstrating the Court's role as an error-correction mechanism

     Voting Consensus: 43% of cases decided unanimously (26 cases), showing remarkable agreement despite ideological divisions

     Barrett's Methodology: Deep dive into her historical originalism approach in Trump v. CASA versus her typical textualist methods in other cases

     New Cert Grants: Overview of the 7 new cases SCOTUS agreed to hear.

     Key Justice Statistics (2024-2025 Term)

     The Justices wrote 5 Per Curiam opinions.

     Justice Roberts: Authored or joined 59 opinions, authored or joined 1 concurrences and authored or joined 2 dissents.

     Justice Thomas: Authored or joined 47 opinions, authored or joined 21 concurrences and authored or joined 14 dissents.

     Justice Alito: Authored or joined 47 opinions, authored or joined 21 concurrences and authored or joined 14 dissents.

     Justice Sotomayor: Authored or joined 45 opinions, authored or joined 11 concurrences and authored or joined 13 dissents.

     Justice Kagan: Authored or joined 51 opinions, authored or joined 2 concurrences and authored or joined 9 dissents.

     Justice Gorsuch: Authored or joined 42 opinions, authored or joined 6 concurrences and authored or joined 12 dissents.

     Justice Kavanaugh: Authored or joined 57 opinions, authored or joined 9 concurrences and authored or joined 3 dissents.

     Justice Barrett: Authored or joined 54 opinions, authored or joined 10 concurrences and authored or joined 5 dissents.

     Justice Jackson: Authored or joined 41 opinions, authored or joined 12 concurrences and authored or joined 17 dissents.

     Referenced Cases

     • Trump v. CASA (universal injunctions)
     • Grupo Mexicano (historical equity test)
     • Louisiana v. Callais (relisted case)
     • Esteras v. United States (criminal sentencing)
     • Medical Marijuana v. Horn (statutory interpretation)
     • FDA v. R.J. Reynolds (administrative law)
     
     

     New Cert Grants:

     1. M & K Employee Solutions, LLC, et al. v. Trustees of the IAM National Pension Fund | Case No. 23-1209 | Docket Link: Here.
     2. Cox Communications, Inc., et al. v. Sony Music Entertainment, et al. | Case No. 24-171 | Docket Link: Here.
     3. FS Credit Opportunities Corp., et al. v. Saba Capital Master Fund, Ltd., et al. | Case No. 24-345 | Docket Link: Here.
     4. Douglas Humberto Urias-Orellana, et al. v. Bondi | No. 24-777 | Docket Link: Here.
     5. Enbridge Energy, LP, et al. v. Dana Nessel, Attorney General of Michigan, on Behalf of the People of the State of Michigan | Case No. 24-783 | Docket Link: Here.
     6. Isabel Rico v. United States | Case No. 24-1056 | Docket Link: Here.
     7. National Republican Senatorial Committee, et al. v. Federal Election Commission, et al. | Case No. 24-621 | Docket Link: Here.
     
     

     Source cited:

     • Mark Walsh, Closing the book on the term, SCOTUSblog (Jun. 27, 2025, 7:15 PM), https://www.scotusblog.com/2025/06/closing-the-book-on-the-term/
     
     

     Timestamps:

     [00:00:00] Introduction

     [00:02:13] June 27th Opinions

     [00:03:20] June 26th Opinions

     [00:04:30] Term in Review

     [00:09:48] Trump v. CASA Deep Dive: Justice Barrett's Approach

     [00:13:40] Comparing Justice Barrett's Methodology Across this Term

     [00:17:00] Grupo Mexicano Heavily Influenced Justice Barrett

     [00:19:42] Comparison of Oral Arguments to Opinion

     [00:29:33] June 30th Cert Grants

     [00:29:41] Cert Grant: M & K Employee Solutions

     [00:30:36] Cert Grant: Cox Communications v. Sony Music Entertainment

     [00:32:16] Cert Grant: FS Credit v. Saba Capital Master Fund

     [00:33:59] Cert Grant: Enbridge Energy v. Nessel

     [00:38:35] Cert Grant: Urias-Orellana v. Bondi

     [00:38:48] Cert Grant: Rico v. United States

     [00:39:56] Cert Grant: Senate Committee on Ethics v. FEC

     [00:41:22] Conclusion

     ]]>This episode:
     1. Analyzes the Supreme Court's blockbuster end to the 2024-2025 term, covering the final nine opinions and examining patterns across all 61 cases decided this term.
     2. Explores the dramatic Friday release where cases "trickled out slowly" due to lengthy dissents read from the bench, dive into comprehensive term statistics, and conduct an in-depth analysis of Justice Barrett's methodological approach in Trump v. CASA—particularly her heavy reliance on historical sources versus textual analysis.
     3. Concludes with analysis of seven landmark cases the Court agreed to hear for next term, including a billion-dollar copyright battle over internet piracy (Cox v. Sony Music), a campaign finance showdown (National Republican Senatorial Committee v. FEC), and disputes over federal removal deadlines, private rights of action, and criminal fugitive tolling that could reshape fundamental areas of American law. June 30 Order List: Here.
     
     

     Episode Highlights

     Final Week Patterns: June 27th saw uniform 6-3 splits with conservative dominance, while June 26th showed more fractures with 5-4 and 6-3 divisions

     Term Overview: 61 total cases decided with a 70% reversal rate, demonstrating the Court's role as an error-correction mechanism

     Voting Consensus: 43% of cases decided unanimously (26 cases), showing remarkable agreement despite ideological divisions

     Barrett's Methodology: Deep dive into her historical originalism approach in Trump v. CASA versus her typical textualist methods in other cases

     New Cert Grants: Overview of the 7 new cases SCOTUS agreed to hear.

     Key Justice Statistics (2024-2025 Term)

     The Justices wrote 5 Per Curiam opinions.

     Justice Roberts: Authored or joined 59 opinions, authored or joined 1 concurrences and authored or joined 2 dissents.

     Justice Thomas: Authored or joined 47 opinions, authored or joined 21 concurrences and authored or joined 14 dissents.

     Justice Alito: Authored or joined 47 opinions, authored or joined 21 concurrences and authored or joined 14 dissents.

     Justice Sotomayor: Authored or joined 45 opinions, authored or joined 11 concurrences and authored or joined 13 dissents.

     Justice Kagan: Authored or joined 51 opinions, authored or joined 2 concurrences and authored or joined 9 dissents.

     Justice Gorsuch: Authored or joined 42 opinions, authored or joined 6 concurrences and authored or joined 12 dissents.

     Justice Kavanaugh: Authored or joined 57 opinions, authored or joined 9 concurrences and authored or joined 3 dissents.

     Justice Barrett: Authored or joined 54 opinions, authored or joined 10 concurrences and authored or joined 5 dissents.

     Justice Jackson: Authored or joined 41 opinions, authored or joined 12 concurrences and authored or joined 17 dissents.

     Referenced Cases

     • Trump v. CASA (universal injunctions)
     • Grupo Mexicano (historical equity test)
     • Louisiana v. Callais (relisted case)
     • Esteras v. United States (criminal sentencing)
     • Medical Marijuana v. Horn (statutory interpretation)
     • FDA v. R.J. Reynolds (administrative law)
     
     

     New Cert Grants:

     1. M & K Employee Solutions, LLC, et al. v. Trustees of the IAM National Pension Fund | Case No. 23-1209 | Docket Link: Here.
     2. Cox Communications, Inc., et al. v. Sony Music Entertainment, et al. | Case No. 24-171 | Docket Link: Here.
     3. FS Credit Opportunities Corp., et al. v. Saba Capital Master Fund, Ltd., et al. | Case No. 24-345 | Docket Link: Here.
     4. Douglas Humberto Urias-Orellana, et al. v. Bondi | No. 24-777 | Docket Link: Here.
     5. Enbridge Energy, LP, et al. v. Dana Nessel, Attorney General of Michigan, on Behalf of the People of the State of Michigan | Case No. 24-783 | Docket Link: Here.
     6. Isabel Rico v. United States | Case No. 24-1056 | Docket Link: Here.
     7. National Republican Senatorial Committee, et al. v. Federal Election Commission, et al. | Case No. 24-621 | Docket Link: Here.
     
     

     Source cited:

     • Mark Walsh, Closing the book on the term, SCOTUSblog (Jun. 27, 2025, 7:15 PM), https://www.scotusblog.com/2025/06/closing-the-book-on-the-term/
     
     

     Timestamps:

     [00:00:00] Introduction

     [00:02:13] June 27th Opinions

     [00:03:20] June 26th Opinions

     [00:04:30] Term in Review

     [00:09:48] Trump v. CASA Deep Dive: Justice Barrett's Approach

     [00:13:40] Comparing Justice Barrett's Methodology Across this Term

     [00:17:00] Grupo Mexicano Heavily Influenced Justice Barrett

     [00:19:42] Comparison of Oral Arguments to Opinion

     [00:29:33] June 30th Cert Grants

     [00:29:41] Cert Grant: M & K Employee Solutions

     [00:30:36] Cert Grant: Cox Communications v. Sony Music Entertainment

     [00:32:16] Cert Grant: FS Credit v. Saba Capital Master Fund

     [00:33:59] Cert Grant: Enbridge Energy v. Nessel

     [00:38:35] Cert Grant: Urias-Orellana v. Bondi

     [00:38:48] Cert Grant: Rico v. United States

     [00:39:56] Cert Grant: Senate Committee on Ethics v. FEC

     [00:41:22] Conclusion

     ]]>d936b039-bcd9-44f1-b872-63bded70e67fMon, 30 Jun 2025 12:00:00 -040042:52falsefull20241041042024June 27 Opinion Summaries: Five Major Decisions That Will Shape AmericaThis episode provides a comprehensive analysis of five major Supreme Court decisions released on June 27, 2025, that collectively reshape key areas of constitutional law including judicial authority, parental rights, agency power, executive appointments, and online speech regulation. We also discuss the notable absence of a decision in Louisiana v. Callais, a complex redistricting case that many Court watchers expected to be resolved.

     Cases Covered:

     Trump v. CASA, Inc.

     • Holding: Federal district courts lack authority to issue universal injunctions that prohibit government enforcement of policies against anyone beyond the named plaintiffs
     • Vote: 6-3 (Barrett majority; Thomas, Alito, Kavanaugh concurrences; Sotomayor and Jackson dissents)
     
     

     Mahmoud v. Taylor

     • Holding: Parents challenging a school board's LGBTQ-inclusive storybooks and refusal to allow opt-outs are entitled to preliminary injunction under the Free Exercise Clause
     • Vote: 6-3 (Alito majority; Thomas concurrence; Sotomayor dissent)
     
     

     FCC v. Consumers' Research

     • Holding: The FCC's universal service contribution scheme does not violate the Constitution's nondelegation doctrine
     • Vote: 6-3 (Kagan majority; Kavanaugh and Jackson concurrences; Gorsuch dissent)
     
     

     Kennedy v. Braidwood Management, Inc.

     • Holding: U.S. Preventive Services Task Force members are inferior officers who can be constitutionally appointed by the HHS Secretary rather than requiring presidential nomination and Senate confirmation
     • Vote: 6-3 (Kavanaugh majority; Thomas dissent)
     
     

     Free Speech Coalition, Inc. v. Paxton

     • Holding: Texas's age verification law for pornographic websites is constitutional under intermediate scrutiny rather than strict scrutiny
     • Vote: 6-3 (Thomas majority; Kagan dissent)
     
     

     Pending Cases: Louisiana v. Callais. On June 27, 2025, the Court stated that it will rehear this case.

     ]]>This episode provides a comprehensive analysis of five major Supreme Court decisions released on June 27, 2025, that collectively reshape key areas of constitutional law including judicial authority, parental rights, agency power, executive appointments, and online speech regulation. We also discuss the notable absence of a decision in Louisiana v. Callais, a complex redistricting case that many Court watchers expected to be resolved.

     Cases Covered:

     Trump v. CASA, Inc.

     • Holding: Federal district courts lack authority to issue universal injunctions that prohibit government enforcement of policies against anyone beyond the named plaintiffs
     • Vote: 6-3 (Barrett majority; Thomas, Alito, Kavanaugh concurrences; Sotomayor and Jackson dissents)
     
     

     Mahmoud v. Taylor

     • Holding: Parents challenging a school board's LGBTQ-inclusive storybooks and refusal to allow opt-outs are entitled to preliminary injunction under the Free Exercise Clause
     • Vote: 6-3 (Alito majority; Thomas concurrence; Sotomayor dissent)
     
     

     FCC v. Consumers' Research

     • Holding: The FCC's universal service contribution scheme does not violate the Constitution's nondelegation doctrine
     • Vote: 6-3 (Kagan majority; Kavanaugh and Jackson concurrences; Gorsuch dissent)
     
     

     Kennedy v. Braidwood Management, Inc.

     • Holding: U.S. Preventive Services Task Force members are inferior officers who can be constitutionally appointed by the HHS Secretary rather than requiring presidential nomination and Senate confirmation
     • Vote: 6-3 (Kavanaugh majority; Thomas dissent)
     
     

     Free Speech Coalition, Inc. v. Paxton

     • Holding: Texas's age verification law for pornographic websites is constitutional under intermediate scrutiny rather than strict scrutiny
     • Vote: 6-3 (Thomas majority; Kagan dissent)
     
     

     Pending Cases: Louisiana v. Callais. On June 27, 2025, the Court stated that it will rehear this case.

     ]]>e09053bb-5cfe-448c-bfaa-2c2d2a43f807Fri, 27 Jun 2025 12:45:00 -040021:01falsefull20241031032024Opinion Summary: Free Speech Coalition, Inc. v. Paxton | Date Decided: 6/27/25 | Case No. 23-1122Opinion Summary: Free Speech Coalition, Inc. v. Paxton | Date Decided: 6/27/25 | Case No. 23-1122

     Link to Docket: Here.

     Background:

     This Court has repeatedly held that States may rationally restrict minors' access to sexual materials, but such restrictions must withstand strict scrutiny if they burden adults' access to constitutionally protected speech. See, e.g., Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. 656, 663 (2004). In the decision below, the Fifth Circuit applied rational-basis review-rather than strict scrutiny-to vacate a preliminary injunction of a provision of a Texas law that significantly burdens adults' access to protected speech, because the law's stated purpose is to protect minors.

     Question Presented:

     Whether the court of appeals erred as a matter of law in applying rational-basis review to a law burdening adults' access to protected speech, instead of strict scrutiny as this Court and other circuits have consistently done.

     Holding: H. B. 1181 triggers, and survives, review under intermediate scrutiny because it only incidentally burdens the protected speech of adults. H. B. 1181 survives intermediate scrutiny because it advances important governmental interests unrelated to the suppression of free speech and does not burden substantially more speech than necessary to further those interests.

     Result: Affirmed.

     Voting Breakdown: 6-3. Justice Thomas delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Alito, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh and Barrett joined. Justice Kagan filed a dissenting opinion in which Justices Sotomayor and Jackson joined.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     • For Petitioners: Derek L. Shaffer, Washington, D.C.
     • For United States, as amicus curiae: Brian H. Fletcher, Principal Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.
     • For Respondent: Aaron L. Nielson, Solicitor General, Austin, Tex.
     
     

     Website Link to Oral Argument: Here.

     Apple Podcast Link to Oral Argument: Here.

     ]]>Opinion Summary: Free Speech Coalition, Inc. v. Paxton | Date Decided: 6/27/25 | Case No. 23-1122

     Link to Docket: Here.

     Background:

     This Court has repeatedly held that States may rationally restrict minors' access to sexual materials, but such restrictions must withstand strict scrutiny if they burden adults' access to constitutionally protected speech. See, e.g., Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. 656, 663 (2004). In the decision below, the Fifth Circuit applied rational-basis review-rather than strict scrutiny-to vacate a preliminary injunction of a provision of a Texas law that significantly burdens adults' access to protected speech, because the law's stated purpose is to protect minors.

     Question Presented:

     Whether the court of appeals erred as a matter of law in applying rational-basis review to a law burdening adults' access to protected speech, instead of strict scrutiny as this Court and other circuits have consistently done.

     Holding: H. B. 1181 triggers, and survives, review under intermediate scrutiny because it only incidentally burdens the protected speech of adults. H. B. 1181 survives intermediate scrutiny because it advances important governmental interests unrelated to the suppression of free speech and does not burden substantially more speech than necessary to further those interests.

     Result: Affirmed.

     Voting Breakdown: 6-3. Justice Thomas delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Alito, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh and Barrett joined. Justice Kagan filed a dissenting opinion in which Justices Sotomayor and Jackson joined.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     • For Petitioners: Derek L. Shaffer, Washington, D.C.
     • For United States, as amicus curiae: Brian H. Fletcher, Principal Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.
     • For Respondent: Aaron L. Nielson, Solicitor General, Austin, Tex.
     
     

     Website Link to Oral Argument: Here.

     Apple Podcast Link to Oral Argument: Here.

     ]]>9c91385e-2fbb-4e5e-98e9-a7f8eacdfcddFri, 27 Jun 2025 11:45:00 -040023:02falsefull20241021022024Opinion Summary: Mahmoud v. Taylor | Date Decided: 6/27/25 | Case No. 24-297Opinion Summary: Mahmoud v. Taylor | Date Decided: 6/27/25 | Case No. 24-297

     Link to Docket: Here.

     Background:

     Respondent Montgomery County Board of Education requires elementary school teachers to read their students storybooks celebrating gender transitions, Pride parades, and same-sex playground romance. The storybooks were chosen to disrupt "cisnormativity" and "either/or thinking" among students. The Board's own principals objected that the curriculum was "not appropriate for the intended age group," presented gender ideology as "fact," "sham[ed]" students with contrary opinions, and was "dismissive of religious beliefs." The Board initially allowed parents to opt their kids out- but then reversed course, saying that no opt-outs would be permitted and that parents would not even be notified when the storybooks were read.

     Petitioners filed suit, not challenging the curriculum, but arguing that compelling their elementary-age children to participate in instruction contrary to their parents' religious convictions violated the Free Exercise Clause. Construing Wisconsin v. Yoder, the Fourth Circuit found no free-exercise burden because no one was forced "to change their religious beliefs or conduct."

     Question Presented:

     Whether public schools burden parents' religious exercise when they compel elementary school children to participate in instruction on gender and sexuality against their parents' religious convictions and with-out notice or opportunity to opt out.

     Holding: Parents challenging the Board's introduction of the "LGBTQ+-inclusive" storybooks, along with its decision to withhold opt outs, are entitled to a preliminary injunction.

     Result: Reversed and remanded.

     Voting Breakdown: 6-3. Justice Alito delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh and Barrett joined. Justice Thomas filed a concurring opinion. Justice Sotomayor filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Kagan and Jackson joined.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     • For Petitioners: Eric S. Baxter, Washington, D.C.; and Sarah M. Harris, Principal Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. (for United States, as amicus curiae.)
     • For Respondents: Alan E. Schoenfeld, New York, N.Y.
     
     

     Website Link to Oral Argument: Here.

     Apple Podcast Link to Oral Argument: Here.

     ]]>Opinion Summary: Mahmoud v. Taylor | Date Decided: 6/27/25 | Case No. 24-297

     Link to Docket: Here.

     Background:

     Respondent Montgomery County Board of Education requires elementary school teachers to read their students storybooks celebrating gender transitions, Pride parades, and same-sex playground romance. The storybooks were chosen to disrupt "cisnormativity" and "either/or thinking" among students. The Board's own principals objected that the curriculum was "not appropriate for the intended age group," presented gender ideology as "fact," "sham[ed]" students with contrary opinions, and was "dismissive of religious beliefs." The Board initially allowed parents to opt their kids out- but then reversed course, saying that no opt-outs would be permitted and that parents would not even be notified when the storybooks were read.

     Petitioners filed suit, not challenging the curriculum, but arguing that compelling their elementary-age children to participate in instruction contrary to their parents' religious convictions violated the Free Exercise Clause. Construing Wisconsin v. Yoder, the Fourth Circuit found no free-exercise burden because no one was forced "to change their religious beliefs or conduct."

     Question Presented:

     Whether public schools burden parents' religious exercise when they compel elementary school children to participate in instruction on gender and sexuality against their parents' religious convictions and with-out notice or opportunity to opt out.

     Holding: Parents challenging the Board's introduction of the "LGBTQ+-inclusive" storybooks, along with its decision to withhold opt outs, are entitled to a preliminary injunction.

     Result: Reversed and remanded.

     Voting Breakdown: 6-3. Justice Alito delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh and Barrett joined. Justice Thomas filed a concurring opinion. Justice Sotomayor filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Kagan and Jackson joined.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     • For Petitioners: Eric S. Baxter, Washington, D.C.; and Sarah M. Harris, Principal Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. (for United States, as amicus curiae.)
     • For Respondents: Alan E. Schoenfeld, New York, N.Y.
     
     

     Website Link to Oral Argument: Here.

     Apple Podcast Link to Oral Argument: Here.

     ]]>22c4ecc3-ee24-4846-b8f7-b621e242d2c5Fri, 27 Jun 2025 11:30:00 -040028:19falsefull20241061062024Opinion Summary: FCC v. Consumers' Research | Date Decided: 6/27/25 | Case No. 24-354Opinion Summary: FCC v. Consumers' Research | Date Decided: 6/27/25 | Case No. 24-354

     This case was consolidated with: SHLB Coalition V. Consumers' Research, Case No. 23-422.

     Link to Docket: Here.

     Background:

     In 47 U.S.C. 254, Congress required the Federal Communications Commission (Commission) to operate universal service subsidy programs using mandatory contributions from telecommunications carriers. The Commission has appointed a private company as the programs' Administrator, authorizing that company to perform administrative tasks such as sending out bills, collecting contributions, and disbursing funds to beneficiaries.

     Questions Presented:

     1. Whether Congress violated the nondelegation doctrine by authorizing the Commission to determine, within the limits set forth in Section 254, the amount that providers must contribute to the Fund.

     2. Whether the Commission violated the nondelegation doctrine by using the Administrator's financial projections in computing universal service contribution rates.

     3. Whether the combination of Congress's conferral of authority on the Commission and the Commission's delegation of administrative responsibilities to the Administrator violates the nondelegation doctrine.

     Holding: The universal-service contribution scheme does not violate the nondelegation doctrine.

     Result: Reversed and remanded.

     Voting Breakdown: 6-3. Justice Kagan delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Sotomayor, Kavanaugh, Barrett and Jackson joined. Justice Kavanaugh and Justice Jackson filed concurring opinions. Justice Gorsuch filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Thomas and Alito joined.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     • For Petitioners in 24-354: Sarah M. Harris, Acting Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.
     • For Petitioners in 24-422: Paul D. Clement, Alexandria, Va.
     • For Respondents: R. Trent McCotter, Washington, D.C.
     
     

     Website Link to Oral Argument: Here.

     Apple Podcast Link to Oral Argument: Here.

     ]]>Opinion Summary: FCC v. Consumers' Research | Date Decided: 6/27/25 | Case No. 24-354

     This case was consolidated with: SHLB Coalition V. Consumers' Research, Case No. 23-422.

     Link to Docket: Here.

     Background:

     In 47 U.S.C. 254, Congress required the Federal Communications Commission (Commission) to operate universal service subsidy programs using mandatory contributions from telecommunications carriers. The Commission has appointed a private company as the programs' Administrator, authorizing that company to perform administrative tasks such as sending out bills, collecting contributions, and disbursing funds to beneficiaries.

     Questions Presented:

     1. Whether Congress violated the nondelegation doctrine by authorizing the Commission to determine, within the limits set forth in Section 254, the amount that providers must contribute to the Fund.

     2. Whether the Commission violated the nondelegation doctrine by using the Administrator's financial projections in computing universal service contribution rates.

     3. Whether the combination of Congress's conferral of authority on the Commission and the Commission's delegation of administrative responsibilities to the Administrator violates the nondelegation doctrine.

     Holding: The universal-service contribution scheme does not violate the nondelegation doctrine.

     Result: Reversed and remanded.

     Voting Breakdown: 6-3. Justice Kagan delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Sotomayor, Kavanaugh, Barrett and Jackson joined. Justice Kavanaugh and Justice Jackson filed concurring opinions. Justice Gorsuch filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Thomas and Alito joined.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     • For Petitioners in 24-354: Sarah M. Harris, Acting Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.
     • For Petitioners in 24-422: Paul D. Clement, Alexandria, Va.
     • For Respondents: R. Trent McCotter, Washington, D.C.
     
     

     Website Link to Oral Argument: Here.

     Apple Podcast Link to Oral Argument: Here.

     ]]>b417323a-3e34-41d4-ae0b-48aff15d7eaaFri, 27 Jun 2025 11:00:00 -040050:54falsefull20241041042024Opinion Summary: Kennedy v. Braidwood Mgmt., Inc. | Date Decided: 6/27/25 | Case No. 24-316Opinion Summary: Kennedy v. Braidwood Mgmt., Inc. | Date Decided: 6/27/25 | Case No. 24-316

     Host Note: On 4/25/25, the Supreme Court ordered the parties to “file supplemental letter briefs addressing the following question: Whether Congress has ‘by Law’ vested the Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services with the authority to appoint members of the United States Preventive Services Task Force. U. S. Const. art. II, §2, cl. 2.” Link to 4/25/25 Order: Here. On 5/5/25, the parties filed supplemental letter briefs.

     Link to Docket: Here.

     Background:

     The U.S. Preventive Services Task Force (Task Force), which sits within the Public Health Service of the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), issues clinical recommendations for preventive medical services, such as screenings and medications to prevent serious diseases. Under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111 -148, 124 Stat. 119, health insurance issuers and group health plans must cover certain preventive services recommended by the Task Force without imposing any cost-sharing requirements on patients. 42 U.S.C. 300gg-13(a)(1).

     Question Presented:

     Whether the court of appeals erred in holding that the structure of the Task Force violates the Appointments Clause of the United States Constitution and in declining to sever the statutory provision that it found to unduly insulate the Task Force from the HHS Secretary’s supervision.

     Holding:

     Result:

     Voting Breakdown:

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     • For Petitioners: Hashim M. Mooppan, Principal Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.
     • For Respondents: Jonathan F. Mitchell, Austin, Tex.
     
     

     Website Link to Oral Argument: Here.

     Apple Podcast Link to Oral Argument: Here.

     ]]>Opinion Summary: Kennedy v. Braidwood Mgmt., Inc. | Date Decided: 6/27/25 | Case No. 24-316

     Host Note: On 4/25/25, the Supreme Court ordered the parties to “file supplemental letter briefs addressing the following question: Whether Congress has ‘by Law’ vested the Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services with the authority to appoint members of the United States Preventive Services Task Force. U. S. Const. art. II, §2, cl. 2.” Link to 4/25/25 Order: Here. On 5/5/25, the parties filed supplemental letter briefs.

     Link to Docket: Here.

     Background:

     The U.S. Preventive Services Task Force (Task Force), which sits within the Public Health Service of the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), issues clinical recommendations for preventive medical services, such as screenings and medications to prevent serious diseases. Under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111 -148, 124 Stat. 119, health insurance issuers and group health plans must cover certain preventive services recommended by the Task Force without imposing any cost-sharing requirements on patients. 42 U.S.C. 300gg-13(a)(1).

     Question Presented:

     Whether the court of appeals erred in holding that the structure of the Task Force violates the Appointments Clause of the United States Constitution and in declining to sever the statutory provision that it found to unduly insulate the Task Force from the HHS Secretary’s supervision.

     Holding:

     Result:

     Voting Breakdown:

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     • For Petitioners: Hashim M. Mooppan, Principal Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.
     • For Respondents: Jonathan F. Mitchell, Austin, Tex.
     
     

     Website Link to Oral Argument: Here.

     Apple Podcast Link to Oral Argument: Here.

     ]]>92b99396-85b1-420a-b7bb-0d382257dc3aFri, 27 Jun 2025 10:45:00 -040025:04falsefull20241051052024Opinion Summary: Trump, President of U.S. v. Casa, Inc. | Date Decided: 6/27/25 | Case No. 24A884Opinion Summary: Trump, President of U.S. v. Casa, Inc. | Date Decided: 6/27/25 | Case No. 24A884

     Links to Docket: Here (Case No. 24A884); Here (Case No. 24A885); and Here (Case No. 24A886).

     Questions Presented:

     1. Whether the Supreme Court should stay the district courts' nationwide preliminary injunctions on the Trump administration’s 1/20/25 executive order ending birthright citizenship except as to the individual plaintiffs and identified members of the organizational plaintiffs or states.
     2. Whether district courts have the authority to issue nationwide preliminary injunctions irrespective of class-action certification.
     
     

     Background:

     1. On January 20, 2025, President Trump issued an Executive Order regarding birthright citizenship.
     2. Section 1 of the Order recognizes that the Constitution and the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), 8 U.S.C. 1101 et seq., confer citizenship upon all persons born in the United States and subject to the jurisdiction thereof.
     3. Specifically, the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides that “[a]ll persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside.” U.S. Const. Amend. XIV, § 1. That provision, known as the Citizenship Clause, repudiated Dred Scott v. Sandford, 19 How. 393 (1857), which infamously misinterpreted the Constitution to deny U.S. citizenship to people of African descent based solely on their race. Congress has reaffirmed the Citizenship Clause in the INA, which provides that “a person born in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof,” is a citizen of the United States. 8 U.S.C. 1401(a).
     4. Section 1 of the Order identifies two circumstances in which a person born in the United States is not subject to its jurisdiction: “(1) when that person’s mother was unlawfully present in the United States and the father was not a United States citizen or lawful permanent resident at the time of said person’s birth, or (2) when that 6 person’s mother’s presence in the United States at the time of said person’s birth was lawful but temporary (such as, but not limited to, visiting the United States under the auspices of the Visa Waiver Program or visiting on a student, work, or tourist visa) and the father was not a United States citizen or lawful permanent resident at the time of said person’s birth.” Citizenship Order § 1.
     5. Section 2 of the Order directs the Executive Branch (1) not to issue documents recognizing U.S. citizenship to the persons identified in Section 1 and (2) not to accept documents issued by state, local, or other governments purporting to recognize the U.S. citizenship of such persons. See Citizenship Order § 2(a). Section 2 specifies that those directives “apply only to persons who are born within the United States after 30 days from the date of this order,” i.e., after February 19. Id. § 2(b).
     6. Three district courts in Maryland, Massachusetts, and Washington have issued overlapping nationwide injunctions at the behest of 22 States, two organizations, and seven individuals. Those universal injunctions prohibit a Day 1 Executive Order from being enforced anywhere in the country, as to “hundreds of thousands” of unspecified individuals who are “not before the court nor identified by the court.”
     7. Three Circuit Courts of Appeals refused to limit the nationwide injunctions.
     
     

     Holding: Universal injunctions likely exceed the equitable authority that Congress has given to federal courts. The Court grants the Government's applications for a partial stay of the injunctions entered below, but only to the extent that the injunctions are broader than necessary to provide complete relief to each plaintiff with standing to sue.

     Result: Applications for partial stays granted.

     Voting Breakdown: 6-3. Justice Barrett delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Alito, Gorsuch, and Kavanaugh joined. Justice Thomas filed a concurring opinion, in which Justice Gorsuch joined. Justice Alito filed a concurring opinion, in which Justice Thomas joined. Justice Kavanaugh filed a concurring opinion. Justice Sotomayor filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Kagan and Jackson joined. Justice Jackson filed a dissenting opinion.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     • For Applicants: D. John Sauer, Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.
     • For State and City Respondents: Jeremy M. Feigenbaum, Solicitor General, Trenton, N.J.
     • For Private Respondents: Kelsi B. Corkran, Washington, D.C.
     
     

     Website Link to Oral Argument: Here.

     Apple Podcast Link to Oral Argument: Here.

     ]]>Opinion Summary: Trump, President of U.S. v. Casa, Inc. | Date Decided: 6/27/25 | Case No. 24A884

     Links to Docket: Here (Case No. 24A884); Here (Case No. 24A885); and Here (Case No. 24A886).

     Questions Presented:

     1. Whether the Supreme Court should stay the district courts' nationwide preliminary injunctions on the Trump administration’s 1/20/25 executive order ending birthright citizenship except as to the individual plaintiffs and identified members of the organizational plaintiffs or states.
     2. Whether district courts have the authority to issue nationwide preliminary injunctions irrespective of class-action certification.
     
     

     Background:

     1. On January 20, 2025, President Trump issued an Executive Order regarding birthright citizenship.
     2. Section 1 of the Order recognizes that the Constitution and the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), 8 U.S.C. 1101 et seq., confer citizenship upon all persons born in the United States and subject to the jurisdiction thereof.
     3. Specifically, the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides that “[a]ll persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside.” U.S. Const. Amend. XIV, § 1. That provision, known as the Citizenship Clause, repudiated Dred Scott v. Sandford, 19 How. 393 (1857), which infamously misinterpreted the Constitution to deny U.S. citizenship to people of African descent based solely on their race. Congress has reaffirmed the Citizenship Clause in the INA, which provides that “a person born in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof,” is a citizen of the United States. 8 U.S.C. 1401(a).
     4. Section 1 of the Order identifies two circumstances in which a person born in the United States is not subject to its jurisdiction: “(1) when that person’s mother was unlawfully present in the United States and the father was not a United States citizen or lawful permanent resident at the time of said person’s birth, or (2) when that 6 person’s mother’s presence in the United States at the time of said person’s birth was lawful but temporary (such as, but not limited to, visiting the United States under the auspices of the Visa Waiver Program or visiting on a student, work, or tourist visa) and the father was not a United States citizen or lawful permanent resident at the time of said person’s birth.” Citizenship Order § 1.
     5. Section 2 of the Order directs the Executive Branch (1) not to issue documents recognizing U.S. citizenship to the persons identified in Section 1 and (2) not to accept documents issued by state, local, or other governments purporting to recognize the U.S. citizenship of such persons. See Citizenship Order § 2(a). Section 2 specifies that those directives “apply only to persons who are born within the United States after 30 days from the date of this order,” i.e., after February 19. Id. § 2(b).
     6. Three district courts in Maryland, Massachusetts, and Washington have issued overlapping nationwide injunctions at the behest of 22 States, two organizations, and seven individuals. Those universal injunctions prohibit a Day 1 Executive Order from being enforced anywhere in the country, as to “hundreds of thousands” of unspecified individuals who are “not before the court nor identified by the court.”
     7. Three Circuit Courts of Appeals refused to limit the nationwide injunctions.
     
     

     Holding: Universal injunctions likely exceed the equitable authority that Congress has given to federal courts. The Court grants the Government's applications for a partial stay of the injunctions entered below, but only to the extent that the injunctions are broader than necessary to provide complete relief to each plaintiff with standing to sue.

     Result: Applications for partial stays granted.

     Voting Breakdown: 6-3. Justice Barrett delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Alito, Gorsuch, and Kavanaugh joined. Justice Thomas filed a concurring opinion, in which Justice Gorsuch joined. Justice Alito filed a concurring opinion, in which Justice Thomas joined. Justice Kavanaugh filed a concurring opinion. Justice Sotomayor filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Kagan and Jackson joined. Justice Jackson filed a dissenting opinion.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     • For Applicants: D. John Sauer, Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.
     • For State and City Respondents: Jeremy M. Feigenbaum, Solicitor General, Trenton, N.J.
     • For Private Respondents: Kelsi B. Corkran, Washington, D.C.
     
     

     Website Link to Oral Argument: Here.

     Apple Podcast Link to Oral Argument: Here.

     ]]>28290791-0141-45c5-bb91-d402a658d0adFri, 27 Jun 2025 10:30:00 -040054:16falsefull20241071072024Opinion Summary: Riley v. Bondi | Date Decided: 6/26/25 | Case No. 23–1270Opinion Summary: Riley v. Bondi | Date Decided: 6/26/25 | Case No. 23–1270

     Link to Docket: Here.

     Background:

     Petitioner Pierre Riley, ineligible for cancellation of removal or discretionary relief from removal, sought deferral in withholding-only proceedings, pursuant to the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment. After the Board of Immigration Appeals issued a decision reversing an immigration judge's grant of relief, Riley promptly petitioned for review by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. Although both parties urged the court to decide the merits of the case, the Fourth Circuit dismissed Riley's petition for lack of jurisdiction pursuant to 8 U.S.C. 1252(b)(1), which states "[t]he petition for review must be filed not later than 30 days after the date of the final order of removal."

     This holding implicates two circuit splits, each of which independently warrants review.

     Questions Presented:

     1. Whether 8 U.S.C. 1252(b)(1)'s 30-day deadline is jurisdictional, or merely a mandatory claims-processing rule that can be waived or forfeited.
     2. Whether a person can obtain review of the BIA's decision in a withholding-only proceeding by filing a petition within 30 days of that BIA decision?
     
     

     Holding: 1. BIA orders denying deferral of removal in "withholding-only" proceedings are not "final order[s] of removal" under Section 1252(b)(1). An "order of removal" includes an "order of deportation," which, in turn, is defined as an order "concluding that the alien is deportable or ordering deportation." 2. The 30-day filing deadline under Section 1252(b)(1) is a claims-processing rule, not a jurisdictional requirement.

     Result: Vacated and remanded.

     Voting Breakdown: 5-4 as to the holding that BIA orders denying deferral of removal in "withholding-only" proceedings are not "final order[s] of removal" under Section 1252(b)(1). 9-0 as to the holding that the 30-day filing deadline under Section 1252(b)(1) is a claims-processing rule, not a jurisdictional requirement.

     Justice Alito delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Kavanaugh, and Barrett joined in full, and in which Justices Sotomayor, Kagan, Gorsuch, and Jackson joined only as to Part II–B. Justice Thomas filed a concurring opinion. Justice Sotomayor filed an opinion dissenting in part, in which Justices Kagan and Jackson joined in full, and in which Justice Gorsuch joined except as to Part IV.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     • For Petitioner:
     • For Respondent:
     
     

     Website Link to Oral Argument: Here.

     Apple Podcast Link to Oral Argument: Here.

     ]]>Opinion Summary: Riley v. Bondi | Date Decided: 6/26/25 | Case No. 23–1270

     Link to Docket: Here.

     Background:

     Petitioner Pierre Riley, ineligible for cancellation of removal or discretionary relief from removal, sought deferral in withholding-only proceedings, pursuant to the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment. After the Board of Immigration Appeals issued a decision reversing an immigration judge's grant of relief, Riley promptly petitioned for review by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. Although both parties urged the court to decide the merits of the case, the Fourth Circuit dismissed Riley's petition for lack of jurisdiction pursuant to 8 U.S.C. 1252(b)(1), which states "[t]he petition for review must be filed not later than 30 days after the date of the final order of removal."

     This holding implicates two circuit splits, each of which independently warrants review.

     Questions Presented:

     1. Whether 8 U.S.C. 1252(b)(1)'s 30-day deadline is jurisdictional, or merely a mandatory claims-processing rule that can be waived or forfeited.
     2. Whether a person can obtain review of the BIA's decision in a withholding-only proceeding by filing a petition within 30 days of that BIA decision?
     
     

     Holding: 1. BIA orders denying deferral of removal in "withholding-only" proceedings are not "final order[s] of removal" under Section 1252(b)(1). An "order of removal" includes an "order of deportation," which, in turn, is defined as an order "concluding that the alien is deportable or ordering deportation." 2. The 30-day filing deadline under Section 1252(b)(1) is a claims-processing rule, not a jurisdictional requirement.

     Result: Vacated and remanded.

     Voting Breakdown: 5-4 as to the holding that BIA orders denying deferral of removal in "withholding-only" proceedings are not "final order[s] of removal" under Section 1252(b)(1). 9-0 as to the holding that the 30-day filing deadline under Section 1252(b)(1) is a claims-processing rule, not a jurisdictional requirement.

     Justice Alito delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Kavanaugh, and Barrett joined in full, and in which Justices Sotomayor, Kagan, Gorsuch, and Jackson joined only as to Part II–B. Justice Thomas filed a concurring opinion. Justice Sotomayor filed an opinion dissenting in part, in which Justices Kagan and Jackson joined in full, and in which Justice Gorsuch joined except as to Part IV.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     • For Petitioner:
     • For Respondent:
     
     

     Website Link to Oral Argument: Here.

     Apple Podcast Link to Oral Argument: Here.

     ]]>74c39d97-4e2b-43b2-bbb1-2df7ae0612b6Thu, 26 Jun 2025 12:30:00 -040029:16falsefull20241011012024Opinion Summary: Gutierrez v. Saenz | Date Decided: 6/26/25 | Case No. 23-7809Opinion Summary: Gutierrez v. Saenz | Date Decided: 6/26/25 | Case No. 23-7809

     Link to Docket: Here.

     Background:

     In Reed v. Goertz, 598 U.S. 230 (2023), this Court held that Rodney Reed has standing to pursue a declaratory judgment that Texas's post-conviction DNA statute was unconstitutional because ''Reed suffered an injury in fact," the named defendant "caused Reed's injury," and if a federal court concludes that Texas's statute violates due process, it is "substantially likely that the state prosecutor would abide by such a court order."

     In this case, a divided panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit refused to follow that ruling over a dissent that recognized that this case was indistinguishable from Reed. The majority formulated its own novel test for Article III standing, which requires scouring the record of the parties' dispute and any legal arguments asserted, to predict whether the defendants in a particular case would actually redress the plaintiff’s injury by complying with a federal court's declaratory judgment. Gutierrez v. Saenz, 93 F.4th 267, 274 (5th Cir. 2024).

     The Fifth Circuit's new test conflicts with Reed and creates a circuit split with the United States Courts of Appeals for the Eighth and Ninth Circuits, which have applied the standing doctrine exactly as this Court directed in Reed. See Johnson v. Griffin, 69 F.4th 506 (8th Cir. 2023); Redd v. Guerrero, 84 F.4th 874 (9th Cir. 2023).

     Question Presented: Does Article III standing require a particularized determination of whether a specific state official will redress the plaintiff’s injury by following a favorable declaratory judgment?

     Holding: Gutierrez has standing to bring his Section 1983 claim challenging Texas's postconviction DNA testing procedures under the Due Process Clause.

     Result: Reversed and remanded.

     Voting Breakdown: 6-3. Justice Sotomayor delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Kagan, Kavanaugh, and Jackson joined, and in which Justice Barrett joined as to all but Part II.B.2. Justice Barrett filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment. Justice Thomas filed a dissenting opinion. Justice Alito filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Thomas and Gorsuch joined.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     • For petitioner: Anne E. Fisher, Assistant Federal Defender, Philadelphia, Pa.
     • For respondents: William F. Cole, Deputy Solicitor General, Austin, Tex.
     
     

     Website Link to Oral Argument: Here.

     Apple Podcast Link to Oral Argument: Here.

     ]]>Opinion Summary: Gutierrez v. Saenz | Date Decided: 6/26/25 | Case No. 23-7809

     Link to Docket: Here.

     Background:

     In Reed v. Goertz, 598 U.S. 230 (2023), this Court held that Rodney Reed has standing to pursue a declaratory judgment that Texas's post-conviction DNA statute was unconstitutional because ''Reed suffered an injury in fact," the named defendant "caused Reed's injury," and if a federal court concludes that Texas's statute violates due process, it is "substantially likely that the state prosecutor would abide by such a court order."

     In this case, a divided panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit refused to follow that ruling over a dissent that recognized that this case was indistinguishable from Reed. The majority formulated its own novel test for Article III standing, which requires scouring the record of the parties' dispute and any legal arguments asserted, to predict whether the defendants in a particular case would actually redress the plaintiff’s injury by complying with a federal court's declaratory judgment. Gutierrez v. Saenz, 93 F.4th 267, 274 (5th Cir. 2024).

     The Fifth Circuit's new test conflicts with Reed and creates a circuit split with the United States Courts of Appeals for the Eighth and Ninth Circuits, which have applied the standing doctrine exactly as this Court directed in Reed. See Johnson v. Griffin, 69 F.4th 506 (8th Cir. 2023); Redd v. Guerrero, 84 F.4th 874 (9th Cir. 2023).

     Question Presented: Does Article III standing require a particularized determination of whether a specific state official will redress the plaintiff’s injury by following a favorable declaratory judgment?

     Holding: Gutierrez has standing to bring his Section 1983 claim challenging Texas's postconviction DNA testing procedures under the Due Process Clause.

     Result: Reversed and remanded.

     Voting Breakdown: 6-3. Justice Sotomayor delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Kagan, Kavanaugh, and Jackson joined, and in which Justice Barrett joined as to all but Part II.B.2. Justice Barrett filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment. Justice Thomas filed a dissenting opinion. Justice Alito filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Thomas and Gorsuch joined.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     • For petitioner: Anne E. Fisher, Assistant Federal Defender, Philadelphia, Pa.
     • For respondents: William F. Cole, Deputy Solicitor General, Austin, Tex.
     
     

     Website Link to Oral Argument: Here.

     Apple Podcast Link to Oral Argument: Here.

     ]]>e5960303-c19f-4039-9357-a7b32f358a5dThu, 26 Jun 2025 11:45:00 -040027:52falsefull20241011012024Opinion Summary: Medina v. Planned Parenthood South Atlantic | Date Decided: 6/26/25 | Case No. 23–1275Opinion Summary: Medina v. Planned Parenthood South Atlantic | Date Decided: 6/26/25 | Case No. 23–1275

     Link to Docket: Here.

     Background:

     More than 30 years ago, this Court first applied what would become known as the "Blessing factors," holding that a Medicaid Act provision created a privately enforceable right to certain reimbursement rates. Wilder v. Va. Hosp. Ass'n, 496 U.S. 498, 509-10 (1990). Later, the Court distilled from Wilder a multi-factor test for deciding whether a "statutory provision gives rise to a federal right" privately enforceable under Section 1983. Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329, 340 (1997). Five years later, though, the Court disparaged Blessing's test while clarifying that only "an unambiguously conferred right is enforceable by § 1983." Gonzaga University v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 282 (2002). Then, in Health & Hospital Corp. of Marion County v. Talevski, 599 U.S. 166, 180 (2023), the Court doubled down on Gonzaga's "demanding bar."

     The Court did not apply Blessing or Wilder in Talevski, but it did not overrule them either. After the Court GVR'd this case in light of Talevski, the Fourth Circuit applied Wilder and Blessing again and reaffirmed its prior opinions, maintaining a 5-2 circuit split over the first question presented and a 3-1 circuit split over the proper reading of O'Bannon v. Town Court Nursing Center, 447 U.S. 773 (1980), which frames the second question.

     Questions Presented:

     1. Whether the Medicaid Act's any-qualified-provider provision unambiguously confers a private right upon a Medicaid beneficiary to choose a specific provider.

     2. What is the scope of a Medicaid beneficiary's alleged right to choose a provider that a state has deemed disqualified?

     Holding: Section 1396a(a)(23)(A) does not clearly and unambiguously confer individual rights enforceable under Section 1983.

     Result: Reversed and remanded.

     Voting Breakdown: 6-3. Justice Gorsuch delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Alito, Kavanaugh, and Barrett joined. Justice Thomas filed a concurring opinion. Justice Jackson filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Sotomayor and Kagan joined.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     • For petitioner: John J. Bursch, Washington, D.C.; and Kyle D. Hawkins, Counselor to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. (for United States, as amicus curiae.)
     • For respondents: Nicole A. Saharsky, Washington, D.C.
     
     

     Website Link to Oral Argument: Here.

     Apple Podcast Link to Oral Argument: Here.

     ]]>Opinion Summary: Medina v. Planned Parenthood South Atlantic | Date Decided: 6/26/25 | Case No. 23–1275

     Link to Docket: Here.

     Background:

     More than 30 years ago, this Court first applied what would become known as the "Blessing factors," holding that a Medicaid Act provision created a privately enforceable right to certain reimbursement rates. Wilder v. Va. Hosp. Ass'n, 496 U.S. 498, 509-10 (1990). Later, the Court distilled from Wilder a multi-factor test for deciding whether a "statutory provision gives rise to a federal right" privately enforceable under Section 1983. Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329, 340 (1997). Five years later, though, the Court disparaged Blessing's test while clarifying that only "an unambiguously conferred right is enforceable by § 1983." Gonzaga University v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 282 (2002). Then, in Health & Hospital Corp. of Marion County v. Talevski, 599 U.S. 166, 180 (2023), the Court doubled down on Gonzaga's "demanding bar."

     The Court did not apply Blessing or Wilder in Talevski, but it did not overrule them either. After the Court GVR'd this case in light of Talevski, the Fourth Circuit applied Wilder and Blessing again and reaffirmed its prior opinions, maintaining a 5-2 circuit split over the first question presented and a 3-1 circuit split over the proper reading of O'Bannon v. Town Court Nursing Center, 447 U.S. 773 (1980), which frames the second question.

     Questions Presented:

     1. Whether the Medicaid Act's any-qualified-provider provision unambiguously confers a private right upon a Medicaid beneficiary to choose a specific provider.

     2. What is the scope of a Medicaid beneficiary's alleged right to choose a provider that a state has deemed disqualified?

     Holding: Section 1396a(a)(23)(A) does not clearly and unambiguously confer individual rights enforceable under Section 1983.

     Result: Reversed and remanded.

     Voting Breakdown: 6-3. Justice Gorsuch delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Alito, Kavanaugh, and Barrett joined. Justice Thomas filed a concurring opinion. Justice Jackson filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Sotomayor and Kagan joined.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     • For petitioner: John J. Bursch, Washington, D.C.; and Kyle D. Hawkins, Counselor to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. (for United States, as amicus curiae.)
     • For respondents: Nicole A. Saharsky, Washington, D.C.
     
     

     Website Link to Oral Argument: Here.

     Apple Podcast Link to Oral Argument: Here.

     ]]>63972c83-5eb8-4094-a1da-2a67b3a995e1Thu, 26 Jun 2025 10:45:00 -040033:35falsefull20241001002024Opinion Summary: Hewitt v. United States | Date Decided: 6/26/25 | Case No. 23-1002Opinion Summary: Hewitt v. United States | Date Decided: 6/26/25 | Case No. 23-1002

     This case was consolidated with: Duffey V. United States, Case No. 23-1007.

     Link to Docket: Here.

     Background:

     The First Step Act (FSA) significantly reduced the mandatory minimum sentences for several federal drug and firearm offenses. First Step Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115- 391, §§ 401, 403, 132 Stat. 5194, 5220-5222. Sections 401 and 403 apply to offenses committed after the FSA's enactment on December 21, 2018, and to "any offense that was committed before the date of enactment * * * if a sentence for the offense has not been imposed as of such date of enactment." FSA§§ 401(c), 403(b).

     There is an acknowledged split between the Third, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits, on the one hand; and the Fifth and Sixth Circuits, on the other hand, on the question whether sections 401(c) and 403(b) apply when a pre-enactment sentence is vacated and the court must impose a new post-enactment sentence.

     Question Presented: Whether the First Step Act's sentencing reduction provisions apply to a defendant originally sentenced before the FSA's enactment when that original sentence is judicially vacated and the defendant is resentenced to a new term of imprisonment after the FSA's enactment.

     Holding: Under § 403(b) of the First Step Act, a sentence "has . . . been imposed" for purposes of that provision if, and only if, the sentence is extant—i.e., has not been vacated. Thus, the Act's more lenient penalties apply to defendants whose previous § 924(c) sentences have been vacated and who need to be resentenced following the Act's enactment.

     Result: Reversed and remanded.

     Voting Breakdown: 5-4. Justice Jackson delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts I, II, and III, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Sotomayor, Kagan, and Gorsuch joined, and an opinion with respect to Parts IV and V, in which Justices Sotomayor and Kagan joined. Justice Alito filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Thomas, Kavanaugh, and Barrett joined.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     • For petitioners: Michael B. Kimberly, Washington, D.C.
     • For respondent in support of petitioners: Masha G. Hansford, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.
     • For Court-appointed amicus curiae in support of judgment below: Michael H. McGinley, Washington, D.C.
     
     

     Website Link to Oral Argument: Here.

     Apple Podcast Link to Oral Argument: Here.

     ]]>Opinion Summary: Hewitt v. United States | Date Decided: 6/26/25 | Case No. 23-1002

     This case was consolidated with: Duffey V. United States, Case No. 23-1007.

     Link to Docket: Here.

     Background:

     The First Step Act (FSA) significantly reduced the mandatory minimum sentences for several federal drug and firearm offenses. First Step Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115- 391, §§ 401, 403, 132 Stat. 5194, 5220-5222. Sections 401 and 403 apply to offenses committed after the FSA's enactment on December 21, 2018, and to "any offense that was committed before the date of enactment * * * if a sentence for the offense has not been imposed as of such date of enactment." FSA§§ 401(c), 403(b).

     There is an acknowledged split between the Third, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits, on the one hand; and the Fifth and Sixth Circuits, on the other hand, on the question whether sections 401(c) and 403(b) apply when a pre-enactment sentence is vacated and the court must impose a new post-enactment sentence.

     Question Presented: Whether the First Step Act's sentencing reduction provisions apply to a defendant originally sentenced before the FSA's enactment when that original sentence is judicially vacated and the defendant is resentenced to a new term of imprisonment after the FSA's enactment.

     Holding: Under § 403(b) of the First Step Act, a sentence "has . . . been imposed" for purposes of that provision if, and only if, the sentence is extant—i.e., has not been vacated. Thus, the Act's more lenient penalties apply to defendants whose previous § 924(c) sentences have been vacated and who need to be resentenced following the Act's enactment.

     Result: Reversed and remanded.

     Voting Breakdown: 5-4. Justice Jackson delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts I, II, and III, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Sotomayor, Kagan, and Gorsuch joined, and an opinion with respect to Parts IV and V, in which Justices Sotomayor and Kagan joined. Justice Alito filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Thomas, Kavanaugh, and Barrett joined.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     • For petitioners: Michael B. Kimberly, Washington, D.C.
     • For respondent in support of petitioners: Masha G. Hansford, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.
     • For Court-appointed amicus curiae in support of judgment below: Michael H. McGinley, Washington, D.C.
     
     

     Website Link to Oral Argument: Here.

     Apple Podcast Link to Oral Argument: Here.

     ]]>d3e2fa20-32a4-4e9a-9bf9-91d618d88aeaThu, 26 Jun 2025 10:15:00 -040027:06falsefull202499992024Supreme Court Roundup: Insights from June 18 and 20 Decisions and New Cert GrantIn today's episode, we analyze the Supreme Court's recent activities across three key areas:
     • Last week's 11 opinions and emerging patterns
     • Term statistics and remaining docket overview
     • Major religious liberty case granted certiorari via June 23rd Order List
     
     

     Key Topics Covered

     Term Statistics (As of June 23, 2025)

     • Total cases heard: 62 unique cases this term
     • Cases decided: 52 (approximately 84%)
     • Cases pending: 11 (approximately 16%)
     • Methodology: Consolidated cases counted once
     
     

     Last Week's Opinion Analysis

     • Unanimous consensus: 7 of 11 cases showed stable coalition of seven justices
     • Opinion distribution: Justice Thomas, Sotomayor, Gorsuch, and Barrett each authored exactly 4 opinions
     • Chief Justice Roberts: Finally joined dissent after 41 consecutive majority opinions
     • Methodological splits: Justices divided on simple textual approaches vs. complex multi-factor tests
     
     

     Featured Case Deep Dive: Esteras v. United States

     • Issue: Whether judges can consider retribution in supervised release decisions
     • Majority (Barrett): Applied "expressio unius" canon - Congress deliberately excluded retribution
     • Dissent (Alito/Gorsuch): Criticized majority's "mind-bending exercises" for trial judges
     • Vote: 7-2 with additional splintering on implementation details
     
     

     Standing Doctrine Analysis: FDA v. Reynolds & Diamond Energy v. EPA

     • Common thread: When can businesses challenge regulations affecting market participants?
     • Identical 7-2 splits with completely different reasoning approaches
     • Barrett's approach: Traditional statutory interpretation and precedent analysis
     • Kavanaugh's approach: Practical economic reasoning and regulatory dynamics
     
     

      Certiorari Grant: Landor v. Louisiana Department of Corrections | Case No. 23-1197 | Docket Link: Here.

     • Question Presented: Whether the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) permits individual-capacity damages suits against state prison officials who violate prisoners' religious exercise rights.
     
     

     The Shocking Facts

     • Petitioner: Damon Landor, devout Rastafarian with 20-year religious dreadlocks
     • Incident: Prison officials threw away Fifth Circuit decision protecting his rights, then forcibly shaved his head
     • Timeline: Occurred with just 3 weeks left in his sentence
     • Legal precedent: Clear violation of Ware v. Louisiana Department of Corrections
     
     

     Legal Framework

     • RFRA (1993): Applies to federal government; Tanzin v. Tanvir (2020) permits individual damages
     • RLUIPA (2000): Applies to state/local governments receiving federal funds
     • Sister statutes: Nearly identical language and purposes
     • Circuit split: All courts of appeals currently reject RLUIPA individual damages
     
     

     Petitioner’s (Landor) Key Arguments:

     • Tanzin controls: Identical "appropriate relief" language must have same meaning
     • Sister statute harmony: Supreme Court routinely interprets RFRA/RLUIPAtogether
     • Constitutional authority: Spending Clause permits individual liability under Dole test
     • Practical necessity: Damages often only meaningful remedy for released prisoners
     
     

      Respondent’s (Louisiana) Key Arguments:

     • No circuit split: Unanimous rejection across all circuits
     • Spending Clause limits: Only grant recipients (states) can be liable, not individual officials
     • Sossamon precedent: "Appropriate relief" is "ambiguous" under RLUIPA
     • Practical concerns: Would worsen prison staffing crisis and destabilize Title IX law
     
     

      United States Key Arguments:

     • Supports petitioner - significant federal government backing
     • Argues Sossamon only addressed sovereign immunity, not individual officials
     • Emphasizes Congress's clear Spending Clause authority
     
     

     Remaining Docket Highlights

     Constitutional Powder Kegs

     • Trump v. Casa trilogy: Immigration enforcement and nationwide injunctions
     • Free Speech Coalition v. Paxton: Online adult content restrictions vs. child protection
     
     

     Voting Rights Crucible

     • Louisiana v. Callais: Racial gerrymandering vs. Voting Rights Act compliance
     
     

     Religious Liberty Battleground

     • Mahmoud v. Taylor: Religious exercise vs. LGBTQ+ curricula in schools
     
     

     Support the Podcast: If you found this analysis helpful, please subscribe, rate, and share this podcast. Your support helps us continue providing in-depth Supreme Court coverage.

     ]]>In today's episode, we analyze the Supreme Court's recent activities across three key areas:
     • Last week's 11 opinions and emerging patterns
     • Term statistics and remaining docket overview
     • Major religious liberty case granted certiorari via June 23rd Order List
     
     

     Key Topics Covered

     Term Statistics (As of June 23, 2025)

     • Total cases heard: 62 unique cases this term
     • Cases decided: 52 (approximately 84%)
     • Cases pending: 11 (approximately 16%)
     • Methodology: Consolidated cases counted once
     
     

     Last Week's Opinion Analysis

     • Unanimous consensus: 7 of 11 cases showed stable coalition of seven justices
     • Opinion distribution: Justice Thomas, Sotomayor, Gorsuch, and Barrett each authored exactly 4 opinions
     • Chief Justice Roberts: Finally joined dissent after 41 consecutive majority opinions
     • Methodological splits: Justices divided on simple textual approaches vs. complex multi-factor tests
     
     

     Featured Case Deep Dive: Esteras v. United States

     • Issue: Whether judges can consider retribution in supervised release decisions
     • Majority (Barrett): Applied "expressio unius" canon - Congress deliberately excluded retribution
     • Dissent (Alito/Gorsuch): Criticized majority's "mind-bending exercises" for trial judges
     • Vote: 7-2 with additional splintering on implementation details
     
     

     Standing Doctrine Analysis: FDA v. Reynolds & Diamond Energy v. EPA

     • Common thread: When can businesses challenge regulations affecting market participants?
     • Identical 7-2 splits with completely different reasoning approaches
     • Barrett's approach: Traditional statutory interpretation and precedent analysis
     • Kavanaugh's approach: Practical economic reasoning and regulatory dynamics
     
     

      Certiorari Grant: Landor v. Louisiana Department of Corrections | Case No. 23-1197 | Docket Link: Here.

     • Question Presented: Whether the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) permits individual-capacity damages suits against state prison officials who violate prisoners' religious exercise rights.
     
     

     The Shocking Facts

     • Petitioner: Damon Landor, devout Rastafarian with 20-year religious dreadlocks
     • Incident: Prison officials threw away Fifth Circuit decision protecting his rights, then forcibly shaved his head
     • Timeline: Occurred with just 3 weeks left in his sentence
     • Legal precedent: Clear violation of Ware v. Louisiana Department of Corrections
     
     

     Legal Framework

     • RFRA (1993): Applies to federal government; Tanzin v. Tanvir (2020) permits individual damages
     • RLUIPA (2000): Applies to state/local governments receiving federal funds
     • Sister statutes: Nearly identical language and purposes
     • Circuit split: All courts of appeals currently reject RLUIPA individual damages
     
     

     Petitioner’s (Landor) Key Arguments:

     • Tanzin controls: Identical "appropriate relief" language must have same meaning
     • Sister statute harmony: Supreme Court routinely interprets RFRA/RLUIPAtogether
     • Constitutional authority: Spending Clause permits individual liability under Dole test
     • Practical necessity: Damages often only meaningful remedy for released prisoners
     
     

      Respondent’s (Louisiana) Key Arguments:

     • No circuit split: Unanimous rejection across all circuits
     • Spending Clause limits: Only grant recipients (states) can be liable, not individual officials
     • Sossamon precedent: "Appropriate relief" is "ambiguous" under RLUIPA
     • Practical concerns: Would worsen prison staffing crisis and destabilize Title IX law
     
     

      United States Key Arguments:

     • Supports petitioner - significant federal government backing
     • Argues Sossamon only addressed sovereign immunity, not individual officials
     • Emphasizes Congress's clear Spending Clause authority
     
     

     Remaining Docket Highlights

     Constitutional Powder Kegs

     • Trump v. Casa trilogy: Immigration enforcement and nationwide injunctions
     • Free Speech Coalition v. Paxton: Online adult content restrictions vs. child protection
     
     

     Voting Rights Crucible

     • Louisiana v. Callais: Racial gerrymandering vs. Voting Rights Act compliance
     
     

     Religious Liberty Battleground

     • Mahmoud v. Taylor: Religious exercise vs. LGBTQ+ curricula in schools
     
     

     Support the Podcast: If you found this analysis helpful, please subscribe, rate, and share this podcast. Your support helps us continue providing in-depth Supreme Court coverage.

     ]]>f7cb9570-1d64-4e4e-ac53-dad4e0a0accaMon, 23 Jun 2025 12:00:00 -040028:56falsefull202498982024Opinion Summaries: June 20, 2025 OpinionsOpinion Summaries: June 20, 2025 Opinions

     The Supreme Court released six significant opinions on June 20, 2025, spanning tobacco regulation, terrorism jurisdiction, environmental standing, telecommunications law, disability rights, and federal sentencing. This episode provides comprehensive analysis of each decision, including voting breakdowns, key holdings, and detailed examination of concurring and dissenting opinions.

     Host Note: Today I'm personally narrating this episode, so the pacing may be slightly different from our usual format.

     Here are details about the six cases:

     1. FDA v. R.J. Reynolds Vapor Co. | Case No. 23-1187

     Holding: Retailers who would sell a new tobacco product if not for the FDA's denial order may seek judicial review of that order under § 387l(a)(1).

     Result: Affirmed and remanded.

     Voting Breakdown: 7-2. Justice Barrett delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Alito, Kagan, Gorsuch and Kavanaugh joined. Justice Jackson filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Sotomayor joined.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     2. Fuld v. Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) | Case No. 24-20 (consolidated with United States v. PLO, Case No. 24-151)

     Holding: The PSJVTA's personal jurisdiction provision does not violate the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause because the statute reasonably ties the assertion of jurisdiction over the PLO and PA to conduct involving the United States and implicating sensitive foreign policy matters within the prerogative of the political branches.

     Result: Reversed and remanded.

     Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Chief Justice Roberts delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Justice Alito, Justice Sotomayor, Justice Kagan, Justice Kavanaugh, Justice Barrett, and Justice Jackson joined. Justice Thomas filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, which Justice Gorsuch joined as to Part II.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     3. Diamond Alternative Energy, LLC v. EPA | Case No. 24-7

     Holding: The fuel producers have Article III standing to challenge EPA's approval of the California regulations.

     Result: Reversed and remanded.

     Voting Breakdown: 7-2. Justice Kavanaugh delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Alito, Kagan, Gorsuch, and Barrett joined. Justice Sotomayor and Justice Jackson filed dissenting opinions.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     4. McLaughlin Chiropractic Associates, Inc. v. McKesson Corp. | Case No. 23-1226

     Holding: The Hobbs Act does not bind district courts in civil enforcement proceedings to an agency's interpretation of a statute. District courts must independently determine the law's meaning under ordinary principles of statutory interpretation while affording appropriate respect to the agency's interpretation.

     Result: Reversed and remanded.

     Voting Breakdown: 6-3. Justice Kavanaugh delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Alito, Gorsuch and Barrett joined. Justice Kagan filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Sotomayor and Jackson joined.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     5. Stanley v. City of Sanford | Case No. 23-997

     Holding: To prevail under §12112(a), a plaintiff must plead and prove that she held or desired a job, and could perform its essential functions with or without reasonable accommodation, at the time of an employer's alleged act of disability-based discrimination.

     Result: Affirmed.

     Voting Breakdown: 7-2. Justice Gorsuch delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts I and II, in which Chief Justice Roberts, and Justice Thomas, Justice Alito, Justice Kagan, Justice Kavanaugh, and Justice Barrett joined, and an opinion with respect to Part III, in which Justice Alito, Justice Sotomayor, and Justice Kagan joined. Justice Thomas filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, in which Justice Barrett joined. Justice Sotomayor filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part. Justice Jackson filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Sotomayor joined as to Parts III and IV, except for n. 12.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     6. Esteras v. United States | Case No. 23-7483

     Holding: A district court considering whether to revoke a defendant's term of supervised release may not consider § 3553(a)(2)(A), which covers retribution vis-à-vis the defendant's underlying criminal offense.

     Result: Vacated and remanded.

     Voting Breakdown: 7-2. Justice Barrett delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas Kagan and Kavanaugh joined and in which Justices Sotomayor and Jackson joined as to all but Part II–B. Justice Sotomayor filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, in which Justice Jackson joined. Justice Jackson filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment. Justice Alito filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Gorsuch joined.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     ]]>Opinion Summaries: June 20, 2025 Opinions

     The Supreme Court released six significant opinions on June 20, 2025, spanning tobacco regulation, terrorism jurisdiction, environmental standing, telecommunications law, disability rights, and federal sentencing. This episode provides comprehensive analysis of each decision, including voting breakdowns, key holdings, and detailed examination of concurring and dissenting opinions.

     Host Note: Today I'm personally narrating this episode, so the pacing may be slightly different from our usual format.

     Here are details about the six cases:

     1. FDA v. R.J. Reynolds Vapor Co. | Case No. 23-1187

     Holding: Retailers who would sell a new tobacco product if not for the FDA's denial order may seek judicial review of that order under § 387l(a)(1).

     Result: Affirmed and remanded.

     Voting Breakdown: 7-2. Justice Barrett delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Alito, Kagan, Gorsuch and Kavanaugh joined. Justice Jackson filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Sotomayor joined.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     2. Fuld v. Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) | Case No. 24-20 (consolidated with United States v. PLO, Case No. 24-151)

     Holding: The PSJVTA's personal jurisdiction provision does not violate the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause because the statute reasonably ties the assertion of jurisdiction over the PLO and PA to conduct involving the United States and implicating sensitive foreign policy matters within the prerogative of the political branches.

     Result: Reversed and remanded.

     Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Chief Justice Roberts delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Justice Alito, Justice Sotomayor, Justice Kagan, Justice Kavanaugh, Justice Barrett, and Justice Jackson joined. Justice Thomas filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, which Justice Gorsuch joined as to Part II.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     3. Diamond Alternative Energy, LLC v. EPA | Case No. 24-7

     Holding: The fuel producers have Article III standing to challenge EPA's approval of the California regulations.

     Result: Reversed and remanded.

     Voting Breakdown: 7-2. Justice Kavanaugh delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Alito, Kagan, Gorsuch, and Barrett joined. Justice Sotomayor and Justice Jackson filed dissenting opinions.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     4. McLaughlin Chiropractic Associates, Inc. v. McKesson Corp. | Case No. 23-1226

     Holding: The Hobbs Act does not bind district courts in civil enforcement proceedings to an agency's interpretation of a statute. District courts must independently determine the law's meaning under ordinary principles of statutory interpretation while affording appropriate respect to the agency's interpretation.

     Result: Reversed and remanded.

     Voting Breakdown: 6-3. Justice Kavanaugh delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Alito, Gorsuch and Barrett joined. Justice Kagan filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Sotomayor and Jackson joined.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     5. Stanley v. City of Sanford | Case No. 23-997

     Holding: To prevail under §12112(a), a plaintiff must plead and prove that she held or desired a job, and could perform its essential functions with or without reasonable accommodation, at the time of an employer's alleged act of disability-based discrimination.

     Result: Affirmed.

     Voting Breakdown: 7-2. Justice Gorsuch delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts I and II, in which Chief Justice Roberts, and Justice Thomas, Justice Alito, Justice Kagan, Justice Kavanaugh, and Justice Barrett joined, and an opinion with respect to Part III, in which Justice Alito, Justice Sotomayor, and Justice Kagan joined. Justice Thomas filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, in which Justice Barrett joined. Justice Sotomayor filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part. Justice Jackson filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Sotomayor joined as to Parts III and IV, except for n. 12.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     6. Esteras v. United States | Case No. 23-7483

     Holding: A district court considering whether to revoke a defendant's term of supervised release may not consider § 3553(a)(2)(A), which covers retribution vis-à-vis the defendant's underlying criminal offense.

     Result: Vacated and remanded.

     Voting Breakdown: 7-2. Justice Barrett delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas Kagan and Kavanaugh joined and in which Justices Sotomayor and Jackson joined as to all but Part II–B. Justice Sotomayor filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, in which Justice Jackson joined. Justice Jackson filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment. Justice Alito filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Gorsuch joined.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     ]]>e183618f-dca4-4af6-b220-63a8413efdc5Fri, 20 Jun 2025 14:00:00 -040027:15falsefull202497972024Opinion Summary: United States v. Skrmetti | Date Decided: 6/18/25 | Case No. 23-477Opinion Summary: United States v. Skrmetti | Date Decided: 6/18/25 | Case No. 23-477

     Link to Docket: Here.

     Question Presented: Whether Tennessee Senate Bill 1 (SBl), which prohibits all medical treatments intended to allow "a minor to identify with, or live as, a purported identity inconsistent with the minor's sex" or to treat "purported discomfort or distress from a discordance between the minor's sex and asserted identity," Tenn. Code Ann. § 68-33-103(a)(1), violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

     Holding: SB1 is not subject to heightened scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and satisfies rational basis review. SB1 satisfies rational basis review.

     Result: Affirmed.

     Voting Breakdown: 6-3. Chief Justice Roberts delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Justice Thomas, Justice Gorsuch, Justice Kavanaugh, and Justice Barrett joined, and in which Justice Alito joined as to Parts I and II–B. Justice Thomas filed a concurring opinion. Justice Barrett filed a concurring opinion, in which Justice Thomas joined. Justice Alito filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment. Justice Sotomayor filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Jackson joined in full, and in which Justice Kagan joined as to Parts I–IV. Justice Kagan filed a dissenting opinion.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     • For petitioner: Elizabeth B. Prelogar, Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C.
     • For respondents L.W., et al. supporting petitioner: Chase B. Strangio, New York, N. Y.
     • For respondents Jonathan Skrmetti, et al.: J. Matthew Rice, Solicitor General, Nashville, Tenn.
     
     

     Website Link to Oral Argument: Here.

     Apple Podcast Link to Oral Argument: Here.

     Timestamps:

     ]]>Opinion Summary: United States v. Skrmetti | Date Decided: 6/18/25 | Case No. 23-477

     Link to Docket: Here.

     Question Presented: Whether Tennessee Senate Bill 1 (SBl), which prohibits all medical treatments intended to allow "a minor to identify with, or live as, a purported identity inconsistent with the minor's sex" or to treat "purported discomfort or distress from a discordance between the minor's sex and asserted identity," Tenn. Code Ann. § 68-33-103(a)(1), violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

     Holding: SB1 is not subject to heightened scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and satisfies rational basis review. SB1 satisfies rational basis review.

     Result: Affirmed.

     Voting Breakdown: 6-3. Chief Justice Roberts delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Justice Thomas, Justice Gorsuch, Justice Kavanaugh, and Justice Barrett joined, and in which Justice Alito joined as to Parts I and II–B. Justice Thomas filed a concurring opinion. Justice Barrett filed a concurring opinion, in which Justice Thomas joined. Justice Alito filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment. Justice Sotomayor filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Jackson joined in full, and in which Justice Kagan joined as to Parts I–IV. Justice Kagan filed a dissenting opinion.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     • For petitioner: Elizabeth B. Prelogar, Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C.
     • For respondents L.W., et al. supporting petitioner: Chase B. Strangio, New York, N. Y.
     • For respondents Jonathan Skrmetti, et al.: J. Matthew Rice, Solicitor General, Nashville, Tenn.
     
     

     Website Link to Oral Argument: Here.

     Apple Podcast Link to Oral Argument: Here.

     Timestamps:

     ]]>ab4a1ae8-43bf-4209-b2af-552399fd3ffeWed, 18 Jun 2025 13:00:00 -040045:44falsefull202491912024Opinion Summary: Perttu v. Richards | Date Decided: 6/18/25 | Case No. 23–1324Opinion Summary: Perttu v. Richards | Date Decided: 6/18/25 | Case No. 23–1324

     Link to Docket: Here.

     Question Presented: In cases subject to the Prison Litigation Reform Act, do prisoners have a right to a jury trial concerning their exhaustion of administrative remedies where disputed facts regarding exhaustion are intertwined with the underlying merits of their claim?

     Holding: Parties are entitled to a jury trial on PLRA exhaustion when that issue is intertwined with the merits of a claim that requires a jury trial under the Seventh Amendment.

     Result: Affirmed.

     Voting Breakdown: 5-4. Chief Justice Roberts delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Justices Sotomayor, Kagan, Gorsuch and Jackson joined. Justice Barrett filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Thomas, Alito and Kavanaugh joined.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     • For petitioner: Ann M. Sherman, Solicitor General, Lansing, Mich.
     • For respondent: Lori Alvino McGill, Charlottesville, Va.
     
     

     Website Link to Oral Argument: Here.

     Apple Podcast Link to Oral Argument: Here.

     ]]>Opinion Summary: Perttu v. Richards | Date Decided: 6/18/25 | Case No. 23–1324

     Link to Docket: Here.

     Question Presented: In cases subject to the Prison Litigation Reform Act, do prisoners have a right to a jury trial concerning their exhaustion of administrative remedies where disputed facts regarding exhaustion are intertwined with the underlying merits of their claim?

     Holding: Parties are entitled to a jury trial on PLRA exhaustion when that issue is intertwined with the merits of a claim that requires a jury trial under the Seventh Amendment.

     Result: Affirmed.

     Voting Breakdown: 5-4. Chief Justice Roberts delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Justices Sotomayor, Kagan, Gorsuch and Jackson joined. Justice Barrett filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Thomas, Alito and Kavanaugh joined.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     • For petitioner: Ann M. Sherman, Solicitor General, Lansing, Mich.
     • For respondent: Lori Alvino McGill, Charlottesville, Va.
     
     

     Website Link to Oral Argument: Here.

     Apple Podcast Link to Oral Argument: Here.

     ]]>48b6b8c8-3256-4f7d-9871-ec8e48943df6Wed, 18 Jun 2025 12:30:00 -040016:01falsefull202491912024Opinion Summary: Oklahoma v. EPA | Date Decided: 6/18/25 | Case No. 23–1067Opinion Summary: Oklahoma v. EPA | Date Decided: 6/18/25 | Case No. 23–1067

     This case was consolidated with: Pacificorp V. EPA, Case No. 23-1067.

     Link to Docket: Here.

     Background:

     Under the Clean Air Act, each state must adopt an implementation plan to meet national standards, which EPA then reviews for compliance with the Act. In 2023, EPA published disapprovals of 21 states' plans implementing national ozone standards. It did so in a single Federal Register notice. The Act specifies that "[a] petition for review of the [EPA's] action in approving or promulgating any implementation plan ... or any other final action of the [EPA] under this Act ... which is locally or regionally applicable may be filed only in" the appropriate regional circuit, while "nationally applicable regulations ... may be filed only in" the D.C. Circuit. 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b)(1). Parties from a dozen states sought judicial review of their respective state plan disapprovals in their appropriate regional circuits.

     The Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth Circuits held that the implementation plan disapprovals of states within those circuits are appropriately challenged in their respective regional courts of appeals. In the decision below, the Tenth Circuit held that challenges to the disapprovals of Oklahoma's and Utah's plans can only be brought in the D.C. Circuit, explicitly disagreeing with the decisions of its sister circuits.

     Questions Presented:

     1. Whether a final action by EPA taken pursuant to its Clean Air Act authority with respect to a single state or region may be challenged only in the D.C. Circuit because EPA published the action in the same Federal Register notice as actions affecting other states or regions and claimed to use a consistent analysis for all states.
     2. Whether the Environmental Protection Agency's disapproval of a State Implementation Plan may only be challenged in the D.C. Circuit under 42 U.S.C. § 7607 (b)(1) if EPA packages that disapproval with disapprovals of other States' SIPs and purports to use a consistent method in evaluating the state-specific determinations in those SIPs.
     
     

     Holding: EPA's disapprovals of the Oklahoma and Utah SIPs are locally or regionally applicable actions reviewable in a regional Circuit.

     Result: Reversed.

     Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Thomas delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Alito, Sotomayor, Kagan, Kavanaugh, Barrett and Jackson joined. Justice Gorsuch filed an opinion concurring in the judgment in which Chief Justice Roberts joined.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     • For Petitioners in 23-1067: Mithun Mansinghani, Oklahoma City, Okla.
     • For Petitioners in 23-1068: Misha Tseytlin, Chicago, Ill.
     • For Respondents: Malcolm L. Stewart, Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.
     
     

     Website Link to Oral Argument: Here.

     Apple Podcast Link to Oral Argument: Here.

     ]]>Opinion Summary: Oklahoma v. EPA | Date Decided: 6/18/25 | Case No. 23–1067

     This case was consolidated with: Pacificorp V. EPA, Case No. 23-1067.

     Link to Docket: Here.

     Background:

     Under the Clean Air Act, each state must adopt an implementation plan to meet national standards, which EPA then reviews for compliance with the Act. In 2023, EPA published disapprovals of 21 states' plans implementing national ozone standards. It did so in a single Federal Register notice. The Act specifies that "[a] petition for review of the [EPA's] action in approving or promulgating any implementation plan ... or any other final action of the [EPA] under this Act ... which is locally or regionally applicable may be filed only in" the appropriate regional circuit, while "nationally applicable regulations ... may be filed only in" the D.C. Circuit. 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b)(1). Parties from a dozen states sought judicial review of their respective state plan disapprovals in their appropriate regional circuits.

     The Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth Circuits held that the implementation plan disapprovals of states within those circuits are appropriately challenged in their respective regional courts of appeals. In the decision below, the Tenth Circuit held that challenges to the disapprovals of Oklahoma's and Utah's plans can only be brought in the D.C. Circuit, explicitly disagreeing with the decisions of its sister circuits.

     Questions Presented:

     1. Whether a final action by EPA taken pursuant to its Clean Air Act authority with respect to a single state or region may be challenged only in the D.C. Circuit because EPA published the action in the same Federal Register notice as actions affecting other states or regions and claimed to use a consistent analysis for all states.
     2. Whether the Environmental Protection Agency's disapproval of a State Implementation Plan may only be challenged in the D.C. Circuit under 42 U.S.C. § 7607 (b)(1) if EPA packages that disapproval with disapprovals of other States' SIPs and purports to use a consistent method in evaluating the state-specific determinations in those SIPs.
     
     

     Holding: EPA's disapprovals of the Oklahoma and Utah SIPs are locally or regionally applicable actions reviewable in a regional Circuit.

     Result: Reversed.

     Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Thomas delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Alito, Sotomayor, Kagan, Kavanaugh, Barrett and Jackson joined. Justice Gorsuch filed an opinion concurring in the judgment in which Chief Justice Roberts joined.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     • For Petitioners in 23-1067: Mithun Mansinghani, Oklahoma City, Okla.
     • For Petitioners in 23-1068: Misha Tseytlin, Chicago, Ill.
     • For Respondents: Malcolm L. Stewart, Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.
     
     

     Website Link to Oral Argument: Here.

     Apple Podcast Link to Oral Argument: Here.

     ]]>b97522d1-04bf-4baf-b1ef-a842d48ca37cWed, 18 Jun 2025 11:45:00 -040012:17falsefull202490902024Opinion Summary: EPA v. Calumet Shreveport Refining, L.L.C. | Date Decided: 6/18/25 | Case No. 23–1229Opinion Summary: EPA v. Calumet Shreveport Refining, L.L.C. | Date Decided: 6/18/25 | Case No. 23–1229

     Link to Docket: Here.

     Question Presented:

     Holding: EPA's denials of small refinery exemption petitions are locally or regionally applicable actions that fall within the "nationwide scope or effect" exception, requiring venue in the D.C. Circuit.

     Result: Vacated and remanded.

     Voting Breakdown: 7-2. Justice Thomas delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Justices Alito, Sotomayor, Kagan, Kavanaugh, Barrett and Jackson joined. Justice Gorsuch filed a dissenting opinion in which Chief Justice Roberts joined.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     • For petitioner: Malcolm L. Stewart, Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C.
     • For respondents Growth Energy and Renewable Fuels Association in support of petitioner: Seth P. Waxman, Washington, D. C.
     • For respondents Calumet Shreveport Refining, L.L.C., et al.: Michael R. Huston, Phoenix, Ariz.
     
     

     Website Link to Oral Argument: Here.

     Apple Podcast Link to Oral Argument: Here.

     Timestamps:

     ]]>Opinion Summary: EPA v. Calumet Shreveport Refining, L.L.C. | Date Decided: 6/18/25 | Case No. 23–1229

     Link to Docket: Here.

     Question Presented:

     Holding: EPA's denials of small refinery exemption petitions are locally or regionally applicable actions that fall within the "nationwide scope or effect" exception, requiring venue in the D.C. Circuit.

     Result: Vacated and remanded.

     Voting Breakdown: 7-2. Justice Thomas delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Justices Alito, Sotomayor, Kagan, Kavanaugh, Barrett and Jackson joined. Justice Gorsuch filed a dissenting opinion in which Chief Justice Roberts joined.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     • For petitioner: Malcolm L. Stewart, Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C.
     • For respondents Growth Energy and Renewable Fuels Association in support of petitioner: Seth P. Waxman, Washington, D. C.
     • For respondents Calumet Shreveport Refining, L.L.C., et al.: Michael R. Huston, Phoenix, Ariz.
     
     

     Website Link to Oral Argument: Here.

     Apple Podcast Link to Oral Argument: Here.

     Timestamps:

     ]]>35cf1ed0-cdc3-42ac-8400-90bdb0019753Wed, 18 Jun 2025 11:30:00 -040042:30falsefull202490902024Opinion Summary: NRC v. Texas | Date Decided: 6/18/25 | Case No. 23–1300Opinion Summary: NRC v. Texas | Date Decided: 6/18/25 | Case No. 23–1300

     This case was consolidated with: Interim Storage Partners, LLC V. Texas, Case No. 23-1312.

     Link to Docket: Here.

     Questions Presented:

     1. Whether the Hobbs Act, 28 U.S.C. 2341 et seq., which authorizes a "party aggrieved" by an agency's "final order" to petition for review in a court of appeals, 28 U.S.C. 2344, allows nonparties to obtain review of claims asserting that an agency order exceeds the agency's statutory authority.
     2. Whether the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, 42 U.S.C. 2011 et seq., and the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982, 42 U.S.C. 10101 et seq., permit the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to license private entities to temporarily store spent nuclear fuel away from the nuclear-reactor sites where the spent fuel was generated.
     3. (For Interim Storage Partners, LLC) Whether the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's exercise of authority to issue a license to a private party to temporarily possess spent nuclear fuel at a location away from an operating nuclear power reactor was lawful under the applicable statutes (as the D.C. and Tenth Circuits have held) or not (as the Fifth Circuit, deliberately splitting from those other circuits, held in this case).
     4. Whether, notwithstanding an allegation of "ultra vires" agency action, a person must take steps to become a "party" to an agency proceeding under the Hobbs Act, 28 U.S.C. 2344, in order to then subsequently challenge the agency action resulting from that proceeding in court (as the Second, Seventh, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits have held), or whether an allegation of "ultra vires" agency action can override statutory limitations on jurisdiction (as the Fifth Circuit, deliberately splitting from those other circuits, held in this case).
     
     

     Holding: Because Texas and Fasken were not parties to the Commission's licensing proceeding, they are not entitled to obtain judicial review of the Commission's licensing decision.

     Result: Reversed and remanded.

     Voting Breakdown: 6-3. Justice Kavanaugh delivered the opinion of the court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Sotomayor, Kagan, Barrett and Jackson joined. Justice Gorsuch filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Thomas and Alito joined.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     • For petitioners in 23-1300: Malcolm L. Stewart, Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C.
     • For petitioner in 23-1312: Brad Fagg, Washington, D. C.
     • For respondents Texas, et al.: Aaron L. Nielson, Solicitor General, Austin, Tex.
     • For respondent Fasken Land and Minerals, Ltd.: David C. Frederick, Washington, D.C.
     
     

     Website Link to Oral Argument: Here.

     Apple Podcast Link to Oral Argument: Here.

     ]]>Opinion Summary: NRC v. Texas | Date Decided: 6/18/25 | Case No. 23–1300

     This case was consolidated with: Interim Storage Partners, LLC V. Texas, Case No. 23-1312.

     Link to Docket: Here.

     Questions Presented:

     1. Whether the Hobbs Act, 28 U.S.C. 2341 et seq., which authorizes a "party aggrieved" by an agency's "final order" to petition for review in a court of appeals, 28 U.S.C. 2344, allows nonparties to obtain review of claims asserting that an agency order exceeds the agency's statutory authority.
     2. Whether the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, 42 U.S.C. 2011 et seq., and the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982, 42 U.S.C. 10101 et seq., permit the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to license private entities to temporarily store spent nuclear fuel away from the nuclear-reactor sites where the spent fuel was generated.
     3. (For Interim Storage Partners, LLC) Whether the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's exercise of authority to issue a license to a private party to temporarily possess spent nuclear fuel at a location away from an operating nuclear power reactor was lawful under the applicable statutes (as the D.C. and Tenth Circuits have held) or not (as the Fifth Circuit, deliberately splitting from those other circuits, held in this case).
     4. Whether, notwithstanding an allegation of "ultra vires" agency action, a person must take steps to become a "party" to an agency proceeding under the Hobbs Act, 28 U.S.C. 2344, in order to then subsequently challenge the agency action resulting from that proceeding in court (as the Second, Seventh, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits have held), or whether an allegation of "ultra vires" agency action can override statutory limitations on jurisdiction (as the Fifth Circuit, deliberately splitting from those other circuits, held in this case).
     
     

     Holding: Because Texas and Fasken were not parties to the Commission's licensing proceeding, they are not entitled to obtain judicial review of the Commission's licensing decision.

     Result: Reversed and remanded.

     Voting Breakdown: 6-3. Justice Kavanaugh delivered the opinion of the court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Sotomayor, Kagan, Barrett and Jackson joined. Justice Gorsuch filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Thomas and Alito joined.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     • For petitioners in 23-1300: Malcolm L. Stewart, Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C.
     • For petitioner in 23-1312: Brad Fagg, Washington, D. C.
     • For respondents Texas, et al.: Aaron L. Nielson, Solicitor General, Austin, Tex.
     • For respondent Fasken Land and Minerals, Ltd.: David C. Frederick, Washington, D.C.
     
     

     Website Link to Oral Argument: Here.

     Apple Podcast Link to Oral Argument: Here.

     ]]>59d8c617-fbd4-469d-a497-f48d711ca586Wed, 18 Jun 2025 10:15:00 -040035:02falsefull202489892024Supreme Court Roundup: June 12th Insights and New Cert GrantsIn this episode, we analyze the Supreme Court's recent activities across three key areas:
     • Six near unanimous decisions released on June 12th, 2025
     • Two major cases granted certiorari via June 16th, 2025 Order
     
     

     In this episode, we analyze the Supreme Court's recent activities across three key areas:

     1. Term statistics and remaining docket overview
     2. Six decisions released on June 12th, 2025
     3. Two major cases granted certiorari via June 16th, 2025 Order
     
     

     2024 Term Statistics

     • Total cases heard: 62 unique cases this term
     • Cases decided: 41 (approximately 66%)
     • Cases pending: 21 (approximately 33%)
     • Methodology: Consolidated cases counted once (e.g., Trump v. CASA/Washington/New Jersey)
     • Timing significance: June typically brings most consequential decisions
     
     

     Key Observations from June 12th, 2025 Decisions

     1. Observation #1: Unanimity Reigned Supreme. June 12th consensus: 4 unanimous (9-0) decisions, 2 near-unanimous (8-1) decisions. Two-week pattern: 9 unanimous decisions and 3 8-1 splits out of 12 total case. Historical context: Must go back 15 opinions to find more than 2 dissents (May 22nd Oklahoma Charter School case). Full-term data: 29 of 41 decided cases unanimous or near-unanimous (71% consensus)
     2. Observation #2: Opinion Assignments Tell a Story. Recent distribution: 8 of 9 justices wrote majority opinions in past two weeks; Justice Kavanaugh who wrote sole opinion the week before)
     3. Observation #3: Speed Suggests Strategic Docket Management. Rapid turnaround: 6-10 weeks from oral argument to decision. Contrast with pending cases: U.S. v. Skrmetti (transgender medical care): 6+ months since December 4th argument; Hewitt v. United States (First Step Act): pending since January 13th; and Stanley v. City of Sanford (ADA): pending since January 13th.
     4. Observation #4: Uncle Sam Had a Bad Day. Government losses: 5 of 6 cases involved citizens vs. government agencies. Case types: FBI raid victims, disabled student vs. school district, veterans vs. benefits administration, prisoner vs. federal procedures, taxpayer vs. IRS. Pattern: Court prioritizing individual redress against institutional power. Only government win: Rivers v. Guerrero, which involved stricter habeas petition standards.
     5. Observation #5: The Court as Error Corrector. Reversal rate: 10 of 12 cases vacated or reversed (83%). Term comparison: Higher than overall 66% reversal rate. "Kick it back" approach: Court often vacates with instructions rather than final resolution
     6. Observation #6: Roberts' Perfect Record. Chief Justice pattern: 41 cases, 41 majority opinions joined. Zero concurrences, zero dissents. Contrast with other justices:Justice Thomas: 5 dissents, Justice Gorsuch: 4 dissents (including both June 12th dissents) and Justice Jackson: 3 dissents authored, 1 joined.
     
     

     June 16th, 2025 Certiorari Grants

     1. First Choice Women's Resource Centers v. Matthew Platkin | Case No. 24-781 | Docket Link: Here.

     Question Presented: Where the subject of a state investigatory demand has established a reasonably objective chill of its First Amendment rights, is a federal court in a first-filed action deprived of jurisdiction because those rights must be adjudicated in state court?

     Key Facts:

     • New Jersey Attorney General issued civil investigatory subpoena to faith-based pregnancy center
     • Subpoena sought donor identities, medical claims, operational practices
     • First Choice filed federal § 1983 lawsuit two days before compliance deadline
     • Complex parallel litigation in federal and state courts
     
     

     Petitioner's Arguments:

     • Circuit split: Fifth Circuit bars pre-enforcement challenges vs. Ninth Circuit allows when showing objective chill
     • Concrete injury through chilling of First Amendment association/speech rights
     • § 1983 guarantees federal forum; state court requirement creates "preclusion trap"
     
     

     Respondent's Arguments:

     • No circuit split—Third Circuit decision was fact-specific
     • Case presents unique procedural complications unsuitable for broad resolution
     • Claims too speculative under Article III ripeness doctrine
     
     

     Stakes: Federal court access for constitutional challenges to state investigations

     2. Chevron USA Inc. v. Plaquemines Parish, Louisiana | Case No. 24-813 | Docket Link: Here.

     Questions Presented:

     1. Whether a causal-nexus or contractual direction test survives the 2011 amendment to the federal-officer removal statute
     2. Whether a federal contractor can remove to federal court when sued for oil-production activities undertaken to fulfill a federal oil-refinement contract
     
     

     Key Facts:

     • Louisiana parishes sued oil companies for environmental harm from WWII-era crude oil production
     • Companies sought federal officer removal based on WWII contracts to supply high-octane aviation gasoline
     • Fifth Circuit found companies satisfied "acting under" requirement but failed "relating to" requirement
     • Majority required explicit contractual directive about challenged conduct
     
     

     Petitioner's Arguments:

     • Fifth Circuit improperly required "explicit directive" in federal contracts
     • Circuit split on federal officer removal standards
     • Vertically integrated operations inherently connected crude production to federally-mandated refinement
     
     

     Respondent's Arguments:

     • No circuit conflict—decision was fact-specific, unpublished
     • Federal crude oil allocation program "severed" connection by allowing open market purchases
     • Contracts contained no directives about extraction methods or locations
     
     

     Stakes: Determines whether climate litigation stays in state court (plaintiff preference) or moves to federal court (defendant preference); potential impact on all pending climate cases

     Support the Podcast

     If you found this analysis helpful, please subscribe, rate, and share this podcast. Your support helps us continue providing in-depth Supreme Court coverage.

     Timestamps

     [00:00:00] Introduction

     [00:00:23] Decision Tally

     [00:01:25] 6-Pack of Observations: June 12th Opinions

     [00:09:52] June 16 Order List

     [00:10:26] Cert Grant: First Choice v. Platkin

     [00:13:36] Cert Grant: Chevron v. Plaquemines

     ]]>In this episode, we analyze the Supreme Court's recent activities across three key areas:
     • Six near unanimous decisions released on June 12th, 2025
     • Two major cases granted certiorari via June 16th, 2025 Order
     
     

     In this episode, we analyze the Supreme Court's recent activities across three key areas:

     1. Term statistics and remaining docket overview
     2. Six decisions released on June 12th, 2025
     3. Two major cases granted certiorari via June 16th, 2025 Order
     
     

     2024 Term Statistics

     • Total cases heard: 62 unique cases this term
     • Cases decided: 41 (approximately 66%)
     • Cases pending: 21 (approximately 33%)
     • Methodology: Consolidated cases counted once (e.g., Trump v. CASA/Washington/New Jersey)
     • Timing significance: June typically brings most consequential decisions
     
     

     Key Observations from June 12th, 2025 Decisions

     1. Observation #1: Unanimity Reigned Supreme. June 12th consensus: 4 unanimous (9-0) decisions, 2 near-unanimous (8-1) decisions. Two-week pattern: 9 unanimous decisions and 3 8-1 splits out of 12 total case. Historical context: Must go back 15 opinions to find more than 2 dissents (May 22nd Oklahoma Charter School case). Full-term data: 29 of 41 decided cases unanimous or near-unanimous (71% consensus)
     2. Observation #2: Opinion Assignments Tell a Story. Recent distribution: 8 of 9 justices wrote majority opinions in past two weeks; Justice Kavanaugh who wrote sole opinion the week before)
     3. Observation #3: Speed Suggests Strategic Docket Management. Rapid turnaround: 6-10 weeks from oral argument to decision. Contrast with pending cases: U.S. v. Skrmetti (transgender medical care): 6+ months since December 4th argument; Hewitt v. United States (First Step Act): pending since January 13th; and Stanley v. City of Sanford (ADA): pending since January 13th.
     4. Observation #4: Uncle Sam Had a Bad Day. Government losses: 5 of 6 cases involved citizens vs. government agencies. Case types: FBI raid victims, disabled student vs. school district, veterans vs. benefits administration, prisoner vs. federal procedures, taxpayer vs. IRS. Pattern: Court prioritizing individual redress against institutional power. Only government win: Rivers v. Guerrero, which involved stricter habeas petition standards.
     5. Observation #5: The Court as Error Corrector. Reversal rate: 10 of 12 cases vacated or reversed (83%). Term comparison: Higher than overall 66% reversal rate. "Kick it back" approach: Court often vacates with instructions rather than final resolution
     6. Observation #6: Roberts' Perfect Record. Chief Justice pattern: 41 cases, 41 majority opinions joined. Zero concurrences, zero dissents. Contrast with other justices:Justice Thomas: 5 dissents, Justice Gorsuch: 4 dissents (including both June 12th dissents) and Justice Jackson: 3 dissents authored, 1 joined.
     
     

     June 16th, 2025 Certiorari Grants

     1. First Choice Women's Resource Centers v. Matthew Platkin | Case No. 24-781 | Docket Link: Here.

     Question Presented: Where the subject of a state investigatory demand has established a reasonably objective chill of its First Amendment rights, is a federal court in a first-filed action deprived of jurisdiction because those rights must be adjudicated in state court?

     Key Facts:

     • New Jersey Attorney General issued civil investigatory subpoena to faith-based pregnancy center
     • Subpoena sought donor identities, medical claims, operational practices
     • First Choice filed federal § 1983 lawsuit two days before compliance deadline
     • Complex parallel litigation in federal and state courts
     
     

     Petitioner's Arguments:

     • Circuit split: Fifth Circuit bars pre-enforcement challenges vs. Ninth Circuit allows when showing objective chill
     • Concrete injury through chilling of First Amendment association/speech rights
     • § 1983 guarantees federal forum; state court requirement creates "preclusion trap"
     
     

     Respondent's Arguments:

     • No circuit split—Third Circuit decision was fact-specific
     • Case presents unique procedural complications unsuitable for broad resolution
     • Claims too speculative under Article III ripeness doctrine
     
     

     Stakes: Federal court access for constitutional challenges to state investigations

     2. Chevron USA Inc. v. Plaquemines Parish, Louisiana | Case No. 24-813 | Docket Link: Here.

     Questions Presented:

     1. Whether a causal-nexus or contractual direction test survives the 2011 amendment to the federal-officer removal statute
     2. Whether a federal contractor can remove to federal court when sued for oil-production activities undertaken to fulfill a federal oil-refinement contract
     
     

     Key Facts:

     • Louisiana parishes sued oil companies for environmental harm from WWII-era crude oil production
     • Companies sought federal officer removal based on WWII contracts to supply high-octane aviation gasoline
     • Fifth Circuit found companies satisfied "acting under" requirement but failed "relating to" requirement
     • Majority required explicit contractual directive about challenged conduct
     
     

     Petitioner's Arguments:

     • Fifth Circuit improperly required "explicit directive" in federal contracts
     • Circuit split on federal officer removal standards
     • Vertically integrated operations inherently connected crude production to federally-mandated refinement
     
     

     Respondent's Arguments:

     • No circuit conflict—decision was fact-specific, unpublished
     • Federal crude oil allocation program "severed" connection by allowing open market purchases
     • Contracts contained no directives about extraction methods or locations
     
     

     Stakes: Determines whether climate litigation stays in state court (plaintiff preference) or moves to federal court (defendant preference); potential impact on all pending climate cases

     Support the Podcast

     If you found this analysis helpful, please subscribe, rate, and share this podcast. Your support helps us continue providing in-depth Supreme Court coverage.

     Timestamps

     [00:00:00] Introduction

     [00:00:23] Decision Tally

     [00:01:25] 6-Pack of Observations: June 12th Opinions

     [00:09:52] June 16 Order List

     [00:10:26] Cert Grant: First Choice v. Platkin

     [00:13:36] Cert Grant: Chevron v. Plaquemines

     ]]>14a2047d-5f0b-41b3-a841-19c8f290cbcbMon, 16 Jun 2025 10:00:00 -040017:49falsefull202488882024Opinion Summary: A.J.T. v. Osseo Area Schools | Date Decided: 6/12/25 | Case No. 24–249Opinion Summary: A.J.T. v. Osseo Area Schools | Date Decided: 6/12/25 | Case No. 24–249

     Link to Docket: Here.

     Background:

     Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act (Rehabilitation Act) require public entities and organizations that receive federal funding to provide reasonable accommodations for people with disabilities. In the decision below, the Eighth Circuit held that, for discrimination claims "based on educational services" brought by children with disabilities, these statutes are violated only if school officials acted with ''bad faith or gross misjudgment."

     That test squarely implicates an entrenched and acknowledged 5-2 circuit split over the standard governing such claims. It is also plainly mistaken on the merits: As the Eighth Circuit itself acknowledged, the test lacks "any anchor in statutory text," App.5a n.2, and it arbitrarily departs from the more lenient standards that all courts-including the Eighth Circuit-apply to ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims brought by plaintiffs outside the school setting.

     Question Presented: Whether the ADA and Rehabilitation Act require children with disabilities to satisfy a uniquely stringent "bad faith or gross misjudgment" standard when seeking relief for discrimination relating to their education.

     Holding: Schoolchildren bringing ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims related to their education are not required to make a heightened showing of "bad faith or gross misjudgment" but instead are subject to the same standards that apply in other disability discrimination contexts.

     Result: Vacated and remanded.

     Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Chief Justice Roberts delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Justice Thomas filed a concurring opinion, in which Justice Kavanaugh joined. Justice Sotomayor filed a concurring opinion, in which Justice Jackson joined.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     • For Petitioner: Roman Martinez
     • For the United States, as Amicus Curiae: Nicole F. Reaves, Assistant to the Solicitor General
     • For Respondents: Lisa S. Blatt
     
     

     Website Link to Oral Argument: Here.

     Apple Podcast Link to Oral Argument: Here.

     ]]>Opinion Summary: A.J.T. v. Osseo Area Schools | Date Decided: 6/12/25 | Case No. 24–249

     Link to Docket: Here.

     Background:

     Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act (Rehabilitation Act) require public entities and organizations that receive federal funding to provide reasonable accommodations for people with disabilities. In the decision below, the Eighth Circuit held that, for discrimination claims "based on educational services" brought by children with disabilities, these statutes are violated only if school officials acted with ''bad faith or gross misjudgment."

     That test squarely implicates an entrenched and acknowledged 5-2 circuit split over the standard governing such claims. It is also plainly mistaken on the merits: As the Eighth Circuit itself acknowledged, the test lacks "any anchor in statutory text," App.5a n.2, and it arbitrarily departs from the more lenient standards that all courts-including the Eighth Circuit-apply to ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims brought by plaintiffs outside the school setting.

     Question Presented: Whether the ADA and Rehabilitation Act require children with disabilities to satisfy a uniquely stringent "bad faith or gross misjudgment" standard when seeking relief for discrimination relating to their education.

     Holding: Schoolchildren bringing ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims related to their education are not required to make a heightened showing of "bad faith or gross misjudgment" but instead are subject to the same standards that apply in other disability discrimination contexts.

     Result: Vacated and remanded.

     Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Chief Justice Roberts delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Justice Thomas filed a concurring opinion, in which Justice Kavanaugh joined. Justice Sotomayor filed a concurring opinion, in which Justice Jackson joined.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     • For Petitioner: Roman Martinez
     • For the United States, as Amicus Curiae: Nicole F. Reaves, Assistant to the Solicitor General
     • For Respondents: Lisa S. Blatt
     
     

     Website Link to Oral Argument: Here.

     Apple Podcast Link to Oral Argument: Here.

     ]]>54cd0d1e-4e75-4ddc-affb-cacc8e6fc851Thu, 12 Jun 2025 13:15:00 -040030:18falsefull202487872024Opinion Summary: Soto v. United States | Date Decided: 6/12/25 | Case No. 24-320Opinion Summary: Soto v. United States | Date Decided: 6/12/25 | Case No. 24-320

     Link to Docket: Here.

     Question Presented:

     Holding:

     Result:

     Voting Breakdown:

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     • For Petitioner:
     • For Respondent:
     
     

     Website Link to Oral Argument: Here.

     Apple Podcast Link to Oral Argument: Here.

     ]]>Opinion Summary: Soto v. United States | Date Decided: 6/12/25 | Case No. 24-320

     Link to Docket: Here.

     Question Presented:

     Holding:

     Result:

     Voting Breakdown:

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     • For Petitioner:
     • For Respondent:
     
     

     Website Link to Oral Argument: Here.

     Apple Podcast Link to Oral Argument: Here.

     ]]>6525a682-0cd2-471e-b91b-b0e122cce3e3Thu, 12 Jun 2025 13:00:00 -040012:44falsefull202486862024Opinion Summary: Martin v. United States | Date Decided: 6/12/25 | Case No. 24–362Opinion Summary: Martin v. United States | Date Decided: 6/12/25 | Case No. 24–362

     Link to Docket: Here.

     Background:

     Petitioners are the innocent victims of a wrong-house raid conducted by an FBI SWAT team in Atlanta, Georgia. Seeking a remedy for torts committed against them, Petitioners brought a cause of action against the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act. In its opinion below, the Eleventh Circuit held that all of Petitioners' FTCA claims are barred by sovereign immunity supplied either through the Constitution's Supremacy Clause or the FTCA's discretionary-function exception. In one or more ways, the opinion below conflicts with decisions from every other circuit.

     Questions Presented:

     1. Whether the Constitution's Supremacy Clause bars claims under the FTCA-a federal statute enacted by Congress-when the negligent or wrongful acts of federal employees have some nexus with furthering federal policy and can reasonably be characterized as complying with the full range of federal law.
     2. Whether the FTCA's discretionary-function exception bars claims for torts arising from wrong-house raids and similar negligent or wrongful acts by federal employees.
     
     

     Holdings:

     1. The law enforcement proviso in Section 2680(h) overrides only the intentional-tort exception in that subsection, not the discretionary-function exception or other exceptions throughout Section 2680.
     2. The Supremacy Clause does not afford the United States a defense in FTCA suits.
     3. On remand, the Eleventh Circuit should consider whether subsection (a)'s discretionary-function exception bars either the plaintiffs' negligent- or intentional-tort claims—undertaking that assessment without reference to the mistaken view that the law enforcement proviso applies to subsection (a).
     
     

     Result: Vacated and remanded.

     Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Gorsuch delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Justice Sotomayor filed a concurring opinion, in which Justice Jackson joined.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     • For Petitioners: Patrick M. Jaicomo
     • For Respondents: Frederick Liu, Assistant to the Solicitor General
     • For Court-Appointed Amicus Curiae in Support of Judgment Below on Question 1: Christopher E. Mills
     
     

     Website Link to Oral Argument: Here.

     Apple Podcast Link to Oral Argument: Here.

     Timestamps:

     ]]>Opinion Summary: Martin v. United States | Date Decided: 6/12/25 | Case No. 24–362

     Link to Docket: Here.

     Background:

     Petitioners are the innocent victims of a wrong-house raid conducted by an FBI SWAT team in Atlanta, Georgia. Seeking a remedy for torts committed against them, Petitioners brought a cause of action against the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act. In its opinion below, the Eleventh Circuit held that all of Petitioners' FTCA claims are barred by sovereign immunity supplied either through the Constitution's Supremacy Clause or the FTCA's discretionary-function exception. In one or more ways, the opinion below conflicts with decisions from every other circuit.

     Questions Presented:

     1. Whether the Constitution's Supremacy Clause bars claims under the FTCA-a federal statute enacted by Congress-when the negligent or wrongful acts of federal employees have some nexus with furthering federal policy and can reasonably be characterized as complying with the full range of federal law.
     2. Whether the FTCA's discretionary-function exception bars claims for torts arising from wrong-house raids and similar negligent or wrongful acts by federal employees.
     
     

     Holdings:

     1. The law enforcement proviso in Section 2680(h) overrides only the intentional-tort exception in that subsection, not the discretionary-function exception or other exceptions throughout Section 2680.
     2. The Supremacy Clause does not afford the United States a defense in FTCA suits.
     3. On remand, the Eleventh Circuit should consider whether subsection (a)'s discretionary-function exception bars either the plaintiffs' negligent- or intentional-tort claims—undertaking that assessment without reference to the mistaken view that the law enforcement proviso applies to subsection (a).
     
     

     Result: Vacated and remanded.

     Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Gorsuch delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Justice Sotomayor filed a concurring opinion, in which Justice Jackson joined.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     • For Petitioners: Patrick M. Jaicomo
     • For Respondents: Frederick Liu, Assistant to the Solicitor General
     • For Court-Appointed Amicus Curiae in Support of Judgment Below on Question 1: Christopher E. Mills
     
     

     Website Link to Oral Argument: Here.

     Apple Podcast Link to Oral Argument: Here.

     Timestamps:

     ]]>48d3ef96-0ccf-4927-9218-6f81121676acThu, 12 Jun 2025 12:30:00 -040027:47falsefull202485852024Opinion Summary: Parrish v. United States | Date Decided: 6/12/25 | Case No. 24–275Opinion Summary: Parrish v. United States | Date Decided: 6/12/25 | Case No. 24–275

     Link to Docket: Here.

     Background:

     Ordinarily, litigants must file a notice of appeal within 30 or 60 days of an adverse judgment. 28 U.S.C. § 2107(a)-(b). Under 28 U.S.C. § 2107(c) and Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(6), however, district courts can reopen an expired appeal period when a party did not receive timely notice of the judgment. The Courts of Appeals have divided about whether a notice of appeal filed after the expiration of the ordinary appeal period but before the appeal period is reopened becomes effective once reopening is granted.

     Holding: A litigant who files a notice of appeal after the original appeal deadline but before the court grants reopening need not file a second notice after reopening. The original notice relates forward to the date reopening is granted.

     Result: Reversed and remanded.

     Voting Breakdown: 8-1. Justice Sotomayor delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Alito, Kagan, Kavanaugh and Barrett joined. Justice Jackson filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which Justice Thomas joined. Justice Gorsuch filed a dissenting opinion.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     • For petitioner: Amanda Rice, Detroit, Mich.
     • For respondent in support of petitioner: Aimee Brown, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.
     • For Court-appointed amicus curiae in support of judgment below: Michael R. Huston, Phoenix, Ariz.
     
     

     Website Link to Oral Argument: Here.

     Apple Podcast Link to Oral Argument: Here.

     ]]>Opinion Summary: Parrish v. United States | Date Decided: 6/12/25 | Case No. 24–275

     Link to Docket: Here.

     Background:

     Ordinarily, litigants must file a notice of appeal within 30 or 60 days of an adverse judgment. 28 U.S.C. § 2107(a)-(b). Under 28 U.S.C. § 2107(c) and Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(6), however, district courts can reopen an expired appeal period when a party did not receive timely notice of the judgment. The Courts of Appeals have divided about whether a notice of appeal filed after the expiration of the ordinary appeal period but before the appeal period is reopened becomes effective once reopening is granted.

     Holding: A litigant who files a notice of appeal after the original appeal deadline but before the court grants reopening need not file a second notice after reopening. The original notice relates forward to the date reopening is granted.

     Result: Reversed and remanded.

     Voting Breakdown: 8-1. Justice Sotomayor delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Alito, Kagan, Kavanaugh and Barrett joined. Justice Jackson filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which Justice Thomas joined. Justice Gorsuch filed a dissenting opinion.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     • For petitioner: Amanda Rice, Detroit, Mich.
     • For respondent in support of petitioner: Aimee Brown, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.
     • For Court-appointed amicus curiae in support of judgment below: Michael R. Huston, Phoenix, Ariz.
     
     

     Website Link to Oral Argument: Here.

     Apple Podcast Link to Oral Argument: Here.

     ]]>2dd61757-19e3-478f-bc2c-9e26a9ccdea3Thu, 12 Jun 2025 09:00:00 -040017:47falsefull202486862024Opinion Summary: Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Zuch | Date Decided: 6/12/25 | Case No. 24–416Opinion Summary: Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Zuch | Date Decided: 6/12/25 | Case No. 24–416

     Link to Docket: Here.

     Question Presented: Whether a proceeding under 26 U.S.C. 6330 for a pre-deprivation determination about a levy proposed by the Internal Revenue Service to collect unpaid taxes becomes moot when there is no longer a live dispute over the proposed levy that gave rise to the proceeding.

     Holding: The Tax Court lacks jurisdiction under Section 6330 to resolve disputes between a taxpayer and the IRS when the IRS is no longer pursuing a levy.

     Result: Reversed and remanded.

     Voting Breakdown: 8-1. Justice Barrett delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Alito, Sotomayor, Kagan, Kavanaugh and Jackson joined. Justice Gorsuch filed a dissenting opinion.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     • For petitioner: Erica L. Ross, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.
     • For respondent: Shay Dvoretzky, Washington, D.C.
     
     

     Website Link to Oral Argument: Here.

     Apple Podcast Link to Oral Argument: Here.

     ]]>Opinion Summary: Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Zuch | Date Decided: 6/12/25 | Case No. 24–416

     Link to Docket: Here.

     Question Presented: Whether a proceeding under 26 U.S.C. 6330 for a pre-deprivation determination about a levy proposed by the Internal Revenue Service to collect unpaid taxes becomes moot when there is no longer a live dispute over the proposed levy that gave rise to the proceeding.

     Holding: The Tax Court lacks jurisdiction under Section 6330 to resolve disputes between a taxpayer and the IRS when the IRS is no longer pursuing a levy.

     Result: Reversed and remanded.

     Voting Breakdown: 8-1. Justice Barrett delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Alito, Sotomayor, Kagan, Kavanaugh and Jackson joined. Justice Gorsuch filed a dissenting opinion.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     • For petitioner: Erica L. Ross, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.
     • For respondent: Shay Dvoretzky, Washington, D.C.
     
     

     Website Link to Oral Argument: Here.

     Apple Podcast Link to Oral Argument: Here.

     ]]>74284f01-bb38-4303-9833-a73849c4bce2Thu, 12 Jun 2025 09:00:00 -040028:30falsefull202484842024Opinion Summary: Rivers v. Guerrero | Date Decided: 6/12/25 | Case No. 23-1345Opinion Summary: Rivers v. Guerrero | Date Decided: 6/12/25 | Case No. 23-1345

     Link to Docket: Here.

     Background:

     Under the federal habeas statute, a prisoner "always gets one chance to bring a federal habeas challenge to his conviction," Banister v. Davis, 590 U.S. 504, 509 (2020). After that, the stringent gatekeeping requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2) bar nearly all attempts to file a "second or successive habeas corpus application." Here, petitioner sought to amend his initial habeas application while it was pending on appeal. The Fifth Circuit applied § 2244(b)(2) and rejected the amended filing.

     The circuits are intractably split on whether § 2244(b)(2) applies to such filings. The Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits hold that § 2244(b)(2) categorically applies to all second-in-time habeas filings made after the district court enters final judgment. The Second Circuit disagrees, applying § 2244(b)(2) only after a petitioner exhausts appellate review of his initial petition. And the Third and Tenth Circuits exempt some second-in-time filings from § 2244(b)(2), depending on whether a prisoner prevails on his initial appeal (Third Circuit) or satisfies a seven-factor test (Tenth Circuit).

     Question Presented: Whether § 2244(b)(2) applies (i) only to habeas filings made after a prisoner has exhausted appellate review of his first petition, (ii) to all second-in-time habeas filings after final judgment, or (iii) to some second-in-time filings, depending on a prisoner's success on appeal or ability to satisfy a seven-factor test.

     Holding: Once a district court enters its judgment with respect to a first-filed habeas petition, a second-in-time filing qualifies as a "second or successive application" properly subject to the requirements of Section 2244(b).

     Result: Affirmed.

     Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Jackson delivered the opinion for a unanimous court. There were no concurring opinions.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     • For Petitioner: Peter A. Bruland, Washington, D.C.
     • For Respondent: Aaron L. Nielson, Solicitor General, Austin, Tex.; and Matthew Guarnieri, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C. (for United States, as amicus curiae.)
     
     

     Website Link to Oral Argument: Here.

     Apple Podcast Link to Oral Argument: Here.

     ]]>Opinion Summary: Rivers v. Guerrero | Date Decided: 6/12/25 | Case No. 23-1345

     Link to Docket: Here.

     Background:

     Under the federal habeas statute, a prisoner "always gets one chance to bring a federal habeas challenge to his conviction," Banister v. Davis, 590 U.S. 504, 509 (2020). After that, the stringent gatekeeping requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2) bar nearly all attempts to file a "second or successive habeas corpus application." Here, petitioner sought to amend his initial habeas application while it was pending on appeal. The Fifth Circuit applied § 2244(b)(2) and rejected the amended filing.

     The circuits are intractably split on whether § 2244(b)(2) applies to such filings. The Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits hold that § 2244(b)(2) categorically applies to all second-in-time habeas filings made after the district court enters final judgment. The Second Circuit disagrees, applying § 2244(b)(2) only after a petitioner exhausts appellate review of his initial petition. And the Third and Tenth Circuits exempt some second-in-time filings from § 2244(b)(2), depending on whether a prisoner prevails on his initial appeal (Third Circuit) or satisfies a seven-factor test (Tenth Circuit).

     Question Presented: Whether § 2244(b)(2) applies (i) only to habeas filings made after a prisoner has exhausted appellate review of his first petition, (ii) to all second-in-time habeas filings after final judgment, or (iii) to some second-in-time filings, depending on a prisoner's success on appeal or ability to satisfy a seven-factor test.

     Holding: Once a district court enters its judgment with respect to a first-filed habeas petition, a second-in-time filing qualifies as a "second or successive application" properly subject to the requirements of Section 2244(b).

     Result: Affirmed.

     Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Jackson delivered the opinion for a unanimous court. There were no concurring opinions.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     • For Petitioner: Peter A. Bruland, Washington, D.C.
     • For Respondent: Aaron L. Nielson, Solicitor General, Austin, Tex.; and Matthew Guarnieri, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C. (for United States, as amicus curiae.)
     
     

     Website Link to Oral Argument: Here.

     Apple Podcast Link to Oral Argument: Here.

     ]]>f727fb08-0984-4460-835a-cab315e2a142Thu, 12 Jun 2025 09:00:00 -040012:08falsefull202483832024Supreme Court Roundup: Decisions, Emergency Actions, and New GrantsSupreme Court Roundup: Decisions, Emergency Actions, and New Grants

     In this episode, we analyze the Supreme Court's recent activities across three key areas:

     • Six unanimous decisions released on June 5th, 2025
     • Two significant emergency docket interventions involving DOGE
     • Three major cases granted certiorari via June 6th, 2025 Order
     
     

     June 5, 2025 Unanimous Decisions

     • Remarkable consensus: 5 unanimous decisions, 1 8-1 dismissal
     • Strategic clearing of non-controversial cases with 30 contentious cases pending
     • Justice Thomas's concurrences in 5 of 6 cases challenging judge-made doctrines
     • Heavy focus on procedural rules as proxies for deeper policy debates
     
     

     Emergency Docket Actions

     1. U.S. DOGE Service v. CREW: Court limits discovery of internal executive communications

     • Court orders narrowing of discovery rather than outright prohibition
     • Decision based on separation of powers principles
     • Justices Sotomayor, Kagan, and Jackson dissented
     
     

     2. Social Security Administration v. AFSCME: Court allows DOGE access to sensitive SSA records

     • Justice Jackson's forceful dissent highlighting privacy concerns
     • Lower courts' compromise solution rejected by majority
     • Concerns about disclosure of personal data without legal determination
     
     

     Certiorari Grants

     1. Coney Island Auto Parts v. Burton | Case No. 24-808

     • Docket Link: Here
     • Question Presented: Whether a motion to vacate a void judgment under Rule 60(b)(4) must be filed within a "reasonable time"
     • Key Facts: Coney Island claims improper service six years after default judgment
     • Petitioner's Argument: Void judgments are legal nullities from the start; no time limit should apply
     • Respondent's Argument: Rule 60(c)(1) explicitly requires "reasonable time" with no exceptions
     • Stakes: Balance between jurisdictional principles and need for legal finality
     
     

     2. Rutherford v. United States | Case No. 24-820 (Consolidated with Carter v. United States | Case No. 24-860)

     • Docket Link: Here
     • Question Presented: Whether the Sentencing Commission exceeded its authority in allowing courts to consider non-retroactive changes in law as "extraordinary and compelling reasons" for sentence reduction
     • Key Fact: Carter received 70-year sentence under pre-First Step Act "stacking" provisions that would result in much shorter sentence today
     • Petitioner's Argument: Commission has broad authority to define "extraordinary and compelling reasons"; gross disparities qualify
     • Government's Argument: Commission can't circumvent Congress's decision not to make First Step Act retroactive
     • Stakes: Potential relief for hundreds of federal prisoners serving lengthy "stacked" sentences
     
     

     3. Hamm v. Smith | Case No. 24-872

     • Docket Link: Here
     • Question Presented: How courts should apply the clinical definition of intellectual disability when all IQ scores are above 70
     • Key Fact: Smith has five IQ scores (75, 74, 72, 78, 74) all above 70 but significant adaptive deficits
     • Petitioner's Argument: Multiple IQ scores above 70 should preclude intellectual disability finding; states should be able to require proof of IQ ≤70
     • Respondent's Argument: Supreme Court precedent requires considering standard error of measurement and adaptive functioning when scores are in 70-75 range
     • Stakes: Implementation of Atkins prohibition on executing intellectually disabled individuals; states' authority to define intellectual disability criteria
     
     

     Support the Podcast

     If you found this analysis helpful, please subscribe, rate, and share this podcast. Your support helps us continue providing in-depth Supreme Court coverage.

     ]]>Supreme Court Roundup: Decisions, Emergency Actions, and New Grants

     In this episode, we analyze the Supreme Court's recent activities across three key areas:

     • Six unanimous decisions released on June 5th, 2025
     • Two significant emergency docket interventions involving DOGE
     • Three major cases granted certiorari via June 6th, 2025 Order
     
     

     June 5, 2025 Unanimous Decisions

     • Remarkable consensus: 5 unanimous decisions, 1 8-1 dismissal
     • Strategic clearing of non-controversial cases with 30 contentious cases pending
     • Justice Thomas's concurrences in 5 of 6 cases challenging judge-made doctrines
     • Heavy focus on procedural rules as proxies for deeper policy debates
     
     

     Emergency Docket Actions

     1. U.S. DOGE Service v. CREW: Court limits discovery of internal executive communications

     • Court orders narrowing of discovery rather than outright prohibition
     • Decision based on separation of powers principles
     • Justices Sotomayor, Kagan, and Jackson dissented
     
     

     2. Social Security Administration v. AFSCME: Court allows DOGE access to sensitive SSA records

     • Justice Jackson's forceful dissent highlighting privacy concerns
     • Lower courts' compromise solution rejected by majority
     • Concerns about disclosure of personal data without legal determination
     
     

     Certiorari Grants

     1. Coney Island Auto Parts v. Burton | Case No. 24-808

     • Docket Link: Here
     • Question Presented: Whether a motion to vacate a void judgment under Rule 60(b)(4) must be filed within a "reasonable time"
     • Key Facts: Coney Island claims improper service six years after default judgment
     • Petitioner's Argument: Void judgments are legal nullities from the start; no time limit should apply
     • Respondent's Argument: Rule 60(c)(1) explicitly requires "reasonable time" with no exceptions
     • Stakes: Balance between jurisdictional principles and need for legal finality
     
     

     2. Rutherford v. United States | Case No. 24-820 (Consolidated with Carter v. United States | Case No. 24-860)

     • Docket Link: Here
     • Question Presented: Whether the Sentencing Commission exceeded its authority in allowing courts to consider non-retroactive changes in law as "extraordinary and compelling reasons" for sentence reduction
     • Key Fact: Carter received 70-year sentence under pre-First Step Act "stacking" provisions that would result in much shorter sentence today
     • Petitioner's Argument: Commission has broad authority to define "extraordinary and compelling reasons"; gross disparities qualify
     • Government's Argument: Commission can't circumvent Congress's decision not to make First Step Act retroactive
     • Stakes: Potential relief for hundreds of federal prisoners serving lengthy "stacked" sentences
     
     

     3. Hamm v. Smith | Case No. 24-872

     • Docket Link: Here
     • Question Presented: How courts should apply the clinical definition of intellectual disability when all IQ scores are above 70
     • Key Fact: Smith has five IQ scores (75, 74, 72, 78, 74) all above 70 but significant adaptive deficits
     • Petitioner's Argument: Multiple IQ scores above 70 should preclude intellectual disability finding; states should be able to require proof of IQ ≤70
     • Respondent's Argument: Supreme Court precedent requires considering standard error of measurement and adaptive functioning when scores are in 70-75 range
     • Stakes: Implementation of Atkins prohibition on executing intellectually disabled individuals; states' authority to define intellectual disability criteria
     
     

     Support the Podcast

     If you found this analysis helpful, please subscribe, rate, and share this podcast. Your support helps us continue providing in-depth Supreme Court coverage.

     ]]>d52eccc9-30a2-4644-a5c9-f693a2913ab4Mon, 09 Jun 2025 10:00:00 -040028:46falsefull202482822024Opinion Summary: Laboratory Corp. of America Holdings v. Davis | Date Decided: 6/5/25 | Case No. 24–304Opinion Summary: Laboratory Corp. of America Holdings v. Davis | Date Decided: 6/5/25 | Case No. 24–304

     In this episode, I breakdown the dismissal, Justice Kavanaugh's dissent and theories for the dismissal.

     Link to Docket: Here.

     Question Presented: Whether a federal court may certify a class action when some of its members lack any Article III injury.

     Result: Dismissed as improvidently granted.

     Voting Breakdown: 8-1. Per Curiam decision.  Justice Kavanaugh filed a dissenting opinion.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     • For Petitioner: Noel J. Francisco
     • For United States, as Amicus Curiae: Sopan Joshi, Assistant to the Solicitor General
     • For Respondents: Deepak Gupta
     
     

     Website Link to Oral Argument: Here.

     Apple Podcast Link to Oral Argument: Here.

     ]]>Opinion Summary: Laboratory Corp. of America Holdings v. Davis | Date Decided: 6/5/25 | Case No. 24–304

     In this episode, I breakdown the dismissal, Justice Kavanaugh's dissent and theories for the dismissal.

     Link to Docket: Here.

     Question Presented: Whether a federal court may certify a class action when some of its members lack any Article III injury.

     Result: Dismissed as improvidently granted.

     Voting Breakdown: 8-1. Per Curiam decision.  Justice Kavanaugh filed a dissenting opinion.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     • For Petitioner: Noel J. Francisco
     • For United States, as Amicus Curiae: Sopan Joshi, Assistant to the Solicitor General
     • For Respondents: Deepak Gupta
     
     

     Website Link to Oral Argument: Here.

     Apple Podcast Link to Oral Argument: Here.

     ]]>eeeff6dd-f9bf-4282-8788-76fcef85f9c1Thu, 05 Jun 2025 13:15:00 -040014:13falsefull202481812024Opinion Summary: Smith & Wesson Brands, Inc. v. Estados Unidos Mexicanos | Date Decided: 6/5/25 | Case No. 23–1141Opinion Summary: Smith & Wesson Brands, Inc. v. Estados Unidos Mexicanos | Date Decided: 6/5/25 | Case No. 23–1141

     Link to Docket: Here.

     Background:

     The Mexican Government sued leading members of the American firearms industry, seeking to hold them liable for harms inflicted by Mexican drug cartels. According to Mexico, America's firearms companies have engaged in a series of business practices for decades-from selling semi-automatic rifles, to making magazines that hold over ten rounds, to failing to impose various sales restrictions-that have created a supply of firearms later smuggled across the border and ultimately used by the cartels to commit crimes. Mexico asks for billions of dollars in damages, plus extensive injunctive relief imposing new gun-control measures in the United States. The district court dismissed the case under the Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act (PLCAA), which generally bars suits against firearms companies based on criminals misusing their products. But the First Circuit reversed. It held that PLCAA does not bar this suit because Mexico stated a claim that defendants' business practices have aided and abetted firearms trafficking to the cartels, proximately harming the Mexican government.

     Questions Presented:

     1. Whether the production and sale of firearms in the United States is the "proximate cause" of alleged injuries to the Mexican government stemming from violence committed by drug cartels in Mexico.
     2. Whether the production and sale of firearms in the United States amounts to "aiding and abetting" illegal firearms trafficking because firearms companies allegedly know that some of their products are unlawfully trafficked.
     
     

     Holding: Because Mexico’s complaint does not plausibly allege that the defendant gun manufacturers aided and abetted gun dealers’ unlawful sales of firearms to Mexican traffickers, PLCAA bars the lawsuit.

     Result: Reversed and remanded.

     Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Kagan delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Justice Thomas and Justice Jackson each filed concurring opinions.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     • For petitioners: Noel J. Francisco, Washington, D.C.
     • For respondent: Catherine E. Stetson, Washington, D.C.
     
     

     Website Link to Oral Argument: Here.

     Apple Podcast Link to Oral Argument: Here.

     Timestamps:

     ]]>Opinion Summary: Smith & Wesson Brands, Inc. v. Estados Unidos Mexicanos | Date Decided: 6/5/25 | Case No. 23–1141

     Link to Docket: Here.

     Background:

     The Mexican Government sued leading members of the American firearms industry, seeking to hold them liable for harms inflicted by Mexican drug cartels. According to Mexico, America's firearms companies have engaged in a series of business practices for decades-from selling semi-automatic rifles, to making magazines that hold over ten rounds, to failing to impose various sales restrictions-that have created a supply of firearms later smuggled across the border and ultimately used by the cartels to commit crimes. Mexico asks for billions of dollars in damages, plus extensive injunctive relief imposing new gun-control measures in the United States. The district court dismissed the case under the Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act (PLCAA), which generally bars suits against firearms companies based on criminals misusing their products. But the First Circuit reversed. It held that PLCAA does not bar this suit because Mexico stated a claim that defendants' business practices have aided and abetted firearms trafficking to the cartels, proximately harming the Mexican government.

     Questions Presented:

     1. Whether the production and sale of firearms in the United States is the "proximate cause" of alleged injuries to the Mexican government stemming from violence committed by drug cartels in Mexico.
     2. Whether the production and sale of firearms in the United States amounts to "aiding and abetting" illegal firearms trafficking because firearms companies allegedly know that some of their products are unlawfully trafficked.
     
     

     Holding: Because Mexico’s complaint does not plausibly allege that the defendant gun manufacturers aided and abetted gun dealers’ unlawful sales of firearms to Mexican traffickers, PLCAA bars the lawsuit.

     Result: Reversed and remanded.

     Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Kagan delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Justice Thomas and Justice Jackson each filed concurring opinions.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     • For petitioners: Noel J. Francisco, Washington, D.C.
     • For respondent: Catherine E. Stetson, Washington, D.C.
     
     

     Website Link to Oral Argument: Here.

     Apple Podcast Link to Oral Argument: Here.

     Timestamps:

     ]]>da4f0216-9bd0-4c4c-aded-621c127de867Thu, 05 Jun 2025 13:00:00 -040021:28falsefull202480802024Opinion Summary: Catholic Charities Bureau, Inc. v. Wisconsin Labor and Industry Review Comm’n. | Date Decided: 6/5/25 | Case No. 24–154Opinion Summary: Catholic Charities Bureau, Inc. v. Wisconsin Labor and Industry Review Comm’n. | Date Decided: 6/5/25 | Case No. 24–154

     Link to Docket: Here.

     Question Presented:

     Holding: The Wisconsin Supreme Court’s application of § 108.02(15)(h)(2) to petitioners violates the First Amendment.

     Result: Reversed and remanded.

     Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Sotomayor delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.  Justices Thomas and Jackson each filed concurring opinions.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     • For Petitioner:
     • For Respondent:
     
     

     Website Link to Oral Argument: Here.

     Apple Podcast Link to Oral Argument: Here.

     Timestamps:

     ]]>Opinion Summary: Catholic Charities Bureau, Inc. v. Wisconsin Labor and Industry Review Comm’n. | Date Decided: 6/5/25 | Case No. 24–154

     Link to Docket: Here.

     Question Presented:

     Holding: The Wisconsin Supreme Court’s application of § 108.02(15)(h)(2) to petitioners violates the First Amendment.

     Result: Reversed and remanded.

     Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Sotomayor delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.  Justices Thomas and Jackson each filed concurring opinions.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     • For Petitioner:
     • For Respondent:
     
     

     Website Link to Oral Argument: Here.

     Apple Podcast Link to Oral Argument: Here.

     Timestamps:

     ]]>d5032847-a6c9-4cb9-bee8-2938801b1ddcThu, 05 Jun 2025 12:30:00 -040028:54falsefull202479792024Opinion Summary: CC/Devas (Mauritius) Ltd. v. Antrix Corp. | Date Decided: 6/5/25 | Case No. 23–1201Opinion Summary: CC/Devas (Mauritius) Ltd. v. Antrix Corp. | Date Decided: 6/5/25 | Case No. 23–1201

     This case was consolidated with: Devas Multimedia Private Ltd. v. Antrix Corp. Ltd., Case No. 24-17.

     Link to Docket: Here.

     Questions Presented:

     1. Whether plaintiffs must prove minimum contacts before federal courts may assert personal jurisdiction over foreign states sued under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act.
     2. The question presented in Antrix Corp. Ltd. is: Under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, "[p]ersonal jurisdiction over a foreign state shall exist as to every claim for relief over which the district courts have jurisdiction under subsection (a) where service has been made under section 1608 of this title." 28 U.S.C. § 1330(b).
     
     

     Host Note: Consolidated with: Devas Multimedia Private Ltd. v. Antrix Corp. Ltd., Case No. 24-17

     Holding: Personal jurisdiction exists under the FSIA when an immunity exception applies and service is proper. The FSIA does not require proof of “minimum contacts” over and above the contacts already required by the Act’s enumerated exceptions to foreign sovereign immunity.

     Result: Reversed and remanded.

     Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Alito delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     • For petitioner in 24-17: Aaron Streett, Houston, Tex.
     • For petitioners in 23-1201: Matthew D. McGill, Washington, D.C.
     • For United States, as amicus curiae supporting petitioners: Sarah M. Harris, Acting Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.
     • For respondents: Carter G. Phillips, Washington, D. C.
     
     

     Website Link to Oral Argument: Here.

     Apple Podcast Link to Oral Argument: Here.

     Timestamps:

     ]]>Opinion Summary: CC/Devas (Mauritius) Ltd. v. Antrix Corp. | Date Decided: 6/5/25 | Case No. 23–1201

     This case was consolidated with: Devas Multimedia Private Ltd. v. Antrix Corp. Ltd., Case No. 24-17.

     Link to Docket: Here.

     Questions Presented:

     1. Whether plaintiffs must prove minimum contacts before federal courts may assert personal jurisdiction over foreign states sued under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act.
     2. The question presented in Antrix Corp. Ltd. is: Under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, "[p]ersonal jurisdiction over a foreign state shall exist as to every claim for relief over which the district courts have jurisdiction under subsection (a) where service has been made under section 1608 of this title." 28 U.S.C. § 1330(b).
     
     

     Host Note: Consolidated with: Devas Multimedia Private Ltd. v. Antrix Corp. Ltd., Case No. 24-17

     Holding: Personal jurisdiction exists under the FSIA when an immunity exception applies and service is proper. The FSIA does not require proof of “minimum contacts” over and above the contacts already required by the Act’s enumerated exceptions to foreign sovereign immunity.

     Result: Reversed and remanded.

     Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Alito delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     • For petitioner in 24-17: Aaron Streett, Houston, Tex.
     • For petitioners in 23-1201: Matthew D. McGill, Washington, D.C.
     • For United States, as amicus curiae supporting petitioners: Sarah M. Harris, Acting Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.
     • For respondents: Carter G. Phillips, Washington, D. C.
     
     

     Website Link to Oral Argument: Here.

     Apple Podcast Link to Oral Argument: Here.

     Timestamps:

     ]]>3ff00b71-cd70-49b6-8883-5229233d0e40Thu, 05 Jun 2025 12:00:00 -040008:12falsefull202478782024Opinion Summary: BLOM Bank SAL v. Honickman| Date Decided: 6/5/25 | Case No. 23–1259Opinion Summary: BLOM Bank SAL v. Honickman| Date Decided: 6/5/25 | Case No. 23–1259

     Link to Docket: Here.

     Background:

     For more than 70 years, this Court has "required a movant seeking relief under Rule 60(b)(6)" of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure "to show 'extraordinary circumstances' justifying the reopening of a final judgment." Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 U.S. 524, 535 (2005) (quoting Ackermann v. United States, 340 U.S. 193, 199 (1950)). This Court has also stressed that a movant must be "faultless" to obtain relief. Pioneer Inv. Servs. v. Brunswick Assocs. Ltd. P'ship, 507 U.S. 380, 393 (1993). "This very strict interpretation of Rule 60(b) is essential if the finality of judgments is to be preserved." Gonzalez, 545 U.S. at 535 (cleaned up).

     In this case, Respondents declined multiple invitations and opportunities to amend their complaint. The District Court then dismissed their complaint with prejudice, and the Second Circuit affirmed. Only then did Respondents move to vacate the judgment so they could file an amended complaint.

     The District Court denied the motion under Rule 60(b)(6)'s well-settled standard. But the Second Circuit reversed, based on an unprecedented "balanc[ing]" test that requires district courts to consider Rule 15(a)'s "liberal pleading principles" when addressing a Rule 60 (b)(6) motion to reopen a judgment for the purpose of filing an amended complaint.

     Question Presented: Whether Rule 60(b)(6)'s stringent standard applies to a post-judgment request to vacate for the purpose of filing an amended complaint.

     Holding: Relief under Rule 60(b)(6) requires extraordinary circumstances, and this standard does not become less demanding when the movant seeks to reopen a case to amend a complaint. A party must first satisfy Rule 60(b) before Rule 15(a)’s liberal amendment standard can apply.

     Result: Reversed and remanded.

     Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Thomas delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Robers and Justices Alito, Sotomayor, Kagan, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, Kavanaugh and Barrett joined and in which Justice Jackson joined in all parts but Part III. Justice Jackson filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     • For petitioner: Michael H. McGinley, Washington, D. C.
     • For respondents: Michael J. Radine, Hackensack, N.J.
     
     

     Website Link to Oral Argument: Here.

     Apple Podcast Link to Oral Argument: Here.

     ]]>Opinion Summary: BLOM Bank SAL v. Honickman| Date Decided: 6/5/25 | Case No. 23–1259

     Link to Docket: Here.

     Background:

     For more than 70 years, this Court has "required a movant seeking relief under Rule 60(b)(6)" of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure "to show 'extraordinary circumstances' justifying the reopening of a final judgment." Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 U.S. 524, 535 (2005) (quoting Ackermann v. United States, 340 U.S. 193, 199 (1950)). This Court has also stressed that a movant must be "faultless" to obtain relief. Pioneer Inv. Servs. v. Brunswick Assocs. Ltd. P'ship, 507 U.S. 380, 393 (1993). "This very strict interpretation of Rule 60(b) is essential if the finality of judgments is to be preserved." Gonzalez, 545 U.S. at 535 (cleaned up).

     In this case, Respondents declined multiple invitations and opportunities to amend their complaint. The District Court then dismissed their complaint with prejudice, and the Second Circuit affirmed. Only then did Respondents move to vacate the judgment so they could file an amended complaint.

     The District Court denied the motion under Rule 60(b)(6)'s well-settled standard. But the Second Circuit reversed, based on an unprecedented "balanc[ing]" test that requires district courts to consider Rule 15(a)'s "liberal pleading principles" when addressing a Rule 60 (b)(6) motion to reopen a judgment for the purpose of filing an amended complaint.

     Question Presented: Whether Rule 60(b)(6)'s stringent standard applies to a post-judgment request to vacate for the purpose of filing an amended complaint.

     Holding: Relief under Rule 60(b)(6) requires extraordinary circumstances, and this standard does not become less demanding when the movant seeks to reopen a case to amend a complaint. A party must first satisfy Rule 60(b) before Rule 15(a)’s liberal amendment standard can apply.

     Result: Reversed and remanded.

     Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Thomas delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Robers and Justices Alito, Sotomayor, Kagan, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, Kavanaugh and Barrett joined and in which Justice Jackson joined in all parts but Part III. Justice Jackson filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     • For petitioner: Michael H. McGinley, Washington, D. C.
     • For respondents: Michael J. Radine, Hackensack, N.J.
     
     

     Website Link to Oral Argument: Here.

     Apple Podcast Link to Oral Argument: Here.

     ]]>69783a12-6cfe-4ebb-9bad-68fe3a66c1f0Thu, 05 Jun 2025 11:15:00 -040021:52falsefull202477772024Opinion Summary: Ames v. OH Dept. of Youth Services | Case No. 23-1039 | Date Decided: 6/5/25Opinion Summary: Ames v. OH Dept. of Youth Services | Case No. 23-1039 | Date Decided: 6/5/25

     In this episode, we'll Ames versus Ohio Department of Youth Services, Case Number 23–1039. I'll walk through the opinion, give my thoughts on case implications and also compare how the oral arguments compared and contrasted to the ultimate opinions. Spoiler alert: oral arguments heavily forecasted the results.

     Link to Docket: Here.

     Question Presented: Whether, in addition to pleading the other elements of Title VII, a majority-group plaintiff must show "background circumstances to support the suspicion that the defendant is that unusual employer who discriminates against the majority."

     Holding: The Sixth Circuit’s “background circumstances” rule—which re¬quires members of a majority group to satisfy a heightened evidentiary standard to prevail on a Title VII claim—cannot be squared with the text of Title VII or the Court’s precedents.

     Result: Vacated and remanded.

     Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Jackson delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Justice Thomas filed a concurring opinion, in which Justice Gorsuch joined.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     • For petitioner: Xiao Wang, Charlottesville, Va.; and Ashley Robertson, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C. (for United States, as amicus curiae.)
     • For respondent: T. Elliot Gaiser, Solicitor General, Columbus, Ohio.
     
     

     Website Link to Oral Argument: Here.

     Apple Podcast Link to Oral Argument: Here.

     Timestamps:

     ]]>Opinion Summary: Ames v. OH Dept. of Youth Services | Case No. 23-1039 | Date Decided: 6/5/25

     In this episode, we'll Ames versus Ohio Department of Youth Services, Case Number 23–1039. I'll walk through the opinion, give my thoughts on case implications and also compare how the oral arguments compared and contrasted to the ultimate opinions. Spoiler alert: oral arguments heavily forecasted the results.

     Link to Docket: Here.

     Question Presented: Whether, in addition to pleading the other elements of Title VII, a majority-group plaintiff must show "background circumstances to support the suspicion that the defendant is that unusual employer who discriminates against the majority."

     Holding: The Sixth Circuit’s “background circumstances” rule—which re¬quires members of a majority group to satisfy a heightened evidentiary standard to prevail on a Title VII claim—cannot be squared with the text of Title VII or the Court’s precedents.

     Result: Vacated and remanded.

     Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Jackson delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Justice Thomas filed a concurring opinion, in which Justice Gorsuch joined.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     • For petitioner: Xiao Wang, Charlottesville, Va.; and Ashley Robertson, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C. (for United States, as amicus curiae.)
     • For respondent: T. Elliot Gaiser, Solicitor General, Columbus, Ohio.
     
     

     Website Link to Oral Argument: Here.

     Apple Podcast Link to Oral Argument: Here.

     Timestamps:

     ]]>b9eb5fac-3278-4abf-bf12-53dc885c2d63Thu, 05 Jun 2025 10:30:00 -040023:46falsefull202476762024Guns, Warrantless Home Searches, and Ballot Boxes: Inside the Supreme Court's June 2nd Order ListGuns, Warrantless Home Searches, and Ballot Boxes: Inside the Supreme Court's June 2nd Order List

     In this episode of Supreme Court Oral Arguments and Opinions, I break down the Court's June 2, 2025 Order List, focusing on several cases that touch on fundamental constitutional questions affecting Americans' daily lives. The episode examines four cases where the Court granted certiorari and two denied cases that sparked passionate written dissents.

     Cases Granted Review:

     1. Bost v. Illinois Board of Elections | Case No. 24-568 | Docket Link: Here.

     Question: Do federal candidates have standing to challenge state laws allowing ballots to be counted after Election Day?

     Background: Stems from a lawsuit by Congressman Michael Bost and two Republican Presidential Elector Nominees involving a challenge to Illinois' law that allows mail-in ballots to be received and counted up to fourteen days after Election Day.

     Implications: Could affect how mail-in ballots are processed in federal elections across more than half the states

     2. Case v. Montana | Case No. 24-624 | Docket Link: Here.

     Question: Do police need probable cause or only reasonable suspicion to enter homes without a warrant during emergencies?

     Background: Stems from a welfare check that resulted in William Trevor Case being shot by police and later convicted of assaulting a peace officer

     Implications: Will clarify Fourth Amendment standards for warrantless home entries during potential emergencies

     3. GEO Group, Inc. v. Menocal | Case No. 24-758 | Docket Link: Here.

     Question: Can government contractors immediately appeal denials of derivative sovereign immunity claims?

     Background: Involves allegations that a private detention center operator forced detainees to clean common areas and paid only $1.00 per day for voluntary work

     Implications: Will affect litigation risks for companies contracting with the government in sensitive areas

     4. Hencely v. Fluor Corp. | Case No. 24-924 | Docket Link: Here.

     Question: Does federal law preempt state tort claims against military contractors in war zones?

     Background: Arises from a 2016 suicide bombing at Bagram Airfield in Afghanistan that severely injured a U.S. Army specialist

     Implications: Billions in potential liability for military contractors and access to remedies for injured service members

     Notable Cert Denials:

     1. Nicholson v. W.L. York | Case No. 23–7490

     Issue: When does the statute of limitations restart for repeated acts of racial discrimination?

     Dissent: Justice Jackson, joined by Justice Sotomayor, argued that each discriminatory act should start a new limitations clock

     Significance: Affects when victims of ongoing discrimination can bring legal claims

     2. Snope v. Brown | Case No. 24–203

     Issue: Does Maryland's ban on AR-15s and similar semi-automatic rifles violate the Second Amendment?

     Statement: Justice Kavanaugh noted AR-15s' common use but supported further percolation

     Dissent: Justice Thomas forcefully dissented, arguing the ban is unconstitutional

     Implications: Maintains state-by-state variations in assault weapons regulations while suggesting the Court may address the issue in coming terms

     Timestamps:

     00:00:00 Introduction

     00:01:26  Cert Granted: Bost v. Illinois Board of Elections

     00:03:39 Cert Granted: Case v. Montana

     00:06:59 Cert Granted: GEO Group v. Menocal

     00:08:48 Cert Grant: Hencely v. Fluor Corp.

     00:10:35 Cert Denied: Nicholson v. W.L. York

     00:12:04 Cert Denied: Snope v. Brown

     00:16:30 Conclusion

     ]]>Guns, Warrantless Home Searches, and Ballot Boxes: Inside the Supreme Court's June 2nd Order List

     In this episode of Supreme Court Oral Arguments and Opinions, I break down the Court's June 2, 2025 Order List, focusing on several cases that touch on fundamental constitutional questions affecting Americans' daily lives. The episode examines four cases where the Court granted certiorari and two denied cases that sparked passionate written dissents.

     Cases Granted Review:

     1. Bost v. Illinois Board of Elections | Case No. 24-568 | Docket Link: Here.

     Question: Do federal candidates have standing to challenge state laws allowing ballots to be counted after Election Day?

     Background: Stems from a lawsuit by Congressman Michael Bost and two Republican Presidential Elector Nominees involving a challenge to Illinois' law that allows mail-in ballots to be received and counted up to fourteen days after Election Day.

     Implications: Could affect how mail-in ballots are processed in federal elections across more than half the states

     2. Case v. Montana | Case No. 24-624 | Docket Link: Here.

     Question: Do police need probable cause or only reasonable suspicion to enter homes without a warrant during emergencies?

     Background: Stems from a welfare check that resulted in William Trevor Case being shot by police and later convicted of assaulting a peace officer

     Implications: Will clarify Fourth Amendment standards for warrantless home entries during potential emergencies

     3. GEO Group, Inc. v. Menocal | Case No. 24-758 | Docket Link: Here.

     Question: Can government contractors immediately appeal denials of derivative sovereign immunity claims?

     Background: Involves allegations that a private detention center operator forced detainees to clean common areas and paid only $1.00 per day for voluntary work

     Implications: Will affect litigation risks for companies contracting with the government in sensitive areas

     4. Hencely v. Fluor Corp. | Case No. 24-924 | Docket Link: Here.

     Question: Does federal law preempt state tort claims against military contractors in war zones?

     Background: Arises from a 2016 suicide bombing at Bagram Airfield in Afghanistan that severely injured a U.S. Army specialist

     Implications: Billions in potential liability for military contractors and access to remedies for injured service members

     Notable Cert Denials:

     1. Nicholson v. W.L. York | Case No. 23–7490

     Issue: When does the statute of limitations restart for repeated acts of racial discrimination?

     Dissent: Justice Jackson, joined by Justice Sotomayor, argued that each discriminatory act should start a new limitations clock

     Significance: Affects when victims of ongoing discrimination can bring legal claims

     2. Snope v. Brown | Case No. 24–203

     Issue: Does Maryland's ban on AR-15s and similar semi-automatic rifles violate the Second Amendment?

     Statement: Justice Kavanaugh noted AR-15s' common use but supported further percolation

     Dissent: Justice Thomas forcefully dissented, arguing the ban is unconstitutional

     Implications: Maintains state-by-state variations in assault weapons regulations while suggesting the Court may address the issue in coming terms

     Timestamps:

     00:00:00 Introduction

     00:01:26  Cert Granted: Bost v. Illinois Board of Elections

     00:03:39 Cert Granted: Case v. Montana

     00:06:59 Cert Granted: GEO Group v. Menocal

     00:08:48 Cert Grant: Hencely v. Fluor Corp.

     00:10:35 Cert Denied: Nicholson v. W.L. York

     00:12:04 Cert Denied: Snope v. Brown

     00:16:30 Conclusion

     ]]>a6cdad2b-dd48-4ae8-b997-42c2d6e90c3fMon, 02 Jun 2025 11:30:00 -040017:19falsefull202475752024Emergency Docket Order Summary: Noem v. Doe | Order Date: 5/30/25 | Case No. 24A1079Emergency Docket Order Summary: Noem v. Doe | Order Date: 5/30/25 | Case No. 24A1079

     Link to Docket: Here.

     Question Presented: Whether the Supreme Court should stay the April 15, 2025 order entered by the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts pending appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit and any further proceedings in this Court.

     The central issue in this case is whether the Secretary of Homeland Security lawfully terminated the CHNV parole program and the existing parole status of approximately half a million individuals through a single Federal Register Notice, or if this en masse termination exceeded the Secretary's authority and violated statutory requirements for case-by-case assessment and proper legal reasoning.

     Decision: Stay granted. The Supreme Court granted the application and stayed the district court order. This means that DHS can terminate the lawful status of all CHNV parolees and proceed to remove them pursuant to law.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     ]]>Emergency Docket Order Summary: Noem v. Doe | Order Date: 5/30/25 | Case No. 24A1079

     Link to Docket: Here.

     Question Presented: Whether the Supreme Court should stay the April 15, 2025 order entered by the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts pending appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit and any further proceedings in this Court.

     The central issue in this case is whether the Secretary of Homeland Security lawfully terminated the CHNV parole program and the existing parole status of approximately half a million individuals through a single Federal Register Notice, or if this en masse termination exceeded the Secretary's authority and violated statutory requirements for case-by-case assessment and proper legal reasoning.

     Decision: Stay granted. The Supreme Court granted the application and stayed the district court order. This means that DHS can terminate the lawful status of all CHNV parolees and proceed to remove them pursuant to law.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     ]]>af077eaa-69e1-425d-9018-75ac6f1e0b11Fri, 30 May 2025 15:00:00 -040015:31falsefull202474742024Reading the Eagle County Tea Leaves: How the Justices' Oral Argument Questions Foreshadowed Their OpinionsReading the Eagle County Tea Leaves: How the Justices' Oral Argument Questions Foreshadowed Their Opinions

     This episode of SCOTUS Oral Arguments and Opinions delves into the case of Seven County Infrastructure Coalition versus Eagle County, decided on May 29, 2025.

     The episode compares and contrasts the oral arguments and written opinions of Justices Kavanaugh and Sotomayor. Justice Kavanaugh's majority opinion emphasized broad judicial deference to federal agencies and the economic impact of extensive environmental reviews.

     In contrast, Justice Sotomayor's concurrence focused on the narrow legal authority under federal transportation law. The episode highlights how Justices Barrett and Jackson influenced the written opinions despite not penning their own separate analyses.

     Overall, it explores how this oral arguments predicted judicial outcomes.

     Website Link to Opinion Summary: Here.

     Apple Podcast Link to Opinion Summary: Here.

     Website Link to Oral Argument: Here.

     Apple Podcast Link to Oral Argument: Here.

     Timestamps:

     00:00 Introduction to the Case

     01:39 Justice Kavanaugh's Majority Opinion

     05:58 Justice Sotomayor's Concurrence

     08:32 Influence of Other Justices

     11:47 Conclusion and Final Thoughts

     ]]>Reading the Eagle County Tea Leaves: How the Justices' Oral Argument Questions Foreshadowed Their Opinions

     This episode of SCOTUS Oral Arguments and Opinions delves into the case of Seven County Infrastructure Coalition versus Eagle County, decided on May 29, 2025.

     The episode compares and contrasts the oral arguments and written opinions of Justices Kavanaugh and Sotomayor. Justice Kavanaugh's majority opinion emphasized broad judicial deference to federal agencies and the economic impact of extensive environmental reviews.

     In contrast, Justice Sotomayor's concurrence focused on the narrow legal authority under federal transportation law. The episode highlights how Justices Barrett and Jackson influenced the written opinions despite not penning their own separate analyses.

     Overall, it explores how this oral arguments predicted judicial outcomes.

     Website Link to Opinion Summary: Here.

     Apple Podcast Link to Opinion Summary: Here.

     Website Link to Oral Argument: Here.

     Apple Podcast Link to Oral Argument: Here.

     Timestamps:

     00:00 Introduction to the Case

     01:39 Justice Kavanaugh's Majority Opinion

     05:58 Justice Sotomayor's Concurrence

     08:32 Influence of Other Justices

     11:47 Conclusion and Final Thoughts

     ]]>245665f1-ce09-48c9-b660-7a45db683924Fri, 30 May 2025 11:00:00 -040012:17falsefull202473732024Opinion Summary: Seven County Infrastructure Coalition v. Eagle County | Date Decided: 5/29/25 | Case No. 23–975Opinion Summary: Seven County Infrastructure Coalition v. Eagle County | Date Decided: 5/29/25 | Case No. 23–975

     Link to Docket: Here.

     Question Presented: Whether the National Environmental Policy Act requires an agency to study environmental impacts beyond the proximate effects of the action over which the agency has regulatory authority.

     Holding: The D.C. Circuit failed to afford the Board the substantial judicial deference required in NEPA cases and incorrectly interpreted NEPA to require the Board to consider the environmental effects of upstream and downstream projects that are separate in time or place from the Uinta Basin Railway.

     Result: Reversed and remanded.

     Voting Breakdown: 8-0. Justice Kavanaugh delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Alito and Barrett joined. Justice Sotomayor filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which Justices Kagan and Jackson joined. Justice Gorsuch took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     • For Petitioner: Paul D. Clement, Alexandria, Va.
     • For federal respondents supporting petitioners: Edwin S. Kneedler, Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C.
     • For respondents Eagle County, et al.: William M. Jay, Washington, D.C.
     
     

     Website Link to Oral Argument: Here.

     Apple Podcast Link to Oral Argument: Here.

     Timestamps:

     [00:00:00] Introduction

     [00:02:10] Question Presented

     [00:03:04] Voting Breakdown

     [00:03:32] Justice Kavanaugh's Majority Opinion

     [00:09:56] Justice Sotomayor's Concurring Opinion

     [00:21:22] Case Implications

     ]]>Opinion Summary: Seven County Infrastructure Coalition v. Eagle County | Date Decided: 5/29/25 | Case No. 23–975

     Link to Docket: Here.

     Question Presented: Whether the National Environmental Policy Act requires an agency to study environmental impacts beyond the proximate effects of the action over which the agency has regulatory authority.

     Holding: The D.C. Circuit failed to afford the Board the substantial judicial deference required in NEPA cases and incorrectly interpreted NEPA to require the Board to consider the environmental effects of upstream and downstream projects that are separate in time or place from the Uinta Basin Railway.

     Result: Reversed and remanded.

     Voting Breakdown: 8-0. Justice Kavanaugh delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Alito and Barrett joined. Justice Sotomayor filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which Justices Kagan and Jackson joined. Justice Gorsuch took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     • For Petitioner: Paul D. Clement, Alexandria, Va.
     • For federal respondents supporting petitioners: Edwin S. Kneedler, Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C.
     • For respondents Eagle County, et al.: William M. Jay, Washington, D.C.
     
     

     Website Link to Oral Argument: Here.

     Apple Podcast Link to Oral Argument: Here.

     Timestamps:

     [00:00:00] Introduction

     [00:02:10] Question Presented

     [00:03:04] Voting Breakdown

     [00:03:32] Justice Kavanaugh's Majority Opinion

     [00:09:56] Justice Sotomayor's Concurring Opinion

     [00:21:22] Case Implications

     ]]>d0a926da-2256-4ff4-82d3-d2b783dd8c8cThu, 29 May 2025 11:15:00 -040024:57falsefull202472722024Cert Denial: Where Do Student Speech Rights End? The ‘Two Genders’ T-Shirt ControversyL. M. v. Middleborough, Petitioner v. United States, et al. | Decision Date: 5/27/25 | Case No. 24-410

     Link to Docket: Here.

     Question Presented: Whether school officials may presume substantial disruption or a violation of the rights of others from a student’s silent, passive, and untargeted ideological speech simply because that speech relates to matters of personal identity, even when the speech responds to the school’s opposing views, actions, or policies.

     Result: Denial of certiorari.

     Voting Breakdown: 7-2. Justices Thomas and Alito dissented from the denial of certiorari.

     Link to Decision: Here.

     ]]>L. M. v. Middleborough, Petitioner v. United States, et al. | Decision Date: 5/27/25 | Case No. 24-410

     Link to Docket: Here.

     Question Presented: Whether school officials may presume substantial disruption or a violation of the rights of others from a student’s silent, passive, and untargeted ideological speech simply because that speech relates to matters of personal identity, even when the speech responds to the school’s opposing views, actions, or policies.

     Result: Denial of certiorari.

     Voting Breakdown: 7-2. Justices Thomas and Alito dissented from the denial of certiorari.

     Link to Decision: Here.

     ]]>8c5fe923-426c-424e-81dc-591d9e1b45e1Tue, 27 May 2025 13:00:00 -040015:45falsefull202471712024Cert Denial: Apache Stronghold: When Sacred Sites Meet Corporate Mining | Decision Date: 5/27/25Apache Stronghold, Petitioner v. United States, et al. | Order Date: 5/23/25 | Case No. 24-291

     Link to Docket: Here.

     Question Presented: Whether the government “substantially burdens” religious exercise under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act ("RFRA"), or must satisfy heightened scrutiny under the Free Exercise Clause, when it singles out a sacred site for complete physical destruction, ending specific religious rituals forever.

     Result: Denial of certiorari.

     Voting Breakdown: 6-2. Justice Gorsuch with whom Justice Thomas joined, dissented from the denial of certiorari.

     Link to Decision: Here.

     ]]>Apache Stronghold, Petitioner v. United States, et al. | Order Date: 5/23/25 | Case No. 24-291

     Link to Docket: Here.

     Question Presented: Whether the government “substantially burdens” religious exercise under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act ("RFRA"), or must satisfy heightened scrutiny under the Free Exercise Clause, when it singles out a sacred site for complete physical destruction, ending specific religious rituals forever.

     Result: Denial of certiorari.

     Voting Breakdown: 6-2. Justice Gorsuch with whom Justice Thomas joined, dissented from the denial of certiorari.

     Link to Decision: Here.

     ]]>f8a5debb-17ac-4218-9f12-4beed833a589Tue, 27 May 2025 11:30:00 -040011:28falsefull202470702024Order Summary: Trump v. Wilcox | Order Date: 5/22/25 | Case No. 24A966Order Summary: Trump v. Wilcox | Order Date: 5/22/25 | Case No. 24A966

     This case comes from the Emergency Docket.

     Link to Docket: Here.

     Question Presented: Whether the Supreme Court should stay the judgments issued by the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia pending appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit and any further proceedings in this Court.

     The underlying case involves the questions of whether the President may remove without cause members of the National Labor Relations Board and Merit Systems Protection Board, or whether statutory for-cause removal protections for these agency heads violate the President's constitutional authority under Article II to supervise and control officers who exercise executive power on his behalf.

     Holding: The Court granted the stay application. The lower court decisions are on hold until the case fully resolves.

     Result: The Justices did not sign the order. Justice Kagan filed a dissent from the grant of the stay application and was joined by along with Justices Sotomayor and Justice Jackson.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     ]]>Order Summary: Trump v. Wilcox | Order Date: 5/22/25 | Case No. 24A966

     This case comes from the Emergency Docket.

     Link to Docket: Here.

     Question Presented: Whether the Supreme Court should stay the judgments issued by the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia pending appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit and any further proceedings in this Court.

     The underlying case involves the questions of whether the President may remove without cause members of the National Labor Relations Board and Merit Systems Protection Board, or whether statutory for-cause removal protections for these agency heads violate the President's constitutional authority under Article II to supervise and control officers who exercise executive power on his behalf.

     Holding: The Court granted the stay application. The lower court decisions are on hold until the case fully resolves.

     Result: The Justices did not sign the order. Justice Kagan filed a dissent from the grant of the stay application and was joined by along with Justices Sotomayor and Justice Jackson.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     ]]>c5e80273-4dc0-4c15-b7b8-bf187d6dbaf5Thu, 22 May 2025 18:00:00 -040010:43falsefull202468682024Reading the Kousisis Tea Leaves: How the Justices' Oral Argument Questions Foreshadowed Their OpinionsI created this episode to highlight and contrast the Justices' questions and comments at oral argument to the written opinion in Kousisis.

     While all Justices agreed on rejecting the economic-loss requirement, their different concerns and questioning approaches during oral argument directly predicted the fragmented reasoning that would characterize their written opinions. The oral argument served as a laboratory for testing legal theories that would ultimately prove difficult to reconcile in a single coherent framework, explaining why this unanimous result required four separate opinions to express the Court's reasoning. Specifically:

     • Justice Barrett used oral argument to test the coherence of competing legal standards, ultimately crafting a majority opinion that rejected petitioners' approach while leaving significant questions unresolved.
     • Justice Thomas used his questioning to explore the specific regulatory context, leading to a concurrence focused on materiality as a limiting principle in DBE cases specifically.
     • Justice Gorsuch consistently probed the boundaries between criminal and non-criminal conduct, resulting in a concurrence defending traditional common-law limitations on fraud liability.
     • Justice Sotomayor maintained focus on the specific case facts and narrow legal question, producing a concurrence that warns against broader doctrinal pronouncements.
     
     

     Website Link to Oral Argument: Here.

     Apple Podcast Link to Oral Argument: Here.

     Website Link to Opinion Summary: Here.

     Apple Podcast Link to Opinion Summary: Here.

     ]]>I created this episode to highlight and contrast the Justices' questions and comments at oral argument to the written opinion in Kousisis.

     While all Justices agreed on rejecting the economic-loss requirement, their different concerns and questioning approaches during oral argument directly predicted the fragmented reasoning that would characterize their written opinions. The oral argument served as a laboratory for testing legal theories that would ultimately prove difficult to reconcile in a single coherent framework, explaining why this unanimous result required four separate opinions to express the Court's reasoning. Specifically:

     • Justice Barrett used oral argument to test the coherence of competing legal standards, ultimately crafting a majority opinion that rejected petitioners' approach while leaving significant questions unresolved.
     • Justice Thomas used his questioning to explore the specific regulatory context, leading to a concurrence focused on materiality as a limiting principle in DBE cases specifically.
     • Justice Gorsuch consistently probed the boundaries between criminal and non-criminal conduct, resulting in a concurrence defending traditional common-law limitations on fraud liability.
     • Justice Sotomayor maintained focus on the specific case facts and narrow legal question, producing a concurrence that warns against broader doctrinal pronouncements.
     
     

     Website Link to Oral Argument: Here.

     Apple Podcast Link to Oral Argument: Here.

     Website Link to Opinion Summary: Here.

     Apple Podcast Link to Opinion Summary: Here.

     ]]>7ae0accf-7333-4dc4-af6a-6166b7a30278Thu, 22 May 2025 12:45:00 -040009:06falsefull202467672024Opinion Summary: Oklahoma Statewide Charter School Board v. Drummond | Case No. 24-394 | Date Decided: 5/22/25Opinion Summary: Oklahoma Statewide Charter School Board v. Drummond | Case No. 24-394 | Date Decided: 5/22/25

     Link to Docket: Here.

     Background:

     The Oklahoma Constitution requires Oklahoma to “establish[ ] and maint[ain] . . . a system of public schools, which shall be open to all the children of the state and free from sectarian control.” The Oklahoma Constitution also requires that [n]o public money . . . shall ever be appropriated . . . or used, directly or indirectly, for the use, benefit, or support of any sect, church, denomination, or system of religion . . . or sectarian institution.”

     Consistent with these constitutional mandates, the Oklahoma Legislature established a type of public school[] established by contract called a charter school. The Oklahoma Charter School Board established a public charter school that fully incorporates Catholic teachings into every aspect of the school, including its curriculum and co-curricular activities.

     Following the Board’s predecessor’s establishment of the aforementioned public charter school, the Oklahoma Attorney filed an original action with the Oklahoma Supreme Court to prevent the charter school from operating.

     The Oklahoma Supreme Court held that a state can exclude privately owned and operated religious charter schools from its charter-school program by enforcing state-law bans on "sectarian" and religiously affiliated charter schools. The court also held that a charter school engages in state action for constitutional purposes when it contracts with the state to provide publicly funded education.

     Questions Presented:

     1. Whether the academic and pedagogical choices of a privately owned and run school constitute state action simply because it contracts with the state to offer a free educational option for interested students.
     2. Whether a state violates the Free Exercise Clause by excluding privately run religious schools from the state's charter-school program solely because the schools are religious, or whether a state can justify such an exclusion by invoking anti-establishment interests that go further than the Establishment Clause requires.
     
     

     Holding: The entire opinion reads: "The judgment is affirmed by an equally divided Court."

     Result: Affirmed.

     Voting Breakdown: 4-4. Per Curiam Opinion.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     • For Petitioners in 24-394: James A. Campbell, Lansdowne, Va.
     • For Petitioner in 24-396: Michael H. McGinley, Washington, D.C.
     • For United States, as Amicus Curiae: D. John Sauer, Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.
     • For Respondent: Gregory G. Garre, Washington, D.C.
     
     

     Website Link to Oral Argument: Here.

     Apple Podcast Link to Oral Argument: Here.

     Timestamps:

     00:00 Introduction

     00:15 Question Presented

     00:53 Result

     01:05 Opinion

     01:10 Case Implications

     ]]>Opinion Summary: Oklahoma Statewide Charter School Board v. Drummond | Case No. 24-394 | Date Decided: 5/22/25

     Link to Docket: Here.

     Background:

     The Oklahoma Constitution requires Oklahoma to “establish[ ] and maint[ain] . . . a system of public schools, which shall be open to all the children of the state and free from sectarian control.” The Oklahoma Constitution also requires that [n]o public money . . . shall ever be appropriated . . . or used, directly or indirectly, for the use, benefit, or support of any sect, church, denomination, or system of religion . . . or sectarian institution.”

     Consistent with these constitutional mandates, the Oklahoma Legislature established a type of public school[] established by contract called a charter school. The Oklahoma Charter School Board established a public charter school that fully incorporates Catholic teachings into every aspect of the school, including its curriculum and co-curricular activities.

     Following the Board’s predecessor’s establishment of the aforementioned public charter school, the Oklahoma Attorney filed an original action with the Oklahoma Supreme Court to prevent the charter school from operating.

     The Oklahoma Supreme Court held that a state can exclude privately owned and operated religious charter schools from its charter-school program by enforcing state-law bans on "sectarian" and religiously affiliated charter schools. The court also held that a charter school engages in state action for constitutional purposes when it contracts with the state to provide publicly funded education.

     Questions Presented:

     1. Whether the academic and pedagogical choices of a privately owned and run school constitute state action simply because it contracts with the state to offer a free educational option for interested students.
     2. Whether a state violates the Free Exercise Clause by excluding privately run religious schools from the state's charter-school program solely because the schools are religious, or whether a state can justify such an exclusion by invoking anti-establishment interests that go further than the Establishment Clause requires.
     
     

     Holding: The entire opinion reads: "The judgment is affirmed by an equally divided Court."

     Result: Affirmed.

     Voting Breakdown: 4-4. Per Curiam Opinion.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     • For Petitioners in 24-394: James A. Campbell, Lansdowne, Va.
     • For Petitioner in 24-396: Michael H. McGinley, Washington, D.C.
     • For United States, as Amicus Curiae: D. John Sauer, Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.
     • For Respondent: Gregory G. Garre, Washington, D.C.
     
     

     Website Link to Oral Argument: Here.

     Apple Podcast Link to Oral Argument: Here.

     Timestamps:

     00:00 Introduction

     00:15 Question Presented

     00:53 Result

     01:05 Opinion

     01:10 Case Implications

     ]]>a9dbc54e-de1f-4595-93f3-b017fcaa6b2cThu, 22 May 2025 09:00:00 -040001:59falsefull202466662024Opinion Summary: Kousisis v. United States | Case No. 23-909 | Date Decided: 5/22/25Opinion Summary: Kousisis v. United States | Case No. 23-909 | Date Decided: 5/22/25

     Link to Docket: Here.

     Questions Presented:

     1. Whether deception to induce a commercial exchange can constitute mail or wire fraud, even if inflicting economic harm on the alleged victim was not the object of the scheme. Whether a sovereign's statutory, regulatory, or policy interest is a property interest when compliance is a material term of payment for goods or services.
     2. Whether all contract rights are "property."
     
     

     Holding: A defendant who induces a victim to enter into a transaction under materially false pretenses may be convicted of federal fraud even if the defendant did not seek to cause the victim economic loss.

     Result: Affirmed.

     Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Barrett delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Alito, Kagan, Kavanaugh and Jackson joined. Justice Thomas filed a concurring opinion. Justice Gorsuch filed an opinion con¬curring in part and concurring in the judgment. Justice Sotomayor filed an opinion concurring in the judgment.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     • For Petitioner: Jeffrey L. Fisher, Stanford, Cal.
     • For Respondent: Eric J. Feigin, Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.
     
     

     Website Link to Oral Argument: Here.

     Apple Podcast Link to Oral Argument: Here.

     Timestamps:

     00:00 Introduction

     00:57 Justice Barrett’s Majority Opinion

     09:01 Justice Thomas’ Concurring Opinion

     15:22 Justice Gorsuch opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment

     24:27 Justice Sotomayor opinion concurring in the judgment

     00:29:52 Case Implications

     ]]>Opinion Summary: Kousisis v. United States | Case No. 23-909 | Date Decided: 5/22/25

     Link to Docket: Here.

     Questions Presented:

     1. Whether deception to induce a commercial exchange can constitute mail or wire fraud, even if inflicting economic harm on the alleged victim was not the object of the scheme. Whether a sovereign's statutory, regulatory, or policy interest is a property interest when compliance is a material term of payment for goods or services.
     2. Whether all contract rights are "property."
     
     

     Holding: A defendant who induces a victim to enter into a transaction under materially false pretenses may be convicted of federal fraud even if the defendant did not seek to cause the victim economic loss.

     Result: Affirmed.

     Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Barrett delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Alito, Kagan, Kavanaugh and Jackson joined. Justice Thomas filed a concurring opinion. Justice Gorsuch filed an opinion con¬curring in part and concurring in the judgment. Justice Sotomayor filed an opinion concurring in the judgment.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     • For Petitioner: Jeffrey L. Fisher, Stanford, Cal.
     • For Respondent: Eric J. Feigin, Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.
     
     

     Website Link to Oral Argument: Here.

     Apple Podcast Link to Oral Argument: Here.

     Timestamps:

     00:00 Introduction

     00:57 Justice Barrett’s Majority Opinion

     09:01 Justice Thomas’ Concurring Opinion

     15:22 Justice Gorsuch opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment

     24:27 Justice Sotomayor opinion concurring in the judgment

     00:29:52 Case Implications

     ]]>6d35bc8e-f1af-4828-9370-fd68ce02d2cdThu, 22 May 2025 09:00:00 -040031:35falsefull202465652024Opinion Summary: A.A.R.P. v. Trump | Case No. 24A1007 | Date Decided: 5/16/25Case Info: A.A.R.P. v. Trump, Case No. 24A1007 | Date Decided: 5/16/25

     Link to Docket: Here.

     Question Presented: Whether Venezuelan nationals detained as alleged members of a terrorist organization are entitled to constitutionally adequate notice and opportunity to challenge their removal before being deported under the Alien Enemies Act, and if so, what minimum notice requirements must the government provide to satisfy due process.

     Plain Language Breakdown:

     In this case, the Supreme Court decided that Venezuelan nationals detained by the government as alleged members of a terrorist organization must receive adequate notice before being removed from the United States under the Alien Enemies Act. The Court found that the District Court's inaction for over 14 hours constituted a constructive denial of the detainees' request for emergency relief, and that due process requires notice that allows detainees a meaningful opportunity to challenge their removal through habeas proceedings. The Court vacated the Fifth Circuit's dismissal of the appeal and granted an injunction preventing the government from removing class members until the Fifth Circuit could determine what level of notice is constitutionally required.

     Justice Kavanaugh concurred, agreeing with the temporary injunction but expressing a preference for the Supreme Court to resolve the critical legal issues promptly rather than remanding to lower courts.

     Justice Alito, joined by Justice Thomas, dissented, arguing that the Court lacked jurisdiction because the District Court's actions were reasonable given the circumstances and insufficient evidence was presented to prove imminent harm to the detainees; he also questioned whether class relief could be obtained in habeas proceedings and whether the requirements for class certification could be met in this case.

     Voting Details: The Supreme Court delivered a Per Curiam opinion. Justice Kavanaugh wrote a concurring opinion. Justice Alito wrote a dissenting opinion, with whom Justice Thomas joined.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Timestamps:

     00:00 Introduction and Plain Language Breakdown

     02:10 Summary of Per Curiam Opinion

     12:47 Summary of Justice Kavanaugh Concurring Opinion

     14:33 Summary of Justice Kavanaugh Dissenting Opinion

     ]]>Case Info: A.A.R.P. v. Trump, Case No. 24A1007 | Date Decided: 5/16/25

     Link to Docket: Here.

     Question Presented: Whether Venezuelan nationals detained as alleged members of a terrorist organization are entitled to constitutionally adequate notice and opportunity to challenge their removal before being deported under the Alien Enemies Act, and if so, what minimum notice requirements must the government provide to satisfy due process.

     Plain Language Breakdown:

     In this case, the Supreme Court decided that Venezuelan nationals detained by the government as alleged members of a terrorist organization must receive adequate notice before being removed from the United States under the Alien Enemies Act. The Court found that the District Court's inaction for over 14 hours constituted a constructive denial of the detainees' request for emergency relief, and that due process requires notice that allows detainees a meaningful opportunity to challenge their removal through habeas proceedings. The Court vacated the Fifth Circuit's dismissal of the appeal and granted an injunction preventing the government from removing class members until the Fifth Circuit could determine what level of notice is constitutionally required.

     Justice Kavanaugh concurred, agreeing with the temporary injunction but expressing a preference for the Supreme Court to resolve the critical legal issues promptly rather than remanding to lower courts.

     Justice Alito, joined by Justice Thomas, dissented, arguing that the Court lacked jurisdiction because the District Court's actions were reasonable given the circumstances and insufficient evidence was presented to prove imminent harm to the detainees; he also questioned whether class relief could be obtained in habeas proceedings and whether the requirements for class certification could be met in this case.

     Voting Details: The Supreme Court delivered a Per Curiam opinion. Justice Kavanaugh wrote a concurring opinion. Justice Alito wrote a dissenting opinion, with whom Justice Thomas joined.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Timestamps:

     00:00 Introduction and Plain Language Breakdown

     02:10 Summary of Per Curiam Opinion

     12:47 Summary of Justice Kavanaugh Concurring Opinion

     14:33 Summary of Justice Kavanaugh Dissenting Opinion

     ]]>9a2db39e-14a7-419b-bd17-47ee3fa97fb5Fri, 16 May 2025 17:30:00 -040023:29falsefull202464642024Highlights: Trump, President of U.S. v. CASA, Inc. | Case No. 24A884 | Date Argued: 5/15/25Here are some highlights from the Trump v. CASA, Inc. case heard on May 15, 2025.

     Justice Kagan and Justice Barrett went viral for their questions. Those portions begin around 09:17.

     Please see the oral argument episode for additional case details.

     As always, I welcome any feedback on the episode or podcast.

     Email: scotus.cases.pod@gmail.com.

     ]]>Here are some highlights from the Trump v. CASA, Inc. case heard on May 15, 2025.

     Justice Kagan and Justice Barrett went viral for their questions. Those portions begin around 09:17.

     Please see the oral argument episode for additional case details.

     As always, I welcome any feedback on the episode or podcast.

     Email: scotus.cases.pod@gmail.com.

     ]]>bcd4ee8c-6b15-47e5-8170-d67bb7742bb9Fri, 16 May 2025 09:00:00 -040016:08falsefull202463632024Oral Argument: Trump, President of U.S. v. CASA, Inc. | Case No. 24A884 | Date Argued: 5/15/25Case Info: Trump, President of U.S. v. CASA, Inc. | Case No. 24A884 | Date Argued: 5/15/25

     Consolidation Note: The following cases were consolidated: (1) Trump, President of U.S. v. CASA, Inc., Case No. 24A884; (2) Trump, President of U.S. v. Washington, Case No. 24A885; and (3) Trump, President of U.S. v. New Jersey, Case No. 24A886.

     Parties:

     1. Applicants: United States and Federal Officials
     2. Respondents: (1) States and cities such as New Jersey, California, Delaware, Massachusetts, and the City and County of San Francisco; (2) Immigrant rights organizations such as CASA, Inc. and Asylum Seeker Advocacy Project, Inc; and (3) private individuals.
     
     

     Links to Docket: Here (Case No. 24A884); Here (Case No. 24A885); and Here (Case No. 24A886).

     Question Presented: Whether the Supreme Court should stay the district courts' nationwide preliminary injunctions on the Trump administration’s 1/20/25 executive order ending birthright citizenship except as to the individual plaintiffs and identified members of the organizational plaintiffs or states.

     Background:

     1. On January 20, 2025, President Trump issued an Executive Order regarding birthright citizenship.
     2. Section 1 of the Order recognizes that the Constitution and the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), 8 U.S.C. 1101 et seq., confer citizenship upon all persons born in the United States and subject to the jurisdiction thereof.
     3. Specifically, the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides that “[a]ll persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside.” U.S. Const. Amend. XIV, § 1. That provision, known as the Citizenship Clause, repudiated Dred Scott v. Sandford, 19 How. 393 (1857), which infamously misinterpreted the Constitution to deny U.S. citizenship to people of African descent based solely on their race. Congress has reaffirmed the Citizenship Clause in the INA, which provides that “a person born in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof,” is a citizen of the United States. 8 U.S.C. 1401(a).
     4. Section 1 of the Order identifies two circumstances in which a person born in the United States is not subject to its jurisdiction: “(1) when that person’s mother was unlawfully present in the United States and the father was not a United States citizen or lawful permanent resident at the time of said person’s birth, or (2) when that 6 person’s mother’s presence in the United States at the time of said person’s birth was lawful but temporary (such as, but not limited to, visiting the United States under the auspices of the Visa Waiver Program or visiting on a student, work, or tourist visa) and the father was not a United States citizen or lawful permanent resident at the time of said person’s birth.” Citizenship Order § 1.
     5. Section 2 of the Order directs the Executive Branch (1) not to issue documents recognizing U.S. citizenship to the persons identified in Section 1 and (2) not to accept documents issued by state, local, or other governments purporting to recognize the U.S. citizenship of such persons. See Citizenship Order § 2(a). Section 2 specifies that those directives “apply only to persons who are born within the United States after 30 days from the date of this order,” i.e., after February 19. Id. § 2(b).
     6. Three district courts in Maryland, Massachusetts, and Washington have issued overlapping nationwide injunctions at the behest of 22 States, two organizations, and seven individuals. Those universal injunctions prohibit a Day 1 Executive Order from being enforced anywhere in the country, as to “hundreds of thousands” of unspecified individuals who are “not before the court nor identified by the court.”
     7. Three Circuit Courts of Appeals refused to limit the nationwide injunctions.
     
     

     Applicant's Position:

     1. The Solicitor General argues that universal injunctions have reached crisis levels, particularly since the start of the current Administration in 2025. The Solicitor General notes that district courts issued more universal injunctions and temporary restraining orders in February 2025 alone than through the first three years of the Biden Administration. The Solicitor General contends this trend prevents the Executive Branch from performing its constitutional functions before courts can fully examine the merits of those actions, and threatens to overwhelm the Supreme Court's emergency docket.
     2. The Solicitor General asserts that the universal injunctions in this case are particularly problematic because they extend to all 50 states and millions of aliens nationwide, even though tailored relief for the actual plaintiffs would fully address their alleged harms.
     3. The Solicitor General argues the injunctions were improperly granted to States that lack standing to raise Citizenship Clause claims, defying the principle that States may only assert their own rights, not those of third parties. Furthermore, the Solicitor General contends the injunctions improperly bar federal agencies from even developing implementation guidance, and the overlapping nature of multiple universal injunctions from different courts creates a "jurisdictionally messy" scenario where the government must prevail in multiple appeals to implement the Order anywhere.
     
     

     Respondents' Position:

     1. Respondents argue that this case presents a uniquely poor candidate for challenging universal injunctions. They emphasize that the Executive Order directly conflicts with binding Supreme Court precedent interpreting the Citizenship Clause, and the government notably does not even attempt to defend the Order's constitutionality in its emergency application. The Respondents contend that while emergency relief might be appropriate in some cases to limit the geographic scope of relief, it is not appropriate where the Supreme Court has already settled the precise constitutional question for the entire nation.
     2. Respondents also argue that the government failed to demonstrate any significant or irreparable harm that would justify emergency relief, let alone warrant contravening nationwide precedent. They point out that the injunctions merely protect a status quo regarding birthright citizenship that dates back to English common law and has existed throughout American history, except for the aberration of Dred Scott.
     3. Respondents emphasize that maintaining this status quo until the cases are resolved imposes no harm on the Executive Branch, while stripping hundreds of thousands of American-born children of their citizenship would inflict tremendous and irreparable harms on the States and the public.
     
     

     Oral Advocates:

     • For Applicants: D. John Sauer, Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.
     • For State and City Respondents: Jeremy M. Feigenbaum, Solicitor General, Trenton, N.J.
     • For Private Respondents: Kelsi B. Corkran, Washington, D.C.
     
     

     Timestamps:

     [00:00:00] Introduction

     [00:00:14] Applicant's Opening Statement Begins

     [00:02:13] Applicant Free for All Questions Begin

     [00:27:45] Applicant Sequential Questions Begin

     [01:03:17] Applicant Questions End, Respondent (State and City) Opening Statement Begins

     [01:05:25] Respondent (State and City) Free for All Questions Begin

     [01:19:03] Respondent (State and City) Sequential Questions Begin

     [01:43:37] Respondent (State and City) Questions End, Respondent (Private) Opening Statement Begins

     [01:44:56] Respondent (Private) Free for All Questions Begin

     [02:00:10] Respondent (Private) Sequential Questions Begin

     [02:13:40] Respondent (Private) Questions End, Applicant Rebuttal Begins

     ]]>Case Info: Trump, President of U.S. v. CASA, Inc. | Case No. 24A884 | Date Argued: 5/15/25

     Consolidation Note: The following cases were consolidated: (1) Trump, President of U.S. v. CASA, Inc., Case No. 24A884; (2) Trump, President of U.S. v. Washington, Case No. 24A885; and (3) Trump, President of U.S. v. New Jersey, Case No. 24A886.

     Parties:

     1. Applicants: United States and Federal Officials
     2. Respondents: (1) States and cities such as New Jersey, California, Delaware, Massachusetts, and the City and County of San Francisco; (2) Immigrant rights organizations such as CASA, Inc. and Asylum Seeker Advocacy Project, Inc; and (3) private individuals.
     
     

     Links to Docket: Here (Case No. 24A884); Here (Case No. 24A885); and Here (Case No. 24A886).

     Question Presented: Whether the Supreme Court should stay the district courts' nationwide preliminary injunctions on the Trump administration’s 1/20/25 executive order ending birthright citizenship except as to the individual plaintiffs and identified members of the organizational plaintiffs or states.

     Background:

     1. On January 20, 2025, President Trump issued an Executive Order regarding birthright citizenship.
     2. Section 1 of the Order recognizes that the Constitution and the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), 8 U.S.C. 1101 et seq., confer citizenship upon all persons born in the United States and subject to the jurisdiction thereof.
     3. Specifically, the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides that “[a]ll persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside.” U.S. Const. Amend. XIV, § 1. That provision, known as the Citizenship Clause, repudiated Dred Scott v. Sandford, 19 How. 393 (1857), which infamously misinterpreted the Constitution to deny U.S. citizenship to people of African descent based solely on their race. Congress has reaffirmed the Citizenship Clause in the INA, which provides that “a person born in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof,” is a citizen of the United States. 8 U.S.C. 1401(a).
     4. Section 1 of the Order identifies two circumstances in which a person born in the United States is not subject to its jurisdiction: “(1) when that person’s mother was unlawfully present in the United States and the father was not a United States citizen or lawful permanent resident at the time of said person’s birth, or (2) when that 6 person’s mother’s presence in the United States at the time of said person’s birth was lawful but temporary (such as, but not limited to, visiting the United States under the auspices of the Visa Waiver Program or visiting on a student, work, or tourist visa) and the father was not a United States citizen or lawful permanent resident at the time of said person’s birth.” Citizenship Order § 1.
     5. Section 2 of the Order directs the Executive Branch (1) not to issue documents recognizing U.S. citizenship to the persons identified in Section 1 and (2) not to accept documents issued by state, local, or other governments purporting to recognize the U.S. citizenship of such persons. See Citizenship Order § 2(a). Section 2 specifies that those directives “apply only to persons who are born within the United States after 30 days from the date of this order,” i.e., after February 19. Id. § 2(b).
     6. Three district courts in Maryland, Massachusetts, and Washington have issued overlapping nationwide injunctions at the behest of 22 States, two organizations, and seven individuals. Those universal injunctions prohibit a Day 1 Executive Order from being enforced anywhere in the country, as to “hundreds of thousands” of unspecified individuals who are “not before the court nor identified by the court.”
     7. Three Circuit Courts of Appeals refused to limit the nationwide injunctions.
     
     

     Applicant's Position:

     1. The Solicitor General argues that universal injunctions have reached crisis levels, particularly since the start of the current Administration in 2025. The Solicitor General notes that district courts issued more universal injunctions and temporary restraining orders in February 2025 alone than through the first three years of the Biden Administration. The Solicitor General contends this trend prevents the Executive Branch from performing its constitutional functions before courts can fully examine the merits of those actions, and threatens to overwhelm the Supreme Court's emergency docket.
     2. The Solicitor General asserts that the universal injunctions in this case are particularly problematic because they extend to all 50 states and millions of aliens nationwide, even though tailored relief for the actual plaintiffs would fully address their alleged harms.
     3. The Solicitor General argues the injunctions were improperly granted to States that lack standing to raise Citizenship Clause claims, defying the principle that States may only assert their own rights, not those of third parties. Furthermore, the Solicitor General contends the injunctions improperly bar federal agencies from even developing implementation guidance, and the overlapping nature of multiple universal injunctions from different courts creates a "jurisdictionally messy" scenario where the government must prevail in multiple appeals to implement the Order anywhere.
     
     

     Respondents' Position:

     1. Respondents argue that this case presents a uniquely poor candidate for challenging universal injunctions. They emphasize that the Executive Order directly conflicts with binding Supreme Court precedent interpreting the Citizenship Clause, and the government notably does not even attempt to defend the Order's constitutionality in its emergency application. The Respondents contend that while emergency relief might be appropriate in some cases to limit the geographic scope of relief, it is not appropriate where the Supreme Court has already settled the precise constitutional question for the entire nation.
     2. Respondents also argue that the government failed to demonstrate any significant or irreparable harm that would justify emergency relief, let alone warrant contravening nationwide precedent. They point out that the injunctions merely protect a status quo regarding birthright citizenship that dates back to English common law and has existed throughout American history, except for the aberration of Dred Scott.
     3. Respondents emphasize that maintaining this status quo until the cases are resolved imposes no harm on the Executive Branch, while stripping hundreds of thousands of American-born children of their citizenship would inflict tremendous and irreparable harms on the States and the public.
     
     

     Oral Advocates:

     • For Applicants: D. John Sauer, Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.
     • For State and City Respondents: Jeremy M. Feigenbaum, Solicitor General, Trenton, N.J.
     • For Private Respondents: Kelsi B. Corkran, Washington, D.C.
     
     

     Timestamps:

     [00:00:00] Introduction

     [00:00:14] Applicant's Opening Statement Begins

     [00:02:13] Applicant Free for All Questions Begin

     [00:27:45] Applicant Sequential Questions Begin

     [01:03:17] Applicant Questions End, Respondent (State and City) Opening Statement Begins

     [01:05:25] Respondent (State and City) Free for All Questions Begin

     [01:19:03] Respondent (State and City) Sequential Questions Begin

     [01:43:37] Respondent (State and City) Questions End, Respondent (Private) Opening Statement Begins

     [01:44:56] Respondent (Private) Free for All Questions Begin

     [02:00:10] Respondent (Private) Sequential Questions Begin

     [02:13:40] Respondent (Private) Questions End, Applicant Rebuttal Begins

     ]]>c36631e8-d38f-47d3-931a-531c2b5e1f9bFri, 16 May 2025 07:00:00 -040002:15:45falsefull202462622024Opinion Summary: Barnes v. Felix | Case No. 23-1239 | Date Decided: 5/15/25Case Info: Barnes v. Felix | Case No. 23-1239 | Date Argued: 1/22/25 | Date Decided: 5/15/25

     Link to Docket: Here.

     Background:

     The Fourth Amendment prohibits a police officer from using "unreasonable" force. U.S. Const. amend. IV. In Graham v. Connor, this Court held that reasonableness depends on "the totality of the circumstances." 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989) (quotation marks omitted). But four circuits-the Second, Fourth, Fifth, and Eighth-cabin Graham. Those circuits evaluate whether a Fourth Amendment violation occurred under the "moment of the threat doctrine," which evaluates the reasonableness of an officer's actions only in the narrow window when the officer's safety was threatened, and not based on events that precede the moment of the threat. In contrast, eight circuits-the First, Third, Sixth, Seventh, Ninth, Tenth, Eleventh, and D.C. Circuits-reject the moment of the threat doctrine and follow the totality of the circumstances approach, including evaluating the officer's actions leading up to the use of force.

     In the decision below, Judge Higginbotham concurred in his own majority opinion, explaining that the minority approach "lessens the Fourth Amendment's protection of the American public" and calling on this Court "to resolve the circuit divide over the application of a doctrine deployed daily across this country." Pet. App. 10a-16a (Higginbotham, J., concurring).

     Question Presented: Whether courts should apply the moment of the threat doctrine when evaluating an excessive force claim under the Fourth Amendment.

     Holding: A claim that a law enforcement officer used excessive force during a stop or arrest is analyzed under the Fourth Amendment, which re­quires that the force deployed be objectively reasonable from the per­spective of a reasonable officer at the scene. The inquiry into the reasonableness of police force re­quires analyzing the totality of the circumstances. That analysis demands careful attention to the facts and circum­stances relating to the incident. Most notable here, the totality of the circumstances inquiry has no time limit.

     Result: Vacated and remanded.

     Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Kagan delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Justice Kavanaugh filed a concurring opinion, in which Justices Thomas, Alito, and Barrett joined.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     • For Petitioner: Nathaniel A.G. Zelinsky, Washington, D. C.; and Zoe A. Jacoby, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C. (for United States, as amicus curiae.)
     • For Respondents: Charles L. McCloud, Washington, D. C.; and Lanora C. Pettit, Principal Deputy Solicitor General, Austin, Tex. (for Texas, et al., as amici curiae.)
     
     

     Website Link to Oral Argument: Here.

     Apple Podcast Link to Oral Argument: Here.

     Timestamps:

     [00:00] Introduction

     [00:38] Justice Kagan Unanimous Opinion

     [04:35] Justice Kavanaugh Concurring Opinion

     [10:12] Case Implications

     ]]>Case Info: Barnes v. Felix | Case No. 23-1239 | Date Argued: 1/22/25 | Date Decided: 5/15/25

     Link to Docket: Here.

     Background:

     The Fourth Amendment prohibits a police officer from using "unreasonable" force. U.S. Const. amend. IV. In Graham v. Connor, this Court held that reasonableness depends on "the totality of the circumstances." 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989) (quotation marks omitted). But four circuits-the Second, Fourth, Fifth, and Eighth-cabin Graham. Those circuits evaluate whether a Fourth Amendment violation occurred under the "moment of the threat doctrine," which evaluates the reasonableness of an officer's actions only in the narrow window when the officer's safety was threatened, and not based on events that precede the moment of the threat. In contrast, eight circuits-the First, Third, Sixth, Seventh, Ninth, Tenth, Eleventh, and D.C. Circuits-reject the moment of the threat doctrine and follow the totality of the circumstances approach, including evaluating the officer's actions leading up to the use of force.

     In the decision below, Judge Higginbotham concurred in his own majority opinion, explaining that the minority approach "lessens the Fourth Amendment's protection of the American public" and calling on this Court "to resolve the circuit divide over the application of a doctrine deployed daily across this country." Pet. App. 10a-16a (Higginbotham, J., concurring).

     Question Presented: Whether courts should apply the moment of the threat doctrine when evaluating an excessive force claim under the Fourth Amendment.

     Holding: A claim that a law enforcement officer used excessive force during a stop or arrest is analyzed under the Fourth Amendment, which re­quires that the force deployed be objectively reasonable from the per­spective of a reasonable officer at the scene. The inquiry into the reasonableness of police force re­quires analyzing the totality of the circumstances. That analysis demands careful attention to the facts and circum­stances relating to the incident. Most notable here, the totality of the circumstances inquiry has no time limit.

     Result: Vacated and remanded.

     Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Kagan delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Justice Kavanaugh filed a concurring opinion, in which Justices Thomas, Alito, and Barrett joined.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     • For Petitioner: Nathaniel A.G. Zelinsky, Washington, D. C.; and Zoe A. Jacoby, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C. (for United States, as amicus curiae.)
     • For Respondents: Charles L. McCloud, Washington, D. C.; and Lanora C. Pettit, Principal Deputy Solicitor General, Austin, Tex. (for Texas, et al., as amici curiae.)
     
     

     Website Link to Oral Argument: Here.

     Apple Podcast Link to Oral Argument: Here.

     Timestamps:

     [00:00] Introduction

     [00:38] Justice Kagan Unanimous Opinion

     [04:35] Justice Kavanaugh Concurring Opinion

     [10:12] Case Implications

     ]]>32bf3a6d-56e0-460b-8767-888339045246Thu, 15 May 2025 09:00:00 -040011:27falsefull202463632024In Memoriam: A Reflection on the Remarkable Journey of Justice David SouterIn Memoriam: A Reflection on the Remarkable Journey of Justice David Souter

     Episode Overview

     In this special memorial episode, we discuss the remarkable life and judicial career of Justice David H. Souter, a Supreme Court Justice who defied political expectations and remained committed to principled jurisprudence.

     Key Highlights

     • Born: September 17, 1939 in Melrose, Massachusetts
     • Appointed to Supreme Court: 1990 by President George H.W. Bush
     • Retired: 2009 (succeeded by Justice Sotomayor)
     • Passed Away: May 8, 2025
     
     

     Notable Career Milestones

     • Rhodes Scholar at Oxford University
     • New Hampshire Attorney General
     • Associate Justice of New Hampshire Supreme Court
     • Judge on the First Circuit Court of Appeals
     • Supreme Court Justice (1990-2009)
     
     

     Landmark Cases Discussed

     1. Planned Parenthood v. Casey (1992) (Opinion Here)

     • Co-authored opinion affirming Roe v. Wade
     • Crafted influential section on judicial precedent
     
     

     2. Bush v. Gore (2000) (Opinion Here)

     • Demonstrated judicial independence
     • Critiqued recount process while questioning judicial overreach
     
     

     Judicial Philosophy Highlights

     • Believed law should adapt to empirical realities
     • Advocated for judicial restraint
     • Supported separation of church and state
     • Consistently prioritized legal principles over political expectations
     
     

     The Supreme Court issued two press releases: Here and Here.

     ]]>In Memoriam: A Reflection on the Remarkable Journey of Justice David Souter

     Episode Overview

     In this special memorial episode, we discuss the remarkable life and judicial career of Justice David H. Souter, a Supreme Court Justice who defied political expectations and remained committed to principled jurisprudence.

     Key Highlights

     • Born: September 17, 1939 in Melrose, Massachusetts
     • Appointed to Supreme Court: 1990 by President George H.W. Bush
     • Retired: 2009 (succeeded by Justice Sotomayor)
     • Passed Away: May 8, 2025
     
     

     Notable Career Milestones

     • Rhodes Scholar at Oxford University
     • New Hampshire Attorney General
     • Associate Justice of New Hampshire Supreme Court
     • Judge on the First Circuit Court of Appeals
     • Supreme Court Justice (1990-2009)
     
     

     Landmark Cases Discussed

     1. Planned Parenthood v. Casey (1992) (Opinion Here)

     • Co-authored opinion affirming Roe v. Wade
     • Crafted influential section on judicial precedent
     
     

     2. Bush v. Gore (2000) (Opinion Here)

     • Demonstrated judicial independence
     • Critiqued recount process while questioning judicial overreach
     
     

     Judicial Philosophy Highlights

     • Believed law should adapt to empirical realities
     • Advocated for judicial restraint
     • Supported separation of church and state
     • Consistently prioritized legal principles over political expectations
     
     

     The Supreme Court issued two press releases: Here and Here.

     ]]>d175b867-838b-45e3-95ca-a072187da8aaFri, 09 May 2025 09:00:00 -040003:58falsefull20243023022024Interview: From Buffalo to the Bench, A Conversation with Chief Justice RobertsEpisode Description:

     This episode features a May 7, 2025 conversation between Supreme Court Chief Justice John Roberts and U.S. District Judge Lawrence J. Vilardo. They discuss why judicial independence matters in our democracy and how it helps balance power between different parts of government.

     Both judges share stories about their personal backgrounds, law school experiences, and key moments in their careers. They also talk about what makes legal writing effective and why court decisions should be written clearly so everyone can understand them. The conversation gives listeners a unique look into the thoughts of two important judges as they reflect on their shared history and how the legal world has changed over time.

     Background:

     On May 7, 2025, Chief Justice John Roberts headlined the Western District of New York 125th Anniversary Dinner Event in Buffalo, NY. As part of this event, U.S. District Judge Lawrence J. Vilardo interviewed Chief Justice Roberts. From the Event's press release:

     “Chief Justice Roberts was born in Buffalo and spent his early childhood here, so we claim him as one of our own,” said Chief U.S. District Judge Elizabeth Wolford. “His willingness to join us for our 125th Anniversary makes the celebration all the more special. It’s a testament to Western New York’s rich legal history and the Chief Justice’s commitment to our profession.”

     Event Press Release: Here.

     H/T to WGRZ-TV for the recording.

     Timestamps:

     00:00 Welcoming Remarks and Reflections

     00:57 Reflecting on the Past: A Journey Back to Buffalo

     09:26 The Art of Writing Clearly

     14:07 Judicial Independence and Its Implications

     25:42 The Role of the Chief Justice in Public Life

     32:04 Reflections on Two Decades on the Court

     38:43 The Evolution of Legal Perspectives

     43:20 The Influence of Judicial Mentorship

     48:35 Reflections on Clerking and the Law

     ]]>Episode Description:

     This episode features a May 7, 2025 conversation between Supreme Court Chief Justice John Roberts and U.S. District Judge Lawrence J. Vilardo. They discuss why judicial independence matters in our democracy and how it helps balance power between different parts of government.

     Both judges share stories about their personal backgrounds, law school experiences, and key moments in their careers. They also talk about what makes legal writing effective and why court decisions should be written clearly so everyone can understand them. The conversation gives listeners a unique look into the thoughts of two important judges as they reflect on their shared history and how the legal world has changed over time.

     Background:

     On May 7, 2025, Chief Justice John Roberts headlined the Western District of New York 125th Anniversary Dinner Event in Buffalo, NY. As part of this event, U.S. District Judge Lawrence J. Vilardo interviewed Chief Justice Roberts. From the Event's press release:

     “Chief Justice Roberts was born in Buffalo and spent his early childhood here, so we claim him as one of our own,” said Chief U.S. District Judge Elizabeth Wolford. “His willingness to join us for our 125th Anniversary makes the celebration all the more special. It’s a testament to Western New York’s rich legal history and the Chief Justice’s commitment to our profession.”

     Event Press Release: Here.

     H/T to WGRZ-TV for the recording.

     Timestamps:

     00:00 Welcoming Remarks and Reflections

     00:57 Reflecting on the Past: A Journey Back to Buffalo

     09:26 The Art of Writing Clearly

     14:07 Judicial Independence and Its Implications

     25:42 The Role of the Chief Justice in Public Life

     32:04 Reflections on Two Decades on the Court

     38:43 The Evolution of Legal Perspectives

     43:20 The Influence of Judicial Mentorship

     48:35 Reflections on Clerking and the Law

     ]]>f3aafda2-c0ba-4dde-a387-6bdbd41c93e5Thu, 08 May 2025 09:00:00 -040051:11falsefull20243013012024Emergency Docket Order Summary: United States v. Shilling | Order Decided: 5/6/25 | Case No. 24A1030Case Info: United States v. Shilling | Order Decided: 5/6/25 | Case No. 24A1030

     Link to Docket: Here.

     Question Presented: Whether the Supreme Court should stay the nationwide injunction issued by the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington.

     Plain English Translation: This order means that the district court’s nationwide injunction is on hold until final adjudication of the case on the merits.  The district court’s nationwide injunction prohibited the Department of Defense from implementing a policy that generally disqualifies from military service individuals who have gender dysphoria or have undergone medical interventions for gender dysphoria.

     Voting Breakdown: The Order is unsigned.  Justice Sotomayor, Justice Kagan, and Justice Jackson would deny the application.

     Timestamps:

     00:00 Introduction

     00:16 Question Presented

     00:28 Emergency Order Text

     01:23 Voting Breakdown

     01:31 Plain English Order Summary

     02:07 Procedural History - Policy Adoption

     02:39 Procedural History - Respondent Identities

     02:52 Procedural History - District Court Orders

     04:39 Procedural History - Government Appeals Denial of Stay of Nationwide Injunction to 9th Circuit; 9th Circuit Denies Appeal

     05:15 Procedural History - Government Appeals Applies to Supreme Court for a Stay

     05:20 Summary of Government Application - The Policy Satisfies Rational Basis Review

     06:42 Summary of Government Application - The Policy Comports with the First Amendment

     07:49 Summary of Government Application - The Policy Complies with the Due Process Clause and Principles of Equity

     07:59 Summary of Government Application - The District Court Erred in Issuing a Nationwide Injunction

     10:04 Summary of Government Application - The Remaining Factors Support the Issuance of a Stay

     ]]>Case Info: United States v. Shilling | Order Decided: 5/6/25 | Case No. 24A1030

     Link to Docket: Here.

     Question Presented: Whether the Supreme Court should stay the nationwide injunction issued by the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington.

     Plain English Translation: This order means that the district court’s nationwide injunction is on hold until final adjudication of the case on the merits.  The district court’s nationwide injunction prohibited the Department of Defense from implementing a policy that generally disqualifies from military service individuals who have gender dysphoria or have undergone medical interventions for gender dysphoria.

     Voting Breakdown: The Order is unsigned.  Justice Sotomayor, Justice Kagan, and Justice Jackson would deny the application.

     Timestamps:

     00:00 Introduction

     00:16 Question Presented

     00:28 Emergency Order Text

     01:23 Voting Breakdown

     01:31 Plain English Order Summary

     02:07 Procedural History - Policy Adoption

     02:39 Procedural History - Respondent Identities

     02:52 Procedural History - District Court Orders

     04:39 Procedural History - Government Appeals Denial of Stay of Nationwide Injunction to 9th Circuit; 9th Circuit Denies Appeal

     05:15 Procedural History - Government Appeals Applies to Supreme Court for a Stay

     05:20 Summary of Government Application - The Policy Satisfies Rational Basis Review

     06:42 Summary of Government Application - The Policy Comports with the First Amendment

     07:49 Summary of Government Application - The Policy Complies with the Due Process Clause and Principles of Equity

     07:59 Summary of Government Application - The District Court Erred in Issuing a Nationwide Injunction

     10:04 Summary of Government Application - The Remaining Factors Support the Issuance of a Stay

     ]]>26af2cad-07c4-4e62-aa50-70a0c2ed9fecTue, 06 May 2025 21:00:00 -040010:34falsefull20242012012024Opinion Summary: Feliciano v. Department of Transportation | Date Decided: 4/30/25 | Case No. 23-861Case Info: Feliciano v. Department of Transportation | Date Decided: 4/30/25 | Case No. 23-861

     Link to Docket: Here.

     Question Presented: Whether a federal civilian employee called or ordered to active duty under a provision of law during a national emergency is entitled to differential pay even if the duty is not directly connected to the national emergency.

     Holding: A federal civilian employee called to active duty pursuant to “any other provision of law . . . during a national emergency” as described in §101(a)(13)(B) is entitled to differential pay if the reservist’s service temporally coincides with a declared national emergency without any showing that the service bears a substantive connection to a particular emergency.

     Result: Reversed and remanded.

     Voting Breakdown: Justice Gorsuch delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Sotomayor, Kavanaugh and Barrett joined.  Justice Thomas filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Alito, Kagan and Jackson joined.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     • For Petitioner: Andrew T. Tutt
     • For Respondent: Nicole F. Reaves, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice
     
     

     Website Link to Oral Argument: Here.

     Apple Podcast Link to Oral Argument: Here.

     Timestamps:

     00:00 Introduction

     00:15 Question Presented

     00:23 Voting Breakdown

     00:40 Justice Gorsuch Majority Opinion

     08:10 Result

     08:11 Justice Thomas Dissenting Opinion

     14:41 Case Implications

     ]]>Case Info: Feliciano v. Department of Transportation | Date Decided: 4/30/25 | Case No. 23-861

     Link to Docket: Here.

     Question Presented: Whether a federal civilian employee called or ordered to active duty under a provision of law during a national emergency is entitled to differential pay even if the duty is not directly connected to the national emergency.

     Holding: A federal civilian employee called to active duty pursuant to “any other provision of law . . . during a national emergency” as described in §101(a)(13)(B) is entitled to differential pay if the reservist’s service temporally coincides with a declared national emergency without any showing that the service bears a substantive connection to a particular emergency.

     Result: Reversed and remanded.

     Voting Breakdown: Justice Gorsuch delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Sotomayor, Kavanaugh and Barrett joined.  Justice Thomas filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Alito, Kagan and Jackson joined.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     • For Petitioner: Andrew T. Tutt
     • For Respondent: Nicole F. Reaves, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice
     
     

     Website Link to Oral Argument: Here.

     Apple Podcast Link to Oral Argument: Here.

     Timestamps:

     00:00 Introduction

     00:15 Question Presented

     00:23 Voting Breakdown

     00:40 Justice Gorsuch Majority Opinion

     08:10 Result

     08:11 Justice Thomas Dissenting Opinion

     14:41 Case Implications

     ]]>292d5703-f820-4d5b-bd32-a850255b8c88Wed, 30 Apr 2025 09:00:00 -040015:38falsefull20241211212024Oral Argument: Oklahoma Statewide Charter School Board v. Drummond | Case No. 24-394 | Date Argued: 4/30/25Case Info: Oklahoma Statewide Charter School Board v. Drummond | Case No. 24-394 | Date Argued: 4/30/25 | Date Decided: 5/22/25

     Link to Docket: Here.

     Background:

     The Oklahoma Constitution requires Oklahoma to “establish[ ] and maint[ain] . . . a system of public schools, which shall be open to all the children of the state and free from sectarian control.” The Oklahoma Constitution also requires that [n]o public money . . . shall ever be appropriated . . . or used, directly or indirectly, for the use, benefit, or support of any sect, church, denomination, or system of religion . . . or sectarian institution.”

     Consistent with these constitutional mandates, the Oklahoma Legislature established a type of public school[] established by contract called a charter school. The Oklahoma Charter School Board established a public charter school that fully incorporates Catholic teachings into every aspect of the school, including its curriculum and co-curricular activities.

     Following the Board’s predecessor’s establishment of the aforementioned public charter school, the Oklahoma Attorney filed an original action with the Oklahoma Supreme Court to prevent the charter school from operating.

     The Oklahoma Supreme Court held that a state can exclude privately owned and operated religious charter schools from its charter-school program by enforcing state-law bans on "sectarian" and religiously affiliated charter schools. The court also held that a charter school engages in state action for constitutional purposes when it contracts with the state to provide publicly funded education.

     Questions Presented:

     1. Whether the academic and pedagogical choices of a privately owned and run school constitute state action simply because it contracts with the state to offer a free educational option for interested students.
     2. Whether a state violates the Free Exercise Clause by excluding privately run religious schools from the state's charter-school program solely because the schools are religious, or whether a state can justify such an exclusion by invoking anti-establishment interests that go further than the Establishment Clause requires.
     
     

     Holding: The entire opinion reads: "The judgment is affirmed by an equally divided Court."

     Result: Affirmed.

     Voting Breakdown: 4-4. Per Curiam Opinion.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Host Notes: Justice Barrett did not participate in this case. Also, this case was consolidated with St. Isidore of Seville Sch. v. Drummond, Case No. 24-396.

     Oral Advocates:

     • For Petitioners in 24-394: James A. Campbell
     • For Petitioner in 24-396: Michael H. McGinley
     • For United States, as Amicus Curiae: D. John Sauer, Solicitor General, Department of Justice
     • For Respondent: Gregory G. Garre
     
     

     Website Link to Opinion Summary: Here.

     Apple Podcast Link to Opinion Summary: Here.

     Timestamps:

     00:00 Introduction

     00:08 Petitioner (in 24-394) Opening Statement Begins

     2:00 Petitioner Free for All Questions Begins

     11:10 Petitioner Sequential Questions Begin

     37:16 Petitioner Questions End, Petitioner (in 24-396) Opening Statement Begins

     38:28 Petitioner Free for All Questions Begin

     44:57 Petitioner Sequential Questions Begin

     58:15, Petitioner Questions End, Government (as Amicus Curiae) Opening Statement Begins

     59:13 Government Free for All Questions Begin

     1:08:32 Government Sequential Questions Begin

     1:17:33 Government Questions End, Respondent Opening Statement Begins

     1:20:01 Respondent Free for All Questions Begin

     1:48:30 Respondent Sequential Questions Begin

     2:08:50 Respondent Questions End, Petitioner Rebuttal Begins

     ]]>Case Info: Oklahoma Statewide Charter School Board v. Drummond | Case No. 24-394 | Date Argued: 4/30/25 | Date Decided: 5/22/25

     Link to Docket: Here.

     Background:

     The Oklahoma Constitution requires Oklahoma to “establish[ ] and maint[ain] . . . a system of public schools, which shall be open to all the children of the state and free from sectarian control.” The Oklahoma Constitution also requires that [n]o public money . . . shall ever be appropriated . . . or used, directly or indirectly, for the use, benefit, or support of any sect, church, denomination, or system of religion . . . or sectarian institution.”

     Consistent with these constitutional mandates, the Oklahoma Legislature established a type of public school[] established by contract called a charter school. The Oklahoma Charter School Board established a public charter school that fully incorporates Catholic teachings into every aspect of the school, including its curriculum and co-curricular activities.

     Following the Board’s predecessor’s establishment of the aforementioned public charter school, the Oklahoma Attorney filed an original action with the Oklahoma Supreme Court to prevent the charter school from operating.

     The Oklahoma Supreme Court held that a state can exclude privately owned and operated religious charter schools from its charter-school program by enforcing state-law bans on "sectarian" and religiously affiliated charter schools. The court also held that a charter school engages in state action for constitutional purposes when it contracts with the state to provide publicly funded education.

     Questions Presented:

     1. Whether the academic and pedagogical choices of a privately owned and run school constitute state action simply because it contracts with the state to offer a free educational option for interested students.
     2. Whether a state violates the Free Exercise Clause by excluding privately run religious schools from the state's charter-school program solely because the schools are religious, or whether a state can justify such an exclusion by invoking anti-establishment interests that go further than the Establishment Clause requires.
     
     

     Holding: The entire opinion reads: "The judgment is affirmed by an equally divided Court."

     Result: Affirmed.

     Voting Breakdown: 4-4. Per Curiam Opinion.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Host Notes: Justice Barrett did not participate in this case. Also, this case was consolidated with St. Isidore of Seville Sch. v. Drummond, Case No. 24-396.

     Oral Advocates:

     • For Petitioners in 24-394: James A. Campbell
     • For Petitioner in 24-396: Michael H. McGinley
     • For United States, as Amicus Curiae: D. John Sauer, Solicitor General, Department of Justice
     • For Respondent: Gregory G. Garre
     
     

     Website Link to Opinion Summary: Here.

     Apple Podcast Link to Opinion Summary: Here.

     Timestamps:

     00:00 Introduction

     00:08 Petitioner (in 24-394) Opening Statement Begins

     2:00 Petitioner Free for All Questions Begins

     11:10 Petitioner Sequential Questions Begin

     37:16 Petitioner Questions End, Petitioner (in 24-396) Opening Statement Begins

     38:28 Petitioner Free for All Questions Begin

     44:57 Petitioner Sequential Questions Begin

     58:15, Petitioner Questions End, Government (as Amicus Curiae) Opening Statement Begins

     59:13 Government Free for All Questions Begin

     1:08:32 Government Sequential Questions Begin

     1:17:33 Government Questions End, Respondent Opening Statement Begins

     1:20:01 Respondent Free for All Questions Begin

     1:48:30 Respondent Sequential Questions Begin

     2:08:50 Respondent Questions End, Petitioner Rebuttal Begins

     ]]>e5929837-cd2d-4b0a-9320-1627e7616a9aWed, 30 Apr 2025 09:00:00 -040002:11:12falsefull202461612024Opinion Summary: Advocate Christ Medical Center v. Kennedy | Date Decided: 4/29/25 | Case No. 23-715Case Info: Advocate Christ Medical Center v. Kennedy | Date Decided: 4/29/25 | Case No. 23-715

     Link to Docket: Here.

     Question Presented: Does the phrase "entitled ... to benefits," used twice in the same sentence of the Medicare Act, mean the same thing for Medicare part A and supplementary security income (SSI), such that it includes all who meet basic program eligibility criteria, whether or not benefits are actually received.

     Holding: In calculating the Medicare fraction, an individual is “entitled to[SSI] benefits” for purposes of the Medicare fraction when she is eligi­ble to receive an SSI cash payment during the month of her hospitali­zation.

     Result: Affirmed.

     Voting Breakdown: 7-2. Justice Barrett delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Alito, Kagan, Gorsuch and Kavanaugh joined.  Justice Jackson filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Sotomayor joined.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Advocates:

     • For Petitioners: Melissa Arbus Sherry
     • For Respondent: Ephraim McDowell, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice
     
     

     Website Link to Oral Argument: Here.

     Apple Podcast Link to Oral Argument: Here.

     ]]>Case Info: Advocate Christ Medical Center v. Kennedy | Date Decided: 4/29/25 | Case No. 23-715

     Link to Docket: Here.

     Question Presented: Does the phrase "entitled ... to benefits," used twice in the same sentence of the Medicare Act, mean the same thing for Medicare part A and supplementary security income (SSI), such that it includes all who meet basic program eligibility criteria, whether or not benefits are actually received.

     Holding: In calculating the Medicare fraction, an individual is “entitled to[SSI] benefits” for purposes of the Medicare fraction when she is eligi­ble to receive an SSI cash payment during the month of her hospitali­zation.

     Result: Affirmed.

     Voting Breakdown: 7-2. Justice Barrett delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Alito, Kagan, Gorsuch and Kavanaugh joined.  Justice Jackson filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Sotomayor joined.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Advocates:

     • For Petitioners: Melissa Arbus Sherry
     • For Respondent: Ephraim McDowell, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice
     
     

     Website Link to Oral Argument: Here.

     Apple Podcast Link to Oral Argument: Here.

     ]]>95a05a84-12fa-4f49-be5d-51bea7d81c73Tue, 29 Apr 2025 09:00:00 -040021:12falsefull20241111112024Oral Argument: Laboratory Corp. of America v. Davis | Case No. 24-304 | Date Argued: 4/29/25Case Info: Laboratory Corp. of America v. Davis | Case No. 24-304 | Date Argued: 4/29/25

     Link to Docket: Here.

     Question Presented: Whether a federal court may certify a class action when some of its members lack any Article III injury.

     Oral Advocates:

     • For Petitioner: Noel J. Francisco
     • For United States, as Amicus Curiae: Sopan Joshi, Assistant to the Solicitor General
     • For Respondents: Deepak Gupta
     
     

     Website Link to Oral Argument: Here.

     Apple Podcast Link to Oral Argument: Here.

     Timestamps:

     00:00 Introduction

     00:06 Petitioner Opening Statement Begins

     02:16 Petitioner Free for All Questions Begin

     21:22 Petitioner Sequential Questions Begin

     1:09:22 Petitioner Questions End, Government Opening Statement Begins

     1:10:41 Government Free for All Questions Begin

     1:20:15 Government Sequential Questions Begin

     1:36:29 Government Questions End, Respondent Opening Statement Begins

     1:38:22 Respondent Free for All Questions Begin

     2:06:52 Respondent Sequential Questions Begin

     2:12:05 Respondent Questions End, Petitioner Rebuttal Begins

     ]]>Case Info: Laboratory Corp. of America v. Davis | Case No. 24-304 | Date Argued: 4/29/25

     Link to Docket: Here.

     Question Presented: Whether a federal court may certify a class action when some of its members lack any Article III injury.

     Oral Advocates:

     • For Petitioner: Noel J. Francisco
     • For United States, as Amicus Curiae: Sopan Joshi, Assistant to the Solicitor General
     • For Respondents: Deepak Gupta
     
     

     Website Link to Oral Argument: Here.

     Apple Podcast Link to Oral Argument: Here.

     Timestamps:

     00:00 Introduction

     00:06 Petitioner Opening Statement Begins

     02:16 Petitioner Free for All Questions Begin

     21:22 Petitioner Sequential Questions Begin

     1:09:22 Petitioner Questions End, Government Opening Statement Begins

     1:10:41 Government Free for All Questions Begin

     1:20:15 Government Sequential Questions Begin

     1:36:29 Government Questions End, Respondent Opening Statement Begins

     1:38:22 Respondent Free for All Questions Begin

     2:06:52 Respondent Sequential Questions Begin

     2:12:05 Respondent Questions End, Petitioner Rebuttal Begins

     ]]>9f4d98da-feec-4485-aec4-e9512ce89944Tue, 29 Apr 2025 09:00:00 -040002:15:20falsefull202460602024Oral Argument: Martin v. United States | Case No. 24-362 | Date Argued: 4/29/25Case Info: Martin v. United States | Case No. 24-362 | Date Argued: 4/29/25

     Link to Docket: Here.

     Background:

     Petitioners are the innocent victims of a wrong-house raid conducted by an FBI SWAT team in Atlanta, Georgia. Seeking a remedy for torts committed against them, Petitioners brought a cause of action against the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act. In its opinion below, the Eleventh Circuit held that all of Petitioners' FTCA claims are barred by sovereign immunity supplied either through the Constitution's Supremacy Clause or the FTCA's discretionary-function exception. In one or more ways, the opinion below conflicts with decisions from every other circuit.

     Questions Presented:

     1. Whether the Constitution's Supremacy Clause bars claims under the FTCA-a federal statute enacted by Congress-when the negligent or wrongful acts of federal employees have some nexus with furthering federal policy and can reasonably be characterized as complying with the full range of federal law.
     2. Whether the FTCA's discretionary-function exception bars claims for torts arising from wrong-house raids and similar negligent or wrongful acts by federal employees.
     
     

     Oral Advocates:

     • For Petitioners: Patrick M. Jaicomo
     • For Respondents: Frederick Liu, Assistant to the Solicitor General
     • For Court-Appointed Amicus Curiae in Support of Judgment Below on Question 1: Christopher E. Mills
     
     

     Website Link to Opinion Summary: Here.

     Apple Podcast Link to Opinion Summary: Here.

     Timestamps:

     00:00 Introduction

     00:05 Petitioner Opening Statement Begins

     02:11 Petitioner Free for All Questions Begin

     21:58 Petitioner Sequential Questions Begin

     22:06 Petitioner Questions End, Respondent Opening Statement Begins

     23:53 Respondent Free for All Questions Begin

     37:10 Respondent Sequential Questions Begin

     39:31 Respondent Questions End, Court Appointed Amicus Curiae Opening Statement Begins

     40:33 Court Appointed Amicus Curiae Free for All Questions Begin

     46:45 Court Appointed Amicus Curiae Sequential Questions Begin

     46:51 Petitioner Rebuttal Begins

     ]]>Case Info: Martin v. United States | Case No. 24-362 | Date Argued: 4/29/25

     Link to Docket: Here.

     Background:

     Petitioners are the innocent victims of a wrong-house raid conducted by an FBI SWAT team in Atlanta, Georgia. Seeking a remedy for torts committed against them, Petitioners brought a cause of action against the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act. In its opinion below, the Eleventh Circuit held that all of Petitioners' FTCA claims are barred by sovereign immunity supplied either through the Constitution's Supremacy Clause or the FTCA's discretionary-function exception. In one or more ways, the opinion below conflicts with decisions from every other circuit.

     Questions Presented:

     1. Whether the Constitution's Supremacy Clause bars claims under the FTCA-a federal statute enacted by Congress-when the negligent or wrongful acts of federal employees have some nexus with furthering federal policy and can reasonably be characterized as complying with the full range of federal law.
     2. Whether the FTCA's discretionary-function exception bars claims for torts arising from wrong-house raids and similar negligent or wrongful acts by federal employees.
     
     

     Oral Advocates:

     • For Petitioners: Patrick M. Jaicomo
     • For Respondents: Frederick Liu, Assistant to the Solicitor General
     • For Court-Appointed Amicus Curiae in Support of Judgment Below on Question 1: Christopher E. Mills
     
     

     Website Link to Opinion Summary: Here.

     Apple Podcast Link to Opinion Summary: Here.

     Timestamps:

     00:00 Introduction

     00:05 Petitioner Opening Statement Begins

     02:11 Petitioner Free for All Questions Begin

     21:58 Petitioner Sequential Questions Begin

     22:06 Petitioner Questions End, Respondent Opening Statement Begins

     23:53 Respondent Free for All Questions Begin

     37:10 Respondent Sequential Questions Begin

     39:31 Respondent Questions End, Court Appointed Amicus Curiae Opening Statement Begins

     40:33 Court Appointed Amicus Curiae Free for All Questions Begin

     46:45 Court Appointed Amicus Curiae Sequential Questions Begin

     46:51 Petitioner Rebuttal Begins

     ]]>5b27e73c-d90f-4c73-adab-b727435cb818Tue, 29 Apr 2025 09:00:00 -040052:23falsefull202459592024Oral Argument: Soto v. United States | Case No. 24-320 | Date Argued: 4/28/25Case Info: Soto v. United States | Case No. 24-320 | Date Argued: 4/28/25

     Link to Docket: Here.

     Background:

     This case determines whether thousands of medically retired combat veterans should receive all the combat related special compensation (CRSC) that Congress specifically authorized for combat veterans. The government has elected to calculate the period of retroactive compensation due using the procedure in the Barring Act (31 U.S.C. § 3702) instead of the one in the CRSC statute (10 U.S.C. § 1413a)-a maneuver that allows the government to apply the Barring Act's six- year limitations period in order to pay the veterans less. But the Barring Act is a default provision and does not apply where "another law" provides a procedure for calculating the amount due-that is, for "settling" a demand for payment.

     Although this Court's precedent defines "settlement" of demands for payment from the federal government as "the administrative determination of the amount due," it has not decided the test for whether a statute provides a settlement procedure that should apply in place of the Barring Act. And agency practice more broadly-which aligns with the test the District Court articulated and is consistent with this Court's definition of "settlement"-is irreconcilable with the novel test that the Federal Circuit applied, although both tests claim reliance on this Court's definition of "settlement."

     Question Presented: When a person makes a demand for money from the federal government pursuant to federal statute, what test should courts and agencies use to determine whether that statute includes a settlement procedure that displaces the default procedures and limitations set forth in the Barring Act (31 U.S.C. § 3702)?

     Oral Advocates:

     • For Petitioner: Tracy F. Flint, Chicago, Ill.
     • For Respondent: Caroline A. Flynn, Assistant to the Solicitor General
     
     

     Website Link to Opinion Summary: Here.

     Apple Podcast Link to Opinion Summary: Here.

     Timestamps:

     00:00 Introduction

     00:05 Petitioner Opening Statement Begins

     2:07 Petitioner Free for All Questions Begin

     25:24 Petitioner Sequential Questions Begin

     30:00 Petitioner Questions End, Respondent Opening Statement Begins

     32:01 Respondent Free for All Questions Begin

     57:40 Respondent Sequential Questions Begin

     57:46 Respondent Questions End, Petitioner Rebuttal Begins

     ]]>Case Info: Soto v. United States | Case No. 24-320 | Date Argued: 4/28/25

     Link to Docket: Here.

     Background:

     This case determines whether thousands of medically retired combat veterans should receive all the combat related special compensation (CRSC) that Congress specifically authorized for combat veterans. The government has elected to calculate the period of retroactive compensation due using the procedure in the Barring Act (31 U.S.C. § 3702) instead of the one in the CRSC statute (10 U.S.C. § 1413a)-a maneuver that allows the government to apply the Barring Act's six- year limitations period in order to pay the veterans less. But the Barring Act is a default provision and does not apply where "another law" provides a procedure for calculating the amount due-that is, for "settling" a demand for payment.

     Although this Court's precedent defines "settlement" of demands for payment from the federal government as "the administrative determination of the amount due," it has not decided the test for whether a statute provides a settlement procedure that should apply in place of the Barring Act. And agency practice more broadly-which aligns with the test the District Court articulated and is consistent with this Court's definition of "settlement"-is irreconcilable with the novel test that the Federal Circuit applied, although both tests claim reliance on this Court's definition of "settlement."

     Question Presented: When a person makes a demand for money from the federal government pursuant to federal statute, what test should courts and agencies use to determine whether that statute includes a settlement procedure that displaces the default procedures and limitations set forth in the Barring Act (31 U.S.C. § 3702)?

     Oral Advocates:

     • For Petitioner: Tracy F. Flint, Chicago, Ill.
     • For Respondent: Caroline A. Flynn, Assistant to the Solicitor General
     
     

     Website Link to Opinion Summary: Here.

     Apple Podcast Link to Opinion Summary: Here.

     Timestamps:

     00:00 Introduction

     00:05 Petitioner Opening Statement Begins

     2:07 Petitioner Free for All Questions Begin

     25:24 Petitioner Sequential Questions Begin

     30:00 Petitioner Questions End, Respondent Opening Statement Begins

     32:01 Respondent Free for All Questions Begin

     57:40 Respondent Sequential Questions Begin

     57:46 Respondent Questions End, Petitioner Rebuttal Begins

     ]]>2746ef7d-86c2-44d8-be0a-ad142e182c7fMon, 28 Apr 2025 09:00:00 -040001:02:50falsefull202458582024Oral Argument: A.J.T. v. Osseo Area Schools | Case No. 24-249 | Date Argued: 4/28/25Case Info: A.J.T. v. Osseo Area Schools | Case No. 24-249 | Date Argued: 4/28/25

     Link to Docket: Here.

     Background:

     Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act (Rehabilitation Act) require public entities and organizations that receive federal funding to provide reasonable accommodations for people with disabilities. In the decision below, the Eighth Circuit held that, for discrimination claims "based on educational services" brought by children with disabilities, these statutes are violated only if school officials acted with ''bad faith or gross misjudgment."

     That test squarely implicates an entrenched and acknowledged 5-2 circuit split over the standard governing such claims. It is also plainly mistaken on the merits: As the Eighth Circuit itself acknowledged, the test lacks "any anchor in statutory text," App.5a n.2, and it arbitrarily departs from the more lenient standards that all courts-including the Eighth Circuit-apply to ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims brought by plaintiffs outside the school setting.

     Question Presented: Whether the ADA and Rehabilitation Act require children with disabilities to satisfy a uniquely stringent "bad faith or gross misjudgment" standard when seeking relief for discrimination relating to their education.

     Holding: Schoolchildren bringing ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims related to their education are not required to make a heightened showing of "bad faith or gross misjudgment" but instead are subject to the same standards that apply in other disability discrimination contexts.

     Result: Vacated and remanded.

     Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Chief Justice Roberts delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Justice Thomas filed a concurring opinion, in which Justice Kavanaugh joined. Justice Sotomayor filed a concurring opinion, in which Justice Jackson joined.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     • For Petitioner: Roman Martinez
     • For the United States, as Amicus Curiae: Nicole F. Reaves, Assistant to the Solicitor General
     • For Respondents: Lisa S. Blatt
     
     

     Host Note: This is probably the sauciest oral argument I've heard this term. Respondent's counsel accuses Petitioner of lying and of asking the Court to consider "uniquely stupid standards." Respondent's counsel also accused the Supreme Court of routinely remanding cases without setting the law. All of these statements clearly made the justices uncomfortable. I included timestamps for these exchanges.

     Timestamps:

     00:00 Introduction

     00:07 Petitioner Opening Statement Begins

     2:04 Petitioner Free for All Questions Begin

     18:06 Petitioner Sequential Questions Begin

     23:04 Petitioner Questions End, Government Opening Statement Begins

     24:29 Government Free for All Questions Begin

     33:42 Government Sequential Questions Begin

     45:17 Government Questions End, Respondent Opening Statement Begins

     47:16 Respondent Free for All Questions Begin

     50:26 Respondent alleges that Petitioner lied and made inaccurate statements about Respondent’s position

     50:55 Justice Gorsuch tells Respondent to be more careful with her words with respect to alleging that Petitioner lied

     52:03 Respondent states that Petitioner asks the court to adopt “uniquely stupid standards.”

     1:03:17 Justice Jackson and Respondent debate whether 504 and Title II require reasonable accommodations

     1:04:31 Respondent admonishes the Supreme Court for sometimes “just remand[ing] and saying we just remand” and for not “set[ting] the law.”

     1:05:01 Justice Gorsuch tells Respondent that he’s troubled by Respondent’s “suggestion that your friends on the other side have lied[]” and asks Respondent “to reconsider that phrase.” Respondent backtracks and says that Petitioner is incorrect.

     1:07:24 Justice Gorsuch asks Respondent to withdraw her accusation that Petitioner lied. Respondent obliges.

     1:16:23 Respondent Sequential Questions Begin

     1:22:38 Respondent Questions End, Petitioner Reply Begins

     ]]>Case Info: A.J.T. v. Osseo Area Schools | Case No. 24-249 | Date Argued: 4/28/25

     Link to Docket: Here.

     Background:

     Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act (Rehabilitation Act) require public entities and organizations that receive federal funding to provide reasonable accommodations for people with disabilities. In the decision below, the Eighth Circuit held that, for discrimination claims "based on educational services" brought by children with disabilities, these statutes are violated only if school officials acted with ''bad faith or gross misjudgment."

     That test squarely implicates an entrenched and acknowledged 5-2 circuit split over the standard governing such claims. It is also plainly mistaken on the merits: As the Eighth Circuit itself acknowledged, the test lacks "any anchor in statutory text," App.5a n.2, and it arbitrarily departs from the more lenient standards that all courts-including the Eighth Circuit-apply to ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims brought by plaintiffs outside the school setting.

     Question Presented: Whether the ADA and Rehabilitation Act require children with disabilities to satisfy a uniquely stringent "bad faith or gross misjudgment" standard when seeking relief for discrimination relating to their education.

     Holding: Schoolchildren bringing ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims related to their education are not required to make a heightened showing of "bad faith or gross misjudgment" but instead are subject to the same standards that apply in other disability discrimination contexts.

     Result: Vacated and remanded.

     Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Chief Justice Roberts delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Justice Thomas filed a concurring opinion, in which Justice Kavanaugh joined. Justice Sotomayor filed a concurring opinion, in which Justice Jackson joined.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     • For Petitioner: Roman Martinez
     • For the United States, as Amicus Curiae: Nicole F. Reaves, Assistant to the Solicitor General
     • For Respondents: Lisa S. Blatt
     
     

     Host Note: This is probably the sauciest oral argument I've heard this term. Respondent's counsel accuses Petitioner of lying and of asking the Court to consider "uniquely stupid standards." Respondent's counsel also accused the Supreme Court of routinely remanding cases without setting the law. All of these statements clearly made the justices uncomfortable. I included timestamps for these exchanges.

     Timestamps:

     00:00 Introduction

     00:07 Petitioner Opening Statement Begins

     2:04 Petitioner Free for All Questions Begin

     18:06 Petitioner Sequential Questions Begin

     23:04 Petitioner Questions End, Government Opening Statement Begins

     24:29 Government Free for All Questions Begin

     33:42 Government Sequential Questions Begin

     45:17 Government Questions End, Respondent Opening Statement Begins

     47:16 Respondent Free for All Questions Begin

     50:26 Respondent alleges that Petitioner lied and made inaccurate statements about Respondent’s position

     50:55 Justice Gorsuch tells Respondent to be more careful with her words with respect to alleging that Petitioner lied

     52:03 Respondent states that Petitioner asks the court to adopt “uniquely stupid standards.”

     1:03:17 Justice Jackson and Respondent debate whether 504 and Title II require reasonable accommodations

     1:04:31 Respondent admonishes the Supreme Court for sometimes “just remand[ing] and saying we just remand” and for not “set[ting] the law.”

     1:05:01 Justice Gorsuch tells Respondent that he’s troubled by Respondent’s “suggestion that your friends on the other side have lied[]” and asks Respondent “to reconsider that phrase.” Respondent backtracks and says that Petitioner is incorrect.

     1:07:24 Justice Gorsuch asks Respondent to withdraw her accusation that Petitioner lied. Respondent obliges.

     1:16:23 Respondent Sequential Questions Begin

     1:22:38 Respondent Questions End, Petitioner Reply Begins

     ]]>51d7a174-9dcf-43c9-8435-0435b8e98a58Mon, 28 Apr 2025 09:00:00 -040001:26:03falsefull202457572024Oral Argument: Diamond Alternative Energy, LLC v. EPA | Case No. 24-7 | Date Argued: 04/23/25Case Info: Diamond Alternative Energy, LLC v. EPA | Case No. 24-7 | Date Argued: 04/23/25

     Link to Docket: Here.

     Background:

     Section 209(a) of the Clean Air Act generally preempts States from adopting emission standards for new motor vehicles. 42 U.S.C. § 7543(a). But under Section 209(b) of that Act, EPA may grant California and only California-a waiver from federal preemption to set its own vehicle-emission standards. Before granting a preemption waiver, EPA must find that California "need[s]" its own emission standards "to meet compelling and extraordinary conditions." Id. § 7543(b)(1)(B).

     In 2022, EPA granted California a waiver to set its own standards for greenhouse-gas emissions and to adopt a zero-emission-vehicle mandate, both expressly intended to address global climate change by reducing California vehicles' consumption of liquid fuel. Fuel producers challenged EPA's waiver as contrary to the text of Section 209(b). The D.C. Circuit rejected the challenge without reaching the merits, concluding that fuel producers' injuries were not redressable because they had not established that vacating EPA's waiver would have any effect on automakers.

     Questions Presented:

     1. Whether a party may establish the redressability component of Article III standing by relying on the coercive and predictable effects of regulation on third parties.
     2. Whether EPA's preemption waiver for California's greenhouse-gas emission standards and zero-emission- vehicle mandate is unlawful.
     
     

     Holding: The fuel producers have Article III standing to challenge EPA's approval of the California regulations.

     Result: Reversed and remanded.

     Voting Breakdown: 7-2. Justice Kavanaugh delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Alito, Kagan, Gorsuch, and Barrett joined. Justice Sotomayor and Justice Jackson filed dissenting opinions.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     • For Petitioners: Jeffrey B. Wall
     • For Federal Respondents: Edwin S. Kneedler, Deputy Solicitor General
     • For State Respondents: Joshua A. Klein, Deputy Solicitor General, Oakland, Cal.
     
     ]]>Case Info: Diamond Alternative Energy, LLC v. EPA | Case No. 24-7 | Date Argued: 04/23/25

     Link to Docket: Here.

     Background:

     Section 209(a) of the Clean Air Act generally preempts States from adopting emission standards for new motor vehicles. 42 U.S.C. § 7543(a). But under Section 209(b) of that Act, EPA may grant California and only California-a waiver from federal preemption to set its own vehicle-emission standards. Before granting a preemption waiver, EPA must find that California "need[s]" its own emission standards "to meet compelling and extraordinary conditions." Id. § 7543(b)(1)(B).

     In 2022, EPA granted California a waiver to set its own standards for greenhouse-gas emissions and to adopt a zero-emission-vehicle mandate, both expressly intended to address global climate change by reducing California vehicles' consumption of liquid fuel. Fuel producers challenged EPA's waiver as contrary to the text of Section 209(b). The D.C. Circuit rejected the challenge without reaching the merits, concluding that fuel producers' injuries were not redressable because they had not established that vacating EPA's waiver would have any effect on automakers.

     Questions Presented:

     1. Whether a party may establish the redressability component of Article III standing by relying on the coercive and predictable effects of regulation on third parties.
     2. Whether EPA's preemption waiver for California's greenhouse-gas emission standards and zero-emission- vehicle mandate is unlawful.
     
     

     Holding: The fuel producers have Article III standing to challenge EPA's approval of the California regulations.

     Result: Reversed and remanded.

     Voting Breakdown: 7-2. Justice Kavanaugh delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Alito, Kagan, Gorsuch, and Barrett joined. Justice Sotomayor and Justice Jackson filed dissenting opinions.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     • For Petitioners: Jeffrey B. Wall
     • For Federal Respondents: Edwin S. Kneedler, Deputy Solicitor General
     • For State Respondents: Joshua A. Klein, Deputy Solicitor General, Oakland, Cal.
     
     ]]>a406d3e7-676b-4e1e-83f7-52f19cdcea72Wed, 23 Apr 2025 09:00:00 -040001:04:53falsefull202456562024Opinion Summary: Velazquez v. Bondi, Att'y Gen. | Date Decided: 4/22/25 | Case No. 23-929Case Info: Velazquez v. Bondi, Att'y Gen. | Date Decided: 4/22/25 | Case No. 23-929

     Link to Docket: Here.

     Question Presented: When a noncitizen's voluntary-departure period ends on a weekend or public holiday, is a motion to reopen filed the next business day sufficient to avoid the penalties for failure to depart?

     Holding: Under §1229c(b)(2), a voluntary-departure deadline that falls on a weekend or legal holiday extends to the next business day.

     Result: Reversed and remanded.

     Voting Breakdown: Justice Gorsuch delivered the opinion of the Court, in which the following justices joined: Chief Justice Roberts, Justice Sotomayor, Justice Kagan, and Justice Jackson.  Justice Thomas filed a dissenting opinion, joined by Justice Alito, and joined by Justice Kavanaugh and Justice Barrett as to Parts I and II.  Justice Alito and Justice Barrett filed dissenting opinions, both joined by Justice Kavanaugh.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     • For Petitioner: Gerard J. Cedrone
     • For Respondent: Anthony A. Yang, Assistant to the Solicitor General
     
     

     Website Link to Oral Argument: Here.

     Apple Podcast Link to Oral Argument: Here.

     Host Note: Please note that the opinion date is April 22, 2025.

     ]]>Case Info: Velazquez v. Bondi, Att'y Gen. | Date Decided: 4/22/25 | Case No. 23-929

     Link to Docket: Here.

     Question Presented: When a noncitizen's voluntary-departure period ends on a weekend or public holiday, is a motion to reopen filed the next business day sufficient to avoid the penalties for failure to depart?

     Holding: Under §1229c(b)(2), a voluntary-departure deadline that falls on a weekend or legal holiday extends to the next business day.

     Result: Reversed and remanded.

     Voting Breakdown: Justice Gorsuch delivered the opinion of the Court, in which the following justices joined: Chief Justice Roberts, Justice Sotomayor, Justice Kagan, and Justice Jackson.  Justice Thomas filed a dissenting opinion, joined by Justice Alito, and joined by Justice Kavanaugh and Justice Barrett as to Parts I and II.  Justice Alito and Justice Barrett filed dissenting opinions, both joined by Justice Kavanaugh.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     • For Petitioner: Gerard J. Cedrone
     • For Respondent: Anthony A. Yang, Assistant to the Solicitor General
     
     

     Website Link to Oral Argument: Here.

     Apple Podcast Link to Oral Argument: Here.

     Host Note: Please note that the opinion date is April 22, 2025.

     ]]>2d898a83-edd7-42f5-8292-f1eb049addc4Tue, 22 Apr 2025 09:00:00 -040014:09falsefull20241141142024Oral Argument: Commissioner v. Zuch | Case No. 24-416 | Date Argued: 4/22/25Case Info: CIR v. Zuch | Case No. 24-416 | Date Argued: 4/22/25

     Link to Docket: Here.

     Question Presented: Whether a proceeding under 26 U.S.C. 6330 for a pre-deprivation determination about a levy proposed by the Internal Revenue Service to collect unpaid taxes becomes moot when there is no longer a live dispute over the proposed levy that gave rise to the proceeding.

     Oral Advocates:

     • For petitioner: Erica L. Ross, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.
     • For respondent: Shay Dvoretzky, Washington, D.C.
     
     

     Website Link to Opinion Summary: Here.

     Apple Podcast Link to Opinion Summary: Here.

     ]]>Case Info: CIR v. Zuch | Case No. 24-416 | Date Argued: 4/22/25

     Link to Docket: Here.

     Question Presented: Whether a proceeding under 26 U.S.C. 6330 for a pre-deprivation determination about a levy proposed by the Internal Revenue Service to collect unpaid taxes becomes moot when there is no longer a live dispute over the proposed levy that gave rise to the proceeding.

     Oral Advocates:

     • For petitioner: Erica L. Ross, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.
     • For respondent: Shay Dvoretzky, Washington, D.C.
     
     

     Website Link to Opinion Summary: Here.

     Apple Podcast Link to Opinion Summary: Here.

     ]]>192f01cb-052e-46a1-b36a-4248e901225fTue, 22 Apr 2025 09:00:00 -040047:33falsefull202455552024Oral Argument: Mahmoud v. Taylor | Case No. 24-297 | Date Argued: 4/22/25Case Info: Mahmoud v. Taylor | Case No. 24-297 | Date Argued: 4/22/25

     Link to Docket: Here.

     Background:

     Respondent Montgomery County Board of Education requires elementary school teachers to read their students storybooks celebrating gender transitions, Pride parades, and same-sex playground romance. The storybooks were chosen to disrupt "cisnormativity" and "either/or thinking" among students. The Board's own principals objected that the curriculum was "not appropriate for the intended age group," presented gender ideology as "fact," "sham[ed]" students with contrary opinions, and was "dismissive of religious beliefs." The Board initially allowed parents to opt their kids out- but then reversed course, saying that no opt-outs would be permitted and that parents would not even be notified when the storybooks were read.

     Petitioners filed suit, not challenging the curriculum, but arguing that compelling their elementary-age children to participate in instruction contrary to their parents' religious convictions violated the Free Exercise Clause. Construing Wisconsin v. Yoder, the Fourth Circuit found no free-exercise burden because no one was forced "to change their religious beliefs or conduct."

     Question Presented:

     Whether public schools burden parents' religious exercise when they compel elementary school children to participate in instruction on gender and sexuality against their parents' religious convictions and with-out notice or opportunity to opt out.

     Oral Advocates:

     • For Petitioners: Eric S. Baxter, Washington, D.C.; and Sarah M. Harris, Principal Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. (for United States, as amicus curiae.)
     • For Respondents: Alan E. Schoenfeld, New York, N.Y.
     
     

     Timestamps:

     00:00 Introduction

     00:05 Petitioner Opening Statement

     02:06 Petitioner Free for All Questions Begin

     18:38 Petitioner Sequential Questions Begin

     53:39 Petitioner Questions End, Government Opening Statement

     54:43 Government Free for All Questions Begin

     1:04:21 Government Sequential Questions Begin

     01:22:12 Government Questions End, Respondent Opening Statement

     01:24:02 Respondent Free for All Questions Begin

     01:52:42 Respondent Sequential Questions Begin

     2:25:55 Respondent Questions End, Petitioner Rebuttal Begins

     ]]>Case Info: Mahmoud v. Taylor | Case No. 24-297 | Date Argued: 4/22/25

     Link to Docket: Here.

     Background:

     Respondent Montgomery County Board of Education requires elementary school teachers to read their students storybooks celebrating gender transitions, Pride parades, and same-sex playground romance. The storybooks were chosen to disrupt "cisnormativity" and "either/or thinking" among students. The Board's own principals objected that the curriculum was "not appropriate for the intended age group," presented gender ideology as "fact," "sham[ed]" students with contrary opinions, and was "dismissive of religious beliefs." The Board initially allowed parents to opt their kids out- but then reversed course, saying that no opt-outs would be permitted and that parents would not even be notified when the storybooks were read.

     Petitioners filed suit, not challenging the curriculum, but arguing that compelling their elementary-age children to participate in instruction contrary to their parents' religious convictions violated the Free Exercise Clause. Construing Wisconsin v. Yoder, the Fourth Circuit found no free-exercise burden because no one was forced "to change their religious beliefs or conduct."

     Question Presented:

     Whether public schools burden parents' religious exercise when they compel elementary school children to participate in instruction on gender and sexuality against their parents' religious convictions and with-out notice or opportunity to opt out.

     Oral Advocates:

     • For Petitioners: Eric S. Baxter, Washington, D.C.; and Sarah M. Harris, Principal Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. (for United States, as amicus curiae.)
     • For Respondents: Alan E. Schoenfeld, New York, N.Y.
     
     

     Timestamps:

     00:00 Introduction

     00:05 Petitioner Opening Statement

     02:06 Petitioner Free for All Questions Begin

     18:38 Petitioner Sequential Questions Begin

     53:39 Petitioner Questions End, Government Opening Statement

     54:43 Government Free for All Questions Begin

     1:04:21 Government Sequential Questions Begin

     01:22:12 Government Questions End, Respondent Opening Statement

     01:24:02 Respondent Free for All Questions Begin

     01:52:42 Respondent Sequential Questions Begin

     2:25:55 Respondent Questions End, Petitioner Rebuttal Begins

     ]]>1ee35f7d-9be9-466c-b675-3f8161e2911dTue, 22 Apr 2025 09:00:00 -040002:29:20falsefull202454542024Oral Argument: Parrish v. United States | Case No. 24-275 | Date Argued: 4/21/25Case Info: Parrish v. United States | Case No. 24-275 | Date Argued: 4/21/25 | Date Decided: 6/12/25

     Link to Docket: Here.

     Background:

     Ordinarily, litigants must file a notice of appeal within 30 or 60 days of an adverse judgment. 28 U.S.C. § 2107(a)-(b). Under 28 U.S.C. § 2107(c) and Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(6), however, district courts can reopen an expired appeal period when a party did not receive timely notice of the judgment. The Courts of Appeals have divided about whether a notice of appeal filed after the expiration of the ordinary appeal period but before the appeal period is reopened becomes effective once reopening is granted.

     Question Presented: Whether a litigant who files a notice of appeal after the ordinary appeal period expires must file a second, duplicative notice after the appeal period is reopened.

     Holding: A litigant who files a notice of appeal after the original appeal deadline but before the court grants reopening need not file a second notice after reopening. The original notice relates forward to the date reopening is granted.

     Result: Reversed and remanded.

     Voting Breakdown: 8-1. Justice Sotomayor delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Alito, Kagan, Kavanaugh and Barrett joined. Justice Jackson filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which Justice Thomas joined. Justice Gorsuch filed a dissenting opinion.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     • For petitioner: Amanda Rice, Detroit, Mich.
     • For respondent in support of petitioner: Aimee Brown, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.
     • For Court-appointed amicus curiae in support of judgment below: Michael R. Huston, Phoenix, Ariz.
     
     

     Website Link to Opinion Summary: Here.

     Apple Podcast Link to Opinion Summary: Here.

     ]]>Case Info: Parrish v. United States | Case No. 24-275 | Date Argued: 4/21/25 | Date Decided: 6/12/25

     Link to Docket: Here.

     Background:

     Ordinarily, litigants must file a notice of appeal within 30 or 60 days of an adverse judgment. 28 U.S.C. § 2107(a)-(b). Under 28 U.S.C. § 2107(c) and Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(6), however, district courts can reopen an expired appeal period when a party did not receive timely notice of the judgment. The Courts of Appeals have divided about whether a notice of appeal filed after the expiration of the ordinary appeal period but before the appeal period is reopened becomes effective once reopening is granted.

     Question Presented: Whether a litigant who files a notice of appeal after the ordinary appeal period expires must file a second, duplicative notice after the appeal period is reopened.

     Holding: A litigant who files a notice of appeal after the original appeal deadline but before the court grants reopening need not file a second notice after reopening. The original notice relates forward to the date reopening is granted.

     Result: Reversed and remanded.

     Voting Breakdown: 8-1. Justice Sotomayor delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Alito, Kagan, Kavanaugh and Barrett joined. Justice Jackson filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which Justice Thomas joined. Justice Gorsuch filed a dissenting opinion.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     • For petitioner: Amanda Rice, Detroit, Mich.
     • For respondent in support of petitioner: Aimee Brown, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.
     • For Court-appointed amicus curiae in support of judgment below: Michael R. Huston, Phoenix, Ariz.
     
     

     Website Link to Opinion Summary: Here.

     Apple Podcast Link to Opinion Summary: Here.

     ]]>1f206132-e1b5-4f1f-84cc-67076bf9f6a2Mon, 21 Apr 2025 12:45:00 -040053:56falsefull202452522024Oral Argument: Kennedy, Sec. of H&HS v. Braidwood Mgmt., Inc. | Case No. 24-316 | Date Argued: 4/21/25Case Info: Kennedy, Sec. of H&HS v. Braidwood Mgmt., Inc. | Case No. 24-316 | Date Argued: 4/21/25

     Link to Docket: Here.

     Background:

     The U.S. Preventive Services Task Force (Task Force), which sits within the Public Health Service of the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), issues clinical recommendations for preventive medical services, such as screenings and medications to prevent serious diseases. Under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111 -148, 124 Stat. 119, health insurance issuers and group health plans must cover certain preventive services recommended by the Task Force without imposing any cost-sharing requirements on patients. 42 U.S.C. 300gg-13(a)(1).

     Question Presented: Whether the court of appeals erred in holding that the structure of the Task Force violates the Appointments Clause, U.S. Const. Art. II, § 2, Cl. 2, and in declining to sever the statutory provision that it found to unduly insulate the Task Force from the HHS Secretary’s supervision.

     Oral Advocates:

     • For Petitioners: Hashim M. Mooppan, Principal Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.
     • For Respondents: Jonathan F. Mitchell, Austin, Tex.
     
     

     Host Note: On 4/25/25, the Supreme Court ordered the parties to “file supplemental letter briefs addressing the following question: Whether Congress has ‘by Law’ vested the Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services with the authority to appoint members of the United States Preventive Services Task Force. U. S. Const. art. II, §2, cl. 2.” Link to 4/25/25 Order: Here. On 5/5/25, the parties filed supplemental letter briefs.

     This may mean that the Supreme Court is skeptical of Respondent’s position that the Task Force members constitute principal officers and that the Supreme Court may not remand the question to the Fifth Circuit. Check out the exchange involving Mr. Mitchell on this point at 42:00.

     ]]>Case Info: Kennedy, Sec. of H&HS v. Braidwood Mgmt., Inc. | Case No. 24-316 | Date Argued: 4/21/25

     Link to Docket: Here.

     Background:

     The U.S. Preventive Services Task Force (Task Force), which sits within the Public Health Service of the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), issues clinical recommendations for preventive medical services, such as screenings and medications to prevent serious diseases. Under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111 -148, 124 Stat. 119, health insurance issuers and group health plans must cover certain preventive services recommended by the Task Force without imposing any cost-sharing requirements on patients. 42 U.S.C. 300gg-13(a)(1).

     Question Presented: Whether the court of appeals erred in holding that the structure of the Task Force violates the Appointments Clause, U.S. Const. Art. II, § 2, Cl. 2, and in declining to sever the statutory provision that it found to unduly insulate the Task Force from the HHS Secretary’s supervision.

     Oral Advocates:

     • For Petitioners: Hashim M. Mooppan, Principal Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.
     • For Respondents: Jonathan F. Mitchell, Austin, Tex.
     
     

     Host Note: On 4/25/25, the Supreme Court ordered the parties to “file supplemental letter briefs addressing the following question: Whether Congress has ‘by Law’ vested the Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services with the authority to appoint members of the United States Preventive Services Task Force. U. S. Const. art. II, §2, cl. 2.” Link to 4/25/25 Order: Here. On 5/5/25, the parties filed supplemental letter briefs.

     This may mean that the Supreme Court is skeptical of Respondent’s position that the Task Force members constitute principal officers and that the Supreme Court may not remand the question to the Fifth Circuit. Check out the exchange involving Mr. Mitchell on this point at 42:00.

     ]]>117be0d8-ce6f-4c97-9c2d-221db7be06f5Mon, 21 Apr 2025 09:00:00 -040001:26:12falsefull202453532024Opinion Summary: Cunningham v. Cornell University | Date Decided: 4/17/25 | Case No. 23-1007Case Info: Cunningham v. Cornell University | Date Decided: 4/17/25 | Case No. 23-1007

     Link to Docket: Here.

     Question Presented: Whether a plaintiff can state a claim by alleging that a plan fiduciary engaged in a transaction constituting a furnishing of goods, services, or facilities between the plan and a party in interest, as proscribed by 29 U.S.C. § 1106(a)(1)(C), or whether a plaintiff must plead and prove additional elements and facts not contained in the provision's text.

     Holding: To state a claim under §1106(a)(1)(C), a plaintiff need only plausi­bly allege the elements contained in that provision itself, without ad­dressing potential §1108 exemptions.

     Result: Reversed and remanded.

     Voting Breakdown: Justice Sotomayor delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Justice Alito filed a concurring opinion, in which Justice Thomas and Justice Kavanaugh joined.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Advocates:

     • For petitioners: Xiao Wang, Charlottesville, Va.; and Yaira Dubin, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. (for United States, as amicus curiae.)
     • For respondents: Nicole A. Saharsky, Washington, D.C.
     
     

     Website Link to Oral Argument: Here.

     Apple Podcast Link to Oral Argument: Here.

     ]]>Case Info: Cunningham v. Cornell University | Date Decided: 4/17/25 | Case No. 23-1007

     Link to Docket: Here.

     Question Presented: Whether a plaintiff can state a claim by alleging that a plan fiduciary engaged in a transaction constituting a furnishing of goods, services, or facilities between the plan and a party in interest, as proscribed by 29 U.S.C. § 1106(a)(1)(C), or whether a plaintiff must plead and prove additional elements and facts not contained in the provision's text.

     Holding: To state a claim under §1106(a)(1)(C), a plaintiff need only plausi­bly allege the elements contained in that provision itself, without ad­dressing potential §1108 exemptions.

     Result: Reversed and remanded.

     Voting Breakdown: Justice Sotomayor delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Justice Alito filed a concurring opinion, in which Justice Thomas and Justice Kavanaugh joined.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Advocates:

     • For petitioners: Xiao Wang, Charlottesville, Va.; and Yaira Dubin, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. (for United States, as amicus curiae.)
     • For respondents: Nicole A. Saharsky, Washington, D.C.
     
     

     Website Link to Oral Argument: Here.

     Apple Podcast Link to Oral Argument: Here.

     ]]>04dc83f9-ecc8-4a36-aa76-35eea59d79a2Thu, 17 Apr 2025 09:00:00 -040011:02falsefull20241331332024Opinion Summary: FDA v. Wages and White Lion Investments, LLC | Date Decided: 4/2/25 | Case No. 23-1038Case Info: FDA v. Wages and White Lion Investments, LLC | Date Decided: 4/2/25 | Case No. 23-1038

     Link to Docket: Here.

     Question Presented: Whether the court of appeals erred in setting aside FDA's denial orders as arbitrary and capricious.

     Holding: The Fifth Circuit’s conclusion that the FDA acted arbitrarily and capriciously in its adjudication of manufacturers’ premarket tobacco product applications is vacated because the FDA’s denial orders were sufficiently consistent with its predecisional guidance—as to scientific evidence, comparative efficacy, and device type—and thus did not run afoul of the change-in-position doctrine.

     Result: Vacated and remanded.

     Voting Breakdown: Justice Alito delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Justice Sotomayor filed a concurring opinion.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     • For petitioner: Curtis E. Gannon, Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.
     • For respondents: Eric N. Heyer, Washington, D.C.
     
     

     Website Link to Oral Argument: Here.

     Apple Podcast Link to Oral Argument: Here.

     ]]>Case Info: FDA v. Wages and White Lion Investments, LLC | Date Decided: 4/2/25 | Case No. 23-1038

     Link to Docket: Here.

     Question Presented: Whether the court of appeals erred in setting aside FDA's denial orders as arbitrary and capricious.

     Holding: The Fifth Circuit’s conclusion that the FDA acted arbitrarily and capriciously in its adjudication of manufacturers’ premarket tobacco product applications is vacated because the FDA’s denial orders were sufficiently consistent with its predecisional guidance—as to scientific evidence, comparative efficacy, and device type—and thus did not run afoul of the change-in-position doctrine.

     Result: Vacated and remanded.

     Voting Breakdown: Justice Alito delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Justice Sotomayor filed a concurring opinion.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     • For petitioner: Curtis E. Gannon, Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.
     • For respondents: Eric N. Heyer, Washington, D.C.
     
     

     Website Link to Oral Argument: Here.

     Apple Podcast Link to Oral Argument: Here.

     ]]>6fa7e1ae-867c-4c09-bd4f-66f069b6bb9dWed, 02 Apr 2025 09:00:00 -040018:22falsefull20241181182024Opinion Summary: Medical Marijuana, Inc. v. Horn | Date Decided: 4/2/25 | Case No. 23-365Case Info: Medical Marijuana, Inc. v. Horn | Date Decided: 4/2/25 | Case No. 23-365

     Link to Docket: Here.

     Question Presented: Whether economic harms resulting from personal injuries are injuries to “business or property by reason of” the defendant's acts for purposes of civil RICO.

     Holding: Under civil RICO, §1964(c), a plaintiff may seek treble damages for business or property loss even if the loss resulted from a personal injury.

     Result: Affirmed and remanded.

     Voting Breakdown: Justice Barrett delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Justices Sotomayor, Kagan, Gorsuch, and Jackson joined.  Justice Jackson filed a concur­ring opinion.  Justice Thomas filed a dissenting opinion.  Justice Kavanaugh filed a dissenting opinion, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito joined.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     • For petitioners: Lisa S. Blatt, Washington, D.C.
     • For respondent: Easha Anand, Stanford, Cal.
     
     

     Website Link to Oral Argument: Here.

     Apple Podcast Link to Oral Argument: Here.

     ]]>Case Info: Medical Marijuana, Inc. v. Horn | Date Decided: 4/2/25 | Case No. 23-365

     Link to Docket: Here.

     Question Presented: Whether economic harms resulting from personal injuries are injuries to “business or property by reason of” the defendant's acts for purposes of civil RICO.

     Holding: Under civil RICO, §1964(c), a plaintiff may seek treble damages for business or property loss even if the loss resulted from a personal injury.

     Result: Affirmed and remanded.

     Voting Breakdown: Justice Barrett delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Justices Sotomayor, Kagan, Gorsuch, and Jackson joined.  Justice Jackson filed a concur­ring opinion.  Justice Thomas filed a dissenting opinion.  Justice Kavanaugh filed a dissenting opinion, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito joined.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     • For petitioners: Lisa S. Blatt, Washington, D.C.
     • For respondent: Easha Anand, Stanford, Cal.
     
     

     Website Link to Oral Argument: Here.

     Apple Podcast Link to Oral Argument: Here.

     ]]>9e36816d-d374-408a-8edb-cb0fd0feef7dWed, 02 Apr 2025 09:00:00 -040013:37falsefull20241061062024Oral Argument: Medina v. Planned Parenthood South Atlantic | Case No. 23-1275 | Date Argued: 4/2/25Case Info: Medina v. Planned Parenthood South Atlantic | Case No. 23-1275 | Date Argued: 4/2/25

     Link to Docket: Here.

     Background:

     More than 30 years ago, this Court first applied what would become known as the "Blessing factors," holding that a Medicaid Act provision created a privately enforceable right to certain reimbursement rates. Wilder v. Va. Hosp. Ass'n, 496 U.S. 498, 509-10 (1990). Later, the Court distilled from Wilder a multi-factor test for deciding whether a "statutory provision gives rise to a federal right" privately enforceable under Section 1983. Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329, 340 (1997). Five years later, though, the Court disparaged Blessing's test while clarifying that only "an unambiguously conferred right is enforceable by § 1983." Gonzaga University v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 282 (2002). Then, in Health & Hospital Corp. of Marion County v. Talevski, 599 U.S. 166, 180 (2023), the Court doubled down on Gonzaga's "demanding bar."

     The Court did not apply Blessing or Wilder in Talevski, but it did not overrule them either. After the Court GVR'd this case in light of Talevski, the Fourth Circuit applied Wilder and Blessing again and reaffirmed its prior opinions, maintaining a 5-2 circuit split over the first question presented and a 3-1 circuit split over the proper reading of O'Bannon v. Town Court Nursing Center, 447 U.S. 773 (1980), which frames the second question.

     Questions Presented:

     1. Whether the Medicaid Act's any-qualified-provider provision unambiguously confers a private right upon a Medicaid beneficiary to choose a specific provider.

     2. What is the scope of a Medicaid beneficiary's alleged right to choose a provider that a state has deemed disqualified?

     Holding: Section 1396a(a)(23)(A) does not clearly and unambiguously confer individual rights enforceable under Section 1983.

     Result: Reversed and remanded.

     Voting Breakdown: 6-3. Justice Gorsuch delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Alito, Kavanaugh, and Barrett joined. Justice Thomas filed a concurring opinion. Justice Jackson filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Sotomayor and Kagan joined.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     • For petitioner: John J. Bursch, Washington, D.C.; and Kyle D. Hawkins, Counselor to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. (for United States, as amicus curiae.)
     • For respondents: Nicole A. Saharsky, Washington, D.C.
     
     ]]>Case Info: Medina v. Planned Parenthood South Atlantic | Case No. 23-1275 | Date Argued: 4/2/25

     Link to Docket: Here.

     Background:

     More than 30 years ago, this Court first applied what would become known as the "Blessing factors," holding that a Medicaid Act provision created a privately enforceable right to certain reimbursement rates. Wilder v. Va. Hosp. Ass'n, 496 U.S. 498, 509-10 (1990). Later, the Court distilled from Wilder a multi-factor test for deciding whether a "statutory provision gives rise to a federal right" privately enforceable under Section 1983. Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329, 340 (1997). Five years later, though, the Court disparaged Blessing's test while clarifying that only "an unambiguously conferred right is enforceable by § 1983." Gonzaga University v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 282 (2002). Then, in Health & Hospital Corp. of Marion County v. Talevski, 599 U.S. 166, 180 (2023), the Court doubled down on Gonzaga's "demanding bar."

     The Court did not apply Blessing or Wilder in Talevski, but it did not overrule them either. After the Court GVR'd this case in light of Talevski, the Fourth Circuit applied Wilder and Blessing again and reaffirmed its prior opinions, maintaining a 5-2 circuit split over the first question presented and a 3-1 circuit split over the proper reading of O'Bannon v. Town Court Nursing Center, 447 U.S. 773 (1980), which frames the second question.

     Questions Presented:

     1. Whether the Medicaid Act's any-qualified-provider provision unambiguously confers a private right upon a Medicaid beneficiary to choose a specific provider.

     2. What is the scope of a Medicaid beneficiary's alleged right to choose a provider that a state has deemed disqualified?

     Holding: Section 1396a(a)(23)(A) does not clearly and unambiguously confer individual rights enforceable under Section 1983.

     Result: Reversed and remanded.

     Voting Breakdown: 6-3. Justice Gorsuch delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Alito, Kavanaugh, and Barrett joined. Justice Thomas filed a concurring opinion. Justice Jackson filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Sotomayor and Kagan joined.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     • For petitioner: John J. Bursch, Washington, D.C.; and Kyle D. Hawkins, Counselor to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. (for United States, as amicus curiae.)
     • For respondents: Nicole A. Saharsky, Washington, D.C.
     
     ]]>8ac98965-4544-4370-b44e-e08edf0c279fWed, 02 Apr 2025 09:00:00 -040001:33:37falsefull202451512024Oral Argument: Fuld v. PLO | Case No. 24-20 | Date Argued: 4/1/25Case Info: Fuld v. PLO | Case No. 24-20 | Date Argued: 4/1/25

     Case consolidated with: United States v. PLO, Case No. 24-151.

     Link to Docket: Here.

     Background:

     The Anti-Terrorism Act (ATA), 18 U.S.C. § 2331 et seq., provides an extraterritorial private right of action for victims of terror attacks committed against American nationals abroad. In 2019, Congress amended the ATA by enacting the Promoting Security and Justice for Victims of Terrorism Act (PSJVTA). Under the PSJVTA, the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) and Palestinian Authority (PA) "shall be deemed to have consented to personal jurisdiction" in an ATA action if: (a) more than 120 days after the statute's enactment, they pay any terrorist convicted of or killed while committing a terror attack against an American national, and the payment is made "by reason of' the conviction or terror attack, 18 U.S.C. § 2334(e) (1)(A); or (b) more than 15 days after the statute's enactment, they "conduct any activity" while physically present in the United States (with limited exceptions), id. § 2334(e)(1) (B).

     The PLO and PA engaged in both categories of conduct after the trigger dates. But in the decisions below, the Second Circuit facially invalidated the PSJVTA. The court held that the Fifth Amendment forbids Congress from specifying conduct that triggers a defendant's consent to federal jurisdiction unless the statute provides the defendant with some "governmental benefit" in return, and that the PLO and PA had not received such a benefit.

     Question Presented: Whether the PSJVTA violates the Fifth Amendment.

     Holding: The PSJVTA's personal jurisdiction provision does not violate the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause because the statute reasonably ties the assertion of jurisdiction over the PLO and PA to conduct involving the United States and implicating sensitive foreign policy matters within the prerogative of the political branches.

     Result: Reversed and remanded.

     Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Chief Justice Roberts delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Justice Alito, Justice Sotomayor, Justice Kagan, Justice Kavanaugh, Justice Barrett, and Justice Jackson joined. Justice Thomas filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, which Justice Gorsuch joined as to Part II.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     • For Petitioners in 24-20: Kent A. Yalowitz, New York, N. Y.
     • For Petitioner in 24-151: Edwin S. Kneedler, Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.
     • For Respondents: Mitchell R. Berger, Washington, D.C.
     
     ]]>Case Info: Fuld v. PLO | Case No. 24-20 | Date Argued: 4/1/25

     Case consolidated with: United States v. PLO, Case No. 24-151.

     Link to Docket: Here.

     Background:

     The Anti-Terrorism Act (ATA), 18 U.S.C. § 2331 et seq., provides an extraterritorial private right of action for victims of terror attacks committed against American nationals abroad. In 2019, Congress amended the ATA by enacting the Promoting Security and Justice for Victims of Terrorism Act (PSJVTA). Under the PSJVTA, the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) and Palestinian Authority (PA) "shall be deemed to have consented to personal jurisdiction" in an ATA action if: (a) more than 120 days after the statute's enactment, they pay any terrorist convicted of or killed while committing a terror attack against an American national, and the payment is made "by reason of' the conviction or terror attack, 18 U.S.C. § 2334(e) (1)(A); or (b) more than 15 days after the statute's enactment, they "conduct any activity" while physically present in the United States (with limited exceptions), id. § 2334(e)(1) (B).

     The PLO and PA engaged in both categories of conduct after the trigger dates. But in the decisions below, the Second Circuit facially invalidated the PSJVTA. The court held that the Fifth Amendment forbids Congress from specifying conduct that triggers a defendant's consent to federal jurisdiction unless the statute provides the defendant with some "governmental benefit" in return, and that the PLO and PA had not received such a benefit.

     Question Presented: Whether the PSJVTA violates the Fifth Amendment.

     Holding: The PSJVTA's personal jurisdiction provision does not violate the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause because the statute reasonably ties the assertion of jurisdiction over the PLO and PA to conduct involving the United States and implicating sensitive foreign policy matters within the prerogative of the political branches.

     Result: Reversed and remanded.

     Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Chief Justice Roberts delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Justice Alito, Justice Sotomayor, Justice Kagan, Justice Kavanaugh, Justice Barrett, and Justice Jackson joined. Justice Thomas filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, which Justice Gorsuch joined as to Part II.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     • For Petitioners in 24-20: Kent A. Yalowitz, New York, N. Y.
     • For Petitioner in 24-151: Edwin S. Kneedler, Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.
     • For Respondents: Mitchell R. Berger, Washington, D.C.
     
     ]]>35bc9e62-40e7-4867-abad-e66cf71030ddTue, 01 Apr 2025 09:00:00 -040001:53:07falsefull202450502024Oral Argument: Catholic Charities Bureau v. WI Labor Review Comm'n | Case No. 24-154 | Date Argued: 3/31/25Case Info: Catholic Charities Bureau v. WI Labor Review Comm'n | Case No. 24-154 | Date Argued: 3/31/25

     Link to Docket: Here.

     Background:

     Wisconsin exempts from its state unemployment tax system certain religious organizations that are "operated, supervised, controlled, or principally supported by a church or convention or association of churches" and that are also "operated primarily for religious purposes."

     Petitioners are Catholic Charities of the Diocese of Superior and several sub-entities. Although all agree Catholic Charities is controlled by a church-the Diocese of Superior-the Wisconsin Supreme Court held that Catholic Charities is not "operated primarily for religious purposes" and thus does not qualify for the tax exemption. Specifically, the court held that Catholic Charities' activities are not "typical" religious activities because Catholic Charities serves and employs non-Catholics, Catholic Charities does not "attempt to imbue program participants with the Catholic faith," and its services to the poor and needy could also be provided by secular organizations.

     Questions Presented:

     1. Does a state violate the First Amendment's Religion Clauses by denying a religious organization an otherwise-available tax exemption because the organization does not meet the state's criteria for religious behavior?
     2. In addressing federal constitutional challenges, may state courts require proof of unconstitutionality "beyond a reasonable doubt?"
     
     

     Holding: The Wisconsin Supreme Court’s application of § 108.02(15)(h)(2) to petitioners violates the First Amendment.

     Result: Reversed and remanded.

     Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Sotomayor delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.  Justices Thomas and Jackson each filed concurring opinions.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     • For petitioners: Eric C. Rassbach, Washington, D. C.; and Curtis E. Gannon, Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. (for United States, as amicus curiae.)
     • For respondents: Colin T. Roth, Assistant Attorney General, Madison, Wis.
     
     

     Website Link to Opinion Summary: Here.

     Apple Podcast Link to Opinion Summary: Here.

     ]]>Case Info: Catholic Charities Bureau v. WI Labor Review Comm'n | Case No. 24-154 | Date Argued: 3/31/25

     Link to Docket: Here.

     Background:

     Wisconsin exempts from its state unemployment tax system certain religious organizations that are "operated, supervised, controlled, or principally supported by a church or convention or association of churches" and that are also "operated primarily for religious purposes."

     Petitioners are Catholic Charities of the Diocese of Superior and several sub-entities. Although all agree Catholic Charities is controlled by a church-the Diocese of Superior-the Wisconsin Supreme Court held that Catholic Charities is not "operated primarily for religious purposes" and thus does not qualify for the tax exemption. Specifically, the court held that Catholic Charities' activities are not "typical" religious activities because Catholic Charities serves and employs non-Catholics, Catholic Charities does not "attempt to imbue program participants with the Catholic faith," and its services to the poor and needy could also be provided by secular organizations.

     Questions Presented:

     1. Does a state violate the First Amendment's Religion Clauses by denying a religious organization an otherwise-available tax exemption because the organization does not meet the state's criteria for religious behavior?
     2. In addressing federal constitutional challenges, may state courts require proof of unconstitutionality "beyond a reasonable doubt?"
     
     

     Holding: The Wisconsin Supreme Court’s application of § 108.02(15)(h)(2) to petitioners violates the First Amendment.

     Result: Reversed and remanded.

     Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Sotomayor delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.  Justices Thomas and Jackson each filed concurring opinions.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     • For petitioners: Eric C. Rassbach, Washington, D. C.; and Curtis E. Gannon, Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. (for United States, as amicus curiae.)
     • For respondents: Colin T. Roth, Assistant Attorney General, Madison, Wis.
     
     

     Website Link to Opinion Summary: Here.

     Apple Podcast Link to Opinion Summary: Here.

     ]]>65f42423-deae-4fda-a61c-9def374b90bcMon, 31 Mar 2025 09:00:00 -040001:39:19falsefull202449492024Oral Argument: Rivers v. Guerrero | Case No. 23-1345 | Date Argued: 3/31/25Case Info: Rivers v. Guerrero | Case No. 23-1345 | Date Argued: 3/31/25 | Date Decided: 6/12/25

     Link to Docket: Here.

     Background:

     Under the federal habeas statute, a prisoner "always gets one chance to bring a federal habeas challenge to his conviction," Banister v. Davis, 590 U.S. 504, 509 (2020). After that, the stringent gatekeeping requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2) bar nearly all attempts to file a "second or successive habeas corpus application." Here, petitioner sought to amend his initial habeas application while it was pending on appeal. The Fifth Circuit applied § 2244(b)(2) and rejected the amended filing.

     The circuits are intractably split on whether § 2244(b)(2) applies to such filings. The Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits hold that § 2244(b)(2) categorically applies to all second-in-time habeas filings made after the district court enters final judgment. The Second Circuit disagrees, applying § 2244(b)(2) only after a petitioner exhausts appellate review of his initial petition. And the Third and Tenth Circuits exempt some second-in-time filings from § 2244(b)(2), depending on whether a prisoner prevails on his initial appeal (Third Circuit) or satisfies a seven-factor test (Tenth Circuit).

     Question Presented: Whether § 2244(b)(2) applies (i) only to habeas filings made after a prisoner has exhausted appellate review of his first petition, (ii) to all second-in-time habeas filings after final judgment, or (iii) to some second-in-time filings, depending on a prisoner's success on appeal or ability to satisfy a seven-factor test.

     Holding: Once a district court enters its judgment with respect to a first-filed habeas petition, a second-in-time filing qualifies as a "second or successive application" properly subject to the requirements of Section 2244(b).

     Result: Affirmed.

     Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Jackson delivered the opinion for a unanimous court. There were no concurring opinions.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     • For petitioner: Peter A. Bruland, Washington, D.C.
     • For respondent: Aaron L. Nielson, Solicitor General, Austin, Tex.; and Matthew Guarnieri, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C. (for United States, as amicus curiae.)
     
     

     Website Link to Opinion Summary: Here.

     Apple Podcast Link to Opinion Summary: Here.

     ]]>Case Info: Rivers v. Guerrero | Case No. 23-1345 | Date Argued: 3/31/25 | Date Decided: 6/12/25

     Link to Docket: Here.

     Background:

     Under the federal habeas statute, a prisoner "always gets one chance to bring a federal habeas challenge to his conviction," Banister v. Davis, 590 U.S. 504, 509 (2020). After that, the stringent gatekeeping requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2) bar nearly all attempts to file a "second or successive habeas corpus application." Here, petitioner sought to amend his initial habeas application while it was pending on appeal. The Fifth Circuit applied § 2244(b)(2) and rejected the amended filing.

     The circuits are intractably split on whether § 2244(b)(2) applies to such filings. The Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits hold that § 2244(b)(2) categorically applies to all second-in-time habeas filings made after the district court enters final judgment. The Second Circuit disagrees, applying § 2244(b)(2) only after a petitioner exhausts appellate review of his initial petition. And the Third and Tenth Circuits exempt some second-in-time filings from § 2244(b)(2), depending on whether a prisoner prevails on his initial appeal (Third Circuit) or satisfies a seven-factor test (Tenth Circuit).

     Question Presented: Whether § 2244(b)(2) applies (i) only to habeas filings made after a prisoner has exhausted appellate review of his first petition, (ii) to all second-in-time habeas filings after final judgment, or (iii) to some second-in-time filings, depending on a prisoner's success on appeal or ability to satisfy a seven-factor test.

     Holding: Once a district court enters its judgment with respect to a first-filed habeas petition, a second-in-time filing qualifies as a "second or successive application" properly subject to the requirements of Section 2244(b).

     Result: Affirmed.

     Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Jackson delivered the opinion for a unanimous court. There were no concurring opinions.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     • For petitioner: Peter A. Bruland, Washington, D.C.
     • For respondent: Aaron L. Nielson, Solicitor General, Austin, Tex.; and Matthew Guarnieri, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C. (for United States, as amicus curiae.)
     
     

     Website Link to Opinion Summary: Here.

     Apple Podcast Link to Opinion Summary: Here.

     ]]>59ac8789-28be-46cf-a9d6-4fb3687f129cMon, 31 Mar 2025 09:00:00 -040051:45falsefull202448482024Opinion Summary: United States v. Miller | Date Decided: 3/26/25 | Case No. 23-824Case Info: United States v. Miller | Date Decided: 3/26/25 | Case No. 23-824

     Link to Docket: Here.

     Question Presented: Whether a bankruptcy trustee may avoid a debtor's tax payment to the United States under Section 544(b) when no actual creditor could have obtained relief under the applicable state  fraudulent-transfer law outside of bankruptcy.

     Holding: Section 106(a)’s sovereign-immunity waiver applies only to a §544(b) claim itself and not to state-law claims nested within that fed­eral claim.

     Result: Reversed.

     Voting Breakdown: Justice Jackson delivered the opinion of the Court, joined by Chief Justice Roberts, along with Justices Thomas, Alito, Sotomayor, Kagan, Kavanaugh and Barrett.  Justice Gorsuch filed a dissenting opinion.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     • For petitioner: Yaira Dubin, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C.
     • For respondent: Lisa S. Blatt, Washington, D. C.
     
     

     Website Link to Oral Argument: Here.

     Apple Podcast Link to Oral Argument: Here.

     ]]>Case Info: United States v. Miller | Date Decided: 3/26/25 | Case No. 23-824

     Link to Docket: Here.

     Question Presented: Whether a bankruptcy trustee may avoid a debtor's tax payment to the United States under Section 544(b) when no actual creditor could have obtained relief under the applicable state  fraudulent-transfer law outside of bankruptcy.

     Holding: Section 106(a)’s sovereign-immunity waiver applies only to a §544(b) claim itself and not to state-law claims nested within that fed­eral claim.

     Result: Reversed.

     Voting Breakdown: Justice Jackson delivered the opinion of the Court, joined by Chief Justice Roberts, along with Justices Thomas, Alito, Sotomayor, Kagan, Kavanaugh and Barrett.  Justice Gorsuch filed a dissenting opinion.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     • For petitioner: Yaira Dubin, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C.
     • For respondent: Lisa S. Blatt, Washington, D. C.
     
     

     Website Link to Oral Argument: Here.

     Apple Podcast Link to Oral Argument: Here.

     ]]>29e9f14c-f448-48a5-8ad4-366dfecb95dfWed, 26 Mar 2025 09:00:00 -040016:02falsefull20241171172024Opinion Summary: Bondi, Att'y Gen. v. VanDerStok | Date Decided: 3/26/25 | Case No. 23-852Case Info: Bondi, Att'y Gen. v. VanDerStok | Date Decided: 3/26/25 | Case No. 23-852

     Link to Docket: Here.

     Questions Presented:

     1. Whether "a weapon parts kit that is designed to or may readily be completed, assembled, restored, or otherwise converted to expel a projectile by the action of an explosive," 27 C.F.R. 478.11, is a "firearm" regulated by the Gun Control Act of 1968 (GCA); and
     2. Whether "a partially complete, disassembled, or nonfunctional frame or receiver" that is "designed to or may readily be completed, assembled, restored, or otherwise converted to function as a frame or receiver," 27 C.F.R. 478.12(c), is a "frame or receiver" regulated by the GCA.
     
     

     Holding: The ATF’s rule is not facially inconsistent with the GCA. The GCA’s statute’s text, context, and structure make clear the GCA reaches some weapon parts kits and unfinished frames or receivers.

     Result: Reversed and remanded.

     Voting Breakdown: Justice Gorsuch delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Sotomayor, Kagan, Kavanaugh, Barrett, and Jackson joined.  Justices Sotomayor, Kavanaugh, and Jackson each filed concurring opinions.  Justices Thomas and Alito each filed dissenting opinions.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     • For petitioners: Elizabeth B. Prelogar, Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C.
     • For respondents: Peter A. Patterson, Washington, D. C.
     
     

     Website Link to Oral Argument: Here.

     Apple Podcast Link to Oral Argument: Here.

     ]]>Case Info: Bondi, Att'y Gen. v. VanDerStok | Date Decided: 3/26/25 | Case No. 23-852

     Link to Docket: Here.

     Questions Presented:

     1. Whether "a weapon parts kit that is designed to or may readily be completed, assembled, restored, or otherwise converted to expel a projectile by the action of an explosive," 27 C.F.R. 478.11, is a "firearm" regulated by the Gun Control Act of 1968 (GCA); and
     2. Whether "a partially complete, disassembled, or nonfunctional frame or receiver" that is "designed to or may readily be completed, assembled, restored, or otherwise converted to function as a frame or receiver," 27 C.F.R. 478.12(c), is a "frame or receiver" regulated by the GCA.
     
     

     Holding: The ATF’s rule is not facially inconsistent with the GCA. The GCA’s statute’s text, context, and structure make clear the GCA reaches some weapon parts kits and unfinished frames or receivers.

     Result: Reversed and remanded.

     Voting Breakdown: Justice Gorsuch delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Sotomayor, Kagan, Kavanaugh, Barrett, and Jackson joined.  Justices Sotomayor, Kavanaugh, and Jackson each filed concurring opinions.  Justices Thomas and Alito each filed dissenting opinions.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     • For petitioners: Elizabeth B. Prelogar, Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C.
     • For respondents: Peter A. Patterson, Washington, D. C.
     
     

     Website Link to Oral Argument: Here.

     Apple Podcast Link to Oral Argument: Here.

     ]]>b77d61fa-df2b-4c94-b873-1ba66d27699eWed, 26 Mar 2025 09:00:00 -040015:29falsefull20241041042024Oral Argument: FCC v. Consumers' Research | Case No. 24-354 | Date Argued: 3/26/25Case Info: FCC v. Consumers' Research | Case No. 24-354 | Date Argued: 3/26/25

     Link to Docket: Here.

     Background:

     In 47 U.S.C. 254, Congress required the Federal Communications Commission (Commission) to operate universal service subsidy programs using mandatory contributions from telecommunications carriers. The Commission has appointed a private company as the programs' Administrator, authorizing that company to perform administrative tasks such as sending out bills, collecting contributions, and disbursing funds to beneficiaries.

     Questions Presented:

     1. Whether Congress violated the nondelegation doctrine by authorizing the Commission to determine, within the limits set forth in Section 254, the amount that providers must contribute to the Fund.

     2. Whether the Commission violated the nondelegation doctrine by using the Administrator's financial projections in computing universal service contribution rates.

     3. Whether the combination of Congress's conferral of authority on the Commission and the Commission's delegation of administrative responsibilities to the Administrator violates the nondelegation doctrine.

     Host Note: Consolidated with: SHLB Coalition V. Consumers' Research, Case No. 23-422.

     Oral Advocates:

     • For Petitioners in 24-354: Sarah M. Harris, Acting Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.
     • For Petitioners in 24-422: Paul D. Clement, Alexandria, Va.
     • For Respondents: R. Trent McCotter, Washington, D.C.
     
     ]]>Case Info: FCC v. Consumers' Research | Case No. 24-354 | Date Argued: 3/26/25

     Link to Docket: Here.

     Background:

     In 47 U.S.C. 254, Congress required the Federal Communications Commission (Commission) to operate universal service subsidy programs using mandatory contributions from telecommunications carriers. The Commission has appointed a private company as the programs' Administrator, authorizing that company to perform administrative tasks such as sending out bills, collecting contributions, and disbursing funds to beneficiaries.

     Questions Presented:

     1. Whether Congress violated the nondelegation doctrine by authorizing the Commission to determine, within the limits set forth in Section 254, the amount that providers must contribute to the Fund.

     2. Whether the Commission violated the nondelegation doctrine by using the Administrator's financial projections in computing universal service contribution rates.

     3. Whether the combination of Congress's conferral of authority on the Commission and the Commission's delegation of administrative responsibilities to the Administrator violates the nondelegation doctrine.

     Host Note: Consolidated with: SHLB Coalition V. Consumers' Research, Case No. 23-422.

     Oral Advocates:

     • For Petitioners in 24-354: Sarah M. Harris, Acting Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.
     • For Petitioners in 24-422: Paul D. Clement, Alexandria, Va.
     • For Respondents: R. Trent McCotter, Washington, D.C.
     
     ]]>ca62d0b1-eeaa-4e18-859c-0d68c644eaf6Wed, 26 Mar 2025 09:00:00 -040002:33:19falsefull202447472024Oral Argument: EPA v. Calumet Shreveport Refining, L.L.C. | Case No. 23-1229 | Date Argued: 3/25/25Case Info: EPA v. Calumet Shreveport Refining, L.L.C. | Case No. 23-1229 | Date Argued: 3/25/25

     Link to Docket: Here.

     Background:

     In a pair of final actions, the United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) denied 105 petitions filed by small oil refineries seeking exemptions from the requirements of the Clean Air Act's Renewable Fuel Standard program. Six of those refineries petitioned for review of EPA's decisions in the Fifth Circuit, which denied the government's motion for transfer to the D.C. Circuit.

     Question Presented: Whether venue for the refineries' challenges lies exclusively in the D.C. Circuit because the agency's denial actions are "nationally applicable" or, alternatively, are "based on a determination of nationwide scope or effect." 42 U.S.C. 7607(b)(1).

     Holding: EPA's denials of small refinery exemption petitions are locally or regionally applicable actions that fall within the "nationwide scope or effect" exception, requiring venue in the D.C. Circuit.

     Result: Vacated and remanded.

     Voting Breakdown: 7-2. Justice Thomas delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Justices Alito, Sotomayor, Kagan, Kavanaugh, Barrett and Jackson joined. Justice Gorsuch filed a dissenting opinion in which Chief Justice Roberts joined.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     • For petitioner: Malcolm L. Stewart, Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C.
     • For respondents Growth Energy and Renewable Fuels Association in support of petitioner: Seth P. Waxman, Washington, D. C.
     • For respondents Calumet Shreveport Refining, L.L.C., et al.: Michael R. Huston, Phoenix, Ariz.
     
     ]]>Case Info: EPA v. Calumet Shreveport Refining, L.L.C. | Case No. 23-1229 | Date Argued: 3/25/25

     Link to Docket: Here.

     Background:

     In a pair of final actions, the United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) denied 105 petitions filed by small oil refineries seeking exemptions from the requirements of the Clean Air Act's Renewable Fuel Standard program. Six of those refineries petitioned for review of EPA's decisions in the Fifth Circuit, which denied the government's motion for transfer to the D.C. Circuit.

     Question Presented: Whether venue for the refineries' challenges lies exclusively in the D.C. Circuit because the agency's denial actions are "nationally applicable" or, alternatively, are "based on a determination of nationwide scope or effect." 42 U.S.C. 7607(b)(1).

     Holding: EPA's denials of small refinery exemption petitions are locally or regionally applicable actions that fall within the "nationwide scope or effect" exception, requiring venue in the D.C. Circuit.

     Result: Vacated and remanded.

     Voting Breakdown: 7-2. Justice Thomas delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Justices Alito, Sotomayor, Kagan, Kavanaugh, Barrett and Jackson joined. Justice Gorsuch filed a dissenting opinion in which Chief Justice Roberts joined.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     • For petitioner: Malcolm L. Stewart, Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C.
     • For respondents Growth Energy and Renewable Fuels Association in support of petitioner: Seth P. Waxman, Washington, D. C.
     • For respondents Calumet Shreveport Refining, L.L.C., et al.: Michael R. Huston, Phoenix, Ariz.
     
     ]]>15f9c450-a263-4dce-a3ba-cc480ad5e33aTue, 25 Mar 2025 09:00:00 -040001:43:22falsefull202446462024Oral Argument: Oklahoma v. EPA | Case No. 23-1067 | Date Argued: 3/25/25Case Info: Oklahoma v. EPA | Case No. 23-1067 | Date Argued: 3/25/25

     Link to Docket: Here.

     Background:

     Under the Clean Air Act, each state must adopt an implementation plan to meet national standards, which EPA then reviews for compliance with the Act. See 42 U.S.C. § 7410. In 2023, EPA published disapprovals of 21 states' plans implementing national ozone standards. It did so in a single Federal Register notice. The Act specifies that "[a] petition for review of the [EPA's] action in approving or promulgating any implementation plan ... or any other final action of the [EPA] under this Act ... which is locally or regionally applicable may be filed only in" the appropriate regional circuit, while "nationally applicable regulations ... may be filed only in" the D.C. Circuit. 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b)(1). Parties from a dozen states sought judicial review of their respective state plan disapprovals in their appropriate regional circuits.

     The Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth Circuits held that the implementation plan disapprovals of states within those circuits are appropriately challenged in their respective regional courts of appeals. In the decision below, the Tenth Circuit held that challenges to the disapprovals of Oklahoma's and Utah's plans can only be brought in the D.C. Circuit, explicitly disagreeing with the decisions of its sister circuits.

     Questions Presented:

     1. Whether a final action by EPA taken pursuant to its Clean Air Act authority with respect to a single state or region may be challenged only in the D.C. Circuit because EPA published the action in the same Federal Register notice as actions affecting other states or regions and claimed to use a consistent analysis for all states.
     2. Whether the Environmental Protection Agency's disapproval of a State Implementation Plan may only be challenged in the D.C. Circuit under 42 U.S.C. § 7607 (b)(1) if EPA packages that disapproval with disapprovals of other States' SIPs and purports to use a consistent method in evaluating the state-specific determinations in those SIPs.
     
     

     Host Note: Consolidated with: Pacificorp V. EPA, Case No. 23-1067.

     Holding: EPA's disapprovals of the Oklahoma and Utah SIPs are locally or regionally applicable actions reviewable in a regional Circuit.

     Result: Reversed.

     Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Thomas delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Alito, Sotomayor, Kagan, Kavanaugh, Barrett and Jackson joined. Justice Gorsuch filed an opinion concurring in the judgment in which Chief Justice Roberts joined.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     • For petitioners in 23-1067: Mithun Mansinghani, Oklahoma City, Okla.
     • For petitioners in 23-1068: Misha Tseytlin, Chicago, Ill.
     • For respondents: Malcolm L. Stewart, Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C. VIDED.
     
     ]]>Case Info: Oklahoma v. EPA | Case No. 23-1067 | Date Argued: 3/25/25

     Link to Docket: Here.

     Background:

     Under the Clean Air Act, each state must adopt an implementation plan to meet national standards, which EPA then reviews for compliance with the Act. See 42 U.S.C. § 7410. In 2023, EPA published disapprovals of 21 states' plans implementing national ozone standards. It did so in a single Federal Register notice. The Act specifies that "[a] petition for review of the [EPA's] action in approving or promulgating any implementation plan ... or any other final action of the [EPA] under this Act ... which is locally or regionally applicable may be filed only in" the appropriate regional circuit, while "nationally applicable regulations ... may be filed only in" the D.C. Circuit. 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b)(1). Parties from a dozen states sought judicial review of their respective state plan disapprovals in their appropriate regional circuits.

     The Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth Circuits held that the implementation plan disapprovals of states within those circuits are appropriately challenged in their respective regional courts of appeals. In the decision below, the Tenth Circuit held that challenges to the disapprovals of Oklahoma's and Utah's plans can only be brought in the D.C. Circuit, explicitly disagreeing with the decisions of its sister circuits.

     Questions Presented:

     1. Whether a final action by EPA taken pursuant to its Clean Air Act authority with respect to a single state or region may be challenged only in the D.C. Circuit because EPA published the action in the same Federal Register notice as actions affecting other states or regions and claimed to use a consistent analysis for all states.
     2. Whether the Environmental Protection Agency's disapproval of a State Implementation Plan may only be challenged in the D.C. Circuit under 42 U.S.C. § 7607 (b)(1) if EPA packages that disapproval with disapprovals of other States' SIPs and purports to use a consistent method in evaluating the state-specific determinations in those SIPs.
     
     

     Host Note: Consolidated with: Pacificorp V. EPA, Case No. 23-1067.

     Holding: EPA's disapprovals of the Oklahoma and Utah SIPs are locally or regionally applicable actions reviewable in a regional Circuit.

     Result: Reversed.

     Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Thomas delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Alito, Sotomayor, Kagan, Kavanaugh, Barrett and Jackson joined. Justice Gorsuch filed an opinion concurring in the judgment in which Chief Justice Roberts joined.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     • For petitioners in 23-1067: Mithun Mansinghani, Oklahoma City, Okla.
     • For petitioners in 23-1068: Misha Tseytlin, Chicago, Ill.
     • For respondents: Malcolm L. Stewart, Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C. VIDED.
     
     ]]>ce83efb6-128b-418d-8ffd-cf055f0015f0Tue, 25 Mar 2025 09:00:00 -040047:50falsefull202445452024Oral Argument: Louisiana v. Callais | Case No. 24-109 | Date Argued: 3/24/25Case Info: Louisiana v. Callais | Case No. 24-109 | Date Argued: 3/24/25

     Link to Docket: Here.

     Background:

     Over the State's strenuous objections, the Middle District of Louisiana held, Robinson v. Ardoin, 605 F. Supp. 3d 759 (M.D. La. 2022)-and the Fifth Circuit affirmed, Robinson v. Ardoin, 86 F.4th 574 (5th Cir. 2023)-that Louisiana likely violated Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act (VRA) by failing to create a second majority-Black congressional district. The Fifth Circuit gave the Legislature a small window of time to adopt its own remedial plan, or else the State would have to go to trial, which would almost certainly end in the Middle District imposing its own preferred map. Rather than acquiesce in the Middle District's preferences, the Legislature reclaimed its sovereign redistricting pen and passed S.B. 8, which created a second majority-Black district as the courts demanded, protected the Legislature's sovereign prerogatives, and achieved its political goals. In this case, a majority of a three-judge court sitting in the Western District of Louisiana enjoined S.B. 8 as an unconstitutional racial gerrymander.

     Questions Presented:

     1. Did the majority err in finding that race predominated in the Legislature's enactment of S.B. 8?
     2. Did the majority err in finding that S.B. 8 fails strict scrutiny?
     3. Did the majority err in subjecting S.B. 8 to the Gingles preconditions?
     4. Is this action non-justiciable?
     
     

     Host Note: Consolidated with Robinson V. Callais (Case No. 24-110)

     Oral Advocates:

     • For Appellant in 24-109: J. Benjamin Aguiñaga, Solicitor General, Baton Rouge, La.
     • For Appellants in 24-110: Stuart C. Naifeh, New York, N.Y.
     • For Appellees: Edward D. Greim, Kansas City, Mo.
     
     ]]>Case Info: Louisiana v. Callais | Case No. 24-109 | Date Argued: 3/24/25

     Link to Docket: Here.

     Background:

     Over the State's strenuous objections, the Middle District of Louisiana held, Robinson v. Ardoin, 605 F. Supp. 3d 759 (M.D. La. 2022)-and the Fifth Circuit affirmed, Robinson v. Ardoin, 86 F.4th 574 (5th Cir. 2023)-that Louisiana likely violated Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act (VRA) by failing to create a second majority-Black congressional district. The Fifth Circuit gave the Legislature a small window of time to adopt its own remedial plan, or else the State would have to go to trial, which would almost certainly end in the Middle District imposing its own preferred map. Rather than acquiesce in the Middle District's preferences, the Legislature reclaimed its sovereign redistricting pen and passed S.B. 8, which created a second majority-Black district as the courts demanded, protected the Legislature's sovereign prerogatives, and achieved its political goals. In this case, a majority of a three-judge court sitting in the Western District of Louisiana enjoined S.B. 8 as an unconstitutional racial gerrymander.

     Questions Presented:

     1. Did the majority err in finding that race predominated in the Legislature's enactment of S.B. 8?
     2. Did the majority err in finding that S.B. 8 fails strict scrutiny?
     3. Did the majority err in subjecting S.B. 8 to the Gingles preconditions?
     4. Is this action non-justiciable?
     
     

     Host Note: Consolidated with Robinson V. Callais (Case No. 24-110)

     Oral Advocates:

     • For Appellant in 24-109: J. Benjamin Aguiñaga, Solicitor General, Baton Rouge, La.
     • For Appellants in 24-110: Stuart C. Naifeh, New York, N.Y.
     • For Appellees: Edward D. Greim, Kansas City, Mo.
     
     ]]>daf44d66-729d-4c2b-8515-7ff87e003407Mon, 24 Mar 2025 09:00:00 -040001:19:03falsefull202444442024Oral Argument: Riley v. Bondi, Att'y Gen. | Case No. 23-1270 | Date Argued: 3/24/25Case Info: Riley v. Bondi, Att'y Gen. | Case No. 23-1270 | Date Argued: 3/24/25

     Link to Docket: Here.

     Background:

     Petitioner Pierre Riley, ineligible for cancellation of removal or discretionary relief from removal, sought deferral in withholding-only proceedings, pursuant to the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment. After the Board of Immigration Appeals issued a decision reversing an immigration judge's grant of relief, Riley promptly petitioned for review by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. Although both parties urged the court to decide the merits of the case, the Fourth Circuit dismissed Riley's petition for lack of jurisdiction pursuant to 8 U.S.C. 1252(b)(1), which states "[t]he petition for review must be filed not later than 30 days after the date of the final order of removal."

     This holding implicates two circuit splits, each of which independently warrants review.

     Questions Presented:

     1. Whether 8 U.S.C. 1252(b)(1)'s 30-day deadline is jurisdictional, or merely a mandatory claims-processing rule that can be waived or forfeited.
     2. Whether a person can obtain review of the BIA's decision in a withholding-only proceeding by filing a petition within 30 days of that BIA decision?
     
     

     Oral Advocates:

     • For petitioner: Keith Bradley, Denver, Colo.
     • For respondent in support of petitioner: Ephraim McDowell, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.
     • For Court-appointed amicus curiae in support of the judgment below: Stephen J. Hammer, Dallas, Tex.
     
     ]]>Case Info: Riley v. Bondi, Att'y Gen. | Case No. 23-1270 | Date Argued: 3/24/25

     Link to Docket: Here.

     Background:

     Petitioner Pierre Riley, ineligible for cancellation of removal or discretionary relief from removal, sought deferral in withholding-only proceedings, pursuant to the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment. After the Board of Immigration Appeals issued a decision reversing an immigration judge's grant of relief, Riley promptly petitioned for review by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. Although both parties urged the court to decide the merits of the case, the Fourth Circuit dismissed Riley's petition for lack of jurisdiction pursuant to 8 U.S.C. 1252(b)(1), which states "[t]he petition for review must be filed not later than 30 days after the date of the final order of removal."

     This holding implicates two circuit splits, each of which independently warrants review.

     Questions Presented:

     1. Whether 8 U.S.C. 1252(b)(1)'s 30-day deadline is jurisdictional, or merely a mandatory claims-processing rule that can be waived or forfeited.
     2. Whether a person can obtain review of the BIA's decision in a withholding-only proceeding by filing a petition within 30 days of that BIA decision?
     
     

     Oral Advocates:

     • For petitioner: Keith Bradley, Denver, Colo.
     • For respondent in support of petitioner: Ephraim McDowell, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.
     • For Court-appointed amicus curiae in support of the judgment below: Stephen J. Hammer, Dallas, Tex.
     
     ]]>f737361d-96af-41ee-bde4-c6b84ad91828Mon, 24 Mar 2025 09:00:00 -040056:42falsefull202443432024Opinion Summary: Delligatti v. United States | Date Decided: 3/21/25 | Case No. 23-825Case Info: Delligatti v. United States | Date Decided: 3/21/25 | Case No. 23-825

     Link to Docket: Here.

     Question Presented: Whether a crime that requires proof of bodily injury or death, but can be  committed by failing to take action, has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force.

     Holding: The knowing or intentional causation of injury or death, whether by act or omission, necessarily involves the “use” of “physical force” against another person within the meaning of §924(c)(3)(A).

     Result: Affirmed.

     Voting Breakdown: Justice Thomas delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Alito, Sotomayor, Kagan, Kavanaugh, and Barrett joined.  Justice Gorsuch filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Jackson joined.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     • For petitioner: Allon Kedem, Washington, D. C.
     • For respondent: Eric J. Feigin, Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C.
     
     

     Website Link to Oral Argument: Here.

     Apple Podcast Link to Oral Argument: Here.

     ]]>Case Info: Delligatti v. United States | Date Decided: 3/21/25 | Case No. 23-825

     Link to Docket: Here.

     Question Presented: Whether a crime that requires proof of bodily injury or death, but can be  committed by failing to take action, has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force.

     Holding: The knowing or intentional causation of injury or death, whether by act or omission, necessarily involves the “use” of “physical force” against another person within the meaning of §924(c)(3)(A).

     Result: Affirmed.

     Voting Breakdown: Justice Thomas delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Alito, Sotomayor, Kagan, Kavanaugh, and Barrett joined.  Justice Gorsuch filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Jackson joined.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     • For petitioner: Allon Kedem, Washington, D. C.
     • For respondent: Eric J. Feigin, Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C.
     
     

     Website Link to Oral Argument: Here.

     Apple Podcast Link to Oral Argument: Here.

     ]]>400e3007-9c45-47a8-a7db-9d52c9c22673Fri, 21 Mar 2025 09:00:00 -040010:41falsefull20241151152024Opinion Summary: Thompson v. United States | Date Decided: 3/21/25 | Case No. 23-1095Case Info: Thompson v. United States | Date Decided: 3/21/25 | Case No. 23-1095

     Link to Docket: Here.

     Question Presented: Whether 18 U.S.C. § 1014, which prohibits making a "false statement" for the purpose of influencing certain financial institutions and federal agencies, also prohibits making a statement that is misleading but not false.

     Holding: 18 U.S.C. § 1014, which prohibits “knowingly mak[ing] any false state­ment,” does not criminalize statements that are misleading but not false.

     Result: Vacated and remanded.

     Voting Breakdown: Chief Justice Roberts delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Justices Alito and Jackson each filed concurring opinions.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     • For petitioner: Chris C. Gair, Chicago, Ill.
     • For respondent: Caroline A. Flynn, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C.
     
     

     Website Link to Oral Argument: Here.

     Apple Podcast Link to Oral Argument: Here.

     ]]>Case Info: Thompson v. United States | Date Decided: 3/21/25 | Case No. 23-1095

     Link to Docket: Here.

     Question Presented: Whether 18 U.S.C. § 1014, which prohibits making a "false statement" for the purpose of influencing certain financial institutions and federal agencies, also prohibits making a statement that is misleading but not false.

     Holding: 18 U.S.C. § 1014, which prohibits “knowingly mak[ing] any false state­ment,” does not criminalize statements that are misleading but not false.

     Result: Vacated and remanded.

     Voting Breakdown: Chief Justice Roberts delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Justices Alito and Jackson each filed concurring opinions.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     • For petitioner: Chris C. Gair, Chicago, Ill.
     • For respondent: Caroline A. Flynn, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C.
     
     

     Website Link to Oral Argument: Here.

     Apple Podcast Link to Oral Argument: Here.

     ]]>e1d0d311-6b70-449d-8371-37fd4ebcc213Fri, 21 Mar 2025 09:00:00 -040010:51falsefull20241141142024Truck Insurance Exchange v. Kaiser Gypsum Co. | Case No. 22-1079 | Date Argued: 3/19/24 | Date Decided: 6/6/24Truck Insurance Exchange v. Kaiser Gypsum Co. | Case No. 22-1079 | Date Argued: 3/19/24 | Date Decided: 6/6/24

     Link to Docket: Here.

     Background:

     Asbestos claims in state court have been plagued by rampant fraud, with claimants seeking inflated recoveries against some asbestos defendants by suppressing evidence of claims against other asbestos defendants. For nearly a decade, bankruptcy courts have sought to protect debtors and their insurers by requiring fraud-prevention measures-like ensuring access to claims information-before channeling the asbestos claims against the debtor to a trust. See 11 U.S.C. § 524(g). In this case, a Chapter 11 debtor colluded with representatives for asbestos claimants to propose and confirm a plan that includes these fraud-prevention measures only for uninsured asbestos claims-not insured asbestos claims. Petitioner is the insurer who bears the financial burden of those 14,000 insured claims. The Bankruptcy Code's plain text empowers any "party in interest" to "raise" and "be heard on any issue" in a Chapter 11 proceeding. 11 U.S.C. § 1109(b). But the court of appeals refused to adjudicate Petitioner's objections to the fraud and collusion, relying on judge-made limitations engrafted onto the Code.

     Question Presented: Whether an insurer with financial responsibility for a bankruptcy claim is a "party in interest" that may object to a Chapter 11 plan of reorganization.

     Holding: An insurer with financial responsibility for bankruptcy claims is a "party in interest" under 11 U.S.C. § 1109(b) that "may raise and may appear and be heard on any issue" in a Chapter 11 case.

     Result: Reversed and remanded.

     Voting Breakdown: 8-0. Justice Sotomayor delivered the opinion of the Court, in which all other Members joined, except Justice Alito, who took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     • For Petitioner: Allyson N. Ho, Dallas, Tex.; and Anthony A. Yang, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. (for United States, as Amicus Curiae.)
     • For debtor Respondents: C. Kevin Marshall, Washington, D.C.
     • For claimant Respondents: David C. Frederick, Washington, D.C.
     
     ]]>Truck Insurance Exchange v. Kaiser Gypsum Co. | Case No. 22-1079 | Date Argued: 3/19/24 | Date Decided: 6/6/24

     Link to Docket: Here.

     Background:

     Asbestos claims in state court have been plagued by rampant fraud, with claimants seeking inflated recoveries against some asbestos defendants by suppressing evidence of claims against other asbestos defendants. For nearly a decade, bankruptcy courts have sought to protect debtors and their insurers by requiring fraud-prevention measures-like ensuring access to claims information-before channeling the asbestos claims against the debtor to a trust. See 11 U.S.C. § 524(g). In this case, a Chapter 11 debtor colluded with representatives for asbestos claimants to propose and confirm a plan that includes these fraud-prevention measures only for uninsured asbestos claims-not insured asbestos claims. Petitioner is the insurer who bears the financial burden of those 14,000 insured claims. The Bankruptcy Code's plain text empowers any "party in interest" to "raise" and "be heard on any issue" in a Chapter 11 proceeding. 11 U.S.C. § 1109(b). But the court of appeals refused to adjudicate Petitioner's objections to the fraud and collusion, relying on judge-made limitations engrafted onto the Code.

     Question Presented: Whether an insurer with financial responsibility for a bankruptcy claim is a "party in interest" that may object to a Chapter 11 plan of reorganization.

     Holding: An insurer with financial responsibility for bankruptcy claims is a "party in interest" under 11 U.S.C. § 1109(b) that "may raise and may appear and be heard on any issue" in a Chapter 11 case.

     Result: Reversed and remanded.

     Voting Breakdown: 8-0. Justice Sotomayor delivered the opinion of the Court, in which all other Members joined, except Justice Alito, who took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     • For Petitioner: Allyson N. Ho, Dallas, Tex.; and Anthony A. Yang, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. (for United States, as Amicus Curiae.)
     • For debtor Respondents: C. Kevin Marshall, Washington, D.C.
     • For claimant Respondents: David C. Frederick, Washington, D.C.
     
     ]]>adab3c6c-6d48-43f6-ba6b-ea56b1a00a14Wed, 19 Mar 2025 09:00:00 -040001:12:11falsefull202348482023Opinion Summary: Bufkin v. Collins | Date Decided: 3/5/25 | Case No. 23-713Case Info: Bufkin v. Collins | Date Decided: 3/5/25 | Case No. 23-713

     Link to Docket: Here.

     Question Presented: Must the Veterans Court ensure that the benefit-of-the-doubt rule was properly applied during the claims process in order to satisfy 38  U.S.C. § 7261(b)(1), which directs the Veterans Court to "take due account" of VA's  application of that rule?

     Holding: The VA’s determination that the evidence regarding a service-re­lated disability claim is in “approximate balance” is a predominantly factual determination reviewed only for clear error.

     Result: Affirmed.

     Voting Breakdown: Justice Thomas delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Alito, Sotomayor, Kagan, Kavanaugh, and Barrett joined.  Justice Jackson filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Gorsuch joined.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     • For petitioners: Melanie L. Bostwick, Washington, D. C.
     • For respondent: Sopan Joshi, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C.
     
     

     Website Link to Oral Argument: Here.

     Apple Podcast Link to Oral Argument: Here.

     ]]>Case Info: Bufkin v. Collins | Date Decided: 3/5/25 | Case No. 23-713

     Link to Docket: Here.

     Question Presented: Must the Veterans Court ensure that the benefit-of-the-doubt rule was properly applied during the claims process in order to satisfy 38  U.S.C. § 7261(b)(1), which directs the Veterans Court to "take due account" of VA's  application of that rule?

     Holding: The VA’s determination that the evidence regarding a service-re­lated disability claim is in “approximate balance” is a predominantly factual determination reviewed only for clear error.

     Result: Affirmed.

     Voting Breakdown: Justice Thomas delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Alito, Sotomayor, Kagan, Kavanaugh, and Barrett joined.  Justice Jackson filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Gorsuch joined.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     • For petitioners: Melanie L. Bostwick, Washington, D. C.
     • For respondent: Sopan Joshi, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C.
     
     

     Website Link to Oral Argument: Here.

     Apple Podcast Link to Oral Argument: Here.

     ]]>95b5e6b8-d00a-4740-be74-621fa547a4ccWed, 05 Mar 2025 09:00:00 -040012:04falsefull20241091092024Oral Argument: NRC v. Texas | Case No. 23-1300 | Date Argued: 3/5/25Case Info: NRC v. Texas | Case No. 23-1300 | Date Argued: 3/5/25

     Link to Docket: Here.

     Questions Presented:

     1. Whether the Hobbs Act, 28 U.S.C. 2341 et seq., which authorizes a "party aggrieved" by an agency's "final order" to petition for review in a court of appeals, 28 U.S.C. 2344, allows nonparties to obtain review of claims asserting that an agency order exceeds the agency's statutory authority.
     2. Whether the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, 42 U.S.C. 2011 et seq., and the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982, 42 U.S.C. 10101 et seq., permit the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to license private entities to temporarily store spent nuclear fuel away from the nuclear-reactor sites where the spent fuel was generated.
     3. (For Interim Storage Partners, LLC) Whether the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's exercise of authority to issue a license to a private party to temporarily possess spent nuclear fuel at a location away from an operating nuclear power reactor was lawful under the applicable statutes (as the D.C. and Tenth Circuits have held) or not (as the Fifth Circuit, deliberately splitting from those other circuits, held in this case).
     4. Whether, notwithstanding an allegation of "ultra vires" agency action, a person must take steps to become a "party" to an agency proceeding under the Hobbs Act, 28 U.S.C. 2344, in order to then subsequently challenge the agency action resulting from that proceeding in court (as the Second, Seventh, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits have held), or whether an allegation of "ultra vires" agency action can override statutory limitations on jurisdiction (as the Fifth Circuit, deliberately splitting from those other circuits, held in this case).
     
     

     Host Note: Consolidated with: Interim Storage Partners, LLC V. Texas, Case No. 23-1312.

     Holding: Because Texas and Fasken were not parties to the Commission's licensing proceeding, they are not entitled to obtain judicial review of the Commission's licensing decision.

     Result: Reversed and remanded.

     Voting Breakdown: 6-3. Justice Kavanaugh delivered the opinion of the court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Sotomayor, Kagan, Barrett and Jackson joined. Justice Gorsuch filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Thomas and Alito joined.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     • For petitioners in 23-1300: Malcolm L. Stewart, Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C.
     • For petitioner in 23-1312: Brad Fagg, Washington, D. C.
     • For respondents Texas, et al.: Aaron L. Nielson, Solicitor General, Austin, Tex.
     • For respondent Fasken Land and Minerals, Ltd.: David C. Frederick, Washington, D.C.
     
     ]]>Case Info: NRC v. Texas | Case No. 23-1300 | Date Argued: 3/5/25

     Link to Docket: Here.

     Questions Presented:

     1. Whether the Hobbs Act, 28 U.S.C. 2341 et seq., which authorizes a "party aggrieved" by an agency's "final order" to petition for review in a court of appeals, 28 U.S.C. 2344, allows nonparties to obtain review of claims asserting that an agency order exceeds the agency's statutory authority.
     2. Whether the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, 42 U.S.C. 2011 et seq., and the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982, 42 U.S.C. 10101 et seq., permit the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to license private entities to temporarily store spent nuclear fuel away from the nuclear-reactor sites where the spent fuel was generated.
     3. (For Interim Storage Partners, LLC) Whether the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's exercise of authority to issue a license to a private party to temporarily possess spent nuclear fuel at a location away from an operating nuclear power reactor was lawful under the applicable statutes (as the D.C. and Tenth Circuits have held) or not (as the Fifth Circuit, deliberately splitting from those other circuits, held in this case).
     4. Whether, notwithstanding an allegation of "ultra vires" agency action, a person must take steps to become a "party" to an agency proceeding under the Hobbs Act, 28 U.S.C. 2344, in order to then subsequently challenge the agency action resulting from that proceeding in court (as the Second, Seventh, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits have held), or whether an allegation of "ultra vires" agency action can override statutory limitations on jurisdiction (as the Fifth Circuit, deliberately splitting from those other circuits, held in this case).
     
     

     Host Note: Consolidated with: Interim Storage Partners, LLC V. Texas, Case No. 23-1312.

     Holding: Because Texas and Fasken were not parties to the Commission's licensing proceeding, they are not entitled to obtain judicial review of the Commission's licensing decision.

     Result: Reversed and remanded.

     Voting Breakdown: 6-3. Justice Kavanaugh delivered the opinion of the court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Sotomayor, Kagan, Barrett and Jackson joined. Justice Gorsuch filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Thomas and Alito joined.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     • For petitioners in 23-1300: Malcolm L. Stewart, Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C.
     • For petitioner in 23-1312: Brad Fagg, Washington, D. C.
     • For respondents Texas, et al.: Aaron L. Nielson, Solicitor General, Austin, Tex.
     • For respondent Fasken Land and Minerals, Ltd.: David C. Frederick, Washington, D.C.
     
     ]]>b9462400-7448-4dc0-b6d6-cad50c3ce3e3Wed, 05 Mar 2025 09:00:00 -040001:35:50falsefull202442422024Opinion Summary: San Francisco v. EPA | Date Decided: 3/4/25 | Case No. 23-753Case Info: San Francisco v. EPA | Date Decided: 3/4/25 | Case No. 23-753

     Link to Docket: Here.

     Question Presented: Whether the Clean Water Act allows EPA (or an authorized state) to impose  generic prohibitions in National Pollutant Discharge Elimination  System (NPDES) permits that subject permit holders to enforcement for exceedances of water quality standards without identifying specific limits to which their  discharges must conform.

     Holding: Section 1311(b)(1)(C) does not authorize the EPA to include “end­ result” provisions in NPDES permits. Determining what steps a per­mittee must take to ensure that water quality standards are met is the EPA’s responsibility, and Congress has given it the tools needed to make that determination.

     Result: Reversed and remanded.

     Voting Breakdown: Justice Alito delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas and Kavanaugh joined.  Justice Gorsuch joined as to all but Part II.  Justices Sotomayor, Kagan, Barrett, and Jackson joined as to Part II. Justice Barrett filed an opinion dissent­ing in part, in which Justices Sotomayor, Kagan, and Jackson joined.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     • For petitioner: Tara M. Steeley, Deputy City Attorney, San Francisco, Cal.
     • For respondent: Frederick Liu, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C
     
     

     Website Link to Oral Argument: Here.

     Apple Podcast Link to Oral Argument: Here.

     ]]>Case Info: San Francisco v. EPA | Date Decided: 3/4/25 | Case No. 23-753

     Link to Docket: Here.

     Question Presented: Whether the Clean Water Act allows EPA (or an authorized state) to impose  generic prohibitions in National Pollutant Discharge Elimination  System (NPDES) permits that subject permit holders to enforcement for exceedances of water quality standards without identifying specific limits to which their  discharges must conform.

     Holding: Section 1311(b)(1)(C) does not authorize the EPA to include “end­ result” provisions in NPDES permits. Determining what steps a per­mittee must take to ensure that water quality standards are met is the EPA’s responsibility, and Congress has given it the tools needed to make that determination.

     Result: Reversed and remanded.

     Voting Breakdown: Justice Alito delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas and Kavanaugh joined.  Justice Gorsuch joined as to all but Part II.  Justices Sotomayor, Kagan, Barrett, and Jackson joined as to Part II. Justice Barrett filed an opinion dissent­ing in part, in which Justices Sotomayor, Kagan, and Jackson joined.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     • For petitioner: Tara M. Steeley, Deputy City Attorney, San Francisco, Cal.
     • For respondent: Frederick Liu, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C
     
     

     Website Link to Oral Argument: Here.

     Apple Podcast Link to Oral Argument: Here.

     ]]>53abefc7-8f74-4faa-9457-dd77f40b2625Tue, 04 Mar 2025 09:00:00 -040013:56falsefull20241081082024Oral Argument: Smith & Wesson Brands v. Estados Unidos Mexicanos | Case No. 23-1141 | Date Argued: 3/4/25Case Info: Smith & Wesson Brands v. Estados Unidos Mexicanos | Case No. 23-1141 | Date Argued: 3/4/25

     Link to Docket: Here.

     Background:

     The Mexican Government sued leading members of the American firearms industry, seeking to hold them liable for harms inflicted by Mexican drug cartels. According to Mexico, America's firearms companies have engaged in a series of business practices for decades-from selling semi-automatic rifles, to making magazines that hold over ten rounds, to failing to impose various sales restrictions-that have created a supply of firearms later smuggled across the border and ultimately used by the cartels to commit crimes. Mexico asks for billions of dollars in damages, plus extensive injunctive relief imposing new gun-control measures in the United States. The district court dismissed the case under the Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act (PLCAA), which generally bars suits against firearms companies based on criminals misusing their products. But the First Circuit reversed. It held that PLCAA does not bar this suit because Mexico stated a claim that defendants' business practices have aided and abetted firearms trafficking to the cartels, proximately harming the Mexican government.

     Questions Presented:

     1. Whether the production and sale of firearms in the United States is the "proximate cause" of alleged injuries to the Mexican government stemming from violence committed by drug cartels in Mexico.
     2. Whether the production and sale of firearms in the United States amounts to "aiding and abetting" illegal firearms trafficking because firearms companies allegedly know that some of their products are unlawfully trafficked.
     
     

     Holding: Because Mexico’s complaint does not plausibly allege that the defendant gun manufacturers aided and abetted gun dealers’ unlawful sales of firearms to Mexican traffickers, PLCAA bars the lawsuit.

     Result: Reversed and remanded.

     Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Kagan delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Justice Thomas and Justice Jackson each filed concurring opinions.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     • For petitioners: Noel J. Francisco, Washington, D.C.
     • For respondent: Catherine E. Stetson, Washington, D.C.
     
     ]]>Case Info: Smith & Wesson Brands v. Estados Unidos Mexicanos | Case No. 23-1141 | Date Argued: 3/4/25

     Link to Docket: Here.

     Background:

     The Mexican Government sued leading members of the American firearms industry, seeking to hold them liable for harms inflicted by Mexican drug cartels. According to Mexico, America's firearms companies have engaged in a series of business practices for decades-from selling semi-automatic rifles, to making magazines that hold over ten rounds, to failing to impose various sales restrictions-that have created a supply of firearms later smuggled across the border and ultimately used by the cartels to commit crimes. Mexico asks for billions of dollars in damages, plus extensive injunctive relief imposing new gun-control measures in the United States. The district court dismissed the case under the Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act (PLCAA), which generally bars suits against firearms companies based on criminals misusing their products. But the First Circuit reversed. It held that PLCAA does not bar this suit because Mexico stated a claim that defendants' business practices have aided and abetted firearms trafficking to the cartels, proximately harming the Mexican government.

     Questions Presented:

     1. Whether the production and sale of firearms in the United States is the "proximate cause" of alleged injuries to the Mexican government stemming from violence committed by drug cartels in Mexico.
     2. Whether the production and sale of firearms in the United States amounts to "aiding and abetting" illegal firearms trafficking because firearms companies allegedly know that some of their products are unlawfully trafficked.
     
     

     Holding: Because Mexico’s complaint does not plausibly allege that the defendant gun manufacturers aided and abetted gun dealers’ unlawful sales of firearms to Mexican traffickers, PLCAA bars the lawsuit.

     Result: Reversed and remanded.

     Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Kagan delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Justice Thomas and Justice Jackson each filed concurring opinions.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     • For petitioners: Noel J. Francisco, Washington, D.C.
     • For respondent: Catherine E. Stetson, Washington, D.C.
     
     ]]>216844fc-2b55-45c1-8788-6d09b126100eTue, 04 Mar 2025 09:00:00 -040001:31:09falsefull202441412024Oral Argument: BLOM Bank SAL v. Honickman | Case No. 23-1259 | Date Argued: 3/3/25Case Info: BLOM Bank SAL v. Honickman | Case No. 23-1259 | Date Argued: 3/3/25

     Link to Docket: Here.

     Background:

     For more than 70 years, this Court has "required a movant seeking relief under Rule 60(b)(6)" of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure "to show 'extraordinary circumstances' justifying the reopening of a final judgment." Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 U.S. 524, 535 (2005) (quoting Ackermann v. United States, 340 U.S. 193, 199 (1950)). This Court has also stressed that a movant must be "faultless" to obtain relief. Pioneer Inv. Servs. v. Brunswick Assocs. Ltd. P'ship, 507 U.S. 380, 393 (1993). "This very strict interpretation of Rule 60(b) is essential if the finality of judgments is to be preserved." Gonzalez, 545 U.S. at 535 (cleaned up).

     In this case, Respondents declined multiple invitations and opportunities to amend their complaint. The District Court then dismissed their complaint with prejudice, and the Second Circuit affirmed. Only then did Respondents move to vacate the judgment so they could file an amended complaint.

     The District Court denied the motion under Rule 60(b)(6)'s well-settled standard. But the Second Circuit reversed, based on an unprecedented "balanc[ing]" test that requires district courts to consider Rule 15(a)'s "liberal pleading principles" when addressing a Rule 60 (b)(6) motion to reopen a judgment for the purpose of filing an amended complaint.

     Question Presented: Whether Rule 60(b)(6)'s stringent standard applies to a post-judgment request to vacate for the purpose of filing an amended complaint.

     Holding: Relief under Rule 60(b)(6) requires extraordinary circumstances, and this standard does not become less demanding when the movant seeks to reopen a case to amend a complaint. A party must first satisfy Rule 60(b) before Rule 15(a)’s liberal amendment standard can apply.

     Result: Reversed and remanded.

     Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Thomas delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Robers and Justices Alito, Sotomayor, Kagan, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, Kavanaugh and Barrett joined and in which Justice Jackson joined in all parts but Part III. Justice Jackson filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judg¬ment.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     • For petitioner: Michael H. McGinley, Washington, D. C.
     • For respondents: Michael J. Radine, Hackensack, N.J.
     
     

     Website Link to Opinion Summary: Here.

     Apple Podcast Link to Opinion Summary: Here.

     ]]>Case Info: BLOM Bank SAL v. Honickman | Case No. 23-1259 | Date Argued: 3/3/25

     Link to Docket: Here.

     Background:

     For more than 70 years, this Court has "required a movant seeking relief under Rule 60(b)(6)" of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure "to show 'extraordinary circumstances' justifying the reopening of a final judgment." Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 U.S. 524, 535 (2005) (quoting Ackermann v. United States, 340 U.S. 193, 199 (1950)). This Court has also stressed that a movant must be "faultless" to obtain relief. Pioneer Inv. Servs. v. Brunswick Assocs. Ltd. P'ship, 507 U.S. 380, 393 (1993). "This very strict interpretation of Rule 60(b) is essential if the finality of judgments is to be preserved." Gonzalez, 545 U.S. at 535 (cleaned up).

     In this case, Respondents declined multiple invitations and opportunities to amend their complaint. The District Court then dismissed their complaint with prejudice, and the Second Circuit affirmed. Only then did Respondents move to vacate the judgment so they could file an amended complaint.

     The District Court denied the motion under Rule 60(b)(6)'s well-settled standard. But the Second Circuit reversed, based on an unprecedented "balanc[ing]" test that requires district courts to consider Rule 15(a)'s "liberal pleading principles" when addressing a Rule 60 (b)(6) motion to reopen a judgment for the purpose of filing an amended complaint.

     Question Presented: Whether Rule 60(b)(6)'s stringent standard applies to a post-judgment request to vacate for the purpose of filing an amended complaint.

     Holding: Relief under Rule 60(b)(6) requires extraordinary circumstances, and this standard does not become less demanding when the movant seeks to reopen a case to amend a complaint. A party must first satisfy Rule 60(b) before Rule 15(a)’s liberal amendment standard can apply.

     Result: Reversed and remanded.

     Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Thomas delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Robers and Justices Alito, Sotomayor, Kagan, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, Kavanaugh and Barrett joined and in which Justice Jackson joined in all parts but Part III. Justice Jackson filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judg¬ment.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     • For petitioner: Michael H. McGinley, Washington, D. C.
     • For respondents: Michael J. Radine, Hackensack, N.J.
     
     

     Website Link to Opinion Summary: Here.

     Apple Podcast Link to Opinion Summary: Here.

     ]]>698f50a6-bec0-4708-949a-6a891d47ede4Mon, 03 Mar 2025 09:00:00 -040052:42falsefull202440402024Oral Argument: CC/Devas Ltd. v. Antrix Corp. Ltd. | Case No. 23-1201 | Date Argued: 3/3/25Case Info: CC/Devas Ltd. v. Antrix Corp. Ltd. | Case No. 23-1201 | Date Argued: 3/3/25

     Link to Docket: Here.

     Questions Presented:

     1. Whether plaintiffs must prove minimum contacts before federal courts may assert personal jurisdiction over foreign states sued under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act.
     2. The question presented in Antrix Corp. Ltd. is: Under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, "[p]ersonal jurisdiction over a foreign state shall exist as to every claim for relief over which the district courts have jurisdiction under subsection (a) where service has been made under section 1608 of this title." 28 U.S.C. § 1330(b).
     
     

     Holding: Personal jurisdiction exists under the FSIA when an immunity exception applies and service is proper. The FSIA does not require proof of “minimum contacts” over and above the contacts already required by the Act’s enumerated exceptions to foreign sovereign immunity.

     Result: Reversed and remanded.

     Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Alito delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     • For petitioner in 24-17: Aaron Streett, Houston, Tex.
     • For petitioners in 23-1201: Matthew D. McGill, Washington, D.C.
     • For United States, as amicus curiae supporting petitioners: Sarah M. Harris, Acting Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C.
     • For respondents: Carter G. Phillips, Washington, D.C.
     
     

     Website Link to Opinion Summary: Here.

     Apple Podcast Link to Opinion Summary: Here.

     ]]>Case Info: CC/Devas Ltd. v. Antrix Corp. Ltd. | Case No. 23-1201 | Date Argued: 3/3/25

     Link to Docket: Here.

     Questions Presented:

     1. Whether plaintiffs must prove minimum contacts before federal courts may assert personal jurisdiction over foreign states sued under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act.
     2. The question presented in Antrix Corp. Ltd. is: Under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, "[p]ersonal jurisdiction over a foreign state shall exist as to every claim for relief over which the district courts have jurisdiction under subsection (a) where service has been made under section 1608 of this title." 28 U.S.C. § 1330(b).
     
     

     Holding: Personal jurisdiction exists under the FSIA when an immunity exception applies and service is proper. The FSIA does not require proof of “minimum contacts” over and above the contacts already required by the Act’s enumerated exceptions to foreign sovereign immunity.

     Result: Reversed and remanded.

     Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Alito delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     • For petitioner in 24-17: Aaron Streett, Houston, Tex.
     • For petitioners in 23-1201: Matthew D. McGill, Washington, D.C.
     • For United States, as amicus curiae supporting petitioners: Sarah M. Harris, Acting Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C.
     • For respondents: Carter G. Phillips, Washington, D.C.
     
     

     Website Link to Opinion Summary: Here.

     Apple Podcast Link to Opinion Summary: Here.

     ]]>c15a3e77-9e52-4d84-a6fe-afb9476eb228Mon, 03 Mar 2025 09:00:00 -040049:24falsefull202439392024Opinion Summary: Waetzig v. Halliburton Energy Services, Inc. | Date Decided: 2/26/25 | Case No. 23-971Case Info: Waetzig v. Halliburton Energy Services, Inc. | Date Decided: 2/26/25 | Case No. 23-971

     Link to Docket: Here.

     Question Presented: Whether a Rule 41 voluntary dismissal without prejudice is a "final judgment, order, or proceeding" under Rule 60(b).

     Holding: A case voluntarily dismissed without prejudice under Rule 41(a) counts as a “final proceeding” under Rule 60(b).

     Result: Reversed and remanded.

     Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Alito delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. No justice filed a concurring or dissenting opinion.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     • For petitioner: Vincent Levy, New York, N. Y.
     • For respondent: Matthew D. McGill, Washington, D. C.
     
     

     Website Link to Oral Argument: Here.

     Podcast Link to Oral Argument: Here.

     ]]>Case Info: Waetzig v. Halliburton Energy Services, Inc. | Date Decided: 2/26/25 | Case No. 23-971

     Link to Docket: Here.

     Question Presented: Whether a Rule 41 voluntary dismissal without prejudice is a "final judgment, order, or proceeding" under Rule 60(b).

     Holding: A case voluntarily dismissed without prejudice under Rule 41(a) counts as a “final proceeding” under Rule 60(b).

     Result: Reversed and remanded.

     Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Alito delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. No justice filed a concurring or dissenting opinion.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     • For petitioner: Vincent Levy, New York, N. Y.
     • For respondent: Matthew D. McGill, Washington, D. C.
     
     

     Website Link to Oral Argument: Here.

     Podcast Link to Oral Argument: Here.

     ]]>81c52f66-c5a7-4ee1-9c3e-954e7b4af643Wed, 26 Feb 2025 09:00:00 -040006:27falsefull20241281282024Opinion Summary: Dewberry Group, Inc. v. Dewberry Engineers Inc. | Date Decided: 2/26/25 | Case No. 23-900Case Info: Dewberry Group, Inc. v. Dewberry Engineers Inc. | Date Decided: 2/26/25 | Case No. 23-900

     Link to Docket: Here.

     Question Presented: Whether an award of the "defendant's profits" under the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a), can include an order for the defendant to disgorge the distinct profits of legally separate non-party corporate affiliates.

     Holding: In awarding the “defendant’s profits” to the prevailing plaintiff in a trademark infringement suit under the Lanham Act, §1117(a), a court can award only profits ascribable to the “defendant” itself. And the term “defendant” bears its usual legal meaning: the party against whom relief or recovery is sought—here, Dewberry Group. The Engi­neers chose not to add the Group’s affiliates as defendants. Accord­ingly, the affiliates’ profits are not the (statutorily disgorgable) “de­fendant’s profits” as ordinarily understood.

     Result: Vacated and remanded.

     Voting Breakdown: Justice Kagan delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Justice Sotomayor filed a concurring opinion.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     • For petitioner: Thomas G. Hungar, Washington, D. C.
     • For United States, as amicus curiae: Nicholas S. Crown, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C.
     • For respondent: Elbert Lin, Richmond, Va.
     
     

     Website Link to Oral Argument: Here.

     Apple Podcast Link to Oral Argument: Here.

     ]]>Case Info: Dewberry Group, Inc. v. Dewberry Engineers Inc. | Date Decided: 2/26/25 | Case No. 23-900

     Link to Docket: Here.

     Question Presented: Whether an award of the "defendant's profits" under the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a), can include an order for the defendant to disgorge the distinct profits of legally separate non-party corporate affiliates.

     Holding: In awarding the “defendant’s profits” to the prevailing plaintiff in a trademark infringement suit under the Lanham Act, §1117(a), a court can award only profits ascribable to the “defendant” itself. And the term “defendant” bears its usual legal meaning: the party against whom relief or recovery is sought—here, Dewberry Group. The Engi­neers chose not to add the Group’s affiliates as defendants. Accord­ingly, the affiliates’ profits are not the (statutorily disgorgable) “de­fendant’s profits” as ordinarily understood.

     Result: Vacated and remanded.

     Voting Breakdown: Justice Kagan delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Justice Sotomayor filed a concurring opinion.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     • For petitioner: Thomas G. Hungar, Washington, D. C.
     • For United States, as amicus curiae: Nicholas S. Crown, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C.
     • For respondent: Elbert Lin, Richmond, Va.
     
     

     Website Link to Oral Argument: Here.

     Apple Podcast Link to Oral Argument: Here.

     ]]>08490752-7ecc-410e-815a-5fd3837075c7Wed, 26 Feb 2025 09:00:00 -040010:21falsefull20241241242024Oral Argument: Ames v. OH Dept. of Youth Services | Case No. 23-1039 | Date Argued: 2/26/25Case Info: Ames v. OH Dept. of Youth Services | Case No. 23-1039 | Date Argued: 2/26/25

     Link to Docket: Here.

     Question Presented: Whether, in addition to pleading the other elements of Title VII, a majority-group plaintiff must show "background circumstances to support the suspicion that the defendant is that unusual employer who discriminates against the majority."

     Holding: The Sixth Circuit’s “background circumstances” rule—which requires members of a majority group to satisfy a heightened evidentiary standard to prevail on a Title VII claim—cannot be squared with the text of Title VII or the Court’s precedents.

     Result: Vacated and remanded.

     Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Jackson delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Justice Thomas filed a concurring opinion, in which Justice Gorsuch joined.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     • For petitioner: Xiao Wang, Charlottesville, Va.; and Ashley Robertson, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C. (for United States, as amicus curiae.)
     • For respondent: T. Elliot Gaiser, Solicitor General, Columbus, Ohio.
     
     

     Website Link to Opinion Summary: Here.

     Apple Podcast Link to Opinion Summary: Here.

     ]]>Case Info: Ames v. OH Dept. of Youth Services | Case No. 23-1039 | Date Argued: 2/26/25

     Link to Docket: Here.

     Question Presented: Whether, in addition to pleading the other elements of Title VII, a majority-group plaintiff must show "background circumstances to support the suspicion that the defendant is that unusual employer who discriminates against the majority."

     Holding: The Sixth Circuit’s “background circumstances” rule—which requires members of a majority group to satisfy a heightened evidentiary standard to prevail on a Title VII claim—cannot be squared with the text of Title VII or the Court’s precedents.

     Result: Vacated and remanded.

     Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Jackson delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Justice Thomas filed a concurring opinion, in which Justice Gorsuch joined.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     • For petitioner: Xiao Wang, Charlottesville, Va.; and Ashley Robertson, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C. (for United States, as amicus curiae.)
     • For respondent: T. Elliot Gaiser, Solicitor General, Columbus, Ohio.
     
     

     Website Link to Opinion Summary: Here.

     Apple Podcast Link to Opinion Summary: Here.

     ]]>55d75b1d-5399-4e01-870c-501714b9ca32Wed, 26 Feb 2025 09:00:00 -040054:56falsefull202438382024Opinion Summary: Glossip v. Oklahoma | Date Decided: 2/25/25 | Case No. 22-7466Case Info: Glossip v. Oklahoma | Date Decided: 2/25/25 | Case No. 22-7466

     Link to Docket: Here.

     Questions Presented:

     1. Whether the State's suppression of the key prosecution witness's admission he was under the care of a psychiatrist and failure to correct that witness's false testimony about that care and related diagnosis violate the due process of law.
     2. Whether the entirety of the suppressed evidence must be considered when  assessing the materiality of  Brady and Napue claims.
     3. Whether due process of law requires reversal, where a capital conviction  is so infected with errors that the State no longer seeks to defend it.
     
     

     Holdings:

     1. This Court has jurisdiction to review the OCCA’s judgment.
     2. The prosecution violated its constitutional obligation to correct false testimony.
     
     

     Result: Reversed and remanded.

     Voting Breakdown: Justice Sotomayor delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Kagan, Kavanaugh, and Jackson joined and in which Justice Barrett joined as to Part II. Justice Barrett filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part.  Justice Thomas filed a dissenting opinion in which Justice Alito joined and in which Justice Barrett joined as to Parts IV– A–1, IV–A–2, and IV–A–3. Justice Gorsuch took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     • For petitioner: Seth P. Waxman, Washington, D. C.
     • For respondent in support of petitioner: Paul D. Clement, Alexandria, Va.
     • For Court-appointed amicus curiae in support of judgment below: Christopher G. Michel, Washington, D. C.
     
     

     Website Link to Oral Argument: Here.

     Apple Podcast Link to Oral Argument: Here.

     ]]>Case Info: Glossip v. Oklahoma | Date Decided: 2/25/25 | Case No. 22-7466

     Link to Docket: Here.

     Questions Presented:

     1. Whether the State's suppression of the key prosecution witness's admission he was under the care of a psychiatrist and failure to correct that witness's false testimony about that care and related diagnosis violate the due process of law.
     2. Whether the entirety of the suppressed evidence must be considered when  assessing the materiality of  Brady and Napue claims.
     3. Whether due process of law requires reversal, where a capital conviction  is so infected with errors that the State no longer seeks to defend it.
     
     

     Holdings:

     1. This Court has jurisdiction to review the OCCA’s judgment.
     2. The prosecution violated its constitutional obligation to correct false testimony.
     
     

     Result: Reversed and remanded.

     Voting Breakdown: Justice Sotomayor delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Kagan, Kavanaugh, and Jackson joined and in which Justice Barrett joined as to Part II. Justice Barrett filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part.  Justice Thomas filed a dissenting opinion in which Justice Alito joined and in which Justice Barrett joined as to Parts IV– A–1, IV–A–2, and IV–A–3. Justice Gorsuch took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     • For petitioner: Seth P. Waxman, Washington, D. C.
     • For respondent in support of petitioner: Paul D. Clement, Alexandria, Va.
     • For Court-appointed amicus curiae in support of judgment below: Christopher G. Michel, Washington, D. C.
     
     

     Website Link to Oral Argument: Here.

     Apple Podcast Link to Oral Argument: Here.

     ]]>90d90bc9-bc1f-4f28-88a7-3229bf72c429Tue, 25 Feb 2025 09:00:00 -040023:27falsefull20241051052024Opinion Summary: Lackey v. Stinnie | Date Decided: 2/25/25 | Case No. 23-621Case Info: Lackey v. Stinnie | Date Decided: 2/25/25 | Case No. 23-621

     Link to Docket: Here.

     Questions Presented:

     1. Whether a party must obtain a ruling that conclusively decides the merits in its favor, as opposed to merely predicting a likelihood of later success, to prevail on the merits under 42 U.S.C. § 1988.
     2. Whether a party must obtain an enduring change in the parties' legal relationship from a judicial act, as opposed to a non-judicial event that moots the case, to prevail under 42 U.S.C. § 1988.
     
     

     Holding: The plaintiff drivers here—who gained only preliminary injunctive relief before this action became moot—do not qualify as “prevailing part[ies]” eligible for attorney’s fees under §1988(b) because no court conclusively resolved their claims by granting enduring judicial relief on the merits that materially altered the legal relationship between the parties.

     Result: Reversed and remanded.

     Voting Breakdown: Chief Justice Roberts delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Justices Thomas, Alito, Kagan, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, and Barrett joined.  Justice Jackson filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Sotomayor joined.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     • For petitioner: Erika L. Maley, Solicitor General, Richmond, Va.; and Anthony A. Yang, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C. (for United States, as amicus curiae.)
     • For respondents: Brian D. Schmalzbach, Richmond, Va.
     
     

     Website Link to Oral Argument: Here.

     Apple Podcast Link to Oral Argument: Here.

     ]]>Case Info: Lackey v. Stinnie | Date Decided: 2/25/25 | Case No. 23-621

     Link to Docket: Here.

     Questions Presented:

     1. Whether a party must obtain a ruling that conclusively decides the merits in its favor, as opposed to merely predicting a likelihood of later success, to prevail on the merits under 42 U.S.C. § 1988.
     2. Whether a party must obtain an enduring change in the parties' legal relationship from a judicial act, as opposed to a non-judicial event that moots the case, to prevail under 42 U.S.C. § 1988.
     
     

     Holding: The plaintiff drivers here—who gained only preliminary injunctive relief before this action became moot—do not qualify as “prevailing part[ies]” eligible for attorney’s fees under §1988(b) because no court conclusively resolved their claims by granting enduring judicial relief on the merits that materially altered the legal relationship between the parties.

     Result: Reversed and remanded.

     Voting Breakdown: Chief Justice Roberts delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Justices Thomas, Alito, Kagan, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, and Barrett joined.  Justice Jackson filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Sotomayor joined.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     • For petitioner: Erika L. Maley, Solicitor General, Richmond, Va.; and Anthony A. Yang, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C. (for United States, as amicus curiae.)
     • For respondents: Brian D. Schmalzbach, Richmond, Va.
     
     

     Website Link to Oral Argument: Here.

     Apple Podcast Link to Oral Argument: Here.

     ]]>c208f77d-5be9-4dbe-b5df-0d9c53b42977Tue, 25 Feb 2025 09:00:00 -040011:21falsefull20241031032024Oral Argument: Esteras v. United States | Case No. 23-7483 | Date Argued: 2/25/25Case Info: Esteras v. United States | Case No. 23-7483 | Date Argued: 2/25/25

     Link to Docket: Here.

     Background:

     The supervised-release statute, 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e), lists factors from 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) for a court to consider when sentencing a person for violating a supervised release condition. In that list, Congress omitted the factors set forth in section 3553(a)(2)(A)-the need for the sentence to reflect the seriousness of the offense, promote respect for the law, and provide just punishment for the offense.

     Question Presented: Even though Congress excluded section 3553(a)(2)(A) from section 3583(e)'s list of factors to consider when revoking supervised release, may a district court rely on the section 3553(a)(2)(A) factors when revoking supervised release?

     Oral Advocates:

     • For Petitioners: Christian J. Grostic, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Cleveland, Ohio.
     • For Respondent: Masha G. Hansford, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.
     
     ]]>Case Info: Esteras v. United States | Case No. 23-7483 | Date Argued: 2/25/25

     Link to Docket: Here.

     Background:

     The supervised-release statute, 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e), lists factors from 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) for a court to consider when sentencing a person for violating a supervised release condition. In that list, Congress omitted the factors set forth in section 3553(a)(2)(A)-the need for the sentence to reflect the seriousness of the offense, promote respect for the law, and provide just punishment for the offense.

     Question Presented: Even though Congress excluded section 3553(a)(2)(A) from section 3583(e)'s list of factors to consider when revoking supervised release, may a district court rely on the section 3553(a)(2)(A) factors when revoking supervised release?

     Oral Advocates:

     • For Petitioners: Christian J. Grostic, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Cleveland, Ohio.
     • For Respondent: Masha G. Hansford, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.
     
     ]]>a611ee9c-df1c-4cb9-bc97-0aaae3b5ee5cTue, 25 Feb 2025 09:00:00 -040001:15:29falsefull202437372024Oral Argument: Perttu v. Richards | Case No. 23-1324 | Date Argued: 2/25/25Case Info: Perttu v. Richards | Case No. 23-1324 | Date Argued: 2/25/25

     Link to Docket: Here.

     Question Presented: In cases subject to the Prison Litigation Reform Act, do prisoners have a right to a jury trial concerning their exhaustion of administrative remedies where disputed facts regarding exhaustion are intertwined with the underlying merits of their claim?

     Oral Advocates:

     • For petitioner: Ann M. Sherman, Solicitor General, Lansing, Mich.
     • For respondent: Lori Alvino McGill, Charlottesville, Va.
     
     ]]>Case Info: Perttu v. Richards | Case No. 23-1324 | Date Argued: 2/25/25

     Link to Docket: Here.

     Question Presented: In cases subject to the Prison Litigation Reform Act, do prisoners have a right to a jury trial concerning their exhaustion of administrative remedies where disputed facts regarding exhaustion are intertwined with the underlying merits of their claim?

     Oral Advocates:

     • For petitioner: Ann M. Sherman, Solicitor General, Lansing, Mich.
     • For respondent: Lori Alvino McGill, Charlottesville, Va.
     
     ]]>9dd68955-e63e-4fb5-bbda-60f1c603fa47Tue, 25 Feb 2025 09:00:00 -040001:16:16falsefull202436362024Oral Argument: Gutierrez v. Saenz | Case No. 23-7809 | Date Argued: 2/24/25Case Info: Gutierrez v. Saenz | Case No. 23-7809 | Date Argued: 2/24/25

     Link to Docket: Here.

     Background:

     In Reed v. Goertz, 598 U.S. 230 (2023), this Court held that Rodney Reed has standing to pursue a declaratory judgment that Texas's post-conviction DNA statute was unconstitutional because ''Reed suffered an injury in fact," the named defendant "caused Reed's injury," and if a federal court concludes that Texas's statute violates due process, it is "substantially likely that the state prosecutor would abide by such a court order."

     In this case, a divided panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit refused to follow that ruling over a dissent that recognized that this case was indistinguishable from Reed. The majority formulated its own novel test for Article III standing, which requires scouring the record of the parties' dispute and any legal arguments asserted, to predict whether the defendants in a particular case would actually redress the plaintiff’s injury by complying with a federal court's declaratory judgment. Gutierrez v. Saenz, 93 F.4th 267, 274 (5th Cir. 2024).

     The Fifth Circuit's new test conflicts with Reed and creates a circuit split with the United States Courts of Appeals for the Eighth and Ninth Circuits, which have applied the standing doctrine exactly as this Court directed in Reed. See Johnson v. Griffin, 69 F.4th 506 (8th Cir. 2023); Redd v. Guerrero, 84 F.4th 874 (9th Cir. 2023).

     Question Presented: Does Article III standing require a particularized determination of whether a specific state official will redress the plaintiff’s injury by following a favorable declaratory judgment?

     Holding: Gutierrez has standing to bring his Section 1983 claim challenging Texas's postconviction DNA testing procedures under the Due Process Clause.

     Result: Reversed and remanded.

     Voting Breakdown: 6-3. Justice Sotomayor delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Kagan, Kavanaugh, and Jackson joined, and in which Justice Barrett joined as to all but Part II.B.2. Justice Barrett filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment. Justice Thomas filed a dissenting opinion. Justice Alito filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Thomas and Gorsuch joined.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     • For petitioner: Anne E. Fisher, Assistant Federal Defender, Philadelphia, Pa.
     • For respondents: William F. Cole, Deputy Solicitor General, Austin, Tex.
     
     ]]>Case Info: Gutierrez v. Saenz | Case No. 23-7809 | Date Argued: 2/24/25

     Link to Docket: Here.

     Background:

     In Reed v. Goertz, 598 U.S. 230 (2023), this Court held that Rodney Reed has standing to pursue a declaratory judgment that Texas's post-conviction DNA statute was unconstitutional because ''Reed suffered an injury in fact," the named defendant "caused Reed's injury," and if a federal court concludes that Texas's statute violates due process, it is "substantially likely that the state prosecutor would abide by such a court order."

     In this case, a divided panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit refused to follow that ruling over a dissent that recognized that this case was indistinguishable from Reed. The majority formulated its own novel test for Article III standing, which requires scouring the record of the parties' dispute and any legal arguments asserted, to predict whether the defendants in a particular case would actually redress the plaintiff’s injury by complying with a federal court's declaratory judgment. Gutierrez v. Saenz, 93 F.4th 267, 274 (5th Cir. 2024).

     The Fifth Circuit's new test conflicts with Reed and creates a circuit split with the United States Courts of Appeals for the Eighth and Ninth Circuits, which have applied the standing doctrine exactly as this Court directed in Reed. See Johnson v. Griffin, 69 F.4th 506 (8th Cir. 2023); Redd v. Guerrero, 84 F.4th 874 (9th Cir. 2023).

     Question Presented: Does Article III standing require a particularized determination of whether a specific state official will redress the plaintiff’s injury by following a favorable declaratory judgment?

     Holding: Gutierrez has standing to bring his Section 1983 claim challenging Texas's postconviction DNA testing procedures under the Due Process Clause.

     Result: Reversed and remanded.

     Voting Breakdown: 6-3. Justice Sotomayor delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Kagan, Kavanaugh, and Jackson joined, and in which Justice Barrett joined as to all but Part II.B.2. Justice Barrett filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment. Justice Thomas filed a dissenting opinion. Justice Alito filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Thomas and Gorsuch joined.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     • For petitioner: Anne E. Fisher, Assistant Federal Defender, Philadelphia, Pa.
     • For respondents: William F. Cole, Deputy Solicitor General, Austin, Tex.
     
     ]]>457e9dfb-f2c8-49d4-ae84-43f0f89b6da7Mon, 24 Feb 2025 09:00:00 -040001:34:30falsefull202435352024Opinion Summary: Hungary v. Simon | Date Decided: 2/21/25 | Case No. 23-867Case Info: Hungary v. Simon | Date Decided: 2/21/25 | Case No. 23-867

     Link to Docket: Here.

     Questions Presented:

     1. Whether historical commingling of assets suffices to establish that  proceeds of seized property have a commercial nexus with the United States under the  expropriation exception to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act.
     2. Whether a plaintiff must make out a valid claim that an exception to the  Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act applies at the pleading stage, rather than merely raising a plausible inference.
     3. Whether a sovereign defendant bears the burden of producing evidence to  affirmatively disprove that the proceeds of property taken in violation of international law  have a commercial nexus with the United States under the expropriation exception to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act.
     
     

     Holding: Alleging commingling of funds alone cannot satisfy the commercial nexus requirement of the FSIA’s expropriation exception.

     Result: Vacated and remanded.

     Voting Breakdown: Justice Sotomayor delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     • For petitioners: Joshua S. Glasgow, Buffalo, N. Y.; and Sopan Joshi, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C. (for United States, as amicus curiae.)
     • For respondents: Shay Dvoretzky, Washington, D. C.
     
     

     Website Link to Oral Argument: Here.

     Apple Podcast Link to Oral Argument: Here.

     ]]>Case Info: Hungary v. Simon | Date Decided: 2/21/25 | Case No. 23-867

     Link to Docket: Here.

     Questions Presented:

     1. Whether historical commingling of assets suffices to establish that  proceeds of seized property have a commercial nexus with the United States under the  expropriation exception to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act.
     2. Whether a plaintiff must make out a valid claim that an exception to the  Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act applies at the pleading stage, rather than merely raising a plausible inference.
     3. Whether a sovereign defendant bears the burden of producing evidence to  affirmatively disprove that the proceeds of property taken in violation of international law  have a commercial nexus with the United States under the expropriation exception to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act.
     
     

     Holding: Alleging commingling of funds alone cannot satisfy the commercial nexus requirement of the FSIA’s expropriation exception.

     Result: Vacated and remanded.

     Voting Breakdown: Justice Sotomayor delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     • For petitioners: Joshua S. Glasgow, Buffalo, N. Y.; and Sopan Joshi, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C. (for United States, as amicus curiae.)
     • For respondents: Shay Dvoretzky, Washington, D. C.
     
     

     Website Link to Oral Argument: Here.

     Apple Podcast Link to Oral Argument: Here.

     ]]>c1284294-dcee-40ea-afa4-9b550d2603a6Fri, 21 Feb 2025 09:00:00 -040011:42falsefull20241191192024Opinion Summary: Wisconsin Bell, Inc. v. United States ex rel. Heath | Date Decided: 2/21/25 | Case No. 23-1127Case Info: Wisconsin Bell, Inc. v. United States ex rel. Heath | Date Decided: 2/21/25 | Case No. 23-1127

     Link to Docket: Here.

     Question Presented: Whether reimbursement requests submitted to the E-rate program are "claims" under the False Claims Act.

     Holding: The E-Rate reimbursement requests at issue are “claims” under the False Claims Act because the Government “provided” (at a minimum) a “por­tion” of the money applied for by transferring more than $100 million from the Treasury into the Fund.

     Result: Affirmed and remanded.

     Voting Breakdown: Justice Kagan delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Justice Thomas filed a concurring opinion, in which Justice Kavanaugh joined, and in which Justice Alito joined as to Part I. Justice Kavanaugh filed a concurring opinion, in which Justice Thomas joined.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     • For petitioner: Allyson N. Ho, Dallas, Tex.
     • For respondent: Tejinder Singh, Washington, D. C.; and Vivek Suri, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C. (for United States, as amicus curiae.)
     
     

     Website Link to Oral Argument: Here.

     Apple Podcast Link to Oral Argument: Here.

     ]]>Case Info: Wisconsin Bell, Inc. v. United States ex rel. Heath | Date Decided: 2/21/25 | Case No. 23-1127

     Link to Docket: Here.

     Question Presented: Whether reimbursement requests submitted to the E-rate program are "claims" under the False Claims Act.

     Holding: The E-Rate reimbursement requests at issue are “claims” under the False Claims Act because the Government “provided” (at a minimum) a “por­tion” of the money applied for by transferring more than $100 million from the Treasury into the Fund.

     Result: Affirmed and remanded.

     Voting Breakdown: Justice Kagan delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Justice Thomas filed a concurring opinion, in which Justice Kavanaugh joined, and in which Justice Alito joined as to Part I. Justice Kavanaugh filed a concurring opinion, in which Justice Thomas joined.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     • For petitioner: Allyson N. Ho, Dallas, Tex.
     • For respondent: Tejinder Singh, Washington, D. C.; and Vivek Suri, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C. (for United States, as amicus curiae.)
     
     

     Website Link to Oral Argument: Here.

     Apple Podcast Link to Oral Argument: Here.

     ]]>9335015f-16f9-451d-9ebd-bd0d74ba79c5Fri, 21 Feb 2025 09:00:00 -040010:08falsefull20241101102024Opinion Summary: Williams v. Reed | Date Decided: 2/21/25 | Case No. 23-191Case Info: Williams v. Reed | Date Decided: 2/21/25 | Case No. 23-191

     Link to Docket: Here.

     Question Presented: Whether exhaustion of state administrative remedies is required to bring claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in state court.

     Holding: Where a state court’s application of a state exhaustion require­ment in effect immunizes state officials from §1983 claims challenging delays in the administrative process, state courts may not deny those §1983 claims on failure-to-exhaust grounds.

     Result: Reversed and remanded.

     Voting Result: Justice Kavanaugh delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Sotomayor, Kagan, and Jackson joined. Justice Thomas filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Alito, Gorsuch and Barrett joined as to Part II.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     • For petitioners: Adam G. Unikowsky, Washington, D. C.
     • For respondent: Edmund G. LaCour, Jr., Solicitor General, Montgomery, Ala.
     
     

     Website Link to Oral Argument: Here.

     Apple Podcast Link to Oral Argument: Here.

     ]]>Case Info: Williams v. Reed | Date Decided: 2/21/25 | Case No. 23-191

     Link to Docket: Here.

     Question Presented: Whether exhaustion of state administrative remedies is required to bring claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in state court.

     Holding: Where a state court’s application of a state exhaustion require­ment in effect immunizes state officials from §1983 claims challenging delays in the administrative process, state courts may not deny those §1983 claims on failure-to-exhaust grounds.

     Result: Reversed and remanded.

     Voting Result: Justice Kavanaugh delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Sotomayor, Kagan, and Jackson joined. Justice Thomas filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Alito, Gorsuch and Barrett joined as to Part II.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     • For petitioners: Adam G. Unikowsky, Washington, D. C.
     • For respondent: Edmund G. LaCour, Jr., Solicitor General, Montgomery, Ala.
     
     

     Website Link to Oral Argument: Here.

     Apple Podcast Link to Oral Argument: Here.

     ]]>f16130b0-b01a-49ca-a339-03dbbbba9171Fri, 21 Feb 2025 09:00:00 -040007:35falsefull20241011012024Oral Argument: Barnes v. Felix | Case No. 23-1239 | Date Argued: 1/22/25Case Info: Barnes v. Felix | Case No. 23-1239 | Date Argued: 1/22/25 | Date Decided: 5/15/25

     Link to Docket: Here.

     Background:

     The Fourth Amendment prohibits a police officer from using "unreasonable" force. U.S. Const. amend. IV. In Graham v. Connor, this Court held that reasonableness depends on "the totality of the circumstances." 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989) (quotation marks omitted). But four circuits-the Second, Fourth, Fifth, and Eighth-cabin Graham. Those circuits evaluate whether a Fourth Amendment violation occurred under the "moment of the threat doctrine," which evaluates the reasonableness of an officer's actions only in the narrow window when the officer's safety was threatened, and not based on events that precede the moment of the threat. In contrast, eight circuits-the First, Third, Sixth, Seventh, Ninth, Tenth, Eleventh, and D.C. Circuits-reject the moment of the threat doctrine and follow the totality of the circumstances approach, including evaluating the officer's actions leading up to the use of force.

     In the decision below, Judge Higginbotham concurred in his own majority opinion, explaining that the minority approach "lessens the Fourth Amendment's protection of the American public" and calling on this Court "to resolve the circuit divide over the application of a doctrine deployed daily across this country." Pet. App. 10a-16a (Higginbotham, J., concurring).

     Question Presented: Whether courts should apply the moment of the threat doctrine when evaluating an excessive force claim under the Fourth Amendment.

     Holding: A claim that a law enforcement officer used excessive force during a stop or arrest is analyzed under the Fourth Amendment, which re­quires that the force deployed be objectively reasonable from the per­spective of a reasonable officer at the scene. The inquiry into the reasonableness of police force re­quires analyzing the totality of the circumstances. That analysis demands careful attention to the facts and circum­stances relating to the incident. Most notable here, the totality of the circumstances inquiry has no time limit.

     Result: Vacated and remanded.

     Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Kagan delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Justice Kavanaugh filed a concurring opinion, in which Justices Thomas, Alito, and Barrett joined.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Website Link to Opinion Summary: Here.

     Apple Podcast Link to Opinion Summary: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     • For petitioner: Nathaniel A.G. Zelinsky, Washington, D. C.; and Zoe A. Jacoby, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C. (for United States, as amicus curiae.)
     • For respondents: Charles L. McCloud, Washington, D. C.; and Lanora C. Pettit, Principal Deputy Solicitor General, Austin, Tex. (for Texas, et al., as amici curiae.)
     
     ]]>Case Info: Barnes v. Felix | Case No. 23-1239 | Date Argued: 1/22/25 | Date Decided: 5/15/25

     Link to Docket: Here.

     Background:

     The Fourth Amendment prohibits a police officer from using "unreasonable" force. U.S. Const. amend. IV. In Graham v. Connor, this Court held that reasonableness depends on "the totality of the circumstances." 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989) (quotation marks omitted). But four circuits-the Second, Fourth, Fifth, and Eighth-cabin Graham. Those circuits evaluate whether a Fourth Amendment violation occurred under the "moment of the threat doctrine," which evaluates the reasonableness of an officer's actions only in the narrow window when the officer's safety was threatened, and not based on events that precede the moment of the threat. In contrast, eight circuits-the First, Third, Sixth, Seventh, Ninth, Tenth, Eleventh, and D.C. Circuits-reject the moment of the threat doctrine and follow the totality of the circumstances approach, including evaluating the officer's actions leading up to the use of force.

     In the decision below, Judge Higginbotham concurred in his own majority opinion, explaining that the minority approach "lessens the Fourth Amendment's protection of the American public" and calling on this Court "to resolve the circuit divide over the application of a doctrine deployed daily across this country." Pet. App. 10a-16a (Higginbotham, J., concurring).

     Question Presented: Whether courts should apply the moment of the threat doctrine when evaluating an excessive force claim under the Fourth Amendment.

     Holding: A claim that a law enforcement officer used excessive force during a stop or arrest is analyzed under the Fourth Amendment, which re­quires that the force deployed be objectively reasonable from the per­spective of a reasonable officer at the scene. The inquiry into the reasonableness of police force re­quires analyzing the totality of the circumstances. That analysis demands careful attention to the facts and circum­stances relating to the incident. Most notable here, the totality of the circumstances inquiry has no time limit.

     Result: Vacated and remanded.

     Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Kagan delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Justice Kavanaugh filed a concurring opinion, in which Justices Thomas, Alito, and Barrett joined.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Website Link to Opinion Summary: Here.

     Apple Podcast Link to Opinion Summary: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     • For petitioner: Nathaniel A.G. Zelinsky, Washington, D. C.; and Zoe A. Jacoby, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C. (for United States, as amicus curiae.)
     • For respondents: Charles L. McCloud, Washington, D. C.; and Lanora C. Pettit, Principal Deputy Solicitor General, Austin, Tex. (for Texas, et al., as amici curiae.)
     
     ]]>b5ccbf30-78d2-4306-8ede-db7aca532b0dWed, 22 Jan 2025 09:00:00 -040001:15:57falsefull202434342024Oral Argument: Cunningham v. Cornell University | Case No. 23-1007 | Date Argued: 1/22/25Case Info: Cunningham v. Cornell University | Case No. 23-1007 | Date Argued: 1/22/25

     Link to Docket: Here.

     Background:

     The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA"), 29 U.S.C. § 1106(a)(1) (C), prohibits a plan fiduciary from "engag[ing] in a transaction, if he knows or should know that such transaction constitutes a direct or indirect furnishing of goods, services, or facilities between the plan and a party in interest." The statute elsewhere defines "party in interest" broadly to include a variety of parties that may contract with or provide services to a plan. See 29 U.S.C. § 1002(14)(B).

     The Eighth and Ninth Circuits have applied the Seventh, and Tenth Circuits have, on the other hand, required plaintiffs to allege additional elements to state a claim, because a "literal reading" of 29 U.S.C. § 1106(a)(1)(C) would purportedly produce "results that are inconsistent with ERISA's statutory purpose." Albert v. Oshkosh Corp., 47 F.4th 570, 585 (7th Cir. 2022).

     Question Presented: Whether a plaintiff can state a claim by alleging that a plan fiduciary engaged in a transaction constituting a furnishing of goods, services, or facilities between the plan and a party in interest, as proscribed by 29 U.S.C. § 1106(a)(1)(C), or whether a plaintiff must plead and prove additional elements and facts not contained in the provision's text.

     Holding: To state a claim under §1106(a)(1)(C), a plaintiff need only plausi­bly allege the elements contained in that provision itself, without ad­dressing potential §1108 exemptions.

     Result: Reversed and remanded.

     Voting Breakdown: Justice Sotomayor delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Justice Alito filed a concurring opinion, in which Justice Thomas and Justice Kavanaugh joined.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Advocates:

     • For petitioners: Xiao Wang, Charlottesville, Va.; and Yaira Dubin, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. (for United States, as amicus curiae.)
     • For respondents: Nicole A. Saharsky, Washington, D.C.
     
     

     Website Link to Opinion Summary: Here.

     Apple Podcast Link to Opinion Summary: Here.

     ]]>Case Info: Cunningham v. Cornell University | Case No. 23-1007 | Date Argued: 1/22/25

     Link to Docket: Here.

     Background:

     The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA"), 29 U.S.C. § 1106(a)(1) (C), prohibits a plan fiduciary from "engag[ing] in a transaction, if he knows or should know that such transaction constitutes a direct or indirect furnishing of goods, services, or facilities between the plan and a party in interest." The statute elsewhere defines "party in interest" broadly to include a variety of parties that may contract with or provide services to a plan. See 29 U.S.C. § 1002(14)(B).

     The Eighth and Ninth Circuits have applied the Seventh, and Tenth Circuits have, on the other hand, required plaintiffs to allege additional elements to state a claim, because a "literal reading" of 29 U.S.C. § 1106(a)(1)(C) would purportedly produce "results that are inconsistent with ERISA's statutory purpose." Albert v. Oshkosh Corp., 47 F.4th 570, 585 (7th Cir. 2022).

     Question Presented: Whether a plaintiff can state a claim by alleging that a plan fiduciary engaged in a transaction constituting a furnishing of goods, services, or facilities between the plan and a party in interest, as proscribed by 29 U.S.C. § 1106(a)(1)(C), or whether a plaintiff must plead and prove additional elements and facts not contained in the provision's text.

     Holding: To state a claim under §1106(a)(1)(C), a plaintiff need only plausi­bly allege the elements contained in that provision itself, without ad­dressing potential §1108 exemptions.

     Result: Reversed and remanded.

     Voting Breakdown: Justice Sotomayor delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Justice Alito filed a concurring opinion, in which Justice Thomas and Justice Kavanaugh joined.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Advocates:

     • For petitioners: Xiao Wang, Charlottesville, Va.; and Yaira Dubin, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. (for United States, as amicus curiae.)
     • For respondents: Nicole A. Saharsky, Washington, D.C.
     
     

     Website Link to Opinion Summary: Here.

     Apple Podcast Link to Opinion Summary: Here.

     ]]>2288cb04-7fbc-4dda-9256-193aea969cf3Wed, 22 Jan 2025 09:00:00 -040001:30:44falsefull202433332024Oral Argument: McLaughlin Chiropractic Assoc. v. McKesson Corp. | Case No. 23-1226 | Date Argued: 1/21/25Case Info: McLaughlin Chiropractic Assoc. v. McKesson Corp. | Case No. 23-1226 | Date Argued: 1/21/25

     Link to Docket: Here.

     Question Presented: Whether the Hobbs Act required the district court in this case to accept the FCC's legal interpretation of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act.

     Holding: The Hobbs Act does not bind district courts in civil enforcement proceedings to an agency's interpretation of a statute. District courts must independently determine the law's meaning under ordinary principles of statutory interpretation while affording appropriate respect to the agency's interpretation.

     Result: Reversed and remanded.

     Voting Breakdown: 6-3. Justice Kavanaugh delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Alito, Gorsuch and Barrett joined. Justice Kagan filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Sotomayor and Jackson joined.

     Oral Advocates:

     • For Petitioner: Matthew W.H. Wessler, Washington, D.C.
     • For Respondents: Joseph R. Palmore, Washington, D.C.; and Matthew Guarnieri, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. (for United States, as amicus curiae.)
     
     ]]>Case Info: McLaughlin Chiropractic Assoc. v. McKesson Corp. | Case No. 23-1226 | Date Argued: 1/21/25

     Link to Docket: Here.

     Question Presented: Whether the Hobbs Act required the district court in this case to accept the FCC's legal interpretation of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act.

     Holding: The Hobbs Act does not bind district courts in civil enforcement proceedings to an agency's interpretation of a statute. District courts must independently determine the law's meaning under ordinary principles of statutory interpretation while affording appropriate respect to the agency's interpretation.

     Result: Reversed and remanded.

     Voting Breakdown: 6-3. Justice Kavanaugh delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Alito, Gorsuch and Barrett joined. Justice Kagan filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Sotomayor and Jackson joined.

     Oral Advocates:

     • For Petitioner: Matthew W.H. Wessler, Washington, D.C.
     • For Respondents: Joseph R. Palmore, Washington, D.C.; and Matthew Guarnieri, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. (for United States, as amicus curiae.)
     
     ]]>70923f9d-e931-4117-8060-ac588380dc0aTue, 21 Jan 2025 09:00:00 -040001:13:53falsefull202432322024Oral Argument: FDA v. R.J. Reynolds Vapor Co. | Case No. 23-1187 | Date Argued: 1/21/25Case Info: FDA v. R.J. Reynolds Vapor Co. | Case No. 23-1187 | Date Argued: 1/21/25

     Link to Docket: Here.

     Background:

     The Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act, Pub. L. No. 111-31, Div. A, 123 Stat. 1776, requires a person to obtain authorization from the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) before introducing a new tobacco product into interstate commerce. If FDA denies an application for authorization, "any person adversely affected by such * * * denial may file a petition for judicial review of such * * * denial with the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia or for the circuit in which such person resides or has their principal place of business." 21 U.S.C. 387l(a)(l). The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has determined that a manufacturer may seek judicial review in that circuit even if it neither resides nor has its principal place of business there, so long as its petition is joined by a seller of its products, such as a gas station or convenience store, based in the circuit.

     Question Presented: Whether a manufacturer may file a petition for review in a circuit (other than the D.C. Circuit) where it neither resides nor has its principal place of business, if the petition is joined by a seller of the manufacturer's products that is located within that circuit.

     Holding: Retailers who would sell a new tobacco product if not for the FDA's denial order may seek judicial review of that order under § 387l(a)(1).

     Result: Affirmed and remanded.

     Voting Breakdown: 7-2. Justice Barrett delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Alito, Kagan, Gorsuch and Kavanaugh joined. Justice Jackson filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Sotomayor joined.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     • For Petitioners: Vivek Suri, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.
     • For Respondents: Ryan J. Watson, Washington, D.C.
     
     ]]>Case Info: FDA v. R.J. Reynolds Vapor Co. | Case No. 23-1187 | Date Argued: 1/21/25

     Link to Docket: Here.

     Background:

     The Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act, Pub. L. No. 111-31, Div. A, 123 Stat. 1776, requires a person to obtain authorization from the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) before introducing a new tobacco product into interstate commerce. If FDA denies an application for authorization, "any person adversely affected by such * * * denial may file a petition for judicial review of such * * * denial with the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia or for the circuit in which such person resides or has their principal place of business." 21 U.S.C. 387l(a)(l). The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has determined that a manufacturer may seek judicial review in that circuit even if it neither resides nor has its principal place of business there, so long as its petition is joined by a seller of its products, such as a gas station or convenience store, based in the circuit.

     Question Presented: Whether a manufacturer may file a petition for review in a circuit (other than the D.C. Circuit) where it neither resides nor has its principal place of business, if the petition is joined by a seller of the manufacturer's products that is located within that circuit.

     Holding: Retailers who would sell a new tobacco product if not for the FDA's denial order may seek judicial review of that order under § 387l(a)(1).

     Result: Affirmed and remanded.

     Voting Breakdown: 7-2. Justice Barrett delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Alito, Kagan, Gorsuch and Kavanaugh joined. Justice Jackson filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Sotomayor joined.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     • For Petitioners: Vivek Suri, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.
     • For Respondents: Ryan J. Watson, Washington, D.C.
     
     ]]>775a913a-fdc3-4b54-96eb-d6eb38c1ff13Tue, 21 Jan 2025 09:00:00 -040001:12:11falsefull202431312024Opinion Summary: TikTok Inc. v. Garland | Date Decided: 1/17/25 | Case No. 24–656Case Info: TikTok Inc. v. Garland | Date Decided: 1/17/25 | Case No. 24–656

     Link to Docket: Here.

     Question Presented: Whether the Protecting Americans from Foreign Adversary Controlled Applications Act, as applied to Petitioners, violates the First Amendment.

     Holding: The challenged provisions do not violate petitioners’ First Amendment rights.

     Result: Affirmed.

     Voting Breakdown: The Supreme Court wrote a Per Curiam unanimous opinion. Justice Sotomayor wrote an opinion that concurred in part and concurred in the judgment. Justice Gorsuch wrote an opinion that concurred in the judgment.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     • For petitioners TikTok Inc., et al.: Noel J. Francisco, Washington, D. C.
     • For petitioners Firebaugh, et al.: Jeffrey L. Fisher, Melo Park, Cal.
     • For respondent: Elizabeth B. Prelogar, Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C.
     
     

     Website Link to Oral Argument: Here.

     Apple Podcast Link to Oral Argument: Here.

     ]]>Case Info: TikTok Inc. v. Garland | Date Decided: 1/17/25 | Case No. 24–656

     Link to Docket: Here.

     Question Presented: Whether the Protecting Americans from Foreign Adversary Controlled Applications Act, as applied to Petitioners, violates the First Amendment.

     Holding: The challenged provisions do not violate petitioners’ First Amendment rights.

     Result: Affirmed.

     Voting Breakdown: The Supreme Court wrote a Per Curiam unanimous opinion. Justice Sotomayor wrote an opinion that concurred in part and concurred in the judgment. Justice Gorsuch wrote an opinion that concurred in the judgment.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     • For petitioners TikTok Inc., et al.: Noel J. Francisco, Washington, D. C.
     • For petitioners Firebaugh, et al.: Jeffrey L. Fisher, Melo Park, Cal.
     • For respondent: Elizabeth B. Prelogar, Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C.
     
     

     Website Link to Oral Argument: Here.

     Apple Podcast Link to Oral Argument: Here.

     ]]>c045e1fd-e94d-461a-8d64-b2071987b0dfFri, 17 Jan 2025 09:00:00 -040016:38falsefull20241251252024Opinion Summary: E.M.D. Sales, Inc. v. Carrera | Date Decided: 1/15/25 | Case No. 23-217Case Info: E.M.D. Sales, Inc. v. Carrera | Date Decided: 1/15/25 | Case No. 23-217

     Link to Docket: Here.

     Question Presented: Whether the burden of proof that employers must satisfy to demonstrate the  applicability of an FLSA exemption is a mere preponderance of the evidence-as six  circuits hold-or clear and convincing evidence, as the Fourth Circuit alone holds.

     Holding: The preponderance of the evidence standard applies when an em­ployer seeks to demonstrate that an employee is exempt from the minimum-wage and overtime-pay provisions of the FLSA.

     Result: Reversed and remanded.

     Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Kavanaugh delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Justice Gor­such filed a concurring opinion, in which Justice Thomas joined.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     • For petitioners: Lisa S. Blatt, Washington, D. C.; and Aimee W. Brown, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C. (for United States, as amicus curiae.)
     • For respondents: Lauren E. Bateman, Washington, D. C.
     
     

     Website Link to Oral Argument: Here.

     Apple Podcast Link to Oral Argument: Here.

     ]]>Case Info: E.M.D. Sales, Inc. v. Carrera | Date Decided: 1/15/25 | Case No. 23-217

     Link to Docket: Here.

     Question Presented: Whether the burden of proof that employers must satisfy to demonstrate the  applicability of an FLSA exemption is a mere preponderance of the evidence-as six  circuits hold-or clear and convincing evidence, as the Fourth Circuit alone holds.

     Holding: The preponderance of the evidence standard applies when an em­ployer seeks to demonstrate that an employee is exempt from the minimum-wage and overtime-pay provisions of the FLSA.

     Result: Reversed and remanded.

     Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Kavanaugh delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Justice Gor­such filed a concurring opinion, in which Justice Thomas joined.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     • For petitioners: Lisa S. Blatt, Washington, D. C.; and Aimee W. Brown, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C. (for United States, as amicus curiae.)
     • For respondents: Lauren E. Bateman, Washington, D. C.
     
     

     Website Link to Oral Argument: Here.

     Apple Podcast Link to Oral Argument: Here.

     ]]>1e55ccc1-2368-4f39-ab70-523437b0ff77Wed, 15 Jan 2025 09:00:00 -040005:42falsefull20241121122024Opinion Summary: Royal Canin U.S.A. v. Wullschleger | Date Decided: 1/15/25 | Case No. 23-677Case Info: Royal Canin U.S.A. v. Wullschleger | Date Decided: 1/15/25 | Case No. 23-677

     Link to Docket: Here.

     Questions Presented:

     1. Whether such a post-removal amendment of the complaint defeats federal-question subject-matter jurisdiction.
     2. Whether such a post-removal amendment of the complaint precludes a district court from exercising supplemental jurisdiction over the plaintiffs remaining state-law claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367.
     
     

     Holding: When a plaintiff amends her complaint to delete the federal-law claims that enabled removal to federal court, leaving only state-law claims behind, the federal court loses supplemental jurisdiction over the state claims, and the case must be remanded to state court.

     Result: Affirmed.

     Voting Breakdown: Justice Kagan delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     • For petitioners: Katherine B. Wellington, Boston, Mass.
     • For respondents: Ashley C. Keller, Chicago, Ill.
     
     

     Website Link to Oral Argument: Here.

     Apple Podcast Link to Oral Argument: Here.

     ]]>Case Info: Royal Canin U.S.A. v. Wullschleger | Date Decided: 1/15/25 | Case No. 23-677

     Link to Docket: Here.

     Questions Presented:

     1. Whether such a post-removal amendment of the complaint defeats federal-question subject-matter jurisdiction.
     2. Whether such a post-removal amendment of the complaint precludes a district court from exercising supplemental jurisdiction over the plaintiffs remaining state-law claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367.
     
     

     Holding: When a plaintiff amends her complaint to delete the federal-law claims that enabled removal to federal court, leaving only state-law claims behind, the federal court loses supplemental jurisdiction over the state claims, and the case must be remanded to state court.

     Result: Affirmed.

     Voting Breakdown: Justice Kagan delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     • For petitioners: Katherine B. Wellington, Boston, Mass.
     • For respondents: Ashley C. Keller, Chicago, Ill.
     
     

     Website Link to Oral Argument: Here.

     Apple Podcast Link to Oral Argument: Here.

     ]]>f8464061-c6e3-40b2-971b-be4fe668e317Wed, 15 Jan 2025 09:00:00 -040009:30falsefull20241021022024Oral Argument: Free Speech Coalition v. Paxton | Case No. 23-1122 | Date Argued: 1/15/25Case Info: Free Speech Coalition v. Paxton | Case No. 23-1122 | Date Argued: 1/15/25

     Link to Docket: Here.

     Background:

     This Court has repeatedly held that States may rationally restrict minors' access to sexual materials, but such restrictions must withstand strict scrutiny if they burden adults' access to constitutionally protected speech. See, e.g., Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. 656, 663 (2004). In the decision below, the Fifth Circuit applied rational-basis review-rather than strict scrutiny-to vacate a preliminary injunction of a provision of a Texas law that significantly burdens adults' access to protected speech, because the law's stated purpose is to protect minors.

     Question Presented: Whether the court of appeals erred as a matter of law in applying rational-basis review to a law burdening adults' access to protected speech, instead of strict scrutiny as this Court and other circuits have consistently done.

     Oral Advocates:

     • For Petitioners: Derek L. Shaffer, Washington, D.C.
     • For United States, as amicus curiae: Brian H. Fletcher, Principal Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.
     • For Respondent: Aaron L. Nielson, Solicitor General, Austin, Tex.
     
     ]]>Case Info: Free Speech Coalition v. Paxton | Case No. 23-1122 | Date Argued: 1/15/25

     Link to Docket: Here.

     Background:

     This Court has repeatedly held that States may rationally restrict minors' access to sexual materials, but such restrictions must withstand strict scrutiny if they burden adults' access to constitutionally protected speech. See, e.g., Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. 656, 663 (2004). In the decision below, the Fifth Circuit applied rational-basis review-rather than strict scrutiny-to vacate a preliminary injunction of a provision of a Texas law that significantly burdens adults' access to protected speech, because the law's stated purpose is to protect minors.

     Question Presented: Whether the court of appeals erred as a matter of law in applying rational-basis review to a law burdening adults' access to protected speech, instead of strict scrutiny as this Court and other circuits have consistently done.

     Oral Advocates:

     • For Petitioners: Derek L. Shaffer, Washington, D.C.
     • For United States, as amicus curiae: Brian H. Fletcher, Principal Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.
     • For Respondent: Aaron L. Nielson, Solicitor General, Austin, Tex.
     
     ]]>4ed3ee93-fa08-4589-b01d-ca495491f554Wed, 15 Jan 2025 09:00:00 -040002:05:32falsefull202430302024Oral Argument: Thompson v. United States | Case No. 23-1095 | Date Argued: 1/14/25Case Info: Thompson v. United States | Case No. 23-1095 | Date Argued: 1/14/25 | Date Decided: 3/21/25

     Link to Docket: Here.

     Question Presented: Whether 18 U.S.C. § 1014, which prohibits making a "false statement" for the purpose of influencing certain financial institutions and federal agencies, also prohibits making a statement that is misleading but not false.

     Holding: 18 U.S.C. § 1014, which prohibits “knowingly mak[ing] any false state­ment,” does not criminalize statements that are misleading but not false.

     Result: Vacated and remanded.

     Voting Breakdown: Chief Justice Roberts delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Justices Alito and Jackson each filed concurring opinions.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     • For petitioner: Chris C. Gair, Chicago, Ill.
     • For respondent: Caroline A. Flynn, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C.
     
     

     Website Link to Opinion Summary: Here.

     Apple Podcast Link to Opinion Summary: Here.

     ]]>Case Info: Thompson v. United States | Case No. 23-1095 | Date Argued: 1/14/25 | Date Decided: 3/21/25

     Link to Docket: Here.

     Question Presented: Whether 18 U.S.C. § 1014, which prohibits making a "false statement" for the purpose of influencing certain financial institutions and federal agencies, also prohibits making a statement that is misleading but not false.

     Holding: 18 U.S.C. § 1014, which prohibits “knowingly mak[ing] any false state­ment,” does not criminalize statements that are misleading but not false.

     Result: Vacated and remanded.

     Voting Breakdown: Chief Justice Roberts delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Justices Alito and Jackson each filed concurring opinions.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     • For petitioner: Chris C. Gair, Chicago, Ill.
     • For respondent: Caroline A. Flynn, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C.
     
     

     Website Link to Opinion Summary: Here.

     Apple Podcast Link to Opinion Summary: Here.

     ]]>4fad3340-f163-411c-b028-e4b5a5f1251dTue, 14 Jan 2025 09:00:00 -040001:17:02falsefull202429292024Oral Argument: Waetzig v. Halliburton Energy Services | Case No. 23-971 | Date Argued: 1/14/25Waetzig v. Halliburton Energy Services | Case No. 23-971 | Date Argued: 1/14/25 | Date Decided: 2/26/25

     Link to Docket: Here.

     Background:

     Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) empowers district courts, on just terms and under circumstances specified in that Rule, to "relieve a party or its legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding."

     Question Presented: Whether a Rule 41 voluntary dismissal without prejudice is a "final judgment, order, or proceeding" under Rule 60(b).

     Holding: A case voluntarily dismissed without prejudice under Rule 41(a) counts as a “final proceeding” under Rule 60(b).

     Result: Reversed and remanded.

     Voting Breakdown: Justice Alito delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. No justice filed a concurring or dissenting opinion.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     • For petitioner: Vincent Levy, New York, N. Y.
     • For respondent: Matthew D. McGill, Washington, D. C.
     
     

     Website Link to Opinion Summary: Here.

     Apple Podcast Link to Opinion Summary: Here.

     ]]>Waetzig v. Halliburton Energy Services | Case No. 23-971 | Date Argued: 1/14/25 | Date Decided: 2/26/25

     Link to Docket: Here.

     Background:

     Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) empowers district courts, on just terms and under circumstances specified in that Rule, to "relieve a party or its legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding."

     Question Presented: Whether a Rule 41 voluntary dismissal without prejudice is a "final judgment, order, or proceeding" under Rule 60(b).

     Holding: A case voluntarily dismissed without prejudice under Rule 41(a) counts as a “final proceeding” under Rule 60(b).

     Result: Reversed and remanded.

     Voting Breakdown: Justice Alito delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. No justice filed a concurring or dissenting opinion.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     • For petitioner: Vincent Levy, New York, N. Y.
     • For respondent: Matthew D. McGill, Washington, D. C.
     
     

     Website Link to Opinion Summary: Here.

     Apple Podcast Link to Opinion Summary: Here.

     ]]>ea63106b-c098-4428-993a-12cd68b40fb3Tue, 14 Jan 2025 09:00:00 -040049:00falsefull202428282024Oral Argument: Stanley v. City of Sanford | Case No. 23-997 | Date Argued: 1/13/25Case Info: Stanley v. City of Sanford | Case No. 23-997 | Date Argued: 1/13/25

     Link to Docket: Here.

     Question Presented: Under the Americans with Disabilities Act, does a former employee-who was qualified to perform her job and who earned post-employment benefits while employed-lose her right to sue over discrimination with respect to those benefits solely because she no longer holds her job?

     Holding: To prevail under §12112(a), a plaintiff must plead and prove that she held or desired a job, and could perform its essential functions with or without reasonable accommodation, at the time of an employer's alleged act of disability-based discrimination.

     Result: Affirmed.

     Voting Breakdown: 7-2. Justice Gorsuch delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts I and II, in which Chief Justice Roberts, and Justice Thomas, Justice Alito, Justice Kagan, Justice Kavanaugh, and Justice Barrett joined, and an opinion with respect to Part III, in which Justice Alito, Justice Sotomayor, and Justice Kagan joined. Justice Thomas filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, in which Justice Barrett joined. Justice Sotomayor filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part. Justice Jackson filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Sotomayor joined as to Parts III and IV, except for n. 12.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     • For Petitioner: Deepak Gupta, Washington, D.C.; and Frederick Liu, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. (for United States, as amicus curiae.)
     • For Respondent: Jessica C. Conner, Orlando, Fla.
     
     ]]>Case Info: Stanley v. City of Sanford | Case No. 23-997 | Date Argued: 1/13/25

     Link to Docket: Here.

     Question Presented: Under the Americans with Disabilities Act, does a former employee-who was qualified to perform her job and who earned post-employment benefits while employed-lose her right to sue over discrimination with respect to those benefits solely because she no longer holds her job?

     Holding: To prevail under §12112(a), a plaintiff must plead and prove that she held or desired a job, and could perform its essential functions with or without reasonable accommodation, at the time of an employer's alleged act of disability-based discrimination.

     Result: Affirmed.

     Voting Breakdown: 7-2. Justice Gorsuch delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts I and II, in which Chief Justice Roberts, and Justice Thomas, Justice Alito, Justice Kagan, Justice Kavanaugh, and Justice Barrett joined, and an opinion with respect to Part III, in which Justice Alito, Justice Sotomayor, and Justice Kagan joined. Justice Thomas filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, in which Justice Barrett joined. Justice Sotomayor filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part. Justice Jackson filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Sotomayor joined as to Parts III and IV, except for n. 12.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     • For Petitioner: Deepak Gupta, Washington, D.C.; and Frederick Liu, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. (for United States, as amicus curiae.)
     • For Respondent: Jessica C. Conner, Orlando, Fla.
     
     ]]>3df660eb-6a55-4919-bbbd-e9285cbb934aMon, 13 Jan 2025 09:00:00 -040001:18:04falsefull202427272024Oral Argument: Hewitt v. United States | Case No. 23-1002 | Date Argued: 1/13/25Case Info: Hewitt v. United States | Case No. 23-1002 | Date Argued: 1/13/25

     This case was consolidated with: Duffey V. United States, Case No. 23-1007.

     Link to Docket: Here.

     Background:

     The First Step Act (FSA) significantly reduced the mandatory minimum sentences for several federal drug and firearm offenses. First Step Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115- 391, §§ 401, 403, 132 Stat. 5194, 5220-5222. Sections 401 and 403 apply to offenses committed after the FSA's enactment on December 21, 2018, and to "any offense that was committed before the date of enactment * * * if a sentence for the offense has not been imposed as of such date of enactment." FSA§§ 401(c), 403(b).

     There is an acknowledged split between the Third, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits, on the one hand; and the Fifth and Sixth Circuits, on the other hand, on the question whether sections 401(c) and 403(b) apply when a pre-enactment sentence is vacated and the court must impose a new post-enactment sentence.

     Question Presented: Whether the First Step Act's sentencing reduction provisions apply to a defendant originally sentenced before the FSA's enactment when that original sentence is judicially vacated and the defendant is resentenced to a new term of imprisonment after the FSA's enactment.

     Holding: Under § 403(b) of the First Step Act, a sentence "has . . . been imposed" for purposes of that provision if, and only if, the sentence is extant—i.e., has not been vacated. Thus, the Act's more lenient penalties apply to defendants whose previous § 924(c) sentences have been vacated and who need to be resentenced following the Act's enactment.

     Result: Reversed and remanded.

     Voting Breakdown: 5-4. Justice Jackson delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts I, II, and III, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Sotomayor, Kagan, and Gorsuch joined, and an opinion with respect to Parts IV and V, in which Justices Sotomayor and Kagan joined. Justice Alito filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Thomas, Kavanaugh, and Barrett joined.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     • For petitioners: Michael B. Kimberly, Washington, D.C.
     • For respondent in support of petitioners: Masha G. Hansford, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.
     • For Court-appointed amicus curiae in support of judgment below: Michael H. McGinley, Washington, D.C.
     
     ]]>Case Info: Hewitt v. United States | Case No. 23-1002 | Date Argued: 1/13/25

     This case was consolidated with: Duffey V. United States, Case No. 23-1007.

     Link to Docket: Here.

     Background:

     The First Step Act (FSA) significantly reduced the mandatory minimum sentences for several federal drug and firearm offenses. First Step Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115- 391, §§ 401, 403, 132 Stat. 5194, 5220-5222. Sections 401 and 403 apply to offenses committed after the FSA's enactment on December 21, 2018, and to "any offense that was committed before the date of enactment * * * if a sentence for the offense has not been imposed as of such date of enactment." FSA§§ 401(c), 403(b).

     There is an acknowledged split between the Third, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits, on the one hand; and the Fifth and Sixth Circuits, on the other hand, on the question whether sections 401(c) and 403(b) apply when a pre-enactment sentence is vacated and the court must impose a new post-enactment sentence.

     Question Presented: Whether the First Step Act's sentencing reduction provisions apply to a defendant originally sentenced before the FSA's enactment when that original sentence is judicially vacated and the defendant is resentenced to a new term of imprisonment after the FSA's enactment.

     Holding: Under § 403(b) of the First Step Act, a sentence "has . . . been imposed" for purposes of that provision if, and only if, the sentence is extant—i.e., has not been vacated. Thus, the Act's more lenient penalties apply to defendants whose previous § 924(c) sentences have been vacated and who need to be resentenced following the Act's enactment.

     Result: Reversed and remanded.

     Voting Breakdown: 5-4. Justice Jackson delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts I, II, and III, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Sotomayor, Kagan, and Gorsuch joined, and an opinion with respect to Parts IV and V, in which Justices Sotomayor and Kagan joined. Justice Alito filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Thomas, Kavanaugh, and Barrett joined.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     • For petitioners: Michael B. Kimberly, Washington, D.C.
     • For respondent in support of petitioners: Masha G. Hansford, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.
     • For Court-appointed amicus curiae in support of judgment below: Michael H. McGinley, Washington, D.C.
     
     ]]>e431942e-7a03-462d-b7bc-dedeb0adae38Mon, 13 Jan 2025 09:00:00 -040001:30:42falsefull202426262024Oral Argument: TikTok, Inc. v. Garland, Att'y Gen. | Case No. 24-656 | Date Argued: 1/10/25Case Info: TikTok, Inc. v. Garland, Att'y Gen. | Case No. 24-656 | Date Argued: 1/10/25 | Date Decided: 1/17/25

     Link to Docket: Here.

     Question Presented: Whether the Protecting Americans from Foreign Adversary Controlled Applications Act, as applied to Petitioners, violates the First Amendment.

     Holding: The challenged provisions do not violate petitioners’ First Amendment rights.

     Result: Affirmed.

     Voting Breakdown: The Supreme Court wrote a Per Curiam unanimous opinion. Justice Sotomayor wrote an opinion that concurred in part and concurred in the judgment. Justice Gorsuch wrote an opinion that concurred in the judgment.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     • For petitioners TikTok Inc., et al.: Noel J. Francisco, Washington, D. C.
     • For petitioners Firebaugh, et al.: Jeffrey L. Fisher, Melo Park, Cal.
     • For respondent: Elizabeth B. Prelogar, Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C.
     
     

     Host Note: Consolidated with: Firebaugh v. Garland, Case No. 24-657.

     Website Link to Opinion Summary: Here.

     Apple Podcast Link to Opinion Summary: Here.

     ]]>Case Info: TikTok, Inc. v. Garland, Att'y Gen. | Case No. 24-656 | Date Argued: 1/10/25 | Date Decided: 1/17/25

     Link to Docket: Here.

     Question Presented: Whether the Protecting Americans from Foreign Adversary Controlled Applications Act, as applied to Petitioners, violates the First Amendment.

     Holding: The challenged provisions do not violate petitioners’ First Amendment rights.

     Result: Affirmed.

     Voting Breakdown: The Supreme Court wrote a Per Curiam unanimous opinion. Justice Sotomayor wrote an opinion that concurred in part and concurred in the judgment. Justice Gorsuch wrote an opinion that concurred in the judgment.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     • For petitioners TikTok Inc., et al.: Noel J. Francisco, Washington, D. C.
     • For petitioners Firebaugh, et al.: Jeffrey L. Fisher, Melo Park, Cal.
     • For respondent: Elizabeth B. Prelogar, Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C.
     
     

     Host Note: Consolidated with: Firebaugh v. Garland, Case No. 24-657.

     Website Link to Opinion Summary: Here.

     Apple Podcast Link to Opinion Summary: Here.

     ]]>eb269219-128f-422c-ae82-ad08bea8bc29Fri, 10 Jan 2025 09:00:00 -040002:28:49falsefull202425252024Oral Argument: Dewberry Group, Inc. v. Dewberry Engineers Inc. | Case No. 23-900 | Date Argued: 12/11/24Case Info: Dewberry Group, Inc. v. Dewberry Engineers Inc. | Case No. 23-900 | Date Argued: 12/11/24 | Date Decided: 2/26/25

     Link to Docket: Here.

     Question Presented: Whether an award of the "defendant's profits" under the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a), can include an order for the defendant to disgorge the distinct profits of legally separate non-party corporate affiliates.

     Holding: In awarding the “defendant’s profits” to the prevailing plaintiff in a trademark infringement suit under the Lanham Act, §1117(a), a court can award only profits ascribable to the “defendant” itself. And the term “defendant” bears its usual legal meaning: the party against whom relief or recovery is sought—here, Dewberry Group. The Engi­neers chose not to add the Group’s affiliates as defendants. Accord­ingly, the affiliates’ profits are not the (statutorily disgorgable) “de­fendant’s profits” as ordinarily understood.

     Result: Vacated and remanded.

     Voting Breakdown: Justice Kagan delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Justice Sotomayor filed a concurring opinion.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     • For petitioner: Thomas G. Hungar, Washington, D. C.
     • For United States, as amicus curiae: Nicholas S. Crown, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C.
     • For respondent: Elbert Lin, Richmond, Va.
     
     

     Website Link to Opinion Summary: Here.

     Apple Podcast Link to Opinion Summary: Here.

     ]]>Case Info: Dewberry Group, Inc. v. Dewberry Engineers Inc. | Case No. 23-900 | Date Argued: 12/11/24 | Date Decided: 2/26/25

     Link to Docket: Here.

     Question Presented: Whether an award of the "defendant's profits" under the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a), can include an order for the defendant to disgorge the distinct profits of legally separate non-party corporate affiliates.

     Holding: In awarding the “defendant’s profits” to the prevailing plaintiff in a trademark infringement suit under the Lanham Act, §1117(a), a court can award only profits ascribable to the “defendant” itself. And the term “defendant” bears its usual legal meaning: the party against whom relief or recovery is sought—here, Dewberry Group. The Engi­neers chose not to add the Group’s affiliates as defendants. Accord­ingly, the affiliates’ profits are not the (statutorily disgorgable) “de­fendant’s profits” as ordinarily understood.

     Result: Vacated and remanded.

     Voting Breakdown: Justice Kagan delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Justice Sotomayor filed a concurring opinion.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     • For petitioner: Thomas G. Hungar, Washington, D. C.
     • For United States, as amicus curiae: Nicholas S. Crown, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C.
     • For respondent: Elbert Lin, Richmond, Va.
     
     

     Website Link to Opinion Summary: Here.

     Apple Podcast Link to Opinion Summary: Here.

     ]]>7370a93e-64b7-4590-bd5a-ac6af548b452Wed, 11 Dec 2024 09:00:00 -040001:10:57falsefull202424242024Opinion Summary: Bouarfa v. Mayorkas | Date Decided: 12/10/24 | Case No. 23-583Case Info: Bouarfa v. Mayorkas | Date Decided: 12/10/24 | Case No. 23-583

     Link to Docket: Here.

     Question Presented: Whether a visa petitioner may obtain judicial review when an approved petition is revoked on the basis of nondiscretionary criteria.

     Holding: Revocation of an approved visa petition under § 1155 based on a sham-marriage determination by the Secretary is the kind of discretion­ary decision that falls within the purview of § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii), which strips federal courts of jurisdiction to review certain actions “in the discretion of” the agency.

     Result: Affirmed.

     Voting Breakdown: Justice Jackson delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. No justice filed a concurring or dissenting opinion.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     • For petitioner: Samir Deger-Sen, New York, N. Y.
     • For respondents: Colleen R. Sinzdak, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C.
     
     

     Website Link to Oral Argument: Here.

     Apple Podcast Link to Oral Argument: Here.

     ]]>Case Info: Bouarfa v. Mayorkas | Date Decided: 12/10/24 | Case No. 23-583

     Link to Docket: Here.

     Question Presented: Whether a visa petitioner may obtain judicial review when an approved petition is revoked on the basis of nondiscretionary criteria.

     Holding: Revocation of an approved visa petition under § 1155 based on a sham-marriage determination by the Secretary is the kind of discretion­ary decision that falls within the purview of § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii), which strips federal courts of jurisdiction to review certain actions “in the discretion of” the agency.

     Result: Affirmed.

     Voting Breakdown: Justice Jackson delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. No justice filed a concurring or dissenting opinion.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     • For petitioner: Samir Deger-Sen, New York, N. Y.
     • For respondents: Colleen R. Sinzdak, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C.
     
     

     Website Link to Oral Argument: Here.

     Apple Podcast Link to Oral Argument: Here.

     ]]>88592af8-cc06-4427-9d98-48a8e4fb1664Tue, 10 Dec 2024 09:00:00 -040007:19falsefull20241071072024Oral Argument: Seven County Coalition v. Eagle County | Case No. 23-975 | Date Argued: 12/10/24Case Info: Seven County Coalition v. Eagle County | Case No. 23-975 | Date Argued: 12/10/24

     Link to Docket: Here.

     Background:

     In Department of Transportation v. Public Citizen, 541 U.S. 752, 770 (2004), this Court held that when an agency cannot prevent an environmental effect "due to its limited statutory authority over the relevant actions," the National Environmental Policy Act does not require it to study that effect. This holding has divided the courts of appeals. Five circuits read Public Citizen to mean that an agency's environmental review can stop where its regulatory authority stops. Two circuits disagree and require review of any impact that can be called reasonably foreseeable.

     Here, the Surface Transportation Board relied on Public Citizen to cabin its environmental review of a new rail line in Utah. But the D.C. Circuit rejected that approach, ruling that the Board "cannot avoid" environmental review "on the ground that it lacks authority to prevent, control, or mitigate" distant environmental effects. As a result, it ordered the Board to study the local effects of oil wells and refineries that lie outside the Board's regulatory authority.

     Question Presented: Whether the National Environmental Policy Act requires an agency to study environmental impacts beyond the proximate effects of the action over which the agency has regulatory authority.

     Holding: The D.C. Circuit failed to afford the Board the substantial judicial deference required in NEPA cases and incorrectly interpreted NEPA to require the Board to consider the environmental effects of upstream and downstream projects that are separate in time or place from the Uinta Basin Railway.

     Result: Reversed and remanded.

     Voting Breakdown: 8-0. Justice Kavanaugh delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Alito and Barrett joined. Justice Sotomayor filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which Justices Kagan and Jackson joined. Justice Gorsuch took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     • For petitioners: Paul D. Clement, Alexandria, Va.
     • For federal respondents supporting petitioners: Edwin S. Kneedler, Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C.
     • For respondents Eagle County, et al.: William M. Jay, Washington, D.C.
     
     

     Website Link to Opinion Summary: Here.

     Apple Podcast Link to Opinion Summary: Here.

     ]]>Case Info: Seven County Coalition v. Eagle County | Case No. 23-975 | Date Argued: 12/10/24

     Link to Docket: Here.

     Background:

     In Department of Transportation v. Public Citizen, 541 U.S. 752, 770 (2004), this Court held that when an agency cannot prevent an environmental effect "due to its limited statutory authority over the relevant actions," the National Environmental Policy Act does not require it to study that effect. This holding has divided the courts of appeals. Five circuits read Public Citizen to mean that an agency's environmental review can stop where its regulatory authority stops. Two circuits disagree and require review of any impact that can be called reasonably foreseeable.

     Here, the Surface Transportation Board relied on Public Citizen to cabin its environmental review of a new rail line in Utah. But the D.C. Circuit rejected that approach, ruling that the Board "cannot avoid" environmental review "on the ground that it lacks authority to prevent, control, or mitigate" distant environmental effects. As a result, it ordered the Board to study the local effects of oil wells and refineries that lie outside the Board's regulatory authority.

     Question Presented: Whether the National Environmental Policy Act requires an agency to study environmental impacts beyond the proximate effects of the action over which the agency has regulatory authority.

     Holding: The D.C. Circuit failed to afford the Board the substantial judicial deference required in NEPA cases and incorrectly interpreted NEPA to require the Board to consider the environmental effects of upstream and downstream projects that are separate in time or place from the Uinta Basin Railway.

     Result: Reversed and remanded.

     Voting Breakdown: 8-0. Justice Kavanaugh delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Alito and Barrett joined. Justice Sotomayor filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which Justices Kagan and Jackson joined. Justice Gorsuch took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     • For petitioners: Paul D. Clement, Alexandria, Va.
     • For federal respondents supporting petitioners: Edwin S. Kneedler, Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C.
     • For respondents Eagle County, et al.: William M. Jay, Washington, D.C.
     
     

     Website Link to Opinion Summary: Here.

     Apple Podcast Link to Opinion Summary: Here.

     ]]>b63f4ea8-259b-43e4-b0e4-172839b64e2eTue, 10 Dec 2024 09:00:00 -040001:50:36falsefull202423232024Oral Argument: Kousisis v. United States | Case No. 23-909 | Date Argued: 12/9/24 | Date Decided: 5/22/25Case Info: Kousisis v. United States | Case No. 23-909 | Date Argued: 12/9/24 | Date Decided: 5/22/25

     Link to Docket: Here.

     Questions Presented:

     1. Whether deception to induce a commercial exchange can constitute mail or wire fraud, even if inflicting economic harm on the alleged victim was not the object of the scheme. Whether a sovereign's statutory, regulatory, or policy interest is a property interest when compliance is a material term of payment for goods or services.
     2. Whether all contract rights are "property."
     
     

     Holding: A defendant who induces a victim to enter into a transaction under materially false pretenses may be convicted of federal fraud even if the defendant did not seek to cause the victim economic loss.

     Result: Affirmed.

     Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Barrett delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Alito, Kagan, Kavanaugh and Jackson joined. Justice Thomas filed a concurring opinion. Justice Gorsuch filed an opinion con¬curring in part and concurring in the judgment. Justice Sotomayor filed an opinion concurring in the judgment.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     • For petitioners: Jeffrey L. Fisher, Stanford, Cal.
     • For respondent: Eric J. Feigin, Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.
     
     

     Website Link to Opinion Summary: Here.

     Apple Podcast Link to Opinion Summary: Here.

     ]]>Case Info: Kousisis v. United States | Case No. 23-909 | Date Argued: 12/9/24 | Date Decided: 5/22/25

     Link to Docket: Here.

     Questions Presented:

     1. Whether deception to induce a commercial exchange can constitute mail or wire fraud, even if inflicting economic harm on the alleged victim was not the object of the scheme. Whether a sovereign's statutory, regulatory, or policy interest is a property interest when compliance is a material term of payment for goods or services.
     2. Whether all contract rights are "property."
     
     

     Holding: A defendant who induces a victim to enter into a transaction under materially false pretenses may be convicted of federal fraud even if the defendant did not seek to cause the victim economic loss.

     Result: Affirmed.

     Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Barrett delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Alito, Kagan, Kavanaugh and Jackson joined. Justice Thomas filed a concurring opinion. Justice Gorsuch filed an opinion con¬curring in part and concurring in the judgment. Justice Sotomayor filed an opinion concurring in the judgment.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     • For petitioners: Jeffrey L. Fisher, Stanford, Cal.
     • For respondent: Eric J. Feigin, Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.
     
     

     Website Link to Opinion Summary: Here.

     Apple Podcast Link to Opinion Summary: Here.

     ]]>a1da5b87-4610-4a9d-9d5a-6ca851d1e39aMon, 09 Dec 2024 09:00:00 -040001:26:52falsefull202422222024Oral Argument: Feliciano v. Dept. of Transportation | Case No. 23-861 | Date Argued: 12/9/24Case Info: Feliciano v. Dept. of Transportation | Case No. 23-861 | Date Argued: 12/9/24 | Date Decided: 4/30/25

     Link to Docket: Here.

     Background:

     This case presents a question of critical importance to hundreds of thousands of Americans who serve their country both as federal civilian employees and members of the Armed Services' reserve components.

     Congress enacted the differential pay statute, 5 U.S.C. § 5538, to eliminate the financial burden that reservists face when called to active duty at pay rates below their federal civilian salaries. To ensure that these reservists suffer no financial penalty for active-duty service, the differential pay statute requires that the government make up the difference. Federal civilian employees are entitled to differential pay when performing active duty "pursuant to a call or order to active duty under * * * a provision of law referred to in section 101(a)(13)(B) of title 10." That section, Section 101(a)(13)(B), enumerates several statutory authorities and includes a catchall provision: "any other provision of law during a war or during a national emergency declared by the President or Congress."

     Recently, in a decision that departed from settled understandings of this language, the Federal Circuit held that reservists relying on Section 101(a)(13)(B)'s catchall provision to claim differential pay must show that they were "directly called to serve in a contingency operation." Adams v. DHS, 3 F.4th 1375, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2021). Under that demanding, fact-intensive standard, the Federal Circuit has rejected claims for differential pay even by reservists like petitioner whose activation orders expressly invoked a presidential emergency declaration.

     Question Presented: Whether a federal civilian employee called or ordered to active duty under a provision of law during a national emergency is entitled to differential pay even if the duty is not directly connected to the national emergency.

     Holding: A federal civilian employee called to active duty pursuant to “any other provision of law . . . during a national emergency” as described in §101(a)(13)(B) is entitled to differential pay if the reservist’s service temporally coincides with a declared national emergency without any showing that the service bears a substantive connection to a particular emergency.

     Result: Reversed and remanded.

     Voting Breakdown: Justice Gorsuch delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Sotomayor, Kavanaugh and Barrett joined.  Justice Thomas filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Alito, Kagan and Jackson joined.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     • For Petitioner: Andrew T. Tutt
     • For Respondent: Nicole F. Reaves, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice
     
     

     Website Link to Opinion Summary: Here.

     Apple Podcast Link to Opinion Summary: Here.

     
     

     ]]>Case Info: Feliciano v. Dept. of Transportation | Case No. 23-861 | Date Argued: 12/9/24 | Date Decided: 4/30/25

     Link to Docket: Here.

     Background:

     This case presents a question of critical importance to hundreds of thousands of Americans who serve their country both as federal civilian employees and members of the Armed Services' reserve components.

     Congress enacted the differential pay statute, 5 U.S.C. § 5538, to eliminate the financial burden that reservists face when called to active duty at pay rates below their federal civilian salaries. To ensure that these reservists suffer no financial penalty for active-duty service, the differential pay statute requires that the government make up the difference. Federal civilian employees are entitled to differential pay when performing active duty "pursuant to a call or order to active duty under * * * a provision of law referred to in section 101(a)(13)(B) of title 10." That section, Section 101(a)(13)(B), enumerates several statutory authorities and includes a catchall provision: "any other provision of law during a war or during a national emergency declared by the President or Congress."

     Recently, in a decision that departed from settled understandings of this language, the Federal Circuit held that reservists relying on Section 101(a)(13)(B)'s catchall provision to claim differential pay must show that they were "directly called to serve in a contingency operation." Adams v. DHS, 3 F.4th 1375, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2021). Under that demanding, fact-intensive standard, the Federal Circuit has rejected claims for differential pay even by reservists like petitioner whose activation orders expressly invoked a presidential emergency declaration.

     Question Presented: Whether a federal civilian employee called or ordered to active duty under a provision of law during a national emergency is entitled to differential pay even if the duty is not directly connected to the national emergency.

     Holding: A federal civilian employee called to active duty pursuant to “any other provision of law . . . during a national emergency” as described in §101(a)(13)(B) is entitled to differential pay if the reservist’s service temporally coincides with a declared national emergency without any showing that the service bears a substantive connection to a particular emergency.

     Result: Reversed and remanded.

     Voting Breakdown: Justice Gorsuch delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Sotomayor, Kavanaugh and Barrett joined.  Justice Thomas filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Alito, Kagan and Jackson joined.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     • For Petitioner: Andrew T. Tutt
     • For Respondent: Nicole F. Reaves, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice
     
     

     Website Link to Opinion Summary: Here.

     Apple Podcast Link to Opinion Summary: Here.

     
     

     ]]>44412a43-f7e4-4f41-bddc-90900e1935dbMon, 09 Dec 2024 09:00:00 -040001:13:33falsefull202421212024Oral Argument: United States v. Skrmetti | Case No. 23-477 | Date Argued: 12/4/24Case Info: United States v. Skrmetti | Case No. 23-477 | Date Argued: 12/4/24

     Link to Docket: Here.

     Question Presented: Whether Tennessee Senate Bill 1 (SBl), which prohibits all medical treatments intended to allow "a minor to identify with, or live as, a purported identity inconsistent with the minor's sex" or to treat "purported discomfort or distress from a discordance between the minor's sex and asserted identity," Tenn. Code Ann. § 68-33-103(a)(1), violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

     Holding: Tennessee's law prohibiting certain medical treatments for transgender minors is not subject to heightened scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and satisfies rational basis review. SB1 satisfies rational basis review.

     Result: Affirmed.

     Voting Breakdown: 6-3. Chief Justice Roberts delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Justice Thomas, Justice Gorsuch, Justice Kavanaugh, and Justice Barrett joined, and in which Justice Alito joined as to Parts I and II–B. Justice Thomas filed a concurring opinion. Justice Barrett filed a concurring opinion, in which Justice Thomas joined. Justice Alito filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment. Justice Sotomayor filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Jackson joined in full, and in which Justice Kagan joined as to Parts I–IV. Justice Kagan filed a dissenting opinion.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     • For Petitioner: Elizabeth B. Prelogar, Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.
     • For Respondents L.W., et al. supporting petitioner: Chase B. Strangio, New York, N.Y.
     • For Respondents Jonathan Skrmetti, et al.: J. Matthew Rice, Solicitor General, Nashville, Tenn.
     
     ]]>Case Info: United States v. Skrmetti | Case No. 23-477 | Date Argued: 12/4/24

     Link to Docket: Here.

     Question Presented: Whether Tennessee Senate Bill 1 (SBl), which prohibits all medical treatments intended to allow "a minor to identify with, or live as, a purported identity inconsistent with the minor's sex" or to treat "purported discomfort or distress from a discordance between the minor's sex and asserted identity," Tenn. Code Ann. § 68-33-103(a)(1), violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

     Holding: Tennessee's law prohibiting certain medical treatments for transgender minors is not subject to heightened scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and satisfies rational basis review. SB1 satisfies rational basis review.

     Result: Affirmed.

     Voting Breakdown: 6-3. Chief Justice Roberts delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Justice Thomas, Justice Gorsuch, Justice Kavanaugh, and Justice Barrett joined, and in which Justice Alito joined as to Parts I and II–B. Justice Thomas filed a concurring opinion. Justice Barrett filed a concurring opinion, in which Justice Thomas joined. Justice Alito filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment. Justice Sotomayor filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Jackson joined in full, and in which Justice Kagan joined as to Parts I–IV. Justice Kagan filed a dissenting opinion.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     • For Petitioner: Elizabeth B. Prelogar, Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.
     • For Respondents L.W., et al. supporting petitioner: Chase B. Strangio, New York, N.Y.
     • For Respondents Jonathan Skrmetti, et al.: J. Matthew Rice, Solicitor General, Nashville, Tenn.
     
     ]]>c7fec292-e6fa-48c1-9633-d8ee61902f46Wed, 04 Dec 2024 09:00:00 -040002:21:10falsefull202420202024Oral Argument: Hungary v. Simon | Case No. 23-867 | Date Argued: 12/03/24Case Info: Hungary v. Simon | Case No. 23-867 | Date Argued: 12/03/24 | Date Decided: 2/21/25

     Link to Docket: Here.

     Background:

     A foreign sovereign is generally immune from suit in domestic courts, subject to the specific exceptions of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act. Under the expropriation exception, claims involving rights in property taken in violation of international law may be heard if "property or any property exchanged for such property" has a commercial nexus with the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(3). Specifically, the property or its proceeds must be either "present in the United States in connection with a commercial activity" or "owned or operated by an agency or instrumentality of the foreign state and that agency or instrumentality is engaged in a commercial activity in the United States." Id. The circuit courts have split as to the showing required to meet the commercial nexus requirement.

     Questions Presented:

     1. Whether historical commingling of assets suffices to establish that  proceeds of seized property have a commercial nexus with the United States under the  expropriation exception to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act.
     2. Whether a plaintiff must make out a valid claim that an exception to the  Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act applies at the pleading stage, rather than merely raising a plausible inference.
     3. Whether a sovereign defendant bears the burden of producing evidence to  affirmatively disprove that the proceeds of property taken in violation of international law  have a commercial nexus with the United States under the expropriation exception to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act.
     
     

     Holding: Alleging commingling of funds alone cannot satisfy the commercial nexus requirement of the FSIA’s expropriation exception.

     Result: Vacated and remanded.

     Voting Breakdown: Justice Sotomayor delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     • For petitioners: Joshua S. Glasgow, Buffalo, N. Y.; and Sopan Joshi, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C. (for United States, as amicus curiae.)
     • For respondents: Shay Dvoretzky, Washington, D. C.
     
     

     Website Link to Opinion Summary: Here.

     Apple Podcast Link to Opinion Summary: Here.

     ]]>Case Info: Hungary v. Simon | Case No. 23-867 | Date Argued: 12/03/24 | Date Decided: 2/21/25

     Link to Docket: Here.

     Background:

     A foreign sovereign is generally immune from suit in domestic courts, subject to the specific exceptions of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act. Under the expropriation exception, claims involving rights in property taken in violation of international law may be heard if "property or any property exchanged for such property" has a commercial nexus with the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(3). Specifically, the property or its proceeds must be either "present in the United States in connection with a commercial activity" or "owned or operated by an agency or instrumentality of the foreign state and that agency or instrumentality is engaged in a commercial activity in the United States." Id. The circuit courts have split as to the showing required to meet the commercial nexus requirement.

     Questions Presented:

     1. Whether historical commingling of assets suffices to establish that  proceeds of seized property have a commercial nexus with the United States under the  expropriation exception to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act.
     2. Whether a plaintiff must make out a valid claim that an exception to the  Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act applies at the pleading stage, rather than merely raising a plausible inference.
     3. Whether a sovereign defendant bears the burden of producing evidence to  affirmatively disprove that the proceeds of property taken in violation of international law  have a commercial nexus with the United States under the expropriation exception to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act.
     
     

     Holding: Alleging commingling of funds alone cannot satisfy the commercial nexus requirement of the FSIA’s expropriation exception.

     Result: Vacated and remanded.

     Voting Breakdown: Justice Sotomayor delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     • For petitioners: Joshua S. Glasgow, Buffalo, N. Y.; and Sopan Joshi, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C. (for United States, as amicus curiae.)
     • For respondents: Shay Dvoretzky, Washington, D. C.
     
     

     Website Link to Opinion Summary: Here.

     Apple Podcast Link to Opinion Summary: Here.

     ]]>c99a551b-04dc-4933-91b5-c04f65be9bbbTue, 03 Dec 2024 09:00:00 -040001:24:01falsefull202452522024Oral Argument: FDA v. Wages and White Lion Investments, LLC | Case No. 23-1038 | Date Argued: 12/2/24Case Info: FDA v. Wages and White Lion Investments, LLC | Case No. 23-1038 | Date Argued: 12/2/24 | Date Decided: 4/2/25

     Link to Docket: Here.

     Background:

     The Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act, Pub. L. No. 111-31, Div. A, 123 Stat. 1776, requires a person to obtain authorization from the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) before introducing a new tobacco product into interstate commerce. The agency may grant such authorization only if the applicant shows, among other things, that the marketing of the product would be "appropriate for the protection of the public health." 21 U.S.C. 387j(c)(2)(A). In this case, the agency denied respondents' applications for authorization to market new e-cigarette products because they had failed to show that marketing the products would be appropriate for the protection of the public health. The Fifth Circuit set aside FDA's denial orders as arbitrary and capricious, relying on legal theories that have been rejected by other courts of appeals that have reviewed materially similar FDA denial orders.

     Question Presented: Whether the court of appeals erred in setting aside FDA's denial orders as arbitrary and capricious.

     Holding: The Fifth Circuit’s conclusion that the FDA acted arbitrarily and capriciously in its adjudication of manufacturers’ premarket tobacco product applications is vacated because the FDA’s denial orders were sufficiently consistent with its predecisional guidance—as to scientific evidence, comparative efficacy, and device type—and thus did not run afoul of the change-in-position doctrine.

     Result: Vacated and remanded.

     Voting Breakdown: Justice Alito delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Justice Sotomayor filed a concurring opinion.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     • For petitioner: Curtis E. Gannon, Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.
     • For respondents: Eric N. Heyer, Washington, D.C.
     
     

     Website Link to Opinion Summary: Here.

     Apple Podcast Link to Opinion Summary: Here.

     ]]>Case Info: FDA v. Wages and White Lion Investments, LLC | Case No. 23-1038 | Date Argued: 12/2/24 | Date Decided: 4/2/25

     Link to Docket: Here.

     Background:

     The Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act, Pub. L. No. 111-31, Div. A, 123 Stat. 1776, requires a person to obtain authorization from the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) before introducing a new tobacco product into interstate commerce. The agency may grant such authorization only if the applicant shows, among other things, that the marketing of the product would be "appropriate for the protection of the public health." 21 U.S.C. 387j(c)(2)(A). In this case, the agency denied respondents' applications for authorization to market new e-cigarette products because they had failed to show that marketing the products would be appropriate for the protection of the public health. The Fifth Circuit set aside FDA's denial orders as arbitrary and capricious, relying on legal theories that have been rejected by other courts of appeals that have reviewed materially similar FDA denial orders.

     Question Presented: Whether the court of appeals erred in setting aside FDA's denial orders as arbitrary and capricious.

     Holding: The Fifth Circuit’s conclusion that the FDA acted arbitrarily and capriciously in its adjudication of manufacturers’ premarket tobacco product applications is vacated because the FDA’s denial orders were sufficiently consistent with its predecisional guidance—as to scientific evidence, comparative efficacy, and device type—and thus did not run afoul of the change-in-position doctrine.

     Result: Vacated and remanded.

     Voting Breakdown: Justice Alito delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Justice Sotomayor filed a concurring opinion.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     • For petitioner: Curtis E. Gannon, Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.
     • For respondents: Eric N. Heyer, Washington, D.C.
     
     

     Website Link to Opinion Summary: Here.

     Apple Podcast Link to Opinion Summary: Here.

     ]]>0ddc48f6-afe4-4357-9bab-68f0b9b635adMon, 02 Dec 2024 09:00:00 -040001:20:05falsefull202418182024Oral Argument: United States v. Miller | Case No. 23-824 | Date Argued: 12/2/24Case Info: United States v. Miller | Case No. 23-824 | Date Argued: 12/2/24 | Date Decided: 3/26/25

     Link to Docket: Here.

     Background:

     The Bankruptcy Code permits a bankruptcy trustee to avoid any prepetition transfer of the debtor's property that would be voidable "under applicable law" outside bankruptcy by an actual unsecured creditor of the estate. 11 U.S.C. 544(b)(1). The applicable law may be state law. Elsewhere, the Code abrogates the sovereign immunity of all governmental units "to the extent set forth in this section with respect to" various sections of the Code, including Section 544. 11 U.S.C. 106(a)(l). The court of appeals below joined a circuit split in holding that Section 106(a)(l) permits a bankruptcy trustee to avoid a debtor's tax payment to the United States under Section 544(b), even though no actual creditor could have obtained relief outside of bankruptcy in light of sovereign immunity, the Supremacy Clause, and the Appropriations Clause.

     Question Presented: Whether a bankruptcy trustee may avoid a debtor's tax payment to the United States under Section 544(b) when no actual creditor could have obtained relief under the applicable state  fraudulent-transfer law outside of bankruptcy.

     Holding: Section 106(a)’s sovereign-immunity waiver applies only to a §544(b) claim itself and not to state-law claims nested within that fed­eral claim.

     Result: Reversed.

     Voting Breakdown: Justice Jackson delivered the opinion of the Court, joined by Chief Justice Roberts, along with Justices Thomas, Alito, Sotomayor, Kagan, Kavanaugh and Barrett.  Justice Gorsuch filed a dissenting opinion.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     • For petitioner: Yaira Dubin, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C.
     • For respondent: Lisa S. Blatt, Washington, D. C.
     
     

     Website Link to Opinion Summary: Here.

     Apple Podcast Link to Opinion Summary: Here.

     ]]>Case Info: United States v. Miller | Case No. 23-824 | Date Argued: 12/2/24 | Date Decided: 3/26/25

     Link to Docket: Here.

     Background:

     The Bankruptcy Code permits a bankruptcy trustee to avoid any prepetition transfer of the debtor's property that would be voidable "under applicable law" outside bankruptcy by an actual unsecured creditor of the estate. 11 U.S.C. 544(b)(1). The applicable law may be state law. Elsewhere, the Code abrogates the sovereign immunity of all governmental units "to the extent set forth in this section with respect to" various sections of the Code, including Section 544. 11 U.S.C. 106(a)(l). The court of appeals below joined a circuit split in holding that Section 106(a)(l) permits a bankruptcy trustee to avoid a debtor's tax payment to the United States under Section 544(b), even though no actual creditor could have obtained relief outside of bankruptcy in light of sovereign immunity, the Supremacy Clause, and the Appropriations Clause.

     Question Presented: Whether a bankruptcy trustee may avoid a debtor's tax payment to the United States under Section 544(b) when no actual creditor could have obtained relief under the applicable state  fraudulent-transfer law outside of bankruptcy.

     Holding: Section 106(a)’s sovereign-immunity waiver applies only to a §544(b) claim itself and not to state-law claims nested within that fed­eral claim.

     Result: Reversed.

     Voting Breakdown: Justice Jackson delivered the opinion of the Court, joined by Chief Justice Roberts, along with Justices Thomas, Alito, Sotomayor, Kagan, Kavanaugh and Barrett.  Justice Gorsuch filed a dissenting opinion.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     • For petitioner: Yaira Dubin, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C.
     • For respondent: Lisa S. Blatt, Washington, D. C.
     
     

     Website Link to Opinion Summary: Here.

     Apple Podcast Link to Opinion Summary: Here.

     ]]>729bfb3c-2d25-4a3e-bd66-be18f25cd94cMon, 02 Dec 2024 09:00:00 -040053:38falsefull202417172024Oral Argument: NVIDIA Corp. v. E. Ohman J:or Fonder AB | Case No. 23-970 | Date Argued: 11/13/24Case Info: NVIDIA Corp. v. E. Ohman J:or Fonder AB | Case No. 23-970 | Date Argued: 11/13/24 | Date Decided: 12/11/24

     Link to Docket: Here.

     Background:

     The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA) imposes "[e]xacting pleading requirements" on plaintiffs who file securities fraud class actions. Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 311, 313 (2007). To state a claim, plaintiffs must "state with particularity all facts" supporting their allegations of falsity and must also allege "facts giving rise to a strong inference" of the required mental state. 15 U.S.C § 78u-4(b)(1), (2)(A); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b). Plaintiffs frequently try to meet these requirements by claiming that internal company documents contradicted the company's public statements.

     Questions Presented:

     1. Whether plaintiffs seeking to allege scienter under the PSLRA based on allegations about internal company documents must plead with particularity the contents of those documents.
     2. Whether plaintiffs can satisfy the PSLRA's falsity requirement by relying on an expert opinion to substitute for particularized allegations of fact.
     
     

     Result: Writ of certiorari DISMISSED as improvidently granted by per curiam Opinion.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     • For petitioners: Neal K. Katyal, Washington, D. C.
     • For respondents: Deepak Gupta, Washington, D. C.; and Colleen R. Sinzdak, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C. (for United States, as amicus curiae.)
     
     ]]>Case Info: NVIDIA Corp. v. E. Ohman J:or Fonder AB | Case No. 23-970 | Date Argued: 11/13/24 | Date Decided: 12/11/24

     Link to Docket: Here.

     Background:

     The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA) imposes "[e]xacting pleading requirements" on plaintiffs who file securities fraud class actions. Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 311, 313 (2007). To state a claim, plaintiffs must "state with particularity all facts" supporting their allegations of falsity and must also allege "facts giving rise to a strong inference" of the required mental state. 15 U.S.C § 78u-4(b)(1), (2)(A); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b). Plaintiffs frequently try to meet these requirements by claiming that internal company documents contradicted the company's public statements.

     Questions Presented:

     1. Whether plaintiffs seeking to allege scienter under the PSLRA based on allegations about internal company documents must plead with particularity the contents of those documents.
     2. Whether plaintiffs can satisfy the PSLRA's falsity requirement by relying on an expert opinion to substitute for particularized allegations of fact.
     
     

     Result: Writ of certiorari DISMISSED as improvidently granted by per curiam Opinion.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     • For petitioners: Neal K. Katyal, Washington, D. C.
     • For respondents: Deepak Gupta, Washington, D. C.; and Colleen R. Sinzdak, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C. (for United States, as amicus curiae.)
     
     ]]>fd62af09-8b17-4daa-a08d-347eea995178Wed, 13 Nov 2024 09:00:00 -040001:27:13falsefull202416162024Oral Argument: Delligatti v. United States | Case No. 23-825 | Date Argued: 11/12/24Case Info: Delligatti v. United States | Case No. 23-825 | Date Argued: 11/12/24 | Date Decided: 3/21/25

     Link to Docket: Here.

     Background:

     Under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3)(A), a felony qualifies as a "crime of violence" if it "has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person or property of another." Courts have disagreed about how to apply use-of-force language to crimes that require proof of a victim's bodily injury or death but can be committed by failing to take action.

     In the decision below, the Second Circuit held that any crime requiring proof of death or bodily injury categorically involves the use of physical force, even if it can be committed through inaction-such as by failing to provide medicine to someone who is sick or by failing to feed a child. That ruling reflects the law in eight circuits.

     Two courts of appeals, by contrast, have held that the use of force is not an element of such crimes if the crime may be committed by inaction. One of those courts recently rejected the government's petition for rehearing en banc, which had argued that any crime requiring proof of bodily injury or death necessarily involves the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force.

     Question Presented: Whether a crime that requires proof of bodily injury or death, but can be  committed by failing to take action, has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force.

     Holding: The knowing or intentional causation of injury or death, whether by act or omission, necessarily involves the “use” of “physical force” against another person within the meaning of §924(c)(3)(A).

     Result: Affirmed.

     Voting Breakdown: Justice Thomas delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Alito, Sotomayor, Kagan, Kavanaugh, and Barrett joined.  Justice Gorsuch filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Jackson joined.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     • For petitioner: Allon Kedem, Washington, D. C.
     • For respondent: Eric J. Feigin, Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C.
     
     

     Website Link to Opinion Summary: Here.

     Apple Podcast Link to Opinion Summary: Here.

     ]]>Case Info: Delligatti v. United States | Case No. 23-825 | Date Argued: 11/12/24 | Date Decided: 3/21/25

     Link to Docket: Here.

     Background:

     Under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3)(A), a felony qualifies as a "crime of violence" if it "has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person or property of another." Courts have disagreed about how to apply use-of-force language to crimes that require proof of a victim's bodily injury or death but can be committed by failing to take action.

     In the decision below, the Second Circuit held that any crime requiring proof of death or bodily injury categorically involves the use of physical force, even if it can be committed through inaction-such as by failing to provide medicine to someone who is sick or by failing to feed a child. That ruling reflects the law in eight circuits.

     Two courts of appeals, by contrast, have held that the use of force is not an element of such crimes if the crime may be committed by inaction. One of those courts recently rejected the government's petition for rehearing en banc, which had argued that any crime requiring proof of bodily injury or death necessarily involves the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force.

     Question Presented: Whether a crime that requires proof of bodily injury or death, but can be  committed by failing to take action, has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force.

     Holding: The knowing or intentional causation of injury or death, whether by act or omission, necessarily involves the “use” of “physical force” against another person within the meaning of §924(c)(3)(A).

     Result: Affirmed.

     Voting Breakdown: Justice Thomas delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Alito, Sotomayor, Kagan, Kavanaugh, and Barrett joined.  Justice Gorsuch filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Jackson joined.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     • For petitioner: Allon Kedem, Washington, D. C.
     • For respondent: Eric J. Feigin, Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C.
     
     

     Website Link to Opinion Summary: Here.

     Apple Podcast Link to Opinion Summary: Here.

     ]]>ca1f42cb-2700-41f6-871a-9b9bdfafff6aTue, 12 Nov 2024 09:00:00 -040001:03:12falsefull202415152024Oral Argument: Velazquez v. Garland, Att'y Gen. | Case No. 23-929 | Date Argued: 11/12/24Case Info: Velazquez v. Garland, Att'y Gen. | Case No. 23-929 | Date Argued: 11/12/24 | Date Decided: 4/22/25

     Link to Docket: Here.

     Background:

     Federal immigration law allows the government to grant a "voluntary departure" period of up to 60 days to a noncitizen "of good moral character" who receives an adverse decision in removal proceedings. 8 U.S.C. §1229c(b). If the noncitizen fails to depart during that window, he or she is subject to a civil fine and is ineligible for various forms of immigration relief (like cancellation of removal or adjustment of status) for 10 years. §1229c(d)(1). If, however, the noncitizen "file[s] a post-decision motion to reopen or reconsider during the period allowed for voluntary departure," the penalties for failure to voluntarily depart do not apply. 8 C.F.R. § 1240.26(b)(3)(iii).

     Question Presented: When a noncitizen's voluntary-departure period ends on a weekend or public holiday, is a motion to reopen filed the next business day sufficient to avoid the penalties for failure to depart?

     Holding: Under §1229c(b)(2), a voluntary-departure deadline that falls on a weekend or legal holiday extends to the next business day.

     Result: Reversed and remanded.

     Voting Breakdown: Justice Gorsuch delivered the opinion of the Court, in which the following justices joined: Chief Justice Roberts, Justice Sotomayor, Justice Kagan, and Justice Jackson.  Justice Thomas filed a dissenting opinion, joined by Justice Alito, and joined by Justice Kavanaugh and Justice Barrett as to Parts I and II.  Justice Alito and Justice Barrett filed dissenting opinions, both joined by Justice Kavanaugh.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     • For Petitioner: Gerard J. Cedrone
     • For Respondent: Anthony A. Yang, Assistant to the Solicitor General
     
     

     Website Link to Opinion Summary: Here.

     Website Link to Oral Argument: Here.

     ]]>Case Info: Velazquez v. Garland, Att'y Gen. | Case No. 23-929 | Date Argued: 11/12/24 | Date Decided: 4/22/25

     Link to Docket: Here.

     Background:

     Federal immigration law allows the government to grant a "voluntary departure" period of up to 60 days to a noncitizen "of good moral character" who receives an adverse decision in removal proceedings. 8 U.S.C. §1229c(b). If the noncitizen fails to depart during that window, he or she is subject to a civil fine and is ineligible for various forms of immigration relief (like cancellation of removal or adjustment of status) for 10 years. §1229c(d)(1). If, however, the noncitizen "file[s] a post-decision motion to reopen or reconsider during the period allowed for voluntary departure," the penalties for failure to voluntarily depart do not apply. 8 C.F.R. § 1240.26(b)(3)(iii).

     Question Presented: When a noncitizen's voluntary-departure period ends on a weekend or public holiday, is a motion to reopen filed the next business day sufficient to avoid the penalties for failure to depart?

     Holding: Under §1229c(b)(2), a voluntary-departure deadline that falls on a weekend or legal holiday extends to the next business day.

     Result: Reversed and remanded.

     Voting Breakdown: Justice Gorsuch delivered the opinion of the Court, in which the following justices joined: Chief Justice Roberts, Justice Sotomayor, Justice Kagan, and Justice Jackson.  Justice Thomas filed a dissenting opinion, joined by Justice Alito, and joined by Justice Kavanaugh and Justice Barrett as to Parts I and II.  Justice Alito and Justice Barrett filed dissenting opinions, both joined by Justice Kavanaugh.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     • For Petitioner: Gerard J. Cedrone
     • For Respondent: Anthony A. Yang, Assistant to the Solicitor General
     
     

     Website Link to Opinion Summary: Here.

     Website Link to Oral Argument: Here.

     ]]>364fbbfe-95b5-4a98-bcfd-b16e7a8fa68aTue, 12 Nov 2024 09:00:00 -040001:07:13falsefull202414142024Oral Argument: Facebook, Inc. v. Amalgamated Bank | Case No. 23-980 | Date Argued: 11/6/24Case Info: Facebook, Inc. v. Amalgamated Bank | Case No. 23-980 | Date Argued: 11/6/24

     Link to Docket: Here.

     Background:

     This petition presents two important questions that have divided the federal courts of appeals.

     First, the circuits have split three ways concerning what public companies must disclose in the "risk factors" section of their 10-K filings. The Sixth Circuit holds that companies need not disclose past instances when a risk has materialized. The First, Second, Third, Fifth, Tenth, and D.C. Circuits hold that companies must disclose that a risk materialized in the past if the company knows that event will harm the business. The Ninth Circuit here adopted a third, outlier position requiring companies to disclose that a risk materialized in the past even if there is no known threat of business harm.

     Second, the circuits disagree on the proper pleading standard for the loss causation element of a private securities-fraud claim. The Fourth Circuit holds that loss causation allegations must satisfy Federal Rule 9(b)'s heightened pleading standard for fraud, while the Fifth and Sixth Circuits apply the ordinary Rule 8 standard. The Ninth Circuit here initially applied Rule 8, then substituted citations of Rule 9(b) without changing its analysis.

     Questions Presented:

     1. Are risk disclosures false or misleading when they do not disclose that a risk has materialized in the past, even if that past event presents no known risk of ongoing or future business harm?
     2. Does Federal Rule 8 or Rule 9(b) supply the proper pleading standard for loss causation in a private securities-fraud action?
     
     

     Result: Writ of certiorari dismissed as improvidently granted by per curiam.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     • For petitioners: Kannon K. Shanmugam, Washington, D. C.
     • For respondents: Kevin K. Russell, Washington, D. C.; and Kevin J. Barber, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C. (for United States, as amicus curiae.)
     
     ]]>Case Info: Facebook, Inc. v. Amalgamated Bank | Case No. 23-980 | Date Argued: 11/6/24

     Link to Docket: Here.

     Background:

     This petition presents two important questions that have divided the federal courts of appeals.

     First, the circuits have split three ways concerning what public companies must disclose in the "risk factors" section of their 10-K filings. The Sixth Circuit holds that companies need not disclose past instances when a risk has materialized. The First, Second, Third, Fifth, Tenth, and D.C. Circuits hold that companies must disclose that a risk materialized in the past if the company knows that event will harm the business. The Ninth Circuit here adopted a third, outlier position requiring companies to disclose that a risk materialized in the past even if there is no known threat of business harm.

     Second, the circuits disagree on the proper pleading standard for the loss causation element of a private securities-fraud claim. The Fourth Circuit holds that loss causation allegations must satisfy Federal Rule 9(b)'s heightened pleading standard for fraud, while the Fifth and Sixth Circuits apply the ordinary Rule 8 standard. The Ninth Circuit here initially applied Rule 8, then substituted citations of Rule 9(b) without changing its analysis.

     Questions Presented:

     1. Are risk disclosures false or misleading when they do not disclose that a risk has materialized in the past, even if that past event presents no known risk of ongoing or future business harm?
     2. Does Federal Rule 8 or Rule 9(b) supply the proper pleading standard for loss causation in a private securities-fraud action?
     
     

     Result: Writ of certiorari dismissed as improvidently granted by per curiam.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     • For petitioners: Kannon K. Shanmugam, Washington, D. C.
     • For respondents: Kevin K. Russell, Washington, D. C.; and Kevin J. Barber, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C. (for United States, as amicus curiae.)
     
     ]]>33db519e-54c0-4922-bfee-c745dc053c8dWed, 06 Nov 2024 09:00:00 -040001:43:35falsefull202413132024Oral Argument: E.M.D. Sales, Inc. v. Carrera | Case No. 23-217 | Date Argued: 11/5/24Case Info: E.M.D. Sales, Inc. v. Carrera | Case No. 23-217 | Date Argued: 11/5/24 | Date Decided: 1/15/25

     Link to Docket: Here.

     Background:

     The Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) covers more than 140 million workers and guarantees eligible workers a minimum wage and overtime pay. But the FLSA also contains 34 exemptions from those requirements. Employers do not have to pay overtime to, e.g., bona fide executives, agricultural workers, and outside salesmen. See 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)-(b).

     The question presented is: Whether the burden of proof that employers must satisfy to demonstrate the applicability of an FLSA exemption is a mere preponderance of the evidence-as six circuits hold-or clear and convincing evidence, as the Fourth Circuit alone holds.

     Question Presented: Whether the burden of proof that employers must satisfy to demonstrate the  applicability of an FLSA exemption is a mere preponderance of the evidence-as six  circuits hold-or clear and convincing evidence, as the Fourth Circuit alone holds.

     Holding: The preponderance of the evidence standard applies when an em­ployer seeks to demonstrate that an employee is exempt from the minimum-wage and overtime-pay provisions of the FLSA.

     Result: Reversed and remanded.

     Voting Breakdown: Justice Kavanaugh delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Justice Gor­such filed a concurring opinion, in which Justice Thomas joined.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     • For petitioners: Lisa S. Blatt, Washington, D. C.; and Aimee W. Brown, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C. (for United States, as amicus curiae.)
     • For respondents: Lauren E. Bateman, Washington, D. C.
     
     

     Website Link to Opinion Summary: Here.

     Apple Podcast Link to Opinion Summary: Here.

     ]]>Case Info: E.M.D. Sales, Inc. v. Carrera | Case No. 23-217 | Date Argued: 11/5/24 | Date Decided: 1/15/25

     Link to Docket: Here.

     Background:

     The Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) covers more than 140 million workers and guarantees eligible workers a minimum wage and overtime pay. But the FLSA also contains 34 exemptions from those requirements. Employers do not have to pay overtime to, e.g., bona fide executives, agricultural workers, and outside salesmen. See 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)-(b).

     The question presented is: Whether the burden of proof that employers must satisfy to demonstrate the applicability of an FLSA exemption is a mere preponderance of the evidence-as six circuits hold-or clear and convincing evidence, as the Fourth Circuit alone holds.

     Question Presented: Whether the burden of proof that employers must satisfy to demonstrate the  applicability of an FLSA exemption is a mere preponderance of the evidence-as six  circuits hold-or clear and convincing evidence, as the Fourth Circuit alone holds.

     Holding: The preponderance of the evidence standard applies when an em­ployer seeks to demonstrate that an employee is exempt from the minimum-wage and overtime-pay provisions of the FLSA.

     Result: Reversed and remanded.

     Voting Breakdown: Justice Kavanaugh delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Justice Gor­such filed a concurring opinion, in which Justice Thomas joined.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     • For petitioners: Lisa S. Blatt, Washington, D. C.; and Aimee W. Brown, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C. (for United States, as amicus curiae.)
     • For respondents: Lauren E. Bateman, Washington, D. C.
     
     

     Website Link to Opinion Summary: Here.

     Apple Podcast Link to Opinion Summary: Here.

     ]]>b2e5b8c5-084d-433b-bbcf-f8ad9ad196b0Tue, 05 Nov 2024 09:00:00 -040042:09falsefull202412122024Oral Argument: Advocate Christ Medical v. Becerra, Sec. of H&HS | Case No. 23-715 | Date Argued: 11/5/24Case Info: Advocate Christ Medical v. Becerra, Sec. of H&HS | Case No. 23-715 | Date Argued: 11/5/24 | Date Decided: 4/29/25

     Link to Docket: Here.

     Background:

     Because low-income patients are often costlier to treat, Congress directed the government to reimburse hospitals that treat a disproportionate share of low--income patients at higher Medicare rates. A hospital qualifies for higher payments in part based on the number of days that a hospital provides inpatient care to senior (or disabled) low- income patients, measured as those who "were entitled to benefits under part A of [Medicare] and were entitled to supplementary security income [SSI] benefits." 42 U.S.C.§ 1395ww(d)(5)(F)(vi)(I).

     In Becerra v. Empire Health Foundation, this Court agreed with the agency that "entitled to [Medicare part A] benefits" included "all those qualifying for the [Medicare] program," whether or not Medicare paid for that hospital stay. 597 U.S. 424, 445 (2022). But Empire expressly left open the question of whether "entitled to [SSI] benefits" likewise includes all those who qualify for the SSI program. Id. at 434 n.2. The agency still insists, contrary to its Medicare interpretation, that only patients who received an SSI cash payment for the month of their hospital stay are "entitled to benefits."

     This case thus presents Empire's open question: Does the phrase "entitled ... to benefits," used twice in the same sentence of the Medicare Act, mean the same thing for Medicare part A and SSI, such that it includes all who meet basic program eligibility criteria, whether or not benefits are actually received.

     Question Presented: Does the phrase "entitled ... to benefits," used twice in the same sentence of the Medicare Act, mean the same thing for Medicare part A and supplementary security income (SSI), such that it includes all who meet basic program eligibility criteria, whether or not benefits are actually received.

     Holding: In calculating the Medicare fraction, an individual is “entitled to[SSI] benefits” for purposes of the Medicare fraction when she is eligi­ble to receive an SSI cash payment during the month of her hospitali­zation.

     Result: Affirmed.

     Voting Breakdown: Justice Barrett delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Alito, Kagan, Gorsuch and Kavanaugh joined.  Justice Jackson filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Sotomayor joined.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Advocates:

     • For Petitioners: Melissa Arbus Sherry
     • For Respondent: Ephraim McDowell, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice
     
     

     Website Link to Opinion Summary: Here.

     Apple Podcast Link to Opinion Summary: Here.

     ]]>Case Info: Advocate Christ Medical v. Becerra, Sec. of H&HS | Case No. 23-715 | Date Argued: 11/5/24 | Date Decided: 4/29/25

     Link to Docket: Here.

     Background:

     Because low-income patients are often costlier to treat, Congress directed the government to reimburse hospitals that treat a disproportionate share of low--income patients at higher Medicare rates. A hospital qualifies for higher payments in part based on the number of days that a hospital provides inpatient care to senior (or disabled) low- income patients, measured as those who "were entitled to benefits under part A of [Medicare] and were entitled to supplementary security income [SSI] benefits." 42 U.S.C.§ 1395ww(d)(5)(F)(vi)(I).

     In Becerra v. Empire Health Foundation, this Court agreed with the agency that "entitled to [Medicare part A] benefits" included "all those qualifying for the [Medicare] program," whether or not Medicare paid for that hospital stay. 597 U.S. 424, 445 (2022). But Empire expressly left open the question of whether "entitled to [SSI] benefits" likewise includes all those who qualify for the SSI program. Id. at 434 n.2. The agency still insists, contrary to its Medicare interpretation, that only patients who received an SSI cash payment for the month of their hospital stay are "entitled to benefits."

     This case thus presents Empire's open question: Does the phrase "entitled ... to benefits," used twice in the same sentence of the Medicare Act, mean the same thing for Medicare part A and SSI, such that it includes all who meet basic program eligibility criteria, whether or not benefits are actually received.

     Question Presented: Does the phrase "entitled ... to benefits," used twice in the same sentence of the Medicare Act, mean the same thing for Medicare part A and supplementary security income (SSI), such that it includes all who meet basic program eligibility criteria, whether or not benefits are actually received.

     Holding: In calculating the Medicare fraction, an individual is “entitled to[SSI] benefits” for purposes of the Medicare fraction when she is eligi­ble to receive an SSI cash payment during the month of her hospitali­zation.

     Result: Affirmed.

     Voting Breakdown: Justice Barrett delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Alito, Kagan, Gorsuch and Kavanaugh joined.  Justice Jackson filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Sotomayor joined.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Advocates:

     • For Petitioners: Melissa Arbus Sherry
     • For Respondent: Ephraim McDowell, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice
     
     

     Website Link to Opinion Summary: Here.

     Apple Podcast Link to Opinion Summary: Here.

     ]]>f5b388ce-9b81-4d93-97a7-18c18fd4e0a7Tue, 05 Nov 2024 09:00:00 -040001:10:28falsefull202411112024Oral Argument: Wisconsin Bell, Inc. v. U.S., ex rel. Heath | Case No. 23-1127 | Date Argued: 11/4/24Case Info: Wisconsin Bell, Inc. v. U.S., ex rel. Heath | Case No. 23-1127 | Date Argued: 11/4/24 | Date Decided: 2/21/25

     Link to Docket: Here.

     Background:

     The Telecommunications Act of 1996 directs the FCC to further the goal of universal access to telecommunications services. In response, the FCC established what's known as the "E-rate" program to provide discounted services to eligible schools and libraries. The program is administered by a private, non-profit corporation and funded entirely by contributions from private telecommunications carriers. After telecommunications carriers provide services to eligible schools and libraries, either the schools and libraries or the providers can submit reimbursement requests to the private corporation for the amount of the discount. In this way, the E-rate program distributes up to $4.5 billion each year.

     Question Presented: Whether reimbursement requests submitted to the E-rate program are "claims" under the False Claims Act.

     Holding: The E-Rate reimbursement requests at issue are “claims” under the False Claims Act because the Government “provided” (at a minimum) a “por­tion” of the money applied for by transferring more than $100 million from the Treasury into the Fund.

     Result: Affirmed and remanded.

     Voting Breakdown: Justice Kagan delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Justice Thomas filed a concurring opinion, in which Justice Kavanaugh joined, and in which Justice Alito joined as to Part I. Justice Kavanaugh filed a concurring opinion, in which Justice Thomas joined.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     • For petitioner: Allyson N. Ho, Dallas, Tex.
     • For respondent: Tejinder Singh, Washington, D. C.; and Vivek Suri, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C. (for United States, as amicus curiae.)
     
     

     Website Link to Opinion Summary: Here.

     Apple Podcast Link to Opinion Summary: Here.

     ]]>Case Info: Wisconsin Bell, Inc. v. U.S., ex rel. Heath | Case No. 23-1127 | Date Argued: 11/4/24 | Date Decided: 2/21/25

     Link to Docket: Here.

     Background:

     The Telecommunications Act of 1996 directs the FCC to further the goal of universal access to telecommunications services. In response, the FCC established what's known as the "E-rate" program to provide discounted services to eligible schools and libraries. The program is administered by a private, non-profit corporation and funded entirely by contributions from private telecommunications carriers. After telecommunications carriers provide services to eligible schools and libraries, either the schools and libraries or the providers can submit reimbursement requests to the private corporation for the amount of the discount. In this way, the E-rate program distributes up to $4.5 billion each year.

     Question Presented: Whether reimbursement requests submitted to the E-rate program are "claims" under the False Claims Act.

     Holding: The E-Rate reimbursement requests at issue are “claims” under the False Claims Act because the Government “provided” (at a minimum) a “por­tion” of the money applied for by transferring more than $100 million from the Treasury into the Fund.

     Result: Affirmed and remanded.

     Voting Breakdown: Justice Kagan delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Justice Thomas filed a concurring opinion, in which Justice Kavanaugh joined, and in which Justice Alito joined as to Part I. Justice Kavanaugh filed a concurring opinion, in which Justice Thomas joined.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     • For petitioner: Allyson N. Ho, Dallas, Tex.
     • For respondent: Tejinder Singh, Washington, D. C.; and Vivek Suri, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C. (for United States, as amicus curiae.)
     
     

     Website Link to Opinion Summary: Here.

     Apple Podcast Link to Opinion Summary: Here.

     ]]>6c236458-3bbc-4696-8e03-2818ba7163a3Mon, 04 Nov 2024 09:00:00 -040001:33:56falsefull202410102024Oral Argument: Bufkin v. McDonough, Sec. of VA | Case No. 23-713 | Date Argued: 10/16/24Case Info: Bufkin v. McDonough, Sec. of VA | Case No. 23-713 | Date Argued: 10/16/24 | Date Decided: 3/5/25

     Link to Docket: Here.

     Background:

     For more than a century, veterans have been entitled to the benefit of the doubt on any close issue relating to their eligibility for service-related benefits. As presently codified, "[w]hen there is an approximate balance of positive and negative evidence regarding any issue material to the determination of a matter, the Secretary [of Veterans Affairs] shall give the benefit of the doubt to the claimant." 38 U.S.C. § 5107(b).

     In 2002, Congress enacted the Veterans Benefits Act. Among other things, the Act supplemented the responsibilities of the U.S. Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims (the "Veterans Court") by requiring it to "take due account of the Secretary's application of section 5107(b)" as part of its review of benefits appeals. 38 U.S.C. § 7261(b)(1).

     In these cases, the Federal Circuit held that § 7261(b)(1) "does not require the Veterans Court to conduct any review of the benefit of the doubt issue beyond the clear error review" of underlying factual findings - something already required by the pre-2002 review statute, under 38 U.S.C. § 7261(a). Pet. App. 16a-17a (quoting Pet. App. 8a- 11a).

     Question Presented: Must the Veterans Court ensure that the benefit-of-the-doubt rule was properly applied during the claims process in order to satisfy 38  U.S.C. § 7261(b)(1), which directs the Veterans Court to "take due account" of VA's  application of that rule?

     Holding: The VA’s determination that the evidence regarding a service-re­lated disability claim is in “approximate balance” is a predominantly factual determination reviewed only for clear error.

     Result: Affirmed.

     Voting Breakdown: Justice Thomas delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Alito, Sotomayor, Kagan, Kavanaugh, and Barrett joined.  Justice Jackson filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Gorsuch joined.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     • For petitioners: Melanie L. Bostwick, Washington, D. C.
     • For respondent: Sopan Joshi, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C.
     
     

     Website Link to Opinion Summary: Here.

     Apple Podcast Link to Opinion Summary: Here.

     ]]>Case Info: Bufkin v. McDonough, Sec. of VA | Case No. 23-713 | Date Argued: 10/16/24 | Date Decided: 3/5/25

     Link to Docket: Here.

     Background:

     For more than a century, veterans have been entitled to the benefit of the doubt on any close issue relating to their eligibility for service-related benefits. As presently codified, "[w]hen there is an approximate balance of positive and negative evidence regarding any issue material to the determination of a matter, the Secretary [of Veterans Affairs] shall give the benefit of the doubt to the claimant." 38 U.S.C. § 5107(b).

     In 2002, Congress enacted the Veterans Benefits Act. Among other things, the Act supplemented the responsibilities of the U.S. Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims (the "Veterans Court") by requiring it to "take due account of the Secretary's application of section 5107(b)" as part of its review of benefits appeals. 38 U.S.C. § 7261(b)(1).

     In these cases, the Federal Circuit held that § 7261(b)(1) "does not require the Veterans Court to conduct any review of the benefit of the doubt issue beyond the clear error review" of underlying factual findings - something already required by the pre-2002 review statute, under 38 U.S.C. § 7261(a). Pet. App. 16a-17a (quoting Pet. App. 8a- 11a).

     Question Presented: Must the Veterans Court ensure that the benefit-of-the-doubt rule was properly applied during the claims process in order to satisfy 38  U.S.C. § 7261(b)(1), which directs the Veterans Court to "take due account" of VA's  application of that rule?

     Holding: The VA’s determination that the evidence regarding a service-re­lated disability claim is in “approximate balance” is a predominantly factual determination reviewed only for clear error.

     Result: Affirmed.

     Voting Breakdown: Justice Thomas delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Alito, Sotomayor, Kagan, Kavanaugh, and Barrett joined.  Justice Jackson filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Gorsuch joined.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     • For petitioners: Melanie L. Bostwick, Washington, D. C.
     • For respondent: Sopan Joshi, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C.
     
     

     Website Link to Opinion Summary: Here.

     Apple Podcast Link to Opinion Summary: Here.

     ]]>0b745f1c-16bf-445e-a9e1-7ebd6a49e7d8Wed, 16 Oct 2024 09:00:00 -040001:12:44falsefull2024992024Oral Argument: San Francisco v. EPA | Case No. 23-753 | Date Argued: 10/16/24Case Info: San Francisco v. EPA | Case No. 23-753 | Date Argued: 10/16/24 | Date Decided: 3/4/25

     Link to Docket: Here.

     Background:

     Congress designed the Clean Water Act (CWA or the Act) to ensure that anyone holding a discharge permit issued under the Act has notice of how much they must control their discharges to comply with the law. The CWA requires that the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and authorized states provide this notice by prescribing specific pollutant limitations in the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permits they issue. Consistent with its text, this Court and the Second Circuit have read the Act to require EPA and states to develop specific limits to achieve goals for surface waters, called water quality standards.

     Parting with these decisions, the Ninth Circuit held here that EPA may issue permits that contain generic prohibitions against violating water quality standards. Rather than specify pollutant limits that tell the permitholder how much they need to control their discharges as required by the CWA, these prohibitions effectively tell permitholders nothing more than not to cause "too much" pollution. These generic water quality terms expose San Francisco and numerous permitholders nationwide to enforcement actions while failing to tell them how much they need to limit or treat their discharges to comply with the Act.

     Question Presented: Whether the Clean Water Act allows EPA (or an authorized state) to impose  generic prohibitions in National Pollutant Discharge Elimination  System (NPDES) permits that subject permit holders to enforcement for exceedances of water quality standards without identifying specific limits to which their  discharges must conform.

     Holding: Section 1311(b)(1)(C) does not authorize the EPA to include “end­ result” provisions in NPDES permits. Determining what steps a per­mittee must take to ensure that water quality standards are met is the EPA’s responsibility, and Congress has given it the tools needed to make that determination.

     Result: Reversed and remanded.

     Voting Breakdown: Justice Alito delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas and Kavanaugh joined.  Justice Gorsuch joined as to all but Part II.  Justices Sotomayor, Kagan, Barrett, and Jackson joined as to Part II. Justice Barrett filed an opinion dissent­ing in part, in which Justices Sotomayor, Kagan, and Jackson joined.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     • For petitioner: Tara M. Steeley, Deputy City Attorney, San Francisco, Cal.
     • For respondent: Frederick Liu, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C
     
     

     Website Link to Oral Arguments: Here.

     Apple Podcast Link to Oral Arguments: Here.

     ]]>Case Info: San Francisco v. EPA | Case No. 23-753 | Date Argued: 10/16/24 | Date Decided: 3/4/25

     Link to Docket: Here.

     Background:

     Congress designed the Clean Water Act (CWA or the Act) to ensure that anyone holding a discharge permit issued under the Act has notice of how much they must control their discharges to comply with the law. The CWA requires that the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and authorized states provide this notice by prescribing specific pollutant limitations in the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permits they issue. Consistent with its text, this Court and the Second Circuit have read the Act to require EPA and states to develop specific limits to achieve goals for surface waters, called water quality standards.

     Parting with these decisions, the Ninth Circuit held here that EPA may issue permits that contain generic prohibitions against violating water quality standards. Rather than specify pollutant limits that tell the permitholder how much they need to control their discharges as required by the CWA, these prohibitions effectively tell permitholders nothing more than not to cause "too much" pollution. These generic water quality terms expose San Francisco and numerous permitholders nationwide to enforcement actions while failing to tell them how much they need to limit or treat their discharges to comply with the Act.

     Question Presented: Whether the Clean Water Act allows EPA (or an authorized state) to impose  generic prohibitions in National Pollutant Discharge Elimination  System (NPDES) permits that subject permit holders to enforcement for exceedances of water quality standards without identifying specific limits to which their  discharges must conform.

     Holding: Section 1311(b)(1)(C) does not authorize the EPA to include “end­ result” provisions in NPDES permits. Determining what steps a per­mittee must take to ensure that water quality standards are met is the EPA’s responsibility, and Congress has given it the tools needed to make that determination.

     Result: Reversed and remanded.

     Voting Breakdown: Justice Alito delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas and Kavanaugh joined.  Justice Gorsuch joined as to all but Part II.  Justices Sotomayor, Kagan, Barrett, and Jackson joined as to Part II. Justice Barrett filed an opinion dissent­ing in part, in which Justices Sotomayor, Kagan, and Jackson joined.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     • For petitioner: Tara M. Steeley, Deputy City Attorney, San Francisco, Cal.
     • For respondent: Frederick Liu, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C
     
     

     Website Link to Oral Arguments: Here.

     Apple Podcast Link to Oral Arguments: Here.

     ]]>6c7d8855-86fc-4fa3-9e45-edf9187daa93Wed, 16 Oct 2024 09:00:00 -040001:37:33falsefull2024882024Oral Argument: Bouarfa v. Mayorkas, Sec. of Homeland Security | Case No. 23-583 | Date Argued: 10/15/24Case Info: Bouarfa v. Mayorkas, Sec. of Homeland Security | Case No. 23-583 | Date Argued: 10/15/24 | Date Decided: 12/10/24

     Link to Docket: Here.

     Background:

     When considering whether to approve a petition for an immigrant visa, the government must adhere to certain nondiscretionary criteria. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1154 (c) (providing that "[n]o petition shall be approved" if the individual seeking a visa has previously entered a marriage "for the purpose of evading the immigration laws"). When a visa petition is denied based on a petitioner's failure to satisfy such a nondiscretionary requirement, it is generally understood that the petitioner has a right to judicial review of that decision.

     Once a visa petition has been approved, the government has the power to revoke approval of the visa petition for "good and sufficient cause" pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1155. The circuits are in open conflict over whether judicial review is available when the government revokes an approved petition on the ground that it had initially misapplied nondiscretionary criteria during the approval process. The Sixth and Ninth Circuits hold that judicial review is available under these circumstances, but the Second, Third, Seventh, and now the Eleventh Circuit all hold that revocations are "discretionary" decisions for which there is no right to judicial review, even when they are based on a misapplication of the same nondiscretionary criteria that would be reviewable if the petition had originally been denied.

     Question Presented: Whether a visa petitioner may obtain judicial review when an approved petition is revoked on the basis of nondiscretionary criteria.

     Holding: Revocation of an approved visa petition under § 1155 based on a sham-marriage determination by the Secretary is the kind of discretion­ary decision that falls within the purview of § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii), which strips federal courts of jurisdiction to review certain actions “in the discretion of ” the agency.

     Result: Affirmed.

     Voting Breakdown: Justice Jackson delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. No justice filed a concurring or dissenting opinion.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     • For petitioner: Samir Deger-Sen, New York, N. Y.
     • For respondents: Colleen R. Sinzdak, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C.
     
     

     Website Link to Opinion Summary: Here.

     Apple Podcast Link to Opinion Summary: Here.

     ]]>Case Info: Bouarfa v. Mayorkas, Sec. of Homeland Security | Case No. 23-583 | Date Argued: 10/15/24 | Date Decided: 12/10/24

     Link to Docket: Here.

     Background:

     When considering whether to approve a petition for an immigrant visa, the government must adhere to certain nondiscretionary criteria. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1154 (c) (providing that "[n]o petition shall be approved" if the individual seeking a visa has previously entered a marriage "for the purpose of evading the immigration laws"). When a visa petition is denied based on a petitioner's failure to satisfy such a nondiscretionary requirement, it is generally understood that the petitioner has a right to judicial review of that decision.

     Once a visa petition has been approved, the government has the power to revoke approval of the visa petition for "good and sufficient cause" pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1155. The circuits are in open conflict over whether judicial review is available when the government revokes an approved petition on the ground that it had initially misapplied nondiscretionary criteria during the approval process. The Sixth and Ninth Circuits hold that judicial review is available under these circumstances, but the Second, Third, Seventh, and now the Eleventh Circuit all hold that revocations are "discretionary" decisions for which there is no right to judicial review, even when they are based on a misapplication of the same nondiscretionary criteria that would be reviewable if the petition had originally been denied.

     Question Presented: Whether a visa petitioner may obtain judicial review when an approved petition is revoked on the basis of nondiscretionary criteria.

     Holding: Revocation of an approved visa petition under § 1155 based on a sham-marriage determination by the Secretary is the kind of discretion­ary decision that falls within the purview of § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii), which strips federal courts of jurisdiction to review certain actions “in the discretion of ” the agency.

     Result: Affirmed.

     Voting Breakdown: Justice Jackson delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. No justice filed a concurring or dissenting opinion.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     • For petitioner: Samir Deger-Sen, New York, N. Y.
     • For respondents: Colleen R. Sinzdak, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C.
     
     

     Website Link to Opinion Summary: Here.

     Apple Podcast Link to Opinion Summary: Here.

     ]]>6bfcd18b-451b-4368-9d4e-21eca063c9abTue, 15 Oct 2024 09:00:00 -040049:19falsefull2024772024Oral Argument: Medical Marijuana, Inc. v. Horn | Case No. 23-365 | Date Argued: 10/15/24Case Info: Medical Marijuana, Inc. v. Horn | Case No. 23-365 | Date Argued: 10/15/24 | Date Decided: 4/2/25

     Link to Docket: Here.

     Background:

     The Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) creates a civil treble-damages action for “[a]ny person injured in his business or property by reason of” certain offenses. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c).

     Question Presented: Whether economic harms resulting from personal injuries are injuries to “business or property by reason of” the defendant's acts for purposes of civil RICO.

     Holding: Under civil RICO, §1964(c), a plaintiff may seek treble damages for business or property loss even if the loss resulted from a personal injury.

     Result: Affirmed and remanded.

     Voting Breakdown: Justice Barrett delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Justices Sotomayor, Kagan, Gorsuch, and Jackson joined.  Justice Jackson filed a concur­ring opinion.  Justice Thomas filed a dissenting opinion.  Justice Kavanaugh filed a dissenting opinion, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito joined.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     • For petitioners: Lisa S. Blatt, Washington, D.C.
     • For respondent: Easha Anand, Stanford, Cal.
     
     

     Website Link to Opinion Summary: Here.

     Apple Podcast Link to Opinion Summary: Here.

     ]]>Case Info: Medical Marijuana, Inc. v. Horn | Case No. 23-365 | Date Argued: 10/15/24 | Date Decided: 4/2/25

     Link to Docket: Here.

     Background:

     The Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) creates a civil treble-damages action for “[a]ny person injured in his business or property by reason of” certain offenses. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c).

     Question Presented: Whether economic harms resulting from personal injuries are injuries to “business or property by reason of” the defendant's acts for purposes of civil RICO.

     Holding: Under civil RICO, §1964(c), a plaintiff may seek treble damages for business or property loss even if the loss resulted from a personal injury.

     Result: Affirmed and remanded.

     Voting Breakdown: Justice Barrett delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Justices Sotomayor, Kagan, Gorsuch, and Jackson joined.  Justice Jackson filed a concur­ring opinion.  Justice Thomas filed a dissenting opinion.  Justice Kavanaugh filed a dissenting opinion, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito joined.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     • For petitioners: Lisa S. Blatt, Washington, D.C.
     • For respondent: Easha Anand, Stanford, Cal.
     
     

     Website Link to Opinion Summary: Here.

     Apple Podcast Link to Opinion Summary: Here.

     ]]>d231aea0-90c6-4597-b822-dd60549dd4efTue, 15 Oct 2024 09:00:00 -040001:08:18falsefull2024662024Oral Argument: Glossip v. Oklahoma | Case No. 22-7466 | Date Argued: 10/9/24Case Info: Glossip v. Oklahoma | Case No. 22-7466 | Date Argued: 10/9/24 | Date Decided: 2/25/25

     Link to Docket: Here.

     Questions Presented:

     1. Whether the State's suppression of the key prosecution witness's admission he was under the care of a psychiatrist and failure to correct that witness's false testimony about that care and related diagnosis violate the due process of law.
     2. Whether the entirety of the suppressed evidence must be considered when  assessing the materiality of  Brady and Napue claims.
     3. Whether due process of law requires reversal, where a capital conviction  is so infected with errors that the State no longer seeks to defend it.
     
     

     Holdings:

     1. This Court has jurisdiction to review the OCCA’s judgment.
     2. The prosecution violated its constitutional obligation to correct false testimony.
     
     

     Result: Reversed and remanded.

     Voting Breakdown: Justice Sotomayor delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Kagan, Kavanaugh, and Jackson joined and in which Justice Barrett joined as to Part II. Justice Barrett filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part.  Justice Thomas filed a dissenting opinion in which Justice Alito joined and in which Justice Barrett joined as to Parts IV– A–1, IV–A–2, and IV–A–3. Justice Gorsuch took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     • For petitioner: Seth P. Waxman, Washington, D. C.
     • For respondent in support of petitioner: Paul D. Clement, Alexandria, Va.
     • For Court-appointed amicus curiae in support of judgment below: Christopher G. Michel, Washington, D. C.
     
     

     Website Link to Opinion Summary: Here.

     Apple Podcast Link to Opinion Summary: Here.

     ]]>Case Info: Glossip v. Oklahoma | Case No. 22-7466 | Date Argued: 10/9/24 | Date Decided: 2/25/25

     Link to Docket: Here.

     Questions Presented:

     1. Whether the State's suppression of the key prosecution witness's admission he was under the care of a psychiatrist and failure to correct that witness's false testimony about that care and related diagnosis violate the due process of law.
     2. Whether the entirety of the suppressed evidence must be considered when  assessing the materiality of  Brady and Napue claims.
     3. Whether due process of law requires reversal, where a capital conviction  is so infected with errors that the State no longer seeks to defend it.
     
     

     Holdings:

     1. This Court has jurisdiction to review the OCCA’s judgment.
     2. The prosecution violated its constitutional obligation to correct false testimony.
     
     

     Result: Reversed and remanded.

     Voting Breakdown: Justice Sotomayor delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Kagan, Kavanaugh, and Jackson joined and in which Justice Barrett joined as to Part II. Justice Barrett filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part.  Justice Thomas filed a dissenting opinion in which Justice Alito joined and in which Justice Barrett joined as to Parts IV– A–1, IV–A–2, and IV–A–3. Justice Gorsuch took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     • For petitioner: Seth P. Waxman, Washington, D. C.
     • For respondent in support of petitioner: Paul D. Clement, Alexandria, Va.
     • For Court-appointed amicus curiae in support of judgment below: Christopher G. Michel, Washington, D. C.
     
     

     Website Link to Opinion Summary: Here.

     Apple Podcast Link to Opinion Summary: Here.

     ]]>32f780e2-fc42-448e-8c6f-163574846a92Wed, 09 Oct 2024 09:00:00 -040001:43:02falsefull2024552024Oral Argument: Bondi, Att'y Gen. v. VanDerStok | Case No. 23-852 | Date Argued: 10/8/24Case Info: Bondi, Att'y Gen. v. VanDerStok | Case No. 23-852 | Date Argued: 10/8/24 | Date Decided: 3/26/25

     Link to Docket: Here.

     Background:

     In the Gun Control Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. 921 et seq., Congress imposed licensing, background-check, recordkeeping, and serialization requirements on persons engaged in the business of importing, manufacturing, or dealing in firearms. The Act defines a "firearm" to include "any weapon * * * which will or is designed to or may readily be converted to expel a projectile by the action of an explosive," as well as "the frame or receiver of any such weapon." 18 U.S.C. 921(a)(3)(A) and (B). In 2022, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives issued a regulation clarifying that certain products that can readily be converted into an operational firearm or a functional frame or receiver fall within that definition. See 87 Fed. Reg. 24,652 (Apr. 26, 2022) (codified in relevant part at 27 C.F.R. 478.11, 478.12(c)). The Fifth Circuit held that those regulatory provisions are inconsistent with the Act.

     Questions Presented:

     1. Whether "a weapon parts kit that is designed to or may readily be completed, assembled, restored, or otherwise converted to expel a projectile by the action of an explosive," 27 C.F.R. 478.11, is a "firearm" regulated by the Gun Control Act of 1968 (GCA); and
     2. Whether "a partially complete, disassembled, or nonfunctional frame or receiver" that is "designed to or may readily be completed, assembled, restored, or otherwise converted to function as a frame or receiver," 27 C.F.R. 478.12(c), is a "frame or receiver" regulated by the GCA.
     
     

     Holding: The ATF’s rule is not facially inconsistent with the GCA. The GCA’s statute’s text, context, and structure make clear the GCA reaches some weapon parts kits and unfinished frames or receivers.

     Result: Reversed and remanded.

     Voting Breakdown: Justice Gorsuch delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Sotomayor, Kagan, Kavanaugh, Barrett, and Jackson joined.  Justices Sotomayor, Kavanaugh, and Jackson each filed concurring opinions.  Justices Thomas and Alito each filed dissenting opinions.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     • For petitioners: Elizabeth B. Prelogar, Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C.
     • For respondents: Peter A. Patterson, Washington, D. C.
     
     

     Website Link to Opinion Summary: Here.

     Apple Podcast Link to Opinion Summary: Here.

     ]]>Case Info: Bondi, Att'y Gen. v. VanDerStok | Case No. 23-852 | Date Argued: 10/8/24 | Date Decided: 3/26/25

     Link to Docket: Here.

     Background:

     In the Gun Control Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. 921 et seq., Congress imposed licensing, background-check, recordkeeping, and serialization requirements on persons engaged in the business of importing, manufacturing, or dealing in firearms. The Act defines a "firearm" to include "any weapon * * * which will or is designed to or may readily be converted to expel a projectile by the action of an explosive," as well as "the frame or receiver of any such weapon." 18 U.S.C. 921(a)(3)(A) and (B). In 2022, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives issued a regulation clarifying that certain products that can readily be converted into an operational firearm or a functional frame or receiver fall within that definition. See 87 Fed. Reg. 24,652 (Apr. 26, 2022) (codified in relevant part at 27 C.F.R. 478.11, 478.12(c)). The Fifth Circuit held that those regulatory provisions are inconsistent with the Act.

     Questions Presented:

     1. Whether "a weapon parts kit that is designed to or may readily be completed, assembled, restored, or otherwise converted to expel a projectile by the action of an explosive," 27 C.F.R. 478.11, is a "firearm" regulated by the Gun Control Act of 1968 (GCA); and
     2. Whether "a partially complete, disassembled, or nonfunctional frame or receiver" that is "designed to or may readily be completed, assembled, restored, or otherwise converted to function as a frame or receiver," 27 C.F.R. 478.12(c), is a "frame or receiver" regulated by the GCA.
     
     

     Holding: The ATF’s rule is not facially inconsistent with the GCA. The GCA’s statute’s text, context, and structure make clear the GCA reaches some weapon parts kits and unfinished frames or receivers.

     Result: Reversed and remanded.

     Voting Breakdown: Justice Gorsuch delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Sotomayor, Kagan, Kavanaugh, Barrett, and Jackson joined.  Justices Sotomayor, Kavanaugh, and Jackson each filed concurring opinions.  Justices Thomas and Alito each filed dissenting opinions.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     • For petitioners: Elizabeth B. Prelogar, Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C.
     • For respondents: Peter A. Patterson, Washington, D. C.
     
     

     Website Link to Opinion Summary: Here.

     Apple Podcast Link to Opinion Summary: Here.

     ]]>77603af9-d2e2-435e-b496-7a1fa6d348a8Tue, 08 Oct 2024 09:00:00 -040001:16:07falsefull2024442024Oral Argument: Lackey v. Stinnie | Case No. 23-621 | Date Argued: 10/8/24Case Info: Lackey v. Stinnie | Case No. 23-621 | Date Argued: 10/8/24 | Date Decided: 2/25/25

     Link to Docket: Here.

     Questions Presented:

     1. Whether a party must obtain a ruling that conclusively decides the merits in its favor, as opposed to merely predicting a likelihood of later success, to prevail on the merits under 42 U.S.C. § 1988.
     2. Whether a party must obtain an enduring change in the parties' legal relationship from a judicial act, as opposed to a non-judicial event that moots the case, to prevail under 42 U.S.C. § 1988.
     
     

     Holding: The plaintiff drivers here—who gained only preliminary injunctive relief before this action became moot—do not qualify as “prevailing part[ies]” eligible for attorney’s fees under §1988(b) because no court conclusively resolved their claims by granting enduring judicial relief on the merits that materially altered the legal relationship between the parties.

     Result: Reversed and remanded.

     Voting Breakdown: Chief Justice Roberts delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Justices Thomas, Alito, Kagan, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, and Barrett joined.  Justice Jackson filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Sotomayor joined.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     • For petitioner: Erika L. Maley, Solicitor General, Richmond, Va.; and Anthony A. Yang, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C. (for United States, as amicus curiae.)
     • For respondents: Brian D. Schmalzbach, Richmond, Va.
     
     

     Website Link to Opinion Summary: Here.

     Apple Podcast Link to Opinion Summary: Here.

     ]]>Case Info: Lackey v. Stinnie | Case No. 23-621 | Date Argued: 10/8/24 | Date Decided: 2/25/25

     Link to Docket: Here.

     Questions Presented:

     1. Whether a party must obtain a ruling that conclusively decides the merits in its favor, as opposed to merely predicting a likelihood of later success, to prevail on the merits under 42 U.S.C. § 1988.
     2. Whether a party must obtain an enduring change in the parties' legal relationship from a judicial act, as opposed to a non-judicial event that moots the case, to prevail under 42 U.S.C. § 1988.
     
     

     Holding: The plaintiff drivers here—who gained only preliminary injunctive relief before this action became moot—do not qualify as “prevailing part[ies]” eligible for attorney’s fees under §1988(b) because no court conclusively resolved their claims by granting enduring judicial relief on the merits that materially altered the legal relationship between the parties.

     Result: Reversed and remanded.

     Voting Breakdown: Chief Justice Roberts delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Justices Thomas, Alito, Kagan, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, and Barrett joined.  Justice Jackson filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Sotomayor joined.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     • For petitioner: Erika L. Maley, Solicitor General, Richmond, Va.; and Anthony A. Yang, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C. (for United States, as amicus curiae.)
     • For respondents: Brian D. Schmalzbach, Richmond, Va.
     
     

     Website Link to Opinion Summary: Here.

     Apple Podcast Link to Opinion Summary: Here.

     ]]>de0227a4-27ec-4fa4-8303-0a5a62c82298Tue, 08 Oct 2024 09:00:00 -040001:17:55falsefull2024332024Oral Argument: Royal Canin U.S.A., Inc. v. Wullschleger | Case No. 23-677 | Date Argued: 10/7/24Case Info: Royal Canin U.S.A., Inc. v. Wullschleger | Case No. 23-677 | Date Argued: 10/7/24 | Date Decided: 1/15/25

     Link to Docket: Here.

     Questions Presented:

     1. Whether such a post-removal amendment of the complaint defeats federal-question subject-matter jurisdiction.
     2. Whether such a post-removal amendment of the complaint precludes a district court from exercising supplemental jurisdiction over the plaintiffs remaining state-law claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367.
     
     

     Holding: When a plaintiff amends her complaint to delete the federal-law claims that enabled removal to federal court, leaving only state-law claims behind, the federal court loses supplemental jurisdiction over the state claims, and the case must be remanded to state court.

     Result: Affirmed.

     Voting Breakdown: Justice Kagan delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     • For petitioners: Katherine B. Wellington, Boston, Mass.
     • For respondents: Ashley C. Keller, Chicago, Ill.
     
     

     Website Link to Oral Argument: Here.

     Apple Podcast Link to Oral Argument: Here.

     ]]>Case Info: Royal Canin U.S.A., Inc. v. Wullschleger | Case No. 23-677 | Date Argued: 10/7/24 | Date Decided: 1/15/25

     Link to Docket: Here.

     Questions Presented:

     1. Whether such a post-removal amendment of the complaint defeats federal-question subject-matter jurisdiction.
     2. Whether such a post-removal amendment of the complaint precludes a district court from exercising supplemental jurisdiction over the plaintiffs remaining state-law claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367.
     
     

     Holding: When a plaintiff amends her complaint to delete the federal-law claims that enabled removal to federal court, leaving only state-law claims behind, the federal court loses supplemental jurisdiction over the state claims, and the case must be remanded to state court.

     Result: Affirmed.

     Voting Breakdown: Justice Kagan delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     • For petitioners: Katherine B. Wellington, Boston, Mass.
     • For respondents: Ashley C. Keller, Chicago, Ill.
     
     

     Website Link to Oral Argument: Here.

     Apple Podcast Link to Oral Argument: Here.

     ]]>f2535ab1-ff89-4845-94ee-999b8f8b177dMon, 07 Oct 2024 09:00:00 -040001:05:22falsefull2024222024Oral Argument: Williams v. Washington | Case No. 23-191 | Date Argued: 10/7/24Case Info: Williams v. Washington | Case No. 23-191 | Date Argued: 10/7/24 | Date Decided: 2/21/25

     Link to Docket: Here.

     Question Presented: Whether exhaustion of state administrative remedies is required to bring claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in state court.

     Holding: Where a state court’s application of a state exhaustion require­ment in effect immunizes state officials from §1983 claims challenging delays in the administrative process, state courts may not deny those §1983 claims on failure-to-exhaust grounds.

     Result: Reversed and remanded.

     Voting Result: Justice Kavanaugh delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Sotomayor, Kagan, and Jackson joined. Justice Thomas filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Alito, Gorsuch and Barrett joined as to Part II.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     • For petitioners: Adam G. Unikowsky, Washington, D. C.
     • For respondent: Edmund G. LaCour, Jr., Solicitor General, Montgomery, Ala.
     
     

     Website Link to Opinion Summary: Here.

     Apple Podcast Link to Opinion Summary: Here.

     ]]>Case Info: Williams v. Washington | Case No. 23-191 | Date Argued: 10/7/24 | Date Decided: 2/21/25

     Link to Docket: Here.

     Question Presented: Whether exhaustion of state administrative remedies is required to bring claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in state court.

     Holding: Where a state court’s application of a state exhaustion require­ment in effect immunizes state officials from §1983 claims challenging delays in the administrative process, state courts may not deny those §1983 claims on failure-to-exhaust grounds.

     Result: Reversed and remanded.

     Voting Result: Justice Kavanaugh delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Sotomayor, Kagan, and Jackson joined. Justice Thomas filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Alito, Gorsuch and Barrett joined as to Part II.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     • For petitioners: Adam G. Unikowsky, Washington, D. C.
     • For respondent: Edmund G. LaCour, Jr., Solicitor General, Montgomery, Ala.
     
     

     Website Link to Opinion Summary: Here.

     Apple Podcast Link to Opinion Summary: Here.

     ]]>c3905756-1225-41ae-98c8-cc138c8ccc12Mon, 07 Oct 2024 09:00:00 -040001:15:51falsefull2024112024Opinion Summary: Trump v. United States | Date Decided: 7/1/24 | Case No. 23-939The question presented in this case is: Whether and if so to what extent does a former President enjoy presidential immunity from criminal prosecution for conduct alleged to involve official acts during his tenure in office.

     The Supreme Court held: Under our constitutional structure of separated powers, the nature of Presidential power entitles a former President to absolute immunity from criminal prosecution for actions within his conclusive and preclusive constitutional authority. And he is entitled to at least presumptive immunity from prosecution for all his official acts. There is no immunity for unofficial acts.

     TIMESTAMPS:

     00:00 Introduction

     00:14 Question Presented

     00:30 Voting Breakdown

     01:10 Chief Justice Roberts Majority Opinion

     02:08 Holding

     21:32 Justice Thomas Concurring Opinion

     23:48 Justice Barrett Opinion Concurring in Part

     28:59 Justice Sotomayor Dissenting Opinion

     38:40 Justice Jackson Dissenting Opinion

     ]]>The question presented in this case is: Whether and if so to what extent does a former President enjoy presidential immunity from criminal prosecution for conduct alleged to involve official acts during his tenure in office.

     The Supreme Court held: Under our constitutional structure of separated powers, the nature of Presidential power entitles a former President to absolute immunity from criminal prosecution for actions within his conclusive and preclusive constitutional authority. And he is entitled to at least presumptive immunity from prosecution for all his official acts. There is no immunity for unofficial acts.

     TIMESTAMPS:

     00:00 Introduction

     00:14 Question Presented

     00:30 Voting Breakdown

     01:10 Chief Justice Roberts Majority Opinion

     02:08 Holding

     21:32 Justice Thomas Concurring Opinion

     23:48 Justice Barrett Opinion Concurring in Part

     28:59 Justice Sotomayor Dissenting Opinion

     38:40 Justice Jackson Dissenting Opinion

     ]]>def5e631-daa2-475a-bd2a-1bf91f855fedMon, 01 Jul 2024 09:00:00 -040042:56falsefull20231251252023Trump v. United States | Case No. 23-939 | Date Argued: 04/25/24The Question Presented is: Whether and if so to what extent does a former President enjoy Presidential immunity from criminal prosecution for conduct alleged to involve official acts during his tenure in office.

     Argued:

     For Petitioner: D. John Sauer; For Respondent: Michael R. Dreeben, Counselor to the Special Counsel, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.

     TIMESTAMPS:

     00:00 Introduction

     00:05 Petitioner Opening Statement Begins

     1:58 Petitioner Free for All Questions Begin

     27:18 Petitioner Sequential Questions Begin

     57:34 Petitioner Questions End, Respondent Opening Statement Begins

     59:27 Respondent Free for All Questions Begin

     128:11 Respondent Sequential Questions Begin

     2:39:15 Respondent Questions End, Rebuttal (D. John Sauer said he had nothing further)

     ]]>The Question Presented is: Whether and if so to what extent does a former President enjoy Presidential immunity from criminal prosecution for conduct alleged to involve official acts during his tenure in office.

     Argued:

     For Petitioner: D. John Sauer; For Respondent: Michael R. Dreeben, Counselor to the Special Counsel, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.

     TIMESTAMPS:

     00:00 Introduction

     00:05 Petitioner Opening Statement Begins

     1:58 Petitioner Free for All Questions Begin

     27:18 Petitioner Sequential Questions Begin

     57:34 Petitioner Questions End, Respondent Opening Statement Begins

     59:27 Respondent Free for All Questions Begin

     128:11 Respondent Sequential Questions Begin

     2:39:15 Respondent Questions End, Rebuttal (D. John Sauer said he had nothing further)

     ]]>08fa1860-8e9d-4fc3-aae6-965c7a3b099cThu, 25 Apr 2024 09:00:00 -040002:39:18falsefull20231221222023Oral Argument: Moyle v. United States | Case No. 23-726 | Date Argued: 4/24/24 | Date Decided: 6/27/24Oral Argument: Moyle v. United States | Case No. 23-726 | Date Argued: 4/24/24 | Date Decided: 6/27/24

     Case consolidated with Idaho v. United States, Case No. 23-727.

     Link to Docket: Here.

     Question Presented: Whether EMTALA preempts state laws that protect human life and prohibit abortions, like Idaho's Defense of Life Act.

     Holding: Certiorari dismissed as improvidently granted.

     Result: Dismissed.

     Voting Breakdown: 5-4. Per curiam opinion. Justice Kagan filed a concurring opinion, in which Justice Sotomayor joined, and in which Justice Jackson joined as to Part II. Justice Barrett filed a concurring opinion, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Kavanaugh joined. Justice Jackson filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part. Justice Alito filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Thomas joined, and Justice Gorsuch joined as to Parts I and II.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     • For Petitioner: Joshua N. Turner, Chief of Constitutional Litigation and Policy, Boise, Idaho.
     • For Respondent: Elizabeth B. Prelogar, Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. VIDED.
     
     ]]>Oral Argument: Moyle v. United States | Case No. 23-726 | Date Argued: 4/24/24 | Date Decided: 6/27/24

     Case consolidated with Idaho v. United States, Case No. 23-727.

     Link to Docket: Here.

     Question Presented: Whether EMTALA preempts state laws that protect human life and prohibit abortions, like Idaho's Defense of Life Act.

     Holding: Certiorari dismissed as improvidently granted.

     Result: Dismissed.

     Voting Breakdown: 5-4. Per curiam opinion. Justice Kagan filed a concurring opinion, in which Justice Sotomayor joined, and in which Justice Jackson joined as to Part II. Justice Barrett filed a concurring opinion, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Kavanaugh joined. Justice Jackson filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part. Justice Alito filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Thomas joined, and Justice Gorsuch joined as to Parts I and II.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     • For Petitioner: Joshua N. Turner, Chief of Constitutional Litigation and Policy, Boise, Idaho.
     • For Respondent: Elizabeth B. Prelogar, Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. VIDED.
     
     ]]>6763a214-6080-463b-a00c-e66860ef38d3Wed, 24 Apr 2024 09:00:00 -040001:53:01falsefull202367672023Oral Argument: Starbucks Corp. v. McKinney | Case No. 23-367 | Date Argued: 4/23/24 | Date Decided: 6/13/24Oral Argument: Starbucks Corp. v. McKinney | Case No. 23-367 | Date Argued: 4/23/24 | Date Decided: 6/13/24

     Link to Docket: Here.

     Background:

     Under the National Labor Relations Act, the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) issues, prosecutes, and adjudicates complaints alleging that employers committed unfair labor practices. 29 U.S.C. § 160(b). Section 10(j) of the Act authorizes federal district courts, while the NLRB adjudication remains pending, to grant preliminary injunctive relief at the NLRB's request "as [the court] deems just and proper." Id. § 160(j).

     Question Presented: Whether courts must evaluate the NLRB's requests for section 10(j) injunctions under the traditional, stringent four-factor test for preliminary injunctions or under some other more lenient standard.

     Holding: When considering the National Labor Relations Board's request for a preliminary injunction under Section 10(j) of the National Labor Relations Act, district courts must apply the traditional four factors articulated in Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.

     Result: Vacated and remanded.

     Voting Breakdown: 8-1. Justice Thomas delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Alito, Sotomayor, Kagan, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, and Barrett joined. Justice Jackson filed an opinion concurring in part, dissenting in part, and concurring in the judgment.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     • For Petitioner: Lisa S. Blatt, Washington, D.C.
     • For Respondent: Austin Raynor, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.
     
     ]]>Oral Argument: Starbucks Corp. v. McKinney | Case No. 23-367 | Date Argued: 4/23/24 | Date Decided: 6/13/24

     Link to Docket: Here.

     Background:

     Under the National Labor Relations Act, the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) issues, prosecutes, and adjudicates complaints alleging that employers committed unfair labor practices. 29 U.S.C. § 160(b). Section 10(j) of the Act authorizes federal district courts, while the NLRB adjudication remains pending, to grant preliminary injunctive relief at the NLRB's request "as [the court] deems just and proper." Id. § 160(j).

     Question Presented: Whether courts must evaluate the NLRB's requests for section 10(j) injunctions under the traditional, stringent four-factor test for preliminary injunctions or under some other more lenient standard.

     Holding: When considering the National Labor Relations Board's request for a preliminary injunction under Section 10(j) of the National Labor Relations Act, district courts must apply the traditional four factors articulated in Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.

     Result: Vacated and remanded.

     Voting Breakdown: 8-1. Justice Thomas delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Alito, Sotomayor, Kagan, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, and Barrett joined. Justice Jackson filed an opinion concurring in part, dissenting in part, and concurring in the judgment.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     • For Petitioner: Lisa S. Blatt, Washington, D.C.
     • For Respondent: Austin Raynor, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.
     
     ]]>93091b1d-7ef6-488c-bd77-e1f0a5e269b2Tue, 23 Apr 2024 09:00:00 -040052:18falsefull202365652023Oral Argument: Department of State v. Muñoz | Case No. 23-334 | Date Argued: 4/23/24 | Date Decided: 6/21/24Oral Argument: Department of State v. Muñoz | Case No. 23-334 | Date Argued: 4/23/24 | Date Decided: 6/21/24

     Link to Docket: Here.

     Background:

     Under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), 8 U.S.C. 1101 et seq., the decision to grant or deny a visa application rests with a consular officer in the Department of State. Under 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(3)(A)(ii), any noncitizen whom a consular officer "knows, or has reasonable ground to believe, seeks to enter the United States to engage solely, principally, or incidentally in* * * unlawful activity" is ineligible to receive a visa or be admitted to the United States.

     Question Presented:

     1. Whether a consular officer's refusal of a visa to a U.S. citizen's noncitizen spouse impinges upon a constitutionally protected interest of the citizen.
     2. Whether, assuming that such a constitutional interest exists, notifying a visa applicant that he was deemed inadmissible under 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(3)(A)(ii) suffices to provide any process that is due.
     
     

     Holding: A U.S. citizen does not have a fundamental liberty interest in her noncitizen spouse being admitted to the country.

     Result: Reversed and remanded.

     Voting Breakdown: 6-3. Justice Barrett delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Alito, and Kavanaugh joined. Justice Gorsuch filed an opinion concurring in the judgment. Justice Sotomayor filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Kagan and Jackson joined.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     • For Petitioner: Curtis E. Gannon, Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.
     • For Respondents: Eric T. Lee, Southfeld, Mich.
     
     ]]>Oral Argument: Department of State v. Muñoz | Case No. 23-334 | Date Argued: 4/23/24 | Date Decided: 6/21/24

     Link to Docket: Here.

     Background:

     Under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), 8 U.S.C. 1101 et seq., the decision to grant or deny a visa application rests with a consular officer in the Department of State. Under 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(3)(A)(ii), any noncitizen whom a consular officer "knows, or has reasonable ground to believe, seeks to enter the United States to engage solely, principally, or incidentally in* * * unlawful activity" is ineligible to receive a visa or be admitted to the United States.

     Question Presented:

     1. Whether a consular officer's refusal of a visa to a U.S. citizen's noncitizen spouse impinges upon a constitutionally protected interest of the citizen.
     2. Whether, assuming that such a constitutional interest exists, notifying a visa applicant that he was deemed inadmissible under 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(3)(A)(ii) suffices to provide any process that is due.
     
     

     Holding: A U.S. citizen does not have a fundamental liberty interest in her noncitizen spouse being admitted to the country.

     Result: Reversed and remanded.

     Voting Breakdown: 6-3. Justice Barrett delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Alito, and Kavanaugh joined. Justice Gorsuch filed an opinion concurring in the judgment. Justice Sotomayor filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Kagan and Jackson joined.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     • For Petitioner: Curtis E. Gannon, Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.
     • For Respondents: Eric T. Lee, Southfeld, Mich.
     
     ]]>d2e636af-185c-46f8-889e-bd2212bdf6f9Tue, 23 Apr 2024 09:00:00 -040001:31:25falsefull202365652023Oral Argument: City of Grants Pass v. Johnson | Case No. 23-175 | Date Argued: 4/22/24 | Date Decided: 6/28/24Oral Argument: City of Grants Pass v. Johnson | Case No. 23-175 | Date Argued: 4/22/24 | Date Decided: 6/28/24

     Link to Docket: Here.

     Background:

     In Martin v. City of Boise, 920 F.3d 584 (9th Cir. 2019), the Ninth Circuit held that the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause prevents cities from enforcing criminal restrictions on public camping unless the person has "access to adequate temporary shelter." Id. at 617 & n.8. In this case, the Ninth Circuit extended Martin to a classwide injunction prohibiting the City of Grants Pass from enforcing its public-camping ordinance even though civil citations. That decision cemented a conflict with the California Supreme Court and the Eleventh Circuit, which have upheld similar ordinances, and entrenched a broader split on the application of the Eighth Amendment to purportedly involuntary conduct. The Ninth Circuit nevertheless denied rehearing en banc by a 14-to-13 vote.

     Question Presented: Does the enforcement of generally applicable laws regulating camping on public property constitute "cruel and unusual punishment" prohibited by the Eighth Amendment?

     Holding: The enforcement of generally applicable laws regulating camping on public property does not constitute "cruel and unusual punishment" prohibited by the Eighth Amendment.

     Result: Reversed and remanded.

     Voting Breakdown: 6-3. Justice Gorsuch delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Alito, Kavanaugh, and Barrett joined. Justice Thomas filed a concurring opinion. Justice Sotomayor filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Kagan and Jackson joined.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     • For Petitioner: Theane D. Evangelis, Los Angeles, Cal.
     • For United States, as Amicus Curiae: Edwin S. Kneedler, Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.
     • For Respondents: Kelsi B. Corkran, Washington, D.C.
     
     ]]>Oral Argument: City of Grants Pass v. Johnson | Case No. 23-175 | Date Argued: 4/22/24 | Date Decided: 6/28/24

     Link to Docket: Here.

     Background:

     In Martin v. City of Boise, 920 F.3d 584 (9th Cir. 2019), the Ninth Circuit held that the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause prevents cities from enforcing criminal restrictions on public camping unless the person has "access to adequate temporary shelter." Id. at 617 & n.8. In this case, the Ninth Circuit extended Martin to a classwide injunction prohibiting the City of Grants Pass from enforcing its public-camping ordinance even though civil citations. That decision cemented a conflict with the California Supreme Court and the Eleventh Circuit, which have upheld similar ordinances, and entrenched a broader split on the application of the Eighth Amendment to purportedly involuntary conduct. The Ninth Circuit nevertheless denied rehearing en banc by a 14-to-13 vote.

     Question Presented: Does the enforcement of generally applicable laws regulating camping on public property constitute "cruel and unusual punishment" prohibited by the Eighth Amendment?

     Holding: The enforcement of generally applicable laws regulating camping on public property does not constitute "cruel and unusual punishment" prohibited by the Eighth Amendment.

     Result: Reversed and remanded.

     Voting Breakdown: 6-3. Justice Gorsuch delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Alito, Kavanaugh, and Barrett joined. Justice Thomas filed a concurring opinion. Justice Sotomayor filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Kagan and Jackson joined.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     • For Petitioner: Theane D. Evangelis, Los Angeles, Cal.
     • For United States, as Amicus Curiae: Edwin S. Kneedler, Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.
     • For Respondents: Kelsi B. Corkran, Washington, D.C.
     
     ]]>a1f72af8-3520-4c72-a759-dc82506d30f6Mon, 22 Apr 2024 09:00:00 -040002:25:57falsefull202364642023Oral Argument: Smith v. Spizzirri | Case No. 22-1218 Date Argued: 4/22/24 | Date Decided: 5/16/24Oral Argument: Smith v. Spizzirri | Case No. 22-1218 Date Argued: 4/22/24 | Date Decided: 5/16/24

     Link to Docket: Here.

     Background:

     This case presents a clear and intractable conflict regarding an important statutory question under the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), 9 U.S.C.1-16. The FAA establishes procedures for enforcing arbitration agreements in federal court. Under Section 3 of the Act, when a court finds a dispute subject to arbitration, the court "shall on application of one of the parties stay the trial of the action until [the] arbitration" has concluded. 9 U.S.C. 3 (emphasis added). While six circuits read Section 3's plain text as mandating a stay, four other circuits have carved out an atextual "exception" to Section 3's stay requirement-granting district courts discretion to dismiss (not stay) if the entire dispute is subject to arbitration. In the proceedings below, the Ninth Circuit declared itself bound by circuit precedent to affirm the district court's "discretion to dismiss," despite "the plain text of the FAA appear[ing] to mandate a stay." The panel candidly acknowledged the 6-4 circuit conflict, and a two-judge concurrence emphasized "the courts of appeals are divided," asserted the Ninth Circuit's position is wrong, and urged "the Supreme Court to take up this question"-an issue this Court has twice confronted but reserved in the past.

     Question Presented: Whether Section 3 of the FAA requires district courts to stay a lawsuit pending arbitration, or whether district courts have discretion to dismiss when all claims are subject to arbitration.

     Holding: When a district court finds that a lawsuit involves an arbitrable dispute and a party has requested a stay of the court proceeding pending arbitration, Section 3 of the Federal Arbitration Act compels the court to issue a stay, and the court lacks discretion to dismiss the suit.

     Result: Reversed and remanded.

     Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Sotomayor delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     • For Petitioner: Daniel L. Geyser, Dallas, Tex.
     • For Respondents: E. Joshua Rosenkranz, New York, N. Y.
     
     ]]>Oral Argument: Smith v. Spizzirri | Case No. 22-1218 Date Argued: 4/22/24 | Date Decided: 5/16/24

     Link to Docket: Here.

     Background:

     This case presents a clear and intractable conflict regarding an important statutory question under the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), 9 U.S.C.1-16. The FAA establishes procedures for enforcing arbitration agreements in federal court. Under Section 3 of the Act, when a court finds a dispute subject to arbitration, the court "shall on application of one of the parties stay the trial of the action until [the] arbitration" has concluded. 9 U.S.C. 3 (emphasis added). While six circuits read Section 3's plain text as mandating a stay, four other circuits have carved out an atextual "exception" to Section 3's stay requirement-granting district courts discretion to dismiss (not stay) if the entire dispute is subject to arbitration. In the proceedings below, the Ninth Circuit declared itself bound by circuit precedent to affirm the district court's "discretion to dismiss," despite "the plain text of the FAA appear[ing] to mandate a stay." The panel candidly acknowledged the 6-4 circuit conflict, and a two-judge concurrence emphasized "the courts of appeals are divided," asserted the Ninth Circuit's position is wrong, and urged "the Supreme Court to take up this question"-an issue this Court has twice confronted but reserved in the past.

     Question Presented: Whether Section 3 of the FAA requires district courts to stay a lawsuit pending arbitration, or whether district courts have discretion to dismiss when all claims are subject to arbitration.

     Holding: When a district court finds that a lawsuit involves an arbitrable dispute and a party has requested a stay of the court proceeding pending arbitration, Section 3 of the Federal Arbitration Act compels the court to issue a stay, and the court lacks discretion to dismiss the suit.

     Result: Reversed and remanded.

     Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Sotomayor delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     • For Petitioner: Daniel L. Geyser, Dallas, Tex.
     • For Respondents: E. Joshua Rosenkranz, New York, N. Y.
     
     ]]>bd25e4b9-0057-458b-b097-9d72833f8c33Mon, 22 Apr 2024 09:00:00 -040043:16falsefull202363632023Oral Argument: Thornell v. Jones | Case No. 22-982 | Date Argued: 4/17/24 | Date Decided: 5/30/24Oral Argument: Thornell v. Jones | Case No. 22-982 | Date Argued: 4/17/24 | Date Decided: 5/30/24

     Link to Docket: Here.

     Background:

     Over thirty years ago, Respondent Danny Lee Jones beat Robert Weaver to death and also beat and strangled Weaver's 7-year-old daughter, Tisha, to death, for which he was convicted and sentenced to death. The district court denied habeas relief following an evidentiary hearing on Jones's ineffective-assistance-of-sentencing-counsel claims. But a Ninth Circuit panel reversed the district court, giving no deference to the district court's detailed factual findings. Judge Mark Bennett authored a nine-judge dissent from the denial of en banc rehearing.

     Question Presented: Did the Ninth Circuit violate this Court's precedents by employing a flawed methodology for assessing Strickland prejudice when it disregarded the district court's factual and credibility findings and excluded evidence in aggravation and the State's rebuttal when it reversed the district court and granted habeas relief?

     Holding: The U.S. Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit's grant of habeas relief on Danny Lee Jones's ineffective assistance of counsel claim was based on an erroneous interpretation and application of Strickland v. Washington.

     Result: Reversed and remanded.

     Voting Breakdown: 6-3. Justice Alito delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, and Barrett joined. Justice Sotomayor filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Kagan joined. Justice Jackson filed a dissenting opinion.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     • For Petitioner: Jason D. Lewis, Deputy Solicitor General, Phoenix, Ariz.
     • For Respondent: Jean-Claude Andre, Santa Monica, Cal.
     
     

     Timestamps:

     ]]>Oral Argument: Thornell v. Jones | Case No. 22-982 | Date Argued: 4/17/24 | Date Decided: 5/30/24

     Link to Docket: Here.

     Background:

     Over thirty years ago, Respondent Danny Lee Jones beat Robert Weaver to death and also beat and strangled Weaver's 7-year-old daughter, Tisha, to death, for which he was convicted and sentenced to death. The district court denied habeas relief following an evidentiary hearing on Jones's ineffective-assistance-of-sentencing-counsel claims. But a Ninth Circuit panel reversed the district court, giving no deference to the district court's detailed factual findings. Judge Mark Bennett authored a nine-judge dissent from the denial of en banc rehearing.

     Question Presented: Did the Ninth Circuit violate this Court's precedents by employing a flawed methodology for assessing Strickland prejudice when it disregarded the district court's factual and credibility findings and excluded evidence in aggravation and the State's rebuttal when it reversed the district court and granted habeas relief?

     Holding: The U.S. Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit's grant of habeas relief on Danny Lee Jones's ineffective assistance of counsel claim was based on an erroneous interpretation and application of Strickland v. Washington.

     Result: Reversed and remanded.

     Voting Breakdown: 6-3. Justice Alito delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, and Barrett joined. Justice Sotomayor filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Kagan joined. Justice Jackson filed a dissenting opinion.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     • For Petitioner: Jason D. Lewis, Deputy Solicitor General, Phoenix, Ariz.
     • For Respondent: Jean-Claude Andre, Santa Monica, Cal.
     
     

     Timestamps:

     ]]>4eec22d0-7969-44fd-9fa0-528e113e2328Wed, 17 Apr 2024 09:00:00 -040001:04:35falsefull202362622023Oral Argument: Fischer v. United States | Case No. 23-5572 | Date Argued: March 25, 2024Oral Argument: Fischer v. United States | Case No. 23-5572 | Date Argued: March 25, 2024

     Link to Docket: Here.

     Question Presented: Did the D.C. Circuit err in construing 18 U.S.C. § 1512(c) (“Witness, Victim, or Informant Tampering"). Which prohibits obstruction of congressional inquiries and investigations to include acts unrelated to investigations and evidence?

     Holding: To prove a violation of §1512(c)(2), the Government must establish that the defendant impaired the availability or integrity for use in an official proceeding of records, documents, objects, or other things used in an official proceeding, or attempted to do so.

     Result: Vacated and remanded.

     Voting Breakdown: 6-3. Chief Justice Roberts delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Justices Thomas, Alito, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh and Jackson joined.  Justice Jackson filed a concurring opinion. Justice Barrett filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Sotomayor and Kagan joined.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     • For Petitioner: Jeffrey T. Green, Bethesda, Md.
     • For Respondent: Elizabeth B. Prelogar, Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.
     
     

     Timestamps:

     [00:00:00] Introduction

     [00:00:07] Petitioner Opening Statement Begins

     [00:01:52] Petitioner Free for All Questions Begin

     [00:25:37] Petitioner Sequential Questions Begin

     [00:34:25] Petitioner Questions End, Respondent Opening Statement Begins

     [00:36:31] Respondent Free for All Questions Begin

     [01:05:01] Respondent Sequential Questions Begin

     [01:36:13] Respondent Sequential Questions End, Petitioner Rebuttal Begins

     ]]>Oral Argument: Fischer v. United States | Case No. 23-5572 | Date Argued: March 25, 2024

     Link to Docket: Here.

     Question Presented: Did the D.C. Circuit err in construing 18 U.S.C. § 1512(c) (“Witness, Victim, or Informant Tampering"). Which prohibits obstruction of congressional inquiries and investigations to include acts unrelated to investigations and evidence?

     Holding: To prove a violation of §1512(c)(2), the Government must establish that the defendant impaired the availability or integrity for use in an official proceeding of records, documents, objects, or other things used in an official proceeding, or attempted to do so.

     Result: Vacated and remanded.

     Voting Breakdown: 6-3. Chief Justice Roberts delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Justices Thomas, Alito, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh and Jackson joined.  Justice Jackson filed a concurring opinion. Justice Barrett filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Sotomayor and Kagan joined.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     • For Petitioner: Jeffrey T. Green, Bethesda, Md.
     • For Respondent: Elizabeth B. Prelogar, Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.
     
     

     Timestamps:

     [00:00:00] Introduction

     [00:00:07] Petitioner Opening Statement Begins

     [00:01:52] Petitioner Free for All Questions Begin

     [00:25:37] Petitioner Sequential Questions Begin

     [00:34:25] Petitioner Questions End, Respondent Opening Statement Begins

     [00:36:31] Respondent Free for All Questions Begin

     [01:05:01] Respondent Sequential Questions Begin

     [01:36:13] Respondent Sequential Questions End, Petitioner Rebuttal Begins

     ]]>21263e02-b325-4770-a5cb-24b3131d2a22Tue, 16 Apr 2024 09:00:00 -040001:40:35falsefull202361612023Oral Argument: Snyder v. United States | Case No. 23-108 | Date Argued: 4/15/24 | Date Decided: 6/26/24Oral Argument: Snyder v. United States | Case No. 23-108 | Date Argued: 4/15/24 | Date Decided: 6/26/24

     Link to Docket: Here.

     Background:

     18 U.S.C. § 666(a)(1)(B) makes it a federal crime for a state or local official to "corruptly solicit[,] demand[,] ... or accept[] ... anything of value from any person, intending to be influenced or rewarded in connection with any" government business "involving any thing of value of $5,000 or more."

     Question Presented: Whether section 666 criminalizes gratuities, i.e., payments in recognition of actions the official has already taken or committed to take, without any quid pro quo agreement to take those actions.

     Holding: Federal law proscribes bribes to state and local officials but does not make it a crime for those officials to accept gratuities for their past acts.

     Result: Reversed and remanded.

     Voting Breakdown: 6-3. Justice Kavanaugh delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Alito, Gorsuch, and Barrett joined. Justice Gorsuch filed a concurring opinion. Justice Jackson filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Sotomayor and Kagan joined.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     • For Petitioner: Lisa S. Blatt, Washington, D.C.
     • For Respondent: Colleen R. Sinzdak, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.
     
     ]]>Oral Argument: Snyder v. United States | Case No. 23-108 | Date Argued: 4/15/24 | Date Decided: 6/26/24

     Link to Docket: Here.

     Background:

     18 U.S.C. § 666(a)(1)(B) makes it a federal crime for a state or local official to "corruptly solicit[,] demand[,] ... or accept[] ... anything of value from any person, intending to be influenced or rewarded in connection with any" government business "involving any thing of value of $5,000 or more."

     Question Presented: Whether section 666 criminalizes gratuities, i.e., payments in recognition of actions the official has already taken or committed to take, without any quid pro quo agreement to take those actions.

     Holding: Federal law proscribes bribes to state and local officials but does not make it a crime for those officials to accept gratuities for their past acts.

     Result: Reversed and remanded.

     Voting Breakdown: 6-3. Justice Kavanaugh delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Alito, Gorsuch, and Barrett joined. Justice Gorsuch filed a concurring opinion. Justice Jackson filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Sotomayor and Kagan joined.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     • For Petitioner: Lisa S. Blatt, Washington, D.C.
     • For Respondent: Colleen R. Sinzdak, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.
     
     ]]>2da2f37f-84e3-47c9-82ff-d25792f2b7b3Mon, 15 Apr 2024 09:00:00 -040001:38:39falsefull202360602023Oral Argument: Chiaverini v. City of Napoleon | Case No. 23-50 | Date Argued: 4/15/24 | Date Decided: 6/20/24Oral Argument: Chiaverini v. City of Napoleon | Case No. 23-50 | Date Argued: 4/15/24 | Date Decided: 6/20/24

     Link to Docket: Here.

     Background:

     To make out a Fourth Amendment malicious prosecution claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must show that legal process was instituted without probable cause. Thompson v. Clark, 142 S. Ct. 1332, 1338 (2022). Under the charge-specific rule, a malicious prosecution claim can proceed as to a baseless criminal charge, even if other charges brought alongside the baseless charge are supported by probable cause. Under the "any-crime" rule, probable cause for even one charge defeats a plaintiff's malicious prosecution claims as to every other charge, including those lacking probable cause.

     Question Presented: Whether Fourth Amendment malicious prosecution claims are governed by the charge-specific rule, as the Second, Third, and Eleventh circuits hold, or by the "any-crime" rule, as the Sixth Circuit holds.

     Holding: Pursuant to the Fourth Amendment and traditional common-law practice, the presence of probable cause for one charge in a criminal proceeding does not categorically defeat a Fourth Amendment malicious-prosecution claim relating to another, baseless charge.

     Result: Vacated and remanded.

     Voting Breakdown: 6-3. Justice Kagan delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Sotomayor, Kavanaugh, Barrett, and Jackson joined. Justice Thomas filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Alito joined. Justice Gorsuch filed a dissenting opinion.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     • For Petitioner: Easha Anand, Stanford, Cal.
     • For United States, as Amicus Curiae: Vivek Suri, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.
     • For Respondents: Megan M. Wold, Washington, D.C.
     
     ]]>Oral Argument: Chiaverini v. City of Napoleon | Case No. 23-50 | Date Argued: 4/15/24 | Date Decided: 6/20/24

     Link to Docket: Here.

     Background:

     To make out a Fourth Amendment malicious prosecution claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must show that legal process was instituted without probable cause. Thompson v. Clark, 142 S. Ct. 1332, 1338 (2022). Under the charge-specific rule, a malicious prosecution claim can proceed as to a baseless criminal charge, even if other charges brought alongside the baseless charge are supported by probable cause. Under the "any-crime" rule, probable cause for even one charge defeats a plaintiff's malicious prosecution claims as to every other charge, including those lacking probable cause.

     Question Presented: Whether Fourth Amendment malicious prosecution claims are governed by the charge-specific rule, as the Second, Third, and Eleventh circuits hold, or by the "any-crime" rule, as the Sixth Circuit holds.

     Holding: Pursuant to the Fourth Amendment and traditional common-law practice, the presence of probable cause for one charge in a criminal proceeding does not categorically defeat a Fourth Amendment malicious-prosecution claim relating to another, baseless charge.

     Result: Vacated and remanded.

     Voting Breakdown: 6-3. Justice Kagan delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Sotomayor, Kavanaugh, Barrett, and Jackson joined. Justice Thomas filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Alito joined. Justice Gorsuch filed a dissenting opinion.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     • For Petitioner: Easha Anand, Stanford, Cal.
     • For United States, as Amicus Curiae: Vivek Suri, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.
     • For Respondents: Megan M. Wold, Washington, D.C.
     
     ]]>d82a063b-c947-400f-80df-2ed292135e51Mon, 15 Apr 2024 09:00:00 -040058:21falsefull202359592023Oral Argument: Erlinger v. United States | Case No. 23-370 | Date Argued: 3/27/24 | Date Decided: 6/21/24Oral Argument: Erlinger v. United States | Case No. 23-370 | Date Argued: 3/27/24 | Date Decided: 6/21/24

     Link to Docket: Here.

     Question Presented: Whether the Constitution requires a jury trial and proof beyond a reasonable doubt to find that a defendant's prior convictions were "committed on occasions different from one another," as is necessary to impose an enhanced sentence under the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1).

     Holding: The Fifth and Sixth Amendments require a unanimous jury to make the determination beyond a reasonable doubt that a defendant's past offenses were committed on separate occasions for purposes of the Armed Career Criminal Act.

     Result: Vacated and remanded.

     Voting Breakdown: 6-3. Justice Gorsuch delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Sotomayor, Kagan, and Barrett joined. Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Thomas filed concurring opinions. Justice Kavanaugh filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Alito joined, and in which Justice Jackson joined except as to Part III. Justice Jackson filed a dissenting opinion.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     • For Petitioner: Jeffrey L. Fisher, Menlo Park, Cal.
     • For Respondent supporting Petitioner: Eric J. Feigin, Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.
     • For Court-appointed Amicus Curiae in support of the judgment below: D. Nick Harper, Washington, D.C.
     
     ]]>Oral Argument: Erlinger v. United States | Case No. 23-370 | Date Argued: 3/27/24 | Date Decided: 6/21/24

     Link to Docket: Here.

     Question Presented: Whether the Constitution requires a jury trial and proof beyond a reasonable doubt to find that a defendant's prior convictions were "committed on occasions different from one another," as is necessary to impose an enhanced sentence under the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1).

     Holding: The Fifth and Sixth Amendments require a unanimous jury to make the determination beyond a reasonable doubt that a defendant's past offenses were committed on separate occasions for purposes of the Armed Career Criminal Act.

     Result: Vacated and remanded.

     Voting Breakdown: 6-3. Justice Gorsuch delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Sotomayor, Kagan, and Barrett joined. Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Thomas filed concurring opinions. Justice Kavanaugh filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Alito joined, and in which Justice Jackson joined except as to Part III. Justice Jackson filed a dissenting opinion.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     • For Petitioner: Jeffrey L. Fisher, Menlo Park, Cal.
     • For Respondent supporting Petitioner: Eric J. Feigin, Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.
     • For Court-appointed Amicus Curiae in support of the judgment below: D. Nick Harper, Washington, D.C.
     
     ]]>27122fde-49da-43c5-b610-49274de7a529Wed, 27 Mar 2024 09:00:00 -040001:33:07falsefull202358582023Oral Argument: Connelly v. United States | Case No. 23-146 | Date Argued: 3/27/24 | Date Decided: 6/6/24Oral Argument: Connelly v. United States | Case No. 23-146 | Date Argued: 3/27/24 | Date Decided: 6/6/24

     Link to Docket: Here.

     Background:

     Closely held corporations often enter into agreements requiring the redemption of a shareholder's stock after the shareholder's death in order to preserve the closely held nature of the business. Corporations that enter such agreements often purchase life insurance on the shareholder in order to fund the transaction.

     Question Presented: Whether the proceeds of a life-insurance policy taken out by a closely held corporation on a shareholder in order to facilitate the redemption of the shareholder's stock should be considered a corporate asset when calculating the value of the shareholder's shares for purposes of the federal estate tax.

     Holding: A corporation's contractual obligation to redeem shares is not necessarily a liability that reduces a corporation's value for purposes of the federal estate tax.

     Result: Affirmed.

     Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Thomas delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     • For Petitioner: Kannon K. Shanmugam, Washington, D.C.
     • For Respondent: Yaira Dubin, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.
     
     ]]>Oral Argument: Connelly v. United States | Case No. 23-146 | Date Argued: 3/27/24 | Date Decided: 6/6/24

     Link to Docket: Here.

     Background:

     Closely held corporations often enter into agreements requiring the redemption of a shareholder's stock after the shareholder's death in order to preserve the closely held nature of the business. Corporations that enter such agreements often purchase life insurance on the shareholder in order to fund the transaction.

     Question Presented: Whether the proceeds of a life-insurance policy taken out by a closely held corporation on a shareholder in order to facilitate the redemption of the shareholder's stock should be considered a corporate asset when calculating the value of the shareholder's shares for purposes of the federal estate tax.

     Holding: A corporation's contractual obligation to redeem shares is not necessarily a liability that reduces a corporation's value for purposes of the federal estate tax.

     Result: Affirmed.

     Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Thomas delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     • For Petitioner: Kannon K. Shanmugam, Washington, D.C.
     • For Respondent: Yaira Dubin, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.
     
     ]]>fe3c4715-17c6-40a6-983b-c54c1989ab33Wed, 27 Mar 2024 09:00:00 -040053:43falsefull202357572023Oral Argument: FDA v. Alliance for Hippocratic Medicine | Case No. 23-235 | Date Argued: 3/26/24 | Date Decided: 6/13/24Oral Argument: FDA v. Alliance for Hippocratic Medicine | Case No. 23-235 | Date Argued: 3/26/24 | Date Decided: 6/13/24

     Case consolidated with Danco Laboratories, L.L.C. v. Alliance for Hippocratic Medicine, Case No. 23-236.

     Link to Docket: Here.

     Background:

     In 2000, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) approved Danco's drug Mifeprex for termination of early pregnancy based on the agency's expert judgment that clinical data showed the drug to be safe and effective. The agency later modified certain conditions of use for mifepristone in 2016 and 2021, again relying on clinical data and the agency's expert judgment that the drug would remain safe and effective under the modified conditions of use. In 2022, associations of doctors who have never prescribed Mifeprex sued FDA, arguing that FDA's actions modifying the drug's conditions of use in 2016 and 2021 violated the Administrative Procedure Act.

     Question Presented:

     1. Whether an association can demonstrate Article III standing to enjoin a government action by arguing that some unspecified member may be injured at some future time by the challenged action; and
     2. Whether the Fifth Circuit erred in upholding the preliminary injunction of FDA's 2016 and 2021 actions based on the court's review of an incomplete administrative record.
     
     

     Holding: Plaintiffs lack Article Ill standing to challenge the Food and Drug Administration's regulatory actions regarding mifepristone.

     Result: Reversed and remanded.

     Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Kavanaugh delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Justice Thomas filed a concurring opinion.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     • For federal Petitioners: Elizabeth B. Prelogar, Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.
     • For Petitioner Danco Laboratories, L.L.C.: Jessica L. Ellsworth, Washington, D.C.
     • For Respondents: Erin M. Hawley, Washington, D.C.
     
     ]]>Oral Argument: FDA v. Alliance for Hippocratic Medicine | Case No. 23-235 | Date Argued: 3/26/24 | Date Decided: 6/13/24

     Case consolidated with Danco Laboratories, L.L.C. v. Alliance for Hippocratic Medicine, Case No. 23-236.

     Link to Docket: Here.

     Background:

     In 2000, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) approved Danco's drug Mifeprex for termination of early pregnancy based on the agency's expert judgment that clinical data showed the drug to be safe and effective. The agency later modified certain conditions of use for mifepristone in 2016 and 2021, again relying on clinical data and the agency's expert judgment that the drug would remain safe and effective under the modified conditions of use. In 2022, associations of doctors who have never prescribed Mifeprex sued FDA, arguing that FDA's actions modifying the drug's conditions of use in 2016 and 2021 violated the Administrative Procedure Act.

     Question Presented:

     1. Whether an association can demonstrate Article III standing to enjoin a government action by arguing that some unspecified member may be injured at some future time by the challenged action; and
     2. Whether the Fifth Circuit erred in upholding the preliminary injunction of FDA's 2016 and 2021 actions based on the court's review of an incomplete administrative record.
     
     

     Holding: Plaintiffs lack Article Ill standing to challenge the Food and Drug Administration's regulatory actions regarding mifepristone.

     Result: Reversed and remanded.

     Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Kavanaugh delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Justice Thomas filed a concurring opinion.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     • For federal Petitioners: Elizabeth B. Prelogar, Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.
     • For Petitioner Danco Laboratories, L.L.C.: Jessica L. Ellsworth, Washington, D.C.
     • For Respondents: Erin M. Hawley, Washington, D.C.
     
     ]]>8ad6fdf8-03ca-4396-9bf0-ad6e609cf4fdTue, 26 Mar 2024 09:00:00 -040001:32:58falsefull202355552023Oral Argument: Becerra v. San Carlos Apache Tribe | Case No. 23-250 | Date Argued: 3/25/24 | Date Decided: 6/6/24Oral Argument: Becerra v. San Carlos Apache Tribe | Case No. 23-250 | Date Argued: 3/25/24 | Date Decided: 6/6/24

     Case consolidated with Becerra v. Northern Arapaho Tribe, Case No. 23-253.

     Link to Docket: Here.

     Background:

     The Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act, 25 U.S.C. 5301 et seq., permits eligible Indian tribes to contract with the federal government to assume responsibility for federal health care programs administered for the benefit of Indians. Upon entering into the contract, a tribe is entitled to the appropriated funds that the Indian Health Service (IHS) would have otherwise allocated to the federal program. 25 U.S.C. 5325(a)(1). The Act also requires IHS to pay "contract support costs"-funds "added to" that appropriated amount to cover the costs of activities the tribe must undertake to operate the transferred program, but which either "normally are not carried on" by IHS when acting as program operator, or which IHS would have "provided * * * from resources other than" the appropriated funds transferred under the contract. 25 U.S.C. 5325(a)(2). Separately, contracting tribes are permitted to collect payment from third-party payors-like private insurers, Medicare, and Medicaid-when they provide health care services to covered individuals.

     Question Presented: Whether IHS must pay "contract support costs" not only to support IHS-funded activities, but also to support the tribe's expenditure of income collected from third parties.

     Holding: The Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act requires the Indian Health Service to pay the contract support costs that a tribe incurs when it collects and spends program income (i.e., revenue from third-party payers like Medicare, Medicaid, and private insurers) to further the functions, services, activities, and programs transferred to it from IHS in a self-determination contract.

     Result: Affirmed.

     Voting Breakdown: 5-4. Chief Justice Roberts delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Justices Sotomayor, Kagan, Gorsuch, and Jackson joined. Justice Kavanaugh filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Thomas, Alito, and Barrett joined.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     • For Petitioner: Caroline A. Flynn, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.
     • For Respondent in 23-253: Adam G. Unikowsky, Washington, D.C.
     • For Respondent in 23-250: Lloyd B. Miller, Washington, D.C.
     
     ]]>Oral Argument: Becerra v. San Carlos Apache Tribe | Case No. 23-250 | Date Argued: 3/25/24 | Date Decided: 6/6/24

     Case consolidated with Becerra v. Northern Arapaho Tribe, Case No. 23-253.

     Link to Docket: Here.

     Background:

     The Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act, 25 U.S.C. 5301 et seq., permits eligible Indian tribes to contract with the federal government to assume responsibility for federal health care programs administered for the benefit of Indians. Upon entering into the contract, a tribe is entitled to the appropriated funds that the Indian Health Service (IHS) would have otherwise allocated to the federal program. 25 U.S.C. 5325(a)(1). The Act also requires IHS to pay "contract support costs"-funds "added to" that appropriated amount to cover the costs of activities the tribe must undertake to operate the transferred program, but which either "normally are not carried on" by IHS when acting as program operator, or which IHS would have "provided * * * from resources other than" the appropriated funds transferred under the contract. 25 U.S.C. 5325(a)(2). Separately, contracting tribes are permitted to collect payment from third-party payors-like private insurers, Medicare, and Medicaid-when they provide health care services to covered individuals.

     Question Presented: Whether IHS must pay "contract support costs" not only to support IHS-funded activities, but also to support the tribe's expenditure of income collected from third parties.

     Holding: The Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act requires the Indian Health Service to pay the contract support costs that a tribe incurs when it collects and spends program income (i.e., revenue from third-party payers like Medicare, Medicaid, and private insurers) to further the functions, services, activities, and programs transferred to it from IHS in a self-determination contract.

     Result: Affirmed.

     Voting Breakdown: 5-4. Chief Justice Roberts delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Justices Sotomayor, Kagan, Gorsuch, and Jackson joined. Justice Kavanaugh filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Thomas, Alito, and Barrett joined.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     • For Petitioner: Caroline A. Flynn, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.
     • For Respondent in 23-253: Adam G. Unikowsky, Washington, D.C.
     • For Respondent in 23-250: Lloyd B. Miller, Washington, D.C.
     
     ]]>d000ebb5-6a79-498d-821b-167ea9aeb79bMon, 25 Mar 2024 09:00:00 -040001:26:28falsefull202353532023Oral Argument: Harrow v. Department of Defense | Case No. 23-21 | Date Argued: 3/25/24 | Date Decided: 5/16/24Oral Argument: Harrow v. Department of Defense | Case No. 23-21 | Date Argued: 3/25/24 | Date Decided: 5/16/24

     Link to Docket: Here.

     Background:

     When a federal employee petitions the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit to review a final decision of the Merit Systems Protection Board, 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(1)(A) provides: "Notwithstanding any other provision of law, any petition for review shall be filed within 60 days after the Board issues notice of the final order or decision of the Board." In the decision below, the Federal Circuit relied on settled circuit precedent holding this filing deadline to be jurisdictional, despite recent opinions from other Circuits and this Court holding analogous filing deadlines to be nonjurisdictional.

     Question Presented: Whether the 60-day deadline in Section 7703(b)(1)(A) is jurisdictional.

     Holding: Title 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(l)'s 60-day filing deadline for a federal employee to petition the Federal Circuit to review a final decision of the Merit Systems Protection Board is not jurisdictional.

     Result: Vacated and remanded.

     Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Kagan delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     • For Petitioner: Joshua P. Davis, San Francisco, Cal.
     • For Respondent: Aimee W. Brown, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.
     
     ]]>Oral Argument: Harrow v. Department of Defense | Case No. 23-21 | Date Argued: 3/25/24 | Date Decided: 5/16/24

     Link to Docket: Here.

     Background:

     When a federal employee petitions the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit to review a final decision of the Merit Systems Protection Board, 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(1)(A) provides: "Notwithstanding any other provision of law, any petition for review shall be filed within 60 days after the Board issues notice of the final order or decision of the Board." In the decision below, the Federal Circuit relied on settled circuit precedent holding this filing deadline to be jurisdictional, despite recent opinions from other Circuits and this Court holding analogous filing deadlines to be nonjurisdictional.

     Question Presented: Whether the 60-day deadline in Section 7703(b)(1)(A) is jurisdictional.

     Holding: Title 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(l)'s 60-day filing deadline for a federal employee to petition the Federal Circuit to review a final decision of the Merit Systems Protection Board is not jurisdictional.

     Result: Vacated and remanded.

     Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Kagan delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     • For Petitioner: Joshua P. Davis, San Francisco, Cal.
     • For Respondent: Aimee W. Brown, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.
     
     ]]>62281058-234f-42a1-9625-c24ebb51a290Mon, 25 Mar 2024 09:00:00 -040050:40falsefull202352522023Oral Argument: Gonzalez v. Trevino | Case No. 22-1025 | Date Argued: 3/20/24 | Date Decided: 6/20/24Oral Argument: Gonzalez v. Trevino | Case No. 22-1025 | Date Argued: 3/20/24 | Date Decided: 6/20/24

     Link to Docket: Here.

     Background:

     In Nieves v. Bartlett, this Court held that probable cause does not bar a retaliatory arrest claim against a "police officer" when a plaintiff shows "that he was arrested when otherwise similarly situated individuals not engaged in the same sort of protected speech had not been." 139 S. Ct. 1715, 1727 (2019). The circuits admittedly disagree on whether only specific examples of non-arrests, Pet. App. 28-29 (5th Cir. 2022), or any "objective proof of retaliatory treatment" can satisfy this standard, Lund v. City of Rockford, 956 F.3d 938, 945 (7th Cir. 2020); see also Ballentine v. Tucker, 28 F.4th 54, 62 (9th Cir. 2022). Here, a 72-year-old councilwoman organized a petition criticizing a city manager, and unwittingly placed it in her binder during a council meeting. Two months later, Respondents-the city manager's allies- engineered her arrest for tampering with a government record. That charge has no precedent involving similar conduct, was supported by an affidavit based on the councilwoman's viewpoints, and skirted ordinary procedures to ensure her jailing. The councilwoman sued Respondents but no arresting officer.

     Question Presented:

     1. Whether the Nieves probable cause exception can be satisfied by objective evidence other than specific examples of arrests that never happened.
     2. Whether the Nieves probable cause rule is limited to individual claims against arresting officers for split-second arrests.
     
     

     Holding: In requiring Petitioner Sylvia Gonzalez to provide specific comparator evidence to support her retaliatory arrest claim, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 5th Circuit did not properly apply the principles of Nieves v. Barlett.

     Result: Vacated and remanded.

     Voting Breakdown: 8-1. Per curiam opinion. Justice Alito filed a concurring opinion. Justice Kavanaugh filed a concurring opinion. Justice Jackson filed a concurring opinion, in which Justice Sotomayor joined. Justice Thomas filed a dissenting opinion.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     • For Petitioner: Anya A. Bidwell, Arlington, Va.
     • For United States, as Amicus Curiae: Nicole F. Reaves, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.
     • For Respondents: Lisa S. Blatt, Washington, D.C.
     
     ]]>Oral Argument: Gonzalez v. Trevino | Case No. 22-1025 | Date Argued: 3/20/24 | Date Decided: 6/20/24

     Link to Docket: Here.

     Background:

     In Nieves v. Bartlett, this Court held that probable cause does not bar a retaliatory arrest claim against a "police officer" when a plaintiff shows "that he was arrested when otherwise similarly situated individuals not engaged in the same sort of protected speech had not been." 139 S. Ct. 1715, 1727 (2019). The circuits admittedly disagree on whether only specific examples of non-arrests, Pet. App. 28-29 (5th Cir. 2022), or any "objective proof of retaliatory treatment" can satisfy this standard, Lund v. City of Rockford, 956 F.3d 938, 945 (7th Cir. 2020); see also Ballentine v. Tucker, 28 F.4th 54, 62 (9th Cir. 2022). Here, a 72-year-old councilwoman organized a petition criticizing a city manager, and unwittingly placed it in her binder during a council meeting. Two months later, Respondents-the city manager's allies- engineered her arrest for tampering with a government record. That charge has no precedent involving similar conduct, was supported by an affidavit based on the councilwoman's viewpoints, and skirted ordinary procedures to ensure her jailing. The councilwoman sued Respondents but no arresting officer.

     Question Presented:

     1. Whether the Nieves probable cause exception can be satisfied by objective evidence other than specific examples of arrests that never happened.
     2. Whether the Nieves probable cause rule is limited to individual claims against arresting officers for split-second arrests.
     
     

     Holding: In requiring Petitioner Sylvia Gonzalez to provide specific comparator evidence to support her retaliatory arrest claim, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 5th Circuit did not properly apply the principles of Nieves v. Barlett.

     Result: Vacated and remanded.

     Voting Breakdown: 8-1. Per curiam opinion. Justice Alito filed a concurring opinion. Justice Kavanaugh filed a concurring opinion. Justice Jackson filed a concurring opinion, in which Justice Sotomayor joined. Justice Thomas filed a dissenting opinion.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     • For Petitioner: Anya A. Bidwell, Arlington, Va.
     • For United States, as Amicus Curiae: Nicole F. Reaves, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.
     • For Respondents: Lisa S. Blatt, Washington, D.C.
     
     ]]>4760e5a4-49b6-4fc2-928a-7a70ec5604afWed, 20 Mar 2024 09:00:00 -040001:25:44falsefull202351512023Oral Argument: Texas v. New Mexico | Case No. 141, Orig. | Date Argued: 3/20/24 | Date Decided: 6/21/24Oral Argument: Texas v. New Mexico | Case No. 141, Orig. | Date Argued: 3/20/24 | Date Decided: 6/21/24

     Link to Docket: Here.

     Question Presented: EXCEPTION OF THE UNITED STATE TO THE THIRD INTERIM REPORT OF THE SPECIAL MASTER: The United States excepts to the Special Master's recommendation that the States' joint motion to enter a consent decree be granted.

     Holding: Because the proposed consent decree would dispose of the United States’ Compact claims without its consent, the States’ motion to enter the consent decree is denied.

     Result: Exception sustained.

     Voting Breakdown: 5-4. Justice Jackson delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Sotomayor, Kagan, and Kavanaugh joined. Justice Gorsuch filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Thomas, Alito, and Barrett joined.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     • For United States, as intervenor: Ann O'Connell, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.
     • For plaintiff: Scott A. Keller, Solicitor General of Texas, Austin, Texas.
     • For defendant Colorado: Frederick R. Yarger, Solicitor General of Colorado, Denver, Colo.
     • For defendant New Mexico: Marcus J. Rael, Jr., Albuquerque, N.M.
     
     ]]>Oral Argument: Texas v. New Mexico | Case No. 141, Orig. | Date Argued: 3/20/24 | Date Decided: 6/21/24

     Link to Docket: Here.

     Question Presented: EXCEPTION OF THE UNITED STATE TO THE THIRD INTERIM REPORT OF THE SPECIAL MASTER: The United States excepts to the Special Master's recommendation that the States' joint motion to enter a consent decree be granted.

     Holding: Because the proposed consent decree would dispose of the United States’ Compact claims without its consent, the States’ motion to enter the consent decree is denied.

     Result: Exception sustained.

     Voting Breakdown: 5-4. Justice Jackson delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Sotomayor, Kagan, and Kavanaugh joined. Justice Gorsuch filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Thomas, Alito, and Barrett joined.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     • For United States, as intervenor: Ann O'Connell, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.
     • For plaintiff: Scott A. Keller, Solicitor General of Texas, Austin, Texas.
     • For defendant Colorado: Frederick R. Yarger, Solicitor General of Colorado, Denver, Colo.
     • For defendant New Mexico: Marcus J. Rael, Jr., Albuquerque, N.M.
     
     ]]>728e8cda-ec5e-4995-867d-caa52c5392f5Wed, 20 Mar 2024 09:00:00 -040001:08:40falsefull202350502023Oral Argument: Diaz v. United States | Case No. 23-14 | Date Argued: 3/19/24 | Date Decided: 6/20/24Oral Argument: Diaz v. United States | Case No. 23-14 | Date Argued: 3/19/24 | Date Decided: 6/20/24

     Link to Docket: Here.

     Background:

     Federal Rule of Evidence 704(b) provides: "In a criminal case, an expert witness must not state an opinion about whether the defendant did or did not have a mental state or condition that constitutes an element of the crime charged or of a defense. Those matters are for the trier of fact alone." Fed. R. Evid. 704(b).

     Question Presented: In a prosecution for drug trafficking-where an element of the offense is that the defendant knew she was carrying illegal drugs-does Rule 704(b) permit a governmental expert witness to testify that most couriers know they are carrying drugs and that drug-trafficking organizations do not entrust large quantities of drugs to unknowing transporters?

     Holding: Expert testimony that "most people" in a group have a particular mental state is not an opinion about "the defendant" and thus does not violate Federal Rule of Evidence 704(b).

     Result: Affirmed.

     Voting Breakdown: 6-3. Justice Thomas delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Alito, Kavanaugh, Barrett, and Jackson joined. Justice Jackson filed a concurring opinion. Justice Gorsuch filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Sotomayor and Kagan joined.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     • For Petitioner: Jeffrey L. Fisher, Stanford, Cal.
     • For Respondent: Matthew Guarnieri, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.
     
     ]]>Oral Argument: Diaz v. United States | Case No. 23-14 | Date Argued: 3/19/24 | Date Decided: 6/20/24

     Link to Docket: Here.

     Background:

     Federal Rule of Evidence 704(b) provides: "In a criminal case, an expert witness must not state an opinion about whether the defendant did or did not have a mental state or condition that constitutes an element of the crime charged or of a defense. Those matters are for the trier of fact alone." Fed. R. Evid. 704(b).

     Question Presented: In a prosecution for drug trafficking-where an element of the offense is that the defendant knew she was carrying illegal drugs-does Rule 704(b) permit a governmental expert witness to testify that most couriers know they are carrying drugs and that drug-trafficking organizations do not entrust large quantities of drugs to unknowing transporters?

     Holding: Expert testimony that "most people" in a group have a particular mental state is not an opinion about "the defendant" and thus does not violate Federal Rule of Evidence 704(b).

     Result: Affirmed.

     Voting Breakdown: 6-3. Justice Thomas delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Alito, Kavanaugh, Barrett, and Jackson joined. Justice Jackson filed a concurring opinion. Justice Gorsuch filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Sotomayor and Kagan joined.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     • For Petitioner: Jeffrey L. Fisher, Stanford, Cal.
     • For Respondent: Matthew Guarnieri, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.
     
     ]]>f89e4ed2-cc27-4fbe-a7df-ebce53a90edcTue, 19 Mar 2024 09:00:00 -040001:24:55falsefull202349492023Oral Argument: Murthy v. Missouri | Case No. 23-411 | Date Argued: 3/18/24 | Date Decided: 6/26/24Oral Argument: Murthy v. Missouri | Case No. 23-411 | Date Argued: 3/18/24 | Date Decided: 6/26/24

     Link to Docket: Here.

     Question Presented:

     1. Whether Respondents have Article III standing;
     2. Whether the government's challenged conduct transformed private social-media companies' content-moderation decisions into state action and violated Respondents' First Amendment rights; and
     3. Whether the terms and breadth of the preliminary injunction are proper.
     
     

     Holding: Respondents, two states and five individual social media users who sued executive branch officials and agencies, alleging that the government pressured the platforms to censor their speech in violation of the First Amendment, lack Article Ill standing to seek an injunction.

     Result: Reversed and remanded.

     Voting Breakdown: 5-4. Justice Barrett delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Sotomayor, Kagan, Kavanaugh, and Jackson joined. Justice Alito filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Thomas and Gorsuch joined.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     • For Petitioner: Brian H. Fletcher, Principal Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.
     • For Respondents: J. Benjamin Aguiñaga, Solicitor General, Baton Rouge, La.
     
     ]]>Oral Argument: Murthy v. Missouri | Case No. 23-411 | Date Argued: 3/18/24 | Date Decided: 6/26/24

     Link to Docket: Here.

     Question Presented:

     1. Whether Respondents have Article III standing;
     2. Whether the government's challenged conduct transformed private social-media companies' content-moderation decisions into state action and violated Respondents' First Amendment rights; and
     3. Whether the terms and breadth of the preliminary injunction are proper.
     
     

     Holding: Respondents, two states and five individual social media users who sued executive branch officials and agencies, alleging that the government pressured the platforms to censor their speech in violation of the First Amendment, lack Article Ill standing to seek an injunction.

     Result: Reversed and remanded.

     Voting Breakdown: 5-4. Justice Barrett delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Sotomayor, Kagan, Kavanaugh, and Jackson joined. Justice Alito filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Thomas and Gorsuch joined.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     • For Petitioner: Brian H. Fletcher, Principal Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.
     • For Respondents: J. Benjamin Aguiñaga, Solicitor General, Baton Rouge, La.
     
     ]]>9eecc692-3437-442b-be6e-ae8d23135e20Tue, 19 Mar 2024 09:00:00 -040001:42:31falsefull202347472023Oral Argument: National Rifle Association of America v. Vullo | Case No. 22-842 | Date Argued: 3/18/24 | Date Decided: 5/30/24Oral Argument: National Rifle Association of America v. Vullo | Case No. 22-842 | Date Argued: 3/18/24 | Date Decided: 5/30/24

     Link to Docket: Here.

     Background:

     Bantam Books v. Sullivan held that a state commission with no formal regulatory power violated the First Amendment when it "deliberately set out to achieve the suppression of publications" through "informal sanctions," including the "threat of invoking legal sanctions and other means of coercion, persuasion, and intimidation." 372 U.S. 58, 66-67 (1963). Respondent here, wielding enormous regulatory power as the head of New York's Department of Financial Services ("DFS"), applied similar pressure tactics-including backchannel threats, ominous guidance letters, and selective enforcement of regulatory infractions-to induce banks and insurance companies to avoid doing business with Petitioner, a gun rights advocacy group. App. 199-200 ¶ 21. Respondent targeted Petitioner explicitly based on its Second Amendment advocacy, which DFS's official regulatory guidance deemed a "reputational risk" to any financial institution serving the NRA. Id. at 199, n.16. The Second Circuit held such conduct permissible as a matter of law, reasoning that "this age of enhanced corporate social responsibility" justifies regulatory concern about "general backlash" against a customer's political speech. Id. at 29-30.

     Question Presented: Does the First Amendment allow a government regulator to threaten regulated entities with adverse regulatory actions if they do business with a controversial speaker, as a consequence of (a) the government's own hostility to the speaker's viewpoint or (b) a perceived "general backlash" against the speaker's advocacy?

     Holding: The NRA plausibly alleged that former superintendent of the New York Department of Financial Services Maria Vullo violated the First Amendment by coercing regulated entities to terminate their business relationships with the NRA in order to punish or suppress the NRA's gun-promotion advocacy.

     Result: Vacated and remanded.

     Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Sotomayor delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Justice Gorsuch and Justice Jackson each filed a concurring opinion.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     • For Petitioner: David D. Cole, Washington, D.C.
     • For United States, as Amicus Curiae: Ephraim McDowell, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.
     • For Respondent: Neal K. Katyal, Washington, D.C.
     
     ]]>Oral Argument: National Rifle Association of America v. Vullo | Case No. 22-842 | Date Argued: 3/18/24 | Date Decided: 5/30/24

     Link to Docket: Here.

     Background:

     Bantam Books v. Sullivan held that a state commission with no formal regulatory power violated the First Amendment when it "deliberately set out to achieve the suppression of publications" through "informal sanctions," including the "threat of invoking legal sanctions and other means of coercion, persuasion, and intimidation." 372 U.S. 58, 66-67 (1963). Respondent here, wielding enormous regulatory power as the head of New York's Department of Financial Services ("DFS"), applied similar pressure tactics-including backchannel threats, ominous guidance letters, and selective enforcement of regulatory infractions-to induce banks and insurance companies to avoid doing business with Petitioner, a gun rights advocacy group. App. 199-200 ¶ 21. Respondent targeted Petitioner explicitly based on its Second Amendment advocacy, which DFS's official regulatory guidance deemed a "reputational risk" to any financial institution serving the NRA. Id. at 199, n.16. The Second Circuit held such conduct permissible as a matter of law, reasoning that "this age of enhanced corporate social responsibility" justifies regulatory concern about "general backlash" against a customer's political speech. Id. at 29-30.

     Question Presented: Does the First Amendment allow a government regulator to threaten regulated entities with adverse regulatory actions if they do business with a controversial speaker, as a consequence of (a) the government's own hostility to the speaker's viewpoint or (b) a perceived "general backlash" against the speaker's advocacy?

     Holding: The NRA plausibly alleged that former superintendent of the New York Department of Financial Services Maria Vullo violated the First Amendment by coercing regulated entities to terminate their business relationships with the NRA in order to punish or suppress the NRA's gun-promotion advocacy.

     Result: Vacated and remanded.

     Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Sotomayor delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Justice Gorsuch and Justice Jackson each filed a concurring opinion.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     • For Petitioner: David D. Cole, Washington, D.C.
     • For United States, as Amicus Curiae: Ephraim McDowell, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.
     • For Respondent: Neal K. Katyal, Washington, D.C.
     
     ]]>a4c3f7c7-b621-4bea-8919-54d101d949b4Mon, 18 Mar 2024 09:00:00 -040001:14:26falsefull202346462023Oral Argument: Coinbase, Inc. v. Suski | Case No. 23-3 | Date Argued: 2/28/24 | Date Decided: 5/23/24Oral Argument: Coinbase, Inc. v. Suski | Case No. 23-3 | Date Argued: 2/28/24 | Date Decided: 5/23/24

     Link to Docket: Here.

     Question Presented: Where parties enter into an arbitration agreement with a delegation clause, should an arbitrator or a court decide whether that arbitration agreement is narrowed by a later contract that is silent as to arbitration and delegation?

     Holding: Where parties have agreed to two contracts, one sending arbitrability disputes to arbitration, and the other either explicitly or implicitly sending arbitrability disputes to the courts, a court must decide which contract governs.

     Result: Affirmed.

     Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Jackson delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Justice Gorsuch filed a concurring opinion.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     • For Petitioner: Jessica L. Ellsworth, Washington, D.C.
     • For Respondents: David J. Harris, Jr., San Diego, Cal.
     
     ]]>Oral Argument: Coinbase, Inc. v. Suski | Case No. 23-3 | Date Argued: 2/28/24 | Date Decided: 5/23/24

     Link to Docket: Here.

     Question Presented: Where parties enter into an arbitration agreement with a delegation clause, should an arbitrator or a court decide whether that arbitration agreement is narrowed by a later contract that is silent as to arbitration and delegation?

     Holding: Where parties have agreed to two contracts, one sending arbitrability disputes to arbitration, and the other either explicitly or implicitly sending arbitrability disputes to the courts, a court must decide which contract governs.

     Result: Affirmed.

     Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Jackson delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Justice Gorsuch filed a concurring opinion.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     • For Petitioner: Jessica L. Ellsworth, Washington, D.C.
     • For Respondents: David J. Harris, Jr., San Diego, Cal.
     
     ]]>096cfeda-dece-411d-8e5c-20267a7266ceWed, 28 Feb 2024 09:00:00 -040042:56falsefull202345452023Oral Argument: Garland v. Cargill | Case No. 22-976 | Date Argued: 2/28/24 | Date Decided: 6/14/24Oral Argument: Garland v. Cargill | Case No. 22-976 | Date Argued: 2/28/24 | Date Decided: 6/14/24

     Link to Docket: Here.

     Background:

     Since 1986, Congress has prohibited the transfer or possession of any new "machinegun." 18 U.S.C. 922(o)(1). The National Firearms Act, 26 U.S.C. 5801 et seq., defines a "machinegun" as "any weapon which shoots, is designed to shoot, or can be readily restored to shoot, automatically more than one shot, without manual reloading, by a single function of the trigger." 26 U.S.C. 5845(b). The statutory definition also encompasses "any part designed and intended solely and exclusively, or combination of parts designed and intended, for use in converting a weapon into a machinegun." Ibid. A "bump stock" is a device designed and intended to permit users to convert a semiautomatic rifle so that the rifle can be fired continuously with a single pull of the trigger, discharging potentially hundreds of bullets per minute. In 2018, after a mass shooting in Las Vegas carried out using bump stocks, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) published an interpretive rule concluding that bump stocks are machineguns as defined in Section 5845(b). In the decision below, the en banc Fifth Circuit held that the ATF rule was unlawful because the statutory definition of "machinegun" does not encompass bump stocks.

     Question Presented: Whether a bump stock device is a "machinegun" as defined in 26 U.S.C. 5845(b) because it is designed and intended for use in converting a rifle into a machinegun, i.e., into a weapon that fires "automatically more than one shot . . . by a single function of the trigger."

     Holding: The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives exceeded its statutory authority by issuing a rule that classifies a bump stock as a "machinegun" under 26 U.S.C. § 5845(b).

     Result: Affirmed.

     Voting Breakdown: 6-3. Justice Thomas delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Alito, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, and Barrett joined. Justice Alito filed a concurring opinion. Justice Sotomayor filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Kagan and Jackson joined.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     • For Petitioner: Brian H. Fletcher, Principal Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.
     • For Respondent: Jonathan F. Mitchell, Austin, Tex.
     
     ]]>Oral Argument: Garland v. Cargill | Case No. 22-976 | Date Argued: 2/28/24 | Date Decided: 6/14/24

     Link to Docket: Here.

     Background:

     Since 1986, Congress has prohibited the transfer or possession of any new "machinegun." 18 U.S.C. 922(o)(1). The National Firearms Act, 26 U.S.C. 5801 et seq., defines a "machinegun" as "any weapon which shoots, is designed to shoot, or can be readily restored to shoot, automatically more than one shot, without manual reloading, by a single function of the trigger." 26 U.S.C. 5845(b). The statutory definition also encompasses "any part designed and intended solely and exclusively, or combination of parts designed and intended, for use in converting a weapon into a machinegun." Ibid. A "bump stock" is a device designed and intended to permit users to convert a semiautomatic rifle so that the rifle can be fired continuously with a single pull of the trigger, discharging potentially hundreds of bullets per minute. In 2018, after a mass shooting in Las Vegas carried out using bump stocks, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) published an interpretive rule concluding that bump stocks are machineguns as defined in Section 5845(b). In the decision below, the en banc Fifth Circuit held that the ATF rule was unlawful because the statutory definition of "machinegun" does not encompass bump stocks.

     Question Presented: Whether a bump stock device is a "machinegun" as defined in 26 U.S.C. 5845(b) because it is designed and intended for use in converting a rifle into a machinegun, i.e., into a weapon that fires "automatically more than one shot . . . by a single function of the trigger."

     Holding: The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives exceeded its statutory authority by issuing a rule that classifies a bump stock as a "machinegun" under 26 U.S.C. § 5845(b).

     Result: Affirmed.

     Voting Breakdown: 6-3. Justice Thomas delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Alito, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, and Barrett joined. Justice Alito filed a concurring opinion. Justice Sotomayor filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Kagan and Jackson joined.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     • For Petitioner: Brian H. Fletcher, Principal Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.
     • For Respondent: Jonathan F. Mitchell, Austin, Tex.
     
     ]]>2e6a8044-9dcc-4591-8ffe-c392138c5f8dWed, 28 Feb 2024 09:00:00 -040001:30:25falsefull202344442023Oral Argument: McIntosh v. United States | Case No. 22-7386 | Date Argued: 2/27/24 | Date Decided: 4/17/24Oral Argument: McIntosh v. United States | Case No. 22-7386 | Date Argued: 2/27/24 | Date Decided: 4/17/24

     Link to Docket: Here.

     Question Presented: Whether a district court may enter a criminal forfeiture order outside the time limitations set forth in Rule 32.2, Fed.R.Crim.P.?

     Holding: A district court's failure to comply with Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.2(b)(2)(B)'s requirement to enter a preliminary order imposing criminal forfeiture before sentencing does not bar a judge from ordering forfeiture at sentencing subject to harmless-error principles on appellate review.

     Result: Affirmed.

     Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Sotomayor delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     • For Petitioner: Steven Y. Yurowitz, New York, N. Y.
     • For Respondent: Matthew Guarnieri, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.
     
     ]]>Oral Argument: McIntosh v. United States | Case No. 22-7386 | Date Argued: 2/27/24 | Date Decided: 4/17/24

     Link to Docket: Here.

     Question Presented: Whether a district court may enter a criminal forfeiture order outside the time limitations set forth in Rule 32.2, Fed.R.Crim.P.?

     Holding: A district court's failure to comply with Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.2(b)(2)(B)'s requirement to enter a preliminary order imposing criminal forfeiture before sentencing does not bar a judge from ordering forfeiture at sentencing subject to harmless-error principles on appellate review.

     Result: Affirmed.

     Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Sotomayor delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     • For Petitioner: Steven Y. Yurowitz, New York, N. Y.
     • For Respondent: Matthew Guarnieri, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.
     
     ]]>e0841ad7-ee3c-4fe0-9674-9c9d5d22bb68Tue, 27 Feb 2024 09:00:00 -040048:57falsefull202343432023Oral Argument: Cantero v. Bank of America, N.A. | Case No. 22-529 | Date Argued: 2/27/24 | Date Decided: 5/30/24Oral Argument: Cantero v. Bank of America, N.A. | Case No. 22-529 | Date Argued: 2/27/24 | Date Decided: 5/30/24

     Link to Docket: Here.

     Background:

     At least thirteen states have, enacted laws requiring mortgage lenders to pay a minimum interest rate on funds held in mortgage escrow accounts. Congress has since recognized the existence of these state escrow-interest laws and has expressly required national banks to comply with them where applicable. See 15 U.S.C. § 1639d(g)(3).

     Question Presented: Does the National Bank Act preempt the application of state escrow-interest laws to national banks?

     Holding: The U.S. Court of Appeals for the 2nd Circuit failed to analyze whether New York's interest-on-escrow law is preempted as applied to national banks in a manner consistent with the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 and Barnett Bank of Marion Cty., N. A. v. Nelson.

     Result: Vacated and remanded.

     Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Kavanaugh delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     • For Petitioner: Jonathan E. Taylor, Washington, D.C.; and Malcolm L. Stewart, Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. (for United States, as Amicus Curiae.)
     • For Respondent: Lisa S. Blatt, Washington, D.C.
     
     ]]>Oral Argument: Cantero v. Bank of America, N.A. | Case No. 22-529 | Date Argued: 2/27/24 | Date Decided: 5/30/24

     Link to Docket: Here.

     Background:

     At least thirteen states have, enacted laws requiring mortgage lenders to pay a minimum interest rate on funds held in mortgage escrow accounts. Congress has since recognized the existence of these state escrow-interest laws and has expressly required national banks to comply with them where applicable. See 15 U.S.C. § 1639d(g)(3).

     Question Presented: Does the National Bank Act preempt the application of state escrow-interest laws to national banks?

     Holding: The U.S. Court of Appeals for the 2nd Circuit failed to analyze whether New York's interest-on-escrow law is preempted as applied to national banks in a manner consistent with the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 and Barnett Bank of Marion Cty., N. A. v. Nelson.

     Result: Vacated and remanded.

     Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Kavanaugh delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     • For Petitioner: Jonathan E. Taylor, Washington, D.C.; and Malcolm L. Stewart, Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. (for United States, as Amicus Curiae.)
     • For Respondent: Lisa S. Blatt, Washington, D.C.
     
     ]]>9ec02360-dba9-445f-a451-2ad5bb0177a6Tue, 27 Feb 2024 09:00:00 -040001:47:46falsefull202342422023Oral Argument: NetChoice, LLC v. Paxton | Case No. 22-555 | Date Argued: 2/26/24 | Date Decided: 7/1/24Oral Argument: NetChoice, LLC v. Paxton | Case No. 22-555 | Date Argued: 2/26/24 | Date Decided: 7/1/24

     Link to Docket: Here.

     Background:

     Throughout our Nation's history, the First Amendment's freedoms of speech and press have protected private entities' rights to choose whether and how to publish and disseminate speech generated by others. E.g., Manhattan Cmty. Access Corp. v. Halleck, 139 S. Ct. 1921, 1930 (2019); Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Boston, 515 U.S. 557, 570, 575 (1995); Miami Herald Publ'g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241,258 (1974). Over two decades ago, this Court held there is "no basis for qualifying the level of First Amendment scrutiny that should be applied to" speech disseminated on "the Internet." Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 870 (1997). Today, many Internet websites publish and disseminate curated collections of expression generated by themselves and others. Nevertheless, the State of Texas-much like Florida before it-has enacted a viewpoint-, content-, and speaker-based law (House Bill 20 or "HB20") targeting certain disfavored "social media" websites. HB20 Section 7 prohibits these websites from making editorial choices based on "viewpoint." And HB20 Section 2 imposes on these websites burdensome operational and disclosure requirements, chilling their editorial choices. This Court has already ensured once that Respondent cannot enforce this law against Petitioners' members. NetChoice, LLC v. Paxton, 142 S. Ct. 1715, 1715-16 (2022).

     Question Presented: Whether the First Amendment prohibits viewpoint-, content-, or speaker-based laws restricting select websites from engaging in editorial choices about whether, and how, to publish and disseminate speech-or otherwise burdening those editorial choices through onerous operational and disclosure requirements.

     Holding: The judgments are vacated, and the cases are remanded, because neither the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the 11th Circuit nor the 5th Circuit conducted a proper analysis of the facial First Amendment challenges to the Florida and Texas laws regulating large internet platforms.

     Result: Vacated and remanded.

     Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Kagan delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Sotomayor, Kavanaugh, and Barrett joined in full, and in which Justice Jackson joined as to Parts I, II and III-A. Justice Barrett filed a concurring opinion. Justice Jackson filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment. Justice Thomas filed an opinion concurring in the judgment. Justice Alito filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which Justices Thomas and Gorsuch joined. (Opinion together with No. 22-277).

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     • For Petitioner: Paul D. Clement, Alexandria, Va.; and Elizabeth B. Prelogar, Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. (for United States, as Amicus Curiae.)
     • For Respondent: Aaron L. Nielson, Solicitor General, Austin, Tex.
     
     ]]>Oral Argument: NetChoice, LLC v. Paxton | Case No. 22-555 | Date Argued: 2/26/24 | Date Decided: 7/1/24

     Link to Docket: Here.

     Background:

     Throughout our Nation's history, the First Amendment's freedoms of speech and press have protected private entities' rights to choose whether and how to publish and disseminate speech generated by others. E.g., Manhattan Cmty. Access Corp. v. Halleck, 139 S. Ct. 1921, 1930 (2019); Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Boston, 515 U.S. 557, 570, 575 (1995); Miami Herald Publ'g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241,258 (1974). Over two decades ago, this Court held there is "no basis for qualifying the level of First Amendment scrutiny that should be applied to" speech disseminated on "the Internet." Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 870 (1997). Today, many Internet websites publish and disseminate curated collections of expression generated by themselves and others. Nevertheless, the State of Texas-much like Florida before it-has enacted a viewpoint-, content-, and speaker-based law (House Bill 20 or "HB20") targeting certain disfavored "social media" websites. HB20 Section 7 prohibits these websites from making editorial choices based on "viewpoint." And HB20 Section 2 imposes on these websites burdensome operational and disclosure requirements, chilling their editorial choices. This Court has already ensured once that Respondent cannot enforce this law against Petitioners' members. NetChoice, LLC v. Paxton, 142 S. Ct. 1715, 1715-16 (2022).

     Question Presented: Whether the First Amendment prohibits viewpoint-, content-, or speaker-based laws restricting select websites from engaging in editorial choices about whether, and how, to publish and disseminate speech-or otherwise burdening those editorial choices through onerous operational and disclosure requirements.

     Holding: The judgments are vacated, and the cases are remanded, because neither the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the 11th Circuit nor the 5th Circuit conducted a proper analysis of the facial First Amendment challenges to the Florida and Texas laws regulating large internet platforms.

     Result: Vacated and remanded.

     Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Kagan delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Sotomayor, Kavanaugh, and Barrett joined in full, and in which Justice Jackson joined as to Parts I, II and III-A. Justice Barrett filed a concurring opinion. Justice Jackson filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment. Justice Thomas filed an opinion concurring in the judgment. Justice Alito filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which Justices Thomas and Gorsuch joined. (Opinion together with No. 22-277).

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     • For Petitioner: Paul D. Clement, Alexandria, Va.; and Elizabeth B. Prelogar, Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. (for United States, as Amicus Curiae.)
     • For Respondent: Aaron L. Nielson, Solicitor General, Austin, Tex.
     
     ]]>8a1cf434-1a53-4244-a7ce-bbee4d253a89Mon, 26 Feb 2024 09:00:00 -040001:20:05falsefull202341412023Oral Argument: Moody v. NetChoice, LLC | Case No. 22-277 | Date Argued: 2/26/24 | Case No. 7/1/24Oral Argument: Moody v. NetChoice, LLC | Case No. 22-277 | Date Argued: 2/26/24 | Case No. 7/1/24

     Link to Docket: Here.

     Background:

     Florida has enacted a law that attempts to prevent social-media companies from abusing their enormous power to censor speech.

     Question Presented:

     1. Whether the First Amendment prohibits a State from requiring that social-media companies host third-party communications, and from regulating the time, place, and manner in which they do so.
     2. Whether the First Amendment prohibits a State from requiring social-media companies to notify and provide an explanation to their users when they censor the user's speech.
     
     

     Holding: The judgments are vacated, and the cases are remanded, because neither the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the 11th Circuit nor the 5th Circuit conducted a proper analysis of the facial First Amendment challenges to the Florida and Texas laws regulating large internet platforms.

     Result: Vacated and remanded.

     Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Kagan delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Sotomayor, Kavanaugh, and Barrett joined in full, and in which Justice Jackson joined as to Parts I, II and III-A. Justice Barrett filed a concurring opinion. Justice Jackson filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment. Justice Thomas filed an opinion concurring in the judgment. Justice Alito filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which Justices Thomas and Gorsuch joined. (Opinion together with No. 22-555).

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     • For Petitioner: For Petitioners: Henry C. Whitaker, Solicitor General, Tallahassee, Fla.
     • For Respondents: Paul D. Clement, Alexandria, Va.; and Elizabeth B. Prelogar, Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. (for United States, as Amicus Curiae.)
     
     ]]>Oral Argument: Moody v. NetChoice, LLC | Case No. 22-277 | Date Argued: 2/26/24 | Case No. 7/1/24

     Link to Docket: Here.

     Background:

     Florida has enacted a law that attempts to prevent social-media companies from abusing their enormous power to censor speech.

     Question Presented:

     1. Whether the First Amendment prohibits a State from requiring that social-media companies host third-party communications, and from regulating the time, place, and manner in which they do so.
     2. Whether the First Amendment prohibits a State from requiring social-media companies to notify and provide an explanation to their users when they censor the user's speech.
     
     

     Holding: The judgments are vacated, and the cases are remanded, because neither the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the 11th Circuit nor the 5th Circuit conducted a proper analysis of the facial First Amendment challenges to the Florida and Texas laws regulating large internet platforms.

     Result: Vacated and remanded.

     Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Kagan delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Sotomayor, Kavanaugh, and Barrett joined in full, and in which Justice Jackson joined as to Parts I, II and III-A. Justice Barrett filed a concurring opinion. Justice Jackson filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment. Justice Thomas filed an opinion concurring in the judgment. Justice Alito filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which Justices Thomas and Gorsuch joined. (Opinion together with No. 22-555).

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     • For Petitioner: For Petitioners: Henry C. Whitaker, Solicitor General, Tallahassee, Fla.
     • For Respondents: Paul D. Clement, Alexandria, Va.; and Elizabeth B. Prelogar, Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. (for United States, as Amicus Curiae.)
     
     ]]>d389186e-a6c2-4eee-a5ee-42113a9e5719Mon, 26 Feb 2024 09:00:00 -040002:22:30falsefull202340402023Oral Argument: Ohio v. EPA | Case No. 23A349 | Date Argued: 2/21/24 | Date Decided: 6/27/2024Oral Argument: Ohio v. EPA | Case No. 23A349 | Date Argued: 2/21/24 | Date Decided: 6/27/2024

     Case consolidated with Kinder Morgan, Inc. v. EPA, Case No. 23A350, American Forest & Paper Assn. v. EPA, Case No. 23A351 and U.S. Steel Corp. v. EPA, Case No. 23A384.

     Link to Docket: Here.

     Holding: The enforcement of the Environmental Protection Agency's federal implementation plan against the applicant states, whose own state implementation plans were determined by EPA to be inadequate because they failed to adequately address certain obligations under the Good Neighbor Provision, shall be stayed pending disposition of the applicants' petition for review in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit and any petition for writ of certiorari, timely sought.

     Result: Application for stay granted.

     Voting Breakdown: 5-4. Justice Gorsuch delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Alito, and Kavanaugh joined. Justice Barrett filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Sotomayor, Kagan, and Jackson joined.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     • For state applicants: Mathura J. Sridharan, Deputy Solicitor General, Columbus, Ohio.
     • For industry applicants: Catherine E. Stetson, Washington, D.C. For federal Respondents: Malcolm L. Stewart, Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.
     • For state Respondents: Judith N. Vale, Deputy Solicitor General, New York, N.Y.
     
     ]]>Oral Argument: Ohio v. EPA | Case No. 23A349 | Date Argued: 2/21/24 | Date Decided: 6/27/2024

     Case consolidated with Kinder Morgan, Inc. v. EPA, Case No. 23A350, American Forest & Paper Assn. v. EPA, Case No. 23A351 and U.S. Steel Corp. v. EPA, Case No. 23A384.

     Link to Docket: Here.

     Holding: The enforcement of the Environmental Protection Agency's federal implementation plan against the applicant states, whose own state implementation plans were determined by EPA to be inadequate because they failed to adequately address certain obligations under the Good Neighbor Provision, shall be stayed pending disposition of the applicants' petition for review in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit and any petition for writ of certiorari, timely sought.

     Result: Application for stay granted.

     Voting Breakdown: 5-4. Justice Gorsuch delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Alito, and Kavanaugh joined. Justice Barrett filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Sotomayor, Kagan, and Jackson joined.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     • For state applicants: Mathura J. Sridharan, Deputy Solicitor General, Columbus, Ohio.
     • For industry applicants: Catherine E. Stetson, Washington, D.C. For federal Respondents: Malcolm L. Stewart, Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.
     • For state Respondents: Judith N. Vale, Deputy Solicitor General, New York, N.Y.
     
     ]]>aaa61c5a-605a-4c79-b509-e34cc2593864Wed, 21 Feb 2024 09:00:00 -040001:29:05falsefull202336362023Oral Argument: Warner Chappell Music, Inc. v. Nealy | Case No. 22-1078 | Date Argued: 2/21/2024 | Date Decided: 5/9/24Oral Argument: Warner Chappell Music, Inc. v. Nealy | Case No. 22-1078 | Date Argued: 2/21/2024 | Date Decided: 5/9/24

     Link to Docket: Here.

     Question Presented: Whether, under the discovery accrual rule applied by the Circuit Courts and the Copyright Act's statute of limitations for civil actions, 17 U.S.C. §507(b), a copyright plaintiff can recover damages for acts that allegedly occurred more than three years before the filing of a lawsuit.

     Holding: The Copyright Act entitles a copyright owner to obtain monetary relief for any timely infringement claim, no matter when the infringement occurred.

     Result: Affirmed.

     Voting Breakdown: 6-3. Justice Kagan delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Sotomayor, Kavanaugh, Barrett, and Jackson joined. Justice Gorsuch filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Thomas and Alito joined.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     • For Petitioner: Kannon K. Shanmugam, Washington, D.C.
     • For Respondents: Joe Wesley Earnhardt, New York, N.Y.; and Yaira Dubin, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. (for United States, as Amicus Curiae.)
     
     ]]>Oral Argument: Warner Chappell Music, Inc. v. Nealy | Case No. 22-1078 | Date Argued: 2/21/2024 | Date Decided: 5/9/24

     Link to Docket: Here.

     Question Presented: Whether, under the discovery accrual rule applied by the Circuit Courts and the Copyright Act's statute of limitations for civil actions, 17 U.S.C. §507(b), a copyright plaintiff can recover damages for acts that allegedly occurred more than three years before the filing of a lawsuit.

     Holding: The Copyright Act entitles a copyright owner to obtain monetary relief for any timely infringement claim, no matter when the infringement occurred.

     Result: Affirmed.

     Voting Breakdown: 6-3. Justice Kagan delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Sotomayor, Kavanaugh, Barrett, and Jackson joined. Justice Gorsuch filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Thomas and Alito joined.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     • For Petitioner: Kannon K. Shanmugam, Washington, D.C.
     • For Respondents: Joe Wesley Earnhardt, New York, N.Y.; and Yaira Dubin, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. (for United States, as Amicus Curiae.)
     
     ]]>098894fc-80be-413e-b673-d192abc0ab4cWed, 21 Feb 2024 09:00:00 -040053:19falsefull202335352023Oral Argument: Bissonnette v. LePage Bakeries Park St., LLC | Case No. 23-51 | Date Argued: 2/20/24 | Date Decided: 4/12/24Oral Argument: Bissonnette v. LePage Bakeries Park St., LLC | Case No. 23-51 | Date Argued: 2/20/24 | Date Decided: 4/12/24

     Link to Docket: Here.

     Background:

     The Federal Arbitration Act exempts the "contracts of employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce." 9 U.S.C. § 1. The First and Seventh Circuits have held that this exemption applies to any member of a class of workers that is engaged in foreign or interstate commerce in the same way as seamen and railroad employees-that is, any worker "actively engaged" in the interstate transportation of goods. The Second and Eleventh Circuits have added an additional requirement: The worker's employer must also be in the "transportation industry."

     Question Presented: To be exempt from the Federal Arbitration Act, must a class of workers that is actively engaged in interstate transportation also be employed by a company in the transportation industry?

     Holding: A transportation worker need not work in the transportation industry to be exempt from coverage under Section 1 of the Federal Arbitration Act.

     Result: Vacated and remanded.

     Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Chief Justice Roberts delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     • For Petitioner: Jennifer D. Bennett, San Francisco, Cal.
     • For Respondents: Traci L. Lovitt, New York, N.Y.
     
     ]]>Oral Argument: Bissonnette v. LePage Bakeries Park St., LLC | Case No. 23-51 | Date Argued: 2/20/24 | Date Decided: 4/12/24

     Link to Docket: Here.

     Background:

     The Federal Arbitration Act exempts the "contracts of employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce." 9 U.S.C. § 1. The First and Seventh Circuits have held that this exemption applies to any member of a class of workers that is engaged in foreign or interstate commerce in the same way as seamen and railroad employees-that is, any worker "actively engaged" in the interstate transportation of goods. The Second and Eleventh Circuits have added an additional requirement: The worker's employer must also be in the "transportation industry."

     Question Presented: To be exempt from the Federal Arbitration Act, must a class of workers that is actively engaged in interstate transportation also be employed by a company in the transportation industry?

     Holding: A transportation worker need not work in the transportation industry to be exempt from coverage under Section 1 of the Federal Arbitration Act.

     Result: Vacated and remanded.

     Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Chief Justice Roberts delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     • For Petitioner: Jennifer D. Bennett, San Francisco, Cal.
     • For Respondents: Traci L. Lovitt, New York, N.Y.
     
     ]]>595c5da1-cc4b-4f76-ad2d-4d9d52f55d6cTue, 20 Feb 2024 09:00:00 -040001:00:18falsefull202472722024Oral Argument: Corner Post, Inc. v. Board of Governors, FRS | Case No. 22-1008 | Date Argued: 2/20/2024 | Date Decided: 7/1/2024Oral Argument: Corner Post, Inc. v. Board of Governors, FRS | Case No. 22-1008 | Date Argued: 2/20/2024 | Date Decided: 7/1/2024

     Link to Docket: Here.

     Background:

     Petitioner Corner Post, Inc. is a convenience store and truck stop in North Dakota that first opened for business in 2018. In 2021, Corner Post sued the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System under the Administrative Procedure Act, challenging a Board rule adopted in 2011 that governs certain fees for debit-card transactions. The Eighth Circuit held that Corner Post's APA claims were barred by 28 U.S.C. §2401 (a)'s six-year statute of limitations. In so doing, it adopted the majority position in an acknowledged circuit split on when APA claims "first accrue[]" under §2401(a). The Eighth Circuit held that Corner Post's APA claims "first accrue[d]" when the Board issued the rule in 2011-even though Corner Post did not open for business until seven years later. As a result, Corner Post's limitations period expired in 2017-a year before it opened for business. The court did not explain how Corner Post could have "suffer[ed] legal wrong" from or been "adversely affected or aggrieved by" the Board's rule-a predicate to stating an APA claim, 5 U.S.C. §702-before Corner Post accepted even one debit-card payment subject to the rule.

     Question Presented: Does a plaintiff's APA claim "first accrue[]" under 28 U.S.C. §2401(a) when an agency issues a rule-regardless of whether that rule injures the plaintiff on that date (as the Eighth Circuit and five other circuits have held)-or when the rule first causes a plaintiff to "suffer[] legal wrong" or be "adversely affected or aggrieved" (as the Sixth Circuit has held)?

     Holding: An Administrative Procedure Act claim does not accrue for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 2401(a), the default 6-year statute of limitations applicable to suits against the United States, until the plaintiff is injured by final agency action.

     Result: Reversed and remanded.

     Voting Breakdown: 6-3. Justice Barrett delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Alito, Gorsuch, and Kavanaugh joined. Justice Kavanaugh filed a concurring opinion. Justice Jackson filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Sotomayor and Kagan joined.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     • For Petitioner: Bryan K. Weir, Arlington, Va.
     • For Respondent: Benjamin W. Snyder, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.
     
     ]]>Oral Argument: Corner Post, Inc. v. Board of Governors, FRS | Case No. 22-1008 | Date Argued: 2/20/2024 | Date Decided: 7/1/2024

     Link to Docket: Here.

     Background:

     Petitioner Corner Post, Inc. is a convenience store and truck stop in North Dakota that first opened for business in 2018. In 2021, Corner Post sued the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System under the Administrative Procedure Act, challenging a Board rule adopted in 2011 that governs certain fees for debit-card transactions. The Eighth Circuit held that Corner Post's APA claims were barred by 28 U.S.C. §2401 (a)'s six-year statute of limitations. In so doing, it adopted the majority position in an acknowledged circuit split on when APA claims "first accrue[]" under §2401(a). The Eighth Circuit held that Corner Post's APA claims "first accrue[d]" when the Board issued the rule in 2011-even though Corner Post did not open for business until seven years later. As a result, Corner Post's limitations period expired in 2017-a year before it opened for business. The court did not explain how Corner Post could have "suffer[ed] legal wrong" from or been "adversely affected or aggrieved by" the Board's rule-a predicate to stating an APA claim, 5 U.S.C. §702-before Corner Post accepted even one debit-card payment subject to the rule.

     Question Presented: Does a plaintiff's APA claim "first accrue[]" under 28 U.S.C. §2401(a) when an agency issues a rule-regardless of whether that rule injures the plaintiff on that date (as the Eighth Circuit and five other circuits have held)-or when the rule first causes a plaintiff to "suffer[] legal wrong" or be "adversely affected or aggrieved" (as the Sixth Circuit has held)?

     Holding: An Administrative Procedure Act claim does not accrue for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 2401(a), the default 6-year statute of limitations applicable to suits against the United States, until the plaintiff is injured by final agency action.

     Result: Reversed and remanded.

     Voting Breakdown: 6-3. Justice Barrett delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Alito, Gorsuch, and Kavanaugh joined. Justice Kavanaugh filed a concurring opinion. Justice Jackson filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Sotomayor and Kagan joined.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     • For Petitioner: Bryan K. Weir, Arlington, Va.
     • For Respondent: Benjamin W. Snyder, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.
     
     ]]>dc7a7a9c-c7c5-4109-b55c-762880c80385Tue, 20 Feb 2024 09:00:00 -040001:10:13falsefull202333332023Oral Argument: Trump v. Anderson | Case No. 23-719 | Date Argued: 2/8/24 | Date Decided: 3/4/24Oral Argument: Trump v. Anderson | Case No. 23-719 | Date Argued: 2/8/24 | Date Decided: 3/4/24

     Link to Docket: Here.

     Background:

     The Supreme Court of Colorado held that President Donald J. Trump is disqualified from holding the office of President because he "engaged in insurrection" against the Constitution of the United States-and that he did so after taking an oath "as an officer of the United States" to "support" the Constitution. The state supreme court ruled that the Colorado Secretary of State should not list President Trump's name on the 2024 presidential primary ballot or count any write-in votes cast for him. The state supreme court stayed its decision pending United States Supreme Court review.

     Question Presented: Did the Colorado Supreme Court err in ordering President Trump excluded from the 2024 presidential primary ballot?

     Holding: Because the Constitution makes Congress, rather than the states, responsible for enforcing Section 3 of the 14th Amendment against federal officeholders and candidates, the Colorado Supreme Court erred in ordering former President Donald Trump excluded from the 2024 presidential primary ballot.

     Result: Reversed.

     Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Per curiam opinion. Justice Barrett filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment. Justices Sotomayor, Kagan, and Jackson filed an opinion concurring in the judgment.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     • For Petitioner: Jonathan F. Mitchell, Austin, Tex.
     • For Respondents Anderson, et al.: Jason C. Murray, Denver, Colo.
     • For Respondent Griswold: Shannon W. Stevenson, Solicitor General, Denver, Colo.
     
     ]]>Oral Argument: Trump v. Anderson | Case No. 23-719 | Date Argued: 2/8/24 | Date Decided: 3/4/24

     Link to Docket: Here.

     Background:

     The Supreme Court of Colorado held that President Donald J. Trump is disqualified from holding the office of President because he "engaged in insurrection" against the Constitution of the United States-and that he did so after taking an oath "as an officer of the United States" to "support" the Constitution. The state supreme court ruled that the Colorado Secretary of State should not list President Trump's name on the 2024 presidential primary ballot or count any write-in votes cast for him. The state supreme court stayed its decision pending United States Supreme Court review.

     Question Presented: Did the Colorado Supreme Court err in ordering President Trump excluded from the 2024 presidential primary ballot?

     Holding: Because the Constitution makes Congress, rather than the states, responsible for enforcing Section 3 of the 14th Amendment against federal officeholders and candidates, the Colorado Supreme Court erred in ordering former President Donald Trump excluded from the 2024 presidential primary ballot.

     Result: Reversed.

     Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Per curiam opinion. Justice Barrett filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment. Justices Sotomayor, Kagan, and Jackson filed an opinion concurring in the judgment.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     • For Petitioner: Jonathan F. Mitchell, Austin, Tex.
     • For Respondents Anderson, et al.: Jason C. Murray, Denver, Colo.
     • For Respondent Griswold: Shannon W. Stevenson, Solicitor General, Denver, Colo.
     
     ]]>7207c305-6a0b-4c44-ad54-7ad07e51ed0dThu, 08 Feb 2024 09:00:00 -040002:09:04falsefull202332322023Oral Argument: Relentless, Inc. v. Department of Commerce | Case No. 22-1219 | Date Argued: 1/17/24 | Date Decided: 6/28/24Oral Argument: Relentless, Inc. v. Department of Commerce | Case No. 22-1219 | Date Argued: 1/17/24 | Date Decided: 6/28/24

     Link to Docket: Here.

     Background:

     The Magnuson-Stevens Act ("MSA'') governs fishery management in federal waters. It states that, with the approval of the Secretary of Commerce, the National Marine Fisheries Service ("NMFS") may require fishing vessels to carry federal observers who enforce the agency's regulations. Congress appropriates funds for these observers. In three circumstances absent here, but not elsewhere, the MSA allows federal observers to be paid in some manner by the regulated party. Deeming annual Congressional appropriations for the federal observers insufficient, the agency asserted a right to force the fishing vessels into contracts to pay the federal observers. The First Circuit approved this practice without stating whether its conclusion was a "product of Chevron step one or step two." It held the mere fact that the MSA provides for federal observers gave the agency carte blanche to charge the regulated party for those observers. Neither Chevron nor the MSA provision allowing measures "necessary and appropriate" to enforce the statute allows this result.

     Question Presented: Whether the Court should overrule Chevron or at least clarify that statutory silence concerning controversial powers expressly but narrowly granted elsewhere in the statute does not constitute an ambiguity requiring deference to the agency.

     Holding: The Administrative Procedure Act requires courts to exercise their independent judgment in deciding whether an agency has acted within its statutory authority, and courts may not defer to an agency interpretation of the law simply because a statute is ambiguous; Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council is overruled.

     Result: Vacated and remanded.

     Voting Breakdown: 6-3. Chief Justice Roberts delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Justices Thomas, Alito, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, and Barrett joined. Justices Thomas and Gorsuch filed concurring opinions. Justice Kagan filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Sotomayor joined, and in which Justice Jackson joined as it applies to No. 22-1219. Justice Jackson took no part in the consideration or decision of the case in No. 22-451.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     • For Petitioner: Roman Martinez, Washington, D.C.
     • For Respondents: Elizabeth B. Prelogar, Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.
     
     ]]>Oral Argument: Relentless, Inc. v. Department of Commerce | Case No. 22-1219 | Date Argued: 1/17/24 | Date Decided: 6/28/24

     Link to Docket: Here.

     Background:

     The Magnuson-Stevens Act ("MSA'') governs fishery management in federal waters. It states that, with the approval of the Secretary of Commerce, the National Marine Fisheries Service ("NMFS") may require fishing vessels to carry federal observers who enforce the agency's regulations. Congress appropriates funds for these observers. In three circumstances absent here, but not elsewhere, the MSA allows federal observers to be paid in some manner by the regulated party. Deeming annual Congressional appropriations for the federal observers insufficient, the agency asserted a right to force the fishing vessels into contracts to pay the federal observers. The First Circuit approved this practice without stating whether its conclusion was a "product of Chevron step one or step two." It held the mere fact that the MSA provides for federal observers gave the agency carte blanche to charge the regulated party for those observers. Neither Chevron nor the MSA provision allowing measures "necessary and appropriate" to enforce the statute allows this result.

     Question Presented: Whether the Court should overrule Chevron or at least clarify that statutory silence concerning controversial powers expressly but narrowly granted elsewhere in the statute does not constitute an ambiguity requiring deference to the agency.

     Holding: The Administrative Procedure Act requires courts to exercise their independent judgment in deciding whether an agency has acted within its statutory authority, and courts may not defer to an agency interpretation of the law simply because a statute is ambiguous; Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council is overruled.

     Result: Vacated and remanded.

     Voting Breakdown: 6-3. Chief Justice Roberts delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Justices Thomas, Alito, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, and Barrett joined. Justices Thomas and Gorsuch filed concurring opinions. Justice Kagan filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Sotomayor joined, and in which Justice Jackson joined as it applies to No. 22-1219. Justice Jackson took no part in the consideration or decision of the case in No. 22-451.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     • For Petitioner: Roman Martinez, Washington, D.C.
     • For Respondents: Elizabeth B. Prelogar, Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.
     
     ]]>acdbb9c1-2064-4b31-b232-115830dbc36eWed, 17 Jan 2024 09:00:00 -040002:11:44falsefull202331312023Oral Argument: Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo | Case No. 22-451 | Date Argued: 1/17/24 | Date Decided: 6/28/24Oral Argument: Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo | Case No. 22-451 | Date Argued: 1/17/24 | Date Decided: 6/28/24

     Case consolidated with Relentless, Inc. v. Department of Commerce, Case No. 22-1219.

     Link to Docket: Here.

     Background:

     The Magnuson-Stevens Act (MSA) governs fishery management in federal waters and provides that the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) may require vessels to "carry" federal observers onboard to enforce the agency's myriad regulations. Given that space onboard a fishing vessel is limited and valuable, that alone is an extraordinary imposition. But in three narrow circumstances not applicable here, the MSA goes further and requires vessels to pay the salaries of the federal observers who oversee their operations-although, with the exception of foreign vessels that enjoy the privilege of fishing in our waters, the MSA caps the costs of those salaries at 2-3% of the value of the vessel's haul. The statutory question underlying this petition is whether the agency can also force a wide variety of domestic vessels to foot the bill for the salaries of the monitors they must carry to the tune of 20% of their revenues. Under well-established principles of statutory construction, the answer would appear to be no, as the express grant of such a controversial power in limited circumstances forecloses a broad implied grant that would render the express grant superfluous. But a divided panel of the D.C. Circuit answered yes under Chevron on the theory that statutory silence produced an ambiguity that justified deferring to the agency.

     Question Presented: Whether the Court should overrule Chevron or at least clarify that statutory silence concerning controversial powers expressly but narrowly granted elsewhere in the statute does not constitute an ambiguity requiring deference to the agency.

     Holding: The Administrative Procedure Act requires courts to exercise their independent judgment in deciding whether an agency has acted within its statutory authority, and courts may not defer to an agency interpretation of the law simply because a statute is ambiguous; Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council is overruled.

     Result: Vacated and remanded.

     Voting Breakdown: 6-3. Chief Justice Roberts delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Justices Thomas, Alito, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, and Barrett joined. Justices Thomas and Gorsuch filed concurring opinions. Justice Kagan filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Sotomayor joined, and in which Justice Jackson joined as it applies to No. 22-1219. Justice Jackson took no part in the consideration or decision of the case in No. 22-451.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     • For Petitioner: Roman Martinez, Washington, D.C.
     • For Respondents: Elizabeth B. Prelogar, Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.
     
     ]]>Oral Argument: Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo | Case No. 22-451 | Date Argued: 1/17/24 | Date Decided: 6/28/24

     Case consolidated with Relentless, Inc. v. Department of Commerce, Case No. 22-1219.

     Link to Docket: Here.

     Background:

     The Magnuson-Stevens Act (MSA) governs fishery management in federal waters and provides that the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) may require vessels to "carry" federal observers onboard to enforce the agency's myriad regulations. Given that space onboard a fishing vessel is limited and valuable, that alone is an extraordinary imposition. But in three narrow circumstances not applicable here, the MSA goes further and requires vessels to pay the salaries of the federal observers who oversee their operations-although, with the exception of foreign vessels that enjoy the privilege of fishing in our waters, the MSA caps the costs of those salaries at 2-3% of the value of the vessel's haul. The statutory question underlying this petition is whether the agency can also force a wide variety of domestic vessels to foot the bill for the salaries of the monitors they must carry to the tune of 20% of their revenues. Under well-established principles of statutory construction, the answer would appear to be no, as the express grant of such a controversial power in limited circumstances forecloses a broad implied grant that would render the express grant superfluous. But a divided panel of the D.C. Circuit answered yes under Chevron on the theory that statutory silence produced an ambiguity that justified deferring to the agency.

     Question Presented: Whether the Court should overrule Chevron or at least clarify that statutory silence concerning controversial powers expressly but narrowly granted elsewhere in the statute does not constitute an ambiguity requiring deference to the agency.

     Holding: The Administrative Procedure Act requires courts to exercise their independent judgment in deciding whether an agency has acted within its statutory authority, and courts may not defer to an agency interpretation of the law simply because a statute is ambiguous; Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council is overruled.

     Result: Vacated and remanded.

     Voting Breakdown: 6-3. Chief Justice Roberts delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Justices Thomas, Alito, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, and Barrett joined. Justices Thomas and Gorsuch filed concurring opinions. Justice Kagan filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Sotomayor joined, and in which Justice Jackson joined as it applies to No. 22-1219. Justice Jackson took no part in the consideration or decision of the case in No. 22-451.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     • For Petitioner: Roman Martinez, Washington, D.C.
     • For Respondents: Elizabeth B. Prelogar, Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.
     
     ]]>f750c5ae-3e6e-42aa-a825-e080b0b2f549Wed, 17 Jan 2024 09:00:00 -040001:16:13falsefull202330302023Oral Argument: Macquarie Infrastructure Corp. v. Moab Partners, L.P. | Case No. 22-1165 | Date Argued: 1/16/24 | Date Decided: 4/12/24Oral Argument: Macquarie Infrastructure Corp. v. Moab Partners, L.P. | Case No. 22-1165 | Date Argued: 1/16/24 | Date Decided: 4/12/24

     Link to Docket: Here.

     Background:

     Section l0(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 prohibits deception in connection with the purchase or sale of securities. To that end, SEC Rule l0b-5 declares it unlawful to make an untrue statement or omit a material fact "necessary" to make an affirmative statement "not misleading." 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(b). A violation of this requirement can give rise to a private claim-a judicially implied private right of action that this Court has construed narrowly. Item 303 of SEC Regulation S-K calls for additional disclosures under a different standard. Item 303 is an administrative rule that requires a company to disclose known trends or uncertainties that are likely to have a material impact on its financial position, regardless of whether the company had made any statements that would otherwise be misleading.

     Question Presented: Whether the Second Circuit erred in holding-in conflict with the Third, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits-that a failure to make a disclosure required under Item 303 can support a private claim under Section l0(b), even in the absence of an otherwise-misleading statement.

     Holding: Pure omissions are not actionable under SEC Rule 10b-5(b), which makes it unlawful to omit material facts in connection with buying or selling securities when that omission renders "statements made" misleading.

     Result: Vacated and remanded.

     Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Sotomayor delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     • For Petitioner: Linda T. Coberly, Chicago, Ill.
     • For Respondent Moab Partners, L.P.: David C. Frederick, Washington, D.C.; and Ephraim McDowell, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. (for United States, as Amicus Curiae.)
     
     

     Timestamps:

     ]]>Oral Argument: Macquarie Infrastructure Corp. v. Moab Partners, L.P. | Case No. 22-1165 | Date Argued: 1/16/24 | Date Decided: 4/12/24

     Link to Docket: Here.

     Background:

     Section l0(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 prohibits deception in connection with the purchase or sale of securities. To that end, SEC Rule l0b-5 declares it unlawful to make an untrue statement or omit a material fact "necessary" to make an affirmative statement "not misleading." 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(b). A violation of this requirement can give rise to a private claim-a judicially implied private right of action that this Court has construed narrowly. Item 303 of SEC Regulation S-K calls for additional disclosures under a different standard. Item 303 is an administrative rule that requires a company to disclose known trends or uncertainties that are likely to have a material impact on its financial position, regardless of whether the company had made any statements that would otherwise be misleading.

     Question Presented: Whether the Second Circuit erred in holding-in conflict with the Third, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits-that a failure to make a disclosure required under Item 303 can support a private claim under Section l0(b), even in the absence of an otherwise-misleading statement.

     Holding: Pure omissions are not actionable under SEC Rule 10b-5(b), which makes it unlawful to omit material facts in connection with buying or selling securities when that omission renders "statements made" misleading.

     Result: Vacated and remanded.

     Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Sotomayor delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     • For Petitioner: Linda T. Coberly, Chicago, Ill.
     • For Respondent Moab Partners, L.P.: David C. Frederick, Washington, D.C.; and Ephraim McDowell, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. (for United States, as Amicus Curiae.)
     
     

     Timestamps:

     ]]>2f1017bb-3e24-4798-b8d3-07cc6c90cac4Tue, 16 Jan 2024 09:00:00 -040001:05:53falsefull202329292023Oral Argument: Devillier v. Texas | Case No. 22-913 | Date Argued: 1/16/24 | Date Decided: 4/16/24Oral Argument: Devillier v. Texas | Case No. 22-913 | Date Argued: 1/16/24 | Date Decided: 4/16/24

     Link to Docket: Here.

     Background:

     In First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, this Court recognized that the Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause was "self-executing" and that "[s]tatutory recognition was not necessary" for claims for just compensation because they "are grounded in the Constitution itself[.]" 482 U.S. 304, 315 (1987). Since First English, several state courts of last resort have held that the self-executing nature of the Takings Clause requires them to entertain claims directly under the Clause without the need for statutory authorization. Two federal Circuits, the Fifth and the Ninth, disagree and have held that claims for just compensation are only available if they are legislatively authorized.

     Question Presented: May a person whose property is taken without compensation seek redress under the self-executing Takings Clause even if the legislature has not affirmatively provided them with a cause of action?

     Holding: Owners of property north of U.S. Interstate Highway 10 adversely affected by the flood evacuation barrier constructed by Texas should be permitted on remand to pursue their takings clause claims through the cause of action available under Texas law.

     Result: Vacated and remanded.

     Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Thomas delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     • For Petitioner: Robert J. McNamara, Arlington, Va.
     • For Respondent: Aaron L. Nielson, Solicitor General, Austin, Tex.; and Edwin S. Kneedler, Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. (for United States, as Amicus Curiae.)
     
     ]]>Oral Argument: Devillier v. Texas | Case No. 22-913 | Date Argued: 1/16/24 | Date Decided: 4/16/24

     Link to Docket: Here.

     Background:

     In First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, this Court recognized that the Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause was "self-executing" and that "[s]tatutory recognition was not necessary" for claims for just compensation because they "are grounded in the Constitution itself[.]" 482 U.S. 304, 315 (1987). Since First English, several state courts of last resort have held that the self-executing nature of the Takings Clause requires them to entertain claims directly under the Clause without the need for statutory authorization. Two federal Circuits, the Fifth and the Ninth, disagree and have held that claims for just compensation are only available if they are legislatively authorized.

     Question Presented: May a person whose property is taken without compensation seek redress under the self-executing Takings Clause even if the legislature has not affirmatively provided them with a cause of action?

     Holding: Owners of property north of U.S. Interstate Highway 10 adversely affected by the flood evacuation barrier constructed by Texas should be permitted on remand to pursue their takings clause claims through the cause of action available under Texas law.

     Result: Vacated and remanded.

     Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Thomas delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     • For Petitioner: Robert J. McNamara, Arlington, Va.
     • For Respondent: Aaron L. Nielson, Solicitor General, Austin, Tex.; and Edwin S. Kneedler, Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. (for United States, as Amicus Curiae.)
     
     ]]>06b2d166-9af8-4252-9dd5-87c87baccb5fTue, 16 Jan 2024 09:00:00 -040001:11:55falsefull202328282023Oral Argument: Smith v. Arizona | Case No. 22-899 | Date Argued: 1/10/24 | Date Decided: 6/21/24Oral Argument: Smith v. Arizona | Case No. 22-899 | Date Argued: 1/10/24 | Date Decided: 6/21/24

     Link to Docket: Here.

     Question Presented: Whether the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment permits the prosecution in a criminal trial to present testimony by a substitute expert conveying the testimonial statements of a nontestifying forensic analyst, on the grounds that (a) the testifying expert offers some independent opinion and the analyst's statements are offered not for their truth but to explain the expert's opinion, and (b) the defendant did not independently seek to subpoena the analyst.

     Holding: When an expert conveys an absent lab analyst's statements in support of the expert's opinion, and the statements provide that support only if true, then the statements come into evidence for their truth, and thus implicate the Sixth Amendment's confrontation clause.

     Result: Vacated and remanded.

     Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Kagan delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Justices Sotomayor, Kavanaugh, Barrett, and Jackson joined, and in which Justices Thomas and Gorsuch joined as to Parts I, II, and IV. Justice Thomas and Justice Gorsuch filed opinions concurring in part. Justice Alito filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which Chief Justice Roberts joined.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     • For Petitioner: Hari Santhanam, Chicago, Ill.
     • For United States, as Amicus Curiae: Eric J. Feigin, Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.
     • For Respondent: Alexander W. Samuels, Principal Deputy Solicitor General, Phoenix, Ariz.
     
     ]]>Oral Argument: Smith v. Arizona | Case No. 22-899 | Date Argued: 1/10/24 | Date Decided: 6/21/24

     Link to Docket: Here.

     Question Presented: Whether the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment permits the prosecution in a criminal trial to present testimony by a substitute expert conveying the testimonial statements of a nontestifying forensic analyst, on the grounds that (a) the testifying expert offers some independent opinion and the analyst's statements are offered not for their truth but to explain the expert's opinion, and (b) the defendant did not independently seek to subpoena the analyst.

     Holding: When an expert conveys an absent lab analyst's statements in support of the expert's opinion, and the statements provide that support only if true, then the statements come into evidence for their truth, and thus implicate the Sixth Amendment's confrontation clause.

     Result: Vacated and remanded.

     Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Kagan delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Justices Sotomayor, Kavanaugh, Barrett, and Jackson joined, and in which Justices Thomas and Gorsuch joined as to Parts I, II, and IV. Justice Thomas and Justice Gorsuch filed opinions concurring in part. Justice Alito filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which Chief Justice Roberts joined.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     • For Petitioner: Hari Santhanam, Chicago, Ill.
     • For United States, as Amicus Curiae: Eric J. Feigin, Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.
     • For Respondent: Alexander W. Samuels, Principal Deputy Solicitor General, Phoenix, Ariz.
     
     ]]>3ab68c4e-ece0-4bfa-9bde-b85e6eb933c5Wed, 10 Jan 2024 09:00:00 -040001:28:53falsefull202327272023Oral Argument: Sheetz v. County of El Dorado | Case No. 22-1074 | Date Argued: 1/9/24 | Date Decided: 4/12/24Oral Argument: Sheetz v. County of El Dorado | Case No. 22-1074 | Date Argued: 1/9/24 | Date Decided: 4/12/24

     Link to Docket: Here.

     Background:

     George Sheetz applied, to the County of El Dorado, California, for a permit to build a modest manufactured house on his property. Pursuant to legislation enacted by the County, and as the condition of obtaining the permit, Mr. Sheetz was required to pay a monetary exaction of $23,420 to help finance unrelated road improvements. The County demanded payment in spite of the fact that it made no individualized determination that the exaction-a substantial sum for Mr. Sheetz bore an "essential nexus" and "rough proportionality" to the purported impacts associated with his modest project as required in Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 837 (1987) and Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 391 (1994). Mr. Sheetz challenged the exaction as an unconstitutional condition under Nollan and Dolan. A California trial court upheld the exaction, holding that, because it was authorized by legislation, the exaction was immune from Nollan/Dolan review. In a published decision, the California Court of Appeal affirmed, and the California Supreme Court denied review. California's judicially-created exemption from Nollan/Dolan scrutiny for legislative exactions conflicts with the decisions of other federal and state courts across the country, and is in strong tension with this Court's more recent precedents.

     Question Presented: Whether a permit exaction is exempt from the unconstitutional-conditions doctrine as applied in Nollan and Dolan simply because it is authorized by legislation.

     Holding: The Fifth Amendment's takings clause does not distinguish between legislative and administrative land-use permit conditions.

     Result: Vacated and remanded.

     Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Barrett delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Justice Sotomayor filed a concurring opinion, in which Justice Jackson joined. Justice Gorsuch filed a concurring opinion. Justice Kavanaugh filed a concurring opinion, in which Justices Kagan and Jackson joined.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     • For Petitioner: Paul J. Beard, II, Los Angeles, Cal.
     • For Respondent: Aileen M. McGrath, San Francisco, Cal.; and Erica L. Ross, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. (for United States, as Amicus Curiae.)
     
     ]]>Oral Argument: Sheetz v. County of El Dorado | Case No. 22-1074 | Date Argued: 1/9/24 | Date Decided: 4/12/24

     Link to Docket: Here.

     Background:

     George Sheetz applied, to the County of El Dorado, California, for a permit to build a modest manufactured house on his property. Pursuant to legislation enacted by the County, and as the condition of obtaining the permit, Mr. Sheetz was required to pay a monetary exaction of $23,420 to help finance unrelated road improvements. The County demanded payment in spite of the fact that it made no individualized determination that the exaction-a substantial sum for Mr. Sheetz bore an "essential nexus" and "rough proportionality" to the purported impacts associated with his modest project as required in Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 837 (1987) and Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 391 (1994). Mr. Sheetz challenged the exaction as an unconstitutional condition under Nollan and Dolan. A California trial court upheld the exaction, holding that, because it was authorized by legislation, the exaction was immune from Nollan/Dolan review. In a published decision, the California Court of Appeal affirmed, and the California Supreme Court denied review. California's judicially-created exemption from Nollan/Dolan scrutiny for legislative exactions conflicts with the decisions of other federal and state courts across the country, and is in strong tension with this Court's more recent precedents.

     Question Presented: Whether a permit exaction is exempt from the unconstitutional-conditions doctrine as applied in Nollan and Dolan simply because it is authorized by legislation.

     Holding: The Fifth Amendment's takings clause does not distinguish between legislative and administrative land-use permit conditions.

     Result: Vacated and remanded.

     Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Barrett delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Justice Sotomayor filed a concurring opinion, in which Justice Jackson joined. Justice Gorsuch filed a concurring opinion. Justice Kavanaugh filed a concurring opinion, in which Justices Kagan and Jackson joined.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     • For Petitioner: Paul J. Beard, II, Los Angeles, Cal.
     • For Respondent: Aileen M. McGrath, San Francisco, Cal.; and Erica L. Ross, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. (for United States, as Amicus Curiae.)
     
     ]]>43b043ee-25e1-4e97-b5f7-a54eaf743041Tue, 09 Jan 2024 09:00:00 -040001:28:53falsefull202470702024Oral Argument: United States Trustee v. John Q. Hammons Fall 2006, LLC | Case No. 22-1238 | Date Argued: 1/9/24 | Date Decided: 6/14/24Oral Argument: United States Trustee v. John Q. Hammons Fall 2006, LLC | Case No. 22-1238 | Date Argued: 1/9/24 | Date Decided: 6/14/24

     Link to Docket: Here.

     Background:

     Section 1004(a) of the Bankruptcy Judgeship Act of 2017, Pub. L. No.115-72, Div. B, 131 Stat. 1232 (28 U.S.C. 1930(a)(6)(B) (2018)), amended the schedule of quarterly fees payable to the United States Trustee in certain pending bankruptcy cases. In Siegel v. Fitzgerald, 142 S. Ct. 1770 (2022), this Court held that that provision contravened Congress's constitutional authority to "establish * * * uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies," U.S. Const. Art. I, § 8, Cl. 4, because it was initially applied only in the 88 federal judicial districts that have United States Trustees but not in the 6 districts that have Bankruptcy Administrators. This Court left open the question of "the appropriate remedy" for the violation. Siegel, 142 S. Ct. at 1783.

     Question Presented: Whether the appropriate remedy for the constitutional uniformity violation found by this Court in Siegel, supra, is to require the United States Trustee to grant retrospective refunds of the increased fees paid by debtors in United States Trustee districts during the period of disuniformity, or is instead either to deem sufficient the prospective remedy adopted by Congress or to require the collection of additional fees from a much smaller number of debtors in Bankruptcy Administrator districts.

     Holding: Prospective parity (i.e., requiring equal fees for otherwise identical Chapter 11 debtors going forward) is the appropriate remedy for the short-lived and small disparity created by the fee statute held unconstitutional in Siegel v. Fitzgerald.

     Result: Reversed and remanded.

     Voting Breakdown: 6-3. "Justice Jackson delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Alito, Sotomayor, Kagan, and Kavanaugh joined. Justice Gorsuch filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Thomas and Barrett joined.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     • For Petitioner: Masha G. Hansford, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.
     • For Respondents: Daniel L. Geyser, Dallas, Tex.
     
     ]]>Oral Argument: United States Trustee v. John Q. Hammons Fall 2006, LLC | Case No. 22-1238 | Date Argued: 1/9/24 | Date Decided: 6/14/24

     Link to Docket: Here.

     Background:

     Section 1004(a) of the Bankruptcy Judgeship Act of 2017, Pub. L. No.115-72, Div. B, 131 Stat. 1232 (28 U.S.C. 1930(a)(6)(B) (2018)), amended the schedule of quarterly fees payable to the United States Trustee in certain pending bankruptcy cases. In Siegel v. Fitzgerald, 142 S. Ct. 1770 (2022), this Court held that that provision contravened Congress's constitutional authority to "establish * * * uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies," U.S. Const. Art. I, § 8, Cl. 4, because it was initially applied only in the 88 federal judicial districts that have United States Trustees but not in the 6 districts that have Bankruptcy Administrators. This Court left open the question of "the appropriate remedy" for the violation. Siegel, 142 S. Ct. at 1783.

     Question Presented: Whether the appropriate remedy for the constitutional uniformity violation found by this Court in Siegel, supra, is to require the United States Trustee to grant retrospective refunds of the increased fees paid by debtors in United States Trustee districts during the period of disuniformity, or is instead either to deem sufficient the prospective remedy adopted by Congress or to require the collection of additional fees from a much smaller number of debtors in Bankruptcy Administrator districts.

     Holding: Prospective parity (i.e., requiring equal fees for otherwise identical Chapter 11 debtors going forward) is the appropriate remedy for the short-lived and small disparity created by the fee statute held unconstitutional in Siegel v. Fitzgerald.

     Result: Reversed and remanded.

     Voting Breakdown: 6-3. "Justice Jackson delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Alito, Sotomayor, Kagan, and Kavanaugh joined. Justice Gorsuch filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Thomas and Barrett joined.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     • For Petitioner: Masha G. Hansford, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.
     • For Respondents: Daniel L. Geyser, Dallas, Tex.
     
     ]]>314b7b20-f3ec-468d-a88a-61f38251d7a2Tue, 09 Jan 2024 09:00:00 -040001:02:41falsefull202324242023Oral Argument: FBI v. Fikre | Case No. 22-1178 | Date Decided: 1/8/24 | Date Decided: 3/19/24Oral Argument: FBI v. Fikre | Case No. 22-1178 | Date Decided: 1/8/24 | Date Decided: 3/19/24

     Link to Docket: Here.

     Background:

     Individuals are sometimes removed from the No Fly List during ongoing litigation about their placement on that list. The Fourth and Sixth Circuits have held that an individual's removal from the No Fly List moots a case when the government represents that the individual will not be placed back on the list based on currently available information. In conflict with those decisions, the Ninth Circuit held in this case that Respondent's claims were not moot even though he was removed from the No Fly List in 2016 and the government provided a sworn declaration stating that he "will not be placed on the No Fly List in the future based on the currently available information."

     Question Presented: Whether Respondent's claims challenging his placement on the No Fly List are moot.

     Holding: The government failed to meet its burden to demonstrate that Yonas Fikre's removal from the government's No Fly List mooted his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 case because its declaration did not disclose the conduct that landed Fikre on the No Fly List and did not ensure that he would not be placed back on the list for engaging in the same or similar conduct in the future.

     Result: Affirmed.

     Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Gorsuch delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Justice Alito filed a concurring opinion, in which Justice Kavanaugh joined.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     • For Petitioner: Sopan Joshi, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.
     • For Respondent: Gadeir Abbas, Washington, D.C.
     
     ]]>Oral Argument: FBI v. Fikre | Case No. 22-1178 | Date Decided: 1/8/24 | Date Decided: 3/19/24

     Link to Docket: Here.

     Background:

     Individuals are sometimes removed from the No Fly List during ongoing litigation about their placement on that list. The Fourth and Sixth Circuits have held that an individual's removal from the No Fly List moots a case when the government represents that the individual will not be placed back on the list based on currently available information. In conflict with those decisions, the Ninth Circuit held in this case that Respondent's claims were not moot even though he was removed from the No Fly List in 2016 and the government provided a sworn declaration stating that he "will not be placed on the No Fly List in the future based on the currently available information."

     Question Presented: Whether Respondent's claims challenging his placement on the No Fly List are moot.

     Holding: The government failed to meet its burden to demonstrate that Yonas Fikre's removal from the government's No Fly List mooted his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 case because its declaration did not disclose the conduct that landed Fikre on the No Fly List and did not ensure that he would not be placed back on the list for engaging in the same or similar conduct in the future.

     Result: Affirmed.

     Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Gorsuch delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Justice Alito filed a concurring opinion, in which Justice Kavanaugh joined.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     • For Petitioner: Sopan Joshi, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.
     • For Respondent: Gadeir Abbas, Washington, D.C.
     
     ]]>2c3706be-fcc7-42f4-9c5c-11e752f8fe63Mon, 08 Jan 2024 09:00:00 -040001:21:48falsefull202324242023Oral Argument: Campos-Chaves v. Garland | Case No. 22-674 | Date Argued: 1/8/24 | Date Decided: 6/14/24Oral Argument: Campos-Chaves v. Garland | Case No. 22-674 | Date Argued: 1/8/24 | Date Decided: 6/14/24

     Host Note: This case was consolidated with Garland v. Singh, Case No. 22-884.

     Link to Docket: Here.

     Background:

     The Immigration and Nationality Act provides that a noncitizen who does not appear at a removal hearing shall be ordered removed in absentia, but only if she was provided "written notice required under paragraph (l) or (2) of section 1229(a).'' 8 U.S.C. § 1229a (b)(5)(A). The Act authorizes rescission of an in absentia order if the noncitizen "did not receive notice in accordance with paragraph (1) or (2) of section 1229(a)." Id. § 1229a (b)(5)(C)(ii). Paragraph (1) of section 1229(a) requires a single notice document that contains all the information specified in the statute, including the "time and place" of proceedings. See Niz-Chavez v. Garland, 141 S. Ct. 1474, 1480-1485 (2021). Paragraph (2) requires notice of the "new time and place" "in the case of any change or postponement in the time and place of such proceedings."

     Question Presented: If the government serves an initial notice document that does not include the "time and place" of proceedings, followed by an additional document containing that information, has the government provided notice "required under" and "in accordance with para- graph (1) or (2) of section 1229(a)" such that an immigration court must enter a removal order in absentia and deny a noncitizen's request to rescind that order?

     Holding: Because each of the aliens in this case received a proper notice for the removal hearings they missed and at which they were ordered removed from the United States, see 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a), they cannot seek rescission of their in absentia removal orders on the basis of defective notice under Section 1229a(b)(5)(C)(ii).

     Result: Affirmed.

     Voting Breakdown: 5-4. Justice Alito delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Kavanaugh, and Barrett joined. Justice Jackson filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Sotomayor, Kagan, and Gorsuch joined.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     • For Merrick B. Garland, Attorney General: Charles L. McCloud, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.
     • For Petitioner in 22-674 and Respondents in 22-884: Easha Anand, Stanford, Cal.
     
     ]]>Oral Argument: Campos-Chaves v. Garland | Case No. 22-674 | Date Argued: 1/8/24 | Date Decided: 6/14/24

     Host Note: This case was consolidated with Garland v. Singh, Case No. 22-884.

     Link to Docket: Here.

     Background:

     The Immigration and Nationality Act provides that a noncitizen who does not appear at a removal hearing shall be ordered removed in absentia, but only if she was provided "written notice required under paragraph (l) or (2) of section 1229(a).'' 8 U.S.C. § 1229a (b)(5)(A). The Act authorizes rescission of an in absentia order if the noncitizen "did not receive notice in accordance with paragraph (1) or (2) of section 1229(a)." Id. § 1229a (b)(5)(C)(ii). Paragraph (1) of section 1229(a) requires a single notice document that contains all the information specified in the statute, including the "time and place" of proceedings. See Niz-Chavez v. Garland, 141 S. Ct. 1474, 1480-1485 (2021). Paragraph (2) requires notice of the "new time and place" "in the case of any change or postponement in the time and place of such proceedings."

     Question Presented: If the government serves an initial notice document that does not include the "time and place" of proceedings, followed by an additional document containing that information, has the government provided notice "required under" and "in accordance with para- graph (1) or (2) of section 1229(a)" such that an immigration court must enter a removal order in absentia and deny a noncitizen's request to rescind that order?

     Holding: Because each of the aliens in this case received a proper notice for the removal hearings they missed and at which they were ordered removed from the United States, see 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a), they cannot seek rescission of their in absentia removal orders on the basis of defective notice under Section 1229a(b)(5)(C)(ii).

     Result: Affirmed.

     Voting Breakdown: 5-4. Justice Alito delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Kavanaugh, and Barrett joined. Justice Jackson filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Sotomayor, Kagan, and Gorsuch joined.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     • For Merrick B. Garland, Attorney General: Charles L. McCloud, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.
     • For Petitioner in 22-674 and Respondents in 22-884: Easha Anand, Stanford, Cal.
     
     ]]>c15e1e8c-ac99-4da7-beb8-fa6a2c18aa91Mon, 08 Jan 2024 09:00:00 -040001:40:15falsefull202322222023Oral Argument: Muldrow v. St. Louis | Case No. 22-193 | Date Argued: 12/6/23 | Date Decided: 4/17/24Oral Argument: Muldrow v. St. Louis | Case No. 22-193 | Date Argued: 12/6/23 | Date Decided: 4/17/24

     Link to Docket: Here.

     Background:

     Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 makes it unlawful for an employer "to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual" with respect to "compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment" on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l). The Eighth Circuit below followed binding circuit precedent to hold that discriminatory job transfers (and denials of requested transfers) are lawful under Title VII when they do not impose "materially significant disadvantages" on employees.

     Question Presented: Does Title VII prohibit discrimination as to all "terms, conditions, or privileges of employment," or is its reach limited to discriminatory employer conduct that courts determine causes materially significant disadvantages for employees?

     Holding: An employee challenging a job transfer under Title VII must show that the transfer brought about some harm with respect to an identifiable term or condition of employment, but that harm need not be significant.

     Result: Vacated and remanded.

     Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Kagan delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Sotomayor, Gorsuch, Barrett, and Jackson joined. Justices Thomas, Alito, and Kavanaugh each filed an opinion concurring in the judgment.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     • For Petitioner: Brian Wolfman, Washington, D.C.; and Aimee W. Brown, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. (for United States, as Amicus Curiae.)
     • For Respondents: Robert M. Loeb, Washington, D.C.
     
     ]]>Oral Argument: Muldrow v. St. Louis | Case No. 22-193 | Date Argued: 12/6/23 | Date Decided: 4/17/24

     Link to Docket: Here.

     Background:

     Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 makes it unlawful for an employer "to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual" with respect to "compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment" on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l). The Eighth Circuit below followed binding circuit precedent to hold that discriminatory job transfers (and denials of requested transfers) are lawful under Title VII when they do not impose "materially significant disadvantages" on employees.

     Question Presented: Does Title VII prohibit discrimination as to all "terms, conditions, or privileges of employment," or is its reach limited to discriminatory employer conduct that courts determine causes materially significant disadvantages for employees?

     Holding: An employee challenging a job transfer under Title VII must show that the transfer brought about some harm with respect to an identifiable term or condition of employment, but that harm need not be significant.

     Result: Vacated and remanded.

     Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Kagan delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Sotomayor, Gorsuch, Barrett, and Jackson joined. Justices Thomas, Alito, and Kavanaugh each filed an opinion concurring in the judgment.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     • For Petitioner: Brian Wolfman, Washington, D.C.; and Aimee W. Brown, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. (for United States, as Amicus Curiae.)
     • For Respondents: Robert M. Loeb, Washington, D.C.
     
     ]]>8764e659-0fbc-42e8-a015-a7b33a83f2b1Wed, 06 Dec 2023 09:00:00 -040001:36:42falsefull202321212023Oral Argument: Moore v. United States | Case No. 22-800 | Date Argued: 12/5/23 | Date Decided: 6/20/24Oral Argument: Moore v. United States | Case No. 22-800 | Date Argued: 12/5/23 | Date Decided: 6/20/24

     Link to Docket: Here.

     Background:

     Beginning with Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189 (1920), this Court's decisions have uniformly held "income," for Sixteenth Amendment purposes, to require realization by the taxpayer. In the decision below, however, the Ninth Circuit approved taxation of a married couple on earnings that they undisputedly did not realize but were instead retained and reinvested by a corporation in which they are minority shareholders. It held that "realization of income is not a constitutional requirement" for Congress to lay an "income" tax exempt from apportionment. App.12. In so holding, the Ninth Circuit became "the first court in the country to state that an 'income tax' doesn't require that a 'taxpayer has realized income.'" App.38 (Bumatay, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc).

     Question Presented: Whether the Sixteenth Amendment authorizes Congress to tax unrealized sums without apportionment among the states.

     Holding: The Mandatory Repatriation Tax, "which attributes the realized and undistributed income of an American-controlled foreign corporation to the entity's American shareholders, and then taxes the American shareholders on their portions of that income" does not exceed Congress's constitutional authority.

     Result: Affirmed.

     Voting Breakdown: 7-2. Justice Kavanaugh delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Sotomayor, Kagan, and Jackson joined. Justice Jackson filed a concurring opinion. Justice Barrett filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which Justice Alito joined. Justice Thomas filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Gorsuch joined.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     • For Petitioner: Andrew M. Grossman, Washington, D.C.
     • For Respondent: Elizabeth B. Prelogar, Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.
     
     ]]>Oral Argument: Moore v. United States | Case No. 22-800 | Date Argued: 12/5/23 | Date Decided: 6/20/24

     Link to Docket: Here.

     Background:

     Beginning with Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189 (1920), this Court's decisions have uniformly held "income," for Sixteenth Amendment purposes, to require realization by the taxpayer. In the decision below, however, the Ninth Circuit approved taxation of a married couple on earnings that they undisputedly did not realize but were instead retained and reinvested by a corporation in which they are minority shareholders. It held that "realization of income is not a constitutional requirement" for Congress to lay an "income" tax exempt from apportionment. App.12. In so holding, the Ninth Circuit became "the first court in the country to state that an 'income tax' doesn't require that a 'taxpayer has realized income.'" App.38 (Bumatay, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc).

     Question Presented: Whether the Sixteenth Amendment authorizes Congress to tax unrealized sums without apportionment among the states.

     Holding: The Mandatory Repatriation Tax, "which attributes the realized and undistributed income of an American-controlled foreign corporation to the entity's American shareholders, and then taxes the American shareholders on their portions of that income" does not exceed Congress's constitutional authority.

     Result: Affirmed.

     Voting Breakdown: 7-2. Justice Kavanaugh delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Sotomayor, Kagan, and Jackson joined. Justice Jackson filed a concurring opinion. Justice Barrett filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which Justice Alito joined. Justice Thomas filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Gorsuch joined.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     • For Petitioner: Andrew M. Grossman, Washington, D.C.
     • For Respondent: Elizabeth B. Prelogar, Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.
     
     ]]>ea3ac0f7-9e54-49a1-b66d-82b157c53776Tue, 05 Dec 2023 09:00:00 -040002:04:39falsefull202320202023Oral Argument: Harrington v. Purdue Pharma L.P. | Case No. 23-124 | Date Argued: 12/4/23 | Date Decided: 6/27/24Oral Argument: Harrington v. Purdue Pharma L.P. | Case No. 23-124 | Date Argued: 12/4/23 | Date Decided: 6/27/24

     Link to Docket: Here.

     Question Presented: Whether the Bankruptcy Code authorizes a court to approve, as part of a plan of reorganization under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code, a release that extinguishes claims held by nondebtors against nondebtor third parties, without the claimants' consent.

     Holding: The bankruptcy code does not authorize a release and injunction that, as part of a plan of reorganization under Chapter 11, effectively seek to discharge claims against a nondebtor without the consent of affected claimants.

     Result: Reversed and remanded.

     Voting Breakdown: 5-4. Justice Gorsuch delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Justices Thomas, Alito, Barrett, and Jackson joined. Justice Kavanaugh filed a dissenting opinion, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Sotomayor and Kagan joined.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     • For Petitioner: Curtis E. Gannon, Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.
     • For Respondents Purdue Pharma L.P., et al.: Gregory G. Garre, Washington, D.C.
     • For Respondents The Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors of Purdue Pharma L.P., et al.: Pratik A. Shah, Washington, D.C.
     
     ]]>Oral Argument: Harrington v. Purdue Pharma L.P. | Case No. 23-124 | Date Argued: 12/4/23 | Date Decided: 6/27/24

     Link to Docket: Here.

     Question Presented: Whether the Bankruptcy Code authorizes a court to approve, as part of a plan of reorganization under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code, a release that extinguishes claims held by nondebtors against nondebtor third parties, without the claimants' consent.

     Holding: The bankruptcy code does not authorize a release and injunction that, as part of a plan of reorganization under Chapter 11, effectively seek to discharge claims against a nondebtor without the consent of affected claimants.

     Result: Reversed and remanded.

     Voting Breakdown: 5-4. Justice Gorsuch delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Justices Thomas, Alito, Barrett, and Jackson joined. Justice Kavanaugh filed a dissenting opinion, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Sotomayor and Kagan joined.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     • For Petitioner: Curtis E. Gannon, Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.
     • For Respondents Purdue Pharma L.P., et al.: Gregory G. Garre, Washington, D.C.
     • For Respondents The Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors of Purdue Pharma L.P., et al.: Pratik A. Shah, Washington, D.C.
     
     ]]>446408ca-8948-41cb-9662-f98b4a5355fbMon, 04 Dec 2023 09:00:00 -040001:43:35falsefull202319192023Oral Argument: SEC v. Jarkesy | Case No. 22-859 | Date Argued: 11/29/23 | Date Decided: 6/27/24Oral Argument: SEC v. Jarkesy | Case No. 22-859 | Date Argued: 11/29/23 | Date Decided: 6/27/24

     Link to Docket: Here.

     Questions Presented:

     1. Whether statutory provisions that empower the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to initiate and adjudicate administrative enforcement proceedings seeking civil penalties violate the Seventh Amendment.
     2. Whether statutory provisions that authorize the SEC to choose to enforce the securities laws through an agency adjudication instead of filing a district court action violate the nondelegation doctrine.
     3. Whether Congress violated Article II by granting for-cause removal protection to administrative law judges in agencies whose heads enjoy for-cause removal protection.
     
     

     Holding: When the Securities and Exchange Commission seeks civil penalties against a defendant for securities fraud, the Seventh Amendment entitles the defendant to a jury trial.

     Result: Affirmed and remanded.

     Voting Breakdown: 6-3. Chief Justice Roberts delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Justices Thomas, Alito, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, and Barrett joined. Justice Gorsuch filed a concurring opinion, in which Justice Thomas joined. Justice Sotomayor filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Kagan and Jackson joined.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     • For Petitioner: Brian H. Fletcher, Principal Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.
     • For Respondents: S. Michael McColloch, Dallas, Tex.
     
     ]]>Oral Argument: SEC v. Jarkesy | Case No. 22-859 | Date Argued: 11/29/23 | Date Decided: 6/27/24

     Link to Docket: Here.

     Questions Presented:

     1. Whether statutory provisions that empower the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to initiate and adjudicate administrative enforcement proceedings seeking civil penalties violate the Seventh Amendment.
     2. Whether statutory provisions that authorize the SEC to choose to enforce the securities laws through an agency adjudication instead of filing a district court action violate the nondelegation doctrine.
     3. Whether Congress violated Article II by granting for-cause removal protection to administrative law judges in agencies whose heads enjoy for-cause removal protection.
     
     

     Holding: When the Securities and Exchange Commission seeks civil penalties against a defendant for securities fraud, the Seventh Amendment entitles the defendant to a jury trial.

     Result: Affirmed and remanded.

     Voting Breakdown: 6-3. Chief Justice Roberts delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Justices Thomas, Alito, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, and Barrett joined. Justice Gorsuch filed a concurring opinion, in which Justice Thomas joined. Justice Sotomayor filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Kagan and Jackson joined.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     • For Petitioner: Brian H. Fletcher, Principal Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.
     • For Respondents: S. Michael McColloch, Dallas, Tex.
     
     ]]>2cb471ed-fe43-4631-9ae1-d2e8b8ab20c9Wed, 29 Nov 2023 09:00:00 -040002:16:40falsefull202318182023Oral Argument: McElrath v. Georgia | Case No. 22-721 | Date Argued: 11/28/23 | Date Decided: 2/21/24Oral Argument: McElrath v. Georgia | Case No. 22-721 | Date Argued: 11/28/23 | Date Decided: 2/21/24

     Link to Docket: Here.

     Background:

     The Georgia Supreme Court held that a jury's verdict of acquittal on one criminal charge and its verdict of guilty on a different criminal charge arising from the same facts were logically and legally impossible to reconcile. It called the verdicts "repugnant," vacated both of them, and subsequently held that the defendant could be prosecuted a second time on both charges.

     Question Presented: Does the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment prohibit a second prosecution for a crime of which a defendant was previously acquitted?

     Holding: The jury's verdict that the defendant was not guilty by reason of insanity of malice murder constituted an acquittal for double jeopardy purposes notwithstanding any inconsistency with the jury's other verdicts.

     Result: Reversed and remanded.

     Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Sotomayor delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Justices Kagan, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, and Barrett joined. Justice Jackson filed an opinion concurring in the judgment. Chief Justice Roberts filed a dissenting opinion. Justice Alito filed a dissenting opinion in which Chief Justice Roberts joined.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     • For Petitioner: Richard A. Simpson, Washington, D.C.
     • For Respondent: Stephen J. Petrany, Solicitor General, Atlanta, Ga.
     
     ]]>Oral Argument: McElrath v. Georgia | Case No. 22-721 | Date Argued: 11/28/23 | Date Decided: 2/21/24

     Link to Docket: Here.

     Background:

     The Georgia Supreme Court held that a jury's verdict of acquittal on one criminal charge and its verdict of guilty on a different criminal charge arising from the same facts were logically and legally impossible to reconcile. It called the verdicts "repugnant," vacated both of them, and subsequently held that the defendant could be prosecuted a second time on both charges.

     Question Presented: Does the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment prohibit a second prosecution for a crime of which a defendant was previously acquitted?

     Holding: The jury's verdict that the defendant was not guilty by reason of insanity of malice murder constituted an acquittal for double jeopardy purposes notwithstanding any inconsistency with the jury's other verdicts.

     Result: Reversed and remanded.

     Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Sotomayor delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Justices Kagan, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, and Barrett joined. Justice Jackson filed an opinion concurring in the judgment. Chief Justice Roberts filed a dissenting opinion. Justice Alito filed a dissenting opinion in which Chief Justice Roberts joined.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     • For Petitioner: Richard A. Simpson, Washington, D.C.
     • For Respondent: Stephen J. Petrany, Solicitor General, Atlanta, Ga.
     
     ]]>d2d27b48-7aca-4ac7-9542-9c1fee03903aTue, 28 Nov 2023 09:00:00 -040059:19falsefull202317172023Oral Argument: Wilkinson v. Garland | Case No. 22-666 | Date Argued: 11/28/23 | Date Decided: 3/19/24Oral Argument: Wilkinson v. Garland | Case No. 22-666 | Date Argued: 11/28/23 | Date Decided: 3/19/24

     Link to Docket: Here.

     Background:

     Under the Immigration and Nationality Act, the Attorney General has discretion to cancel removal of non-permanent residents who satisfy four eligibility criteria, including "that removal would result in exceptional and extremely unusual hardship" to the applicant's immediate family member who is a U.S. citizen or lawful permanent resident. 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(l)(D). Congress stripped courts of jurisdiction to review cancellation-of-removal determinations, 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i), but expressly preserved their jurisdiction to review "questions of law." Id. § 1252(a)(2)(D). And as this Court has already held, this "statutory phrase 'questions of law' includes the application of a legal standard to undisputed or established facts"—that is, a "mixed question of law and fact." Guerrero-Lasprilla u. Barr, 140 S. Ct. 1062, 1068-69 (2020).

     Question Presented: Whether an agency determination that a given set of established facts does not rise to the statutory standard of "exceptional and extremely unusual hardship" is a mixed question of law and fact reviewable under § 1252(a)(2)(D), as three circuits have held, or whether this determination is a discretionary judgment call unreviewable under § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i), as the court below and two other circuits have concluded.

     Holding: The Immigration Judge's discretionary decision that Situ Kamu Wilkinson failed to satisfy 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(l)(D)'s "exceptional and extremely unusual hardship" standard for determining eligibility for cancellation of removal is a mixed question of law and fact, reviewable under Section 1252(a)(2)(D)'s jurisdiction restoring exception for "questions of law"; the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 3rd Circuit's holding that the IJ's decision was unreviewable under Section 1252(a)(2)(B)(i) was in error.

     Result: Reversed in part, Vacated in part, remanded.

     Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Jackson delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Justice Alito filed a concurring opinion.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     • For Petitioner: Jaime A. Santos, Washington, D.C.
     • For Respondent: Colleen R. Sinzdak, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.
     
     ]]>Oral Argument: Wilkinson v. Garland | Case No. 22-666 | Date Argued: 11/28/23 | Date Decided: 3/19/24

     Link to Docket: Here.

     Background:

     Under the Immigration and Nationality Act, the Attorney General has discretion to cancel removal of non-permanent residents who satisfy four eligibility criteria, including "that removal would result in exceptional and extremely unusual hardship" to the applicant's immediate family member who is a U.S. citizen or lawful permanent resident. 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(l)(D). Congress stripped courts of jurisdiction to review cancellation-of-removal determinations, 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i), but expressly preserved their jurisdiction to review "questions of law." Id. § 1252(a)(2)(D). And as this Court has already held, this "statutory phrase 'questions of law' includes the application of a legal standard to undisputed or established facts"—that is, a "mixed question of law and fact." Guerrero-Lasprilla u. Barr, 140 S. Ct. 1062, 1068-69 (2020).

     Question Presented: Whether an agency determination that a given set of established facts does not rise to the statutory standard of "exceptional and extremely unusual hardship" is a mixed question of law and fact reviewable under § 1252(a)(2)(D), as three circuits have held, or whether this determination is a discretionary judgment call unreviewable under § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i), as the court below and two other circuits have concluded.

     Holding: The Immigration Judge's discretionary decision that Situ Kamu Wilkinson failed to satisfy 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(l)(D)'s "exceptional and extremely unusual hardship" standard for determining eligibility for cancellation of removal is a mixed question of law and fact, reviewable under Section 1252(a)(2)(D)'s jurisdiction restoring exception for "questions of law"; the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 3rd Circuit's holding that the IJ's decision was unreviewable under Section 1252(a)(2)(B)(i) was in error.

     Result: Reversed in part, Vacated in part, remanded.

     Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Jackson delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Justice Alito filed a concurring opinion.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     • For Petitioner: Jaime A. Santos, Washington, D.C.
     • For Respondent: Colleen R. Sinzdak, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.
     
     ]]>006380c4-0a8e-47a4-8485-a515900edb8eTue, 28 Nov 2023 09:00:00 -040001:30:22falsefull202316162023Oral Argument: Brown v. United States | Case No. 22-6389 | Date Argued: 11/27/2023 | Date Decided: 5/23/24Oral Argument: Brown v. United States | Case No. 22-6389 | Date Argued: 11/27/2023 | Date Decided: 5/23/24

     Host Note: Case consolidated with Jackson v. United States, Case No. 22-6640.

     Link to Docket: Here.

     Background:

     The Armed Career Criminal Act ("ACCA") provides that felons who possess a firearm are normally subject to a maximum 10-year sentence. But if the felon already has at least three "serious drug offense" convictions, then the minimum sentence is fifteen years. Courts decide whether a prior state conviction counts as a serious drug offense using the categorical approach. That requires determining whether the elements of a state drug offense are the same as, or narrower than those of its federal counterpart. If so, the state conviction qualifies as an ACCA predicate. But federal drug law often changes-as here, where Congress decriminalized hemp, narrowing the federal definition of marijuana. If state law doesn't follow suit, sentencing courts face a categorical conundrum. Under an earlier version of federal law, the state and federal offenses match-and the state offense is an ACCA predicate. Under the amended version, the offenses do not match-and the state offense is not an ACCA predicate. So the version of federal law that the court chooses to consult dictates the difference between serving a 10-year maximum or a 15-year minimum.

     Question Presented: Which version of federal law should a sentencing court consult under ACCA's categorical approach?

     Holding: For purposes of the Armed Career Criminal Act's 15-year mandatory minimum sentence on certain defendants with three or more previous convictions, a state drug conviction counts as an ACCA predicate if it involved a drug on the federal schedules at the time of that conviction.

     Result: Affirmed.

     Voting Breakdown: 6-3. Justice Alito delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Sotomayor, Kavanaugh, and Barrett joined. Justice Jackson filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Kagan joined, and in which Justice Gorsuch joined as to Parts I, II, and III.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     • For Petitioner Brown: Jeffrey T. Green, Washington, D.C.
     • For Petitioner Jackson: Andrew Adler, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Fort Lauderdale, Fla.
     • For Respondent: Austin Raynor, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.
     
     ]]>Oral Argument: Brown v. United States | Case No. 22-6389 | Date Argued: 11/27/2023 | Date Decided: 5/23/24

     Host Note: Case consolidated with Jackson v. United States, Case No. 22-6640.

     Link to Docket: Here.

     Background:

     The Armed Career Criminal Act ("ACCA") provides that felons who possess a firearm are normally subject to a maximum 10-year sentence. But if the felon already has at least three "serious drug offense" convictions, then the minimum sentence is fifteen years. Courts decide whether a prior state conviction counts as a serious drug offense using the categorical approach. That requires determining whether the elements of a state drug offense are the same as, or narrower than those of its federal counterpart. If so, the state conviction qualifies as an ACCA predicate. But federal drug law often changes-as here, where Congress decriminalized hemp, narrowing the federal definition of marijuana. If state law doesn't follow suit, sentencing courts face a categorical conundrum. Under an earlier version of federal law, the state and federal offenses match-and the state offense is an ACCA predicate. Under the amended version, the offenses do not match-and the state offense is not an ACCA predicate. So the version of federal law that the court chooses to consult dictates the difference between serving a 10-year maximum or a 15-year minimum.

     Question Presented: Which version of federal law should a sentencing court consult under ACCA's categorical approach?

     Holding: For purposes of the Armed Career Criminal Act's 15-year mandatory minimum sentence on certain defendants with three or more previous convictions, a state drug conviction counts as an ACCA predicate if it involved a drug on the federal schedules at the time of that conviction.

     Result: Affirmed.

     Voting Breakdown: 6-3. Justice Alito delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Sotomayor, Kavanaugh, and Barrett joined. Justice Jackson filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Kagan joined, and in which Justice Gorsuch joined as to Parts I, II, and III.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     • For Petitioner Brown: Jeffrey T. Green, Washington, D.C.
     • For Petitioner Jackson: Andrew Adler, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Fort Lauderdale, Fla.
     • For Respondent: Austin Raynor, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.
     
     ]]>a839d1a1-6ed8-49af-9335-5fa41cbeec91Mon, 27 Nov 2023 09:00:00 -040001:24:50falsefull202314142023Oral Argument: Rudisill v. McDonough | Case No. 22-888 | Date Argued: 11/8/23 | Date Decided: 4/16/24Oral Argument: Rudisill v. McDonough | Case No. 22-888 | Date Argued: 11/8/23 | Date Decided: 4/16/24

     Link to Docket: Here.

     Question Presented: Whether a veteran who has served two separate and distinct periods of qualifying service under the Montgomery GI Bill, 38 U.S.C. § 3001 et seq., and under the Post-9/11 GI Bill, 38 U.S.C. § 3301 et seq., is entitled to receive a total of 48 months of education benefits as between both programs, without first exhausting the Montgomery benefit in order to obtain the more generous Post-9/11 benefit.

     Holding: Service members who, through separate periods of service, accrue educational benefits under both the Montgomery and Post-9/11 GI Bills may use either one, in any order, up to 38 U.S.C. § 3695(a)'s 48-month aggregate-benefits cap.

     Result: Reversed and remanded.

     Voting Breakdown: 7-2. Justice Jackson delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Sotomayor, Kagan, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, and Barrett joined. Justice Kavanaugh filed a concurring opinion, in which Justice Barrett joined. Justice Thomas filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Alito joined.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     • For Petitioner: For Petitioner: Misha Tseytlin, Chicago, Ill.
     • For Respondent: Vivek Suri, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.
     
     ]]>Oral Argument: Rudisill v. McDonough | Case No. 22-888 | Date Argued: 11/8/23 | Date Decided: 4/16/24

     Link to Docket: Here.

     Question Presented: Whether a veteran who has served two separate and distinct periods of qualifying service under the Montgomery GI Bill, 38 U.S.C. § 3001 et seq., and under the Post-9/11 GI Bill, 38 U.S.C. § 3301 et seq., is entitled to receive a total of 48 months of education benefits as between both programs, without first exhausting the Montgomery benefit in order to obtain the more generous Post-9/11 benefit.

     Holding: Service members who, through separate periods of service, accrue educational benefits under both the Montgomery and Post-9/11 GI Bills may use either one, in any order, up to 38 U.S.C. § 3695(a)'s 48-month aggregate-benefits cap.

     Result: Reversed and remanded.

     Voting Breakdown: 7-2. Justice Jackson delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Sotomayor, Kagan, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, and Barrett joined. Justice Kavanaugh filed a concurring opinion, in which Justice Barrett joined. Justice Thomas filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Alito joined.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     • For Petitioner: For Petitioner: Misha Tseytlin, Chicago, Ill.
     • For Respondent: Vivek Suri, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.
     
     ]]>db7e724f-fc30-4c20-a0d4-17fba05e8d31Wed, 08 Nov 2023 09:00:00 -040001:10:16falsefull202313132023Oral Argument: United States v. Rahimi | Case No. 22-915 | Date Argued: 11/7/23 | Date Decided: 6/21/24Oral Argument: United States v. Rahimi | Case No. 22-915 | Date Argued: 11/7/23 | Date Decided: 6/21/24

     Link to Docket: Here.

     Question Presented: Whether 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(8), which prohibits the possession of firearms by persons subject to domestic-violence restraining orders, violates the Second Amendment on its face.

     Holding: When an individual has been found by a court to pose a credible threat to the physical safety of another, that individual may be temporarily disarmed consistent with the Second Amendment.

     Result: Reversed and remanded.

     Voting Breakdown: 8-1. Chief Justice Roberts delivered the opinion for the Court, in which Justices Alito, Sotomayor, Kagan, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, Barrett, and Jackson joined. Justice Sotomayor filed a concurring opinion, in which Justice Kagan joined. Justices Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, Barrett, and Jackson filed concurring opinions. Justice Thomas filed a dissenting opinion.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     • For Petitioner: Elizabeth B. Prelogar, Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.
     • For Respondent: J. Matthew Wright, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Amarillo, Tex.
     
     ]]>Oral Argument: United States v. Rahimi | Case No. 22-915 | Date Argued: 11/7/23 | Date Decided: 6/21/24

     Link to Docket: Here.

     Question Presented: Whether 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(8), which prohibits the possession of firearms by persons subject to domestic-violence restraining orders, violates the Second Amendment on its face.

     Holding: When an individual has been found by a court to pose a credible threat to the physical safety of another, that individual may be temporarily disarmed consistent with the Second Amendment.

     Result: Reversed and remanded.

     Voting Breakdown: 8-1. Chief Justice Roberts delivered the opinion for the Court, in which Justices Alito, Sotomayor, Kagan, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, Barrett, and Jackson joined. Justice Sotomayor filed a concurring opinion, in which Justice Kagan joined. Justices Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, Barrett, and Jackson filed concurring opinions. Justice Thomas filed a dissenting opinion.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     • For Petitioner: Elizabeth B. Prelogar, Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.
     • For Respondent: J. Matthew Wright, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Amarillo, Tex.
     
     ]]>50fbdba8-de99-4c41-92b5-9ee11836a263Tue, 07 Nov 2023 09:00:00 -040001:32:41falsefull202312122023Oral Argument: Department of Agriculture Rural Development Rural Housing Serv. v. Kirtz | Case No. 22-846 | Argument Date: 11/6/23 | Date Decided: 2/8/24Oral Argument: Department of Agriculture Rural Development Rural Housing Serv. v. Kirtz | Case No. 22-846 | Argument Date: 11/6/23 | Date Decided: 2/8/24

     Link to Docket: Here.

     Question Presented: Whether the civil-liability provisions of the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. 1681 et seq., unequivocally and unambiguously waive the sovereign immunity of the United States.

     Holding: A consumer may sue a federal agency under 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681n, 16810 for defying the terms of the Fair Credit Reporting Act.

     Result: Affirmed.

     Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Gorsuch delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     • For Petitioner: Benjamin W. Snyder, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.
     • For Respondent: Nandan M. Joshi, Washington, D.C.
     
     ]]>Oral Argument: Department of Agriculture Rural Development Rural Housing Serv. v. Kirtz | Case No. 22-846 | Argument Date: 11/6/23 | Date Decided: 2/8/24

     Link to Docket: Here.

     Question Presented: Whether the civil-liability provisions of the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. 1681 et seq., unequivocally and unambiguously waive the sovereign immunity of the United States.

     Holding: A consumer may sue a federal agency under 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681n, 16810 for defying the terms of the Fair Credit Reporting Act.

     Result: Affirmed.

     Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Gorsuch delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     • For Petitioner: Benjamin W. Snyder, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.
     • For Respondent: Nandan M. Joshi, Washington, D.C.
     
     ]]>86d7412b-98fb-4102-87c6-29669ca99b81Mon, 06 Nov 2023 09:00:00 -040001:18:28falsefull202311112023Oral Argument: Vidal v. Elster | Case No. 22-704 | Date Argued: 11/1/23 | Date Decided: 6/13/24Oral Argument: Vidal v. Elster | Case No. 22-704 | Date Argued: 11/1/23 | Date Decided: 6/13/24

     Question Presented: Whether the refusal to register a mark under Section 1052(c) violates the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment when the mark contains criticism of a government official or public figure.

     Holding: The Lanham Act's names clause "which prohibits the registration of a mark that "[c]onsists of or comprises a name, portrait, or signature identifying a particular living individual except by his written consent," does not violate the First Amendment.

     Result: Reversed.

     Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Thomas announced the judgment of the Court and delivered the opinion of the Court, except as to Part III. Justices Alito and Gorsuch joined that opinion in full; Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Kavanaugh joined all but Part III; and Justice Barrett joined Parts I, II-A, and II-B. Justice Kavanaugh filed an opinion concurring in part, in which Chief Justice Roberts joined. Justice Barrett filed an opinion concurring in part, in which Justice Kagan joined, in which Justice Sotomayor joined as to Parts I, II, and III-B, and in which Justice Jackson joined as to Parts I and II. Justice Sotomayor filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which Justices Kagan and Jackson joined.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     • For Petitioner: Malcolm L. Stewart, Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.
     • For Respondent: Jonathan E. Taylor, Washington, D.C.
     
     ]]>Oral Argument: Vidal v. Elster | Case No. 22-704 | Date Argued: 11/1/23 | Date Decided: 6/13/24

     Question Presented: Whether the refusal to register a mark under Section 1052(c) violates the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment when the mark contains criticism of a government official or public figure.

     Holding: The Lanham Act's names clause "which prohibits the registration of a mark that "[c]onsists of or comprises a name, portrait, or signature identifying a particular living individual except by his written consent," does not violate the First Amendment.

     Result: Reversed.

     Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Thomas announced the judgment of the Court and delivered the opinion of the Court, except as to Part III. Justices Alito and Gorsuch joined that opinion in full; Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Kavanaugh joined all but Part III; and Justice Barrett joined Parts I, II-A, and II-B. Justice Kavanaugh filed an opinion concurring in part, in which Chief Justice Roberts joined. Justice Barrett filed an opinion concurring in part, in which Justice Kagan joined, in which Justice Sotomayor joined as to Parts I, II, and III-B, and in which Justice Jackson joined as to Parts I and II. Justice Sotomayor filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which Justices Kagan and Jackson joined.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     • For Petitioner: Malcolm L. Stewart, Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.
     • For Respondent: Jonathan E. Taylor, Washington, D.C.
     
     ]]>b70e6ba0-93c4-4fac-8331-90893d373c2dWed, 01 Nov 2023 09:00:00 -040001:15:48falsefull202310102023Oral Arguments: Lindke v. Freed | Case No. 22-611 | Date Argued: 10/31/2023 | Date Decided: 3/15/24Case Info: Lindke v. Freed | Case No. 22-611 | Date Argued: 10/31/2023 | Date Decided: 3/15/24

     Background: Courts have increasingly been called upon to determine whether a public official who selectively blocks access to his or her social media account has engaged in state action subject to constitutional scrutiny. To answer that question, most circuits consider a broad range of factors, including the account's appearance and purpose. But in the decision below, the court of appeals rejected the relevance of any consideration other than whether the official was performing a "duty of his office" or invoking the "authority of his office."

     Question Presented: Whether a public official's social media activity can constitute state action only if the official used the account to perform a governmental duty or under the authority of his or her office.

     Holding: A public official who prevents someone from commenting on the official's social-media page engages in state action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 only if the official both (1) possessed actual authority to speak on the state's behalf on a particular matter, and (2) purported to exercise that authority when speaking in the relevant social-media posts.

     Result: Vacated and remanded.

     Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Barrett delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     • For Petitioner: Allon Kedem, Washington, D.C.
     • For Respondent: Victoria R. Ferres, Port Huron, Mich.; and Masha G. Hansford, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. (for United States, as Amicus Curiae.)
     
     ]]>Case Info: Lindke v. Freed | Case No. 22-611 | Date Argued: 10/31/2023 | Date Decided: 3/15/24

     Background: Courts have increasingly been called upon to determine whether a public official who selectively blocks access to his or her social media account has engaged in state action subject to constitutional scrutiny. To answer that question, most circuits consider a broad range of factors, including the account's appearance and purpose. But in the decision below, the court of appeals rejected the relevance of any consideration other than whether the official was performing a "duty of his office" or invoking the "authority of his office."

     Question Presented: Whether a public official's social media activity can constitute state action only if the official used the account to perform a governmental duty or under the authority of his or her office.

     Holding: A public official who prevents someone from commenting on the official's social-media page engages in state action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 only if the official both (1) possessed actual authority to speak on the state's behalf on a particular matter, and (2) purported to exercise that authority when speaking in the relevant social-media posts.

     Result: Vacated and remanded.

     Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Barrett delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     • For Petitioner: Allon Kedem, Washington, D.C.
     • For Respondent: Victoria R. Ferres, Port Huron, Mich.; and Masha G. Hansford, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. (for United States, as Amicus Curiae.)
     
     ]]>a252dfca-9427-48e7-8467-221ffd688d5aTue, 31 Oct 2023 09:00:00 -040001:17:21falsefull202465652024Oral Argument: O'Connor-Ratcliff v. Garnier | Case No. 22-324 | Date Argued: 10/31/2023 | Date Decided: 3/15/2024Case Info: O'Connor-Ratcliff v. Garnier | Case No. 22-324 | Date Argued: 10/31/2023 | Date Decided: 3/15/2024

     Question Presented: Whether a public official engages in state action subject to the First Amendment by blocking an individual from the official's personal social-media account, when the official uses the account to feature their job and communicate about job-related matters with the public, but does not do so pursuant to any governmental authority or duty.

     Holding: Judgment vacated and case remanded for further proceedings consistent with the opinion in Lindke v. Freed.

     Result: Vacated and remanded.

     Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Per Curiam opinion.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     • For Petitioners: Hashim M. Mooppan, Washington, D.C.; and Sopan Joshi, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. (for United States, as Amicus Curiae.)
     • For Respondents: Pamela S. Karlan, Stanford, Cal.
     
     ]]>Case Info: O'Connor-Ratcliff v. Garnier | Case No. 22-324 | Date Argued: 10/31/2023 | Date Decided: 3/15/2024

     Question Presented: Whether a public official engages in state action subject to the First Amendment by blocking an individual from the official's personal social-media account, when the official uses the account to feature their job and communicate about job-related matters with the public, but does not do so pursuant to any governmental authority or duty.

     Holding: Judgment vacated and case remanded for further proceedings consistent with the opinion in Lindke v. Freed.

     Result: Vacated and remanded.

     Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Per Curiam opinion.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     • For Petitioners: Hashim M. Mooppan, Washington, D.C.; and Sopan Joshi, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. (for United States, as Amicus Curiae.)
     • For Respondents: Pamela S. Karlan, Stanford, Cal.
     
     ]]>baa5ba40-00d6-4d2d-a9f3-f87dcbc1d726Tue, 31 Oct 2023 09:00:00 -040001:40:35falsefull2023882023Oral Argument: Culley v. Marshall | Case No. 22-585 | Date Argued: 10/30/23 | Date Decided: 5/9/24Case Info: Culley v. Marshall | Case No. 22-585 | Date Argued: 10/30/23 | Date Decided: 5/9/24

     Question Presented: In determining whether the Due Process Clause requires a state or local government to provide a post seizure probable cause hearing prior to a statutory judicial forfeiture proceeding and, if so, when such a hearing must take place, should district courts apply the "speedy trial" test employed in United States v. $8,850, 461 U.S. 555 (1983) and Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972), as held by the Eleventh Circuit or the three-part due process analysis set forth in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976) as held by at least the Second, Fifth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits.

     Holding: In civil forfeiture cases involving personal property, the due process clause requires a timely forfeiture hearing but does not require a separate preliminary hearing.

     Result: Affirmed.

     Voting Breakdown: 6-3. Justice Kavanaugh delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Alito, Gorsuch, and Barrett joined. Justice Gorsuch filed a concurring opinion, in which Justice Thomas joined. Justice Sotomayor filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Kagan and Jackson joined.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     • For Petitioner: Shay Dvoretzky, Washington, D.C.
     • For Respondents: Edmund G. LaCour, Jr., Solicitor General, Montgomery, Ala.; and Nicole F. Reaves, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. (for United States, as Amicus Curiae.)
     
     ]]>Case Info: Culley v. Marshall | Case No. 22-585 | Date Argued: 10/30/23 | Date Decided: 5/9/24

     Question Presented: In determining whether the Due Process Clause requires a state or local government to provide a post seizure probable cause hearing prior to a statutory judicial forfeiture proceeding and, if so, when such a hearing must take place, should district courts apply the "speedy trial" test employed in United States v. $8,850, 461 U.S. 555 (1983) and Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972), as held by the Eleventh Circuit or the three-part due process analysis set forth in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976) as held by at least the Second, Fifth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits.

     Holding: In civil forfeiture cases involving personal property, the due process clause requires a timely forfeiture hearing but does not require a separate preliminary hearing.

     Result: Affirmed.

     Voting Breakdown: 6-3. Justice Kavanaugh delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Alito, Gorsuch, and Barrett joined. Justice Gorsuch filed a concurring opinion, in which Justice Thomas joined. Justice Sotomayor filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Kagan and Jackson joined.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     • For Petitioner: Shay Dvoretzky, Washington, D.C.
     • For Respondents: Edmund G. LaCour, Jr., Solicitor General, Montgomery, Ala.; and Nicole F. Reaves, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. (for United States, as Amicus Curiae.)
     
     ]]>6157b7a9-7012-41ab-8362-f06e2c55b7dbMon, 30 Oct 2023 09:00:00 -040001:39:55falsefull2023772023Oral Argument: Alexander v. South Carolina State Conference of the NAACP | Case No. 22-807 | Date Argued: 10/11/23 | Date Decided: 5/23/24Case Info: Alexander v. South Carolina State Conference of the NAACP | Case No. 22-807 | Date Argued: 10/11/23 | Date Decided: 5/23/24

     Background: The three-judge district court never mentioned the presumption of the South Carolina General Assembly's good faith, analyzed Congressional District 1 as a whole, or examined the intent of the General Assembly as a whole. It also disregarded the publicly available election data used to draw District 1 and legislator testimony demonstrating that politics and traditional districting principles better explain District 1 than race. And it never identified an alternative map that achieved the General Assembly's political objectives while similarly adhering to traditional criteria. The court nonetheless held that a portion of District 1 is racially gerrymandered and discriminatory, and therefore permanently enjoined elections there. After an eight-day trial featuring more than twenty witnesses and hundreds of exhibits, the court rested this holding on its brief questioning of the experienced nonpartisan map drawer and its conclusion that he used a racial target as a proxy for politics in District 1. Plaintiffs did not pursue that theory at trial, and the court never explained why the General Assembly would use race as a proxy to draw lines for political reasons when it could (and did) use election data directly to do the job.

     Questions Presented:

     1. Did the district court err when it failed to apply the presumption of good faith and to holistically analyze District 1 and the General Assembly's intent?
     2. Did the district court err in failing to enforce the alternative-map requirement in this circumstantial case?
     3. Did the district court err when it failed to disentangle race from politics?
     4. Did the district court err in finding racial predominance when it never analyzed District l's compliance with traditional districting principles?
     5. Did the district court clearly err in finding that the General Assembly used a racial target as a proxy for politics when the record showed only that the General Assembly was aware of race, that race and politics are highly correlated, and that the General Assembly drew districts based on election data? 6. Did the district court err in upholding the intentional discrimination claim when it never even considered whether-let alone found that-District 1 has a discriminatory effect?
     
     

     Holding: Because the district court's finding that race predominated in the design of South Carolina's first congressional district was clearly erroneous, the district court's racial-gerrymandering and vote-dilution holdings cannot stand.

     Result: Reversed in Part, Remanded in Part.

     Voting Breakdown: 5-3. Justice Alito delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, and Barrett joined, and in which Justice Thomas joined as to all but Part III-C. Justice Thomas filed an opinion concurring in part. Justice Kagan filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Sotomayor and Jackson joined.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     • For Appellants: John M. Gore, Washington, D.C.
     • For Appellees: Leah C. Aden, New York, N. Y.
     • For United States, as Amicus Curiae: Caroline A. Flynn, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.
     
     ]]>Case Info: Alexander v. South Carolina State Conference of the NAACP | Case No. 22-807 | Date Argued: 10/11/23 | Date Decided: 5/23/24

     Background: The three-judge district court never mentioned the presumption of the South Carolina General Assembly's good faith, analyzed Congressional District 1 as a whole, or examined the intent of the General Assembly as a whole. It also disregarded the publicly available election data used to draw District 1 and legislator testimony demonstrating that politics and traditional districting principles better explain District 1 than race. And it never identified an alternative map that achieved the General Assembly's political objectives while similarly adhering to traditional criteria. The court nonetheless held that a portion of District 1 is racially gerrymandered and discriminatory, and therefore permanently enjoined elections there. After an eight-day trial featuring more than twenty witnesses and hundreds of exhibits, the court rested this holding on its brief questioning of the experienced nonpartisan map drawer and its conclusion that he used a racial target as a proxy for politics in District 1. Plaintiffs did not pursue that theory at trial, and the court never explained why the General Assembly would use race as a proxy to draw lines for political reasons when it could (and did) use election data directly to do the job.

     Questions Presented:

     1. Did the district court err when it failed to apply the presumption of good faith and to holistically analyze District 1 and the General Assembly's intent?
     2. Did the district court err in failing to enforce the alternative-map requirement in this circumstantial case?
     3. Did the district court err when it failed to disentangle race from politics?
     4. Did the district court err in finding racial predominance when it never analyzed District l's compliance with traditional districting principles?
     5. Did the district court clearly err in finding that the General Assembly used a racial target as a proxy for politics when the record showed only that the General Assembly was aware of race, that race and politics are highly correlated, and that the General Assembly drew districts based on election data? 6. Did the district court err in upholding the intentional discrimination claim when it never even considered whether-let alone found that-District 1 has a discriminatory effect?
     
     

     Holding: Because the district court's finding that race predominated in the design of South Carolina's first congressional district was clearly erroneous, the district court's racial-gerrymandering and vote-dilution holdings cannot stand.

     Result: Reversed in Part, Remanded in Part.

     Voting Breakdown: 5-3. Justice Alito delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, and Barrett joined, and in which Justice Thomas joined as to all but Part III-C. Justice Thomas filed an opinion concurring in part. Justice Kagan filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Sotomayor and Jackson joined.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     • For Appellants: John M. Gore, Washington, D.C.
     • For Appellees: Leah C. Aden, New York, N. Y.
     • For United States, as Amicus Curiae: Caroline A. Flynn, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.
     
     ]]>73dde36d-5cea-464b-a442-adad9e73bbd6Wed, 11 Oct 2023 09:00:00 -040002:05:04falsefull2023662023Oral Argument: Murray v. UBS Securities, LLC | Case No. 22-660 | Date Argued: 10/10/23 | Date Decided: 2/8/24Case Info: Murray v. UBS Securities, LLC | Case No. 22-660 | Date Argued: 10/10/23 | Date Decided: 2/8/24

     Background: The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 protects whistleblowers who report financial wrongdoing at publicly traded companies. 18 U.S.C. § 1514A. When a whistleblower invokes the Act and claims he was fired because of his report, his claim is "governed by the legal burdens of proof set forth in section 42121(b) of title 49, United States Code." 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(b)(2)(C). Under that incorporated framework, a whistleblowing employee meets his burden by showing that his protected activity "was a contributing factor in the unfavorable personnel action alleged in the complaint." 49 U.S.C. § 42121(b)(2)(B)(iii). If the employee meets that burden, the employer can prevail only if it "demonstrates by clear and convincing evidence that the employer would have taken the same unfavorable personnel action in the absence of that behavior." Id. § 42121(b)(2)(B)(iv).

     Question Presented: Under the burden-shifting framework that governs Sarbanes-Oxley cases, must a whistleblower prove his employer acted with a "retaliatory intent" as part of his case in chief, or is the lack of "retaliatory intent" part of the affirmative defense on which the employer bears the burden of proof?

     Holding: A whistleblower seeking to invoke the protections of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act must prove that their protected activity was a contributing factor in the employer's unfavorable personnel action, but need not prove that the employer acted with "retaliatory intent."

     Result: Reversed and remanded.

     Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Sotomayor delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Justice Alito filed a concurring opinion, in which Justice Barrett joined.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     • For Petitioner: Easha Anand, Stanford, Cal.; and Anthony A. Yang, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. (for United States, as Amicus Curiae.)
     • For Respondents: Eugene Scalia, Washington, D.C.
     
     ]]>Case Info: Murray v. UBS Securities, LLC | Case No. 22-660 | Date Argued: 10/10/23 | Date Decided: 2/8/24

     Background: The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 protects whistleblowers who report financial wrongdoing at publicly traded companies. 18 U.S.C. § 1514A. When a whistleblower invokes the Act and claims he was fired because of his report, his claim is "governed by the legal burdens of proof set forth in section 42121(b) of title 49, United States Code." 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(b)(2)(C). Under that incorporated framework, a whistleblowing employee meets his burden by showing that his protected activity "was a contributing factor in the unfavorable personnel action alleged in the complaint." 49 U.S.C. § 42121(b)(2)(B)(iii). If the employee meets that burden, the employer can prevail only if it "demonstrates by clear and convincing evidence that the employer would have taken the same unfavorable personnel action in the absence of that behavior." Id. § 42121(b)(2)(B)(iv).

     Question Presented: Under the burden-shifting framework that governs Sarbanes-Oxley cases, must a whistleblower prove his employer acted with a "retaliatory intent" as part of his case in chief, or is the lack of "retaliatory intent" part of the affirmative defense on which the employer bears the burden of proof?

     Holding: A whistleblower seeking to invoke the protections of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act must prove that their protected activity was a contributing factor in the employer's unfavorable personnel action, but need not prove that the employer acted with "retaliatory intent."

     Result: Reversed and remanded.

     Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Sotomayor delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Justice Alito filed a concurring opinion, in which Justice Barrett joined.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     • For Petitioner: Easha Anand, Stanford, Cal.; and Anthony A. Yang, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. (for United States, as Amicus Curiae.)
     • For Respondents: Eugene Scalia, Washington, D.C.
     
     ]]>b5192065-b497-497f-9e61-92f51598b172Tue, 10 Oct 2023 09:00:00 -040001:28:03falsefull2023552023Oral Argument: Great Lakes Ins. SE v. Raiders Retreat Realty Co. | Case No. 22-500 | Date Argued: 10/10/23 | Date Decided: 2/21/24Case Info: Great Lakes Ins. SE v. Raiders Retreat Realty Co. | Case No. 22-500 | Date Argued: 10/10/23 | Date Decided: 2/21/24

     Question Presented: Under federal admiralty law, can a choice of law clause in a maritime contract be rendered unenforceable if enforcement is contrary to the "strong public policy" of the state whose law is displaced?

     Holding: Choice-of-law provisions in maritime contracts are presumptively enforceable under federal maritime law, with narrow exceptions not applicable in this case.

     Result: Reversed.

     Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Kavanaugh delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Justice Thomas filed a concurring opinion.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     • For Petitioner: Jeffrey B. Wall, Washington, D.C.
     • For Respondent: Howard J. Bashman, Fort Washington, Pa.
     
     ]]>Case Info: Great Lakes Ins. SE v. Raiders Retreat Realty Co. | Case No. 22-500 | Date Argued: 10/10/23 | Date Decided: 2/21/24

     Question Presented: Under federal admiralty law, can a choice of law clause in a maritime contract be rendered unenforceable if enforcement is contrary to the "strong public policy" of the state whose law is displaced?

     Holding: Choice-of-law provisions in maritime contracts are presumptively enforceable under federal maritime law, with narrow exceptions not applicable in this case.

     Result: Reversed.

     Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Kavanaugh delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Justice Thomas filed a concurring opinion.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     • For Petitioner: Jeffrey B. Wall, Washington, D.C.
     • For Respondent: Howard J. Bashman, Fort Washington, Pa.
     
     ]]>d459c803-39ab-4fb1-b3b7-e465ddb76d1eTue, 10 Oct 2023 09:00:00 -040001:10:53falsefull2023442023Oral Argument: Acheson Hotels, LLC v. Laufer | Case No. 22-429 | Date Argued: 10/4/23 | Date Decided: 12/5/23Case Info: Acheson Hotels, LLC v. Laufer | Case No. 22-429 | Date Argued: 10/4/23 | Date Decided: 12/5/23

     Question Presented: Does a self-appointed Americans with Disabilities Act "tester" have Article III standing to challenge a place of public accommodation's failure to provide disability accessibility information on its website, even if she lacks any intention of visiting that place of public accommodation?

     Holding: Because Deborah Laufer voluntarily dismissed her pending suits under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Laufer's case against Acheson is moot.

     Result: Vacated and remanded.

     Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Barrett delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Alito, Sotomayor, Kagan, Gorsuch, and Kavanaugh joined. Justice Thomas and Justice Jackson filed opinions concurring in the judgment.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     • For Petitioner: Adam G. Unikowsky, Washington, D.C.
     • For United States, as Amicus Curiae: Erica L. Ross, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. For Respondent: Kelsi B. Corkran, Washington, D.C.
     
     ]]>Case Info: Acheson Hotels, LLC v. Laufer | Case No. 22-429 | Date Argued: 10/4/23 | Date Decided: 12/5/23

     Question Presented: Does a self-appointed Americans with Disabilities Act "tester" have Article III standing to challenge a place of public accommodation's failure to provide disability accessibility information on its website, even if she lacks any intention of visiting that place of public accommodation?

     Holding: Because Deborah Laufer voluntarily dismissed her pending suits under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Laufer's case against Acheson is moot.

     Result: Vacated and remanded.

     Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Barrett delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Alito, Sotomayor, Kagan, Gorsuch, and Kavanaugh joined. Justice Thomas and Justice Jackson filed opinions concurring in the judgment.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     • For Petitioner: Adam G. Unikowsky, Washington, D.C.
     • For United States, as Amicus Curiae: Erica L. Ross, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. For Respondent: Kelsi B. Corkran, Washington, D.C.
     
     ]]>7ea82cf5-a5ac-4f60-a7bd-3ef2fba7a17aWed, 04 Oct 2023 09:00:00 -040001:24:42falsefull2023332023Oral Argument: CFPB v. Community Financial Services Assn. of America, Ltd. | Case No. 22-448 | Date Argued: 10/3/23 | Date Decided: 4/16/24Case Info: Consumer Financial Protection Bureau v. Community Financial Services Assn. of America, Ltd. | Case No. 22-448 | Date Argued: 10/3/23 | Date Decided: 4/16/24

     Question Presented: Whether the court of appeals erred in holding that the statute providing funding to the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB), 12 U.S.C. 5497, violates the Appropriations Clause, U.S. Const. Art. I,§ 9, Cl. 7, and in vacating a regulation promulgated at a time when the CFPB was receiving such funding.

     Holding: Congress' statutory authorization allowing the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau to draw money from the earnings of the Federal Reserve System to carry out the bureau's duties, 12 U.S.C. § 5497(a)(l)-(2), satisfies the appropriations clause.

     Result: Reversed and remanded.

     Voting Breakdown: 7-2. Justice Thomas delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Sotomayor, Kagan, Kavanaugh, Barrett, and Jackson joined. Justice Kagan filed a concurring opinion, in which Justices Sotomayor, Kavanaugh, and Barrett joined. Justice Jackson filed a concurring opinion. Justice Alito filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Gorsuch joined.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     • For Petitioner: Elizabeth B. Prelogar, Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.
     • For Respondents: Noel J. Francisco, Washington, D.C.
     
     ]]>Case Info: Consumer Financial Protection Bureau v. Community Financial Services Assn. of America, Ltd. | Case No. 22-448 | Date Argued: 10/3/23 | Date Decided: 4/16/24

     Question Presented: Whether the court of appeals erred in holding that the statute providing funding to the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB), 12 U.S.C. 5497, violates the Appropriations Clause, U.S. Const. Art. I,§ 9, Cl. 7, and in vacating a regulation promulgated at a time when the CFPB was receiving such funding.

     Holding: Congress' statutory authorization allowing the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau to draw money from the earnings of the Federal Reserve System to carry out the bureau's duties, 12 U.S.C. § 5497(a)(l)-(2), satisfies the appropriations clause.

     Result: Reversed and remanded.

     Voting Breakdown: 7-2. Justice Thomas delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Sotomayor, Kagan, Kavanaugh, Barrett, and Jackson joined. Justice Kagan filed a concurring opinion, in which Justices Sotomayor, Kavanaugh, and Barrett joined. Justice Jackson filed a concurring opinion. Justice Alito filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Gorsuch joined.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     • For Petitioner: Elizabeth B. Prelogar, Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.
     • For Respondents: Noel J. Francisco, Washington, D.C.
     
     ]]>2eb99f62-956c-447e-ab11-1cd1392b2e9dTue, 03 Oct 2023 09:00:00 -040001:34:17falsefull2023222023Oral Argument: Pulsifer v. United States | Case No. 22-340 | Date Argued: 10/2/23 | Date Decided: 3/15/24Case Info: Pulsifer v. United States | Case No. 22-340 | Date Argued: 10/2/23 | Date Decided: 3/15/24

     Background: The "safety valve" provision of the federal sentencing statute requires a district court to ignore any statutory mandatory minimum and instead follow the Sentencing Guidelines if a defendant was convicted of certain nonviolent drug crimes and can meet five sets of criteria. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f)(1)-(5). Congress amended the first set of criteria, in§ 3553(f)(1), in the First Step Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-391, § 402, 132 Stat. 5194, 5221, broad criminal justice and sentencing reform legislation designed to provide a second chance for nonviolent offenders. A defendant satisfies § 3553(f)(1), as amended, if he "does not have-(A) more than 4 criminal history points, excluding any criminal history points resulting from a 1-point offense, as determined under the sentencing guidelines; (B) a prior 3-point offense, as determined under the sentencing guidelines; and (C) a prior 2-point violent offense, as determined under the sentencing guidelines." 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f)(1) (emphasis added).

     Question Presented: Whether the "and" in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f)(1) means "and," so that a defendant satisfies the provision so long as he does not have (A) more than 4 criminal history points, (B) a 3-point offense, and (C) a 2-point offense (as the Ninth Circuit holds), or whether the "and" means "or," so that a defendant satisfies the provision so long as he does not have (A) more than 4 criminal history points, (B) a 3-point offense, or (C) a 2-point violent offense (as the Seventh and Eighth Circuits hold).

     Holding: A criminal defendant facing a mandatory minimum sentence is eligible for safety-valve relief under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f)(l) only if the defendant satisfies each of the provision's three conditions.

     Voting Breakdown: 6-3. Justice Kagan delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Alito, Kavanaugh, and Barrett joined. Justice Gorsuch filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Sotomayor and Jackson joined.

     Oral Advocates:

     • For Petitioner: Shay Dvoretzky, Washington, D.C.
     • For Respondent: Frederick Liu, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.
     
     

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     ]]>Case Info: Pulsifer v. United States | Case No. 22-340 | Date Argued: 10/2/23 | Date Decided: 3/15/24

     Background: The "safety valve" provision of the federal sentencing statute requires a district court to ignore any statutory mandatory minimum and instead follow the Sentencing Guidelines if a defendant was convicted of certain nonviolent drug crimes and can meet five sets of criteria. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f)(1)-(5). Congress amended the first set of criteria, in§ 3553(f)(1), in the First Step Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-391, § 402, 132 Stat. 5194, 5221, broad criminal justice and sentencing reform legislation designed to provide a second chance for nonviolent offenders. A defendant satisfies § 3553(f)(1), as amended, if he "does not have-(A) more than 4 criminal history points, excluding any criminal history points resulting from a 1-point offense, as determined under the sentencing guidelines; (B) a prior 3-point offense, as determined under the sentencing guidelines; and (C) a prior 2-point violent offense, as determined under the sentencing guidelines." 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f)(1) (emphasis added).

     Question Presented: Whether the "and" in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f)(1) means "and," so that a defendant satisfies the provision so long as he does not have (A) more than 4 criminal history points, (B) a 3-point offense, and (C) a 2-point offense (as the Ninth Circuit holds), or whether the "and" means "or," so that a defendant satisfies the provision so long as he does not have (A) more than 4 criminal history points, (B) a 3-point offense, or (C) a 2-point violent offense (as the Seventh and Eighth Circuits hold).

     Holding: A criminal defendant facing a mandatory minimum sentence is eligible for safety-valve relief under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f)(l) only if the defendant satisfies each of the provision's three conditions.

     Voting Breakdown: 6-3. Justice Kagan delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Alito, Kavanaugh, and Barrett joined. Justice Gorsuch filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Sotomayor and Jackson joined.

     Oral Advocates:

     • For Petitioner: Shay Dvoretzky, Washington, D.C.
     • For Respondent: Frederick Liu, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.
     
     

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     ]]>f03747f9-75e7-4f9e-8c53-0761b223e950Mon, 02 Oct 2023 09:00:00 -040001:40:16falsefull2023112023Oral Argument: Tyler v. Hennepin County | Case No. 22-166 | Date Argued: 4/26/2023 | Date Decided: 5/25/2023Oral Argument: Tyler v. Hennepin County | Case No. 22-166 | Date Argued: 4/26/2023 | Date Decided: 5/25/2023
     ]]>Oral Argument: Tyler v. Hennepin County | Case No. 22-166 | Date Argued: 4/26/2023 | Date Decided: 5/25/2023
     ]]>1a74e2a2-aea1-45ed-8fd6-29eff6ed762fWed, 26 Apr 2023 09:00:00 -040001:40:51falsefull202259592022Oral Argument: Yegiazaryan v. Smagin | Case No. 22-381 | Date Argued: 4/25/2023 | Date Decided: 6/22/2023Oral Argument: Yegiazaryan v. Smagin | Case No. 22-381 | Date Argued: 4/25/2023 | Date Decided: 6/22/2023
     ]]>Oral Argument: Yegiazaryan v. Smagin | Case No. 22-381 | Date Argued: 4/25/2023 | Date Decided: 6/22/2023
     ]]>305325b0-c160-4204-9ecb-200514a5c0edTue, 25 Apr 2023 09:00:00 -040001:04:10falsefull202258582022Oral Argument: Dupree v. Younger | Case No. 22-210 | Date Argued: 4/24/2023 | Date Decided: 5/25/2023Oral Argument: Dupree v. Younger | Case No. 22-210 | Date Argued: 4/24/2023 | Date Decided: 5/25/2023
     ]]>Oral Argument: Dupree v. Younger | Case No. 22-210 | Date Argued: 4/24/2023 | Date Decided: 5/25/2023
     ]]>bafe59d6-653f-49b7-9adc-96d487a849a0Mon, 24 Apr 2023 09:00:00 -040058:08falsefull202257572022Oral Argument: Lac du Flambeau Band v. Coughlin | Case No. 22-227 | Date Argued: 4/24/2023 | Date Decided: 6/15/2023Oral Argument: Lac du Flambeau Band v. Coughlin | Case No. 22-227 | Date Argued: 4/24/2023 | Date Decided: 6/15/2023
     ]]>Oral Argument: Lac du Flambeau Band v. Coughlin | Case No. 22-227 | Date Argued: 4/24/2023 | Date Decided: 6/15/2023
     ]]>e7f371dd-a8a3-4a9a-be14-3457d11d5658Mon, 24 Apr 2023 09:00:00 -040058:13falsefull202256562022Oral Argument: Counterman v. Colorado | Case No. 22-138 | Date Argued: 4/19/2023 | Date Decided: 6/27/2023Oral Argument: Counterman v. Colorado | Case No. 22-138 | Date Argued: 4/19/2023 | Date Decided: 6/27/2023
     ]]>Oral Argument: Counterman v. Colorado | Case No. 22-138 | Date Argued: 4/19/2023 | Date Decided: 6/27/2023
     ]]>b80554ba-0250-4bc9-93f2-d8777eec91c3Wed, 19 Apr 2023 09:00:00 -040001:46:24falsefull202255552022Oral Argument: Groff v. DeJoy | Case No. 22-174 | Date Argued: 4/18/2023 | Date Decided: 6/29/2023Oral Argument: Groff v. DeJoy | Case No. 22-174 | Date Argued: 4/18/2023 | Date Decided: 6/29/2023
     ]]>Oral Argument: Groff v. DeJoy | Case No. 22-174 | Date Argued: 4/18/2023 | Date Decided: 6/29/2023
     ]]>3c5342e7-401f-4421-acd9-7ff897e10d49Tue, 18 Apr 2023 09:00:00 -040001:47:52falsefull202254542022Oral Argument: U.S., ex rel. Schutte v. Supervalu Inc. | Case No. 21-1326 | Date Argued: 4/18/2023 | Date Decided: 6/1/2023Oral Argument: U.S., ex rel. Schutte v. Supervalu Inc. | Case No. 21-1326 | Date Argued: 4/18/2023 | Date Decided: 6/1/2023
     ]]>Oral Argument: U.S., ex rel. Schutte v. Supervalu Inc. | Case No. 21-1326 | Date Argued: 4/18/2023 | Date Decided: 6/1/2023
     ]]>dee6bf5f-323c-4aa3-ae8e-e5f4cebfbfbaTue, 18 Apr 2023 09:00:00 -040001:12:19falsefull202253532022Oral Argument: Pugin v. Garland | Case No. 22-23 | Date Argued: 4/17/2023 | Date Decided: 6/22/2023Oral Argument: Pugin v. Garland | Case No. 22-23 | Date Argued: 4/17/2023 | Date Decided: 6/22/2023
     ]]>Oral Argument: Pugin v. Garland | Case No. 22-23 | Date Argued: 4/17/2023 | Date Decided: 6/22/2023
     ]]>897ba36e-241e-472b-b3f7-67a980aca6bbMon, 17 Apr 2023 09:00:00 -040001:39:08falsefull202252522022Oral Argument: Slack Technologies, LLC v. Pirani | Case No. 22-200 | Date Argued: 4/17/2023 | Date Decided: 6/1/2023Oral Argument: Slack Technologies, LLC v. Pirani | Case No. 22-200 | Date Argued: 4/17/2023 | Date Decided: 6/1/2023
     ]]>Oral Argument: Slack Technologies, LLC v. Pirani | Case No. 22-200 | Date Argued: 4/17/2023 | Date Decided: 6/1/2023
     ]]>ecbd4358-d4e9-450b-acfc-3fad52c0d38cMon, 17 Apr 2023 09:00:00 -040001:10:03falsefull202251512022Oral Argument: Samia v. United States | Case No. 22-196 | Date Argued: 3/29/2023 | Date Decided: 6/23/2023Oral Argument: Samia v. United States | Case No. 22-196 | Date Argued: 3/29/2023 | Date Decided: 6/23/2023
     ]]>Oral Argument: Samia v. United States | Case No. 22-196 | Date Argued: 3/29/2023 | Date Decided: 6/23/2023
     ]]>b653e0cd-7c9f-4df9-a3d5-e08811763d3fWed, 29 Mar 2023 09:00:00 -040001:38:22falsefull202250502022Oral Argument: Smith v. United States | Case No. 21-1576 | Date Argued: 3/28/2023 | Date Decided: 6/15/2023Oral Argument: Smith v. United States | Case No. 21-1576 | Date Argued: 3/28/2023 | Date Decided: 6/15/2023
     ]]>Oral Argument: Smith v. United States | Case No. 21-1576 | Date Argued: 3/28/2023 | Date Decided: 6/15/2023
     ]]>73fe71a2-b094-4a3d-a928-05a90f0a6b47Tue, 28 Mar 2023 09:00:00 -040001:16:40falsefull202248482022Oral Argument: Lora v. United States | Case No. 22-49 | Date Argued: 3/28/2023 | Date Decided: 6/16/2023Oral Argument: Lora v. United States | Case No. 22-49 | Date Argued: 3/28/2023 | Date Decided: 6/16/2023
     ]]>Oral Argument: Lora v. United States | Case No. 22-49 | Date Argued: 3/28/2023 | Date Decided: 6/16/2023
     ]]>0a6cd218-4f7a-4d21-b538-8bb6c2ef4898Tue, 28 Mar 2023 09:00:00 -040001:01:29falsefull202247472022Oral Argument: Amgen Inc. v. Sanofi | Case No. 21-757 | Date Argued: 3/27/2023 | Date Decided: 5/18/2023Oral Argument: Amgen Inc. v. Sanofi | Case No. 21-757 | Date Argued: 3/27/2023 | Date Decided: 5/18/2023
     ]]>Oral Argument: Amgen Inc. v. Sanofi | Case No. 21-757 | Date Argued: 3/27/2023 | Date Decided: 5/18/2023
     ]]>4dca8cb5-9464-47d9-b485-cb7dfa93f35eMon, 27 Mar 2023 09:00:00 -040001:39:18falsefull202246462022Oral Argument: United States v. Hansen | Case No. 22-179 | Date Argued: 3/27/2023 | Date Decided: 6/23/2023Oral Argument: United States v. Hansen | Case No. 22-179 | Date Argued: 3/27/2023 | Date Decided: 6/23/2023
     ]]>Oral Argument: United States v. Hansen | Case No. 22-179 | Date Argued: 3/27/2023 | Date Decided: 6/23/2023
     ]]>57076bb2-609e-4791-8f3a-03d33ecf67b8Mon, 27 Mar 2023 09:00:00 -040001:22:20falsefull202245452022Oral Argument: Karcho Polselli v. IRS | Case No. 21-1599 | Date Argued: 3/29/2023 | Date Decided: 5/18/2023Oral Argument: Karcho Polselli v. IRS | Case No. 21-1599 | Date Argued: 3/29/2023 | Date Decided: 5/18/2023
     ]]>Oral Argument: Karcho Polselli v. IRS | Case No. 21-1599 | Date Argued: 3/29/2023 | Date Decided: 5/18/2023
     ]]>74ba560f-a1ed-468d-b1aa-2ff43090aae9Wed, 22 Mar 2023 09:00:00 -040050:25falsefull202249492022Oral Argument: Jack Daniel's Properties, Inc. v. VIP Products | Case No. 22-148 | Date Argued: 3/22/2023 | Date Decided: 6/8/2023Oral Argument: Jack Daniel's Properties, Inc. v. VIP Products | Case No. 22-148 | Date Argued: 3/22/2023 | Date Decided: 6/8/2023
     ]]>Oral Argument: Jack Daniel's Properties, Inc. v. VIP Products | Case No. 22-148 | Date Argued: 3/22/2023 | Date Decided: 6/8/2023
     ]]>a5d3e8a6-5c16-45da-beb4-133258ed55ceWed, 22 Mar 2023 09:00:00 -040001:23:26falsefull202244442022Oral Argument: Abitron Austria GmbH v. Hetronic International, Inc. | Case No. 21-1043 | Date Argued: 3/21/2023 | Date Decided: 6/29/2023Oral Argument: Abitron Austria GmbH v. Hetronic International, Inc. | Case No. 21-1043 | Date Argued: 3/21/2023 | Date Decided: 6/29/2023
     ]]>Oral Argument: Abitron Austria GmbH v. Hetronic International, Inc. | Case No. 21-1043 | Date Argued: 3/21/2023 | Date Decided: 6/29/2023
     ]]>b5158ba2-4257-4d8a-9b0d-7401f1992101Tue, 21 Mar 2023 09:00:00 -040001:27:14falsefull202243432022Oral Argument: Coinbase, Inc. v. Bielski | Case No. 22-105 | Date Argued: 3/21/2023 | Date Decided: 6/23/2023Oral Argument: Coinbase, Inc. v. Bielski | Case No. 22-105 | Date Argued: 3/21/2023 | Date Decided: 6/23/2023
     ]]>Oral Argument: Coinbase, Inc. v. Bielski | Case No. 22-105 | Date Argued: 3/21/2023 | Date Decided: 6/23/2023
     ]]>e58d7a00-3490-40ca-822f-f9841c2cc0c3Tue, 21 Mar 2023 09:00:00 -040001:22:22falsefull202242422022Oral Argument: Arizona v. Navajo Nation | Case No. 21-1484 | Date Argued: 3/20/2023 | Date Decided: 6/22/2023Oral Argument: Arizona v. Navajo Nation | Case No. 21-1484 | Date Argued: 3/20/2023 | Date Decided: 6/22/2023
     ]]>Oral Argument: Arizona v. Navajo Nation | Case No. 21-1484 | Date Argued: 3/20/2023 | Date Decided: 6/22/2023
     ]]>bcc44f5f-e2f7-4b7b-b839-3b64ffdca6ceMon, 20 Mar 2023 09:00:00 -040001:50:02falsefull202241412022Oral Argument: New York v. New Jersey Oral Argument | Case No. 156-Orig | Date Argued: 3/1/2023 | Date Decided: 4/18/2023Oral Argument: New York v. New Jersey Oral Argument | Case No. 156-Orig | Date Argued: 3/1/2023 | Date Decided: 4/18/2023
     ]]>Oral Argument: New York v. New Jersey Oral Argument | Case No. 156-Orig | Date Argued: 3/1/2023 | Date Decided: 4/18/2023
     ]]>1585fae6-861c-4ecc-9427-d234c61d0121Wed, 01 Mar 2023 09:00:00 -040001:28:34falsefull202240402022Oral Argument: Biden v. Nebraska | Case No. 22-506 | Date Argued: 2/28/2023 | Date Decided: 6/30/2023Oral Argument: Biden v. Nebraska | Case No. 22-506 | Date Argued: 2/28/2023 | Date Decided: 6/30/2023
     ]]>Oral Argument: Biden v. Nebraska | Case No. 22-506 | Date Argued: 2/28/2023 | Date Decided: 6/30/2023
     ]]>9bb669e6-fe7f-406b-9f9a-964fde417787Tue, 28 Feb 2023 09:00:00 -040002:02:33falsefull202239392022Oral Argument: Deptartment of Education v. Brown | Case No. 22-535 | Date Argued: 2/28/2023 | Date Decided: 6/30/2023Oral Argument: Deptartment of Education v. Brown | Case No. 22-535 | Date Argued: 2/28/2023 | Date Decided: 6/30/2023
     ]]>Oral Argument: Deptartment of Education v. Brown | Case No. 22-535 | Date Argued: 2/28/2023 | Date Decided: 6/30/2023
     ]]>2b66ea62-48c4-4cb0-9419-c7d9e40eefb6Tue, 28 Feb 2023 09:00:00 -040001:15:37falsefull202238382022Oral Argument: Dubin v. United States | Case No. 22-10 | Date Argued: 2/27/2023 | Date Decided: 6/8/2023Oral Argument: Dubin v. United States | Case No. 22-10 | Date Argued: 2/27/2023 | Date Decided: 6/8/2023
     ]]>Oral Argument: Dubin v. United States | Case No. 22-10 | Date Argued: 2/27/2023 | Date Decided: 6/8/2023
     ]]>1f2ed152-5984-46f2-b4a8-a940455bf7a1Mon, 27 Feb 2023 09:00:00 -040001:32:29falsefull202237372022Oral Argument: Twitter, Inc. v. Taamneh | Case No. 21-1496 | Date Argued: 2/22/2023 | Date Decided: 5/18/2023Oral Argument: Twitter, Inc. v. Taamneh | Case No. 21-1496 | Date Argued: 2/22/2023 | Date Decided: 5/18/2023
     ]]>Oral Argument: Twitter, Inc. v. Taamneh | Case No. 21-1496 | Date Argued: 2/22/2023 | Date Decided: 5/18/2023
     ]]>efed27b0-33cd-4496-9afe-be314672af35Wed, 22 Feb 2023 09:00:00 -040002:29:42falsefull202236362022Oral Argument: Gonzalez v. Google LLC | Case No. 21-1333 | Date Argued: 2/21/2023 | Date Decided: 5/18/2023Oral Argument: Gonzalez v. Google LLC | Case No. 21-1333 | Date Argued: 2/21/2023 | Date Decided: 5/18/2023
     ]]>Oral Argument: Gonzalez v. Google LLC | Case No. 21-1333 | Date Argued: 2/21/2023 | Date Decided: 5/18/2023
     ]]>2249e0c5-16a0-4d4e-8d85-ef11ee9765f8Tue, 21 Feb 2023 09:00:00 -040002:40:41falsefull202235352022Oral Argument: Gonzalez v. Google LLC | Case No. 21-1333 | Date Argued: 2/21/2023 | Date Decided: 5/18/2023Oral Argument: Gonzalez v. Google LLC | Case No. 21-1333 | Date Argued: 2/21/2023 | Date Decided: 5/18/2023
     ]]>Oral Argument: Gonzalez v. Google LLC | Case No. 21-1333 | Date Argued: 2/21/2023 | Date Decided: 5/18/2023
     ]]>62ebb302-9ad6-4d84-93c5-edae2aeb7444Tue, 21 Feb 2023 09:00:00 -040002:40:41falsefull202235352022Oral Argument: Perez v. Sturgis Public Schools | Case No. 21-887 | Date Argued: 1/18/2023 | Date Decided: 3/21/2023Oral Argument: Perez v. Sturgis Public Schools | Case No. 21-887 | Date Argued: 1/18/2023 | Date Decided: 3/21/2023
     ]]>Oral Argument: Perez v. Sturgis Public Schools | Case No. 21-887 | Date Argued: 1/18/2023 | Date Decided: 3/21/2023
     ]]>ab8ced38-6017-4bd9-9ddf-5f123e4f48a0Wed, 18 Jan 2023 09:00:00 -040001:28:58falsefull202234342022Oral Argument: Santos-Zacaria v. Garland, Att'y Gen. | Case No. 21-1436 | Date Argued: 1/17/2023 | Date Decided: 5/11/2023Oral Argument: Santos-Zacaria v. Garland, Att'y Gen. | Case No. 21-1436 | Date Argued: 1/17/2023 | Date Decided: 5/11/2023
     ]]>Oral Argument: Santos-Zacaria v. Garland, Att'y Gen. | Case No. 21-1436 | Date Argued: 1/17/2023 | Date Decided: 5/11/2023
     ]]>abe8d636-ac03-46d4-a8b8-428f304a11dbTue, 17 Jan 2023 09:00:00 -040001:03:33falsefull202233332022Oral Argument: Turkiye Halk Bankasi A.S. v. United States | Case No. 21-1450 | Date Argued: 1/17/2023 | Date Decided: 4/19/2023Oral Argument: Turkiye Halk Bankasi A.S. v. United States | Case No. 21-1450 | Date Argued: 1/17/2023 | Date Decided: 4/19/2023
     ]]>Oral Argument: Turkiye Halk Bankasi A.S. v. United States | Case No. 21-1450 | Date Argued: 1/17/2023 | Date Decided: 4/19/2023
     ]]>82513e80-1d04-4ce0-9ca0-40ae109a6fb6Tue, 17 Jan 2023 09:00:00 -040001:35:58falsefull202232322022Oral Argument: Financial Oversight Board v. CPI | Case No. 22-96 | Date Argued: 1/11/2023 | Date Decided: 5/11/2023Oral Argument: Financial Oversight Board v. CPI | Case No. 22-96 | Date Argued: 1/11/2023 | Date Decided: 5/11/2023
     ]]>Oral Argument: Financial Oversight Board v. CPI | Case No. 22-96 | Date Argued: 1/11/2023 | Date Decided: 5/11/2023
     ]]>867cdd62-035c-4cbe-b53d-992dd011942dWed, 11 Jan 2023 09:00:00 -040056:27falsefull202231312022Oral Argument: Glacier Northwest, Inc. v. Int'l Brotherhood of Teamsters | Case No. 21-1449 | Date Argued: 1/10/2023 | Date Decided: 6/1/2023Oral Argument: Glacier Northwest, Inc. v. Int'l Brotherhood of Teamsters | Case No. 21-1449 | Date Argued: 1/10/2023 | Date Decided: 6/1/2023
     ]]>Oral Argument: Glacier Northwest, Inc. v. Int'l Brotherhood of Teamsters | Case No. 21-1449 | Date Argued: 1/10/2023 | Date Decided: 6/1/2023
     ]]>d0130482-1022-4803-b771-e154207f7f52Tue, 10 Jan 2023 09:00:00 -040001:26:00falsefull202230302022Oral Argument: In Re Grand Jury | Case No. 21-1397 | Date Argued: 1/9/2023 | Date Decided: 1/23/2023Oral Argument: In Re Grand Jury | Case No. 21-1397 | Date Argued: 1/9/2023 | Date Decided: 1/23/2023
     ]]>Oral Argument: In Re Grand Jury | Case No. 21-1397 | Date Argued: 1/9/2023 | Date Decided: 1/23/2023
     ]]>db48a595-027c-4b94-814c-dd32493e3f12Mon, 09 Jan 2023 09:00:00 -040001:07:58falsefull202229292022Oral Argument: OH Adjutant Gen.'s Dept. v. FLRA | Case No. 21-1454 | Date Argued: 1/9/2023 | Date Decided: 5/18/2023Oral Argument: OH Adjutant Gen.'s Dept. v. FLRA | Case No. 21-1454 | Date Argued: 1/9/2023 | Date Decided: 5/18/2023
     ]]>Oral Argument: OH Adjutant Gen.'s Dept. v. FLRA | Case No. 21-1454 | Date Argued: 1/9/2023 | Date Decided: 5/18/2023
     ]]>3b710f77-c88d-41cf-8c29-842731de8415Mon, 09 Jan 2023 09:00:00 -040001:29:32falsefull202228282022Oral Argument: Moore v. Harper | Case No. 21-1271 | Date Argued: 12/7/2022 | Date Decided: 6/27/2023Oral Argument: Moore v. Harper | Case No. 21-1271 | Date Argued: 12/7/2022 | Date Decided: 6/27/2023
     ]]>Oral Argument: Moore v. Harper | Case No. 21-1271 | Date Argued: 12/7/2022 | Date Decided: 6/27/2023
     ]]>4271b338-8221-452a-b152-2395449cdac6Wed, 07 Dec 2022 09:00:00 -040002:53:47falsefull202227272022Oral Argument: U.S., ex rel. Polansky v. Executive Health | Case No. 21-1052 | Date Argued: 12/6/2022 | Date Decided: 6/16/2023Oral Argument: U.S., ex rel. Polansky v. Executive Health | Case No. 21-1052 | Date Argued: 12/6/2022 | Date Decided: 6/16/2023
     ]]>Oral Argument: U.S., ex rel. Polansky v. Executive Health | Case No. 21-1052 | Date Argued: 12/6/2022 | Date Decided: 6/16/2023
     ]]>b539a7db-73ba-471a-9525-fcf6507598afTue, 06 Dec 2022 09:00:00 -040001:21:23falsefull202226262022Oral Argument: Bartenwerfer v. Buckley | Case No. 21-908 | Date Argued: 12/6/2022 | Date Decided: 2/22/2023Oral Argument: Bartenwerfer v. Buckley | Case No. 21-908 | Date Argued: 12/6/2022 | Date Decided: 2/22/2023
     ]]>Oral Argument: Bartenwerfer v. Buckley | Case No. 21-908 | Date Argued: 12/6/2022 | Date Decided: 2/22/2023
     ]]>49a40546-7cdf-459a-bdde-6bc6ce69271aTue, 06 Dec 2022 09:00:00 -040001:12:44falsefull202225252022Oral Argument: 303 Creative LLC v. Elenis | Case No. 21-476 | Date Argued: 12/5/2022 | Date Decided: 6/30/2023Oral Argument: 303 Creative LLC v. Elenis | Case No. 21-476 | Date Argued: 12/5/2022 | Date Decided: 6/30/2023
     ]]>Oral Argument: 303 Creative LLC v. Elenis | Case No. 21-476 | Date Argued: 12/5/2022 | Date Decided: 6/30/2023
     ]]>e3e11049-6362-4130-b973-e324f473a2f3Mon, 05 Dec 2022 09:00:00 -040002:21:57falsefull202224242022Oral Argument: MOAC Mall Holdings LLC v. Transform Holdco LLC | Case No. 21-1270 | Date Argued: 12/5/2022 | Date Decided: 4/19/2023Oral Argument: MOAC Mall Holdings LLC v. Transform Holdco LLC | Case No. 21-1270 | Date Argued: 12/5/2022 | Date Decided: 4/19/2023
     ]]>Oral Argument: MOAC Mall Holdings LLC v. Transform Holdco LLC | Case No. 21-1270 | Date Argued: 12/5/2022 | Date Decided: 4/19/2023
     ]]>4ad2fb59-6484-4b44-9da9-53881a316c69Mon, 05 Dec 2022 09:00:00 -040001:09:51falsefull202223232022Oral Argument: Wilkins v. United States | Case No. 21-1164 | Date Argued: 11/30/2022 | Date Decided: 3/28/2023Oral Argument: Wilkins v. United States | Case No. 21-1164 | Date Argued: 11/30/2022 | Date Decided: 3/28/2023
     ]]>Oral Argument: Wilkins v. United States | Case No. 21-1164 | Date Argued: 11/30/2022 | Date Decided: 3/28/2023
     ]]>10b29acc-d51a-440b-a1dc-5c2ed22f6da1Wed, 30 Nov 2022 09:00:00 -040001:05:48falsefull202222222022Oral Argument: United States v. Texas | Case No. 22-58 | Date Argued: 11/29/2022 | Date Decided: 6/23/2023Oral Argument: United States v. Texas | Case No. 22-58 | Date Argued: 11/29/2022 | Date Decided: 6/23/2023
     ]]>Oral Argument: United States v. Texas | Case No. 22-58 | Date Argued: 11/29/2022 | Date Decided: 6/23/2023
     ]]>d3fae2c3-6a42-4edb-8e51-caa78b2bb817Tue, 29 Nov 2022 09:00:00 -040002:16:13falsefull202221212022Oral Argument: Percoco v. United States | Case No. 21-1158 | Date Argued: 11/28/2022 | Date Decided: 5/11/2023Oral Argument: Percoco v. United States | Case No. 21-1158 | Date Argued: 11/28/2022 | Date Decided: 5/11/2023
     ]]>Oral Argument: Percoco v. United States | Case No. 21-1158 | Date Argued: 11/28/2022 | Date Decided: 5/11/2023
     ]]>b8b75fdd-bf62-4487-b887-e95b0ca0da77Mon, 28 Nov 2022 09:00:00 -040001:07:55falsefull202220202022Oral Argument: Ciminelli v. United States | Case No. 21-1170 | Date Argued: 11/28/2022 | Date Decided: 5/11/2023Oral Argument: Ciminelli v. United States | Case No. 21-1170 | Date Argued: 11/28/2022 | Date Decided: 5/11/2023
     ]]>Oral Argument: Ciminelli v. United States | Case No. 21-1170 | Date Argued: 11/28/2022 | Date Decided: 5/11/2023
     ]]>a20e5c38-6c76-40cc-aa8c-8a49ec2b53dfMon, 28 Nov 2022 09:00:00 -040001:17:45falsefull202219192022Oral Argument: Haaland v. Brackeen | Case No. 21-376 | Date Argued: 11/9/2022 | Date Decided: 6/15/2023Oral Argument: Haaland v. Brackeen | Case No. 21-376 | Date Argued: 11/9/2022 | Date Decided: 6/15/2023
     ]]>Oral Argument: Haaland v. Brackeen | Case No. 21-376 | Date Argued: 11/9/2022 | Date Decided: 6/15/2023
     ]]>1f037f87-3b9c-4f57-9d10-cf9c2e276f96Wed, 09 Nov 2022 09:00:00 -040003:12:20falsefull202218182022Oral Argument: Mallory v. Norfolk Southern Railway Co. | Case No. 21-1168 | Date Argued: 11/8/2022 | Date Decided: 6/27/2023Oral Argument: Mallory v. Norfolk Southern Railway Co. | Case No. 21-1168 | Date Argued: 11/8/2022 | Date Decided: 6/27/2023
     ]]>Oral Argument: Mallory v. Norfolk Southern Railway Co. | Case No. 21-1168 | Date Argued: 11/8/2022 | Date Decided: 6/27/2023
     ]]>9aea8739-e204-4f50-b0ff-d51e04ddcb2aTue, 08 Nov 2022 09:00:00 -040001:48:14falsefull202217172022Oral Argument: Health and Hospital Corp. v. Talevski | Case No. 21-806 | Date Argued: 11/8/2022 | Date Decided: 6/8/2023Oral Argument: Health and Hospital Corp. v. Talevski | Case No. 21-806 | Date Argued: 11/8/2022 | Date Decided: 6/8/2023
     ]]>Oral Argument: Health and Hospital Corp. v. Talevski | Case No. 21-806 | Date Argued: 11/8/2022 | Date Decided: 6/8/2023
     ]]>8010810c-5a40-4657-b5c3-dccfd4943fdeTue, 08 Nov 2022 09:00:00 -040001:48:05falsefull202216162022Oral Argument: Axon Enterprise, Inc. v. FTC | Case No. 21-86 | Date Argued: 11/7/2022 | Date Decided: 4/14/2023Oral Argument: Axon Enterprise, Inc. v. FTC | Case No. 21-86 | Date Argued: 11/7/2022 | Date Decided: 4/14/2023
     ]]>Oral Argument: Axon Enterprise, Inc. v. FTC | Case No. 21-86 | Date Argued: 11/7/2022 | Date Decided: 4/14/2023
     ]]>aa3eaacd-6bb6-42f5-8411-8facf7d6cdc0Mon, 07 Nov 2022 09:00:00 -040001:31:33falsefull202215152022Oral Argument: SEC v. Cochran | Case No. 21-1239 | Date Argued: 11/7/2022 | Date Decided: 4/13/2023Oral Argument: SEC v. Cochran | Case No. 21-1239 | Date Argued: 11/7/2022 | Date Decided: 4/13/2023
     ]]>Oral Argument: SEC v. Cochran | Case No. 21-1239 | Date Argued: 11/7/2022 | Date Decided: 4/13/2023
     ]]>2e38c3cd-495d-4a55-b6f3-c890657f82d5Mon, 07 Nov 2022 09:00:00 -040001:09:22falsefull202214142022Oral Argument: Bittner v. United States | Case No. 21-1195 | Date Argued: 11/2/2022 | Date Decided: 2/28/2023Oral Argument: Bittner v. United States | Case No. 21-1195 | Date Argued: 11/2/2022 | Date Decided: 2/28/2023
     ]]>Oral Argument: Bittner v. United States | Case No. 21-1195 | Date Argued: 11/2/2022 | Date Decided: 2/28/2023
     ]]>b4bd9893-c1a0-48d4-805a-76835825dd61Wed, 02 Nov 2022 09:00:00 -040001:12:55falsefull202213132022Oral Argument: Jones v. Hendrix | Case No. 21-857 | Date Argued: 11/1/2022 | Date Decided: 6/22/2023Oral Argument: Jones v. Hendrix | Case No. 21-857 | Date Argued: 11/1/2022 | Date Decided: 6/22/2023
     ]]>Oral Argument: Jones v. Hendrix | Case No. 21-857 | Date Argued: 11/1/2022 | Date Decided: 6/22/2023
     ]]>ce985967-ec9f-4e78-9b12-6c8e479fc276Tue, 01 Nov 2022 09:00:00 -040001:19:56falsefull202212122022Oral Argument: Cruz v. Arizona | Case No. 21-846 | Date Argued: 11/1/2022 | Date Decided: 2/22/2023Oral Argument: Cruz v. Arizona | Case No. 21-846 | Date Argued: 11/1/2022 | Date Decided: 2/22/2023
     ]]>Oral Argument: Cruz v. Arizona | Case No. 21-846 | Date Argued: 11/1/2022 | Date Decided: 2/22/2023
     ]]>975f0de1-79ea-4cb7-92f8-23b803bfae58Tue, 01 Nov 2022 09:00:00 -040001:01:58falsefull202211112022Oral Argument: Students for Fair Admissions v. UNC | Case No. 21-707 | Date Argued: 10/31/2022 | Date Decided: 6/29/2023Oral Argument: Students for Fair Admissions v. UNC | Case No. 21-707 | Date Argued: 10/31/2022 | Date Decided: 6/29/2023
     ]]>Oral Argument: Students for Fair Admissions v. UNC | Case No. 21-707 | Date Argued: 10/31/2022 | Date Decided: 6/29/2023
     ]]>38c8ed50-cf60-4122-8341-2bf85df2a98aMon, 31 Oct 2022 09:00:00 -040002:44:44falsefull202210102022Oral Argument: Students for Fair Admissions v. President and Fellows of Harvard | Case No. 20-1199 | Date Argued: 10/31/2022 | Date Decided: 6/29/2023Oral Argument: Students for Fair Admissions v. President and Fellows of Harvard | Case No. 20-1199 | Date Argued: 10/31/2022 | Date Decided: 6/29/2023
     ]]>Oral Argument: Students for Fair Admissions v. President and Fellows of Harvard | Case No. 20-1199 | Date Argued: 10/31/2022 | Date Decided: 6/29/2023
     ]]>1ec8e82c-bd7a-4d8b-812c-2ab4a7c1189cMon, 31 Oct 2022 09:00:00 -040001:31:33falsefull2022992022Oral Argument: Andy Warhol Found., Inc. v. Goldsmith | Case No. 21-869 | Date Argued: 10/12/2022 | Date Decided: 5/18/2023Oral Argument: Andy Warhol Found., Inc. v. Goldsmith | Case No. 21-869 | Date Argued: 10/12/2022 | Date Decided: 5/18/2023
     ]]>Oral Argument: Andy Warhol Found., Inc. v. Goldsmith | Case No. 21-869 | Date Argued: 10/12/2022 | Date Decided: 5/18/2023
     ]]>9773655a-a820-4eb6-8c50-c60ecbc76451Wed, 12 Oct 2022 09:00:00 -040001:42:29falsefull2022882022Oral Argument: Helix Energy Solutions v. Hewitt | Case No. 21-984 | Date Argued: 10/12/2022 | Date Decided: 2/22/2023Oral Argument: Helix Energy Solutions v. Hewitt | Case No. 21-984 | Date Argued: 10/12/2022 | Date Decided: 2/22/2023
     ]]>Oral Argument: Helix Energy Solutions v. Hewitt | Case No. 21-984 | Date Argued: 10/12/2022 | Date Decided: 2/22/2023
     ]]>d9df2038-dc67-4af5-b276-10cd41c10183Wed, 12 Oct 2022 09:00:00 -040001:33:51falsefull2022772022Oral Argument: National Pork Producers v. Ross | Case No. 21-468 | Date Argued: 10/11/2022 | Date Decided: 5/11/2023Oral Argument: National Pork Producers v. Ross | Case No. 21-468 | Date Argued: 10/11/2022 | Date Decided: 5/11/2023
     ]]>Oral Argument: National Pork Producers v. Ross | Case No. 21-468 | Date Argued: 10/11/2022 | Date Decided: 5/11/2023
     ]]>103871f8-873f-48f0-953d-7aee2ae4cb76Tue, 11 Oct 2022 09:00:00 -040002:12:08falsefull2022662022Oral Argument: Reed v. Goertz | Case No. 21-442 | Date Argued: 10/11/2022 | Date Decided: 4/19/2023Oral Argument: Reed v. Goertz | Case No. 21-442 | Date Argued: 10/11/2022 | Date Decided: 4/19/2023
     ]]>Oral Argument: Reed v. Goertz | Case No. 21-442 | Date Argued: 10/11/2022 | Date Decided: 4/19/2023
     ]]>a0a42d12-2001-44d0-a873-16b8b3212f8dTue, 11 Oct 2022 09:00:00 -040059:52falsefull2022552022Oral Argument: Arellano v. McDonough | Case No. 21-432 | Date Argued: 10/4/2022 | Date Decided: 1/23/2023Oral Argument: Arellano v. McDonough | Case No. 21-432 | Date Argued: 10/4/2022 | Date Decided: 1/23/2023
     ]]>Oral Argument: Arellano v. McDonough | Case No. 21-432 | Date Argued: 10/4/2022 | Date Decided: 1/23/2023
     ]]>bc0b0aed-3e7c-40e4-98a8-c601c2069d13Tue, 04 Oct 2022 09:00:00 -040047:32falsefull2024332024Oral Argument: Merrill v. Milligan | Case No. 21-1086 | Date Argued: 10/4/2022 | Date Decided: 6/8/2023Oral Argument: Merrill v. Milligan | Case No. 21-1086 | Date Argued: 10/4/2022 | Date Decided: 6/8/2023
     ]]>Oral Argument: Merrill v. Milligan | Case No. 21-1086 | Date Argued: 10/4/2022 | Date Decided: 6/8/2023
     ]]>7fa582fd-ebfe-4107-9fc5-d323a103ee31Tue, 04 Oct 2022 09:00:00 -040001:53:57falsefull2022442022Oral Argument: Sackett v. EPA | Case No. 21-454 | Date Argued: 10/3/2022 | Date Decided: 5/25/2023Oral Argument: Sackett v. EPA | Case No. 21-454 | Date Argued: 10/3/2022 | Date Decided: 5/25/2023
     ]]>Oral Argument: Sackett v. EPA | Case No. 21-454 | Date Argued: 10/3/2022 | Date Decided: 5/25/2023
     ]]>bf3a00ad-b9a9-42c3-ba23-2bfa4218e835Mon, 03 Oct 2022 09:00:00 -040001:48:05falsefull2022222022Oral Argument: Delaware v. Pennsylvania and Wisconsin | Case No. 145-Orig | Date Argued: 10/3/2022 | Date Decided: 2/28/2023Oral Argument: Delaware v. Pennsylvania and Wisconsin | Case No. 145-Orig | Date Argued: 10/3/2022 | Date Decided: 2/28/2023
     ]]>Oral Argument: Delaware v. Pennsylvania and Wisconsin | Case No. 145-Orig | Date Argued: 10/3/2022 | Date Decided: 2/28/2023
     ]]>3f59602f-ca53-4457-ba05-6fb4cea64349Mon, 03 Oct 2022 09:00:00 -040001:08:40falsefull2022112022Oral Argument: Oklahoma v. Castro-Huerta | Case No. 21-429 | Date Argued: 4/27/2022 | Date Decided: 6/29/2022Oklahoma v. Castro-Huerta | Case No. 21-429 | Date Argued: 4/27/2022 | Date Decided: 6/29/2022

     Question Presented: 1. Whether a State has authority to prosecute non-Indians who commit crimes against Indians in Indian country. 2. Whether McGirt v. Oklahoma, 140 S. Ct. 2452 (2020), should be overruled.

     Holding: The Federal Government and the State have concurrent jurisdiction to prosecute crimes committed by non-Indians against Indians in Indian country.

     Result: Judgment REVERSED and case REMANDED.

     Voting Breakdown: 5-4. Justice Kavanaugh delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Alito and Barrett joined. Justice Gorsuch filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Breyer, Sotomayor and Kagan joined.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     For Petitioner: Kannon K. Shanmugam, Washington, D.C. For Respondent: Zachary C. Schauf, Washington, D.C.; and Edwin S. Kneedler, Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. (for United States, as amicus curiae.)

     ]]>Oklahoma v. Castro-Huerta | Case No. 21-429 | Date Argued: 4/27/2022 | Date Decided: 6/29/2022

     Question Presented: 1. Whether a State has authority to prosecute non-Indians who commit crimes against Indians in Indian country. 2. Whether McGirt v. Oklahoma, 140 S. Ct. 2452 (2020), should be overruled.

     Holding: The Federal Government and the State have concurrent jurisdiction to prosecute crimes committed by non-Indians against Indians in Indian country.

     Result: Judgment REVERSED and case REMANDED.

     Voting Breakdown: 5-4. Justice Kavanaugh delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Alito and Barrett joined. Justice Gorsuch filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Breyer, Sotomayor and Kagan joined.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     For Petitioner: Kannon K. Shanmugam, Washington, D.C. For Respondent: Zachary C. Schauf, Washington, D.C.; and Edwin S. Kneedler, Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. (for United States, as amicus curiae.)

     ]]>70577604-b852-4cfd-878f-7cfb19df67b9Wed, 27 Apr 2022 09:00:00 -040002:09:42falsefull2021112021Oral Argument: Biden v. Texas | Case No. 21-954 | Date Argued: 4/26/2022 | Date Decided: 6/30/2022Biden v. Texas | Case No. 21-954 | Date Argued: 4/26/2022 | Date Decided: 6/30/2022

     Background: This case concerns the Migrant Protection Protocols (MPP), a former policy of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) under which certain noncitizens arriving at the southwest border were returned to Mexico during their immigration proceedings. On June 1, 2021, the Secretary of Homeland Security issued a memorandum terminating MPP. The district court vacated the Secretary's termination decision and remanded the matter to the agency on two grounds: (1) that terminating MPP violates 8 U.S.C. 1225 because DHS lacks capacity to detain all the inadmissible noncitizens it encounters who purportedly must be detained under that provision, and (2) that the Secretary had not adequately explained his decision. The court entered a permanent injunction requiring DHS to reinstate and maintain MPP unless Congress funds sufficient detention capacity for DHS to detain all noncitizens subject to mandatory detention under Section 1225 and until the agency adequately explained a future termination. On October 29, 2021, after thoroughly reconsidering the matter on remand, the Secretary issued a new decision terminating MPP and providing a comprehensive explanation for the decision. The court of appeals nevertheless affirmed the injunction, endorsing the district court's reading of Section 1225 and holding that the Secretary's new decision could not be considered because it had no legal effect.

     Question Presented: Whether 8 U.S.C. 1225 requires DHS to continue implementing MPP. Whether the court of appeals erred by concluding that the Secretary's new decision terminating MPP had no legal effect.

     Holding: The Government’s rescission of MPP did not violate section 1225 of the INA, and the October 29 Memoranda constituted final agency action.

     Result: Judgment REVERSED and case REMANDED.

     Voting Breakdown: 5-4. Chief Justice Roberts delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Justices Breyer, Sotomayor, Kagan and Kavanaugh joined. Justice Kavanaugh filed a concurring opinion. Justice Alito filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Thomas and Gorsuch joined. Justice Barrett filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Thomas, Alito and Gorsuch joined as to all but the

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     For Petitioners: Elizabeth B. Prelogar, Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. For Respondents: Judd E. Stone, II, Solicitor General, Austin, Tex.

     ]]>Biden v. Texas | Case No. 21-954 | Date Argued: 4/26/2022 | Date Decided: 6/30/2022

     Background: This case concerns the Migrant Protection Protocols (MPP), a former policy of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) under which certain noncitizens arriving at the southwest border were returned to Mexico during their immigration proceedings. On June 1, 2021, the Secretary of Homeland Security issued a memorandum terminating MPP. The district court vacated the Secretary's termination decision and remanded the matter to the agency on two grounds: (1) that terminating MPP violates 8 U.S.C. 1225 because DHS lacks capacity to detain all the inadmissible noncitizens it encounters who purportedly must be detained under that provision, and (2) that the Secretary had not adequately explained his decision. The court entered a permanent injunction requiring DHS to reinstate and maintain MPP unless Congress funds sufficient detention capacity for DHS to detain all noncitizens subject to mandatory detention under Section 1225 and until the agency adequately explained a future termination. On October 29, 2021, after thoroughly reconsidering the matter on remand, the Secretary issued a new decision terminating MPP and providing a comprehensive explanation for the decision. The court of appeals nevertheless affirmed the injunction, endorsing the district court's reading of Section 1225 and holding that the Secretary's new decision could not be considered because it had no legal effect.

     Question Presented: Whether 8 U.S.C. 1225 requires DHS to continue implementing MPP. Whether the court of appeals erred by concluding that the Secretary's new decision terminating MPP had no legal effect.

     Holding: The Government’s rescission of MPP did not violate section 1225 of the INA, and the October 29 Memoranda constituted final agency action.

     Result: Judgment REVERSED and case REMANDED.

     Voting Breakdown: 5-4. Chief Justice Roberts delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Justices Breyer, Sotomayor, Kagan and Kavanaugh joined. Justice Kavanaugh filed a concurring opinion. Justice Alito filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Thomas and Gorsuch joined. Justice Barrett filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Thomas, Alito and Gorsuch joined as to all but the

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     For Petitioners: Elizabeth B. Prelogar, Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. For Respondents: Judd E. Stone, II, Solicitor General, Austin, Tex.

     ]]>c1db8cd9-2aed-4d48-baf7-2dab83fa7dbeTue, 26 Apr 2022 09:00:00 -040001:47:12falsefull2021332021Oral Argument: Shoop v. Twyford | Case No. 21-511 | Date Argued: 4/26/2022 | Date Decided: 6/21/2022
     ]]>
     ]]>ef4e20ea-900e-4b0f-bf71-a668fb759b81Tue, 26 Apr 2022 09:00:00 -040058:40falsefull2021222021Oral Argument: Nance v. Ward | Case No. 21-439 | Date Argued: 4/25/2022 | Date Decided: 6/23/2022Nance v. Ward | Case No. 21-439 | Date Argued: 4/25/2022 | Date Decided: 6/23/2022

     Background: In Bucklew v. Precythe, 139 S. Ct. 1112 (2019), "all nine Justices" agreed that a person challenging a State's method of execution could allege an alternative "not ... authorized under current state law" and that there was therefore "little likelihood that an inmate facing a serious risk of pain will be unable to identify an available alternative." Id. at 1136 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring). In the proceedings below, Petitioner filed a § 1983 suit bringing an as-applied challenge to Georgia's sole statutorily authorized method of execution, lethal injection. Petitioner alleged the use of a firing squad as an alternative method. A divided panel held that Petitioner's challenge could not be heard. The panel ruled that Petitioner must bring his challenge in habeas rather than via § 1983 because he had alleged an alternative method not currently authorized under Georgia law. It further held that Petitioner's claim would be an impermissible successive petition notwithstanding that the claim would not have been ripe at the time of Petitioner's first petition.

     Question Presented: Whether an inmate's as-applied method-of-execution challenge must be raised in a habeas petition instead of through a § 1983 action if the inmate pleads an alternative method of execution not currently authorized by state law. Whether, if such a challenge must be raised in habeas, it constitutes a successive petition where the challenge would not have been ripe at the time of the inmate's first habeas petition.

     Holding: Section 1983 remains an appropriate vehicle for a prisoner’s method-of-execution claim where, as here, the prisoner proposes an alternative method not authorized by the State’s death-penalty statute. Both §1983 and the federal habeas statute enable a prisoner to complain of “unconstitutional treatment at the hands of state officials.” Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U. S. 477, 480. A prisoner may generally sue under §1983, unless his claim falls into that statute’s “implicit exception” for actions that lie “within the core of habeas corpus.” Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U. S. 74, 79. When a prisoner seeks relief that would “necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence,” he comes within the core and must proceed in habeas. Heck, 512 U. S., at 487. The Court has twice held that prisoners could bring method-ofexecution claims under §1983. See Nelson, 541 U. S., at 644–647; Hill v. McDonough, 547 U. S. 573, 580–583. Although these cases predated the Court’s requirement that prisoners identify alternative methods of execution, each prisoner had still said enough to leave the Court convinced that alternatives to the challenged procedures were available. See Nelson, 541 U. S., at 646; Hill, 547 U. S., at 580–581. Because alternatives were available, the prisoners’ challenges would not “necessarily prevent [the State] from carrying out [their] execution[s].” Nelson, 541 U. S., at 647 (emphasis in original); see Hill, 547 U. S., at 583. That made §1983 a proper vehicle. In Nelson and Hill, the Court observed that using a different method required only a change in an agency’s uncodified protocol. Here, Georgia would have to change its statute to carry out Nance’s execution by firing squad. Except for that fact, this case would even more clearly than Nelson and Hill be fit for §1983. Since those cases, the Court has required a prisoner bringing a method-of-execution claim to propose an alternative way of carrying out his death sentence. Thus, an order granting the prisoner relief does not, as required for habeas, “necessarily prevent” the State from implementing the execution. Nelson, 541 U. S., at 647 (emphasis in original). Rather, the order gives the State a pathway forward. That remains true even where, as here, the proposed alternative is one unauthorized by present state law. Nance’s requested relief still places his execution in Georgia’s control. If Georgia wants to carry out the death sentence, it can enact legislation approving what a court has found to be a fairly easy-to-employ method of execution. Although that 3 Cite as: 597 U. S. ____ (2022) Syllabus may take more time and effort than changing an agency protocol, Hill explained that the “incidental delay” involved in changing a procedure is irrelevant to the vehicle question—which focuses on whether the requested relief would “necessarily” invalidate the death sentence. 547 U. S., at 583. And anyway, Georgia has given no reason to think that passing new legislation would be a substantial impediment. The Court of Appeals could reach the contrary conclusion only by wrongly treating Georgia’s statute as immutable. In its view, granting Nance relief would necessarily imply the invalidity of his death sentence because Georgia law must be taken as “fixed.” 981 F. 3d, at 1211. But one of the “main aims” of §1983 is to “override”—and thus compel change of—state laws when necessary to vindicate federal constitutional rights. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U. S. 167, 173. Indeed, courts not uncommonly entertain prisoner suits under §1983 that may, if successful, require changing state law. Under the contrary approach, the federal vehicle for bringing a federal method-of-execution claim would depend on the vagaries of state law. Consider how Nance’s claim would fare in different States. In Georgia (and any other State with lethal injection as the sole authorized method), he would have to bring his claim in a habeas petition. But in States authorizing other methods when a court holds injection unlawful, he could file a §1983 suit. It would be strange to read stateby-state discrepancies into the Court’s understanding of how §1983 and the habeas statute apply to federal constitutional claims. That is especially so because the use of the vehicles can lead to different outcomes: An inmate in one State could end up getting his requested relief, while an inmate in another might have his case thrown out. The approach of the Court of Appeals raises one last problem: It threatens to undo the commitment this Court made in Bucklew. The Court there told prisoners they could identify an alternative method not “presently authorized” by the executing State’s law. 587 U. S., at ___. But under the approach of the Court of Appeals, a prisoner who presents an out-of-state alternative is relegated to habeas—and once there, he will almost inevitably collide with the second-or-successive bar. That result, precluding claims like Nance’s, would turn Bucklew into a sham. Finally, recognizing that §1983 is a good vehicle for a claim like Nance’s does not countenance “last-minute” claims to forestall an execution. Id., at ___. Courts must consider delay in deciding whether to grant a stay of execution, and outside the stay context, courts have tools to streamline §1983 actions and protect a sentence’s timely enforcement.

     Result: Judgment REVERSED and case REMANDED.

     Voting Breakdown: 5-4. Justice Kagan delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Breyer, Sotomayor and Kavanaugh joined. Justice Barrett filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Thomas, Alito and Gorsuch joined.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     For Petitioner: Matthew S. Hellman, Washington, D.C.; and Masha G. Hansford, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. For Respondents: Stephen J. Petrany, Solicitor General, Atlanta, Ga.

     ]]>Nance v. Ward | Case No. 21-439 | Date Argued: 4/25/2022 | Date Decided: 6/23/2022

     Background: In Bucklew v. Precythe, 139 S. Ct. 1112 (2019), "all nine Justices" agreed that a person challenging a State's method of execution could allege an alternative "not ... authorized under current state law" and that there was therefore "little likelihood that an inmate facing a serious risk of pain will be unable to identify an available alternative." Id. at 1136 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring). In the proceedings below, Petitioner filed a § 1983 suit bringing an as-applied challenge to Georgia's sole statutorily authorized method of execution, lethal injection. Petitioner alleged the use of a firing squad as an alternative method. A divided panel held that Petitioner's challenge could not be heard. The panel ruled that Petitioner must bring his challenge in habeas rather than via § 1983 because he had alleged an alternative method not currently authorized under Georgia law. It further held that Petitioner's claim would be an impermissible successive petition notwithstanding that the claim would not have been ripe at the time of Petitioner's first petition.

     Question Presented: Whether an inmate's as-applied method-of-execution challenge must be raised in a habeas petition instead of through a § 1983 action if the inmate pleads an alternative method of execution not currently authorized by state law. Whether, if such a challenge must be raised in habeas, it constitutes a successive petition where the challenge would not have been ripe at the time of the inmate's first habeas petition.

     Holding: Section 1983 remains an appropriate vehicle for a prisoner’s method-of-execution claim where, as here, the prisoner proposes an alternative method not authorized by the State’s death-penalty statute. Both §1983 and the federal habeas statute enable a prisoner to complain of “unconstitutional treatment at the hands of state officials.” Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U. S. 477, 480. A prisoner may generally sue under §1983, unless his claim falls into that statute’s “implicit exception” for actions that lie “within the core of habeas corpus.” Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U. S. 74, 79. When a prisoner seeks relief that would “necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence,” he comes within the core and must proceed in habeas. Heck, 512 U. S., at 487. The Court has twice held that prisoners could bring method-ofexecution claims under §1983. See Nelson, 541 U. S., at 644–647; Hill v. McDonough, 547 U. S. 573, 580–583. Although these cases predated the Court’s requirement that prisoners identify alternative methods of execution, each prisoner had still said enough to leave the Court convinced that alternatives to the challenged procedures were available. See Nelson, 541 U. S., at 646; Hill, 547 U. S., at 580–581. Because alternatives were available, the prisoners’ challenges would not “necessarily prevent [the State] from carrying out [their] execution[s].” Nelson, 541 U. S., at 647 (emphasis in original); see Hill, 547 U. S., at 583. That made §1983 a proper vehicle. In Nelson and Hill, the Court observed that using a different method required only a change in an agency’s uncodified protocol. Here, Georgia would have to change its statute to carry out Nance’s execution by firing squad. Except for that fact, this case would even more clearly than Nelson and Hill be fit for §1983. Since those cases, the Court has required a prisoner bringing a method-of-execution claim to propose an alternative way of carrying out his death sentence. Thus, an order granting the prisoner relief does not, as required for habeas, “necessarily prevent” the State from implementing the execution. Nelson, 541 U. S., at 647 (emphasis in original). Rather, the order gives the State a pathway forward. That remains true even where, as here, the proposed alternative is one unauthorized by present state law. Nance’s requested relief still places his execution in Georgia’s control. If Georgia wants to carry out the death sentence, it can enact legislation approving what a court has found to be a fairly easy-to-employ method of execution. Although that 3 Cite as: 597 U. S. ____ (2022) Syllabus may take more time and effort than changing an agency protocol, Hill explained that the “incidental delay” involved in changing a procedure is irrelevant to the vehicle question—which focuses on whether the requested relief would “necessarily” invalidate the death sentence. 547 U. S., at 583. And anyway, Georgia has given no reason to think that passing new legislation would be a substantial impediment. The Court of Appeals could reach the contrary conclusion only by wrongly treating Georgia’s statute as immutable. In its view, granting Nance relief would necessarily imply the invalidity of his death sentence because Georgia law must be taken as “fixed.” 981 F. 3d, at 1211. But one of the “main aims” of §1983 is to “override”—and thus compel change of—state laws when necessary to vindicate federal constitutional rights. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U. S. 167, 173. Indeed, courts not uncommonly entertain prisoner suits under §1983 that may, if successful, require changing state law. Under the contrary approach, the federal vehicle for bringing a federal method-of-execution claim would depend on the vagaries of state law. Consider how Nance’s claim would fare in different States. In Georgia (and any other State with lethal injection as the sole authorized method), he would have to bring his claim in a habeas petition. But in States authorizing other methods when a court holds injection unlawful, he could file a §1983 suit. It would be strange to read stateby-state discrepancies into the Court’s understanding of how §1983 and the habeas statute apply to federal constitutional claims. That is especially so because the use of the vehicles can lead to different outcomes: An inmate in one State could end up getting his requested relief, while an inmate in another might have his case thrown out. The approach of the Court of Appeals raises one last problem: It threatens to undo the commitment this Court made in Bucklew. The Court there told prisoners they could identify an alternative method not “presently authorized” by the executing State’s law. 587 U. S., at ___. But under the approach of the Court of Appeals, a prisoner who presents an out-of-state alternative is relegated to habeas—and once there, he will almost inevitably collide with the second-or-successive bar. That result, precluding claims like Nance’s, would turn Bucklew into a sham. Finally, recognizing that §1983 is a good vehicle for a claim like Nance’s does not countenance “last-minute” claims to forestall an execution. Id., at ___. Courts must consider delay in deciding whether to grant a stay of execution, and outside the stay context, courts have tools to streamline §1983 actions and protect a sentence’s timely enforcement.

     Result: Judgment REVERSED and case REMANDED.

     Voting Breakdown: 5-4. Justice Kagan delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Breyer, Sotomayor and Kavanaugh joined. Justice Barrett filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Thomas, Alito and Gorsuch joined.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     For Petitioner: Matthew S. Hellman, Washington, D.C.; and Masha G. Hansford, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. For Respondents: Stephen J. Petrany, Solicitor General, Atlanta, Ga.

     ]]>4643db80-dbe0-4073-9edb-1df8e209a20bMon, 25 Apr 2022 09:00:00 -040001:26:01falsefull2021552021Oral Argument: Nance v. Ward | Case No. 21-439 | Date Argued: 4/25/2022 | Date Decided: 6/23/2022Nance v. Ward | Case No. 21-439 | Date Argued: 4/25/2022 | Date Decided: 6/23/2022

     Background: In Bucklew v. Precythe, 139 S. Ct. 1112 (2019), "all nine Justices" agreed that a person challenging a State's method of execution could allege an alternative "not ... authorized under current state law" and that there was therefore "little likelihood that an inmate facing a serious risk of pain will be unable to identify an available alternative." Id. at 1136 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring). In the proceedings below, Petitioner filed a § 1983 suit bringing an as-applied challenge to Georgia's sole statutorily authorized method of execution, lethal injection. Petitioner alleged the use of a firing squad as an alternative method. A divided panel held that Petitioner's challenge could not be heard. The panel ruled that Petitioner must bring his challenge in habeas rather than via § 1983 because he had alleged an alternative method not currently authorized under Georgia law. It further held that Petitioner's claim would be an impermissible successive petition notwithstanding that the claim would not have been ripe at the time of Petitioner's first petition.

     Question Presented: Whether an inmate's as-applied method-of-execution challenge must be raised in a habeas petition instead of through a § 1983 action if the inmate pleads an alternative method of execution not currently authorized by state law. Whether, if such a challenge must be raised in habeas, it constitutes a successive petition where the challenge would not have been ripe at the time of the inmate's first habeas petition.

     Holding: Section 1983 remains an appropriate vehicle for a prisoner’s method-of-execution claim where, as here, the prisoner proposes an alternative method not authorized by the State’s death-penalty statute. Both §1983 and the federal habeas statute enable a prisoner to complain of “unconstitutional treatment at the hands of state officials.” Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U. S. 477, 480. A prisoner may generally sue under §1983, unless his claim falls into that statute’s “implicit exception” for actions that lie “within the core of habeas corpus.” Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U. S. 74, 79. When a prisoner seeks relief that would “necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence,” he comes within the core and must proceed in habeas. Heck, 512 U. S., at 487. The Court has twice held that prisoners could bring method-ofexecution claims under §1983. See Nelson, 541 U. S., at 644–647; Hill v. McDonough, 547 U. S. 573, 580–583. Although these cases predated the Court’s requirement that prisoners identify alternative methods of execution, each prisoner had still said enough to leave the Court convinced that alternatives to the challenged procedures were available. See Nelson, 541 U. S., at 646; Hill, 547 U. S., at 580–581. Because alternatives were available, the prisoners’ challenges would not “necessarily prevent [the State] from carrying out [their] execution[s].” Nelson, 541 U. S., at 647 (emphasis in original); see Hill, 547 U. S., at 583. That made §1983 a proper vehicle. In Nelson and Hill, the Court observed that using a different method required only a change in an agency’s uncodified protocol. Here, Georgia would have to change its statute to carry out Nance’s execution by firing squad. Except for that fact, this case would even more clearly than Nelson and Hill be fit for §1983. Since those cases, the Court has required a prisoner bringing a method-of-execution claim to propose an alternative way of carrying out his death sentence. Thus, an order granting the prisoner relief does not, as required for habeas, “necessarily prevent” the State from implementing the execution. Nelson, 541 U. S., at 647 (emphasis in original). Rather, the order gives the State a pathway forward. That remains true even where, as here, the proposed alternative is one unauthorized by present state law. Nance’s requested relief still places his execution in Georgia’s control. If Georgia wants to carry out the death sentence, it can enact legislation approving what a court has found to be a fairly easy-to-employ method of execution. Although that 3 Cite as: 597 U. S. ____ (2022) Syllabus may take more time and effort than changing an agency protocol, Hill explained that the “incidental delay” involved in changing a procedure is irrelevant to the vehicle question—which focuses on whether the requested relief would “necessarily” invalidate the death sentence. 547 U. S., at 583. And anyway, Georgia has given no reason to think that passing new legislation would be a substantial impediment. The Court of Appeals could reach the contrary conclusion only by wrongly treating Georgia’s statute as immutable. In its view, granting Nance relief would necessarily imply the invalidity of his death sentence because Georgia law must be taken as “fixed.” 981 F. 3d, at 1211. But one of the “main aims” of §1983 is to “override”—and thus compel change of—state laws when necessary to vindicate federal constitutional rights. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U. S. 167, 173. Indeed, courts not uncommonly entertain prisoner suits under §1983 that may, if successful, require changing state law. Under the contrary approach, the federal vehicle for bringing a federal method-of-execution claim would depend on the vagaries of state law. Consider how Nance’s claim would fare in different States. In Georgia (and any other State with lethal injection as the sole authorized method), he would have to bring his claim in a habeas petition. But in States authorizing other methods when a court holds injection unlawful, he could file a §1983 suit. It would be strange to read stateby-state discrepancies into the Court’s understanding of how §1983 and the habeas statute apply to federal constitutional claims. That is especially so because the use of the vehicles can lead to different outcomes: An inmate in one State could end up getting his requested relief, while an inmate in another might have his case thrown out. The approach of the Court of Appeals raises one last problem: It threatens to undo the commitment this Court made in Bucklew. The Court there told prisoners they could identify an alternative method not “presently authorized” by the executing State’s law. 587 U. S., at ___. But under the approach of the Court of Appeals, a prisoner who presents an out-of-state alternative is relegated to habeas—and once there, he will almost inevitably collide with the second-or-successive bar. That result, precluding claims like Nance’s, would turn Bucklew into a sham. Finally, recognizing that §1983 is a good vehicle for a claim like Nance’s does not countenance “last-minute” claims to forestall an execution. Id., at ___. Courts must consider delay in deciding whether to grant a stay of execution, and outside the stay context, courts have tools to streamline §1983 actions and protect a sentence’s timely enforcement.

     Result: Judgment REVERSED and case REMANDED.

     Voting Breakdown: 5-4. Justice Kagan delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Breyer, Sotomayor and Kavanaugh joined. Justice Barrett filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Thomas, Alito and Gorsuch joined.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     For Petitioner: Matthew S. Hellman, Washington, D.C.; and Masha G. Hansford, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. For Respondents: Stephen J. Petrany, Solicitor General, Atlanta, Ga.

     ]]>Nance v. Ward | Case No. 21-439 | Date Argued: 4/25/2022 | Date Decided: 6/23/2022

     Background: In Bucklew v. Precythe, 139 S. Ct. 1112 (2019), "all nine Justices" agreed that a person challenging a State's method of execution could allege an alternative "not ... authorized under current state law" and that there was therefore "little likelihood that an inmate facing a serious risk of pain will be unable to identify an available alternative." Id. at 1136 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring). In the proceedings below, Petitioner filed a § 1983 suit bringing an as-applied challenge to Georgia's sole statutorily authorized method of execution, lethal injection. Petitioner alleged the use of a firing squad as an alternative method. A divided panel held that Petitioner's challenge could not be heard. The panel ruled that Petitioner must bring his challenge in habeas rather than via § 1983 because he had alleged an alternative method not currently authorized under Georgia law. It further held that Petitioner's claim would be an impermissible successive petition notwithstanding that the claim would not have been ripe at the time of Petitioner's first petition.

     Question Presented: Whether an inmate's as-applied method-of-execution challenge must be raised in a habeas petition instead of through a § 1983 action if the inmate pleads an alternative method of execution not currently authorized by state law. Whether, if such a challenge must be raised in habeas, it constitutes a successive petition where the challenge would not have been ripe at the time of the inmate's first habeas petition.

     Holding: Section 1983 remains an appropriate vehicle for a prisoner’s method-of-execution claim where, as here, the prisoner proposes an alternative method not authorized by the State’s death-penalty statute. Both §1983 and the federal habeas statute enable a prisoner to complain of “unconstitutional treatment at the hands of state officials.” Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U. S. 477, 480. A prisoner may generally sue under §1983, unless his claim falls into that statute’s “implicit exception” for actions that lie “within the core of habeas corpus.” Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U. S. 74, 79. When a prisoner seeks relief that would “necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence,” he comes within the core and must proceed in habeas. Heck, 512 U. S., at 487. The Court has twice held that prisoners could bring method-ofexecution claims under §1983. See Nelson, 541 U. S., at 644–647; Hill v. McDonough, 547 U. S. 573, 580–583. Although these cases predated the Court’s requirement that prisoners identify alternative methods of execution, each prisoner had still said enough to leave the Court convinced that alternatives to the challenged procedures were available. See Nelson, 541 U. S., at 646; Hill, 547 U. S., at 580–581. Because alternatives were available, the prisoners’ challenges would not “necessarily prevent [the State] from carrying out [their] execution[s].” Nelson, 541 U. S., at 647 (emphasis in original); see Hill, 547 U. S., at 583. That made §1983 a proper vehicle. In Nelson and Hill, the Court observed that using a different method required only a change in an agency’s uncodified protocol. Here, Georgia would have to change its statute to carry out Nance’s execution by firing squad. Except for that fact, this case would even more clearly than Nelson and Hill be fit for §1983. Since those cases, the Court has required a prisoner bringing a method-of-execution claim to propose an alternative way of carrying out his death sentence. Thus, an order granting the prisoner relief does not, as required for habeas, “necessarily prevent” the State from implementing the execution. Nelson, 541 U. S., at 647 (emphasis in original). Rather, the order gives the State a pathway forward. That remains true even where, as here, the proposed alternative is one unauthorized by present state law. Nance’s requested relief still places his execution in Georgia’s control. If Georgia wants to carry out the death sentence, it can enact legislation approving what a court has found to be a fairly easy-to-employ method of execution. Although that 3 Cite as: 597 U. S. ____ (2022) Syllabus may take more time and effort than changing an agency protocol, Hill explained that the “incidental delay” involved in changing a procedure is irrelevant to the vehicle question—which focuses on whether the requested relief would “necessarily” invalidate the death sentence. 547 U. S., at 583. And anyway, Georgia has given no reason to think that passing new legislation would be a substantial impediment. The Court of Appeals could reach the contrary conclusion only by wrongly treating Georgia’s statute as immutable. In its view, granting Nance relief would necessarily imply the invalidity of his death sentence because Georgia law must be taken as “fixed.” 981 F. 3d, at 1211. But one of the “main aims” of §1983 is to “override”—and thus compel change of—state laws when necessary to vindicate federal constitutional rights. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U. S. 167, 173. Indeed, courts not uncommonly entertain prisoner suits under §1983 that may, if successful, require changing state law. Under the contrary approach, the federal vehicle for bringing a federal method-of-execution claim would depend on the vagaries of state law. Consider how Nance’s claim would fare in different States. In Georgia (and any other State with lethal injection as the sole authorized method), he would have to bring his claim in a habeas petition. But in States authorizing other methods when a court holds injection unlawful, he could file a §1983 suit. It would be strange to read stateby-state discrepancies into the Court’s understanding of how §1983 and the habeas statute apply to federal constitutional claims. That is especially so because the use of the vehicles can lead to different outcomes: An inmate in one State could end up getting his requested relief, while an inmate in another might have his case thrown out. The approach of the Court of Appeals raises one last problem: It threatens to undo the commitment this Court made in Bucklew. The Court there told prisoners they could identify an alternative method not “presently authorized” by the executing State’s law. 587 U. S., at ___. But under the approach of the Court of Appeals, a prisoner who presents an out-of-state alternative is relegated to habeas—and once there, he will almost inevitably collide with the second-or-successive bar. That result, precluding claims like Nance’s, would turn Bucklew into a sham. Finally, recognizing that §1983 is a good vehicle for a claim like Nance’s does not countenance “last-minute” claims to forestall an execution. Id., at ___. Courts must consider delay in deciding whether to grant a stay of execution, and outside the stay context, courts have tools to streamline §1983 actions and protect a sentence’s timely enforcement.

     Result: Judgment REVERSED and case REMANDED.

     Voting Breakdown: 5-4. Justice Kagan delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Breyer, Sotomayor and Kavanaugh joined. Justice Barrett filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Thomas, Alito and Gorsuch joined.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     For Petitioner: Matthew S. Hellman, Washington, D.C.; and Masha G. Hansford, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. For Respondents: Stephen J. Petrany, Solicitor General, Atlanta, Ga.

     ]]>d381be30-ccef-4809-8d25-61905d0a51eaMon, 25 Apr 2022 09:00:00 -040001:26:01falsefull2021552021Oral Argument: Kennedy v. Bremerton Sch. Dist. | Case No. 21-418 | Date Argued: 4/25/2022 | Date Decided: 6/27/2022Kennedy v. Bremerton Sch. Dist. | Case No. 21-418 | Date Argued: 4/25/2022 | Date Decided: 6/27/2022

     Background: Petitioner Joseph Kennedy lost his job as a football coach at a public high school because he knelt and said a quiet prayer by himself at midfield after the game ended. After considering an interlocutory petition in which Kennedy sought review of the lower courts' refusal to grant him a preliminary injunction, four members of this Court observed that "the Ninth Circuit's understanding of the free speech rights of public school teachers is troubling and may justify review in the future," but concluded that this Court should stay its hand until the lower courts definitively determined the reason for Kennedy's termination. The statement also noted that Kennedy had a then unaddressed claim under the Free Exercise Clause. On remand, the lower courts found-and the school district ultimately agreed-that Kennedy lost his job solely because of his religious expression. Yet the Ninth Circuit nevertheless ruled against him again. The court not only doubled down on its "troubling" free-speech reasoning, which transforms virtually all speech by public-school employees into government speech lacking any First Amendment protection, but reached the remarkable conclusion that, even if Kennedy's prayer was private expression protected by the Free Speech and Free Exercise Clauses (which it undoubtedly was), the Establishment Clause nevertheless required its suppression. The court denied en banc review over the objection of 11 judges.

     Question Presented: 1. Whether a public-school employee who says a brief, quiet prayer by himself while at school and visible to students is engaged in government speech that lacks any First Amendment protection. 2. Whether, assuming that such religious expression is private and protected by the Free Speech and Free Exercise Clauses, the Establishment Clause nevertheless compels public schools to prohibit it.

     Holding: The Free Exercise and Free Speech Clauses of the First Amendment protect an individual engaging in a personal religious observance from government reprisal; the Constitution neither mandates nor permits the government to suppress such religious expression.

     Result: Judgment REVERSED.

     Voting Breakdown: 5-3. Justice Gorsuch delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Alito and Barrett joined and in which Justice Kavanaugh joined except as to Part IIIâB. Justice Thomas and Justice Alito filed concurring opinions. Justice Sotomayor filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Breyer and Kagan joined.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     For Petitioner: Paul D. Clement, Washington, D.C. For Respondent: Richard B. Katskee, Washington, D.C.

     ]]>Kennedy v. Bremerton Sch. Dist. | Case No. 21-418 | Date Argued: 4/25/2022 | Date Decided: 6/27/2022

     Background: Petitioner Joseph Kennedy lost his job as a football coach at a public high school because he knelt and said a quiet prayer by himself at midfield after the game ended. After considering an interlocutory petition in which Kennedy sought review of the lower courts' refusal to grant him a preliminary injunction, four members of this Court observed that "the Ninth Circuit's understanding of the free speech rights of public school teachers is troubling and may justify review in the future," but concluded that this Court should stay its hand until the lower courts definitively determined the reason for Kennedy's termination. The statement also noted that Kennedy had a then unaddressed claim under the Free Exercise Clause. On remand, the lower courts found-and the school district ultimately agreed-that Kennedy lost his job solely because of his religious expression. Yet the Ninth Circuit nevertheless ruled against him again. The court not only doubled down on its "troubling" free-speech reasoning, which transforms virtually all speech by public-school employees into government speech lacking any First Amendment protection, but reached the remarkable conclusion that, even if Kennedy's prayer was private expression protected by the Free Speech and Free Exercise Clauses (which it undoubtedly was), the Establishment Clause nevertheless required its suppression. The court denied en banc review over the objection of 11 judges.

     Question Presented: 1. Whether a public-school employee who says a brief, quiet prayer by himself while at school and visible to students is engaged in government speech that lacks any First Amendment protection. 2. Whether, assuming that such religious expression is private and protected by the Free Speech and Free Exercise Clauses, the Establishment Clause nevertheless compels public schools to prohibit it.

     Holding: The Free Exercise and Free Speech Clauses of the First Amendment protect an individual engaging in a personal religious observance from government reprisal; the Constitution neither mandates nor permits the government to suppress such religious expression.

     Result: Judgment REVERSED.

     Voting Breakdown: 5-3. Justice Gorsuch delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Alito and Barrett joined and in which Justice Kavanaugh joined except as to Part IIIâB. Justice Thomas and Justice Alito filed concurring opinions. Justice Sotomayor filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Breyer and Kagan joined.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     For Petitioner: Paul D. Clement, Washington, D.C. For Respondent: Richard B. Katskee, Washington, D.C.

     ]]>c7eb6882-db46-4aea-a904-da1a347685cdMon, 25 Apr 2022 09:00:00 -040001:47:12falsefull2021442021Oral Argument: Kemp v. United States | Case No. 21-5726 | Date Argued: 4/19/2022 | Date Decided: 6/13/2022Vega v. Tekoh | Case No. 21-499 | Date Argued: 4/20/2022 | Date Decided: 6/23/2022

     Background: In Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), this Court announced a prophylactic rule protecting the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. That rule generally prohibits criminal trial courts from admitting into evidence against a criminal defendant any self- incriminating statement made by that defendant while he was in custody, unless the defendant first received certain warnings spelled out in Miranda. The Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, provides a damages remedy for deprivations of any right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States.

     Question Presented: Whether a plaintiff may state a claim for relief against a law enforcement officer under Section 1983 based simply on an officer's failure to provide the warnings prescribed in Miranda.

     Holding: A violation of the Miranda rules does not provide a basis for a §1983 claim.

     Result: Judgment REVERSED and case REMANDED.

     Voting Breakdown: 6-3. Justice Alito delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh and Barrett joined. Justice Kagan filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Breyer and Sotomayor joined.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     For Petitioner: Roman Martinez, Washington, D.C.; and Vivek Suri, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. (for United States, as amicus curiae.) For Respondent: Paul L. Hoffman, Hermosa Beach, Cal.

     ]]>Vega v. Tekoh | Case No. 21-499 | Date Argued: 4/20/2022 | Date Decided: 6/23/2022

     Background: In Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), this Court announced a prophylactic rule protecting the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. That rule generally prohibits criminal trial courts from admitting into evidence against a criminal defendant any self- incriminating statement made by that defendant while he was in custody, unless the defendant first received certain warnings spelled out in Miranda. The Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, provides a damages remedy for deprivations of any right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States.

     Question Presented: Whether a plaintiff may state a claim for relief against a law enforcement officer under Section 1983 based simply on an officer's failure to provide the warnings prescribed in Miranda.

     Holding: A violation of the Miranda rules does not provide a basis for a §1983 claim.

     Result: Judgment REVERSED and case REMANDED.

     Voting Breakdown: 6-3. Justice Alito delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh and Barrett joined. Justice Kagan filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Breyer and Sotomayor joined.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     For Petitioner: Roman Martinez, Washington, D.C.; and Vivek Suri, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. (for United States, as amicus curiae.) For Respondent: Paul L. Hoffman, Hermosa Beach, Cal.

     ]]>70afeaf0-1be9-4022-8c6a-8292bdc49505Wed, 20 Apr 2022 09:00:00 -040001:20:20falsefull2021772021Oral Argument: George v. McDonough | Case No. 21-234 | Date Argued: 4/19/2022 | Date Decided: 6/15/2022George v. McDonough | Case No. 21-234 | Date Argued: 4/19/2022 | Date Decided: 6/15/2022

     Background: In the veterans-benefits system, Congress has provided that an otherwise-final agency decision is subject to revision if that decision is based on "clear and unmistakable error." Here, the Federal Circuit held that the agency's application of a regulation that conflicts with the plain meaning of a statute cannot amount to "clear and unmistakable error." The Federal Circuit reasoned that a federal court's later invalidation of such a regulation is merely a change in interpretation of the law. But this Court has made clear that when a court interprets the plain meaning of a statute, it is not announcing a change but rather declaring what the statute has always meant. An agency regulation that departs from that plain meaning is — and always was — legally invalid. And if the agency relied on that unlawful regulation in an adjudication, that adjudication is infected with a legal error that is clear and unmistakable on the face of the ruling.

     Question Presented: When the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) denies a veteran's claim for benefits in reliance on an agency interpretation that is later deemed invalid under the plain text of the statutory provisions in effect at the time of the denial, is that the kind of "clear and unmistakable error" that the veteran may invoke to challenge VA's decision?

     Holding: The invalidation of a VA regulation after a veteran’s benefits decision becomes final cannot support a claim for collateral relief based on clear and unmistakable error.

     Result: Adjudged to be AFFIRMED.

     Voting Breakdown: 6-2. Justice Barrett delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Alito, Kagan and Kavanaugh joined. Justice Sotomayor filed a dissenting opinion. Justice Gorsuch filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Breyer joined and in which Justice Sotomayor joined as to all but Part IIâC.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     For Petitioner: Melanie L. Bostwick, Washington, D.C. For Respondent: Anthony A. Yang, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.

     ]]>George v. McDonough | Case No. 21-234 | Date Argued: 4/19/2022 | Date Decided: 6/15/2022

     Background: In the veterans-benefits system, Congress has provided that an otherwise-final agency decision is subject to revision if that decision is based on "clear and unmistakable error." Here, the Federal Circuit held that the agency's application of a regulation that conflicts with the plain meaning of a statute cannot amount to "clear and unmistakable error." The Federal Circuit reasoned that a federal court's later invalidation of such a regulation is merely a change in interpretation of the law. But this Court has made clear that when a court interprets the plain meaning of a statute, it is not announcing a change but rather declaring what the statute has always meant. An agency regulation that departs from that plain meaning is — and always was — legally invalid. And if the agency relied on that unlawful regulation in an adjudication, that adjudication is infected with a legal error that is clear and unmistakable on the face of the ruling.

     Question Presented: When the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) denies a veteran's claim for benefits in reliance on an agency interpretation that is later deemed invalid under the plain text of the statutory provisions in effect at the time of the denial, is that the kind of "clear and unmistakable error" that the veteran may invoke to challenge VA's decision?

     Holding: The invalidation of a VA regulation after a veteran’s benefits decision becomes final cannot support a claim for collateral relief based on clear and unmistakable error.

     Result: Adjudged to be AFFIRMED.

     Voting Breakdown: 6-2. Justice Barrett delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Alito, Kagan and Kavanaugh joined. Justice Sotomayor filed a dissenting opinion. Justice Gorsuch filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Breyer joined and in which Justice Sotomayor joined as to all but Part IIâC.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     For Petitioner: Melanie L. Bostwick, Washington, D.C. For Respondent: Anthony A. Yang, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.

     ]]>09788b94-4a7d-48b2-9d26-a3ce7e01ce56Tue, 19 Apr 2022 09:00:00 -040043:31falsefull2021882021Oral Argument: Kemp v. United States | Case No. 21-5726 | Date Argued: 4/19/2022 | Date Decided: 6/13/2022Kemp v. United States | Case No. 21-5726 | Date Argued: 4/19/2022 | Date Decided: 6/13/2022

     Background: Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(1) authorizes relief from final judgment based on "mistake," as well as inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect.

     Question Presented: The question presented is: Whether Rule 60(b)(1) authorizes relief based on a district court's error of law.

     Holding: The term “mistake” in Rule 60(b)(1) includes a judge’s errors of law. Because Kemp’s motion alleged such a legal error, it was cognizable under Rule 60(b)(1) and untimely under Rule 60(c)’s 1-year limitations period.

     Result: Adjudged to be AFFIRMED.

     Voting Breakdown: 8-1. Justice Thomas delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Breyer, Alito, Sotomayor, Kagan, Kavanaugh and Barrett joined. Justice Sotomayor filed a concurring opinion. Justice Gorsuch filed a dissenting opinion.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     For Petitioner: Andrew L. Adler, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Ft. Lauderdale, Fla. For Respondent: Benjamin W. Snyder, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.

     ]]>Kemp v. United States | Case No. 21-5726 | Date Argued: 4/19/2022 | Date Decided: 6/13/2022

     Background: Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(1) authorizes relief from final judgment based on "mistake," as well as inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect.

     Question Presented: The question presented is: Whether Rule 60(b)(1) authorizes relief based on a district court's error of law.

     Holding: The term “mistake” in Rule 60(b)(1) includes a judge’s errors of law. Because Kemp’s motion alleged such a legal error, it was cognizable under Rule 60(b)(1) and untimely under Rule 60(c)’s 1-year limitations period.

     Result: Adjudged to be AFFIRMED.

     Voting Breakdown: 8-1. Justice Thomas delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Breyer, Alito, Sotomayor, Kagan, Kavanaugh and Barrett joined. Justice Sotomayor filed a concurring opinion. Justice Gorsuch filed a dissenting opinion.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     For Petitioner: Andrew L. Adler, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Ft. Lauderdale, Fla. For Respondent: Benjamin W. Snyder, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.

     ]]>a359c53e-fd2e-476f-a6f0-c40057b63ec4Tue, 19 Apr 2022 09:00:00 -040043:31falsefull2021772021Oral Argument: United States v. Washington | Case No. 21-404 | Date Argued: 4/18/2022 | Date Decided: 6/21/2022United States v. Washington | Case No. 21-404 | Date Argued: 4/18/2022 | Date Decided: 6/21/2022

     Question Presented: Whether a state workers' compensation law that applies exclusively to federal contract workers who perform services at a specified federal facility is barred by principles of intergovernmental immunity, or is instead authorized by 40 U.S.C. 3172(a), which permits the application of state workers' compensation laws to federal facilities "in the same way and to the same extent as if the premises were under the exclusive jurisdiction of the State."

     Holding: Washington’s law facially discriminates against the Federal Government and its contractors. Because §3172 does not clearly and unambiguously waive the Federal Government’s immunity from discriminatory state laws, Washington’s law is unconstitutional under the Supremacy Clause.

     Result: Judgment REVERSED and case REMANDED.

     Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Breyer delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     For Petitioner: Malcolm L. Stewart, Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. For Respondents: Tera M. Heintz, Deputy Solicitor General, Olympia, Wash.

     ]]>United States v. Washington | Case No. 21-404 | Date Argued: 4/18/2022 | Date Decided: 6/21/2022

     Question Presented: Whether a state workers' compensation law that applies exclusively to federal contract workers who perform services at a specified federal facility is barred by principles of intergovernmental immunity, or is instead authorized by 40 U.S.C. 3172(a), which permits the application of state workers' compensation laws to federal facilities "in the same way and to the same extent as if the premises were under the exclusive jurisdiction of the State."

     Holding: Washington’s law facially discriminates against the Federal Government and its contractors. Because §3172 does not clearly and unambiguously waive the Federal Government’s immunity from discriminatory state laws, Washington’s law is unconstitutional under the Supremacy Clause.

     Result: Judgment REVERSED and case REMANDED.

     Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Breyer delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     For Petitioner: Malcolm L. Stewart, Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. For Respondents: Tera M. Heintz, Deputy Solicitor General, Olympia, Wash.

     ]]>0ddc714b-f4cb-46a2-9d21-6b93e70c2299Mon, 18 Apr 2022 09:00:00 -040001:03:05falsefull202110102021Oral Argument: United States v. Washington | Case No. 21-404 | Date Argued: 4/18/2022 | Date Decided: 6/21/2022United States v. Washington | Case No. 21-404 | Date Argued: 4/18/2022 | Date Decided: 6/21/2022

     Question Presented: Whether a state workers' compensation law that applies exclusively to federal contract workers who perform services at a specified federal facility is barred by principles of intergovernmental immunity, or is instead authorized by 40 U.S.C. 3172(a), which permits the application of state workers' compensation laws to federal facilities "in the same way and to the same extent as if the premises were under the exclusive jurisdiction of the State."

     Holding: Washington’s law facially discriminates against the Federal Government and its contractors. Because §3172 does not clearly and unambiguously waive the Federal Government’s immunity from discriminatory state laws, Washington’s law is unconstitutional under the Supremacy Clause.

     Result: Judgment REVERSED and case REMANDED.

     Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Breyer delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     For Petitioner: Malcolm L. Stewart, Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. For Respondents: Tera M. Heintz, Deputy Solicitor General, Olympia, Wash.

     ]]>United States v. Washington | Case No. 21-404 | Date Argued: 4/18/2022 | Date Decided: 6/21/2022

     Question Presented: Whether a state workers' compensation law that applies exclusively to federal contract workers who perform services at a specified federal facility is barred by principles of intergovernmental immunity, or is instead authorized by 40 U.S.C. 3172(a), which permits the application of state workers' compensation laws to federal facilities "in the same way and to the same extent as if the premises were under the exclusive jurisdiction of the State."

     Holding: Washington’s law facially discriminates against the Federal Government and its contractors. Because §3172 does not clearly and unambiguously waive the Federal Government’s immunity from discriminatory state laws, Washington’s law is unconstitutional under the Supremacy Clause.

     Result: Judgment REVERSED and case REMANDED.

     Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Breyer delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     For Petitioner: Malcolm L. Stewart, Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. For Respondents: Tera M. Heintz, Deputy Solicitor General, Olympia, Wash.

     ]]>b6d02558-95c7-4324-b672-27ee9e23bfc9Mon, 18 Apr 2022 09:00:00 -040001:03:05falsefull202110102021Oral Argument: Siegel v. Fitzgerald | Case No. 21-441 | Date Argued: 4/18/2022 | Date Decided: 6/6/2022Siegel v. Fitzgerald | Case No. 21-441 | Date Argued: 4/18/2022 | Date Decided: 6/6/2022

     Background: This case presents a clear and acknowledged conflict over the constitutionality of a federal statute governing the quarterly fees in large Chapter 11 bankruptcies. The Bankruptcy Clause authorizes Congress to "establish * * * uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United States." Notwithstanding this directive, Congress has divided the nation's bankruptcy courts into two distinct programs: 88 judicial districts operate under the U.S. Trustee program, and 6 judicial districts (all in North Carolina and Alabama) operate under the Bankruptcy Administrator program. Each program generally performs similar tasks, and each program-until recently-imposed the same quarterly fees on Chapter 11 debtors in their districts. In the Bankruptcy Judgeship Act of 2017, however, Congress adopted a five-year increase in quarterly fees paid only in U.S. Trustee districts-increasing the maximum fee from $30,000 to $250,000 for all pending cases. 28 U.S.C. 1930(a)(6)(B) (2018). That same increase was not imposed in Administrator districts until nine months later, and it applied only to cases filed after that date. The result is a wide disparity in fees paid by identically situated debtors based solely on the geographic location of their bankruptcy. The total difference exceeds $100 million in aggregate fees in Chapter 11 cases nationwide. In the decision below, the Fourth Circuit joined the Fifth Circuit (each over dissents) in upholding these non-uniform fees; the Second Circuit has rejected those decisions and declared the 2017 Act unconstitutional.

     Question Presented: Whether the Bankruptcy Judgeship Act violates the uniformity requirement of the Bankruptcy Clause by increasing quarterly fees solely in U.S. Trustee districts.

     Holding: Congress’ enactment of a significant fee increase that exempted debtors in two States violated the uniformity requirement of the Bankruptcy Clause.

     Result: Judgment REVERSED and case REMANDED.

     Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Sotomayor delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     For Petitioner: Daniel L. Geyser, Dallas, Tex. For Respondent: Curtis E. Gannon, Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.

     ]]>Siegel v. Fitzgerald | Case No. 21-441 | Date Argued: 4/18/2022 | Date Decided: 6/6/2022

     Background: This case presents a clear and acknowledged conflict over the constitutionality of a federal statute governing the quarterly fees in large Chapter 11 bankruptcies. The Bankruptcy Clause authorizes Congress to "establish * * * uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United States." Notwithstanding this directive, Congress has divided the nation's bankruptcy courts into two distinct programs: 88 judicial districts operate under the U.S. Trustee program, and 6 judicial districts (all in North Carolina and Alabama) operate under the Bankruptcy Administrator program. Each program generally performs similar tasks, and each program-until recently-imposed the same quarterly fees on Chapter 11 debtors in their districts. In the Bankruptcy Judgeship Act of 2017, however, Congress adopted a five-year increase in quarterly fees paid only in U.S. Trustee districts-increasing the maximum fee from $30,000 to $250,000 for all pending cases. 28 U.S.C. 1930(a)(6)(B) (2018). That same increase was not imposed in Administrator districts until nine months later, and it applied only to cases filed after that date. The result is a wide disparity in fees paid by identically situated debtors based solely on the geographic location of their bankruptcy. The total difference exceeds $100 million in aggregate fees in Chapter 11 cases nationwide. In the decision below, the Fourth Circuit joined the Fifth Circuit (each over dissents) in upholding these non-uniform fees; the Second Circuit has rejected those decisions and declared the 2017 Act unconstitutional.

     Question Presented: Whether the Bankruptcy Judgeship Act violates the uniformity requirement of the Bankruptcy Clause by increasing quarterly fees solely in U.S. Trustee districts.

     Holding: Congress’ enactment of a significant fee increase that exempted debtors in two States violated the uniformity requirement of the Bankruptcy Clause.

     Result: Judgment REVERSED and case REMANDED.

     Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Sotomayor delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     For Petitioner: Daniel L. Geyser, Dallas, Tex. For Respondent: Curtis E. Gannon, Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.

     ]]>639d84e1-7d44-4a27-955d-c6e73c9e7608Mon, 18 Apr 2022 09:00:00 -040001:15:26falsefull2021992021Oral Argument: Viking River Cruises, Inc. v. Moriana | Case No. 20-1573 | Date Argued: 3/30/2022 | Date Decided: 6/15/2022Viking River Cruises, Inc. v. Moriana | Case No. 20-1573 | Date Argued: 3/30/2022 | Date Decided: 6/15/2022

     Background: In AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333 (2011), and Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S.Ct. 1612 (2018), this Court held that when parties agree to resolve their disputes by individualized arbitration, those agreements are fully enforceable under the Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA"). Courts are not free to disregard or "reshape traditional individualized arbitration" by applying rules that demand collective or representational adjudication of certain claims. Epic, 138 S.Ct. at 1623. The FAA allows the parties not only to choose arbitration but to retain the benefits of arbitration by maintaining its traditional, bilateral form. While California courts follow Concepcion and Epic when a party to an individualized arbitration agreement tries to assert class-action claims, they refuse to do so when a party to such an agreement asserts representative claims under the California Private Attorneys General Act ("PAGA"), which — like a class action — allows aggrieved employees to seek monetary awards on a representative basis on behalf of other employees. See Iskanian v. CLS Transp. Los Angeles, LLC, 327 P.3d 129 (Cal. 2014). As a result, Concepcion and Epic have not caused bilateral arbitration to flourish in California, as this Court intended, but have merely caused FAA-defying representational litigation to shift form.

     Question Presented: Whether the Federal Arbitration Act requires enforcement of a bilateral arbitration agreement providing that an employee cannot raise representative claims, including under PAGA.

     Holding: The FAA preempts the rule of Iskanian insofar as it precludes division of PAGA actions into individual and non-individual claims through an agreement to arbitrate.

     Result: Judgment REVERSED and case REMANDED.

     Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Alito delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Justices Breyer, Sotomayor, Kagan and Gorsuch joined in which Chief Justice Roberts joined as to Parts I and III and in which Justices Kavanaugh and Barrett joined as to Part III. Justice Sotomayor filed a concurring opinion. Justice Barrett filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, in

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     For Petitioner: Paul D. Clement, Washington, D.C. For Respondent: Scott L. Nelson, Washington, D.C.

     ]]>Viking River Cruises, Inc. v. Moriana | Case No. 20-1573 | Date Argued: 3/30/2022 | Date Decided: 6/15/2022

     Background: In AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333 (2011), and Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S.Ct. 1612 (2018), this Court held that when parties agree to resolve their disputes by individualized arbitration, those agreements are fully enforceable under the Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA"). Courts are not free to disregard or "reshape traditional individualized arbitration" by applying rules that demand collective or representational adjudication of certain claims. Epic, 138 S.Ct. at 1623. The FAA allows the parties not only to choose arbitration but to retain the benefits of arbitration by maintaining its traditional, bilateral form. While California courts follow Concepcion and Epic when a party to an individualized arbitration agreement tries to assert class-action claims, they refuse to do so when a party to such an agreement asserts representative claims under the California Private Attorneys General Act ("PAGA"), which — like a class action — allows aggrieved employees to seek monetary awards on a representative basis on behalf of other employees. See Iskanian v. CLS Transp. Los Angeles, LLC, 327 P.3d 129 (Cal. 2014). As a result, Concepcion and Epic have not caused bilateral arbitration to flourish in California, as this Court intended, but have merely caused FAA-defying representational litigation to shift form.

     Question Presented: Whether the Federal Arbitration Act requires enforcement of a bilateral arbitration agreement providing that an employee cannot raise representative claims, including under PAGA.

     Holding: The FAA preempts the rule of Iskanian insofar as it precludes division of PAGA actions into individual and non-individual claims through an agreement to arbitrate.

     Result: Judgment REVERSED and case REMANDED.

     Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Alito delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Justices Breyer, Sotomayor, Kagan and Gorsuch joined in which Chief Justice Roberts joined as to Parts I and III and in which Justices Kavanaugh and Barrett joined as to Part III. Justice Sotomayor filed a concurring opinion. Justice Barrett filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, in

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     For Petitioner: Paul D. Clement, Washington, D.C. For Respondent: Scott L. Nelson, Washington, D.C.

     ]]>a451d69c-f6b7-450f-bea6-a1c35eb5f5b0Wed, 30 Mar 2022 09:00:00 -040001:20:55falsefull202111112021Oral Argument: Torres v. Texas Dept. of Public Safety | Case No. 20-603 | Date Argued: 3/29/2022 | Date Decided: 6/29/2022Torres v. Texas Dept. of Public Safety | Case No. 20-603 | Date Argued: 3/29/2022 | Date Decided: 6/29/2022

     Background: In the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act of 1994 (USERRA), Congress gave the over 19 million military servicemembers — including over 800,000 who work for state and local government employers — a cause of action to remedy adverse employment actions taken because of their military service. It enacted USERRA pursuant to its constitutional War Powers, U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cls. 11-16, recognizing that unremedied employment discrimination by state employers based on military service could interfere with the nation's "ability to provide for a strong national defense." H.R. Rep. No. 105-448, at 5 (1998). USERRA's cause of action against state employers may be pursued only in state courts. In a sharply divided decision that conflicts with the Constitution's text, structure, and history, the court below, a Texas intermediate appellate court with jurisdiction over more than 2 million Texas citizens, held that USERRA's cause of action is unconstitutional because Congress lacks the power to authorize lawsuits against nonconsenting states pursuant to its War Powers.

     Question Presented: Whether Congress has the power to authorize suits against nonconsenting states pursuant to its War Powers.

     Holding: By ratifying the Constitution, the States agreed their sovereignty would yield to the national power to raise and support the Armed Forces. Congress may exercise this power to authorize private damages suits against nonconsenting States, as in USERRA.

     Result: Judgment REVERSED and case REMANDED.

     Voting Breakdown: 5-4. Justice Breyer delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Sotomayor, Kagan and Kavanaugh joined. Justice Kagan filed a concurring opinion. Justice Thomas filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Alito, Gorsuch and Barrett joined.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     For Petitioner: Andrew T. Tutt, Washington, D.C.; and Christopher G. Michel, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. (for United States, as amicus curiae.) For Respondent: Judd E. Stone, II, Solicitor General, Austin, Tex.

     ]]>Torres v. Texas Dept. of Public Safety | Case No. 20-603 | Date Argued: 3/29/2022 | Date Decided: 6/29/2022

     Background: In the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act of 1994 (USERRA), Congress gave the over 19 million military servicemembers — including over 800,000 who work for state and local government employers — a cause of action to remedy adverse employment actions taken because of their military service. It enacted USERRA pursuant to its constitutional War Powers, U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cls. 11-16, recognizing that unremedied employment discrimination by state employers based on military service could interfere with the nation's "ability to provide for a strong national defense." H.R. Rep. No. 105-448, at 5 (1998). USERRA's cause of action against state employers may be pursued only in state courts. In a sharply divided decision that conflicts with the Constitution's text, structure, and history, the court below, a Texas intermediate appellate court with jurisdiction over more than 2 million Texas citizens, held that USERRA's cause of action is unconstitutional because Congress lacks the power to authorize lawsuits against nonconsenting states pursuant to its War Powers.

     Question Presented: Whether Congress has the power to authorize suits against nonconsenting states pursuant to its War Powers.

     Holding: By ratifying the Constitution, the States agreed their sovereignty would yield to the national power to raise and support the Armed Forces. Congress may exercise this power to authorize private damages suits against nonconsenting States, as in USERRA.

     Result: Judgment REVERSED and case REMANDED.

     Voting Breakdown: 5-4. Justice Breyer delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Sotomayor, Kagan and Kavanaugh joined. Justice Kagan filed a concurring opinion. Justice Thomas filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Alito, Gorsuch and Barrett joined.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     For Petitioner: Andrew T. Tutt, Washington, D.C.; and Christopher G. Michel, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. (for United States, as amicus curiae.) For Respondent: Judd E. Stone, II, Solicitor General, Austin, Tex.

     ]]>929c6ad8-fbb4-41f8-af30-c1eff09ac9e7Tue, 29 Mar 2022 09:00:00 -040001:41:05falsefull202112122021Oral Argument: LeDure v. Union Pacific Railroad Co. | Case No. 20-807 | Date Argued: 3/28/2022 | Date Decided: 4/28/2022LeDure v. Union Pacific Railroad Co. | Case No. 20-807 | Date Argued: 3/28/2022 | Date Decided: 4/28/2022

     Question Presented: [cannot locate]

     Holding: [NO INFORMATION]

     Result: Voting information not found

     Voting Breakdown: ?-?. Voting breakdown not found

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     For Petitioner: David C. Frederick, Washington, D.C.; and Colleen E. Sinzdak, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. (for United States, as amicus curiae.) For Respondent: J. Scott Ballenger, Washington, D.C.

     ]]>LeDure v. Union Pacific Railroad Co. | Case No. 20-807 | Date Argued: 3/28/2022 | Date Decided: 4/28/2022

     Question Presented: [cannot locate]

     Holding: [NO INFORMATION]

     Result: Voting information not found

     Voting Breakdown: ?-?. Voting breakdown not found

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     For Petitioner: David C. Frederick, Washington, D.C.; and Colleen E. Sinzdak, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. (for United States, as amicus curiae.) For Respondent: J. Scott Ballenger, Washington, D.C.

     ]]>cef1e53c-0897-4afc-ac2d-42cbf57cadf8Mon, 28 Mar 2022 09:00:00 -040001:41:04falsefull202114142021Oral Argument: Southwest Airlines Co. v. Saxon | Case No. 21-309 | Date Argued: 3/28/2022 | Date Decided: 6/6/2022Southwest Airlines Co. v. Saxon | Case No. 21-309 | Date Argued: 3/28/2022 | Date Decided: 6/6/2022

     Question Presented: Section 1 of the Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA") provides that the FAA does not apply "to contracts of employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce." 9 U.S.C. § 1. In Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105 (2001), this Court held that Section 1 applies only to interstate "transportation workers." The Court did not define the term "transportation worker."

     Holding: Saxon belongs to a “class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce” to which §1’s exemption applies.

     Result: Adjudged to be AFFIRMED.

     Voting Breakdown: 8-0. Justice Thomas delivered the opinion of the Court, in which all other Members joined except Justice Barrett, who took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     For Petitioner: Shay Dvoretzky, Washington, D.C. For Respondent: Jennifer D. Bennett, San Francisco, Cal.

     ]]>Southwest Airlines Co. v. Saxon | Case No. 21-309 | Date Argued: 3/28/2022 | Date Decided: 6/6/2022

     Question Presented: Section 1 of the Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA") provides that the FAA does not apply "to contracts of employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce." 9 U.S.C. § 1. In Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105 (2001), this Court held that Section 1 applies only to interstate "transportation workers." The Court did not define the term "transportation worker."

     Holding: Saxon belongs to a “class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce” to which §1’s exemption applies.

     Result: Adjudged to be AFFIRMED.

     Voting Breakdown: 8-0. Justice Thomas delivered the opinion of the Court, in which all other Members joined except Justice Barrett, who took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     For Petitioner: Shay Dvoretzky, Washington, D.C. For Respondent: Jennifer D. Bennett, San Francisco, Cal.

     ]]>d5fd4f07-5510-4051-bef1-d56909264ffaMon, 28 Mar 2022 09:00:00 -040001:06:40falsefull202113132021Oral Argument: Golan v. Saada | Case No. 20-1034 | Date Argued: 3/22/2022 | Date Decided: 6/15/2022Golan v. Saada | Case No. 20-1034 | Date Argued: 3/22/2022 | Date Decided: 6/15/2022

     Question Presented: Whether, upon finding that return to the country of habitual residence places a child at grave risk, a district court is required to consider ameliorative measures that would facilitate the return of the child notwithstanding the grave risk finding.

     Holding: A court is not categorically required to examine all possible ameliorative measures before denying a Hague Convention petition for return of a child to a foreign country once the court has found that return would expose the child to a grave risk of harm.

     Result: Judgment VACATED and case REMANDED.

     Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Sotomayor delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     For Petitioner: Karen R. King, New York, N.Y. For United States, as amicus curiae: Frederick Liu, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. For Respondent: Richard Min, New York, N.Y.

     ]]>Golan v. Saada | Case No. 20-1034 | Date Argued: 3/22/2022 | Date Decided: 6/15/2022

     Question Presented: Whether, upon finding that return to the country of habitual residence places a child at grave risk, a district court is required to consider ameliorative measures that would facilitate the return of the child notwithstanding the grave risk finding.

     Holding: A court is not categorically required to examine all possible ameliorative measures before denying a Hague Convention petition for return of a child to a foreign country once the court has found that return would expose the child to a grave risk of harm.

     Result: Judgment VACATED and case REMANDED.

     Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Sotomayor delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     For Petitioner: Karen R. King, New York, N.Y. For United States, as amicus curiae: Frederick Liu, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. For Respondent: Richard Min, New York, N.Y.

     ]]>b6d3c50a-2dc7-496e-b20c-944a1fc337eaTue, 22 Mar 2022 09:00:00 -040001:19:54falsefull202116162021Oral Argument: Golan v. Saada | Case No. 20-1034 | Date Argued: 3/22/2022 | Date Decided: 6/15/2022Golan v. Saada | Case No. 20-1034 | Date Argued: 3/22/2022 | Date Decided: 6/15/2022

     Question Presented: Whether, upon finding that return to the country of habitual residence places a child at grave risk, a district court is required to consider ameliorative measures that would facilitate the return of the child notwithstanding the grave risk finding.

     Holding: A court is not categorically required to examine all possible ameliorative measures before denying a Hague Convention petition for return of a child to a foreign country once the court has found that return would expose the child to a grave risk of harm.

     Result: Judgment VACATED and case REMANDED.

     Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Sotomayor delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     For Petitioner: Karen R. King, New York, N.Y. For United States, as amicus curiae: Frederick Liu, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. For Respondent: Richard Min, New York, N.Y.

     ]]>Golan v. Saada | Case No. 20-1034 | Date Argued: 3/22/2022 | Date Decided: 6/15/2022

     Question Presented: Whether, upon finding that return to the country of habitual residence places a child at grave risk, a district court is required to consider ameliorative measures that would facilitate the return of the child notwithstanding the grave risk finding.

     Holding: A court is not categorically required to examine all possible ameliorative measures before denying a Hague Convention petition for return of a child to a foreign country once the court has found that return would expose the child to a grave risk of harm.

     Result: Judgment VACATED and case REMANDED.

     Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Sotomayor delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     For Petitioner: Karen R. King, New York, N.Y. For United States, as amicus curiae: Frederick Liu, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. For Respondent: Richard Min, New York, N.Y.

     ]]>4d7cb169-edbb-42a8-bc06-9180ab0032a7Tue, 22 Mar 2022 09:00:00 -040001:19:54falsefull202116162021Oral Argument: Morgan v. Sundance, Inc. | Case No. 21-328 | Date Argued: 3/21/2022 | Date Decided: 5/23/2022Morgan v. Sundance, Inc. | Case No. 21-328 | Date Argued: 3/21/2022 | Date Decided: 5/23/2022

     Background: Waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a known right and, in the context of contracts, occurs when one party to a contract either explicitly repudiates its rights under the contract or acts in a manner inconsistent with an intention of exercising them.

     Question Presented: Does the arbitration-specific requirement that the proponent of a contractual waiver defense prove prejudice violate this Court's instruction that lower courts must "place arbitration agreements on an equal footing with other contracts?" AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 339 (2011).

     Holding: The Eighth Circuit erred in conditioning a waiver of the right to arbitrate on a showing of prejudice. Federal courts have generally resolved cases like this one as a matter of federal law, using the terminology of waiver. The parties dispute whether that framework is correct. Assuming without deciding that it is, federal courts may not create arbitration-specific variants of federal procedural rules, like those concerning waiver, based on the FAA’s “policy favoring arbitration.” Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U. S. 1, 24. That policy “is merely an acknowledgment of the FAA’s commitment to overrule the judiciary’s longstanding refusal to enforce agreements to arbitrate and to place such agreements upon the same footing as other contracts.” Granite Rock Co. v. Teamsters, 561 U. S. 287, 302 (internal quotation marks omitted). Accordingly, a court must hold a party to its arbitration contract just as the court would to any other kind. But a court may not devise novel rules to favor arbitration over litigation. See Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U. S. 213, 218–221. The federal policy is about treating arbitration contracts like all others, not about fostering arbitration. The text of the FAA makes clear that courts are not to create arbitration-specific procedural rules like the one here. Section 6 of the FAA provides that any application under the statute—including an application to stay litigation or compel arbitration—“shall be made and heard in the manner provided by law for the making and hearing of motions” (unless the statute says otherwise). A directive to treat arbitration applications “in the manner provided by law” for all other motions is simply a command to apply the usual federal procedural rules, including any rules relating to a motion’s timeliness. Because the usual federal rule of waiver does not include a prejudice requirement, Section 6 instructs that prejudice is not a condition of finding that a party waived its right to stay litigation or compel arbitration under the FAA. Stripped of its prejudice requirement, the Eighth Circuit’s current waiver inquiry would focus on Sundance’s conduct. Did Sundance knowingly relinquish the right to arbitrate by acting inconsistently with that right? On remand, the Court of Appeals may resolve that question, or determine that a different procedural framework (such as forfeiture) is appropriate. The Court’s sole holding today is that it may not make up a new procedural rule based on the FAA’s “policy favoring arbitration.”.

     Result: Judgment VACATED and case REMANDED.

     Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Kagan delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     For Petitioner: Karla A. Gilbride, Washington, D.C. For Respondent: Paul D. Clement, Washington, D.C.

     ]]>Morgan v. Sundance, Inc. | Case No. 21-328 | Date Argued: 3/21/2022 | Date Decided: 5/23/2022

     Background: Waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a known right and, in the context of contracts, occurs when one party to a contract either explicitly repudiates its rights under the contract or acts in a manner inconsistent with an intention of exercising them.

     Question Presented: Does the arbitration-specific requirement that the proponent of a contractual waiver defense prove prejudice violate this Court's instruction that lower courts must "place arbitration agreements on an equal footing with other contracts?" AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 339 (2011).

     Holding: The Eighth Circuit erred in conditioning a waiver of the right to arbitrate on a showing of prejudice. Federal courts have generally resolved cases like this one as a matter of federal law, using the terminology of waiver. The parties dispute whether that framework is correct. Assuming without deciding that it is, federal courts may not create arbitration-specific variants of federal procedural rules, like those concerning waiver, based on the FAA’s “policy favoring arbitration.” Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U. S. 1, 24. That policy “is merely an acknowledgment of the FAA’s commitment to overrule the judiciary’s longstanding refusal to enforce agreements to arbitrate and to place such agreements upon the same footing as other contracts.” Granite Rock Co. v. Teamsters, 561 U. S. 287, 302 (internal quotation marks omitted). Accordingly, a court must hold a party to its arbitration contract just as the court would to any other kind. But a court may not devise novel rules to favor arbitration over litigation. See Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U. S. 213, 218–221. The federal policy is about treating arbitration contracts like all others, not about fostering arbitration. The text of the FAA makes clear that courts are not to create arbitration-specific procedural rules like the one here. Section 6 of the FAA provides that any application under the statute—including an application to stay litigation or compel arbitration—“shall be made and heard in the manner provided by law for the making and hearing of motions” (unless the statute says otherwise). A directive to treat arbitration applications “in the manner provided by law” for all other motions is simply a command to apply the usual federal procedural rules, including any rules relating to a motion’s timeliness. Because the usual federal rule of waiver does not include a prejudice requirement, Section 6 instructs that prejudice is not a condition of finding that a party waived its right to stay litigation or compel arbitration under the FAA. Stripped of its prejudice requirement, the Eighth Circuit’s current waiver inquiry would focus on Sundance’s conduct. Did Sundance knowingly relinquish the right to arbitrate by acting inconsistently with that right? On remand, the Court of Appeals may resolve that question, or determine that a different procedural framework (such as forfeiture) is appropriate. The Court’s sole holding today is that it may not make up a new procedural rule based on the FAA’s “policy favoring arbitration.”.

     Result: Judgment VACATED and case REMANDED.

     Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Kagan delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     For Petitioner: Karla A. Gilbride, Washington, D.C. For Respondent: Paul D. Clement, Washington, D.C.

     ]]>2329eeb9-6b97-4004-8ce9-5378e41fb715Mon, 21 Mar 2022 09:00:00 -040001:22:02falsefull202118182021Oral Argument: Berger v. North Carolina State Conf. of NAACP | Case No. 21-248 | Date Argued: 3/21/2022 | Date Decided: 6/23/2022Berger v. North Carolina State Conf. of NAACP | Case No. 21-248 | Date Argued: 3/21/2022 | Date Decided: 6/23/2022

     Background: The leaders of North Carolina's Republican-controlled legislature retained a private attorney to represent them, purportedly on behalf of the State, to defend the constitutionality of North Carolina's voter-ID law. Rather than allowing both Executive Branch officials and legislative leaders to speak on behalf of the State as they did at the district court, the Fourth Circuit ordered the dismissal of the legislative leaders from the case on appeal.

     Question Presented: Whether a state agent authorized by state law to defend the State's interest in litigation must overcome a presumption of adequate representation to intervene as of right in a case in which a state official is a defendant.

     Holding: North Carolina’s legislative leaders are entitled to intervene in this litigation.

     Result: Judgment REVERSED.

     Voting Breakdown: 8-1. Justice Gorsuch delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Breyer, Alito, Kagan, Kavanaugh and Barrett joined. Justice Sotomayor filed a dissenting opinion.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     For Petitioners: David H. Thompson, Washington, D.C. For NAACP Respondents: Elisabeth S. Theodore, Washington, D.C. For state Respondents: Sarah Boyce, Deputy Solicitor General, Raleigh, N. C.

     ]]>Berger v. North Carolina State Conf. of NAACP | Case No. 21-248 | Date Argued: 3/21/2022 | Date Decided: 6/23/2022

     Background: The leaders of North Carolina's Republican-controlled legislature retained a private attorney to represent them, purportedly on behalf of the State, to defend the constitutionality of North Carolina's voter-ID law. Rather than allowing both Executive Branch officials and legislative leaders to speak on behalf of the State as they did at the district court, the Fourth Circuit ordered the dismissal of the legislative leaders from the case on appeal.

     Question Presented: Whether a state agent authorized by state law to defend the State's interest in litigation must overcome a presumption of adequate representation to intervene as of right in a case in which a state official is a defendant.

     Holding: North Carolina’s legislative leaders are entitled to intervene in this litigation.

     Result: Judgment REVERSED.

     Voting Breakdown: 8-1. Justice Gorsuch delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Breyer, Alito, Kagan, Kavanaugh and Barrett joined. Justice Sotomayor filed a dissenting opinion.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     For Petitioners: David H. Thompson, Washington, D.C. For NAACP Respondents: Elisabeth S. Theodore, Washington, D.C. For state Respondents: Sarah Boyce, Deputy Solicitor General, Raleigh, N. C.

     ]]>670bc76c-3ce3-443b-b5dc-c655b617769aMon, 21 Mar 2022 09:00:00 -040001:11:02falsefull202117172021Oral Argument: Egbert v. Boule | Case No. 21-147 | Date Argued: 3/2/2022 | Date Decided: 6/8/2022Egbert v. Boule | Case No. 21-147 | Date Argued: 3/2/2022 | Date Decided: 6/8/2022

     Question Presented: [cannot locate]

     Holding: Bivens does not extend to create causes of action for Boule’s Fourth Amendment excessive-force claim and First Amendment retaliation claim.

     Result: Judgment REVERSED.

     Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Thomas delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Alito, Kavanaugh and Barrett joined. Justice Gorsuch filed an opinion concurring in the judgment. Justice Sotomayor filed an opinion concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part, in which Justices Breyer and Kagan joined.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     For Petitioner: Sarah M. Harris, Washington, D.C.; and Michael R. Huston, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. (for United States, as amicus curiae.) For Respondent: Felicia H. Ellsworth, Boston, Mass.

     ]]>Egbert v. Boule | Case No. 21-147 | Date Argued: 3/2/2022 | Date Decided: 6/8/2022

     Question Presented: [cannot locate]

     Holding: Bivens does not extend to create causes of action for Boule’s Fourth Amendment excessive-force claim and First Amendment retaliation claim.

     Result: Judgment REVERSED.

     Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Thomas delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Alito, Kavanaugh and Barrett joined. Justice Gorsuch filed an opinion concurring in the judgment. Justice Sotomayor filed an opinion concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part, in which Justices Breyer and Kagan joined.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     For Petitioner: Sarah M. Harris, Washington, D.C.; and Michael R. Huston, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. (for United States, as amicus curiae.) For Respondent: Felicia H. Ellsworth, Boston, Mass.

     ]]>b55cd43f-f79b-42a8-b931-1ba47624e411Wed, 02 Mar 2022 09:00:00 -040001:11:54falsefull202119192021Oral Argument: Ruan v. United States | Case No. 20-1410 | Date Argued: 3/1/2022 | Date Decided: 6/27/2022Ruan v. United States | Case No. 20-1410 | Date Argued: 3/1/2022 | Date Decided: 6/27/2022

     Background: A physician otherwise authorized to prescribe controlled substances may be convicted of unlawful distribution under 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) if his prescriptions "fall outside the usual course of professional practice." United States v. Moore, 423 U.S. 122, 124 (1975).

     Question Presented: Whether a physician alleged to have prescribed controlled substances outside the usual course of professional practice may be convicted under Section 841(a)(1) without regard to whether, in good faith, he "reasonably believed" or "subjectively intended" that his prescriptions fall within that course of professional practice.

     Holding: Section 841’s “knowingly or intentionally” mens rea applies to the statute’s “except as authorized” clause. Once a defendant meets the burden of producing evidence that his or her conduct was “authorized,” the Government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant knowingly or intentionally acted in an unauthorized manner.

     Result: Judgment VACATED and case REMANDED.

     Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Breyer delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Sotomayor, Kagan, Gorsuch and Kavanaugh joined. Justice Alito filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which Justice Thomas joined and in which Justice Barrett joined as to Parts IâA, IâB and II.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     For Petitioner in 20-1410: Lawrence S. Robbins, Washington, D.C. For Petitioner in 21-5261: Beau B. Brindley, Chicago, Ill. For Respondent: Eric J. Feigin, Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.

     ]]>Ruan v. United States | Case No. 20-1410 | Date Argued: 3/1/2022 | Date Decided: 6/27/2022

     Background: A physician otherwise authorized to prescribe controlled substances may be convicted of unlawful distribution under 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) if his prescriptions "fall outside the usual course of professional practice." United States v. Moore, 423 U.S. 122, 124 (1975).

     Question Presented: Whether a physician alleged to have prescribed controlled substances outside the usual course of professional practice may be convicted under Section 841(a)(1) without regard to whether, in good faith, he "reasonably believed" or "subjectively intended" that his prescriptions fall within that course of professional practice.

     Holding: Section 841’s “knowingly or intentionally” mens rea applies to the statute’s “except as authorized” clause. Once a defendant meets the burden of producing evidence that his or her conduct was “authorized,” the Government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant knowingly or intentionally acted in an unauthorized manner.

     Result: Judgment VACATED and case REMANDED.

     Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Breyer delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Sotomayor, Kagan, Gorsuch and Kavanaugh joined. Justice Alito filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which Justice Thomas joined and in which Justice Barrett joined as to Parts IâA, IâB and II.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     For Petitioner in 20-1410: Lawrence S. Robbins, Washington, D.C. For Petitioner in 21-5261: Beau B. Brindley, Chicago, Ill. For Respondent: Eric J. Feigin, Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.

     ]]>d443f2a8-870b-4436-8319-4cd7204966d8Tue, 01 Mar 2022 09:00:00 -040001:35:23falsefull202121212021Oral Argument: West Virginia v. EPA | Case No. 20-1530 | Date Argued: 2/28/2022 | Date Decided: 6/30/2022West Virginia v. EPA | Case No. 20-1530 | Date Argued: 2/28/2022 | Date Decided: 6/30/2022

     Question Presented: [cannot locate]

     Holding: [NO INFORMATION]

     Result: Judgment REVERSED and case REMANDED.

     Voting Breakdown: 6-3. Chief Justice Roberts delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Justices Thomas, Alito, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh and Barrett joined. Justice Gorsuch filed a concurring opinion, in which Justice Alito joined. Justice Kagan filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Breyer and Sotomayor joined.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     For state Petitioners: Lindsay S. See, Solicitor General, Charleston, W. Va. For private Petitioners: Jacob M. Roth, Washington, D.C. For federal Respondents: Elizabeth B. Prelogar, Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. For power company Respondents: Beth S. Brinkmann, Washington, D.C.

     ]]>West Virginia v. EPA | Case No. 20-1530 | Date Argued: 2/28/2022 | Date Decided: 6/30/2022

     Question Presented: [cannot locate]

     Holding: [NO INFORMATION]

     Result: Judgment REVERSED and case REMANDED.

     Voting Breakdown: 6-3. Chief Justice Roberts delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Justices Thomas, Alito, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh and Barrett joined. Justice Gorsuch filed a concurring opinion, in which Justice Alito joined. Justice Kagan filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Breyer and Sotomayor joined.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     For state Petitioners: Lindsay S. See, Solicitor General, Charleston, W. Va. For private Petitioners: Jacob M. Roth, Washington, D.C. For federal Respondents: Elizabeth B. Prelogar, Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. For power company Respondents: Beth S. Brinkmann, Washington, D.C.

     ]]>0b6525bd-48d6-452e-92fb-e9e176cbea09Mon, 28 Feb 2022 09:00:00 -040002:03:04falsefull202122222021Oral Argument: Ysleta del Sur Pueblo v. Texas | Case No. 20-493 | Date Argued: 2/22/2022 | Date Decided: 6/15/2022Ysleta del Sur Pueblo v. Texas | Case No. 20-493 | Date Argued: 2/22/2022 | Date Decided: 6/15/2022

     Background: In 1987, following years of negotiation and drafting, the Ysleta del Sur Pueblo (the "Pueblo") and Alabama-Coushatta Tribe of Texas (together, the "Tribes") secured restoration of their trust relationships with the federal government through the Ysleta del Sur Pueblo and Alabama-Coushatta Indian Tribes of Texas Restoration Act ("Restoration Act"). That Act includes a "Gaming Activities" provision that states in relevant part: (a) IN GENERAL.- All gaming activities which are prohibited by the laws of the State of Texas are hereby prohibited on the reservation and on lands of the tribe ... (b) NO STATE REGULATORY JURISDICTION.-Nothing in this section shall be construed as a grant of civil or criminal regulatory jurisdiction to the State of Texas. In 1994, the Fifth Circuit's decision in Ysleta del Sur Pueblo v. Texas, 36 F.3d 1325 (5th Cir. 1994) ("Ysleta I") eschewed the Restoration Act's plain language, legislative history, and this Court's governing precedent to grant Texas regulatory jurisdiction over non-prohibited gaming activities on the Tribes' lands. Ysleta I and its progeny effectively read Section 107(b) out of the Restoration Act and deprive the Pueblo of its sovereign authority to regulate its own non-prohibited gaming.

     Question Presented: Whether the Restoration Act provides the Pueblo with sovereign authority to regulate non-prohibited gaming activities on its lands (including bingo), as set forth in the plain language of Section 107(b), the Act's legislative history, and this Court's holding in California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202 (1987), or whether the Fifth Circuit's decision affirming Ysleta I correctly subjects the Pueblo to all Texas gaming regulations.

     Holding: The Restoration Act bans as a matter of federal law on tribal lands only those gaming activities also banned in Texas.

     Result: Judgment VACATED and case REMANDED.

     Voting Breakdown: 5-4. Justice Gorsuch delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Justices Breyer, Sotomayor, Kagan and Barrett joined. Chief Justice Roberts filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Thomas, Alito and Kavanaugh joined.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     For Petitioners: Brant C. Martin, Fort Worth, Tex.; and Anthony A. Yang, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. (for United States, as amicus curiae.) For Respondent: Lanora C. Pettit, Principal Deputy Solicitor General, Austin, Tex.

     ]]>Ysleta del Sur Pueblo v. Texas | Case No. 20-493 | Date Argued: 2/22/2022 | Date Decided: 6/15/2022

     Background: In 1987, following years of negotiation and drafting, the Ysleta del Sur Pueblo (the "Pueblo") and Alabama-Coushatta Tribe of Texas (together, the "Tribes") secured restoration of their trust relationships with the federal government through the Ysleta del Sur Pueblo and Alabama-Coushatta Indian Tribes of Texas Restoration Act ("Restoration Act"). That Act includes a "Gaming Activities" provision that states in relevant part: (a) IN GENERAL.- All gaming activities which are prohibited by the laws of the State of Texas are hereby prohibited on the reservation and on lands of the tribe ... (b) NO STATE REGULATORY JURISDICTION.-Nothing in this section shall be construed as a grant of civil or criminal regulatory jurisdiction to the State of Texas. In 1994, the Fifth Circuit's decision in Ysleta del Sur Pueblo v. Texas, 36 F.3d 1325 (5th Cir. 1994) ("Ysleta I") eschewed the Restoration Act's plain language, legislative history, and this Court's governing precedent to grant Texas regulatory jurisdiction over non-prohibited gaming activities on the Tribes' lands. Ysleta I and its progeny effectively read Section 107(b) out of the Restoration Act and deprive the Pueblo of its sovereign authority to regulate its own non-prohibited gaming.

     Question Presented: Whether the Restoration Act provides the Pueblo with sovereign authority to regulate non-prohibited gaming activities on its lands (including bingo), as set forth in the plain language of Section 107(b), the Act's legislative history, and this Court's holding in California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202 (1987), or whether the Fifth Circuit's decision affirming Ysleta I correctly subjects the Pueblo to all Texas gaming regulations.

     Holding: The Restoration Act bans as a matter of federal law on tribal lands only those gaming activities also banned in Texas.

     Result: Judgment VACATED and case REMANDED.

     Voting Breakdown: 5-4. Justice Gorsuch delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Justices Breyer, Sotomayor, Kagan and Barrett joined. Chief Justice Roberts filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Thomas, Alito and Kavanaugh joined.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     For Petitioners: Brant C. Martin, Fort Worth, Tex.; and Anthony A. Yang, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. (for United States, as amicus curiae.) For Respondent: Lanora C. Pettit, Principal Deputy Solicitor General, Austin, Tex.

     ]]>2fef42fd-667c-4629-a9a3-7d16034ca292Tue, 22 Feb 2022 09:00:00 -040001:31:42falsefull202125252021Oral Argument: Denezpi v. United States | Case No. 20-7622 | Date Argued: 2/22/2022 | Date Decided: 6/13/2022Denezpi v. United States | Case No. 20-7622 | Date Argued: 2/22/2022 | Date Decided: 6/13/2022

     Background: In April 2017, a Court of Indian Offenses in Colorado prosecuted petitioner Merle Denezpi for violations of federal regulatory laws and the code of the Ute Mountain Ute Tribe. In June 2018, more than a year after sentencing for those offenses, a federal court in Colorado indicted Mr. Denezpi for one count of aggravated sexual abuse. The indictment was based on the same incident for which Mr. Denezpi had been prosecuted and sentenced in the Court of Indian Offenses. Mr. Denezpi moved to dismiss the indictment on double jeopardy grounds.

     Question Presented: Whether the Court of Indian Offenses of Ute Mountain Ute Agency is a federal agency such that a defendant's conviction in that court bars a subsequent prosecution for a federal offense arising out of the same incident.

     Holding: The Double Jeopardy Clause does not bar successive prosecutions of distinct offenses arising from a single act, even if a single sovereign prosecutes them.

     Result: Adjudged to be AFFIRMED.

     Voting Breakdown: 6-3. Justice Barrett delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Breyer, Alito and Kavanaugh joined. Justice Gorsuch filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Sotomayor and Kagan joined as to Parts I and III.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     For Petitioner: Michael B. Kimberly, Washington, D.C. For Respondent: Erica L. Ross, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.

     ]]>Denezpi v. United States | Case No. 20-7622 | Date Argued: 2/22/2022 | Date Decided: 6/13/2022

     Background: In April 2017, a Court of Indian Offenses in Colorado prosecuted petitioner Merle Denezpi for violations of federal regulatory laws and the code of the Ute Mountain Ute Tribe. In June 2018, more than a year after sentencing for those offenses, a federal court in Colorado indicted Mr. Denezpi for one count of aggravated sexual abuse. The indictment was based on the same incident for which Mr. Denezpi had been prosecuted and sentenced in the Court of Indian Offenses. Mr. Denezpi moved to dismiss the indictment on double jeopardy grounds.

     Question Presented: Whether the Court of Indian Offenses of Ute Mountain Ute Agency is a federal agency such that a defendant's conviction in that court bars a subsequent prosecution for a federal offense arising out of the same incident.

     Holding: The Double Jeopardy Clause does not bar successive prosecutions of distinct offenses arising from a single act, even if a single sovereign prosecutes them.

     Result: Adjudged to be AFFIRMED.

     Voting Breakdown: 6-3. Justice Barrett delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Breyer, Alito and Kavanaugh joined. Justice Gorsuch filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Sotomayor and Kagan joined as to Parts I and III.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     For Petitioner: Michael B. Kimberly, Washington, D.C. For Respondent: Erica L. Ross, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.

     ]]>ce1e97bd-57a3-4776-8738-3297f915eaa0Tue, 22 Feb 2022 09:00:00 -040001:05:32falsefull202124242021Oral Argument: Federal Election Commission v. Ted Cruz for Senate | Case No. 21-12 | Date Argued: 1/19/2022 | Date Decided: 5/16/2022Federal Election Commission v. Ted Cruz for Senate | Case No. 21-12 | Date Argued: 1/19/2022 | Date Decided: 5/16/2022

     Question Presented: [cannot locate]

     Holding: 1. Appellees have standing to challenge the threatened enforcement of Section 304.

     Result: Adjudged to be AFFIRMED.

     Voting Breakdown: 6-3. Chief Justice Roberts delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Justices Thomas, Alito, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh and Barrett joined. Justice Kagan filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Breyer and Sotomayor joined.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     For appellant: Malcolm L. Stewart, Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. For appellees: Charles J. Cooper, Washington, D.C.

     ]]>Federal Election Commission v. Ted Cruz for Senate | Case No. 21-12 | Date Argued: 1/19/2022 | Date Decided: 5/16/2022

     Question Presented: [cannot locate]

     Holding: 1. Appellees have standing to challenge the threatened enforcement of Section 304.

     Result: Adjudged to be AFFIRMED.

     Voting Breakdown: 6-3. Chief Justice Roberts delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Justices Thomas, Alito, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh and Barrett joined. Justice Kagan filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Breyer and Sotomayor joined.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     For appellant: Malcolm L. Stewart, Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. For appellees: Charles J. Cooper, Washington, D.C.

     ]]>da7a3b9b-9078-4184-b7f7-0dbf4135da42Wed, 19 Jan 2022 09:00:00 -040001:28:22falsefull202127272021Oral Argument: Concepcion v. United States | Case No. 20-1650 | Date Argued: 1/19/2022 | Date Decided: 6/27/2022Concepcion v. United States | Case No. 20-1650 | Date Argued: 1/19/2022 | Date Decided: 6/27/2022

     Question Presented: [cannot locate]

     Holding: The First Step Act allows district courts to consider intervening changes of law or fact in exercising their discretion to reduce a sentence.

     Result: Judgment REVERSED and case REMANDED.

     Voting Breakdown: 5-4. Justice Sotomayor delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Justices Thomas, Breyer, Kagan and Gorsuch joined. Justice Kavanaugh filed a dissenting opinion, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Alito and Barrett joined.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     For Petitioner: Charles L. McCloud, Washington, D.C. For Respondent: Matthew Guarnieri, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.

     ]]>Concepcion v. United States | Case No. 20-1650 | Date Argued: 1/19/2022 | Date Decided: 6/27/2022

     Question Presented: [cannot locate]

     Holding: The First Step Act allows district courts to consider intervening changes of law or fact in exercising their discretion to reduce a sentence.

     Result: Judgment REVERSED and case REMANDED.

     Voting Breakdown: 5-4. Justice Sotomayor delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Justices Thomas, Breyer, Kagan and Gorsuch joined. Justice Kavanaugh filed a dissenting opinion, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Alito and Barrett joined.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     For Petitioner: Charles L. McCloud, Washington, D.C. For Respondent: Matthew Guarnieri, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.

     ]]>aaff4eae-a2f4-41eb-8b89-4ef9bb03714dWed, 19 Jan 2022 09:00:00 -040001:15:29falsefull202126262021Oral Argument: Shurtleff v. Boston | Case No. 20-1800 | Date Argued: 1/18/2022 | Date Decided: 5/2/2022Shurtleff v. Boston | Case No. 20-1800 | Date Argued: 1/18/2022 | Date Decided: 5/2/2022

     Background: Boston creates designated public forums in many contexts, including on City Hall Plaza. Over a twelve-year period, the City approved 284 applications from private organizations to use one of the City's three flagpoles on the Plaza, which the City designated as a public forum for private speech. Boston approved all prior applications, denying none, and exercised no substantive control over the content of these 284 flag raisings. The City rejected only one application, Camp Constitution's request to briefly raise a Christian flag in connection with an event celebrating the civic contributions of Boston's Christian community. Although the City admitted that the flag raisings are private speech, it invoked the Establishment Clause to justify censoring Camp Constitution's Christian viewpoint.

     Question Presented: Whether the First Circuit's failure to apply this Court's forum doctrine to the City's exclusion of the Christian flag from a city hall flagpole, which was designated as a public forum open to "all applicants" until the City denied access to the Christian flag, is inconsistent with this Court's precedents holding that speech restrictions based on religious viewpoint violate the First Amendment or are otherwise subject to strict scrutiny. Whether the First Circuit's classifying private religious speech as government speech because it occurs on a government flagpole in a public forum, when nothing about the religious speech or the circumstances of the temporary flag display in the forum is attributable to the government, conflicts with this Court's decisions in Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744 (2017), Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460 (2009), and Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free School District, 508 U.S. 384 (1993). Whether the First Circuit's finding that the Establishment Clause justified a city's viewpoint-based exclusion of religious expression from a flagpole forum that was open to "all applicants" conflicts with this Court's precedents in Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981), Capitol Square Review & Advisory Board v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753 (1995), and Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the University of Virginia, 515 U.S. 819 (1995).

     Holding: 1. Boston’s flag-raising program does not express government speech.

     Result: Judgment REVERSED and case REMANDED.

     Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Breyer delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Sotomayor, Kagan, Kavanaugh and Barrett joined. Justice Kavanaugh filed a concurring opinion. Justice Alito filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which Justices Thomas and Gorsuch joined. Justice Gorsuch filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which Justice Thomas joined.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     For Petitioners: Mathew Staver, Orlando, Fla.; and Sopan Joshi, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. (for United States, as amicus curiae.) For Respondents: Douglas Hallward-Driemeier, Washington, D.C.

     ]]>Shurtleff v. Boston | Case No. 20-1800 | Date Argued: 1/18/2022 | Date Decided: 5/2/2022

     Background: Boston creates designated public forums in many contexts, including on City Hall Plaza. Over a twelve-year period, the City approved 284 applications from private organizations to use one of the City's three flagpoles on the Plaza, which the City designated as a public forum for private speech. Boston approved all prior applications, denying none, and exercised no substantive control over the content of these 284 flag raisings. The City rejected only one application, Camp Constitution's request to briefly raise a Christian flag in connection with an event celebrating the civic contributions of Boston's Christian community. Although the City admitted that the flag raisings are private speech, it invoked the Establishment Clause to justify censoring Camp Constitution's Christian viewpoint.

     Question Presented: Whether the First Circuit's failure to apply this Court's forum doctrine to the City's exclusion of the Christian flag from a city hall flagpole, which was designated as a public forum open to "all applicants" until the City denied access to the Christian flag, is inconsistent with this Court's precedents holding that speech restrictions based on religious viewpoint violate the First Amendment or are otherwise subject to strict scrutiny. Whether the First Circuit's classifying private religious speech as government speech because it occurs on a government flagpole in a public forum, when nothing about the religious speech or the circumstances of the temporary flag display in the forum is attributable to the government, conflicts with this Court's decisions in Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744 (2017), Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460 (2009), and Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free School District, 508 U.S. 384 (1993). Whether the First Circuit's finding that the Establishment Clause justified a city's viewpoint-based exclusion of religious expression from a flagpole forum that was open to "all applicants" conflicts with this Court's precedents in Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981), Capitol Square Review & Advisory Board v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753 (1995), and Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the University of Virginia, 515 U.S. 819 (1995).

     Holding: 1. Boston’s flag-raising program does not express government speech.

     Result: Judgment REVERSED and case REMANDED.

     Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Breyer delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Sotomayor, Kagan, Kavanaugh and Barrett joined. Justice Kavanaugh filed a concurring opinion. Justice Alito filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which Justices Thomas and Gorsuch joined. Justice Gorsuch filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which Justice Thomas joined.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     For Petitioners: Mathew Staver, Orlando, Fla.; and Sopan Joshi, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. (for United States, as amicus curiae.) For Respondents: Douglas Hallward-Driemeier, Washington, D.C.

     ]]>188ad433-0e13-4a5a-b9b3-22949617ca72Tue, 18 Jan 2022 09:00:00 -040001:22:57falsefull202129292021Oral Argument: Cassirer v. Thyssen-Bornemisza Collection | Case No. 20-1566 | Date Argued: 1/18/2022 | Date Decided: 4/21/2022Cassirer v. Thyssen-Bornemisza Collection | Case No. 20-1566 | Date Argued: 1/18/2022 | Date Decided: 4/21/2022

     Background: The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602–1611 ("FSIA"), provides that where a foreign state or an "agency or instrumentality" of a foreign state is not entitled to immunity, a federal court should "apply the law of the forum state, including its choice-of-law rules." Here, the foreign state defendant (an agency or instrumentality of the Kingdom of Spain) seeks to avoid California's choice-of-law rule and instead asks the federal court to apply federal common law.

     Question Presented: Whether a federal court hearing state law claims brought under the FSIA must apply the forum state's choice-of-law rules to determine what substantive law governs the claims at issue, or whether it may apply federal common law.

     Holding: In an FSIA suit raising non-federal claims against a foreign state or instrumentality, a court should determine the substantive law by using the same choice-of-law rule applicable in a similar suit against a private party. Here, that means applying the forum State’s choiceof-law rule, not a rule deriving from federal common law. The FSIA provides a baseline principle of foreign sovereign immunity from civil actions unless a statutory exception applies (including the expropriation exception found to apply here). See §§1604–1607. Yet the FSIA was never “intended to affect the substantive law determining the liability of a foreign state or instrumentality” deemed amenable to suit. First Nat. City Bank v. Banco Para el Comercio Exterior de Cuba, 462 U. S. 611, 620. To the contrary, Section 1606 of the statute provides: “As to any claim for relief with respect to which a foreign state is not entitled to immunity under [the FSIA], the foreign state shall be liable in the same manner and to the same extent as a private individual under like circumstances.” When a foreign state is not immune from suit, it is subject to the same rules of liability (the same substantive law) as a private party. See First Nat. City Bank, at 622, n. 11. Section 1606 dictates the selection of a choice-of-law rule: It must mirror the rule that would apply in a similar suit between private parties. Only the same choice-of-law rule can guarantee use of the same substantive law—and thus guarantee the same liability. Consider two suits seeking recovery of a painting: one suit against a foreign-statecontrolled museum (as here), the other against a private museum. If the choice-of-law rules in the two suits differed, so might the substantive law chosen. And if the substantive law differed, so might the suits’ outcomes. Contrary to Section 1606, the two museums would not be “liable to the same manner and to the same extent.” In this case, Section 1606 requires the use of California’s choice-oflaw rule—because that is the rule a court would use in comparable private litigation. Consider the just-hypothesized suit against a private museum, brought as this case was in California and asserting 3 Cite as: 596 U. S. ____ (2022) Syllabus non-federal claims. If the private suit were filed in state court, California’s choice-of-law rule would govern. And if the private suit were filed in federal court, the same would be true, because a federal court sitting in diversity borrows the forum State’s choice-of-law rule. See Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U. S. 487, 496. If California’s choice-of-law rule applies in the private-museum suit, it must also apply in the suit here, against the Foundation. That is the only way to ensure—as Section 1606 demands—that the Foundation, although a Spanish instrumentality, will be liable in the same way as a private party. Even absent the clarity of Section 1606, the Court would likely reach the same result. Scant justification exists for federal common lawmaking in this context. Judicial creation of federal common law to displace state-created rules must be “necessary to protect uniquely federal interests.” Texas Industries, Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U. S. 630, 640. While foreign relations is an interest of that kind, here even the Federal Government disclaims any necessity for a federal choiceof-law rule in FSIA suits raising non-federal claims.

     Result: Judgment VACATED and case REMANDED.

     Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Kagan delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     For Petitioners: David Boies, Armonk, N.Y.; and Masha G. Hansford, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. (for United States, as amicus curiae.) For Respondent: Thaddeus J. Stauber, Los Angeles, Cal.

     ]]>Cassirer v. Thyssen-Bornemisza Collection | Case No. 20-1566 | Date Argued: 1/18/2022 | Date Decided: 4/21/2022

     Background: The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602–1611 ("FSIA"), provides that where a foreign state or an "agency or instrumentality" of a foreign state is not entitled to immunity, a federal court should "apply the law of the forum state, including its choice-of-law rules." Here, the foreign state defendant (an agency or instrumentality of the Kingdom of Spain) seeks to avoid California's choice-of-law rule and instead asks the federal court to apply federal common law.

     Question Presented: Whether a federal court hearing state law claims brought under the FSIA must apply the forum state's choice-of-law rules to determine what substantive law governs the claims at issue, or whether it may apply federal common law.

     Holding: In an FSIA suit raising non-federal claims against a foreign state or instrumentality, a court should determine the substantive law by using the same choice-of-law rule applicable in a similar suit against a private party. Here, that means applying the forum State’s choiceof-law rule, not a rule deriving from federal common law. The FSIA provides a baseline principle of foreign sovereign immunity from civil actions unless a statutory exception applies (including the expropriation exception found to apply here). See §§1604–1607. Yet the FSIA was never “intended to affect the substantive law determining the liability of a foreign state or instrumentality” deemed amenable to suit. First Nat. City Bank v. Banco Para el Comercio Exterior de Cuba, 462 U. S. 611, 620. To the contrary, Section 1606 of the statute provides: “As to any claim for relief with respect to which a foreign state is not entitled to immunity under [the FSIA], the foreign state shall be liable in the same manner and to the same extent as a private individual under like circumstances.” When a foreign state is not immune from suit, it is subject to the same rules of liability (the same substantive law) as a private party. See First Nat. City Bank, at 622, n. 11. Section 1606 dictates the selection of a choice-of-law rule: It must mirror the rule that would apply in a similar suit between private parties. Only the same choice-of-law rule can guarantee use of the same substantive law—and thus guarantee the same liability. Consider two suits seeking recovery of a painting: one suit against a foreign-statecontrolled museum (as here), the other against a private museum. If the choice-of-law rules in the two suits differed, so might the substantive law chosen. And if the substantive law differed, so might the suits’ outcomes. Contrary to Section 1606, the two museums would not be “liable to the same manner and to the same extent.” In this case, Section 1606 requires the use of California’s choice-oflaw rule—because that is the rule a court would use in comparable private litigation. Consider the just-hypothesized suit against a private museum, brought as this case was in California and asserting 3 Cite as: 596 U. S. ____ (2022) Syllabus non-federal claims. If the private suit were filed in state court, California’s choice-of-law rule would govern. And if the private suit were filed in federal court, the same would be true, because a federal court sitting in diversity borrows the forum State’s choice-of-law rule. See Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U. S. 487, 496. If California’s choice-of-law rule applies in the private-museum suit, it must also apply in the suit here, against the Foundation. That is the only way to ensure—as Section 1606 demands—that the Foundation, although a Spanish instrumentality, will be liable in the same way as a private party. Even absent the clarity of Section 1606, the Court would likely reach the same result. Scant justification exists for federal common lawmaking in this context. Judicial creation of federal common law to displace state-created rules must be “necessary to protect uniquely federal interests.” Texas Industries, Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U. S. 630, 640. While foreign relations is an interest of that kind, here even the Federal Government disclaims any necessity for a federal choiceof-law rule in FSIA suits raising non-federal claims.

     Result: Judgment VACATED and case REMANDED.

     Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Kagan delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     For Petitioners: David Boies, Armonk, N.Y.; and Masha G. Hansford, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. (for United States, as amicus curiae.) For Respondent: Thaddeus J. Stauber, Los Angeles, Cal.

     ]]>830c9c7c-6a29-4bd6-9fd2-8126374b5350Tue, 18 Jan 2022 09:00:00 -040001:04:13falsefull202128282021Oral Argument: Boechler, P.C. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue | Case No. 20-1472 | Date Argued: 1/12/2022 | Date Decided: 4/21/2022Boechler, P.C. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue | Case No. 20-1472 | Date Argued: 1/12/2022 | Date Decided: 4/21/2022

     Background: Section 6330(d)(1) of the Internal Revenue Code establishes a 30-day time limit to file a petition for review in the Tax Court of a notice of determination from the Internal Revenue Service ("IRS").

     Question Presented: Whether the time limit in Section 6330(d)(1) is a jurisdictional requirement or a claim-processing rule subject to equitable tolling.

     Holding: Section 6330(d)(1)’s 30-day time limit to file a petition for review of a collection due process determination is a nonjurisdictional deadline subject to equitable tolling.

     Result: Judgment REVERSED and case REMANDED.

     Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Barrett delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     For Petitioner: Melissa Arbus Sherry, Washington, D.C. For Respondent: Jonathan C. Bond, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.

     ]]>Boechler, P.C. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue | Case No. 20-1472 | Date Argued: 1/12/2022 | Date Decided: 4/21/2022

     Background: Section 6330(d)(1) of the Internal Revenue Code establishes a 30-day time limit to file a petition for review in the Tax Court of a notice of determination from the Internal Revenue Service ("IRS").

     Question Presented: Whether the time limit in Section 6330(d)(1) is a jurisdictional requirement or a claim-processing rule subject to equitable tolling.

     Holding: Section 6330(d)(1)’s 30-day time limit to file a petition for review of a collection due process determination is a nonjurisdictional deadline subject to equitable tolling.

     Result: Judgment REVERSED and case REMANDED.

     Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Barrett delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     For Petitioner: Melissa Arbus Sherry, Washington, D.C. For Respondent: Jonathan C. Bond, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.

     ]]>c83b68e5-c346-4030-826c-1ffbacad73b7Wed, 12 Jan 2022 09:00:00 -040001:07:12falsefull202130302021Oral Argument: Gallardo v. Marstiller | Case No. 20-1263 | Date Argued: 1/10/2022 | Date Decided: 6/6/2022Gallardo v. Marstiller | Case No. 20-1263 | Date Argued: 1/10/2022 | Date Decided: 6/6/2022

     Question Presented: Whether the federal Medicaid Act provides for a state Medicaid program to recover reimbursement for Medicaid's payment of a beneficiary's past medical expenses by taking funds from the portion of the beneficiary's tort recovery that compensates for future medical expenses.

     Holding: The Medicaid Act permits a State to seek reimbursement from settlement payments allocated for future medical care.

     Result: Adjudged to be AFFIRMED.

     Voting Breakdown: 7-1. Justice Thomas delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Alito, Kagan, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh and Barrett joined. Justice Sotomayor filed dissenting opinion in which, Justice Breyer joined.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     For Petitioner: Bryan S. Gowdy, Jacksonville, Fla.; and Vivek Suri, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. (for United States, as amicus curiae.) For Respondent: Henry C. Whitaker, Solicitor General, Tallahassee, Fla.

     ]]>Gallardo v. Marstiller | Case No. 20-1263 | Date Argued: 1/10/2022 | Date Decided: 6/6/2022

     Question Presented: Whether the federal Medicaid Act provides for a state Medicaid program to recover reimbursement for Medicaid's payment of a beneficiary's past medical expenses by taking funds from the portion of the beneficiary's tort recovery that compensates for future medical expenses.

     Holding: The Medicaid Act permits a State to seek reimbursement from settlement payments allocated for future medical care.

     Result: Adjudged to be AFFIRMED.

     Voting Breakdown: 7-1. Justice Thomas delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Alito, Kagan, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh and Barrett joined. Justice Sotomayor filed dissenting opinion in which, Justice Breyer joined.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     For Petitioner: Bryan S. Gowdy, Jacksonville, Fla.; and Vivek Suri, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. (for United States, as amicus curiae.) For Respondent: Henry C. Whitaker, Solicitor General, Tallahassee, Fla.

     ]]>eb55b086-47a4-4904-99b3-10982c23daeeMon, 10 Jan 2022 09:00:00 -040001:45:25falsefull202133332021Oral Argument: Shinn v. Ramirez | Case No. 20-1009 | Date Argued: 12/8/2021 | Date Decided: 5/23/2022Shinn v. Ramirez | Case No. 20-1009 | Date Argued: 12/8/2021 | Date Decided: 5/23/2022

     Question Presented: The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2), precludes a federal court from considering evidence outside the state-court record when reviewing the merits of a claim for habeas relief if a prisoner or his attorney has failed to diligently develop the claim's factual basis in state court, subject to only two statutory exceptions. In Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U.S. 1 (2012), this Court announced an equitable exception to the procedural default bar, holding that a prisoner may obtain federal habeas review of a defaulted claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel if post-conviction counsel was ineffective in failing to raise it. The Ninth Circuit has held that Martinez also requires an exception to § 2254(e)(2)'s prohibition on expansion of the state-court record in federal court. Does Martinez justify a federal habeas court's disregard of § 2254(e)(2)'s clear prohibition on expanding the state-court record?

     Holding: Under §2254(e)(2), a federal habeas court may not conduct an evidentiary hearing or otherwise consider evidence beyond the state-court record based on the ineffective assistance of state postconviction counsel.

     Result: Judgment REVERSED.

     Voting Breakdown: 6-3. Justice Thomas delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Alito, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh and Barrett joined. Justice Sotomayor filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Breyer and Kagan joined.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     For Petitioner: Brunn W. Roysden, III, Solicitor General, Phoenix, Ariz. For Respondents: Robert M. Loeb, Washington, D.C.

     ]]>Shinn v. Ramirez | Case No. 20-1009 | Date Argued: 12/8/2021 | Date Decided: 5/23/2022

     Question Presented: The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2), precludes a federal court from considering evidence outside the state-court record when reviewing the merits of a claim for habeas relief if a prisoner or his attorney has failed to diligently develop the claim's factual basis in state court, subject to only two statutory exceptions. In Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U.S. 1 (2012), this Court announced an equitable exception to the procedural default bar, holding that a prisoner may obtain federal habeas review of a defaulted claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel if post-conviction counsel was ineffective in failing to raise it. The Ninth Circuit has held that Martinez also requires an exception to § 2254(e)(2)'s prohibition on expansion of the state-court record in federal court. Does Martinez justify a federal habeas court's disregard of § 2254(e)(2)'s clear prohibition on expanding the state-court record?

     Holding: Under §2254(e)(2), a federal habeas court may not conduct an evidentiary hearing or otherwise consider evidence beyond the state-court record based on the ineffective assistance of state postconviction counsel.

     Result: Judgment REVERSED.

     Voting Breakdown: 6-3. Justice Thomas delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Alito, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh and Barrett joined. Justice Sotomayor filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Breyer and Kagan joined.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     For Petitioner: Brunn W. Roysden, III, Solicitor General, Phoenix, Ariz. For Respondents: Robert M. Loeb, Washington, D.C.

     ]]>a882a884-2c06-4caa-9334-35c30da0dc7eWed, 08 Dec 2021 09:00:00 -040054:05falsefull202489892024Oral Argument: Carson v. Makin | Case No. 20-1088 | Date Argued: 12/8/2021 | Date Decided: 6/21/2022Carson v. Makin | Case No. 20-1088 | Date Argued: 12/8/2021 | Date Decided: 6/21/2022

     Background: In Espinoza v. Montana Department of Revenue, 140 S. Ct. 2246 (2020), this Court held that a state cannot exclude families and schools from participating in a student-aid program because of a school's religious status. The Court expressly declined to address religious use—that is, whether a state may exclude families and schools based on what they plan to do with the money.

     Question Presented: Does a state violate the Religion Clauses or Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution by prohibiting students participating in an otherwise generally available student-aid program from choosing to use their aid to attend schools that provide religious, or "sectarian," instruction?

     Holding: Maine’s “nonsectarian” requirement for otherwise generally available tuition assistance payments violates the Free Exercise Clause.

     Result: Judgment REVERSED and case REMANDED.

     Voting Breakdown: 6-2. Chief Justice Roberts delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Justices Thomas, Alito, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh and Barrett joined. Justice Breyer filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Kagan joined and in which Justice Sotomayor joined as to all but Part IâB. Justice Sotomayor filed a dissenting opinion.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     For Petitioners: Michael Bindas, Seattle, Wash. For Respondent: Christopher C. Taub, Chief Deputy Attorney General, Augusta, Me.; and Malcolm L. Stewart, Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. (for United States, as amicus curiae.)

     ]]>Carson v. Makin | Case No. 20-1088 | Date Argued: 12/8/2021 | Date Decided: 6/21/2022

     Background: In Espinoza v. Montana Department of Revenue, 140 S. Ct. 2246 (2020), this Court held that a state cannot exclude families and schools from participating in a student-aid program because of a school's religious status. The Court expressly declined to address religious use—that is, whether a state may exclude families and schools based on what they plan to do with the money.

     Question Presented: Does a state violate the Religion Clauses or Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution by prohibiting students participating in an otherwise generally available student-aid program from choosing to use their aid to attend schools that provide religious, or "sectarian," instruction?

     Holding: Maine’s “nonsectarian” requirement for otherwise generally available tuition assistance payments violates the Free Exercise Clause.

     Result: Judgment REVERSED and case REMANDED.

     Voting Breakdown: 6-2. Chief Justice Roberts delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Justices Thomas, Alito, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh and Barrett joined. Justice Breyer filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Kagan joined and in which Justice Sotomayor joined as to all but Part IâB. Justice Sotomayor filed a dissenting opinion.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     For Petitioners: Michael Bindas, Seattle, Wash. For Respondent: Christopher C. Taub, Chief Deputy Attorney General, Augusta, Me.; and Malcolm L. Stewart, Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. (for United States, as amicus curiae.)

     ]]>41d97580-0a29-4bd4-a308-dccf6b026a96Wed, 08 Dec 2021 09:00:00 -040001:55:01falsefull202137372021Oral Argument: United States v. Taylor | Case No. 20-1459 | Date Argued: 12/7/2021 | Date Decided: 6/21/2022United States v. Taylor | Case No. 20-1459 | Date Argued: 12/7/2021 | Date Decided: 6/21/2022

     Question Presented: Whether 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(3)(A)'s definition of "crime of violence" excludes attempted Hobbs Act robbery, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1951(a).

     Holding: Attempted Hobbs Act robbery does not qualify as a “crime of violence” under §924(c)(3)(A) because no element of the offense requires proof that the defendant used, attempted to use, or threatened to use force.

     Result: Adjudged to be AFFIRMED.

     Voting Breakdown: 7-1. Justice Gorsuch delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Breyer, Sotomayor, Kagan, Kavanaugh and Barrett joined. Justice Thomas and Justice Alito filed dissenting opinions.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     For Petitioner: Rebecca Taibleson, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. For Respondent: Michael R. Dreeben, Washington, D.C.

     ]]>United States v. Taylor | Case No. 20-1459 | Date Argued: 12/7/2021 | Date Decided: 6/21/2022

     Question Presented: Whether 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(3)(A)'s definition of "crime of violence" excludes attempted Hobbs Act robbery, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1951(a).

     Holding: Attempted Hobbs Act robbery does not qualify as a “crime of violence” under §924(c)(3)(A) because no element of the offense requires proof that the defendant used, attempted to use, or threatened to use force.

     Result: Adjudged to be AFFIRMED.

     Voting Breakdown: 7-1. Justice Gorsuch delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Breyer, Sotomayor, Kagan, Kavanaugh and Barrett joined. Justice Thomas and Justice Alito filed dissenting opinions.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     For Petitioner: Rebecca Taibleson, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. For Respondent: Michael R. Dreeben, Washington, D.C.

     ]]>8335e949-a39b-4410-925c-205672ed5cb0Tue, 07 Dec 2021 09:00:00 -040001:26:26falsefull202138382021Oral Argument: Hughes v. Northwestern University | Case No. 19-1401 | Date Argued: 12/6/2021 | Date Decided: 1/24/2022Hughes v. Northwestern University | Case No. 19-1401 | Date Argued: 12/6/2021 | Date Decided: 1/24/2022

     Background: Under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA"), 29 U.S.C. § 1104, a plan fiduciary must discharge its duties "with the care, skill, prudence, and diligence" that a prudent person "acting in a like capacity and familiar with such matters" would use. 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(B). Petitioners filed a class action alleging that respondents violated their duty of prudence by: (1) failing to monitor and control recordkeeping fees, resulting in unreasonably high costs to plan participants; (2) offering retail class mutual funds with higher fees than those charged by otherwise identical share classes of the same funds; and (3) offering options with unnecessary fees when other options with lower costs and identical investment guarantees were available to the plan fiduciaries.

     Question Presented: Whether allegations that a defined-contribution retirement plan paid or charged its participants fees that substantially exceeded fees for alternative available investment products or services are sufficient to state a claim against plan fiduciaries for breach of the duty of prudence under ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(B).

     Holding: The Seventh Circuit erred in relying on the participants’ ultimate choice over their investments to excuse allegedly imprudent decisions by respondents. Determining whether petitioners state plausible claims against plan fiduciaries for violations of ERISA’s duty of prudence requires a context-specific inquiry of the fiduciaries’ continuing duty to monitor investments and to remove imprudent ones as articulated in Tibble v. Edison Int’l, 575 U. S. 523. Tibble concerned allegations that plan fiduciaries had offered “higher priced retail-class mutual funds as Plan investments when materially identical lower priced institutional-class mutual funds were available.” Id., at 525–526. The Tibble Court concluded that the plaintiffs had identified a potential violation with respect to certain funds because “a fiduciary is required to conduct a regular review of its investment.” Id., at 528. Tibble’s discussion of the continuing duty to monitor plan investments applies here. Petitioners allege that respondents’ failure to monitor investments prudently—by retaining recordkeepers that charged excessive fees, offering options likely to confuse investors, and neglecting to provide cheaper and otherwise-identical alternative investments—resulted in respondents failing to remove imprudent investments from the menu of investment offerings. In rejecting petitioners’ allegations, the Seventh Circuit did not apply Tibble’s guidance but instead erroneously focused on another component of the duty of prudence: a fiduciary’s obligation to assemble a diverse menu of options. But respondents’ provision of an adequate array of investment choices, including the lower cost investments plaintiffs wanted, does not excuse their allegedly imprudent decisions. Even in a defined-contribution plan where participants choose their investments, Tibble instructs that plan fiduciaries must conduct their own independent evaluation to determine which investments may be prudently included in the plan’s menu of options. See id., at 529–530. If the fiduciaries fail to remove an imprudent investment from the plan within a reasonable time, they breach their duty. The Seventh Circuit’s exclusive focus on investor choice elided this aspect of the duty of prudence. The court maintained the same mistaken focus in rejecting petitioners’ claims with respect to recordkeeping fees on the grounds that plan participants could have chosen investment options with lower expenses. The Court vacates the judgment below so that the Seventh Circuit may reevaluate the allegations as a whole, considering whether petitioners have plausibly alleged a violation of the duty of prudence as articulated in Tibble under applicable pleading standards. The content of the duty of prudence turns on “the circumstances . . . prevailing” at the time the fiduciary acts, 29 U. S. C. §1104(a)(1)(B), so the appropriate inquiry will be context specific. Fifth Third Bancorp v. Dudenhoeffer, 573 U. S. 409, 425.

     Result: Judgment VACATED and case REMANDED.

     Voting Breakdown: 8-0. Justice Sotomayor delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Justice Barrett, took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     For Petitioners: David C. Frederick, Washington, D.C.; and Michael R. Huston, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. (for United States, as amicus curiae.) For Respondents: Gregory G. Garre, Washington, D.C.

     ]]>Hughes v. Northwestern University | Case No. 19-1401 | Date Argued: 12/6/2021 | Date Decided: 1/24/2022

     Background: Under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA"), 29 U.S.C. § 1104, a plan fiduciary must discharge its duties "with the care, skill, prudence, and diligence" that a prudent person "acting in a like capacity and familiar with such matters" would use. 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(B). Petitioners filed a class action alleging that respondents violated their duty of prudence by: (1) failing to monitor and control recordkeeping fees, resulting in unreasonably high costs to plan participants; (2) offering retail class mutual funds with higher fees than those charged by otherwise identical share classes of the same funds; and (3) offering options with unnecessary fees when other options with lower costs and identical investment guarantees were available to the plan fiduciaries.

     Question Presented: Whether allegations that a defined-contribution retirement plan paid or charged its participants fees that substantially exceeded fees for alternative available investment products or services are sufficient to state a claim against plan fiduciaries for breach of the duty of prudence under ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(B).

     Holding: The Seventh Circuit erred in relying on the participants’ ultimate choice over their investments to excuse allegedly imprudent decisions by respondents. Determining whether petitioners state plausible claims against plan fiduciaries for violations of ERISA’s duty of prudence requires a context-specific inquiry of the fiduciaries’ continuing duty to monitor investments and to remove imprudent ones as articulated in Tibble v. Edison Int’l, 575 U. S. 523. Tibble concerned allegations that plan fiduciaries had offered “higher priced retail-class mutual funds as Plan investments when materially identical lower priced institutional-class mutual funds were available.” Id., at 525–526. The Tibble Court concluded that the plaintiffs had identified a potential violation with respect to certain funds because “a fiduciary is required to conduct a regular review of its investment.” Id., at 528. Tibble’s discussion of the continuing duty to monitor plan investments applies here. Petitioners allege that respondents’ failure to monitor investments prudently—by retaining recordkeepers that charged excessive fees, offering options likely to confuse investors, and neglecting to provide cheaper and otherwise-identical alternative investments—resulted in respondents failing to remove imprudent investments from the menu of investment offerings. In rejecting petitioners’ allegations, the Seventh Circuit did not apply Tibble’s guidance but instead erroneously focused on another component of the duty of prudence: a fiduciary’s obligation to assemble a diverse menu of options. But respondents’ provision of an adequate array of investment choices, including the lower cost investments plaintiffs wanted, does not excuse their allegedly imprudent decisions. Even in a defined-contribution plan where participants choose their investments, Tibble instructs that plan fiduciaries must conduct their own independent evaluation to determine which investments may be prudently included in the plan’s menu of options. See id., at 529–530. If the fiduciaries fail to remove an imprudent investment from the plan within a reasonable time, they breach their duty. The Seventh Circuit’s exclusive focus on investor choice elided this aspect of the duty of prudence. The court maintained the same mistaken focus in rejecting petitioners’ claims with respect to recordkeeping fees on the grounds that plan participants could have chosen investment options with lower expenses. The Court vacates the judgment below so that the Seventh Circuit may reevaluate the allegations as a whole, considering whether petitioners have plausibly alleged a violation of the duty of prudence as articulated in Tibble under applicable pleading standards. The content of the duty of prudence turns on “the circumstances . . . prevailing” at the time the fiduciary acts, 29 U. S. C. §1104(a)(1)(B), so the appropriate inquiry will be context specific. Fifth Third Bancorp v. Dudenhoeffer, 573 U. S. 409, 425.

     Result: Judgment VACATED and case REMANDED.

     Voting Breakdown: 8-0. Justice Sotomayor delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Justice Barrett, took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     For Petitioners: David C. Frederick, Washington, D.C.; and Michael R. Huston, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. (for United States, as amicus curiae.) For Respondents: Gregory G. Garre, Washington, D.C.

     ]]>c3cc610a-9755-4e1a-82da-1aaf361779ebMon, 06 Dec 2021 09:00:00 -040001:30:48falsefull202139392021Oral Argument: Dobbs v. Jackson Women's Health | Case No. 19-1392 | Date Argued: 12/1/2021 | Date Decided: 6/24/2022Dobbs v. Jackson Women's Health | Case No. 19-1392 | Date Argued: 12/1/2021 | Date Decided: 6/24/2022

     Question Presented: Whether all pre-viability prohibitions on elective abortions are unconstitutional. Whether the validity of a pre-viability law that protects women's health, the dignity of unborn children, and the integrity of the medical profession and society should be analyzed under Casey's "undue burden" standard or Hellerstedt's balancing of benefits and burdens. Whether abortion providers have third-party standing to invalidate a law that protects women from the dangers of late-term abortions by restricting inhumane dismemberment abortions.

     Holding: The Constitution does not confer a right to abortion; Roe and Casey are overruled; and the authority to regulate abortion is returned to the people and their elected representatives.

     Result: Judgment REVERSED and case REMANDED.

     Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Alito delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Justices Thomas, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh and Barrett joined. Justice Thomas and Justice Kavanaugh filed concurring opinions. Chief Justice Roberts filed an opinion concurring in the judgment. Justices Breyer, Sotomayor and Kagan, filed

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     For Petitioners: Scott G. Stewart, Solicitor General, Jackson, Miss. For Respondents: Julie Rikelman, New York, N.Y.; and Elizabeth B. Prelogar, Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. (for United States, as amicus curiae.)

     ]]>Dobbs v. Jackson Women's Health | Case No. 19-1392 | Date Argued: 12/1/2021 | Date Decided: 6/24/2022

     Question Presented: Whether all pre-viability prohibitions on elective abortions are unconstitutional. Whether the validity of a pre-viability law that protects women's health, the dignity of unborn children, and the integrity of the medical profession and society should be analyzed under Casey's "undue burden" standard or Hellerstedt's balancing of benefits and burdens. Whether abortion providers have third-party standing to invalidate a law that protects women from the dangers of late-term abortions by restricting inhumane dismemberment abortions.

     Holding: The Constitution does not confer a right to abortion; Roe and Casey are overruled; and the authority to regulate abortion is returned to the people and their elected representatives.

     Result: Judgment REVERSED and case REMANDED.

     Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Alito delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Justices Thomas, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh and Barrett joined. Justice Thomas and Justice Kavanaugh filed concurring opinions. Chief Justice Roberts filed an opinion concurring in the judgment. Justices Breyer, Sotomayor and Kagan, filed

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     For Petitioners: Scott G. Stewart, Solicitor General, Jackson, Miss. For Respondents: Julie Rikelman, New York, N.Y.; and Elizabeth B. Prelogar, Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. (for United States, as amicus curiae.)

     ]]>a742cafb-dd91-438a-8476-8a6c85fd3a3eWed, 01 Dec 2021 09:00:00 -040001:53:02falsefull202141412021Oral Argument: Cummings v. Premier Rehab | Case No. 20-219 | Date Argued: 11/30/2021 | Date Decided: 4/28/2022Cummings v. Premier Rehab | Case No. 20-219 | Date Argued: 11/30/2021 | Date Decided: 4/28/2022

     Background: Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits recipients of federal funds from discriminating based on race, color, or national origin, and provides that victims of discrimination may recover compensatory damages for intentional violations. This Court has interpreted Title VI's implied private right of action as providing victims of intentional discrimination compensatory, but not punitive, damages. Congress has expressly incorporated Title VI's remedial scheme into other statutes that prohibit recipients of federal funds from discriminating on other grounds, including disability.

     Question Presented: Whether the compensatory damages available under Title VI and the statutes that incorporate its remedial scheme include compensation for emotional distress.

     Holding: Emotional distress damages are not recoverable in a private action to enforce either the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 or the Affordable Care Act.

     Result: Adjudged to be AFFIRMED.

     Voting Breakdown: 6-3. Chief Justice Roberts delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Justices Thomas, Alito, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh and Barrett joined. Justice Kavanaugh filed a concurring opinion, in which Justice Gorsuch joined. Justice Breyer filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Sotomayor and Kagan joined.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     For Petitioner: Andrew Rozynski, New York, N.Y.; and Colleen R. Sinzdak, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. (for United States, as amicus curiae.) For Respondent: Kannon K. Shanmugam, Washington, D.C.

     ]]>Cummings v. Premier Rehab | Case No. 20-219 | Date Argued: 11/30/2021 | Date Decided: 4/28/2022

     Background: Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits recipients of federal funds from discriminating based on race, color, or national origin, and provides that victims of discrimination may recover compensatory damages for intentional violations. This Court has interpreted Title VI's implied private right of action as providing victims of intentional discrimination compensatory, but not punitive, damages. Congress has expressly incorporated Title VI's remedial scheme into other statutes that prohibit recipients of federal funds from discriminating on other grounds, including disability.

     Question Presented: Whether the compensatory damages available under Title VI and the statutes that incorporate its remedial scheme include compensation for emotional distress.

     Holding: Emotional distress damages are not recoverable in a private action to enforce either the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 or the Affordable Care Act.

     Result: Adjudged to be AFFIRMED.

     Voting Breakdown: 6-3. Chief Justice Roberts delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Justices Thomas, Alito, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh and Barrett joined. Justice Kavanaugh filed a concurring opinion, in which Justice Gorsuch joined. Justice Breyer filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Sotomayor and Kagan joined.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     For Petitioner: Andrew Rozynski, New York, N.Y.; and Colleen R. Sinzdak, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. (for United States, as amicus curiae.) For Respondent: Kannon K. Shanmugam, Washington, D.C.

     ]]>ddb09f86-61cb-4b2f-9a4e-ba06b98e86f4Tue, 30 Nov 2021 09:00:00 -040001:20:17falsefull202143432021Oral Argument: American Hospital Assn. v. Becerra | Case No. 20-1114 | Date Argued: 11/30/2021 | Date Decided: 6/15/2022American Hospital Assn. v. Becerra | Case No. 20-1114 | Date Argued: 11/30/2021 | Date Decided: 6/15/2022

     Question Presented: Whether Chevron deference permits HHS to set reimbursement rates based on acquisition cost and vary such rates by hospital group if it has not collected hospital acquisition cost survey data. Whether petitioners' suit challenging HHS's adjustments is precluded by 42 U.S.C. § 1395l(t)(12), which bars judicial review of "the development of the [outpatient prospective payment] classification system," "the establishment of" various groups of outpatient services, and "adjustments" pursuant to certain provisions of the statute.

     Holding: 1. The statute does not preclude judicial review of HHS’s reimbursement rates. Judicial review of final agency action is traditionally available unless “a statute’s language or structure” precludes it, Mach Mining, LLC v. EEOC, 575 U. S. 480, 486, and this Court has long recognized a “strong presumption” in its favor, Weyerhaeuser Co. v. United States Fish and Wildlife Serv., 586 U. S. ___, ___. Here, no provision in the Medicare statute precludes judicial review of the 2018 and 2019 reimbursement rates. HHS cites two nearby provisions that preclude review of the general payment methodology that HHS employs to set rates for other Medicare outpatient services. See §§1395l(t)(12)(A), (C). But HHS sets rates for outpatient prescription drugs using a different payment methodology. HHS also argues that other statutory requirements would make allowing judicial review of the 2018 and 2019 reimbursement rates impractical. Regardless, such arguments cannot override the text of the statute and the traditional presumption in favor of judicial review of administrative action.

     Result: Judgment REVERSED and case REMANDED.

     Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Kavanaugh delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     For Petitioners: Donald B. Verrilli, Jr., Washington, D.C. For Respondents: Christopher G. Michel, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.

     ]]>American Hospital Assn. v. Becerra | Case No. 20-1114 | Date Argued: 11/30/2021 | Date Decided: 6/15/2022

     Question Presented: Whether Chevron deference permits HHS to set reimbursement rates based on acquisition cost and vary such rates by hospital group if it has not collected hospital acquisition cost survey data. Whether petitioners' suit challenging HHS's adjustments is precluded by 42 U.S.C. § 1395l(t)(12), which bars judicial review of "the development of the [outpatient prospective payment] classification system," "the establishment of" various groups of outpatient services, and "adjustments" pursuant to certain provisions of the statute.

     Holding: 1. The statute does not preclude judicial review of HHS’s reimbursement rates. Judicial review of final agency action is traditionally available unless “a statute’s language or structure” precludes it, Mach Mining, LLC v. EEOC, 575 U. S. 480, 486, and this Court has long recognized a “strong presumption” in its favor, Weyerhaeuser Co. v. United States Fish and Wildlife Serv., 586 U. S. ___, ___. Here, no provision in the Medicare statute precludes judicial review of the 2018 and 2019 reimbursement rates. HHS cites two nearby provisions that preclude review of the general payment methodology that HHS employs to set rates for other Medicare outpatient services. See §§1395l(t)(12)(A), (C). But HHS sets rates for outpatient prescription drugs using a different payment methodology. HHS also argues that other statutory requirements would make allowing judicial review of the 2018 and 2019 reimbursement rates impractical. Regardless, such arguments cannot override the text of the statute and the traditional presumption in favor of judicial review of administrative action.

     Result: Judgment REVERSED and case REMANDED.

     Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Kavanaugh delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     For Petitioners: Donald B. Verrilli, Jr., Washington, D.C. For Respondents: Christopher G. Michel, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.

     ]]>ea4f09e4-f9d1-4747-ad0f-1d5d9768e3bdTue, 30 Nov 2021 09:00:00 -040001:13:08falsefull202142422021Oral Argument: Becerra v. Empire Health Foundation | Case No. 20-1312 | Date Argued: 11/29/2021 | Date Decided: 6/24/2022Becerra v. Empire Health Foundation | Case No. 20-1312 | Date Argued: 11/29/2021 | Date Decided: 6/24/2022

     Background: The Medicare statute provides that a hospital that serves a "significantly disproportionate number of low-income patients" is entitled to an upward adjustment in the rate at which the federal government reimburses the hospital for services provided to Medicare patients. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395ww(d)(5)(F)(i)(I), (ii). That adjustment-known as a "disproportionate share hospital" (DSH) adjustment-requires a determination of the percentage of the hospital's patients who are eligible for Medicaid, the low-income healthcare program.

     Question Presented: Whether the Secretary has permissibly included in a hospital's Medicare fraction all of the hospital's patient days of individuals who satisfy the requirements to be entitled to Medicare Part A benefits, regardless of whether Medicare actually paid the hospital for those particular days.

     Holding: In calculating the Medicare fraction, individuals “entitled to [Medicare Part A] benefits” are all those qualifying for the program, regardless of whether they receive Medicare payments for part or all of a hospital stay.

     Result: Judgment REVERSED and case REMANDED.

     Voting Breakdown: 5-4. Justice Kagan delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Justices Thomas, Breyer, Sotomayor and Barrett joined. Justice Kavanaugh filed a dissenting opinion, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Alito and Gorsuch joined.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     For Petitioner: Jonathan C. Bond, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. For Respondent: Daniel J. Hettich, Washington, D.C.

     ]]>Becerra v. Empire Health Foundation | Case No. 20-1312 | Date Argued: 11/29/2021 | Date Decided: 6/24/2022

     Background: The Medicare statute provides that a hospital that serves a "significantly disproportionate number of low-income patients" is entitled to an upward adjustment in the rate at which the federal government reimburses the hospital for services provided to Medicare patients. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395ww(d)(5)(F)(i)(I), (ii). That adjustment-known as a "disproportionate share hospital" (DSH) adjustment-requires a determination of the percentage of the hospital's patients who are eligible for Medicaid, the low-income healthcare program.

     Question Presented: Whether the Secretary has permissibly included in a hospital's Medicare fraction all of the hospital's patient days of individuals who satisfy the requirements to be entitled to Medicare Part A benefits, regardless of whether Medicare actually paid the hospital for those particular days.

     Holding: In calculating the Medicare fraction, individuals “entitled to [Medicare Part A] benefits” are all those qualifying for the program, regardless of whether they receive Medicare payments for part or all of a hospital stay.

     Result: Judgment REVERSED and case REMANDED.

     Voting Breakdown: 5-4. Justice Kagan delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Justices Thomas, Breyer, Sotomayor and Barrett joined. Justice Kavanaugh filed a dissenting opinion, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Alito and Gorsuch joined.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     For Petitioner: Jonathan C. Bond, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. For Respondent: Daniel J. Hettich, Washington, D.C.

     ]]>643fcbcb-e298-44dc-bd41-9a3060abe4d6Mon, 29 Nov 2021 09:00:00 -040001:09:18falsefull202144442021Oral Argument: Austin v. Reagan National Advertising | Case No. 20-1029 | Date Argued: 11/10/2021 | Date Decided: 4/21/2022Austin v. Reagan National Advertising | Case No. 20-1029 | Date Argued: 11/10/2021 | Date Decided: 4/21/2022

     Background: Austin sign code provisions distinguish between on-premise and off-premise signs based solely on location—specifically, whether a sign is located at the same location as the business, person, activity, goods, products, or services being advertised. In Reed v. Town of Gilbert, this Court held that, because the Gilbert sign code "single[d] out specific subject matter for differential treatment," it was content-based regardless of the government's purpose. 576 U.S. 155, 169 (2015).

     Question Presented: Is the city code's distinction between on- and off-premise signs a facially unconstitutional content-based regulation under Reed v. Town of Gilbert?

     Holding: The City’s on-/off-premises distinction is facially content neutral under the First Amendment.

     Result: Judgment REVERSED and case REMANDED.

     Voting Breakdown: 6-3. Justice Sotomayor delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Breyer, Kagan and Kavanaugh joined. Justice Breyer filed a concurring opinion. Justice Alito filed an opinion concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part. Justice Thomas filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Gorsuch and Barrett joined.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     For Petitioner: Michael R. Dreeben, Washington, D.C.; and Benjamin Snyder, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. (for United States, as amicus curiae.) For Respondents: Kannon K. Shanmugam, Washington, D.C.

     ]]>Austin v. Reagan National Advertising | Case No. 20-1029 | Date Argued: 11/10/2021 | Date Decided: 4/21/2022

     Background: Austin sign code provisions distinguish between on-premise and off-premise signs based solely on location—specifically, whether a sign is located at the same location as the business, person, activity, goods, products, or services being advertised. In Reed v. Town of Gilbert, this Court held that, because the Gilbert sign code "single[d] out specific subject matter for differential treatment," it was content-based regardless of the government's purpose. 576 U.S. 155, 169 (2015).

     Question Presented: Is the city code's distinction between on- and off-premise signs a facially unconstitutional content-based regulation under Reed v. Town of Gilbert?

     Holding: The City’s on-/off-premises distinction is facially content neutral under the First Amendment.

     Result: Judgment REVERSED and case REMANDED.

     Voting Breakdown: 6-3. Justice Sotomayor delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Breyer, Kagan and Kavanaugh joined. Justice Breyer filed a concurring opinion. Justice Alito filed an opinion concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part. Justice Thomas filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Gorsuch and Barrett joined.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     For Petitioner: Michael R. Dreeben, Washington, D.C.; and Benjamin Snyder, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. (for United States, as amicus curiae.) For Respondents: Kannon K. Shanmugam, Washington, D.C.

     ]]>11e70c6a-2d26-462b-b0d9-cacf9dda9956Wed, 10 Nov 2021 09:00:00 -040001:37:26falsefull202145452021Oral Argument: United States v. Vaello-Madero | Case No. 20-303 | Date Argued: 11/9/2021 | Date Decided: 4/21/2022United States v. Vaello-Madero | Case No. 20-303 | Date Argued: 11/9/2021 | Date Decided: 4/21/2022

     Question Presented: Whether Congress violated the equal-protection component of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment by establishing Supplemental Security Income—a program that provides benefits to needy aged, blind, and disabled individuals—in the 50 States and the District of Columbia, and in the Northern Mariana Islands pursuant to a negotiated covenant, but not extending it to Puerto Rico.

     Holding: The Constitution does not require Congress to extend SSI benefits to residents of Puerto Rico. In Califano v. Torres, 435 U. S. 1, and Harris v. Rosario, 446 U. S. 651, the Court applied the deferential rational-basis test to uphold Congress’s decision not to extend certain federal benefits to Puerto Rico, noting that because Congress chose to treat residents of Puerto Rico differently from residents of the States for purposes of tax laws, it could do the same for benefits programs. Those two precedents dictate the result here. Congress’s decision to exempt Puerto Rico’s residents from most federal income, gift, estate, and excise taxes supplies a rational basis for likewise distinguishing residents of Puerto Rico from residents of the States for purposes of the SSI benefits program. Vaello Madero’s contrary position would usher in potentially far-reaching consequences, with serious implications for the Puerto Rican people and the Puerto Rican economy. The Constitution does not require that extreme outcome.

     Result: Judgment REVERSED.

     Voting Breakdown: 8-1. Justice Kavanaugh delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Breyer, Alito, Kagan, Gorsuch and Barrett joined. Justice Thomas and Justice Gorsuch filed concurring opinions. Justice Sotomayor filed a dissenting opinion.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     For Petitioner: Curtis E. Gannon, Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. For Respondent: Hermann Ferre, New York, N.Y.

     ]]>United States v. Vaello-Madero | Case No. 20-303 | Date Argued: 11/9/2021 | Date Decided: 4/21/2022

     Question Presented: Whether Congress violated the equal-protection component of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment by establishing Supplemental Security Income—a program that provides benefits to needy aged, blind, and disabled individuals—in the 50 States and the District of Columbia, and in the Northern Mariana Islands pursuant to a negotiated covenant, but not extending it to Puerto Rico.

     Holding: The Constitution does not require Congress to extend SSI benefits to residents of Puerto Rico. In Califano v. Torres, 435 U. S. 1, and Harris v. Rosario, 446 U. S. 651, the Court applied the deferential rational-basis test to uphold Congress’s decision not to extend certain federal benefits to Puerto Rico, noting that because Congress chose to treat residents of Puerto Rico differently from residents of the States for purposes of tax laws, it could do the same for benefits programs. Those two precedents dictate the result here. Congress’s decision to exempt Puerto Rico’s residents from most federal income, gift, estate, and excise taxes supplies a rational basis for likewise distinguishing residents of Puerto Rico from residents of the States for purposes of the SSI benefits program. Vaello Madero’s contrary position would usher in potentially far-reaching consequences, with serious implications for the Puerto Rican people and the Puerto Rican economy. The Constitution does not require that extreme outcome.

     Result: Judgment REVERSED.

     Voting Breakdown: 8-1. Justice Kavanaugh delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Breyer, Alito, Kagan, Gorsuch and Barrett joined. Justice Thomas and Justice Gorsuch filed concurring opinions. Justice Sotomayor filed a dissenting opinion.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     For Petitioner: Curtis E. Gannon, Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. For Respondent: Hermann Ferre, New York, N.Y.

     ]]>d574868f-8931-4a53-bb9f-713f7444c348Tue, 09 Nov 2021 09:00:00 -040001:12:45falsefull202147472021Oral Argument: Ramirez v. Collier | Case No. 21-5592 | Date Argued: 11/9/2021 | Date Decided: 3/24/2022Ramirez v. Collier | Case No. 21-5592 | Date Argued: 11/9/2021 | Date Decided: 3/24/2022

     Question Presented: Under the Free Exercise Clause and Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act ("RLUIPA"), if a prisoner requests a religious accommodation that the state rejects, must the prisoner prove that the state has substantially burdened his religious exercise, or does the state need to prove that its denial of the religious accommodation satisfies strict scrutiny?

     Holding: Ramirez is likely to succeed on his RLUIPA claims because Texas’s restrictions on religious touch and audible prayer in the execution chamber burden religious exercise and are not the least restrictive means of furthering the State’s compelling interests.

     Result: Judgment REVERSED and case REMANDED.

     Voting Breakdown: 8-1. Chief Justice Roberts delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Justices Breyer, Alito, Sotomayor, Kagan, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh and Barrett joined. Justice Sotomayor and Justice Kavanaugh filed concurring opinions. Justice Thomas filed a dissenting opinion.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     For Petitioner: Seth Kretzer, Houston, Tex. For United States, as amicus curiae: Eric J. Feigin, Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. For Respondents: Judd E. Stone, II, Solicitor General, Austin, Tex.

     ]]>Ramirez v. Collier | Case No. 21-5592 | Date Argued: 11/9/2021 | Date Decided: 3/24/2022

     Question Presented: Under the Free Exercise Clause and Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act ("RLUIPA"), if a prisoner requests a religious accommodation that the state rejects, must the prisoner prove that the state has substantially burdened his religious exercise, or does the state need to prove that its denial of the religious accommodation satisfies strict scrutiny?

     Holding: Ramirez is likely to succeed on his RLUIPA claims because Texas’s restrictions on religious touch and audible prayer in the execution chamber burden religious exercise and are not the least restrictive means of furthering the State’s compelling interests.

     Result: Judgment REVERSED and case REMANDED.

     Voting Breakdown: 8-1. Chief Justice Roberts delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Justices Breyer, Alito, Sotomayor, Kagan, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh and Barrett joined. Justice Sotomayor and Justice Kavanaugh filed concurring opinions. Justice Thomas filed a dissenting opinion.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     For Petitioner: Seth Kretzer, Houston, Tex. For United States, as amicus curiae: Eric J. Feigin, Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. For Respondents: Judd E. Stone, II, Solicitor General, Austin, Tex.

     ]]>d1f2d80c-1d9d-4832-8ac7-20fa535330efTue, 09 Nov 2021 09:00:00 -040001:37:36falsefull202146462021Oral Argument: FBI v. Fazaga | Case No. 20-828 | Date Argued: 11/8/2021 | Date Decided: 3/4/2022FBI v. Fazaga | Case No. 20-828 | Date Argued: 11/8/2021 | Date Decided: 3/4/2022

     Background: Section 1806 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (FISA), 50 U.S.C. 1801 et seq., governs the "[u]se of information" obtained or derived from electronic surveillance conducted under FSIA. Section 1806(c) requires the government to notify a person of its intent to use or disclose such information against that person in a judicial or administrative proceeding in specified circumstances.

     Question Presented: Whether Section 1806(f) displaces the state-secrets privilege and authorizes a district court to resolve, in camera and ex parte, the merits of a lawsuit challenging the lawfulness of government surveillance by considering the privileged evidence.

     Holding: Section 1806(f) does not displace the state secrets privilege.

     Result: Judgment REVERSED and case REMANDED.

     Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Alito delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     For Petitioners: Edwin S. Kneedler, Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. For Agent Respondents: Catherine M.A. Carroll, Washington, D.C. For Respondents Fazaga, et al.: Ahilan T. Arulanantham, Los Angeles, Cal.

     ]]>FBI v. Fazaga | Case No. 20-828 | Date Argued: 11/8/2021 | Date Decided: 3/4/2022

     Background: Section 1806 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (FISA), 50 U.S.C. 1801 et seq., governs the "[u]se of information" obtained or derived from electronic surveillance conducted under FSIA. Section 1806(c) requires the government to notify a person of its intent to use or disclose such information against that person in a judicial or administrative proceeding in specified circumstances.

     Question Presented: Whether Section 1806(f) displaces the state-secrets privilege and authorizes a district court to resolve, in camera and ex parte, the merits of a lawsuit challenging the lawfulness of government surveillance by considering the privileged evidence.

     Holding: Section 1806(f) does not displace the state secrets privilege.

     Result: Judgment REVERSED and case REMANDED.

     Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Alito delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     For Petitioners: Edwin S. Kneedler, Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. For Agent Respondents: Catherine M.A. Carroll, Washington, D.C. For Respondents Fazaga, et al.: Ahilan T. Arulanantham, Los Angeles, Cal.

     ]]>d6b49c67-0ea1-4955-a7f1-639c21f731dbMon, 08 Nov 2021 09:00:00 -040002:06:51falsefull202149492021Oral Argument: Unicolors, Inc. v. H&M Hennes & Mauritz, L.P. | Case No. 20-915 | Date Argued: 11/8/2021 | Date Decided: 2/24/2022Unicolors, Inc. v. H&M Hennes & Mauritz, L.P. | Case No. 20-915 | Date Argued: 11/8/2021 | Date Decided: 2/24/2022

     Question Presented: Did the Ninth Circuit err in breaking with its own prior precedent and the findings of other circuits and the Copyright Office in holding that 17 U.S.C. § 411 requires referral to the Copyright Office where there is no indicia of fraud or material error as to the work's registrability, but rather only good-faith mistakes in the registration application?

     Holding: Section 411(b) does not distinguish between a mistake of law and a mistake of fact; lack of either factual or legal knowledge can excuse an inaccuracy in a copyright registration under §411(b)(1)(A)’s safe harbor.

     Result: Judgment VACATED and case REMANDED.

     Voting Breakdown: 6-1. Justice Breyer delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Sotomayor, Kagan, Kavanaugh and Barrett joined. Justice Thomas filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Alito joined and in which Justice Gorsuch joined except as to Part II.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     For Petitioner: E. Joshua Rosenkranz, New York, N.Y.; and Melissa N. Patterson, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. (for United States, as amicus curiae.) For Respondent: Peter K. Stris, Los Angeles, Cal.

     ]]>Unicolors, Inc. v. H&M Hennes & Mauritz, L.P. | Case No. 20-915 | Date Argued: 11/8/2021 | Date Decided: 2/24/2022

     Question Presented: Did the Ninth Circuit err in breaking with its own prior precedent and the findings of other circuits and the Copyright Office in holding that 17 U.S.C. § 411 requires referral to the Copyright Office where there is no indicia of fraud or material error as to the work's registrability, but rather only good-faith mistakes in the registration application?

     Holding: Section 411(b) does not distinguish between a mistake of law and a mistake of fact; lack of either factual or legal knowledge can excuse an inaccuracy in a copyright registration under §411(b)(1)(A)’s safe harbor.

     Result: Judgment VACATED and case REMANDED.

     Voting Breakdown: 6-1. Justice Breyer delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Sotomayor, Kagan, Kavanaugh and Barrett joined. Justice Thomas filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Alito joined and in which Justice Gorsuch joined except as to Part II.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     For Petitioner: E. Joshua Rosenkranz, New York, N.Y.; and Melissa N. Patterson, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. (for United States, as amicus curiae.) For Respondent: Peter K. Stris, Los Angeles, Cal.

     ]]>e725c95a-de74-4014-9e7a-1835b600877dMon, 08 Nov 2021 09:00:00 -040001:18:11falsefull202148482021Oral Argument: New York State Rifle & Pistol Assn. v. Bruen | Case No. 20-843 | Date Argued: 11/3/2021 | Date Decided: 6/23/2022New York State Rifle & Pistol Assn. v. Bruen | Case No. 20-843 | Date Argued: 11/3/2021 | Date Decided: 6/23/2022

     Background: New York prohibits its ordinary law-abiding citizens from carrying a handgun outside the home without a license, and it denies licenses to every citizen who fails to convince the state that he or she has "proper cause" to carry a firearm. In District of Columbia v. Heller, this Court held that the Second Amendment protects "the individual right to possess and carry weapons in case of confrontation," 554 U.S. 570, 592 (2008), and in McDonald v. City of Chicago, the Court held that this right "is fully applicable to the States," 561 U.S. 742, 750 (2010).

     Question Presented: Whether the Second Amendment allows the government to prohibit ordinary law-abiding citizens from carrying handguns outside the home for self-defense.

     Holding: New York’s proper-cause requirement violates the Fourteenth Amendment by preventing law-abiding citizens with ordinary self-defense needs from exercising their Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms in public for self-defense.

     Result: Judgment REVERSED and case REMANDED.

     Voting Breakdown: 6-1. Justice Thomas delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Alito, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh and Barrett joined. Justice Alito filed a concurring opinion. Justice Kavanaugh filed a concurring opinion, in which Chief Justice Roberts joined. Justice Barrett filed a concurring opinion. Justice Breyer filed a dissenting opinion, in which Sotomayor and Kagan

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     For Petitioners: Paul D. Clement, Washington, D.C. For Respondents: Barbara D. Underwood, Solicitor General, New York, N.Y.; and Brian H. Fletcher, Principal Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. (for United States, as amicus curiae.)

     ]]>New York State Rifle & Pistol Assn. v. Bruen | Case No. 20-843 | Date Argued: 11/3/2021 | Date Decided: 6/23/2022

     Background: New York prohibits its ordinary law-abiding citizens from carrying a handgun outside the home without a license, and it denies licenses to every citizen who fails to convince the state that he or she has "proper cause" to carry a firearm. In District of Columbia v. Heller, this Court held that the Second Amendment protects "the individual right to possess and carry weapons in case of confrontation," 554 U.S. 570, 592 (2008), and in McDonald v. City of Chicago, the Court held that this right "is fully applicable to the States," 561 U.S. 742, 750 (2010).

     Question Presented: Whether the Second Amendment allows the government to prohibit ordinary law-abiding citizens from carrying handguns outside the home for self-defense.

     Holding: New York’s proper-cause requirement violates the Fourteenth Amendment by preventing law-abiding citizens with ordinary self-defense needs from exercising their Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms in public for self-defense.

     Result: Judgment REVERSED and case REMANDED.

     Voting Breakdown: 6-1. Justice Thomas delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Alito, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh and Barrett joined. Justice Alito filed a concurring opinion. Justice Kavanaugh filed a concurring opinion, in which Chief Justice Roberts joined. Justice Barrett filed a concurring opinion. Justice Breyer filed a dissenting opinion, in which Sotomayor and Kagan

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     For Petitioners: Paul D. Clement, Washington, D.C. For Respondents: Barbara D. Underwood, Solicitor General, New York, N.Y.; and Brian H. Fletcher, Principal Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. (for United States, as amicus curiae.)

     ]]>a302cecf-5e5b-4295-8cec-2c8ed18c2b61Wed, 03 Nov 2021 09:00:00 -040001:57:02falsefull202150502021Oral Argument: Houston Community College Sys. v. Wilson | Case No. 20-804 | Date Argued: 11/2/2021 | Date Decided: 3/24/2022Houston Community College Sys. v. Wilson | Case No. 20-804 | Date Argued: 11/2/2021 | Date Decided: 3/24/2022

     Question Presented: Does the First Amendment restrict the authority of an elected body to issue a censure resolution in response to a member's speech?

     Holding: Mr. Wilson does not possess an actionable First Amendment claim arising from the Board’s purely verbal censure.

     Result: Judgment REVERSED.

     Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Gorsuch delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     For Petitioner: Richard A. Morris, Houston, Tex.; and Sopan Joshi, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. (for United States, as amicus curiae.) For Respondent: MIchael B. Kimberly, Washington, D.C.

     ]]>Houston Community College Sys. v. Wilson | Case No. 20-804 | Date Argued: 11/2/2021 | Date Decided: 3/24/2022

     Question Presented: Does the First Amendment restrict the authority of an elected body to issue a censure resolution in response to a member's speech?

     Holding: Mr. Wilson does not possess an actionable First Amendment claim arising from the Board’s purely verbal censure.

     Result: Judgment REVERSED.

     Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Gorsuch delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     For Petitioner: Richard A. Morris, Houston, Tex.; and Sopan Joshi, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. (for United States, as amicus curiae.) For Respondent: MIchael B. Kimberly, Washington, D.C.

     ]]>cf825f23-a196-4a96-8956-8d8e4b9881d9Tue, 02 Nov 2021 09:00:00 -040001:25:28falsefull202152522021Oral Argument: Badgerow v. Walters | Case No. 20-1143 | Date Argued: 11/2/2021 | Date Decided: 3/31/2022Badgerow v. Walters | Case No. 20-1143 | Date Argued: 11/2/2021 | Date Decided: 3/31/2022

     Background: This case presents a clear and intractable conflict regarding an important jurisdictional question under the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA). When parties to an arbitration seek to confirm, vacate, or modify their award under Sections 9, 10, and 11 of the FAA, those provisions do not themselves create federal jurisdiction. Instead, there must be an independent jurisdictional basis for federal courts to act. This Court has established that there is no "look through" jurisdiction under Section 10 of the FAA absent complete diversity between the parties. But the circuits are hopelessly split on whether there is "look through" jurisdiction under Section 10 for federal question cases. This case asks a straightforward question: Does the "look through" approach to federal jurisdiction apply to requests to confirm or vacate arbitration awards under Sections 9 and 10 of the FAA?

     Question Presented: Whether federal courts have subject-matter jurisdiction to confirm or vacate an arbitration award under Sections 9 and 10 of the Federal Arbitration Act when the only basis for jurisdiction is that the underlying dispute involved a federal question.

     Holding: Vaden’s “look-through” approach to determining federal jurisdiction does not apply to requests to confirm or vacate arbitral awards under Sections 9 and 10 of the FAA.

     Result: Judgment REVERSED and case REMANDED.

     Voting Breakdown: 8-1. Justice Kagan delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Alito, Sotomayor, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh and Barrett joined. Justice Breyer filed a dissenting opinion.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     For Petitioner: Daniel L. Geyser, Dallas, Tex. For Respondents: Lisa S. Blatt, Washington, D.C.

     ]]>Badgerow v. Walters | Case No. 20-1143 | Date Argued: 11/2/2021 | Date Decided: 3/31/2022

     Background: This case presents a clear and intractable conflict regarding an important jurisdictional question under the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA). When parties to an arbitration seek to confirm, vacate, or modify their award under Sections 9, 10, and 11 of the FAA, those provisions do not themselves create federal jurisdiction. Instead, there must be an independent jurisdictional basis for federal courts to act. This Court has established that there is no "look through" jurisdiction under Section 10 of the FAA absent complete diversity between the parties. But the circuits are hopelessly split on whether there is "look through" jurisdiction under Section 10 for federal question cases. This case asks a straightforward question: Does the "look through" approach to federal jurisdiction apply to requests to confirm or vacate arbitration awards under Sections 9 and 10 of the FAA?

     Question Presented: Whether federal courts have subject-matter jurisdiction to confirm or vacate an arbitration award under Sections 9 and 10 of the Federal Arbitration Act when the only basis for jurisdiction is that the underlying dispute involved a federal question.

     Holding: Vaden’s “look-through” approach to determining federal jurisdiction does not apply to requests to confirm or vacate arbitral awards under Sections 9 and 10 of the FAA.

     Result: Judgment REVERSED and case REMANDED.

     Voting Breakdown: 8-1. Justice Kagan delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Alito, Sotomayor, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh and Barrett joined. Justice Breyer filed a dissenting opinion.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     For Petitioner: Daniel L. Geyser, Dallas, Tex. For Respondents: Lisa S. Blatt, Washington, D.C.

     ]]>6111fd67-eb0a-4bf3-8cc3-402ec92267beTue, 02 Nov 2021 09:00:00 -040051:45falsefull202151512021Oral Argument: Whole Woman's Health v. Jackson | Case No. 21-463 | Date Argued: 11/1/2021 | Date Decided: 12/10/2021Whole Woman's Health v. Jackson | Case No. 21-463 | Date Argued: 11/1/2021 | Date Decided: 12/10/2021

     Background: The State of Texas adopted a law banning abortions at approximately six weeks of pregnancy, in clear violation of this Court's precedent. Rather than forthrightly defending the constitutionality of the law, or even the propriety of a state court enforcement proceeding, Texas crafted an unprecedented enforcement scheme that was designed to evade judicial review and shield this unconstitutional statute from the normal mechanisms by which state officials would otherwise have to enforce it. This state of affairs should not be tolerated in our federal system, especially where the rights at issue are explicitly protected by the Federal Constitution.

     Question Presented: Whether a State can insulate from federal-court review a law that prohibits the exercise of a constitutional right by delegating to the general public the authority to enforce that prohibition through civil actions.

     Holding: The order of the District Court is affirmed in part and reversed in part, and the case is remanded. ___F. Supp. 3d ___, affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. JUSTICE GORSUCH announced the judgment of the Court, and delivered the opinion of the Court except as to Part II–C, concluding that a pre-enforcement challenge to S. B. 8 under the Federal Constitution may proceed past the motion to dismiss stage against certain of the named defendants but not others.

     Result: Adjudged to be AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, and case REMANDED.

     Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Gorsuch, announced the judgment of the Court and delivered the opinion of the Court except as to Part IIâC. Justices Alito, Kavanaugh and Barrett joined that opinion in full and Justice Thomas joined except for Part IIâC. Justice Thomas filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part. Chief Justice Roberts filed an opinion concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part, in which Justices Breyer, Sotomayor and Kagan joined. Justice Sotomayor filed an opinion concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part, in which Justices Breyer and Kagan joined.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     For Petitioners: Marc A. Hearron, Washington, D.C. For Respondents: Judd E. Stone, II, Solicitor General, Austin, Tex.

     ]]>Whole Woman's Health v. Jackson | Case No. 21-463 | Date Argued: 11/1/2021 | Date Decided: 12/10/2021

     Background: The State of Texas adopted a law banning abortions at approximately six weeks of pregnancy, in clear violation of this Court's precedent. Rather than forthrightly defending the constitutionality of the law, or even the propriety of a state court enforcement proceeding, Texas crafted an unprecedented enforcement scheme that was designed to evade judicial review and shield this unconstitutional statute from the normal mechanisms by which state officials would otherwise have to enforce it. This state of affairs should not be tolerated in our federal system, especially where the rights at issue are explicitly protected by the Federal Constitution.

     Question Presented: Whether a State can insulate from federal-court review a law that prohibits the exercise of a constitutional right by delegating to the general public the authority to enforce that prohibition through civil actions.

     Holding: The order of the District Court is affirmed in part and reversed in part, and the case is remanded. ___F. Supp. 3d ___, affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. JUSTICE GORSUCH announced the judgment of the Court, and delivered the opinion of the Court except as to Part II–C, concluding that a pre-enforcement challenge to S. B. 8 under the Federal Constitution may proceed past the motion to dismiss stage against certain of the named defendants but not others.

     Result: Adjudged to be AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, and case REMANDED.

     Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Gorsuch, announced the judgment of the Court and delivered the opinion of the Court except as to Part IIâC. Justices Alito, Kavanaugh and Barrett joined that opinion in full and Justice Thomas joined except for Part IIâC. Justice Thomas filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part. Chief Justice Roberts filed an opinion concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part, in which Justices Breyer, Sotomayor and Kagan joined. Justice Sotomayor filed an opinion concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part, in which Justices Breyer and Kagan joined.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     For Petitioners: Marc A. Hearron, Washington, D.C. For Respondents: Judd E. Stone, II, Solicitor General, Austin, Tex.

     ]]>19f2cefe-150a-479f-ab86-f77052aa2bccMon, 01 Nov 2021 09:00:00 -040001:23:10falsefull202154542021Oral Argument: United States v. Texas | Case No. 21-588 | Date Argued: 11/1/2021 | Date Decided: 12/10/2021United States v. Texas | Case No. 21-588 | Date Argued: 11/1/2021 | Date Decided: 12/10/2021

     Question Presented: THE APPLICATION IS TREATED AS A PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI BEFORE JUDGMENT, AND THE PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI BEFORE JUDGMENT IS GRANTED, LIMITED TO THE FOLLOWING QUESTION: MAY THE UNITED STATES BRING SUIT IN FEDERAL COURT AND OBTAIN INJUNCTIVE OR DECLARATORY RELIEF AGAINST THE STATE, STATE COURT JUDGES, STATE COURT CLERKS, OTHER STATE OFFICIALS, OR ALL PRIVATE PARTIES TO PROHIBIT S.B. 8 FROM BEING ENFORCED.

     Holding: Dismissed as Improvidently Granted

     Result: Voting information not found

     Voting Breakdown: ?-?. Voting breakdown not found

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     For Petitioner: Elizabeth B. Prelogar, Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. For state Respondent: Judd E. Stone, II, Solicitor General, Austin, Tex. For private Respondents: Jonathan F. Mitchell, Austin, Tex.

     ]]>United States v. Texas | Case No. 21-588 | Date Argued: 11/1/2021 | Date Decided: 12/10/2021

     Question Presented: THE APPLICATION IS TREATED AS A PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI BEFORE JUDGMENT, AND THE PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI BEFORE JUDGMENT IS GRANTED, LIMITED TO THE FOLLOWING QUESTION: MAY THE UNITED STATES BRING SUIT IN FEDERAL COURT AND OBTAIN INJUNCTIVE OR DECLARATORY RELIEF AGAINST THE STATE, STATE COURT JUDGES, STATE COURT CLERKS, OTHER STATE OFFICIALS, OR ALL PRIVATE PARTIES TO PROHIBIT S.B. 8 FROM BEING ENFORCED.

     Holding: Dismissed as Improvidently Granted

     Result: Voting information not found

     Voting Breakdown: ?-?. Voting breakdown not found

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     For Petitioner: Elizabeth B. Prelogar, Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. For state Respondent: Judd E. Stone, II, Solicitor General, Austin, Tex. For private Respondents: Jonathan F. Mitchell, Austin, Tex.

     ]]>31d1e37d-5cf8-4849-bb26-fcf525ad1d5fMon, 01 Nov 2021 09:00:00 -040001:27:35falsefull202153532021Oral Argument: United States v. Tsarnaev | Case No. 20-443 | Date Argued: 10/13/2021 | Date Decided: 3/4/2022United States v. Tsarnaev | Case No. 20-443 | Date Argued: 10/13/2021 | Date Decided: 3/4/2022

     Question Presented: Whether the court of appeals erred in concluding that respondent's capital sentences must be vacated on the ground that the district court, during its 21-day voir dire, did not ask each prospective juror for a specific accounting of the pretrial media coverage that he or she had read, heard, or seen about respondent's case. Whether the district court committed reversible error at the penalty phase of respondent's trial by excluding evidence that respondent's older brother was allegedly involved in different crimes two years before the offenses for which respondent was convicted.

     Holding: The Court of Appeals improperly vacated Dzhokhar’s capital sentences.

     Result: Judgment REVERSED.

     Voting Breakdown: 6-1. Justice Thomas delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Alito, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh and Barrett joined. Justice Barrett filed a concurring opinion, in which Justice Gorsuch joined. Justice Breyer filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Kagan joined and in which Justice Sotomayor joined except as to Part IIâC.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     For Petitioner: Eric J. Feigin, Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. For Respondent: Ginger D. Anders, Washington, D.C.

     ]]>United States v. Tsarnaev | Case No. 20-443 | Date Argued: 10/13/2021 | Date Decided: 3/4/2022

     Question Presented: Whether the court of appeals erred in concluding that respondent's capital sentences must be vacated on the ground that the district court, during its 21-day voir dire, did not ask each prospective juror for a specific accounting of the pretrial media coverage that he or she had read, heard, or seen about respondent's case. Whether the district court committed reversible error at the penalty phase of respondent's trial by excluding evidence that respondent's older brother was allegedly involved in different crimes two years before the offenses for which respondent was convicted.

     Holding: The Court of Appeals improperly vacated Dzhokhar’s capital sentences.

     Result: Judgment REVERSED.

     Voting Breakdown: 6-1. Justice Thomas delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Alito, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh and Barrett joined. Justice Barrett filed a concurring opinion, in which Justice Gorsuch joined. Justice Breyer filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Kagan joined and in which Justice Sotomayor joined except as to Part IIâC.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     For Petitioner: Eric J. Feigin, Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. For Respondent: Ginger D. Anders, Washington, D.C.

     ]]>a76a58d3-c309-4544-8b7e-ab4f61427d5cWed, 13 Oct 2021 09:00:00 -040001:34:35falsefull202156562021Oral Argument: Thompson v. Clark | Case No. 20-659 | Date Argued: 10/12/2021 | Date Decided: 4/4/2022Thompson v. Clark | Case No. 20-659 | Date Argued: 10/12/2021 | Date Decided: 4/4/2022

     Question Presented: I. Whether the rule that a plaintiff must await favorable termination before bringing a Section 1983 action alleging unreasonable seizure pursuant to legal process requires the plaintiff to show that the criminal proceeding against him has "formally ended in a manner not inconsistent with his innocence," as the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 11th Circuit decided in Laskar v. Hurd, 972 F.3d 1278 (11th Cir. 2020); or that the proceeding "ended in a manner that affirmatively indicates his innocence," as the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 2nd Circuit decided in Lanning v. City of Glens Falls, 908 F.3d 19 (2d Cir. 2018); or that the proceeding terminated without a conviction, as the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 10th Circuit and several other circuits have held. II. Whether, if the Supreme Court adopts the "affirmative indication of innocence" standard, the withdrawal of criminal charges suffices to satisfy that rule.

     Holding: To demonstrate a favorable termination of a criminal prosecution for purposes of the Fourth Amendment claim under §1983 for malicious prosecution, a plaintiff need not show that the criminal prosecution ended with some affirmative indication of innocence. A plaintiff need only show that his prosecution ended without a conviction. Thompson has satisfied that requirement here.

     Result: Judgment REVERSED and case REMANDED.

     Voting Breakdown: 6-3. Justice Kavanaugh delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Breyer, Sotomayor, Kagan and Barrett joined. Justice Alito filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Thomas and Gorsuch joined.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     For Petitioner: Amir H. Ali, Washington, D.C.; and Jonathan Y. Ellis, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. (for United States, as amicus curiae.) For Respondents: John D. Moore, New York, N.Y.

     ]]>Thompson v. Clark | Case No. 20-659 | Date Argued: 10/12/2021 | Date Decided: 4/4/2022

     Question Presented: I. Whether the rule that a plaintiff must await favorable termination before bringing a Section 1983 action alleging unreasonable seizure pursuant to legal process requires the plaintiff to show that the criminal proceeding against him has "formally ended in a manner not inconsistent with his innocence," as the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 11th Circuit decided in Laskar v. Hurd, 972 F.3d 1278 (11th Cir. 2020); or that the proceeding "ended in a manner that affirmatively indicates his innocence," as the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 2nd Circuit decided in Lanning v. City of Glens Falls, 908 F.3d 19 (2d Cir. 2018); or that the proceeding terminated without a conviction, as the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 10th Circuit and several other circuits have held. II. Whether, if the Supreme Court adopts the "affirmative indication of innocence" standard, the withdrawal of criminal charges suffices to satisfy that rule.

     Holding: To demonstrate a favorable termination of a criminal prosecution for purposes of the Fourth Amendment claim under §1983 for malicious prosecution, a plaintiff need not show that the criminal prosecution ended with some affirmative indication of innocence. A plaintiff need only show that his prosecution ended without a conviction. Thompson has satisfied that requirement here.

     Result: Judgment REVERSED and case REMANDED.

     Voting Breakdown: 6-3. Justice Kavanaugh delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Breyer, Sotomayor, Kagan and Barrett joined. Justice Alito filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Thomas and Gorsuch joined.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     For Petitioner: Amir H. Ali, Washington, D.C.; and Jonathan Y. Ellis, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. (for United States, as amicus curiae.) For Respondents: John D. Moore, New York, N.Y.

     ]]>f4a8be56-0024-4776-9a9b-26d4afc979f2Tue, 12 Oct 2021 09:00:00 -040001:29:42falsefull202157572021Oral Argument: United States v. Zubaydah | Case No. 20-827 | Date Argued: 10/6/2021 | Date Decided: 3/3/2022United States v. Zubaydah | Case No. 20-827 | Date Argued: 10/6/2021 | Date Decided: 3/3/2022

     Question Presented: Whether the court of appeals erred when it rejected the United States' assertion of the state-secrets privilege based on the court's own assessment of potential harm to the national security, and required discovery to proceed further under 28 U.S.C. 1782(a) against former Central Intelligence Agency contractors on matters concerning alleged clandestine CIA activities.

     Holding: The judgment is reversed, and the case is remanded. 938 F. 3d 1123, reversed and remanded. JUSTICE BREYER delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to all but Parts II–B–2 and III, concluding that, in the context of Zubaydah’s §1782 discovery application, the Court of Appeals erred in holding that the state secrets privilege did not apply to information that could confirm or deny the existence of a CIA detention site in Poland.

     Result: Judgment REVERSED and case REMANDED.

     Voting Breakdown: 4-1. Justice Breyer delivered the opinion of the Court, except as to Parts II-B-2 and III. Chief Justice Roberts joined that opinion in full, Justices Kavanaugh and Barrett joined as to all but Part II-B-2, Justice Kagan joined as to all but Parts III and IV and the judgment of dismissal and Justices Thomas and Alito joined Part IV. Justice Thomas filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, in which Justice Alito joined. Justice Kavanaugh filed an opinion concurring in part, in which Justice Barrett joined. Justice Kagan filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part. Justice Gorsuch filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Sotomayor joined.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     For Petitioner: Brian H. Fletcher, Acting Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. For Respondents: David F. Klein, Washington, D.C.

     ]]>United States v. Zubaydah | Case No. 20-827 | Date Argued: 10/6/2021 | Date Decided: 3/3/2022

     Question Presented: Whether the court of appeals erred when it rejected the United States' assertion of the state-secrets privilege based on the court's own assessment of potential harm to the national security, and required discovery to proceed further under 28 U.S.C. 1782(a) against former Central Intelligence Agency contractors on matters concerning alleged clandestine CIA activities.

     Holding: The judgment is reversed, and the case is remanded. 938 F. 3d 1123, reversed and remanded. JUSTICE BREYER delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to all but Parts II–B–2 and III, concluding that, in the context of Zubaydah’s §1782 discovery application, the Court of Appeals erred in holding that the state secrets privilege did not apply to information that could confirm or deny the existence of a CIA detention site in Poland.

     Result: Judgment REVERSED and case REMANDED.

     Voting Breakdown: 4-1. Justice Breyer delivered the opinion of the Court, except as to Parts II-B-2 and III. Chief Justice Roberts joined that opinion in full, Justices Kavanaugh and Barrett joined as to all but Part II-B-2, Justice Kagan joined as to all but Parts III and IV and the judgment of dismissal and Justices Thomas and Alito joined Part IV. Justice Thomas filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, in which Justice Alito joined. Justice Kavanaugh filed an opinion concurring in part, in which Justice Barrett joined. Justice Kagan filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part. Justice Gorsuch filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Sotomayor joined.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     For Petitioner: Brian H. Fletcher, Acting Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. For Respondents: David F. Klein, Washington, D.C.

     ]]>8abac360-2f60-4dc5-a815-d1fde45adbd6Wed, 06 Oct 2021 09:00:00 -040001:10:29falsefull202159592021Oral Argument: Brown v. Davenport | Case No. 20-826 | Date Argued: 10/5/2021 | Date Decided: 4/21/2022Brown v. Davenport | Case No. 20-826 | Date Argued: 10/5/2021 | Date Decided: 4/21/2022

     Background: In Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619 (1993), the Court held that the test for determining whether a constitutional error was harmless on habeas review is whether the error had a "substantial and injurious effect or influence" on the verdict. Later, in Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967), the Court held that, in addition to satisfying Brecht, a habeas petitioner must satisfy the requirements of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA). AEDPA provides that federal courts cannot grant habeas relief unless the state court's decision "was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law."

     Question Presented: May a federal habeas court grant relief based solely on its conclusion that the Brecht test is satisfied, or must the court also find that the state court's Chapman application was unreasonable under AEDPA?

     Holding: [NO INFORMATION]

     Result: Judgment REVERSED.

     Voting Breakdown: 6-3. Justice Gorsuch delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Alito, Kavanaugh and Barrett joined. Justice Kagan filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Breyer and Sotomayor joined.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     For Petitioner: Fadwa A. Hammoud, Solicitor General, Lansing, Mich. For Respondent: Tasha Bahal, Boston, Mass.

     ]]>Brown v. Davenport | Case No. 20-826 | Date Argued: 10/5/2021 | Date Decided: 4/21/2022

     Background: In Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619 (1993), the Court held that the test for determining whether a constitutional error was harmless on habeas review is whether the error had a "substantial and injurious effect or influence" on the verdict. Later, in Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967), the Court held that, in addition to satisfying Brecht, a habeas petitioner must satisfy the requirements of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA). AEDPA provides that federal courts cannot grant habeas relief unless the state court's decision "was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law."

     Question Presented: May a federal habeas court grant relief based solely on its conclusion that the Brecht test is satisfied, or must the court also find that the state court's Chapman application was unreasonable under AEDPA?

     Holding: [NO INFORMATION]

     Result: Judgment REVERSED.

     Voting Breakdown: 6-3. Justice Gorsuch delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Alito, Kavanaugh and Barrett joined. Justice Kagan filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Breyer and Sotomayor joined.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     For Petitioner: Fadwa A. Hammoud, Solicitor General, Lansing, Mich. For Respondent: Tasha Bahal, Boston, Mass.

     ]]>1ea06361-645a-43bd-a64b-7836ff2f1e8dTue, 05 Oct 2021 09:00:00 -040051:57falsefull202161612021Oral Argument: Hemphill v. New York | Case No. 20-637 | Date Argued: 10/5/2021 | Date Decided: 1/20/2022Hemphill v. New York | Case No. 20-637 | Date Argued: 10/5/2021 | Date Decided: 1/20/2022

     Background: A litigant's argumentation or introduction of evidence at trial is often deemed to "open the door" to the admission of responsive evidence that would otherwise be barred by the rules of evidence. In People v. Reid, the New York Court of Appeals announced an "open door" rule of constitutional dimension, separate and apart from the traditional evidentiary rule. Under this rule, a criminal defendant who, in the court's view, "opened the door" to responsive evidence, may thereby forfeit hearsay and Confrontation Clause objections that would otherwise preclude admission of the responsive evidence. The New York court has applied that rule even where it rests on an accused's truthful trial arguments or evidence; the accused has not engaged in a course of conduct suggesting that the right to object to responsive evidence would be abused; nor, indeed, the accused has done anything that could be construed as a knowing waiver of constitutional protections.

     Question Presented: Whether, or under what circumstances, a criminal defendant who opens the door to responsive evidence also forfeits his right to exclude evidence otherwise barred by the Confrontation Clause.

     Holding: The trial court’s admission of the transcript of Morris’ plea allocution over Hemphill’s objection violated Hemphill’s Sixth Amendment right to confront the witnesses against him.

     Result: Judgment REVERSED and case REMANDED.

     Voting Breakdown: 8-1. Justice Sotomayor delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Breyer, Alito, Kagan, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh and Barrett joined. Justice Alito filed a concurring opinion, in which Justice Kavanaugh joined. Justice Thomas filed a dissenting opinion.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     For Petitioner: Jeffrey L. Fisher, Stanford, Cal. For Respondent: Gina Mignola, Assistant District Attorney, Bronx, N.Y.

     ]]>Hemphill v. New York | Case No. 20-637 | Date Argued: 10/5/2021 | Date Decided: 1/20/2022

     Background: A litigant's argumentation or introduction of evidence at trial is often deemed to "open the door" to the admission of responsive evidence that would otherwise be barred by the rules of evidence. In People v. Reid, the New York Court of Appeals announced an "open door" rule of constitutional dimension, separate and apart from the traditional evidentiary rule. Under this rule, a criminal defendant who, in the court's view, "opened the door" to responsive evidence, may thereby forfeit hearsay and Confrontation Clause objections that would otherwise preclude admission of the responsive evidence. The New York court has applied that rule even where it rests on an accused's truthful trial arguments or evidence; the accused has not engaged in a course of conduct suggesting that the right to object to responsive evidence would be abused; nor, indeed, the accused has done anything that could be construed as a knowing waiver of constitutional protections.

     Question Presented: Whether, or under what circumstances, a criminal defendant who opens the door to responsive evidence also forfeits his right to exclude evidence otherwise barred by the Confrontation Clause.

     Holding: The trial court’s admission of the transcript of Morris’ plea allocution over Hemphill’s objection violated Hemphill’s Sixth Amendment right to confront the witnesses against him.

     Result: Judgment REVERSED and case REMANDED.

     Voting Breakdown: 8-1. Justice Sotomayor delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Breyer, Alito, Kagan, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh and Barrett joined. Justice Alito filed a concurring opinion, in which Justice Kavanaugh joined. Justice Thomas filed a dissenting opinion.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     For Petitioner: Jeffrey L. Fisher, Stanford, Cal. For Respondent: Gina Mignola, Assistant District Attorney, Bronx, N.Y.

     ]]>ab0684fa-25b3-4914-8e65-9cf213cfbcf9Tue, 05 Oct 2021 09:00:00 -040001:10:17falsefull202160602021Oral Argument: Wooden v. United States | Case No. 20-5279 | Date Argued: 10/4/2021 | Date Decided: 3/7/2022Wooden v. United States | Case No. 20-5279 | Date Argued: 10/4/2021 | Date Decided: 3/7/2022

     Question Presented: 1. Did the warrantless entry and search of petitioner's home violate his Fourth Amendment right to be free from illegal search and seizure? 2. Were petitioner Wooden's prior convictions for ten burglaries committed during a single criminal episode at a storage facility "committed on occasions different from one another" under the Armed Career Criminal Act ("ACCA")?

     Holding: Wooden’s ten burglary offenses arising from a single criminal episode did not occur on different “occasions” and thus count as only one prior conviction for purposes of ACCA.

     Result: Judgment REVERSED.

     Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Kagan delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Breyer, Sotomayor and Kavanaugh joined and in which Justices Thomas, Alito and Barrett joined as to all but Part IIâB. Justice Sotomayor filed a concurring opinion. Justice Kavanaugh filed a concurring opinion. Justice Barrett filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, in which Justice Thomas joined. Justice Gorsuch filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which Justice Sotomayor joined as to Parts II, III and IV.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     For Petitioner: Allon Kedem, Washington, D.C. For Respondent: Erica L. Ross, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.

     ]]>Wooden v. United States | Case No. 20-5279 | Date Argued: 10/4/2021 | Date Decided: 3/7/2022

     Question Presented: 1. Did the warrantless entry and search of petitioner's home violate his Fourth Amendment right to be free from illegal search and seizure? 2. Were petitioner Wooden's prior convictions for ten burglaries committed during a single criminal episode at a storage facility "committed on occasions different from one another" under the Armed Career Criminal Act ("ACCA")?

     Holding: Wooden’s ten burglary offenses arising from a single criminal episode did not occur on different “occasions” and thus count as only one prior conviction for purposes of ACCA.

     Result: Judgment REVERSED.

     Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Kagan delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Breyer, Sotomayor and Kavanaugh joined and in which Justices Thomas, Alito and Barrett joined as to all but Part IIâB. Justice Sotomayor filed a concurring opinion. Justice Kavanaugh filed a concurring opinion. Justice Barrett filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, in which Justice Thomas joined. Justice Gorsuch filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which Justice Sotomayor joined as to Parts II, III and IV.

     Link to Opinion: Here.

     Oral Advocates:

     For Petitioner: Allon Kedem, Washington, D.C. For Respondent: Erica L. Ross, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.

     ]]>09706fa1-2494-41bd-bcc9-e0a7826c8d31Mon, 04 Oct 2021 09:00:00 -040001:04:52falsefull202162622021