In this case, an airline used its monopoly power to compel an agent to agree to give up strong claims which it had for commission payments that were due. The agent sought to have the agreement set aside on the grounds of duress. In ruling against the agent, the Supreme Court examined the circumstances where an agreement, which is entered into because of a threat to cause harm by forceful but lawful means, can be set aside and where it cannot be.

Other cases referred to:

• The Universe Sentinel [1983] AC 366
• Kaufman v Gerson [1904] 1 KB 591
• Borrelli v Ting [2010] Bus LR 1718
• The Cenk [2012] 2 All ER (Comm) 855
• CTN Cash and Carry v Gallaher Ltd. [1994] 4 All ER 714

[2020] 1 BCLC 524 (in which Jeremy Callman appeared for the successful

Defendants) which tackled questions of what dissolution of an 1890 Act

partnership means and what brings about a dissolution. The Judge looked at the

differences between ‘general dissolution’ and ‘technical dissolution’, how the

word ‘dissolution’ is used in different ways and whether the transfer of a

substantial part of a partnership business triggers a dissolution. He also

explored the interaction between section 1 of the Partnership Act 1890

(defining partnership) on the one hand, and dissolution on the other hand. He

helpfully unpacked the distinctions to be drawn between how easy it is to form

a partnership, as compared to the hurdles that need to be jumped to persuade a

court that the partners have agreed to bring their partnership to an end. A

useful case in the area of dissolution, where there is little decided case law.

This podcast explains the facts of the case and the Judge’s decision.

One of the executors had been unreasonable in his conduct regarding relatively minor issues regarding the estate, including the reimbursement of approximately £2,000 to one of the beneficiaries. This had already led to significant conflicts, and all the other beneficiaries wanted his removal. There had in addition been a breakdown of relations between the parties. The only option was to appoint an independent administrator. 

The case offers useful guidance as to the circumstances in which the court will order removal under s. 50 of the Administration of Justice Act 1985, and its relation to an order for passing over under s. 116 of the Senior Courts Act 1981.

between the equitable doctrine of proprietary estoppel and the statutory

requirement that agreements for the sale of land must be in signed writing. In

Howe v Gossop, Snowden J considered the question of whether a proprietary

estoppel asserted in defence of a claim of possession of land allegedly

transferred by oral contract can be defeated by the failure to comply with the

requirements of the Law of Property (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1989 s.2 for

a contract for the sale of land. He held that the defendants had not asserted

the estoppel in order to enforce an agreement rendered unenforceable by s.2,

but had argued that the estoppel should be satisfied by an irrevocable licence

in their favour: and thus their defence was not barred by s.2. The judgment

also contains a useful review and discussion of the leading authorities on this

issue.

David Schmitz explores these differences as revealed in the recent case of Edwards (Trustee in Bankruptcy of Jagdev Singh Wasu) v Aurora Leasing Ltd. and Howard deWalden Estates Ltd. [2021] EWHC 96 (Ch) ICC Judge Prentis